Supporting Lifelong Learning

Chapter 2
11
Supporting Lifelong Learning
Volume 1
011
This book brings together a number of texts from Europe, North America
11 and Australia to illustrate, explore and challenge some of the ideas and
assumptions which underpin notions of lifelong learning. The chapters trace
the transition from notions of learning as a psychological or cognitive
phenomenon occurring in the minds of individual learners, towards more
social and situated accounts which emphasize the role of culture and social
participation. These different accounts of learning have far reaching impli-
cations for all those involved.
0111 Supporting Lifelong Learning, Volume 1: Perspectives on learning argues that the
‘learning’ aspect of ‘lifelong learning’ has received surprisingly little attention
in discussions of how to promote more effective and inclusive approaches. In
examining this issue more closely it will appeal to those who are involved
in supporting learners in the workplace, the classroom or the community.
It will also appeal to postgraduate and doctorate level students with an
interest in post-school education and training.
This book is one of three Readers prepared for the Open University MA
Course: E845 Supporting Lifelong Learning. The three separate volumes pro-
0111 vide an in-depth examination of lifelong learning from the perspectives of
teaching and learning, organizing learning and policy making. They bring
together for the first time theories from a diverse range of disciplines that
are now central to our understanding of lifelong learning and provide a new
and distinctive contribution to the field.
Roger Harrison is a Lecturer in Education at The Open University.

Fiona Reeve is a Lecturer in Lifelong Learning at The Open University.
Ann Hanson is Staff Tutor in Education at The Open University in the
0111 North West.
Julia Clarke is a Research Fellow at The Open University.
4111
ii Supporting lifelong learning, volume I
Supporting Lifelong Learning, Volume 1:

Perspectives on learning
The companion volumes in this series are:
Supporting Lifelong Learning, Volume 2: Organizing learning
Edited by Fiona Reeve, Marion Cartwright and Richard Edwards
Supporting Lifelong Learning, Volume 3: Making policy work
Edited by Richard Edwards, Nod Miller, Nick Small and Alan Tait
All of these Readers are part of a course: Supporting Lifelong Learning (E845), that is
itself part of the Open University Masters Programme in Education.
The Open University Masters Programme in Education
The Open University Masters Programme in Education is now firmly established as
the most popular postgraduate degree for education professionals in Europe, with over
3,000 students registering each year. The Masters Programme in Education is designed
particularly for those with experience of teaching, the advisory service, educational
administration or allied fields.
Structure of the Masters Programme in Education
The Masters Programme is a modular degree, and students are, therefore, free to select
from the programme which best fits in with their interests and professional goals.
Specialist lines in management, applied linguistics and lifelong learning are also avail-
able. Study within the Open University’s Advanced Diploma can also be counted
towards a Masters Degree, and successful study within the Masters Programme entitles
students to apply for entry into the Open University Doctorate in Education programme.
OU-Supported Open Learning
The Masters Programme in Education provides great flexibility. Students study at their
own pace, in their own time, anywhere in the European Union. They receive specially
prepared study materials, supported by tutorials, thus offering the chance to work with
other students.
The Doctorate in Education
The Doctorate in Education is a part-time doctoral degree, combining taught courses,
research methods and a dissertation designed to meet the needs of professionals in
education and related areas who are seeking to extend and deepen their knowledge
and understanding of contemporary educational issues. The Doctorate in Education
builds upon successful study within the Open University Masters Programme in
Education.
How to apply
If you would like to register for this programme, or simply find out more information
about available courses, please write for the Professional Development in Education
prospectus to the Call Centre, PO Box 724, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton
Keynes, MK7 6ZW, UK (Telephone 0 (0 44) 1908 653231). Details can also be viewed
on our web page http://www.open.ac.uk
Roger Harrison, Fiona Reeve, Ann Hanson and Julia Clarke iii
11
Supporting Lifelong
Learning
Volume 1
011
11 Perspectives on learning
0111 Edited by
Roger Harrison, Fiona Reeve,
Ann Hanson and Julia Clarke
0111
0111
4111 London and New York

First published 2002 by RoutledgeFalmer
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Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
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RoutledgeFalmer is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
© 2002 Compilation, original and editorial material,
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All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted
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Roger Harrison, Fiona Reeve, Ann Hanson and Julia Clarke v
11
Contents
011
11 List of illustrations vii

Acknowledgements ix
Introduction: perspectives on learning 1

ROGER HARRISON, FIONA REEVE, ANN HANSON AND
JULIA CLARKE
0111
1 Learning and adult education 8
ALAN ROGERS
2 The interpersonal relationship in the facilitation of learning 25

CARL R. ROGERS
3 From Technical Rationality to reflection-in-action 40

DONALD SCHÖN
0111 4 Deconstructing domestication: women’s experience and

the goals of critical pedagogy 62
JULIA CLARKE
5 Self and experience in adult learning 78

ROBIN USHER, IAN BRYANT AND RENNIE JOHNSTON
6 Promoting reflection in professional courses: the

challenge of context 91
0111 DAVID BOUD AND DAVID WALKER
7 Legitimate peripheral participation in communities of

practice 111
4111 JEAN LAVE AND ETIENNE WENGER
vi Contents
8 Learning from other people at work 127

MICHAEL ERAUT, JANE ALDERTON, GERALD COLE AND
PETER SENKER
9 Beyond the institution of apprenticeship: towards a

social theory of learning as the production of
knowledge 146
DAVID GUILE AND MICHAEL YOUNG
10 The technology of learning in a social world 163

TERRY MAYES
11 Sustainable literacies and the ecology of lifelong

learning 176
MARY HAMILTON
12 Academic writing in new and emergent discipline areas 188

MIKE BAYNHAM
13 Pedagogies for lifelong learning: building bridges or

building walls? 203
MIRIAM ZUKAS AND JANICE MALCOLM
Index 219
Roger Harrison, Fiona Reeve, Ann Hanson and Julia Clarke vii
11
Illustrations
011
11 Figures
1.1 Learning theories 9

1.2 Bloom and Gagné: hierarchies of learning 11
1.3a The learning cycle 17
1.3b The learning cycle and the search for new knowledge 17
1.3c The learning cycle and conceptualisation 19
0111 1.3d The learning cycle and decision making 19
1.4 Preferred learning styles 21
1.5 The learning episode and the implications for the teacher of
adults 23
13.1 Dimensions of pedagogic identity 211
Table
12.1 The disciplinary politics of nursing 192
0111
0111
4111
Roger Harrison, Fiona Reeve, Ann Hanson and Julia Clarke ix
11
Acknowledgements
011
11
We are indebted to the following for allowing us to make use of copyright
material:
Chapter 1: Rogers, A. (1996) ‘Learning and adult education’, in A. Rogers

Teaching Adults. Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press.
0111 Reproduced by permission of Open University Press.
Chapter 2: Rogers, C. (1967) ‘The interpersonal relationships in the facili-

tation of learning’, in R. Leeper (ed.) Humanizing Education. Alexandria,
VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. Copyright
© ASCD. Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
Chapter 3: Schön, D. (1983) ‘From technical rationality to reflection-in-

action’, in The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. New
York: Basic Books. Copyright © 1983 by Basic Books, Inc. Reprinted by
0111 permission of Basic Books, a member of Perseus Books, L.L.C. Territory
granted: World excluding the UK and Commonwealth. UK and British
Commonwealth rights granted by Ashgate Publishing Ltd © Schon, D.
(1991) The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. Avebury:
Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Chapter 4: Clarke, J. ‘Deconstructing domestication: women’s experience

and the goals of critical pedagogy’. Newly commissioned work.
Chapter 5: Usher, R., Bryant, I. and Johnston, R. (1997) ‘Reconfiguring the

0111 “other”: self and experience in adult learning’, in R. Usher, I. Bryant and
R. Johnston, Learning Beyond the Limits: Adult Education and the Postmodern
Challenge. London and New York: Routledge. Reproduced by permission of
Taylor & Francis Ltd.
4111
x Acknowledgements
Chapter 6: Boud, D. and Walker, D. (1998) ‘Promoting reflection in profes-

sional courses: the challenge of context’, Studies in Higher Education, 23(2):
191–206. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd.
Chapter 7: Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991) ‘Legitimate peripheral participa-

tion in communities of practice’, in J. Lave and E. Wenger, Situated Learning.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reproduced by permission of
Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 8: Eraut, M., Alderton, J., Cole, G. and Senker, P. (1998) ‘Learning
from other people at work’, in F. Coffield (ed.) Learning at Work. Bristol:
The Policy Press. Reproduced by permission of The Policy Press.
Chapter 9: Guile, D. and Young, M. (1999) ‘Beyond the institution of appren-

ticeship: towards a social theory of learning as the production of knowledge’,
in P. Ainley and H. Rainbird (eds) Apprenticeship: Towards a New Paradigm
of Learning. London: Kogan Page. Reproduced by permission of Kogan Page.
Chapter 10: Mayes, T. ‘The technology of learning in a social world’. Newly

commissioned work.
Chapter 11: Hamilton, M. (2000) ‘Sustainable literacies and the ecology of

lifelong learning’, originally prepared as a working paper for the Global
Colloquium on Supporting Lifelong Learning (online). Milton Keynes:
The Open University. Available at http://www.open.ac.uk/lifelong-learning
Reproduced by permission of The Open University.
Chapter 12: Baynham, M. (2000) ‘Academic writing in new and emergent

discipline areas’, in M. R. Lea and B. Stierer (eds) Student Writing in Higher
Education. Buckingham and Philadelphia: SRHE and Open University Press.
Reproduced by permission of Open University Press.
Chapter 13: Zukas, M. and Malcolm, J. (2000) ‘Pedagogies for lifelong learn-
ing: building bridges or building walls?’, originally prepared as a working paper
for the Global Colloquium on Supporting Lifelong Learning (online). Milton
Keynes: The Open University. Available at http://www.open.ac.uk/lifelong-
learning. Reproduced by permission of The Open University.
While the publishers have made every effort to contact copyright holders of
the material used in this volume, they would be grateful to hear from any
they were unable to contact.
Roger Harrison, Fiona Reeve, Ann Hanson and Julia Clarke 1
11
Introduction
Perspectives on learning
Roger Harrison, Fiona Reeve, Ann Hanson
and Julia Clarke
011
11 In recent times we have seen a loosening of the boundaries around concepts

of adult learning, symbolized by contemporary discourses of ‘lifelong learn-
ing’. Learning is now seen as a key feature of participation in social and
economic life. Learning as a preparation for life has been displaced by
learning as an essential strategy for successful negotiation of the life course,
as the conditions in which we live and work are subject to ever more rapid
change. Traditional distinctions between formal and informal learning, or
0111 between different institutional contexts, become less significant since learn-
ing might occur in the workplace, the home, the car, the internet cafe, as
well as the college. We learn not only for the purposes of gaining formal
qualifications but also to obtain and keep employment, develop expertise in
a leisure activity, deal with changes in relationships, or manage personal
finances. We learn from colleagues, friends, parents and children. We learn
through mentoring, television and books, as well as various forms of ‘web-
ucation’ and ‘e-learning’. There seems to be no aspect of human experience
that does not lend itself to appropriation as a pedagogical project; a situa-
tion that has raised questions for some about the nature and intent of the
0111 lifelong learning project as a whole (Alheit, 1998). In contemporary condi-
tions learning becomes not only ‘lifelong’, suggesting learning as relevant
throughout the life course, but also ‘life-wide’, suggesting learning as an
essential aspect of our whole life experience, not just that which we think
of as ‘education’. Whilst this adds to the difficulty of making generaliza-
tions about learning, it also serves to stimulate interest in wider understand-
ings of the processes of learning. These wider understandings extend the
reach of ‘learning’ beyond the institutional settings and formats of ‘educa-
tion’ and constitute a serious challenge to many established ideas of how,
why, where and with whom learning might occur.
0111 It is perhaps surprising then that whilst notions of lifelong learning have
achieved a high profile within discourses of adult education and training,
The Introduction was written especially for this volume.

4111
2 Supporting lifelong learning: perspectives on learning
the learning aspect of lifelong learning has received rather less attention.
When we hear or read about lifelong learning it is usually as part of an
injunction to learn more, and more efficiently, in the cause of realizing our
personal potential and securing national economic competitiveness. Atten-
tion is thus directed towards the alleged outcomes of learning, rather than
the processes through which it might be achieved. Attention is also directed
towards the ‘lifelong’ aspects of lifelong learning, with the implication that
there is no escape and no hiding place from the requirement to learn. Such
descriptive and prescriptive discourses have been effective in rallying a wide
constituency behind the idea that lifelong learning is not only imperative
but also a ‘good thing’, whilst eliding the possibility of more critical and
analytical engagement with what it actually means. In particular these
discourses are remarkable in the extent to which they pass over questions
about the nature, processes or purposes of learning.
This book brings together a number of texts from Europe, North America
and Australia to illustrate, explore and challenge some of the ideas and
assumptions that underpin notions of learning within current discourses of
lifelong learning. Some of them will be familiar to those involved in sup-
porting learners, in fact they might well constitute the theoretical touchstone
of their practices. The work of Carl Rogers, for example, is foundational to
the learner-centred rhetoric, if not always the practice, of many formal and
informal initiatives in lifelong learning currently being developed in the UK
and elsewhere. Similarly Donald Schön has become a key reference point for
those who see their professional identity in terms of the ‘reflective practi-
tioner’ and who understand professional knowledge as constituted through
‘reflective practice’. These seminal texts still provide powerful and persuasive
accounts of learning, accounts that have had far-reaching effects on peda-
gogic practices and assumptions about learner identity and the construction
of knowledge. Indeed, a central theme running through this book is that ideas
about learning are closely implicated in shaping ideas about pedagogy, iden-
tity and knowledge construction. For example, a perspective that views the
learning process as a transmission from teacher to learner would tend to
emphasize the efficient organization of knowledge into manageable chunks
and the skills of the teacher in communicating these to learners. Here the
role of the learner is simply to annex the knowledge of others, rather than to
critique this knowledge or adapt it to their own situation. In contrast a view
of learning as occurring through reflection on experience would emphasize
the central role of the learner in constructing new knowledge through pro-
cessing the raw material of experience, and the skills of the teacher in facil-
itating this process. Here the role of the learner is pivotal both to the learning
process and to the definition of what counts as knowledge. Research by Jean
Lave and Etienne Wenger indicates a very different view of learning as pri-
marily a social rather than an individual activity; as something that occurs
with or without the existence of teachers and curricula; with knowledge being
11 generated through co-participation in ‘communities of practice’. Here the

focus of interest shifts from the minds of individual learners to the social and
cultural context in which they are operating. Learner identity can no longer
be understood in terms of the freewheeling, autonomous and self-directed
individual, but as relational, context dependent and embedded in social
practices. Further possibilities are introduced within a New Literacy Studies
perspective, discussed in this volume by Mary Hamilton, where the focus
of interest is not on pedagogy, but on the workings of power in culture
and politics. Here the questions that come into focus are about which forms
011 of learning, and which learners, are privileged and which are marginalized
in contemporary discourses of lifelong learning. Each of these perspectives is
examined within the chapters in this book.
11 The above might suggest the possibility of clear delineation between
theories of learning; of defining and positioning each in relation to the others
so that their similarities and differences can be clearly seen. In fact, as Alan
Rogers (Chapter 1) indicates, such clear-cut boundaries are hard to draw.
Lifelong learning is a large and complex field, traversed by many discipli-
nary traditions, ranging from psychology to anthropology, social theory,
linguistics, feminism and post-structuralism. It is a field characterized by
0111 shifting discourses of what we mean by learners and learning, and pedagog-
ical practices characterized by hybridity and fluidity rather than purity or
constancy. There is a similar danger inherent in presenting learning theor-
ies within a linear or developmental framework. The sequence of chapters
in this book might suggest a clear progression, with each new theory posi-
tioned as a corrective to previous misconceptions. But to present such a
progressive narrative would be misleading. It would, for example, imply some
degree of consensus about the direction in which we might locate ‘progress’.
We would adopt a different stance, viewing theory as a series of under-
standings that are located in, and emerge from, particular historical, social
0111 and cultural settings. From this perspective theories of learning can be viewed
as discourses about learning that bring into focus certain aspects and char-
acteristics of the learning process whilst excluding others from the picture.
Each approach might present itself as progressive, but with different values
and purposes.
At risk of falling into the ‘reductionist, binary, and reificatory logic’
(Fenwick, 2000) of such classificatory systems, we propose the following three
frames of understanding within which the chapters in this collection might
be grouped.
First, learning might be understood as making sense of experience through
0111 a process of reflection. This is a ‘constructivist’ account of learning in which
learners take on the central role as meaning makers as they process, inter-
pret and generalize from their own lived experience. In doing so they create
mental structures or frames of understanding that can then be used in other
4111 situations. Learning is presented as a dynamic process in which the individual
learner is the central actor, and knowledge is seen as temporary, contingent

and constructed by the learner. It is a view of learning and the learner that
the writings of Carl Rogers and Donald Schön have been enormously influ-
ential in promoting and has been enthusiastically taken up by many
practitioners who have sought to privilege the lived experience of the learner
as a counter to more traditional, discipline-based pedagogic practices. In
recent times it has been used as part of a legitimating rationale for those
curriculum innovations such as work-based learning, recording achievement,
the assessment of prior learning, and the use of ICT, which seek to devolve
control of the pace, place and subject of learning to the learner. In doing
so they raise important questions about the role and status of those who
support learning, suggesting activities such as ‘facilitating’, ‘mentoring’ and
‘coaching’ as more appropriate than ‘teaching’.
Critiques of experiential theories of learning have emerged from feminist and
postmodern perspectives, among others. It is this latter that is explored here by
Robin Usher, Ian Bryant and Rennie Johnston. Their analysis draws attention
to the absence of any consideration of the effects of culture and power within
these accounts of learning and representations of the learner. Viewing learners
as individualized, rational processors of experience, detached from history,
sociality and human practices, is revealed as neither natural or neutral, but part
of a culturally and politically located understanding of what it means to be a
person and a learner. Their postmodern analysis introduces a sceptical and
questioning attitude towards taken-for-granted notions of identity, culture and
knowledge, suggesting that they are not as stable, universal or foundational as
they might appear. In a similar spirit of deconstruction, Julia Clarke takes a
feminist perspective towards the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire, illuminating
the way in which the liberation/domestication binary legitimates a gendered
interpretation of emancipation that has the effect of marginalizing the desires
and interests of many women. Using this critical lens, what is presented as a uni-
versal vision of emancipation can be seen as a partial and ideological agenda
that represents the interests of some groups in society while imposing its own
form of oppression on others. These chapters help to illustrate how such criti-
cal perspectives can offer analytical tools for tracing the effects of power in dis-
courses of learning that claim universality and neutrality.
As long-standing advocates of the use of reflection in supporting learning
and professional development, David Boud and David Walker in their chap-
ter expose and critique a range of practices that in their view are in danger
of subverting the more radical and provocative aspects of reflection. In partic-
ular they are wary of the use of reflection in contexts where its potential is
constrained and the messy and challenging processes of critical reflection
are replaced by simplified and technical formulae. Their contribution is a
timely response to critiques of reflective practice that point out that for many
practitioners, contemporary conditions of employment have led to an erosion
of opportunities for exercising professional judgement. The introduction of
11 market forces, performance targets and quality audits into many areas of work
can be seen as decreasing the scope for professional autonomy, and increasing
the tendency towards ‘instrumental’ and ‘recipe following’ forms of reflec-
tion. They also take on board the postmodern critique of reflection as
individualized and universalized processes that pass over the influence of the
broader social, cultural and political context in which they are embedded.
For Boud and Walker an awareness that experience is open to multiple read-
ings, and an understanding that context shapes notions of learning, are
essential components of critical reflection on practice.
011 The chapter by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger introduces our second
frame of understanding. Here the concern with context is taken a stage
further in suggesting that it is the social situation and its attendant social
11 practices that create the possibilities for learning. Rather than occupying the
centre of the frame, heroically creating meaning from personal experience,
the individual learner is relegated to the role of participant in a collective
process of negotiating meaning within a particular context and community
of practice. By suggesting that learning can only be understood as a social
process this perspective displaces the more traditional preoccupations of
learning theory with what goes on in the mind of the individual learner.
0111 Here it is not the learner but the social and cultural context that occupies
the centre of the theoretical frame. Knowledge, skills and understanding are
entirely contingent on the specific context in which they occur and the
interactions through which they are generated. The idea of knowledge as a
stable commodity that belongs to an individual and that can be transmitted,
assessed and accredited is undermined by this account of learning, with
significant implications for current practices of supporting and accrediting
learners. The research reported by Michael Eraut, Jane Alderton, Gerald
Cole and Peter Senker on informal learning in the workplace can be read
as supportive to many aspects of the above account, showing learning as
0111 highly situated and dependent on social relations within the workplace. The
evidence they present constitutes a powerful argument for the significance
of the informal learning gained through social relations with those who might
be colleagues, mentors, line managers or other carriers of specialist know-
ledge. An important dimension introduced by their analysis is that they show
how individuals are simultaneously engaged on a number of learning careers
spanning a range of social contexts. Participation is multiple and complex,
with learners carrying knowledge from one setting, resituating and inte-
grating it in others. A feature of Lave and Wenger’s chapter is that whilst
providing a detailed account of how learning occurs through participation
0111 in communities of practice they do not move on to suggest strategies for
improving pedagogy. The chapters by David Guile and Michael Young, and
by Terry Mayes, begin to explore some of the pedagogic implications of
taking this view of learning, and in particular they focus on the potential
4111 role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in facilitating
this move. Viewing learning as a social rather than an individual process

opens up significant and exciting new possibilities for ‘thinking practices
differently’, turning on their heads many traditional notions of learning and
supporting learners.
Our third frame of understanding is not so much a theory about how
learning occurs as a critical account of the work language does in estab-
lishing understandings and expectations about what is learned, how it is
learned and what aspects are valued through assessment. Viewing learning
as ‘literacy practices’ helps to extend the discussion about its nature and
effects, bringing into view wider sociocultural and political questions that
are largely absent from behaviourist, reflective and situated accounts of
learning. Mary Hamilton develops this critique, pointing to the role of so-
cial institutions and power relations in constituting and sustaining certain
privileged and elite forms of literacy practice. Hamilton argues that a move
towards valuing vernacular literacies opens up possibilities for a wider and
more inclusive vision of lifelong learning. In doing so she brings into focus
those forms of learning that people engage in outside the domain of formal
education – the ‘life-wide’ dimension of lifelong learning – and allows us to
reflect on those distinctions that position some forms of learning as fund-
able and worthy of accreditation and others as not. Mike Baynham’s chapter
is based on empirical research into the forms of literacy practices required
by students in higher education. His study indicates that these are far from
being the settled and closely defined packages of study skills that one might
expect, but rather a set of shifting and constantly renegotiated meanings as
to what constitutes academic knowledge and what it means to be a student
in higher education. As well as illustrating the diversity of literacy practices
required by different disciplinary areas, and the lack of clarity in communi-
cating these to students, his study provides an insight into the dynamic
process of meaning making. He shows students and tutors engaged in the
construction their own understandings of the literacy practices required,
drawing on resources from their personal and practical experience of the
world as well as the codes and practices of the academic institution. Even
within the relatively bounded and regulated context of higher education we
begin to see how meanings are not fixed, but always in flux and therefore
open to negotiation and change.
The final chapter by Miriam Zukas and Janice Malcolm provides a different
map of the territory we have traversed in this book. Their project is to look
across the highly segmented terrain of lifelong learning in the UK, focusing
on those who they term ‘educators’; on the identity positions available to
them and the effects of these on the nature and content of learning. Here
they draw on the notion of ‘communities of practice’ to suggest that the
different contexts of adult, further and higher education have developed
their own distinctive pedagogic practices. For them, lifelong learning is a
‘virtual concept’ that has mobilized surprisingly little discussion about the
11 possibility, or even desirability, of continuity or connectivity between the

pedagogic practices it includes. Although the focus of their study is on
teaching rather than learning, their chapter nevertheless provides an appro-
priate conclusion to this volume. By drawing attention to the different
assumptions and value judgements embedded in conceptual models of
teaching and learning they emphasize the importance of taking a critical
stance towards technical and formulaic attempts to capture ‘best practice’.
What such formulations fail to acknowledge is the diversity of perspectives
on learning that are available and the practical and ethical implications of
011 these for learners and those who support learning.
References
11
Alheit, P. (1998) On a Contradictory Way to the ‘Learning Society’: A critical
approach, Studies in the Education of Adults, 66–82.
Fenwick, T. (2000) Expanding Conceptions of Experiential Learning: A review of
the five contemporary perspectives on cognition, Adult Education Quarterly, Vol.
50, 243–272.
0111
0111
0111
4111
Chapter 1
Learning and adult education

Alan Rogers
Learning theories
It is important to stress the fact that there are many strategies for learning,
because some recent writers have suggested that there is only one way in
which all learning is done (we shall talk about one or two of these strate-
gies later in this section). We need to be wary of adopting any all-embracing
theory of learning that implies exclusivity.
It will be useful to summarise the many different learning theories briefly.
They may be divided for simplicity’s sake into three main groups. There are
the behaviourist theories, mostly of the stimulus–response variety of differing
degrees of complexity. There are the cognitive theories, based on a different
view of the nature of knowledge. And there are those theories that have been
called humanist; these rely on various analyses of personality and of society.
Before looking at these in more detail, one or two comments need to be
made. First, it is tempting to identify the stimulus–response learning the-
ories with the ‘conformist’ view of education and the humanist with the
‘liberation’ view. There is some truth is this in that the humanists often talk
in terms of liberation. But his is too simplistic: the divide between these two
approaches runs right through all three sets of theories. The behavioural
theories range from a simple reinforcement of the desired responses through
to an exploration of the many different possible responses; the cognitive
theories can talk at one extreme of the discipline of the subject and at the
other end of the continuum of open discovery learning; and the humanist
theories can describe the importance of role imitation in attitudinal devel-
opment on the one hand and the freedom of the learning group on the other.
Second, however, there does seem to be a correlation between each of
these groups of learning theories and the three main elements in the
teaching–learning encounter. Education consists of a dynamic interaction
involving three parties – the teacher-planner, the student participant(s), and
the subject-matter. Each of the three groups of learning theories tends to
This is an edited version of a chapter previously published in Teaching Adults, 1996,

Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press.
Alan Rogers 9
11
Learning Conformist- (continuum) Liberation-
theories oriented oriented
Behavioural; Reinforcement of Exploration of

teacher-centred desired responses different responses
Cognitive; Discipline Discovery learning

subject-centred of subject
011
Humanist; Imitation of norms Group learning
learner-centred
11
Figure 1.1 Learning theories.
exalt the primacy of one of these three elements. Behavioural theories stress
the role of the teacher-agent in providing the stimulus and selecting and
0111 reinforcing the approved responses; cognitive theories emphasise the content
of the material; while the humanist theories (the most complex group) direct
attention to the active involvement of the student participant.
Behaviourist theories
This group of theories suggests that we learn by receiving stimuli from our
environment that provoke a response. The teacher can direct this process
by selecting the stimuli and by reinforcing the approved responses while
discouraging the ‘wrong’ responses. Learning is thus brought about by an
0111 association between the desired responses and the reinforcement (rewards and
punishments through a complicated system of success and failure indicators).
These theories stress the active role of the teacher-agent. The student-
learner is often seen as more passive. Although the learner offers a variety
of responses, it is only the teacher who can determine the ‘right’ response
and who can reward it appropriately, discouraging the other responses.
Feedback, the return from the learner to the teacher, thus stands on its own,
separate from and following after the learning process.
The behaviourist theories are based on a view of knowledge that dis-
tinguishes sharply between right and wrong. They assume that knowledge is
0111 truth and can be known; it is independent of both teacher and learner;
it is the same for all learners.
Stimulus–response theories are not seen by their proponents as just applic-
able to low-level learning. They also apply at more advanced levels. Nor
4111 are they confined to skill learning; they form the basis for cognitive and
attitudinal learning as well – to the understanding of historical processes and

the appreciation of music. Indeed, the general validity of the theory is that
it is often seen to underlie most of the other theories of learning. Cognitive
theories stress the inherent demands of the subject-matter but they still rely
on an assumption that responses are called out by different stimuli. And
humanist theories urge that the stimuli arise from our social and life context,
that the variety of our responses is dependent on our individual experiences
and personalities, and that at an early stage of life we all learn by a system
of approvals and disapprovals that indicate whether our social patterns of
behaviour are acceptable or not. Stimulus and response form part of almost
all theories of learning in some form or other.
Cognitive theories
Since the 1960s, a number of theories have emerged that direct attention
to the activity of the learner in processing the response and to the nature
of knowledge itself. These form a distinct group.
These theories point to the active engagement of the mind in learning.
They stress the processes involved in creating responses, the organisation of
perceptions, the development of insights. In order to learn, understanding
is necessary. The material must be marshalled step by step and then mastered.
The setting of goals is related to each part of the material encountered.
Feedback is an essential part of the process of learning, not separate from it.
Although the learner is seen to be active rather than passive, the activity
itself is controlled by the inherent structure of knowledge itself. The mater-
ial that the teacher-agent orders and that the learner seeks to master domi-
nates the process. The words ‘must’ and ‘necessary’ and ‘discipline’, which
occur frequently in connection with this view of learning, reveal that teacher
and learner are faced by something that is bigger than both of them, some-
thing to which they must adapt themselves. The world of knowledge lies
outside of themselves.
This group of views is not confined to the acquisition of new knowledge
or the development of new understandings. It applies to learning new skills
and new attitudes as well.
Both kinds of learning theories, behavioural and cognitive, posit hierar-
chies of learning: that there are strategies for low-level learning and strategies
for higher-level learning. Learning advances as more and more learning takes
place; there are higher levels of learning that not all learners attain to.
Bloom, who drew a distinction between learning in the cognitive domain
and learning in the affective domain, may be taken as an example of this.
He suggests (1965) that the steps to learning in each domain parallel each
other. Thus the process of cognitive learning consists of the recall and recog-
nition of knowledge; comprehension, understanding the material, exploring it
more actively; the application of the comprehended knowledge, using it in
Alan Rogers 11
11 concrete situations; then exploring each new situation by breaking it down

into its constituted parts (analysis) and building it up into new concepts
(synthesis); and finally evaluation in which the learners come to assess the
new knowledge, to judge its value in relation to the realisation of their goals.
On the affective side, there is a similar progression: receiving stimuli, paying
attention, developing awareness, being willing to receive and eventually
using selective attention; then responding willingly, the emergence of a sense
of satisfaction with the response; third, valuing the concepts and the process
they are engaged in, making an assessment that the activity is worth doing,
011 so that the learners come to express their preferences and eventually their
commitment; then conceptualising, making judgements, attaching concepts
to each of the values they have identified; and finally organising these values
11 into a system that in the end comes to characterise each individual. He
suggests that the steps to learning are the same in all learners. Gagné (1972)
too drew up a progression of learning from the simple ‘signal’ learning
through stimulus–response to the very complex ‘problem-solving’ learning.
Humanist theories
0111 Such hierarchies however do not seem to characterise many forms of
humanist learning theories. These are more recent in origin and are not
so coherent as those in the other two groups.
Humanist learning theories spring from an understanding of the major
contemporary changes in culture – away from the certainties of empirical
science, the relatively simple and universally valid conclusions of objective
research, the stability and general applicability of scientific laws, the gener-
ally accepted values, the positivism of August Comte and others – into the
modern world of living complexity, uncertainty, instability, the uniqueness
of individual response and the conflicts of values (Schein, 1972). Humanist
0111
Bloom Gagné
Cognitive Affective Signal

Stimulus–response
Knowledge Receiving Chaining
Comprehension Responding Verbal association
Application Valuing Multiple discrimination
Analysis–synthesis Conceptualising Concept learning
0111 Evaluation Organising Principle learning
Problem solving
Figure 1.2 Bloom and Gagné: hierarchies of learning.

4111
learning theories stress once more the active nature of the learner. Indeed,
the learner’s actions largely create the learning situation. They emphasise
the urges and drives of the personality, movements towards (for example)
increased autonomy and competence, the compulsion towards growth and
development, the active search for meaning, the fulfilment of goals that indi-
viduals set for themselves. They stress the particular social settings within
which learning operates. Learning and setting goals for oneself are seen to
be natural processes, calling into play the personal learning abilities that the
learners have already developed and which they seek to enhance. Learning
comes largely from drawing upon all the experience that goes to make up
the self and upon the resources of the wider community. Motivation for
learning comes from within; and the material on which the learning drive
fastens is the whole of life, the cultural and interpersonal relationships that
form the social context.
These views also stress the autonomy of the learners and emphasise that
all the other theories talk about ‘controls’, about the learner being controlled
by the stimuli, by the teacher, by the subject-matter. The humanist views
on the other hand see learning as part of a process of conflict in which the
learners are seeking to take control of their own life processes. It is the
engagement of the learners with the world around them and with them-
selves that creates the learning milieu. The material on which they exercise
their learning skills is less important than the goals they have set themselves.
The role of the teacher is to increase the range of experiences so that the
student participants can use these in any way they please to achieve their
own desired learning changes.
It will be necessary for us to spend a little more time looking at these
newer views, for they will influence the way in which adult education will
develop over the coming years, before we can draw some general conclu-
sions from them. It will be convenient to divide them into two main groups:
those that focus on the personality factors and those that focus on the social
or environmental context with which the learner is in dialogue.
Personality theories
Most personality learning theories depend on prior concepts relating to the
distribution of personality types along a spectrum of one kind or another –
between the extrovert and the introvert, for instance, or between those who
see the ‘locus of control’ as within themselves and those who see it as outside
of themselves (‘I was ill because I ate bad meat’ as against ‘the food in that
restaurant made me ill’), or between the fatalist and the self-confident
(Rotter, 1982).
Those who locate people on such external–internal scales tend to suggest
that people placed at the external end of the continuum have a general
expectancy that positive reinforcements are not under their control; that
Alan Rogers 13
11 they may tend to lack self-confidence, to possess feelings of inferiority, even

to expect failure and to rely more on luck, fate, chance or God. They suggest
that in terms of learning, these people often feel that what they don’t know
is so vast and what they do know is so small that they may be discouraged
from attempting to master new fields. At the opposite extreme, it is suggested,
are those who believe that reinforcement is contingent on their own behav-
iour. These people are usually thought to be more independent, resisting
manipulation; they will act, pay attention and (if they feel it necessary to
the achievement of some goal they have set for themselves) remember. They
011 are seen to draw upon the information and other resources provided by their
environment, to select activities in which they have already been successful,
and to feel confident that what they already know will help them to master
11 further skills and knowledge. Most people however are thought to occupy
mid-points between these two extremes or to display characteristics of both
of these types at different times and in different circumstances.
Various learning theories have been built on these analyses of personality
types, for instance, in the work of Carl Rogers (1974), Abraham Maslow
(1968) and Cy Houle (1961). The importance of attitudes in the learning
process and the relationship of attitudes to knowledge is the great contri-
0111 bution of these theories to our understanding of learning. Learning does not
just affect the head (as so much in cognitive learning theories suggests).
Berne (1970), for instance, built his view of learning to a large extent on
the difference within each person of the ‘parent’ (P), the ‘adult’ (A) and
the ‘child’ (C). He argued that communication between people may go seri-
ously wrong if these attitudes become confused, if the lines get crossed, if
for example one person speaking as ‘adult’ is responded to as ‘child’.
Environmental learning theories

0111 These writers emphasise that ‘no man is an island’. The learning process, espe-
cially when self-impelled in the way the personality theorists suggest, calls
upon the resources of the environment in which the learner is situated.
But these writers go further than this: they suggest that learning is created by
the active encounter between the person and the outside world more than
by the inner drives and urges. Four main sets of social and environmental
learning theories may be identified.
In brief, human communications theory indicates that communications link
people together into an organisation to achieve a common purpose. Com-
munication is not just a one-way tool; it is a system or network of events.
0111 Communication is a transaction, a series of two-way processes that involve
a source (initiator), a transmission, a message and a receiver. There is
inevitably interference and distortion in the transmission, and feedback is a
necessary, though independent, part of the process in order to check whether
4111 that has been received is perceived as being equivalent to what has been
sent. Interpretation is an essential element of the transaction, and in this

the receiver is active, not passive. Learning is thus a process of change that
comes about through reactions to the continuous reception of messages
that is the inevitable consequence of each person being part of a human
communications network or society.
Human communications theory tends towards the ‘external’ end of the
scale; social learning theory on the other hand stresses the ‘internal’ factors.
It is based on the study of the interaction of the individual and the social
environment. The interaction starts with the members of the family and
widens out from there, and much of the learning consists of imitation and
the internalisation of value systems acquired from others. Recent studies, for
instance, have stressed the need for direct human contact in attitudinal
development; and the importance of peer group pressure has also become
clear. Like the human communications theory, this is not just a stimulus–
response theory. It emphasises the active engagement of the person with the
environment, a dialectic with all the potential for conflict and the need for
conflict resolution.
Some modern learning theories have seen the engagement of the individ-
ual with the environment in a holistic sense – the total environment, not just
the social environment. The physical world in which we live, the built envir-
onment that we have made for ourselves, the mental world that we have
created (what the French call mentalités) as well as the social environment
are all elements with which we are bound in a perpetual engagement.
Some writers have seen this engagement in terms of a struggle, a desperate
search for freedom. Habermas (1978), like Carl Rogers, views human life as
a quest for self-emancipation, a search for autonomy through self-formative
processes. Like others, he has drawn on the seminal work of Paulo Freire
(1972) who identified three stages of learning: activities that are task-related;
second, activities concerned with personal relationships; and third, what he
calls ‘conscientization’, a concept that implies the transformation of the
awareness of surrounding reality, the development of a concern for change,
and a realistic assessment of the resources of and hindrances to such a pro-
cess and the conflicts it is bound to provoke. Learning is only learning when
it leads to action for change.
Habermas similarly identifies three kinds of learning, which form some-
thing of a hierarchy:
• instrumental learning – how to manipulate the environment; the acqui-

sition of skills and understanding needed to control the world we live
in (it is interesting that Habermas places scientific learning on the lowest
rung of his scale);
• communicative learning – learning changes in the realm of interpersonal
relations and concerned with increasing interpersonal understanding;
Alan Rogers 15
11 • emancipatory learning – self-understanding, awareness and transformation

of cultural and personal presuppositions that are always with us and affect
the way we act.
Habermas suggests that these different kinds of learning have different

methods of investigation, of teaching and of evaluation. Any teaching–
learning situation will call upon all three kinds of learning in different
proportions. Because the teaching–learning encounter is part of the wider
struggle of the individual and his/her total environment, it will involve a
011 complete transformation of the relationship between learner, teacher (medi-
ator of knowledge) and knowledge (sometimes seen as ‘competencies’).
A further group of humanist learning theories relate to what is called para-
11 digm transformation. This view argues that the environment we live in is the
result of our own creative processes; that we build, name and manipulate
the environment for ourselves; and that learning is a process of rebuild-
ing, renaming and remanipulating that environment. It calls for the modi-
fication and adaptation of those paradigms (i.e. accepted and usually
unchallenged world-pictures on which we build our lives) that underlie our
personality and all our actions.
0111 One way of looking at this is to use the metaphor of ‘learning maps’
(Rogers, 1993). People draw maps in their head: they place every experi-
ence, concept and activity on this map at some distance from themselves at
the centre of these maps. Those who like cooking and feel themselves to be
good at it, for example, will locate ‘cooking’ close to the self-centre, whereas
they may well locate ‘computers’ closer to the periphery because they feel
less at ease with this feature of modern society or because it seems to be
distant from their main preoccupations. Learning, it has been suggested, is
easiest among those subjects that are close to the centre; and this implies
that learning includes a process of redrawing these maps so as to bring the
0111 desired learning subjects closer to the self-centre. So long as adults feel that
any subject is ‘not for me’, they will experience great difficulties in learning.
Perhaps the most influential expressions of this group of theories is George
Kelly’s ‘personal construct theory’. Kelly (1955) argues that learning is not
something determined by external influences but that we create our own
learning. By observing and reflecting on experience, we form our own per-
sonal constructs (units of meaning) from our ideas, feelings, memories and
evaluations about events, places and people in our lives. In this way, we
make sense of the world and manipulate it rather than respond to stimuli.
The act of learning is then largely initiated by the learner, exploring and
0111 extending his or her own understanding, holding what has been called a
‘learning conversation with him-/herself’.
This school of thought rejects the notion of knowledge existing outside
of ourselves, an objective reality to be discovered by research. Rather all
4111
knowledge is contingent; it is ‘contested and provisional’. What exist are

the various ‘acts of knowing’ that we all engage in. Knowledge creation does
not mean so much the uncovering of hidden truth as the construction of
new perceptions. Those who search after truth are faced with choosing
between all the various ‘acts of knowing’. The focus thus switches from trying
to establish the validity of the knowledge itself to the criteria by which we
can judge the validity of the questions asked and the answers arrived at in
each individual case; how can we determine which ‘act of knowing’ carries
with it some experiential validity for ourselves?
Some have gone further. They have denied the existence of the mind as a
finite, fixed entity in favour of ‘a dynamic, ever-changing flux with unknown
potential’. They claim that those psychologists who speak in terms of fixed
measures like intelligence, aptitude and personality traits for what are seen
by others to be ‘temporary stabilised states’ are to be regarded as perpetuat-
ing myths and creating blocks to a ‘true’ perception of the personality as fluid
and active in its own quest.
We are thus back with the views that see learning as dependent on the
innate drives of men and women towards autonomy and understanding in
an attempt to control rather than be controlled, in a search for liberation.
But it is a different form of theory. Learning is not seen by these writers as
merely the satisfaction of a sense of urges, seeking a state of rest and harmony,
the diminishing of a sense of anxiety, the relief of tension. Rather, learning
through life is to be viewed as an active engagement with our environment
and with ourselves, a struggle that may actually increase tension, a dialectic
in which we seek to alter both our environment and ourselves in the constant
search for something better, some ideal, a struggle that will never end.
Learning is seen as the process by which our sense of discontent with the
now and here and the search for transcendence expresses itself in a quest
for perfectibility.
Experiential learning and the learning cycle

There is growing consensus that experience forms the basis of all learning.
Many modern writers suggest that at the heart of all learning is the search
for meaning in experience. Mezirow (1981) has stressed this above all else.
Learning is creating meanings, finding the keys, making sense of experience
– a process that is as natural to all adults as breathing.
The process by which this search for meaning is conducted is, according
to many contemporary writers, critical reflection on experience. Freire and
others have suggested that learning is accomplished by critically analysing
experience. They have spoken of a learning cycle starting with experience,
proceeding through reflection on experience, and leading to action, which
in its turn becomes the concrete experience for further reflection and thus
the next stage of the cycle (Figure 1.3a). They argue that action is an
Alan Rogers 17
11
Concrete Critical reflection

experience on experience
011
11 Action
Further critical
reflection on
experience
Figure 1.3a The learning cycle.

0111
Search for new

knowledge and
experience

0111
Action
Further critical
reflection
0111
Figure 1.3b The learning cycle and the search for new knowledge.
4111
essential part of the learning process, not a result of learning, not an add-
on at the end. Without action, learning has not effectively taken place.
We need to modify this learning cycle in three ways if we are to understand
it fully. First, the process of reflection is complex. It involves making a judge-
ment on experience, assessing it in the light of some other standard that is
drawn from other experience, either one’s own or other people’s experience.
It means trying to determine how to explain the experience, to assess in what
ways the experience could have been different. Farmers, faced with a new pest
or disease, will ask their neighbours, ‘What is it? We have never seen it before’;
they thus reveal that they have first searched their own experience and are
now actively seeking to access the experience of others.
In learning through critical reflection on experience there is the active
search for new material against which experience can be judged. The
learning cycle needs then to be adapted as shown in Figure 1.3b.
Second, as David Kolb (1984) has pointed out, critical reflection will lead
in some cases to the drawing of conclusions, to developing generalisations,
general principles (‘abstract conceptualisation’ as he puts it). Critical reflec-
tion can be seen as asking questions about experience in the light of other
experience; abstract conceptualisation may be seen as identifying possible
answers. Hypotheses are formed from the process of critical reflection on
experience, which can be tested in new situations (Figure 1.3c).
Third, however, learning includes goals, purposes, intentions, choice and
decision making, and it is not at all clear where these elements fit into the
learning cycle. Decisions are needed to determine which other forms of expe-
rience are used for critical reflection; decisions are certainly needed before
translating abstract conceptualisation into active experimentation; and deci-
sions and goals occur at other points in the cycle. These have tended to be
omitted from discussions of the learning cycle (Figure 1.3d).
There is then a widespread acceptance that critical reflection on experi-
ence leading to action forms a large part of the process of learning. But it is
probably unacceptable to suggest (as some writers do) that this is the way in
which we learn. As we have seen above, there are many different strategies
of learning, and we clearly use them all at some time or other. Critical reflec-
tion on experience would seem to be the key strategy in the process of
creating meaning out of experience; it is certainly the main way in which
critical learning is developed. But there is more to learning than the search
for meanings.
The importance of new knowledge cannot be exaggerated. It is against
new knowledge, against our earlier experience or against the experience of
others, however that is mediated to us (through teaching or speech or the
written word or observation, etc.), that we measure the experience that forms
the basis of learning, that we pass judgement on it, that we seek to make
meaning; it is through such other knowledge that we reflect critically on
experience. Without new knowledge there can be no critical reflection.
Alan Rogers 19
11
Search for new
knowledge and
experience

011
11 Active Abstract
experimentation conceptualisation
Further critical
reflection
Figure 1.3c The learning cycle and conceptualisation.

0111
Search for and

selection of new
knowledge and
experience
Decision
0111 making
Active Abstract
experimentation conceptualisation
Decision
making Further critical
reflection
0111
Figure 1.3d The learning cycle and decision making.
4111
Learning styles
One common element in modern discussions of adult learning relates to
what are called ‘learning styles’. We have all engaged for the whole of our
lives in natural learning and from time to time in the more purposeful and
structured ‘learning episodes’. In the course of this, we have developed our
own learning styles.
The subject of learning styles is too extensive to explore fully in these
pages, but an outline of recent current thinking is necessary. The most rele-
vant material is that based on the learning cycle that David Kolb elaborated
and which is discussed above. The argument goes like this. Each of the stages
of the learning cycle calls for different learning approaches and appeals to
different kinds of persons.
Every individual develops through experience one or more preferred
learning styles. It is important to stress that we all tend to use all of these
styles, we do not confine our learning efforts to one only. But we prefer to
use one or perhaps two modes of learning above the others; we feel stronger
at learning through one approach rather than through any of the others.
What is clear is that we all learn actively and that we do it in different ways
(see Figure 1.4).
Two conclusions for the teacher of adults come from this view of learning
styles. The first is that in any adult learning group there will always be people
with a range of different learning styles. We can never assume that all our
student participants will prefer to learn only through one form of activity.
This means that it is necessary for any teacher to adopt a wide range of
teaching–learning activities in order to help those who prefer to learn
through active engagement with experience, those who prefer to reflect criti-
cally, those who prefer to develop more generalised views, and those who
prefer to experiment and test out other people’s theories.
The second conclusion is that the development of understandings about
learning styles was never intended to enable the teacher of adults to put
people into a particular learning style category. It was developed to help
explain what is going on. Some student participants will wish to strengthen
those learning styles with which they feel less comfortable, which they feel
are weaker. Some activists may thus wish to develop their skills of critical
reflection or abstract conceptualisation, for example. But others will seek to
use their strongest style to maximise their learning. It is never safe to rely
upon any one conclusion in adult education.
There is still much that is not known about learning styles. We do not
know for instance whether we use exactly the same learning styles for all
learning situations. For example, if Habermas is right and there are three
quite different kinds of learning, it is not clear if our learning styles will vary
according to the kind of learning being engaged in. Emancipatory learning
may call for more reflective styles than for activist styles. Again we do not
Alan Rogers 21
11
Active learners
Some people prefer to learn by doing something immediately. They don’t
bother to wait to listen to all the instructions, to read the manual first but get on
with the job. These people get impatient when someone tells them all about
the task first. When they have finished one activity, they want to pass quickly to
the next one. They want to see as many new things as possible; they like to
meet lots of new people. They will often volunteer to take the lead in any
activity. They like short-term goals and are usually bored by the slower work of
011 implementing and consolidating a programme. They tend to believe what they
are told. These people want to find out things for themselves.
Reflective learners
11 Some people prefer to ‘wait and see’, to sit back and watch others doing the
task first, to listen to the talk of others. These people don’t give the first answer
that comes into their heads; when they are asked a question, they take time to
think, they hesitate and are often uncertain. These people tend to like sharing
their learning with others because this helps them to collect different opinions
before they make up their minds.
Theorising learners
0111 Some people like to build systems, to get down to first principles. They speak
in general rather than in concrete terms. They question the basic assumptions.
They try to make coherent pictures out of complex material (they often
represent ideas in diagrams showing relationships). They try to be objective,
detached; they are less sympathetic to human feelings, to other people’s
subjective judgements. These people want the world to be logical; they do not
like too many different opinions.
Experimental learners
Some people like to experiment, to apply our new insights. They try to find new
and more effective ways of doing things. They take short cuts or devise new
0111 modes of working. They tend to be confident, energetic, impatient of what they
see as too much talk. They like solving problems and see new situations as a
challenge from which they can learn a good deal. They like being shown how
to do something but become frustrated if they are not allowed to do it for
themselves very quickly.
Figure 1.4 Preferred learning styles.

Source: Adapted from the works of Kolb, 1976, 1984; Honey and Mumford, 1986.
0111
4111
know if these learning styles are common to all societies and all cultures or
whether they are culture-bound (most of the research has been undertaken in
Western rich societies). Equally we do not know if learning styles remain the
same with ageing: do older learners continue to learn through the style they pre-
ferred when they were younger? While learning styles theories have been tested
empirically with certain learning groups in a limited range of cultures (Honey
and Mumford, 1986), these aspects have not yet been properly studied.
Concerns of the teacher of adults

Some practical conclusions may be drawn from all of this for the teacher of
adults.
The existence of natural ‘learning episodes’ suggests a series of principles
for those whose function is to create purposeful, systematic and structured
learning opportunities for adults. The task of the teacher is twofold – to
build upon these processes but at the same time to seek to go beyond them
in a number of ways:
• not just to use but also to build up and enhance the participants’ existing
learning techniques, to help to make them more efficient;
• to start with the specific issue but then to help the learner to move from
the concrete to the more general, to draw out the principles underlying
the particular instances;
• to help the learner make the learning more permanent, more available
for later use, rather than being simply a one-off incident of learning;
• to urge that the process should not stop once the immediate task is
completed but lead on to further purposeful learning.
These form part of the goals of the teacher, using as our base the natural
learning processes of our adult student participants.
Some of the more important considerations to be drawn from the adult
learning episodes and borne in mind during the planning and teaching
process are summarised in Figure 1.5.
Conclusion
There are many different theories about learning. Most of them rely upon
some form of stimulus–response, but recent work suggests that the individual
is engaged in learning through a process of active interrelating with either
new knowledge or with his/her social or total environment. Learning takes
place in a number of different domains, and different strategies are called
into play to cope with different types of learning. All these theories have
something to teach us about what we are doing, they each contribute to the
list of factors that will make for the effective teaching of adults.
Alan Rogers 23
11
Characteristics Implications
1 Episodic, not continuous ● Rely on short bursts of learning activity.

● Break material into manageable units;
but hook each one on to other items of
learning.
2 Problem-centred, not ● Make relevant to students’ needs for

011 curriculum-oriented; motivation.
immediate goals based on ● Be aware of students’ intentions.
needs and intentions; ● Students to set goals.
concrete situation; ● Start where they are, not necessarily
11 immediate, not future at the beginning.
application; short term ● Do activity now, not prepare for it in
the future.
3 Learning styles ● Be aware of different learning styles;

build up learning skills.
● analogical thinking; use ● Relate new material to existing
of existing knowledge experience and knowledge.
0111 and experience ● Be sensitive to range and use of
experience.
● trial and error ● Discovery learning; students to be
active, not passive recipients.
● Need for reinforcement; build in
feedback.
● Need for practice.
● meaningful wholes ● Move from simplified wholes to more
complex wholes.
● Help students to build up units to
create whole; select out essential units
0111 from non-essential.
● less memory; but ● Rely on understanding for retention,
imitation not memory.
● Use of demonstration.
4 Lack of interest in general ● Move from concrete to general, not

principles from general to concrete; encourage
questioning of general principles;
build up relationships.
● stops when need is met ● Remotivate to further learning.
0111 Figure 1.5 The learning episode and the implications for the teacher of adults.
4111
Rather than suggest that any one of these groups of learning theories is
‘right’ and the others are ‘wrong’, I have directed attention to the ‘natural
learning episode’, those incidents in which adults throughout their lives
engage in purposeful and structured learning using their own preferred
learning style in order to achieve a particular goal or solve a specific problem.
These episodes remind us that our student participants are already experi-
enced learners; and they will help us to understand more clearly how to
structure our own learning opportunities for adults. Our purpose as teachers
of adults is to go beyond this natural learning process – to help the learners
to make its results more permanent; to help them to draw out general prin-
ciples; to use the process to lead on to further purposeful learning; to
encourage them, in short, to become free in their own learning. We can use
the characteristics of these learning episodes as a basis for creating adult
learning episodes for our student participants.
References
Berne, E. (1970) Games People Play. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Bloom, B.S. (1965) Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. London: Longman.
Freire, P. (1972) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Gagné, R.M. (1972) Domains of Learning, Interchange, 3(1): 1–8.
Habermas, J. (1978) Knowledge and Human Interest. London: Heinemann.
Honey, P. and Mumford, A. (1986) Manual of Learning Styles. London: Peter Honey.
Houle, C.O. (1961) The Inquiring Mind: a Study of the Adult who Continues to Learn.
Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Kelly, G.A. (1955) Psychology of Personal Constructs, 2 vols. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
Kolb, D.A. (1976) Learning Style Inventory Technical Manual. Boston, MA: McBer.
Kolb, D.A. (1984) Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and
Development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Maslow, A.H. (1968) Towards a Psychology of Being. New York: Van Nostrand.
Mezirow, J. (1981) A critical theory of adult learning and education, Adult Education,
3: 3–24.
Rogers, A. (1993) Adult learning maps and the teaching process, Studies in the
Education of Adults, 22(2): 199–220.
Rogers, C. (1974) On Becoming a Person. London: Constable.
Rotter, J.B. (1982) The Development and Applications of Social Learning Theory. New
York: Praeger.
Schein, E.H. and Kommers, D.W. (1972) Professional Education. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
Chapter 2
11
The interpersonal relationship
in the facilitation of learning
Carl R. Rogers
011
11 I wish to begin this chapter with a statement that may seem surprising to
some and perhaps offensive to others. It is simply this: Teaching, in my
estimation, is a vastly overrated function.
Having made such a statement, I scurry to the dictionary to see if I really
mean what I say. Teaching means ‘to instruct’. Personally, I am not much
interested in instructing another in what she should know or think, though
others seem to love to do this. ‘To impart knowledge or skill’. My reaction
0111 is, why not be more efficient, using a book or programmed learning? ‘To
make to know’. Here my hackles rise. I have no wish to make anyone know
something. ‘To show, guide, direct’. As I see it, too many people have been
shown, guided, directed. So I come to the conclusion that I do mean what
I said. Teaching is, for me, a relatively unimportant and vastly overvalued
activity.
But there is more in my attitude than this. I have a negative reaction to
teaching. Why? I think it is because it raises all the wrong questions. As
soon as we focus on teaching, the question arises, what shall we teach? What,
from our superior vantage point, does the other person need to know? I
0111 wonder if, in this modern world, we are justified in the presumption that we
are wise about the future and the young are foolish. Are we really sure as to
what they should know? Then there is the ridiculous question of coverage.
What shall the course cover? This notion of coverage is based on the assump-
tion that what is taught is what is learned; what is presented is what is
assimilated. I know of no assumption so obviously untrue. One does not need
research to provide evidence that this is false. One needs only to talk with
a few students.
But I ask myself, ‘Am I so prejudiced against teaching that I find no situ-
ation in which it is worthwhile?’ I immediately think of my experiences in
0111 Australia long ago. I became much interested in the Australian Aborigines.
This is an edited version of an article previously published in Humanizing Education, 1967,

Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.
4111
Here is a group that for more than 20,000 years has managed to live and
exist in a desolate environment in which modern man would perish within
a few days. The secret of the Aboriginal’s survival has been teaching. He
has passed on to the young every shred of knowledge about how to find
water, about how to track game, about how to kill the kangaroo, about how
to find his way through the trackless desert. Such knowledge is conveyed to
the young as being the way to behave, and any innovation is frowned upon.
It is clear that teaching has provided him the way to survive in a hostile
and relatively unchanging environment.
Now I am closer to the nub of the question that excites me. Teaching
and the imparting of knowledge makes sense in an unchanging environ-
ment. This is why it has been an unquestioned function for centuries. But
if there is one truth about modern man, it is that he lives in an environ-
ment that is continually changing. The one thing I can be sure of is that the
physics that is taught to the present-day student will be outdated in a decade.
The teaching in psychology will certainly be out of date in twenty years.
The so-called ‘facts of history’ depend very largely upon the current mood
and temper of the culture. Chemistry, biology, genetics, and sociology are
in such flux that a firm statement made today will almost certainly be modi-
fied by the time the student gets around to using the knowledge.
We are, in my view, faced with an entirely new situation in education
where the goal of education, if we are to survive, is the facilitation of change
and learning. The only man who is educated is the man who has learned how
to learn; the man who has learned how to adapt and change; the man who
has realized that no knowledge is secure, that only the process of seeking
knowledge gives a basis for security. Changingness, a reliance on process
rather than upon static knowledge, is the only thing that makes any sense
as a goal for education in the modern world.
So now with some relief I turn to an activity, a purpose, that really warms
me – the facilitation of learning. When I have been able to transform a
group – and here I mean all the members of a group, myself included – into
a community of learners, then the excitement has been almost beyond belief.
To free curiosity; to permit individuals to go charging off in new directions
dictated by their own interests; to unleash the sense of inquiry; to open
everything to questioning and exploration; to recognize that everything is
in process of change – here is an experience I can never forget. I cannot
always achieve it in groups with which I am associated, but when it is
partially or largely achieved, then it becomes a never-to-be-forgotten group
experience. Out of such a context arise true students, real learners, creative
scientists and scholars, and practitioners, the kind of individuals who can
live in a delicate but ever-changing balance between what is presently known
and the flowing, moving, altering problems and facts of the future.
But do we know how to achieve this new goal in education or is it a
will-o’-the-wisp that sometimes occurs, sometimes fails to occur, and thus
offers little real hope? My answer is that we possess a very considerable
Carl R. Rogers 27
11 knowledge of the conditions that encourage self-initiated, significant, expe-

riential, ‘gut-level’ learning by the whole person. We do not frequently see
these conditions put into effect because they mean a real revolution in our
approach to education and revolutions are not for the timid. But we do find
examples of this revolution in action.
We know – and I will briefly mention some of the evidence – that the ini-
tiation of such learning rests not upon the teaching skills of the leader, not
upon scholarly knowledge of the field, not upon curricular planning, not upon
use of audio-visual aids, not upon the programmed learning used, not
011 upon lectures and presentations, not upon an abundance of books, though
each of these might at one time or another be utilized as an important
resource. No, the facilitation of significant learning rests upon certain attitu-
11 dinal qualities that exist in the personal relationship between the facilitator
and the learner.
We came upon such findings first in the field of psychotherapy, but now
there is evidence that shows these findings apply in the classroom as well. We
find it easier to think that the intensive relationship between therapist and
client might possess these qualities, but we are also finding that they may exist
in the countless interpersonal interactions between the teacher and pupils.
0111
Qualities that facilitate learning
What are these qualities, these attitudes, that facilitate learning? Let me
describe them very briefly, drawing illustrations from the teaching field.
Realness in the facilitator of learning

Perhaps the most basic of these essential attitudes is realness or genuineness.
When the facilitator is a real person, being what she is, entering into a rela-
0111 tionship with the learner without presenting a front or a façade, she is much
more likely to be effective. This means that the feelings that she is experienc-
ing are available to her, available to her awareness, that she is able to live these
feelings, be them, and able to communicate them if appropriate. It means that
she comes into a direct personal encounter with the learner, meeting her on a
person-to-person basis. It means that she is being herself, not denying herself.
Seen from this point of view it is suggested that the teacher can be a real
person in her relationship with her students. She can be enthusiastic, can
be bored, can be interested in students, can be angry, can be sensitive and
sympathetic. Because she accepts these feelings as her own, she has no need
0111 to impose them on her students. She can like or dislike a student product
without implying that it is objectively good or bad or that the student is
good or bad. She is simply expressing a feeling for the product, a feeling that
exists within herself. Thus, she is a person to her students, not a faceless
4111 embodiment of a curricular requirement nor a sterile tube through which
knowledge is passed from one generation to the next.
It is obvious that this attitudinal set, found to be effective in

psychotherapy, is sharply in contrast with the tendency of most teachers to
show themselves to their pupils simply as roles. It is quite customary for
teachers rather consciously to put on the mask, the role, the façade of being
a teacher and to wear this façade all day, removing it only when they have
left the school at night.
But not all teachers are like this. Take Barbara Shiel. She gave her pupils
a great deal of responsible freedom, and I will mention some of the reactions
of her students later. But here is an example of the way she shared herself
with her pupils – not just sharing feelings of sweetness and light, but anger
and frustration. She had made art materials freely available, and students
often used these in creative ways, but the room frequently looked like a pic-
ture of chaos. Here is her report of her feelings and what she did with them.
I find it maddening to live with the mess – with a capital M! No one

seems to care except me. Finally, one day I told the children . . . that I
am a neat, orderly person by nature and that the mess was driving me
to distraction. Did they have a solution? It was suggested there were
some volunteers who could clean up . . . I said it didn’t seem fair to me
to have the same people clean up all the time for others – but it would
solve it for me. ‘Well, some people like to clean,’ they replied. So that’s
the way it is.
(Shiel, 1966)
I hope this example puts some lively meaning into the phrases I used earlier,
that the facilitator ‘is able to live these feelings, be them, and able to commu-
nicate them if appropriate’. I have chosen an example of negative feelings
because I think it is more difficult for most of us to visualize what this would
mean. In this instance, Miss Shiel is taking the risk of being transparent in
her angry frustrations about the mess. And what happens? The same thing
that, in my experience, nearly always happens. These young people accept
and respect her feelings, take them into account, and work out a novel solu-
tion that none of us, I believe, would have suggested. Miss Shiel wisely
comments, ‘I used to get upset and feel guilty when I became angry. I finally
realized the children could accept my feelings too. And it is important for
them to know when they’ve “pushed me”. I have my limits, too’ (Shiel,
1966).
Just to show that positive feelings, when they are real, are equally effec-
tive, let me quote briefly a college student’s reaction, in a different course:
Your sense of humour in the class was cheering; we all felt relaxed
because you showed us your human self, not a mechanical teacher image.
I feel as if I have more understanding and faith in my teachers now. I
feel closer to the students too.
Carl R. Rogers 29
11 Another says:
You conducted the class on a personal level and therefore in my mind

I was able to formulate a picture of you as a person and not as merely
a walking textbook.
Another student in the same course:
It wasn’t as if there was a teacher in the class, but rather someone whom
011 we could trust and identify as a ‘sharer.’ You were so perceptive and
sensitive to our thoughts, and this made it all the more ‘authentic’ for
me. It was an ‘authentic’ experience, not just a class.
11 (Bull, 1966)
I trust I am making it clear that to be real is not always easy, nor is it achieved
all at once, but it is basic to the person who wants to become that revolu-
tionary individual, a facilitator of learning.
Prizing, acceptance, trust

0111
There is another attitude that stands out in those who are successful in facili-
tating learning. I have observed this attitude. I have experienced it. Yet, it
is hard to know what term to put to it so I shall use several. I think of it as
prizing the learner, prizing her feelings, her opinions, her person. It is a caring
for the learner, but a non-possessive caring. It is an acceptance of this other
individual as a separate person, having worth in her own right. It is a basic
trust – a believe that this other person is somehow fundamentally trust-
worthy. Whether we call it prizing, acceptance, trust, or by some other term,
it shows up in a variety of observable ways. The facilitator who has a consid-
0111 erable degree of this attitude can be fully acceptant of the fear and hesitation
of the student as she approaches a new problem as well as acceptant of the
pupil’s satisfaction in achievement. Such a teacher can accept the student’s
occasional apathy, her erratic desires to explore byroads of knowledge, as
well as her disciplined efforts to achieve major goals. She can accept personal
feelings that both disturb and promote learning – rivalry with a sibling,
hatred of authority, concern about personal adequacy. What we are des-
cribing is a prizing of the learner as an imperfect human being with many
feelings, many potentialities. The facilitator’s prizing or acceptance of the
learner is an operational expression of her essential confidence and trust in
0111 the capacity of the human organism.
I would like to give some examples of this attitude from the classroom
situation. Here any teacher statements would be properly suspect since many
of us would like to feel we hold such attitudes and might have a biased
4111 perception of our qualities. But let me indicate how this attitude of prizing,
of accepting, of trusting appears to the student who is fortunate enough to

experience it.
Here is a statement from a college student in a class with Dr Morey Appell:
Your way of being with us is a revelation to me. In your class I feel

important, mature, and capable of doings things on my own. I want to
think for myself and this need cannot be accomplished through text-
books and lectures alone, but through living. I think you see me as a
person with real feelings and needs, an individual. What I say and do
are significant expressions from me, and you recognize this.
(Appell, 1959)
The facilitator who cares, who prizes, who trusts the learner creates a
climate for learning so different from the ordinary classroom that any resem-
blance is purely coincidental.
Empathic understanding
A further element that establishes a climate for self-initiated, experiential
learning is empathic understanding. When the teacher has the ability to
understand the student’s reactions from the inside, has a sensitive awareness
of the way the process of education and learning seems to the student, then
again the likelihood of significant learning is increased.
This kind of understanding is sharply different from the usual evaluative
understanding, which follows the pattern of ‘I understand what is wrong with
you.’ When there is a sensitive empathy, however, the reaction in the learner
follows something of this pattern, ‘At last someone understands how it feels
and seems to be me without wanting to analyse me or judge me. Now I can
blossom and grow and learn.’
This attitude of standing in the other’s shoes, of viewing the world through
the student’s eyes, is almost unheard of in the classroom. One could listen
to thousands of ordinary classroom interactions without coming across one
instance of clearly communicated, sensitively accurate, empathic under-
standing. But it has a tremendously releasing effect when it occurs.
Let me take an illustration from Virginia Axline, dealing with a second
grade boy. Jay, age 7, has been aggressive, a troublemaker, slow of speech
and learning. Because of his ‘cussing’, he was taken to the principal, who
paddled him, unknown to Miss Axline. During a free work period, Jay fash-
ioned very carefully a man of clay down to a hat and a handkerchief in his
pocket. ‘Who is that?’ asked Miss Axline. ‘Dunno,’ replied Jay. ‘Maybe it is
the principal. He has a handkerchief in his pocket like that.’ Jay glared at
the clay figure. ‘Yes,’ he said. Then he began to tear the head off and looked
up and smiled. Miss Axline said, ‘You sometimes feel like twisting his head
off, don’t you? You get so mad at him.’ Jay tore off one arm, another, then
Carl R. Rogers 31
11 beat the figure to a pulp with his fists. Another boy, with the perception of
the young, explained, ‘Jay is mad at Mr X because he licked him this noon.’
‘Then you must feel lots better now,’ Miss Axline commented. Jay grinned
and began to rebuild Mr X (Axline, 1944).
The other examples I have cited also indicate how deeply appreciative
students feel when they are simply understood – not evaluated, not judged,
simply understood from their own point of view, not the teacher’s. If any
teacher set herself the task of endeavouring to make one non-evaluative,
acceptant, empathic response per day to a student’s demonstrated or verbal-
011 ized feeling, I believe she would discover the potency of this currently almost
non-existent kind of understanding.
11
What are the bases of facilitative attitudes?
A ‘puzzlement’
It is natural that we do not always have the attitudes I have been describing.
Some teachers raise the question, ‘But what if I am not feeling empathic, do
not, at this moment, prize or accept or like my students. What then?’ My
0111 response is that realness is the most important of the attitudes mentioned,
and it is not accidental that this attitude was described first. So if one has
little understanding of the student’s inner world and a dislike for the stu-
dents or their behaviour, it is almost certainly more constructive to be real
than to be pseudo-empathic or to put on a façade of caring.
But this is not nearly as simple as it sounds. To be genuine, or honest, or
congruent, or real means to be this way about oneself. I cannot be real about
another because I do not know what is real for him. I can only tell, if I wish
to be truly honest, what is going on in me.
Let me take an example. Early in this chapter I reported Miss Shiel’s feel-
0111 ings about the ‘mess’ created by the art work. Essentially she said, ‘I find it
maddening to live with the mess! I’m neat and orderly and it is driving me
to distraction.’ But suppose her feelings had come out somewhat differently
in the disguised way that is much more common in classrooms at all levels.
She might have said, ‘You are the messiest children I’ve ever seen! You don’t
care about tidiness or cleanliness. You are just terrible!’ This is most definitely
not an example of genuineness or realness, in the sense in which I am using
these terms. There is a profound distinction between the two statements,
which I should like to spell out.
In the second statement she is telling nothing of herself, sharing none of
0111 her feelings. Doubtless the children will sense that she is angry, but because
children are perceptively shrewd, they may be uncertain as to whether she
is angry at them or has just come from an argument with the principal. It
has none of the honesty of the first statement in which she tells of her own
4111 upsetness, of her own feeling of being driven to distraction.
Another aspect of the second statement is that it is all made up of judge-

ments or evaluations, and like most judgements, they are all arguable. Are
these children messy, or are they simply excited and involved in what they
are doing? Are they all messy, or are some as disturbed by the chaos as
she? Do they care nothing about tidiness, or is it simply that they don’t care
about it every day? If a group of visitors were coming, would their attitude
be different? Are they terrible, or simply children? I trust it is evident that
when we make judgements, they are almost never fully accurate and hence
cause resentment and anger as well as guilt and apprehension. Had she used
the second statement, the response of the class would have been entirely
different.
I am going to some lengths to clarify this point because I have found from
experience that to stress the value of being real, of being one’s feelings, is
taken by some as a licence to pass judgements on others, to project on others
all the feelings that one should be ‘owning’. Nothing could be further from
my meaning.
Actually the achievement of realness is most difficult, and even when one
wishes to be truly genuine, it occurs but rarely. Certainly it is not simply a
matter of the words used, and if one is feeling judgemental, the use of a
verbal formula that sounds like the sharing of feelings will not help. It is
just another instance of a façade, of a lack of genuineness. Only slowly can
we learn to be truly real. For first of all, one must be close to one’s feelings,
capable of being aware of them. Then one must be willing to take the risk
of sharing them as they are, inside, not disguising them as judgements, or
attributing them to other people. This is why I so admire Miss Shiel’s sharing
or her anger and frustration, without in any way disguising it.
A trust in the human organism

It would be most unlikely that one could hold the three attitudes I have
described, or could commit herself to being a facilitator of learning unless
she has come to have a profound trust in the human organism and its poten-
tialities. If I distrust the human being, then I must cram her with information
of my own choosing lest she go her own mistaken way. But if I trust the
capacity of the human individual for developing her own potentiality, then
I can provide her with many opportunities and permit her to choose her
own way and her own direction in her learning.
It is clear, I believe, that the teachers rely basically upon the tendency
towards fulfilment, towards actualization, in their students. They are basing
their work on the hypothesis that students who are in real contact with
problems that are relevant to them wish to learn, want to grow, seek to
discover, endeavour to master, desire to create, move towards self-discipline.
The teacher is attempting to develop a quality of climate in the classroom
Carl R. Rogers 33
11 and a quality of personal relationship with students that will permit these
natural tendencies to come to their fruition.
Living the uncertainty of discovery

I believe it should be said that this basically confident view of the human
being and the attitudes toward students that I have described do not appear
suddenly, in some miraculous manner, in the facilitator of learning. Instead,
they come about through taking risks, through acting on tentative hypo-
011 theses. I can only state that I started my career with the firm view that
individuals must be manipulated for their own good; I only came to the atti-
tudes I have described and the trust in the individual that is implicit in them
11 because I found that these attitudes were so much more potent in producing
learning and constructive change. Hence, I believe that it is only by risking
herself in these new ways that the teacher can discover, for herself, whether
or not they are effective, whether or not they are for her.
I will then draw a conclusion, based on the experiences of the several facili-
tators and their students that have been included up to this point. When a
facilitator creates, even to a modest degree, a classroom climate characterized
0111 by all that she can achieve of realness, prizing, and empathy; when she trusts
the constructive tendency of the individual and the group; then she discovers
that she has inaugurated an educational revolution. Learning of a different
quality, proceeding at a different pace, with a greater degree of pervasiveness,
occurs. Feelings – positive, negative, confused – become a part of the class-
room experience. Learning becomes life and a very vital life at that. The stu-
dent is on the way, sometimes excitedly, sometimes reluctantly, to becoming
a learning, changing being.
Evidence from students

0111
Certainly before the research evidence was in, students were making it clear
by their reactions to student-centred or person-centred classrooms that an
educational revolution was underway. This kind of evidence persists to the
present day.
The most striking learnings of students exposed to such a climate are by
no means restricted to greater achievement in the three Rs. The significant
learnings are the more personal ones – independence, self-initiated and
responsible learning, release of creativity, a tendency to become more of a
person. I can only illustrate this by picking, almost at random, statements
0111 from students whose teachers have endeavoured to create a climate of trust,
of prizing, of realness, of understanding, and above all, of freedom. Here is
one of a number of statements made by students in a course on poetry led
(not taught) by Dr Samuel Moon.
4111
In retrospect, I find that I have actually enjoyed this course, both as a

class and as an experiment, although it had me quite unsettled at times.
This, in itself, made the course worthwhile since the majority of my
courses this semester merely had me bored with them and the whole
process of ‘higher education.’ Quite aside from anything else, due mostly
to this course, I found myself devoting more time to writing poetry than
to writing short stories, which temporarily interfered with my writing
class.
. . . I should like to point out one very definite thing which I have
gained from the course; this is an increased readiness on my part to
listen to and to seriously consider the opinions of my fellow students.
In view of my past attitude, this alone makes the course valuable. I
suppose the real result of any course can be expressed in answer to
the question, ‘Would you take it over again?’ My answer would be an
unqualified ‘Yes.’
(Moon, 1966: 227)
I should like to add to this several comments from Dr Bull’s sophomore

students in a class in adolescent psychology. The first two are midsemester
comments.
This course is proving to be a vital and profound experience for me

. . . This unique learning situation is giving me a whole new concep-
tion of just what learning is . . . I am experiencing a real growth in
this atmosphere of constructive freedom . . . the whole experience is
challenging.
I feel that the course had been of great value to me . . . I’m glad to have
had this experience because it has made me think . . . I’ve never been
so personally involved with a course before, especially outside the class-
room. It has been frustrating, rewarding, enjoyable, and tiring!
The other comments are from the end of the course:
This course is not ending with the close of the semester for me, but
continuing . . . I don’t know of any greater benefit which can be gained
from a course than this desire for further knowledge.
I feel as though this type of class situation has stimulated me more in

making me realize where my responsibilities lie, especially as far as doing
required work on my own. I no longer feel as though a test date is the
criterion for reading a book. I feel as though my future work will be done
for what I will get out of it, not just for a test mark.
Carl R. Rogers 35
11 I think that now I am acutely aware of the breakdown in communica-

tions that does exist in our society from seeing what happened in our class
. . . I’ve grown immensely. I know that I am a different person than I was
when I came into that class . . . It has done a great deal in helping me
understand myself better . . . thank you for contributing to my growth.
My idea of education has been to gain information from the teacher by

attending lectures. The emphasis and focus were on the teacher . . . One
of the biggest changes that I experienced in this class was my outlook
011 on education. Learning is something more than a grade on a report card.
No one can measure what you have learned because it’s a personal thing.
I was very confused between learning and memorization. I could memo-
11 rize very well, but I doubt if I ever learned as much as I could have. I
believe my attitude toward learning has changed from a grade-centred
outlook to a more personal one.
(Bull, 1966)
If you wish to know what this type of course seems like to a sixth grader,
let me give you a sampling of the reactions of Miss Shiel’s youngsters,
misspellings and all.
0111
I feel that I am learning self ability [sic]. I am learning not only school
work but I am learning that you can learn on your own as well as
someone can teach you.
I like this plan because there is a lot of freedom. I also learn more this
way than the other way you don’t have to wate [sic] for others you can
go at your own speed rate and it also takes a lot of responsibility.
(Shiel, 1966)
0111 Or let me take two more, from Dr Appell’s graduate class:
I have been thinking about what happened through this experience.

The only conclusion I come to is that if I try to measure what is going
on, or what I was at the beginning, I have got to know what I was when
I started – and I don’t . . . so many things I did and feel are just lost . . .
scrambled up inside . . . They don’t seem to come out in a nice little
pattern or organization I can say and write . . . There are so many things
left unsaid. I know I have only scratched the surface, I guess. I can feel
so many things almost ready to come out . . . maybe that’s enough. It
0111 seems all kinds of things have so much more meaning now than ever before
. . . This experience has had meaning, has done things to me and I am
not sure how much or how far just yet. I think I am going to be a better
me in the fall. That’s one thing I am sure of.
4111 (Appell, 1963)
You allow no play, yet I’m learning. Since the term began I seem to feel
more alive, more real to myself. I enjoy being alone as well as with other
people. My relationships with children and other adults are becoming
more emotional and involved. Eating an orange last week, I peeled the
skin off each separate orange section and liked it better with the trans-
parent shell off. It was juicier and fresher tasting that way. I began to
think, that’s how I feel sometimes, without a transparent wall around me,
really communicating my feelings. I feel that I’m growing, how much, I
don’t know. I’m thinking, considering, pondering and learning.
(Appell, 1959)
I can’t read these student statements – sixth grade, college, graduate level –
without being deeply moved. Here are teachers, risking themselves, being
themselves, trusting their students, adventuring into the existential unknown,
taking the subjective leap. And what happens? Exciting, incredible human
events. You can sense persons being created, learnings being initiated, future
citizens rising to meet the challenge of unknown worlds. If only one teacher
out of a hundred dared to risk, dared to be, dared to trust, dared to under-
stand, we would have an infusion of a living spirit into education that would,
in my estimation, be priceless.
The effect upon the instructor

Let me turn to another dimension that excites me. I have spoken of the
effect upon the student of a climate that encourages significant, self-reliant,
personal learning. But I have said nothing about the reciprocal effect upon
the instructor. When she has been the agent for the release of such self-
initiated learning, the faculty member finds herself changed as well as her
student. One such says:
To say that I am overwhelmed by what happened only faintly reflects

my feelings. I have taught for many years but I have never experienced
anything remotely resembling what occurred. I, for my part, never found
in a classroom so much of the whole person coming forth, so deeply
involved, so deeply stirred. Further, I question if in the traditional setup,
with its emphasis on subject matter, examinations, grades, there is, or
there can be a place for the ‘becoming’ person with his deep and mani-
fold needs as he struggles to fulfill himself. But this is going far afield. I
can only report to you what happened and to say that I am grateful and
that I am also humbled by the experience. I would like you to know this
for it has enriched my life and being.
(Rogers, 1961: 313)
Another faculty member reports as follows:

Carl R. Rogers 37
11 Rogers has said that relationships conducted on these assumptions

mean ‘turning present day education upside down.’ I have found this to
be true as I have tried to implement this way of living with students. The
experiences I have had have plunged me into relationships which have
been significant and challenging and beyond compare for me. They
have inspired me and stimulated me and left me at times shaken and
awed with their consequences for both me and the students. They have
led me to the fact of what I can only call . . . the tragedy of education in
our time – student after student who reports this to be his first experience
011 with total trust, with freedom to be and to move in ways most consistent
for the enhancement and maintenance of the core of dignity which some-
how has survived humiliation, distortion, and corrosive cynicism.
11 (Appell, 1959)
Too idealistic?
Some readers may feel that the whole approach of this chapter – the belief
that teachers can relate as persons to their students – is hopelessly unreal-
istic and idealistic. They may see that in essence it is encouraging both
0111 teachers and students to be creative in their relationship to each other and
in their relationship to subject matter, and feel that such a goal is quite
impossible. They are not alone in this. I have heard scientists at leading
schools of science and scholars in leading universities arguing that it is absurd
to try to encourage all students to be creative – we need hosts of mediocre
technicians and workers, and if a few creative scientists and artists and leaders
emerge, that will be enough. That may be enough for them. It may be enough
to suit you. I want to go on record as saying it is not enough to suit me.
When I realize the incredible potential in the ordinary student, I want to
try to realise it. We are working hard to release the incredible energy in the
0111 atom and the nucleus of the atom. If we do not devote equal energy – yes,
and equal money – to the release of the potential of the individual person
then the enormous discrepancy between our level of physical energy
resources and human energy resources will doom us to a deserved and
universal destruction.
I am sorry I can’t be coolly scientific about this. The issue is too urgent.
I can only be passionate in my statement that people count, that interper-
sonal relationships are important, that we know something about releasing
human potential, that we could learn much more, and that unless we give
strong positive attention to the human interpersonal side of our educational
0111 dilemma, our civilization is on its way down the drain. Better courses, better
curricula, better coverage, better teaching machines will never resolve our
dilemma in a basic way. Only persons acting like persons in their relation-
ships with their students can even begin to make a dent on this most urgent
4111 problem of modern education.
Summary
Let me try to state, somewhat more calmly and soberly, what I have said
with such feeling and passion.
I have said that it is most unfortunate that educators and the public think
about, and focus on, teaching. It leads them into a host of questions that are
either irrelevant or absurd so far as real education is concerned.
I have said that if we focused on the facilitation of learning – how, why,
and when the student learns, and how learning seems and feels from the
inside – we might be on a much more profitable track.
I have said that we have some knowledge, and could gain more, about
the conditions that facilitate learning, and that one of the most important
of these conditions is the attitudinal quality of the interpersonal relationship
between facilitator and learner.
Those attitudes that appear effective in promoting learning can be
described. First of all is a transparent realness in the facilitator, a willing-
ness to be a person, to be and live the feelings and thoughts of the moment.
When this realness includes a prizing, caring, a trust and respect for the
learner, the climate for learning is enhanced. When it includes a sensitive
and accurate emphatic listening, then indeed a freeing climate, stimulative
of self-initiated learning and growth, exists. The student is trusted to develop.
I have tried to make plain that individuals who hold such attitudes, and
are bold enough to act on them, do not simply modify classroom methods
– they revolutionize them. They perform almost none of the functions of
teachers. It is no longer accurate to call them teachers. They are catalysers,
facilitators, giving freedom and life and the opportunity to learn, to students.
I have brought in the cumulating research evidence that suggests that
individuals who hold such attitudes are regarded as effective in the class-
room; that the problems that concern them have to do with the release of
potential, not the deficiencies of their students; that they seem to create
classroom situations in which there are not admired children and disliked
children, but in which affection and liking are part of the life of every child;
that in classrooms approaching such a psychological climate, children learn
more of the conventional subjects.
But I have intentionally gone beyond the empirical findings to try to take
you into the inner life of the student – elementary, college, and graduate –
who is fortunate enough to live and learn in such an interpersonal rela-
tionship with a facilitator, in order to let you see what learning feels like
when it is free, self-initiated and spontaneous. I have tried to indicate how
it even changes the student–student relationship – making it more aware,
more caring, more sensitive, as well as increasing the self-related learning of
significant material. I have spoken of the change it brings about in the faculty
member.
Throughout, I have tried to indicate that if we are to have citizens who
can live constructively in this kaleidoscopically changing world, we can only
Carl R. Rogers 39
11 have them if we are willing for them to become self-starting, self-initiating

learners. Finally, it has been my purpose to show that this kind of learner
develops best, so far as we now know, in a growth-promoting, facilitative
relationship with a person.
References
Appell, Morey L. (1959) ‘Selected student reactions to student-centered courses’,
unpublished manuscript, Indiana State University.
011 Appell, Morey L. (1963) ‘Self-understanding for the guidance counselor’, Personnel
Guidance Journal, October, pp. 143–148.
Axline, Virginia M. (1944) ‘Morale on the school front’, Journal of Educational
Research, pp. 521–533.
11 Bull, Patricia (1966) ‘Student reactions, Fall, 1965’, unpublished manuscript, New
York State University College.
Moon, Samuel F. (1966) ‘Teaching the self,’ Improving College and University
Teaching, 14 Autumn, pp. 213–229.
Rogers, Carl R. (1961) On Becoming a Person, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Shiel, Barbara J. (1966) ‘Evaluation: a self-directed curriculum, 1965’, unpublished
manuscript, n.p.
0111
0111
0111
4111
Chapter 3
From Technical Rationality to

reflection-in-action
Donald Schön
The dominant epistemology of practice

According to the model of Technical Rationality – the view of professional
knowledge that has most powerfully shaped both our thinking about the
professions and the institutional relations of research, education, and prac-
tice – professional activity consists of instrumental problem solving made
rigorous by the application of scientific theory and technique. Although all
occupations are concerned, in this view, with the instrumental adjustment
of means to ends, only the professions practice rigorously technical problem
solving based on specialized scientific knowledge.
The prototypes of professional expertise are the ‘learned professions’ of
medicine and law and, close behind these, business and engineering. These
are, in Nathan Glazer’s terms, the ‘major’ or ‘near-major’ professions (Glazer,
1974: 345). They are distinct from ‘minor’ professions such as social work,
librarianship, education, divinity and town planning. In the essay from which
these terms are drawn, Glazer (1974) argues that the schools of the minor
professions are hopelessly non-rigorous, dependent on representatives of
academic disciplines, such as economics or political science, who are super-
ior in status to the professions themselves. But what is of greatest interest
from our point of view is that Glazer’s distinction between major and minor
professions rests on a particularly well-articulated version of the model of
Technical Rationality. The major professions are ‘disciplined by an unam-
biguous end – health, success in litigation, profit – which settles men’s minds’
(ibid.: 363) and they operate in stable institutional contexts. Hence they
are grounded in systematic, fundamental knowledge, of which scientific
knowledge is the prototype, or else they have ‘a high component of strictly
technological knowledge based on science in the education which they
provide’ (ibid.: 349). In contrast, the minor professions suffer from shifting,
This is an edited version of an article previously published in The Reflective Practitioner,

1983, New York: Basic Books; 1991, Avebury: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Donald Schön 41
11 ambiguous ends and from unstable institutional contexts of practice, and are
therefore unable to develop a base of systematic, scientific professional know-
ledge. For Glazer, the development of a scientific knowledge base depends
on fixed, unambiguous ends because professional practice is an instrumental
activity. If applied science consists of cumulative, empirical knowledge about
the means best suited to chosen ends, how can a profession ground itself in
science when its ends are confused or unstable?
The systematic knowledge base of a profession is thought to have four essen-
tial properties. It is specialized, firmly bounded, scientific and standardized.
011 This last point is particularly important, because it bears on the paradigmatic
relationship that holds, according to Technical Rationality, between a profes-
sion’s knowledge base and its practice. In Wilbert Moore’s words:
11
If every professional problem were in all respects unique, solutions would
be at best accidental, and therefore have nothing to do with expert
knowledge. What we are suggesting, on the contrary, is that there are
sufficient uniformities in problems and in devices for solving them to
qualify the solvers as professionals . . . professionals apply very general
principles, standardized knowledge, to concrete problems . . .
0111 (Moore, 1970: 56)
This concept of ‘application’ leads to a view of professional knowledge as a

hierarchy in which ‘general principles’ occupy the highest level and ‘concrete
problem solving’ the lowest. As Edgar Schein has put it, there are three
components to professional knowledge:
1 An underlying discipline or basic science component upon which the prac-

tice rests or from which it is developed.
2 An applied science or ‘engineering’ component from which many of the
0111 day-to-day diagnostic procedures and problem-solutions are derived.
3 A skills and attitudinal component that concerns the actual performance
of services to the client, using the underlying basic and applied know-
ledge.
(Schein, 1973: 39)
The application of basic science yields applied science. Applied science yields
diagnostic and problem solving techniques, which are applied in turn to the
actual delivery of services. Applied science is said to ‘rest on’ the founda-
0111 tion of basic science. And the more basic and general the knowledge, the
higher the status of its producer.
When the representatives of aspiring professions consider the problem of
rising to full professional status, they often ask whether their knowledge
4111 base has the requisite properties and whether it is regularly applied to the
everyday problems of practice. Thus, in an article entitled ‘The librarian:

from occupation to profession’ the author states that:
the central gap is of course the failure to develop a general body of scien-
tific knowledge bearing precisely on this problem, in the way that the
medical profession with its auxiliary scientific fields has developed an
immense body of knowledge with which to cure human diseases.
(Goode, 1966: 39)
The sciences in which he proposes to ground his profession are ‘communi-

cations theory, the sociology or psychology of mass communications, or the
psychology of learning as it applies to reading’ (Goode, 1966: 39). Unfor-
tunately, however, he finds that:
most day-to-day professional work utilizes rather concrete rule-of-thumb

local regulations and rules and major catalog systems . . . The problems
of selection and organization are dealt with on a highly empiricist basis,
concretely, with little reference to general scientific principles.
(Goode, 1966: 39)
And a social worker, considering the same sort of question, concludes that
‘social work is already a profession’ because it has a basis in:
theory construction via systematic research. To generate valid theory

that will provide a solid base for professional techniques requires the
application of the scientific method to the service-related problems of
the profession. Continued employment of the scientific method is
nurtured by and in turn reinforces the element of rationality.
(Greenwood, 1966: 11)
It is by progressing along this route that social work seeks to ‘rise within the
professional hierarchy so that it, too, might enjoy maximum prestige,
authority, and monopoly which presently belong to a few top professions’
(Greenwood, 1966: 19).
If the model of Technical Rationality appeared only in such statements
of intent, or in programmatic descriptions of professional knowledge, we
might have some doubts about its dominance. But the model is also em-
bedded in the institutional context of professional life. It is implicit in the
institutionalized relations of research and practice, and in the normative
curricula of professional education. Even when practitioners, educators, and
researchers question the model of Technical Rationality, they are party to
institutions that perpetuate it.
From the point of view of the model of Technical Rationality institu-
tionalized in the professional curriculum, real knowledge lies in the theories
Donald Schön 43
11 and techniques of basic and applied science. Hence, these disciplines should
come first. ‘Skills’ in the use of theory and technique to solve concrete prob-
lems should come later on, when the student has learned the relevant science
– first, because he cannot learn skills of application until he has learned
applicable knowledge; and second, because skills are an ambiguous,
secondary kind of knowledge. There is something disturbing about calling
them ‘knowledge’ at all.
Again, medicine is the prototypical example. Ever since the Flexner
Report, which revolutionized medical education in the early decades of the
011 twentieth century, medical schools have devoted the first two years of study
to the basic sciences – chemistry, physiology, pathology – as ‘the appropriate
foundation for later clinical training’ (Thorne, 1973: 30). Even the physical
11 arrangement of the curriculum reflects the basic division among the elements
of professional knowledge:
The separation of the medical school curriculum into two dis-

junctive stages, the preclinical and the clinical, reflects the division
between theory and practice. The division also appears in the location
of training and in medical school facilities. The sciences of biochem-
0111 istry, physiology, pathology and pharmacology are learned from
classrooms and laboratories, that is, in formal academic settings. More
practical training, in clinical arts such as internal medicine, obstetrics
and pediatrics, takes place in hospital clinics, within actual institutions
of delivery.
(Thorne, 1973: 31)
The origins of Technical Rationality

It is striking that the dominant model of professional knowledge seems to
0111 its proponents to require very little justification. How comes it that in the
second half of the twentieth century we found in our universities a domi-
nant view of professional knowledge as the application of scientific theory
and technique to the instrumental problems of practice?
The answer to this question lies in the last three hundred years of the his-
tory of Western ideas and institutions. Technical Rationality is the heritage
of Positivism, the powerful philosophical doctrine that grew up in the nine-
teenth century as an account of the rise of science and technology and as a
social movement aimed at applying the achievements of science and tech-
nology to the well-being of mankind. It became institutionalized in the mod-
0111 ern university, founded in the late nineteenth century when Positivism was
at its height, and in the professional schools that secured their place in the
university in the early decades of the twentieth century.
Since the Reformation, the history of the West has been shaped by the
4111 rise of science and technology and by the industrial movement that was both
cause and consequence of the increasingly powerful scientific world-view.

As the scientific world-view gained dominance, so did the idea that human
progress would be achieved by harnessing science to create technology for
the achievement of human ends. This Technological Programme1 became
a major theme for the philosophers of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth
century, and by the late nineteenth century had been firmly established as
a pillar of conventional wisdom. By this time, too, the professions had come
to be seen as vehicles for the application of the new sciences to the achieve-
ment of human progress. The engineers, closely tied to the development of
industrial technology, became a model of technical practice for the other
professions. Medicine, a learned profession with origins in the medieval
universities, was refashioned in the new image of a science-based technique
for the preservation of health. And statecraft came to be seen as a kind of
social engineering. As the professions evolved and proliferated, they became,
increasingly, the principal agents of the Technological Programme.
As the scientific movement, industrialism, and the Technological Pro-
gramme became dominant in Western society, a philosophy emerged that
sought both to give an account of the triumphs of science and technology
and to purge mankind of the residues of religion, mysticism and metaphysics
that still prevented scientific thought and technological practice from wholly
ruling over the affairs of men. It was in this spirit that, in the first half of
the nineteenth century, Auguste Comte first expressed the three principal
doctrines of Positivism. First, there was the conviction that empirical science
was not just a form of knowledge but the only source of positive knowledge
of the world. Second, there was the intention to cleanse men’s minds of
mysticism, superstition, and other forms of pseudoknowledge. And finally,
there was the programme of extending scientific knowledge and technical
control to human society.
As Positivists became increasingly sophisticated in their efforts to explain
and justify the exclusivity of scientific knowledge, they recognized to what
extent observational statements were theory-laden, and found it necessary to
ground empirical knowledge in irreducible elements of sensory experience.
They began to see laws of nature not as facts inherent in nature but as con-
structs created to explain observed phenomena, and science became for them
a hypothetico-deductive system. In order to account for his observations, the
scientist constructed hypotheses, abstract models of an unseen world that
could be tested only indirectly through deductions susceptible to confirma-
tion or disconfirmation by experiment. The heart of scientific inquiry con-
sisted of the use of crucial experiments to choose among competing theories
of explanation.
In the light of Positivist doctrines such as these, practice appeared as a
puzzling anomaly. Practical knowledge exists, but it does not fit neatly into
Positivist categories. We cannot readily treat it as a form of descriptive know-
ledge of the world, nor can we reduce it to the analytic schemas of logic and
Donald Schön 45
11 mathematics. Positivism solved the puzzle of practical knowledge in a way

that had been foreshadowed by the Technological Programme and by
Comte’s programme for applying science to morality and politics. Practical
knowledge was to be construed as knowledge of the relationship of means
to ends. Given agreement about ends,2 the question, ‘How ought I to act?’
could be reduced to a merely instrumental question about the means best
suited to achieve one’s ends. Disagreement about means could be resolved
by reference to facts concerning the possible means, their relevant conse-
quences, and the methods for comparing them with respect to the chosen
011 ends of action. Ultimately, the instrumental question could be resolved by
recourse to experiment. And as men built up scientific understandings of
cause and effect, causal relationships could be mapped on to instrumental
11 ones. It would be possible to select the means appropriate to one’s ends by
applying the relevant scientific theory. The question, ‘How ought I to act?’
could become a scientific one, and the best means could be selected by the
use of the science-based technique.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the professions of
engineering and medicine achieved dramatic successes in reliably adjusting
means to ends and became models of instrumental practice. The engineer’s
0111 design and analysis of materials and artefacts, the physician’s diagnosis and
treatment of disease, became prototypes of the science-based, technical prac-
tice that was destined to supplant craft and artistry. For according to the
Positivist epistemology of practice, craft and artistry had no lasting place in
rigorous practical knowledge.
Universities came of age in the United States, assumed their now familiar
structure and styles of operation, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries when science and technology were on the rise and the intellectual
hegemony of Positivism was beginning to be established. Although other tra-
ditions of thought were never wholly extinguished in American universities –
0111 indeed, in some places managed to preserve a kind of local dominance –
nevertheless in the United States more than in any other nation except
Germany the very heart of the university was given over to the scientific enter-
prise, to the ethos of the Technological Programme, and to Positivism.
But for this, the professionalizing occupations paid a price. They had to
accept the Positivist epistemology of practice that was now built into the
very tissue of the universities. And they had also to accept the fundamental
division of labour on which Veblen (1962) had placed so great an emphasis.
It was to be the business of university-based scientists and scholars to create
the fundamental theory that professionals and technicians would apply to
0111 practice. The function of the professional school would be:
the transmission to its students of the generalized and systematic know-

ledge that is the basis of professional performance.
4111 (Hughes, 1973: 660)
But this division of labour reflected a hierarchy of kinds of knowledge that

was also a ladder of status. Those who create new theory were thought to
be higher in status than those who apply it, and the schools of ‘higher
learning’ were thought to be superior to the ‘lower’.
Emerging awareness of the limits of Technical

Rationality
Following World War II, the United States Government began an unparal-
leled increase in the rate of spending for research. As government spending for
research increased, research institutions proliferated. Some were associated
with the universities, others stood outside them. All were organized around the
production of new scientific knowledge and were largely promoted on the basis
of the proposition that the production of new scientific knowledge could be
used to create wealth, achieve national goals, improve human life, and solve
social problems. Nowhere was the rate of increase in research spending more
dramatic, and nowhere were the results of that spending more visible, than in
the field of medicine. The great centres of medical research and teaching were
expanded, and new ones were created. The medical research centre, with its
medical school and its teaching hospital, became the institutional model to
which other professions aspired. Other professions, hoping to achieve some of
medicine’s effectiveness and prestige, sought to emulate its linkage of research
and teaching institutions, its hierarchy of research and clinical roles, and its
system for connecting basic and applied research to practice.
The prestige and apparent success of the medical and engineering models
exerted a great attraction for the social sciences. In fields such as education, social
work, planning, and policy making, social scientists attempted to do research, to
apply it, and to educate practitioners, all according to their perceptions of the
models of medicine and engineering. Indeed, the very language of social scien-
tists, rich in reference to measurement, controlled experiment, applied science,
laboratories and clinics, was striking in its reverence for these models.
However, both the general public and the professionals have become
increasingly aware of the flaws and limitations of the professions. The profes-
sions have suffered a crisis of legitimacy rooted both in their perceived failure
to live up to their own norms and in their perceived incapacity to help
society achieve its objectives and solve its problems. Increasingly, we have
become aware of the importance to actual practice of phenomena –
complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value-conflict – that do
not fit the model of Technical Rationality. Now, in the light of the Positivist
origins of Technical Rationality, we can more readily see why these
phenomena are so troublesome.
From the perspective of Technical Rationality, professional practice is a
process of problem solving. Problems of choice or decision are solved through
the selection, from available means, of the one best suited to established ends.
Donald Schön 47
11 But with this emphasis on problem solving, we ignore problem setting, the
process by which we define the decision to be made, the ends to be achieved,
the means that may be chosen. In real-world practice, problems do not pre-
sent themselves to the practitioner as givens. They must be constructed from
the materials of problematic situations that are puzzling, troubling and uncer-
tain. In order to convert a problematic situation to a problem, a practitioner
must do a certain kind of work. He must make sense of an uncertain situa-
tion that initially makes no sense. When professionals consider what road to
build, for example, they deal usually with a complex and ill-defined situation
011 in which geographic, topological, financial, economic and political issues are
mixed up together. Once they have somehow decided what road to build and
go on to consider how best to build it, they may have a problem they can
11 solve by the application of available techniques; but when the road they have
built leads unexpectedly to the destruction of a neighbourhood, they may find
themselves again in a situation of uncertainty.
It is this sort of situation that professionals are coming increasingly to see
as central to their practice. They are coming to recognize that although
problem setting is a necessary condition for technical problem solving, it is
not itself a technical problem. When we set the problem, we select what we
0111 will treat as the ‘things’ of the situation, we set the boundaries of our atten-
tion to it, and we impose upon it a coherence that allows us to say what is
wrong and in what directions the situation needs to be changed. Problem
setting is a process in which, interactively, we name the things to which we
will attend and frame the context in which we will attend to them.
Even when a problem has been constructed, it may escape the categories
of applied science because it presents itself as unique or unstable. In order
to solve a problem by the application of existing theory or technique, a prac-
titioner must be able to map those categories on to features of the practice
situation. When a nutritionist finds a diet deficient in lysine, for example,
0111 dietary supplements known to contain lysine can be recommended. But a
unique case falls outside the categories of applied theory; an unstable situa-
tion slips out from under them. A nutritionist attempting a planned
nutritional intervention in a rural Central American community may dis-
cover that the intervention fails because the situation has become something
other than the one planned for.
Technical Rationality depends on agreement about ends. When ends are
fixed and clear, then the decision to act can present itself as an instrumental
problem. But when ends are confused and conflicting, there is as yet no
‘problem’ to solve. A conflict of ends cannot be resolved by the use of tech-
0111 niques derived from applied research. It is rather through the non-technical
process of framing the problematic situation that we may organize and clarify
both the ends to be achieved and the possible means of achieving them.
Similarly, when there are conflicting paradigms of professional practice,
4111 such as we find in the pluralism of psychiatry, social work or town planning,
there is no clearly established context for the use of technique. There is

contention over multiple ways of framing the practice role, each of which
entrains a distinctive approach to problem setting and solving. And when
practitioners do resolve conflicting role frames, it is through a kind of inquiry
that falls outside the model of Technical Rationality. Again, it is the work
of naming and framing that creates the conditions necessary to the exercise
of technical expertise.
We can readily understand, therefore, not only why uncertainty, unique-
ness, instability and value conflict are so troublesome to the Positivist episte-
mology of practice but also why practitioners bound by this epistemology
find themselves caught in a dilemma. Their definition of rigorous profes-
sional knowledge excludes phenomena they have learned to see as central
to their practice. And artistic ways of coping with these phenomena do not
qualify, for them, as rigorous professional knowledge.
This dilemma of ‘rigour or relevance’ arises more acutely in some areas of
practice than in others. In the varied topography of professional practice,
there is a high, hard ground where practitioners can make effective use of
research-based theory and technique, and there is a swampy lowland where
situations are confusing ‘messes’ incapable of technical solution. The diffi-
culty is that the problems of the high ground, however great their technical
interest, are often relatively unimportant to clients or to the larger society,
whereas in the swamp are the problems of greatest human concern. Shall
the practitioner stay on the high, hard ground where he can practise rigor-
ously, as he understands rigour, but where he is constrained to deal with
problems of relatively little social importance? Or shall he descend to the
swamp where he can engage the most important and challenging problems
if he is willing to forsake technical rigour?
In ‘major’ professions such as medicine, engineering or agronomy there
are zones where practitioners can function as technical experts. But there are
also zones where the major professions resemble the minor ones. Medical
technologies, such as kidney dialysis, generate demands in excess of the will-
ingness of the nation to invest in medical care. Engineering that seems pow-
erful and elegant when judged from a narrowly technical perspective may also
carry unacceptable risks to environmental quality or human safety. Large-
scale, industrialized agriculture destroys the peasant economies of the devel-
oping worlds. How should professionals take account of such issues as these?
There are those who choose the swampy lowlands. They deliberately
involve themselves in messy but crucially important problems and, when
asked to describe their methods of inquiry, they speak of experience, trial
and error, intuition, and muddling through.
Other professionals opt for the high ground. Hungry for technical rigour,
devoted to an image of solid professional competence, or fearful of entering
a world in which they feel they do not know what they are doing, they
choose to confine themselves to a narrowly technical practice.
Donald Schön 49
11 Many practitioners have responded to the dilemma of rigour or relevance

by cutting the practice situation to fit professional knowledge. This they
do in several ways. They may become selectively inattentive to data that
fall outside their categories. Designers of management information systems
may simply avoid noticing, for example, how their systems trigger games
of control and evasion. They may use ‘junk categories’ to explain away
discrepant data,3 as technical analysts sometimes attribute the failure of their
recommendations to ‘personality’ or to ‘politics’. Or they may try to force
the situation into a mould that lends itself to the use of available techniques.
011 Thus, an industrial engineer may simplify the actual arrangement of a manu-
facturing system in order to make it easier to analyse; or, more ominously,
members of the helping professions may get rid of clients who resist profes-
11 sional help, relegating the categories such as ‘problem tenant’ or ‘rebellious
child’. All such strategies carry a danger of misreading situations, or manip-
ulating them, to serve the practitioner’s interest in maintaining his
confidence in his standard models and techniques. When people are involved
in the situation, the practitioner may preserve his sense of expertise at his
clients’ expense.
Schein (1973), Glazer (1974) and Simon (1972) propose three differ-
0111 ent approaches to the limitations of Technical Rationality and the related
dilemma of rigour or relevance. All three employ a common strategy, how-
ever. They try to fill the gap between the scientific basis of professional know-
ledge and the demands of real-world practice in such a way as to preserve the
model of Technical Rationality. Schein does it by segregating convergent sci-
ence from divergent practice, relegating divergence to a residual category
called ‘divergent skill’. Glazer does it by attributing convergence to the major
professions, which he applauds, and divergence to the minor professions,
which he dismisses. Simon does it by proposing a science of design that
depends on having well-formed instrumental problems to begin with.
0111 Yet the Positivist epistemology of practice, the model of professional know-
ledge to which these writers cling, has fallen into disrepute in its original
home, the philosophy of science. Among philosophers of science no one
wants any longer to be called a Positivist, and there is a rebirth of interest
in the ancient topics of craft, artistry and myth – topics whose fate Positivism
once claimed to have sealed. It seems clear, however, that the dilemma that
afflicts the professions hinges not on science per se but on the Positivist view
of science. From this perspective, we tend to see science, after the fact, as a
body of established propositions derived from research. When we recognize
their limited utility in practice, we experience the dilemma of rigour or rele-
0111 vance. But we may also consider science before the fact as a process in which
scientists grapple with uncertainties and display arts of inquiry akin to the
uncertainties and arts of practice.
Let us then reconsider the question of professional knowledge; let us stand
4111 the question on its head. If the model of Technical Rationality is incomplete,
in that it fails to account for the practical competence in ‘divergent’ situations,

so much the worse for the model. Let us search, instead, for an epistemology of
practice implicit in the artistic, intuitive processes that some practitioners do
bring to situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value conflict.
Reflection-in-action
When we go about the spontaneous, intuitive performance of the actions of
everyday life, we show ourselves to be knowledgeable in a special way. Often
we cannot say what it is that we know. When we try to describe it we find
ourselves at a loss, or we produce descriptions that are obviously inappro-
priate. Our knowing is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and
in our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing. It seems right to say that
our knowing is in our action.
Similarly, the workaday life of the professional depends on tacit knowing-
in-action. Every competent practitioner can recognize phenomena – families
of symptoms associated with a particular disease, peculiarities of a certain
kind of building site, irregularities of materials or structures – for which he
cannot give a reasonably accurate or complete description. In his day-to-day
practice he makes innumerable judgements of quality for which he cannot
state adequate criteria, and he displays skills for which he cannot state the
rules and procedures. Even when he makes conscious use of research-based
theories and techniques, he is dependent on tacit recognitions, judgements
and skilful performances.
On the other hand, both ordinary people and professional practitioners
often think about what they are doing, sometimes even while doing it.
Stimulated by surprise, they turn thought back on action and on the knowing
that is implicit in action. They may ask themselves, for example, ‘What
features do I notice when I recognize this thing? What are the criteria by
which I make this judgement? What procedures am I enacting when I per-
form this skill? How am I framing the problem that I am trying to solve?’
Usually, reflection on knowing-in-action goes together with reflection on
the stuff at hand. There is some puzzling, or troubling, or interesting phenom-
enon with which the individual is trying to deal. As he tries to make sense
of it, he also reflects on the understandings that have been implicit in his
action, understandings that he surfaces, criticizes, restructures and embodies
in further action.
It is this entire process of reflection-in-action that is central to the ‘art’
by which practitioners sometimes deal well with situations of uncertainty,
instability, uniqueness and value conflict.
Knowing-in-action. Once we put aside the model of Technical Rationality,
which leads us to think of intelligent practice as an application of knowledge
to instrumental decisions, there is nothing strange about the idea that a
kind of knowing is inherent in intelligent action. Common sense admits the
Donald Schön 51
11 category of know-how, and it does not stretch common sense very much to
say that the know-how is in the action – that a tightrope walker’s know-how,
for example, lies in, and is revealed by, the way he takes his trip across the
wire, or that a big-league pitcher’s know-how is in his way of pitching to a
batter’s weakness, changing his pace, or distributing his energies over the
course of a game. There is nothing in common sense to make us say that know-
how consists of rules or plans that we entertain in the mind prior to action.
Although we sometimes think before acting, it is also true that in much of
the spontaneous behaviour of skilful practice we reveal a kind of knowing
011 that does not stem from a prior intellectual operation.
As Gilbert Ryle has put it:
11 What distinguishes sensible from silly operations is not their parentage

but their procedure, and this holds no less for intellectual than for prac-
tical performances. ‘Intelligent’ cannot be defined in terms of ‘intel-
lectual’ or ‘knowing how’ in terms of ‘knowing that’; ‘thinking what I am
doing’ does not connote ‘both thinking what to do and doing it.’ When
I do something intelligently . . . I am doing one thing and not two. My
performance has a special procedure or manner, not special antecedents.
0111 (Ryle, 1949: 32)
Over the years, several writers on the epistemology of practice have been
struck by the fact that skilful action often reveals a ‘knowing more than we
can say’.
Psycholinguists have noted that we speak in conformity with rules of
phonology and syntax that most of us cannot describe.4 Alfred Schutz (1962)
and his intellectual descendants have analysed the tacit, everyday know-how
that we bring to social interactions such as the rituals of greeting, ending a
meeting, or standing in a crowded elevator. Birdwhistell (1970) has made
0111 comparable contributions to a description of the tacit knowledge embodied
in our use and recognition of movement and gesture. In these domains, too,
we behave according to rules and procedures that we cannot usually describe
and of which we are often unaware.
In examples like these, knowing has the following properties:
• There are actions, recognitions and judgements that we know how to

carry out spontaneously; we do not have to think about them prior to
or during their performance.
• We are often unaware of having learned to do these things; we simply
0111 find ourselves doing them.
• In some cases, we were once aware of the understandings that were subse-
quently internalized in our feeling for the stuff of action. In other cases,
we may never have been aware of them. In both cases, however, we are
4111 usually unable to describe the knowing that our action reveals.
It is in this sense that I speak of knowing-in-action, the characteristic

mode of ordinary practical knowledge.
Reflecting-in-action. If common sense recognizes knowing-in-action, it also
recognizes that we sometimes think about what we are doing. Phrases such
as ‘thinking on your feet’, ‘keeping your wits about you’, and ‘learning by
doing’ suggest not only that we can think about doing but that we can think
about doing something while doing it. Some of the most interesting exam-
ples of this process occur in the midst of a performance.
Big-league baseball pitchers speak, for example, of the experience of ‘find-
ing the groove’:
Only a few pitchers can control the whole game with pure physical
ability. The rest have to learn to adjust once they’re out there. If they
can’t, they’re dead ducks.
[You get] a special feel for the ball, a kind of command that lets you
repeat the exact same thing you did before that proved successful.
Finding your groove has to do with studying those winning habits and
trying to repeat them every time you perform.
(Maslow, 1981: 34)
I do not wholly understand what it means to ‘find the groove’. It is clear,

however, that the pitchers are talking about a particular kind of reflection.
What is ‘learning to adjust once you’re out there’? Presumably it involves
noticing how you have been pitching to the batters and how well it has
been working, and on the basis of these thoughts and observations, changing
the way you have been doing it. When you get a ‘feel for the ball’ that lets
you ‘repeat the exact same thing you did before that proved successful’, you
are noticing, at the very least, that you have been doing something right,
and your ‘feeling’ allows you to do that something again. When you ‘study
those winning habits’, you are thinking about the know-how that has enabled
you to win. The pitchers seem to be talking about a kind of reflection on
their patterns of action, on the situations in which they are performing, and
on the know-how implicit in their performance. They are reflecting on action
and, in some cases, reflecting in action.
When good jazz musicians improvise together, they also manifest a ‘feel for’
their material and they make on-the-spot adjustments to the sounds they
hear. Listening to one another and to themselves, they feel where the
music is going and adjust their playing accordingly. They can do this, first of
all, because their collective effort at musical invention makes use of a schema
– a metric, melodic and harmonic schema familiar to all the participants –
that gives a predictable order to the piece. In addition, each of the musicians
has at the ready a repertoire of musical figures that he can deliver at
Donald Schön 53
11 appropriate moments. Improvisation consists of varying, combining and

recombining a set of figures within the schema that bounds and gives coher-
ence to the performance. As the musicians feel the direction of the music that
is developing out of their interwoven contributions, they make new sense of
it and adjust their performance to the new sense they have made. They are
reflecting-in-action on the music they are collectively making and on their
individual contributions to it, thinking what they are doing and, in the pro-
cess, evolving their way of doing it. Of course, we need not suppose that they
reflect-in-action in the medium of words. More likely, they reflect through a
011 ‘feel for the music’ that is not unlike the pitcher’s ‘feel for the ball’.
Much reflection-in-action hinges on the experience of surprise. When
intuitive, spontaneous performance yields nothing more than the results
11 expected for it, then we tend not to think about it. But when intuitive perfor-
mance leads to surprises, pleasing and promising or unwanted, we may
respond by reflecting-in-action. Like the baseball pitcher, we may reflect on
our ‘winning habits’; or like the jazz musician, on our sense of the music
we have been making; or like the designer, on the misfit we have uninten-
tionally created. In such processes, reflection tends to focus interactively on
the outcomes of action, the action itself, and the intuitive knowing implicit
0111 in the action.
Let us consider an example that reveals these processes in some detail.
In an article entitled ‘If you want to get ahead, get a theory’, Inhelder and
Karmiloff-Smith describe a rather unusual experiment concerning ‘children’s
processes of discovery in action’ (Inhelder and Karmiloff-Smith, 1975: 195).
They asked their subjects to balance wooden blocks on a metal bar. Some
of the blocks were plain wooden blocks, but others were conspicuously or
inconspicuously weighted at one end. The authors attended to the sponta-
neous processes by which the children tried to learn about the properties of
the blocks, balance them on the bar, and regulate their actions after success
0111 or failure.
They found that virtually all children aged 6 to 7 began the task in the
same way:
all blocks were systematically first tried at their geometric centre.

(Inhelder and Karmiloff-Smith, 1975: 202)
And they found that slightly older children would not only place all blocks
at their geometric centre but that:
0111 when asked to add small blocks of varying shapes and sizes to blocks
already in balance, they added up to ten blocks precariously one on top
of the other at the geometric centre rather than distributing them at
the extremities.
4111 (ibid.: 203)
They explain this persistent and virtually universal behaviour by attributing

to the children what they call a ‘theory-in-action’: a ‘geometric centre
theory’ of balancing, or, as one child put it, a theory that ‘things always bal-
ance in the middle’.
Of course, when the children tried to balance the counterweighted blocks
at their geometric centres, they failed. How did they respond to failure? Some
children made what the authors called an ‘action-response’:
They now placed the very same blocks more and more systematically at
the geometric centre, with only very slight corrections around this point.
They showed considerable surprise at not being able to balance the
blocks a second time (‘Heh, what’s wrong with this one, it worked
before’) . . . Action sequences then became reduced to: Place carefully
at geometric centre, correct very slightly around this centre, abandon
all attempts, declaring the object ‘impossible’ to balance.
Other children, generally between the ages of 7 and 8, responded in a very

different ways. When the counterweighted blocks failed to balance at their
geometric centres, these children began to decentre them. They did this first
with conspicuously counterweighted blocks. Then:
gradually, and often almost reluctantly, the 7 to 8 year olds began to

make corrections also on the inconspicuous weight blocks . . . At this
point, we observed many pauses during action sequences on the incon-
spicuous weight items.
(ibid.: 205)
Later still:
As the children were now really beginning to question the generality of

their geometric centre theory, a negative response at the geometric
centre sufficed to have the child rapidly make corrections toward the
point of balance.
(ibid.)
And finally:
children paused before each item, roughly assessed the weight distribu-
tion of the block by lifting it (‘you have to be careful, sometimes it’s
just as heavy on each side, sometimes it’s heavier on one side’), inferred
the probable point of balance and then placed the object immediately
very close to it, without making any attempts at first balancing at the
geometric centre.
(ibid.)
Donald Schön 55
11 The children now behaved as though they had come to hold a theory-in-
action that blocks balance, not at their geometric centres, but at their centres
of gravity.
This second pattern of response to error, the authors call ‘theory-response’.
Children work their way toward it through a series of stages. When they are
first confronted with a number of events that refute their geometric centre
theories-in-action, they stop and think. Then, starting with the conspicuous-
weight blocks, they begin to make corrections away from the geometric
centre. Finally, when they have really abandoned their earlier theories-in-
011 action, they weigh all the blocks in their hands so as to infer the probable
point of balance. As they shift their theories of balancing from geometric
centre to centre of gravity, they also shift from a ‘success orientation’ to a
11 ‘theory orientation’. Positive and negative results come to be taken not as
signs of success or failure in action but as information relevant to a theory
of balancing.
It is interesting to note that as the authors observe and describe this
process, they are compelled to invent a language. They describe theories-in-
action that the children themselves cannot describe:
0111 Indeed, although the (younger) child’s action sequences bear eloquent
witness to a theory-in-action implicit in his behavior, this should not
be taken as a capacity to conceptualize explicitly on what he is doing
and why.
Knowing-in-action, which the child may represent to himself in terms of a

‘feel for the blocks’, the observers redescribe in terms of ‘theories’. I shall say
that they convert the child’s knowing-in-action to knowledge-in-action.
A conversion of this kind seems to be inevitable in any attempt to talk
0111 about reflection-in-action. One must use words to describe a kind of knowing,
and a change of knowing, which are probably not originally represented in
words at all. Thus, from their observations of the children’s behaviour, the
authors make verbal descriptions of the children’s intuitive understandings.
These are the authors’ theories about the children’s knowing-in-action. Like
all such theories, they are deliberate, idiosyncratic constructions, and they
can be put to experimental test:
just as the child was constructing a theory-in-action in his endeavour

to balance the blocks, so we, too, were making on-the-spot hypotheses
0111 about the child’s theories and providing opportunities for negative and
positive responses in order to verify our own theories!
(ibid.: 199)
4111 Reflecting-in-practice. The block-balancing experiment is a beautiful

example of reflection-in-action, but it is very far removed from our usual
images of professional practice. If we are to relate the idea of reflection-in-

action to professional practice, we must consider what a practice is and how
it is like and unlike the kinds of action we have been discussing.
The word ‘practice’ is ambiguous. When we speak of a lawyer’s practice,
we mean the kinds of things he does, the kinds of clients he has, the range
of cases he is called upon to handle. When we speak of someone practising
the piano, however, we mean the repetitive or experimental activity by
which he tries to increase his proficiency on the instrument. In the first
sense, ‘practice’ refers to performance in a range of professional situations.
In the second, it refers to preparation for performance. But professional prac-
tice also includes an element of repetition. A professional practitioner is a
specialist who encounters certain types of situations again and again. This
is suggested by the way in which professionals use the word ‘case’ – or project,
account, commission, or deal, depending on the profession. All such terms
denote the units that make up a practice, and they denote types of family-
resembling examples. Thus, a physician may encounter many different ‘cases
of measles’; a lawyer, many different ‘cases of libel’. As a practitioner expe-
riences many variations of a small number of types of cases, he is able to
‘practise’ his practice. He develops a repertoire of expectations, images and
techniques. He learns what to look for and how to respond to what he finds.
As long as his practice is stable, in the sense that it brings him the same
types of cases, he becomes less and less subject to surprise. His knowing-in-
practice tends to become increasingly tacit, spontaneous and automatic,
thereby conferring upon him and his clients the benefits of specialization.
On the other hand, professional specialization can have negative effects.
In the individual, a high degree of specialization can lead to a parochial
narrowness of vision. When a profession divides into subspecialities, it can
break apart an earlier wholeness of experience and understanding. Thus
people sometimes yearn for the general practitioner of earlier days, who is
thought to have concerned himself with the ‘whole patient’, and they some-
times accuse contemporary specialists of treating particular illnesses in
isolation from the rest of the patient’s life experience. Further, as a practice
becomes more repetitive and routine, and as knowing-in-practice becomes
increasingly tacit and spontaneous, the practitioner may miss important
opportunities to think about what he is doing. He may find that, like the
younger children in the block-balancing experiment, he is drawn into
patterns of error that he cannot correct. And if he learns, as often happens,
to be selectively inattentive to phenomena that do not fit the categories of
his knowing-in-action, then he may suffer from boredom or ‘burn-out’ and
afflict his clients with the consequences of his narrowness and rigidity. When
this happens, the practitioner has ‘over-learned’ what he knows.
A practitioner’s reflection can serve as a corrective to over-learning.
Through reflection, he can surface and criticize the tacit understandings that
have grown up around the repetitive experiences of a specialized practice,
Donald Schön 57
11 and can make new sense of the situations of uncertainty or uniqueness that
he may allow himself to experience.
Practitioners do reflect on their knowing-in-practice. Sometimes, in the
relative tranquillity of a post-mortem, they think back on a project they
have undertaken, a situation they have lived through, and they explore the
understandings they have brought to their handling of the case. They may
do this in a mood of idle speculation, or in a deliberate effort to prepare
themselves for future cases.
But they may also reflect on practice while they are in the midst of it.
011 Here they reflect-in-action, but the meaning of this term needs now to be
considered in terms of the complexity of knowing-in-practice.
A practitioner’s reflection-in-action may not be very rapid. It is bounded
11 by the ‘action-present’, the zone of time in which action can still make a
difference to the situation. The action-present may stretch over minutes,
hours, days, or even weeks or months, depending on the pace of activity and
the situational boundaries that are characteristic of the practice. Within the
give-and-take of courtroom behaviour, for example, a lawyer’s reflection-in-
action may take place in seconds; but when the context is that of an antitrust
case that drags on over years, reflection-in-action may proceed in leisurely
0111 fashion over the course of several months. An orchestra conductor may think
of a single performance as a unit of practice, but in another sense a whole
season is his unit. The pace and duration of episodes of reflection-in-action
vary with the pace and duration of the situations of practice.
When a practitioner reflects in and on his practice, the possible objects
of his reflection are as varied as the kinds of phenomena before him and the
systems of knowing-in-practice that he brings to them. He may reflect on
the tacit norms and appreciations that underlie a judgement, or on the strate-
gies and theories implicit in a pattern of behaviour. He may reflect on the
feeling for a situation that has led him to adopt a particular course of action,
0111 on the way in which he has framed the problem he is trying to solve, or on
the role he has constructed for himself within a larger institutional context.
Reflection-in-action, in these several modes, is central to the art through
which practitioners sometimes cope with the troublesome ‘divergent’ situa-
tions of practice.
When the phenomenon at hand eludes the ordinary categories of know-
ledge-in-practice, presenting itself as unique or unstable, the practitioner
may surface and criticize his initial understanding of the phenomenon,
construct a new description of it, and test the new description by an on-the-
spot experiment. Sometimes he arrives at a new theory of the phenomenon
0111 by articulating a feeling he has about it.
When he finds himself stuck in a problematic situation that he cannot
readily convert to a manageable problem, he may construct a new way of
setting the problem – a new frame that, in what I shall call a ‘frame experi-
4111 ment’, he tries to impose on the situation.
When he is confronted with demands that seem incompatible or incon-

sistent, he may respond by reflecting on the appreciations that he and others
have brought to the situation. Conscious of a dilemma, he may attribute it
to the way in which he has set his problem, or even to the way in which
he has framed his role. He may then find a way of integrating, or choosing
among, the values at stake in the situation.
In his mid-thirties, sometime between the composition of his early work
The Cossacks and his later War and Peace, Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy became
interested in education. He started a school for peasant children on his estate
at Yasnaya Polyana, he visited Europe to learn the latest educational meth-
ods, and he published an educational journal, also called Yasnaya Polyana.
Before he was done (his new novel eventually replaced his interest in educa-
tion), he had built some seventy schools, had created an informal teacher-
training programme, and had written an exemplary piece of educational
evaluation.
For the most part, the methods of the European schools filled him with
disgust, yet he was entranced by Rousseau’s writings on education. His own
school anticipated John Dewey’s later approach to learning by doing, and
bore the stamp of his conviction that good teaching required ‘not a method
but an art’.
An artful teacher sees a child’s difficulty in learning to read not as a defect
in the child but as a defect ‘of his own instruction’. So he must find a way
of explaining what is bothering the pupil. He must do a piece of experi-
mental research, then and there, in the classroom. And because the child’s
difficulties may be unique, the teacher cannot assume that his repertoire of
explanations will suffice, even though they are ‘at the tongue’s end’. He must
be ready to invent new methods and must ‘endeavour to develop in himself
the ability of discovering them’.
Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) have
undertaken a programme of in-service education for teachers, a programme
organized around the idea of on-the-spot reflection and experiment, very
much as in Tolstoy’s art of teaching. In this Teacher Project,5 the researchers
have encouraged a small group of teachers to explore their own intuitive
thinking about apparently simple tasks in domains such as mathematics,
physics, music, and the perceived behaviour of the moon. The teachers have
made some important discoveries. They have allowed themselves to become
confused about subjects they are supposed to ‘know’; and as they have tried
to work their way out of their confusions, they have also begun to think
differently about learning and teaching.
Early in the project, a critical event occurred. The teachers were asked to
observe and react to a videotape of two boys engaged in playing a simple
game. The boys sat at a table, separated from one another by an opaque
screen. In front of one boy, blocks of various colours, shapes and sizes were
arranged in a pattern. In front of the other, similar blocks were lying on the
Donald Schön 59
11 table in no particular order. The first boy was to tell the second one how to
reproduce the pattern. After the first few instructions, however, it became
clear that the second boy had gone astray. In fact, the two boys had lost
touch with one another, though neither of them knew it.
In their initial reactions to the videotape, the teachers spoke of a ‘commu-
nications problem’. they said that the instruction giver had ‘well-developed
verbal skills’ and that the receiver was ‘unable to follow directions’. Then
one of the researchers pointed out that, although the blocks contained no
green squares – all squares were orange and only triangles were green – she
011 had heard the first boy tell the second to ‘take a green square’. When the
teachers watched the videotape again, they were astonished. That small
mistake had set off a chain of false moves. The second boy had put a green
11 thing, a triangle, where the first boy’s pattern had an orange square, and
from then on all the instructions became problematic. Under the circum-
stances, the second boy seemed to have displayed considerable ingenuity in
his attempts to reconcile the instructions with the pattern before him.
At this point, the teachers reversed their picture of the situation. They
could see why the second boy behaved as he did. He no longer seemed stupid;
he had, indeed, ‘followed instructions’. As one teacher put it, they were now
0111 ‘giving him reason’. They saw reasons for his behaviour; and his errors, which
they had previously seen as an inability to follow directions, they now found
reasonable.
Later on in the project, as the teachers increasingly challenged themselves
to discover the meanings of a child’s puzzling behaviour, they often spoke
of ‘giving him reason’.
In examples such as these, something falls outside the range of ordinary
expectations. The banker has a feeling that something is wrong, though he
cannot at first say what it is. The physician sees an odd combination of dis-
eases never before described in a medical text. Tolstoy thinks of each of his
0111 pupils as an individual with ways of learning and imperfections peculiar to
himself. The teachers are astonished by the sense behind a student’s mistake.
In each instance, the practitioner allows himself to experience surprise,
puzzlement, or confusion in a situation that he finds uncertain or unique. He
reflects on the phenomena before him, and on the prior understandings that
have been implicit in his behaviour. He carries out an experiment that serves
to generate both a new understanding of the phenomena and a change in the
situation.
When someone reflects-in-action, he becomes a researcher in the prac-
tice context. He is not dependent on the categories of established theory
0111 and technique, but constructs a new theory of the unique case. His inquiry
is not limited to a deliberation about means that depends on a prior agree-
ment about ends. He does not keep means and ends separate, but defines
them interactively as he frames a problematic situation. He does not separ-
4111 ate thinking from doing, ratiocinating his way to a decision that he must
later convert to action. Because his experimenting is a kind of action, imple-

mentation is built into his inquiry. Thus reflection-in-action can proceed,
even in situations of uncertainty or uniqueness, because it is not bound by
the dichotomies of Technical Rationality.
Although reflection-in-action is an extraordinary process, it is not a rare
event. Indeed, for some reflective practitioners it is the core of practice.
Nevertheless, because professionalism is still mainly identified with technical
expertise, reflection-in-action is not generally accepted – even by those who
do it – as a legitimate form of professional knowing.
Many practitioners, locked into a view of themselves as technical experts,
find nothing in the world of practice to occasion reflection. They have
become too skilful at techniques of selective inattention, junk categories and
situational control, techniques that they use to preserve the constancy of
their knowledge-in-practice. For them, uncertainty is a threat; its admission
is a sign of weakness. Others, more inclined toward and adept at reflection-
in-action, nevertheless feel profoundly uneasy because they cannot say what
they know how to do, cannot justify its quality or rigour.
For these reasons, the study of reflection-in-action is critically important.
The dilemma of rigour or relevance may be dissolved if we can develop an
epistemology of practice that places technical problem solving within a
broader context of reflective inquiry, shows how reflection-in-action may be
rigorous in its own right, and links the art of practice in uncertainty and
uniqueness to the scientist’s art of research. We may thereby increase the
legitimacy of reflection-in-action and encourage its broader, deeper, and
more rigorous use.
Notes
1 I first used this term in Technology and Change (New York: Delacorte Press, 1966).
2 Of course, the problem of the lack of agreement about ends has engaged the
attention of many of the protagonists of the positivist epistemology of practice.
Approaches to this problem have ranged from the search for an ultimate end,
to which all others could be subordinated; to a ‘universal solvent’ for ends, as
in the utility functions of the welfare economists; to the ‘piecemeal social engin-
eering’ proposed by Karl Popper. For a discussion of these, their defects and
merits, see Frankel, C. ‘The relation of theory to practice: some standard views’,
in C. Frankel et al. (eds) (1968) Social Theory and Social Intervention, Cleveland:
Case Western Reserve University Press.
3 The term is taken from Geertz, C. ‘Thick description: toward an interpretive
theory of culture’, in Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures, New York:
Basic Books.
4 The whole of contemporary linguistics and psycholinguistics is relevant here –
for example, the work of Chomsky, Halle, and Sinclair.
5 The staff of the Teacher Project consisted of Jeanne Bamberger, Eleanor
Duckworth and Margaret Lampert. My description of the incident of ‘giving the
child reason’ is adapted from a project memorandum by Lampert.
Donald Schön 61
11 References
Birdwhistell, R.L. (1970) Kinesics and Context, Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Glazer, N. (1974) ‘Schools of the minor professions’, Minerva.
Goode, W. (1966) ‘The librarian: from occupation to profession’, in H. Vollmer and
D. Mills (eds) Professionalization, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Greenwood, E. (1966) ‘Attributes of a profession’, in H. Vollmer and D. Mills (eds)
Professionalization, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Hughes, E. (1973) ‘Higher education and the professions’, in C. Kaysen (ed.) Content
and Context: Essays on College Education, New York: McGraw-Hill.
011
Inhelder, B. and Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1975) ‘If you want to get ahead, get a theory’,
Cognition, vol. 3, no. 3: 195–212.
Maslow, J.E. (1981) ‘Grooving on a baseball afternoon’, Mainliner, May: 34.
11 Moore, W.E. (1970) The Professions, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Ryle, G. (1949) ‘On knowing how and knowing that’, in G. Ryle The Concept of
Mind, London: Hutchinson.
Schein, E. (1973) Professional Education, New York: McGraw-Hill.
Schutz, A. (1962) Collected Papers, The Hague: Nijhoff.
Simon, H. (1972) The Sciences of the Artificial, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Thorne, B. (1973) ‘Professional education in medicine’, in E. Hughes, B. Thorne,
0111 A. DeBaggis, A. Gurin and D. Williams Education for the Professions of Medicine,
Law, Theology and Social Welfare, New York: McGraw-Hill.
Veblen, T. (1962) The Higher Learning in America, New York: Hill and Wang (reprint
of 1918 edition).
0111
0111
4111
Chapter 4
Deconstructing domestication
Women’s experience and the goals of
critical pedagogy
Julia Clarke
Introduction
Critical pedagogy refers to a particular strand of educational practice, associ-
ated most commonly with the name of the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire,
whose educational philosophy, politics and praxis1 was directed towards revo-
lutionary social change. This chapter begins with a personal account of my
own changing perspective over the past thirty years on the goals of liberation,
democracy and social justice, which were often assumed, in the literature of
critical pedagogy, to be universal and unproblematic. Among the theoretical
understandings that have helped me to make sense of problems arising in my
personal and professional experience, I draw upon feminism and deconstruc-
tion to explore the ways in which the emancipatory goals of critical pedagogy
are embedded in a masculine construction of human subjectivity. This is evi-
dent in Freire’s account of liberation, which is defined in opposition to domes-
tication. In this account there is thus an implicit denigration of those aspects
of human experience – the work of caring for our own and our dependants’
physical and emotional needs – that are located in the domestic sphere, and
are generally associated with women’s lives. After outlining the source of
Freire’s masculine construction of the liberated subject, I go on to show how
this is reflected in accounts of radical education, transformative learning and
related strands of adult education practice. Finally, I consider the implica-
tions of this critique for adult educators, with reference to themes emerging
from my own study of the experiences of work, learning, and domesticity
among a particular group of women in Southern England (Clarke, 1998).
While there is no intention to generalise from this small-scale study to make
universal claims about women’s experience, my concluding arguments refer
to ‘women’s experience’ as the current state of affairs in which most, but not
all, women, and some, but very few, men take on the bulk of domestic and
caring work in human societies around the world.
Newly commissioned work.

Julia Clarke 63
11 A problem in my experience
When I began a student work placement as a volunteer tutor for an adult
literacy project in 1974, my tutor lent me her copy of Freire’s (1972a)
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, and I embraced critical pedagogy as a form of
educational practice grounded in a neo-Marxist analysis of power and oppres-
sion. For the next twenty years, I generally articulated the political aims of
my adult and community education work in terms of Freire’s fundamental
thesis that, since education can never be a neutral process, we must choose
between engaging in education for liberation, or for domestication. This
011 presented an uncompromising tool for the critical evaluation of my educa-
tional practice as I debated with colleagues the ways in which liberation
might be achieved through publishing student writing, teaching ‘communi-
11 cations skills’ to YTS2 trainees, or running workplace ‘basic skills’ courses
for manual workers. However, the dilemmas and contradictions of critical
pedagogy became particularly problematic when I began to reflect on the
goals and outcomes of courses called ‘Fresh Start for Women’, which I was
running in the early 1990s.
These Fresh Start courses comprised a negotiated curriculum that included
the positive evaluation of skills acquired through unpaid labour in the home,
0111 suggesting ways in which these might be represented, developed or trans-
ferred to other situations. The curriculum was based on a concern that the
years spent doing unpaid work as mothers, carers and providers of domestic
services often results in certain ways of being that prevent women from
competing in the labour market or pursuing goal-related education or
training. Whatever kinds of learning and change we hoped to achieve, it
was clear that the material outcomes for participants on these course would
depend largely on local opportunities for continuing education, paid work
and childcare. In the mainly rural area where I was working, such opportu-
nities are extremely limited. A surprising number of the participants went
0111 on to do voluntary work in social welfare organisations – surprising since
most of them were living on low incomes and yet still chose to work without
pay. The decision of these women to commit themselves to an active role
in a community far wider than their immediate family might lead us to claim
that our courses engendered a stronger sense of personal agency and a recog-
nition of the value of social participation. I became concerned, however,
that our educational practice often seemed to encourage women to take on
an additional burden of unpaid labour in the service of others. This posed
a question about whether it was in these women’s interests to valorise the
skills they have developed through caring for others, while these skills are
0111 so undervalued in the labour market.
Critical pedagogy is infused with notions of false consciousness, which
assume there must be a single true or objective way of talking about our
experience if we can only clear away the distortions of ideology. This is
4111 exemplified in an account of three women’s educational projects described
by Gilliam Highet (1991: 155), who set out to examine the ways in which
these projects were ‘still contributing to the socialisation of women into
accepting differential social roles’. Highet saw the educator’s task as that of
‘developing and specifying alternative goals and values in women’s educa-
tion’ (ibid.: 164). She suggests, however, that some of the learners she
encountered, particularly mothers, would need to change their relationships
and attitudes before they could aspire to Highet’s ‘goals and values’. These
women, in Highet’s view, are held back in their ‘progress towards equality’
because ‘the sort of relationships which many women have with their chil-
dren, and the attitudes they hold in relation to their responsibilities towards
children . . . often make it difficult to convince women themselves of the
importance of creche provision’ (ibid.).
Highet’s stance illustrates the problem that I have associated with critical
pedagogy. The question of what we actually mean by terms like ‘progress
towards equality’, and whether such goals are in women’s interests, cannot
be separated from the question raised by Highet’s assumption that the women
in her study do not know what is good for them. These women’s relation-
ships and responsibilities are dismissed as the objects of mistaken attitudes,
obstacles that prevent women from pursuing our true interests.
As a mother, my own experience includes that of making choices about
work, education and caring for others that may appear to be against my inter-
ests. These interests, however, comprise a constantly shifting and often con-
flicting jumble of needs, wishes and desires, none of which are more true
than any others. My questioning of Freire’s repression of domestication in
his concept of liberation arises from a belief that the desire for involvement
in committed relationships, and consequent ambivalence and conflict, does
not constitute a case of false consciousness but represent a challenge to the
goals and values of critical pedagogy. The appeal of Freire’s work to diverse
communities of adult educators around the globe can be explained, to a great
extent, by his eclectic reworking of ideas from Critical Theory, radical
Catholic theology and revolutionary socialism (Mackie, 1980). In the follow-
ing brief account, my aim is to illustrate some of the ways in which these
ideas contribute to notions of human subjectivity and liberation from which
women are excluded.
Man’s domain: work, history and culture

Critical theorists are united by a concern with the freedom and autonomy
of individuals and the transformation of social relations of domination and
oppression. The prerequisite for such a transformation is an ideology critique
that involves examining the historical roots and assumptions of ideologies,
analysing the social interests that they serve, and exposing ideological mysti-
fications and distortions of a true reality. Freire’s emphasis on education for
revolutionary change draws upon the concept of hegemony in the writings
Julia Clarke 65
11 of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci. The aim of hegemony is to univer-

salise the values of a dominant or aspiring class so that a consenting popu-
lation adopts common understandings of truth, good taste, and the natural
order of everyday life. Gramsci’s educational aim was to create the possi-
bility of a counter-hegemony that would arise from the proletariat through
the creation of working-class intellectuals. Counter-hegemony is achieved
not through argument against the ideas and practices of the dominant classes,
but by developing an alternative set of ideas, beliefs and practices rooted in
working-class experience. For Gramsci, a communist revolution represented
011 the end of class divisions. Since he saw the interests of the working classes
as generalisable, universal interests, Gramsci believed that, ultimately, a
working-class hegemony would prevail over that of a class whose interests
11 were partial and exclusive. A hegemony of universal interests would elimin-
ate the need for coercion since hegemony becomes so deeply embedded in
society that it becomes the common sense view of reality.
Gramsci argued that the development of a powerful counter-hegemony
required working-class intellectuals who were versed in the high status know-
ledge of the classics, and the intellectual heritage of the great writers and
thinkers of Western civilisation. Freire, on the other hand, while endorsing
0111 Gramsci’s belief in the importance of education and cultural transformation
for the revolutionary process, opposed this kind of learning, in which students
are cast as empty vessels into which dominant and oppressive forms of know-
ledge could be poured. He described this as banking education, which ‘inhibits
creativity and domesticates (although it cannot completely destroy) the inten-
tionality of consciousness by isolating consciousness from the world, thereby
denying men their ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully
human’ (Freire, 1972a: 56).
In Brazil during the 1950s, Paulo Freire developed a strategy for adult
education and revolution that would create the social conditions in which
0111 man3 could become more ‘fully human’. ‘To exist humanly’, Freire wrote, ‘is
to name the world, to change it . . . Men are not built in silence, but in
word, in work, in action-reflection’ (Freire, 1972a: 61). A banking educa-
tion, Freire argued, was one in which knowledge is regarded as a commodity
and learners are assumed to be ignorant, empty vessels, waiting to be filled
with a partial knowledge selected for them by representatives of the oppressor
class. Freire’s educational project starts from topics that are rich in experi-
ential meaning for particular groups in particular social contexts but whose
‘true’ nature may be veiled in oppressive ideologies and myths. In his adult
literacy programme, Freirean educators would pose words like WORK,
0111 WEALTH, SLUM, or RAIN as problematic, and invite the learners to
subject the images that represent these words to a critical examination aimed
at action that will transform their meaning in reality. The transformation
that takes place is one in which learners cease to identify themselves as
4111 objects to whom the experience of work, wealth, slums or rain just happens.
In becoming a subject of that experience, the learner engages in a process

of conscientisation.
Freire constructs a hierarchy of ‘levels of consciousness’, from the lowest
level of preoccupation with basic biological problems, through stages of
fatalism and naivety to the highest level of ‘critically transitive conscious-
ness’ that is the goal of conscientisation. The participants in Freire’s ‘Cultural
Action for Freedom’ are men whose ‘domain of existence is the domain of
work, of history, of culture, of values – the domain in which men experi-
ence the dialectic between determinism and freedom’ (Freire, 1972b: 52).
Freire refers to Marx’s conception of work as productive labour in order to
distinguish men from animals. As well as being the makers of history, ‘there
is a further fundamental distinction between man’s relationships with the
world and the animal’s contacts with it: only men work’. But, ‘for action to
be work it must result in significant products, which while distinct from the
active agent, at the same time condition him and become the object of his
reflection’ (ibid.: 56).
Freire (1972b: 79) writes of attempts to thwart the liberation of men so
that they might achieve a ‘maximum of potential consciousness’ as attempts
to domesticate the future. Why does Freire choose a term that is generally
associated with the taming of nature, with intimate relations and with the
home to express a retrogressive desire to maintain the status quo, to ‘domes-
ticate the future’? Freire draws his analysis of the social psychology of
oppression directly from Erich Fromm, whose humanistic concern for liber-
ation relies on the representation of mother in the timeless images of home,
nature, soil and the ocean. These images are constructed in opposition to
father’s bounded engagement in rational thought and directed movement
through time:
Mother is the home we come from, she is nature, soil, the ocean; father
does not represent any such natural home . . . he represents the other
pole of human existence; the world of thought, of man-made things, of
law and order, of discipline, of travel and adventure. Father is the one
who teaches the child, who shows him the road into the world.
(Fromm, 1957: 35)
The imagery of women as part of the natural world matches Freire’s descrip-
tion of animals: ‘Unlike men, animals are simply in the world, incapable of
objectifying either themselves or the world. They live a life without time’
(Freire, 1972b: 51).
In order to show his child ‘the road into the world’, the father must detach
himself from the world in order to objectify it and to reflect on the nature
of his own existence. While some men may choose the ‘dehumanizing’ road
of oppression, ‘Nevertheless, because they impregnate the world with their
reflective presence, only men can humanize or dehumanize’ (Freire, 1972b:
Julia Clarke 67
11 55). Women are biologically incapable of impregnation, and, even meta-

phorically, only women and female animals can represent a ‘world’ that is
impregnated by men. Here, Freire’s conception of liberation not only
excludes women, but depends upon an essentially female world from which
men can detach themselves and which, at the same time, humanise by
‘impregnating the world with man’s curious and inventive presence,
imprinting it with the trace of his works’ (ibid.). Freire writes of those who
‘want to stop time’, as those who want to ‘domesticate’ the future, to ‘keep
it in line with the present’, and claims that ‘there is no genuine hope in
011 those who intend to make the future repeat their present, nor in those who
see the future as something predetermined. Both have a “domesticated”
notion of history’ (ibid.: 41).
11 Liberation thus requires the agency of a rational, unfettered individual
travelling the road of progress through time. This concept depends on the
idea of domestication as a timeless dimension of animal existence, just as
the liberated man depends upon women’s domestic activity for his own suste-
nance and for the care and nurture of his children. The rationality of man
is thus constructed through a separation of his mind from the source of his
own physical existence (from ‘the world’, from mother, from nature, and
0111 from his own bodily and emotional needs and desires). This rational subject
is then able, whether through ideology critique, counter-hegemony or consci-
entisation, to claim individual and collective knowledge of a single, objective
‘true reality’. In these discourses, individual emancipation and collective
liberation rely on the idea of a community of such rational subjects coming
together as equal participants in the public sphere. There is an assumption
of common human interests and this assumption underpins much of the
educational practice associated with Critical Pedagogy.
Critical pedagogy
0111
Teachers engaged in critical pedagogy are united in a view of education as
a practice committed to the reduction, or even elimination, of injustice and
oppression. Most critical educators would claim that their practice aims to
foster both individual transformation and collective action, but there is some
disagreement about the relationship between individual and social change.
Critical pedagogy encompasses diverse understandings and analyses of the
many and varied contexts, forms and relations of oppression. More funda-
mental disagreements regarding the utopian goals of critical pedagogy are
not always made explicit, but are apparent in the following examples selected
0111 from the literature to illustrate some strands of critical pedagogy. I have
grouped descriptions of educational practice into loose categories in order
to identify distinctive strands. Most practices will contain elements of several
strands as I have characterised them here. My aim, in this instance, is not
4111 to construct a clearly delineated taxonomy, but to illustrate some of the
educational practices that might be included under the broad umbrella of

critical pedagogy.
Transformative learning
In his theory of Transformative Learning, Jack Mezirow (1991) investigates
the perspective transformation involved in achieving emancipatory know-
ledge. This way of knowing corresponds to Freire’s ‘critically transitive
consciousness’ but Mezirow argues that Freire’s interest is limited to ‘critical
reflection on oppressive social norms or practices’ through the sociolinguistic
praxis of ‘naming the world’ (1992: 251). Mezirow maintains that transfor-
mation can occur through reflection on epistemic and psychological, as well
as sociolinguistic, assumptions (ibid.). Transformative learning may be trig-
gered by any event in our personal and social life that challenges the
assumptions on which we have based our interpretations of experience. This
forces a re-evaluation of those assumptions and the development of new
meanings in a process of critical reflection and rational discourse.
This broader agenda relieves educators from the responsibility for generat-
ing and sustaining a unitary vision of an alternative or more ‘true’ reality and
allows for the incorporation of New Age notions of spirituality and personal
growth into a particularly North American construction of transformative
learning. Accounts of practice that refer to this model of transformative learn-
ing include descriptions of different kinds of life-changing events that pro-
vide opportunities for ‘growth and learning’ (Morey, 1997: 38). Caring for
elderly relatives, contracting a serious illness, the experience of homelessness,
or sharing personal life histories all provide opportunities for transforma-
tive learning (Merriam et al., 1997; Ettling and Hayes, 1997; Group for
Collaborative Inquiry, 1997). It is interesting to note, however, that even in
the late 1990s the concerns of transformative educators appeared to be con-
fined within traditionally gendered spheres of interest. Of ten conference
papers (Armstrong et al., 1997) linking notions of transformation to theory,
learning, pedagogy or community, the seven written by women focus on direct
experiences related to physical and emotional issues and relationships in small
groups. Meanwhile, the three papers written by men are concerned with
global ecology and learning programmes in the big labour unions (O’Sullivan,
1997; Hall and Livingstone, 1997; Livingstone, 1997). Calling upon ‘pro-
gressive intellectuals’ to work with the labour unions so that ‘future Gramscis
may flourish and enable the working class to withstand future Mussolinis’,
David Livingstone (1997: 289) argues that the most fertile ground for
critical pedagogy is among those communities represented by leaders who
are already committed to social change. This echoes a similar assertion
by Thomas Heaney and Aimee Horton (1990), who define Emancipatory
Education as a practice that can only occur when both learners and teachers
are already engaged in social movements: ‘Emancipatory projects will be
Julia Clarke 69
11 defined in collaboration with activist groups and organizations rather than

individuals.’ In Britain, this approach is most often represented in the litera-
ture of Radical Education.
Radical education
An example of the radical education strand of critical pedagogy can be found
in Tom Lovett’s work in Northern Ireland. In his analysis of the social con-
text of Britain in the 1980s, Lovett describes the social fragmentation caused
011 by changes in family life and the relationship between men and women.
Lovett suggests that working-class communities have not had the resources
to benefit from the ‘personal liberation’ of the 1970s. Is this a euphemism
11 for women’s liberation? Whoever may have been the beneficiaries of this
‘personal liberation’, the result, in Lovett’s view, has been that working-class
areas have become ‘the victims of a process of mindless violence, the com-
munity turning in on itself in the search for thrills, kicks, money’ (1988: 142).
Lovett recognises a role for women in ‘the reconstruction of local work-
ing class communities’ (ibid.: 160). However, the educational programme
for community activists at Ulster People’s College is contrasted with other
0111 initiatives in community education, offering subjects like ‘practical home
skills and formal qualifications’. The latter are dismissed as not ‘relevant to
community action or the problems of social change’ (ibid.: 150).
For radical educational projects to ‘experience . . . the meaning of a social-
ist/radical vision’, Allman and Wallis advocate a return to the original writ-
ings of Marx, Gramsci and Freire. Although lip service is paid to a ‘plurality
of human interests’, these projects are characterised by a continuing ‘search
for common and, therefore, potentially shared human goals’ (Allman and
Wallis, 1995: 19). The question of who is included in, or excluded from, these
‘shared human goals’ warrants a critical feminist enquiry. Nevertheless, a
0111 number of women continue to endorse the same ‘socialist/radical vision’. For
example, in her account of women’s involvement in adult education between
1867 and 1919, Julia Swindells presents a particular group of women as the
active subjects in radical education. These are not those members of the
Mothers’ Union who are content to listen to lectures about ‘domestic issues’
but, rather, the members of the Women’s Co-operative Guild, described as
‘honest working women’ who are literate, articulate, and active in public
political life (Swindells, 1995). Patti Lather describes the ideology critique,
which is central to the radical education strand of critical pedagogy, as one
that depends on a ‘binary logic with demonizes some “Other” and positions
0111 itself as innocent’ (1992: 131). What kind of descriptions, I wonder, might
be used to describe those ‘other’ women who do not fit into Swindells’ cate-
gory of ‘honest working women’? Jane Thompson pays tribute to the ‘vast
majority of women’ whose ‘capacity for survival, and whose potential for
4111 resistance, is not in question’ (Thompson, 1995: 133). Despite this tribute,
however, Thompson regards her task as a teacher of Women’s Studies at

Ruskin College as one of providing ‘ideas and information that rescue
women’s lives from oblivion’ (ibid.: 133). Before they have been rescued,
these women are constructed as victims, customers, desistors and those who
are impotent in Thompson’s argument for a ‘really useful knowledge’ that
‘shifts the emphasis from victims to survivors . . . from customers to activists
. . . from impotence to creative anger . . . from those who desist to those who
resist’ (ibid.: 131, 132).
Border pedagogies
Jane Thompson’s construction of learners as alleged ‘Others’, who need to
be rescued from themselves, has been challenged in those critical pedago-
gies that may be referred to as Border Pedagogy (Giroux, 1992); Pedagogy of
Resistance (McLaren, 1994); or as pedagogies of desire, of representation and so
on, depending on the particular interest of the protagonist. The ‘borders’
being traversed in this strand are those between Critical Theory and post-
modern developments in Cultural Theory. This encounter leads to a
questioning of the oversimplification of categories like race, class, gender or
sexuality as if such categories describe objective and essential human attri-
butes and characteristics. The focus, instead, is on the ways in which we
represent people, objects and events, and on the social hierarchies and insti-
tutional arrangements that make some descriptions more powerful than
others.
Debates within the strand of border pedagogies reflect a continuing tension
between those who advocate emancipation within the discourse of Critical
Theory, and those who, like Elizabeth Ellsworth (1992), have begun to ask,
‘Why doesn’t this feel empowering?’ In her critical and self-reflexive account
of teaching an anti-racism course to university students, Ellsworth challenges
critical pedagogy’s ‘conventional notions of dialogue and democracy’, which
assume that learners can become fully rational and disinterested. Ellsworth
argues that, on the contrary, they should be regarded as ‘subjects split
between the conscious and the unconscious and among multiple social posi-
tionings’ (1992: 108). In a vitriolic response to Ellsworth’s challenge to the
simple optimism of critical pedagogy, Giroux accuses her of proposing a ‘crip-
pling form of political disengagement’ (Giroux, 1988: 171), and Peter
McLaren dismisses Ellsworth’s stance as one of ‘political inertia and moral
cowardice’ (McLaren, 1988: 68).
Accounts of practice within this disparate body, which I have grouped
together under the heading of border pedagogies, are generally located within
higher education, and the debates often become abstract and removed from
practical engagement with the complexity of concrete situations. Among
the ‘multiple social positionings’ occupied by adults enrolled on courses like
‘Fresh Start for Women’, are those that might be illuminated through a
Julia Clarke 71
11 study of the gendered organisation of domestic labour and paid work. While
a goal of liberation is clearly problematic, it is also clear that women continue
to be disadvantaged, even oppressed, by these social arrangements. As an
adult educator, my work is still directed towards developing critical reflection
and introducing new perspectives that serve the interests of learners (and my
own) by expanding our awareness of possibilities for personal and social
change. It has become clear, however, that this question of interests cannot
be resolved with reference to Freire’s opposition to liberation or domestica-
tion. Of course, education is never a neutral process, but the opposition to
011 liberation/domestication becomes problematic when we consider the extent
to which our thinking about liberation ignores, denies or suppresses the
domestication upon which we depend for our physical and emotional suste-
11 nance. In Freire’s work, the undesirable condition, or process, of domestica-
tion denotes a kind of blind acceptance of oppression. This does not allow
for a positive association of the domestic sphere with love and with the con-
nectedness of one’s own needs and interests to the needs and interests of
others. If domestication includes providing shelter, food and clothing for our-
selves and our dependants, then whose interests are served by a goal of liber-
ation from such domestication? Posing this question led me to feminist theory
0111 and deconstruction.
Feminism and deconstruction

Feminism is a political stance, advocating the right of women to participate
on equal terms with men in every aspect of human affairs. This definition
of feminism allows for very different accounts of what constitutes participa-
tion and such accounts must acknowledge that relations of power and
oppression operate among and between women as well as between men and
women. The categorisation of women as a homogenous group has been effec-
0111 tively challenged by arguments that factors such as race, ethnicity, social
class or sexual orientation may constitute more immediate, and sometimes
more violent intractable, sites of oppression than those identified in terms
of gender alone. And yet definitions of feminism must rest on a concept of
gender that allows for all women to somehow be classed as different from
all men. This presents a dilemma, which has been polarised within feminist
debate as a politics of equality or a politics of difference. A politics of equality
is rooted in a view of gender identity as the result of socialisation, in which
gender differences are regarded as the cultural differences that are socially
constructed around biological differences between the sexes. Early feminists,
0111 like Mary Wollstonecraft and Simone de Beauvoir argued for the release of
women from the burdens of domesticity to enable us to develop our own
rationality and participate alongside men in public life. This view has been
described as ‘adding women in’, and implies a negation of differences between
4111 men and women. A politics of difference, on the other hand, is based on a
view that there is a dialectical relationship between culture and biology.

Although the restriction of gender to just two categories is historically and
culturally specific, there are also ways in which notions of masculinity are
closely related to the male body and femininity to the female body. Thus
gender differences cannot be divorced from biological differences unless we
disregard significant aspects of our bodily experience. However, even the
notion of experience is problematic, and Judith Butler (1990: 136) argues
that gender should be understood as a process of ‘doing’ rather than ‘being’.
Through our practical engagement in social relations, institutions and
discourses we bring ourselves into line with a gender, which Butler describes
as a ‘fabrication, a fantasy instituted and inscribed on the surface of our
bodies’ (ibid.: 136). This echoes the perspective from cultural theory that I
have associated with the literature of ‘Border pedagogies’, a perspective that
is illuminated by feminist deconstruction of the gendered dualisms on which
Western rationality depends.
Deconstruction has developed from Jaques Derrida’s view of language as
text based on a ‘metaphysics of presence’ in which all present states depend,
for their meaning, on absent states. This enables us to see how, for example,
emotion is subordinated to reason, which both repress and depend upon the
concept of emotion for its meaning. Similarly, Freire’s concept of liberation
depends, for its meaning, on a repression and denial of domestication. A
feminist deconstructive perspective exposes the highly gendered nature of
Freire’s binary thinking, consistent with a pattern of ‘phallocentric align-
ments’ that permeate modern Western thought (Grosz, 1993). Feminist
writers have shown how modern thinking is founded on a pattern of binary
oppositions in which the term associated with masculinity is always privi-
leged. Thus women are continually positioned as inferior through the
association of femininity with the subordinate term in these and similar hier-
archical dualisms of man/woman, culture/nature, subject/object, mind/body,
order/chaos and so on (Hekman, 1990; Plumwood, 1993). A feminist decon-
structive approach to this kind of binary thinking involves foreground-
ing the subordinate terms, not in order to reverse the oppositions and privi-
lege the body or nature, for example above mind or culture, but to displace
both terms and open up the way for new meanings.
Deconstructing domestication
In order to look at educational experiences from the standpoint that gives
prominence to women’s domestication I decided to study the biographies of
learners who have regarded themselves as primarily responsible for the care
of others and yet whose aspirations involve some form of continuing educa-
tion. I conducted three, hour-long interviews and a series of group meetings
with 18 women who had chosen to continue their education despite facing
all the barriers most commonly identified as those that prevent participation
Julia Clarke 73
11 in continuing education.4 Each interview followed a similar chronological

pattern, beginning with childhood memories of the stories told by, or about,
parents and grandparents, moving on through to the present and finishing
with hopes and plans for the future. When we tell stories about our lives we
construct these within larger narratives or discourses that provide criteria
for evaluating the actions of, for example, the good mother, the serious
student or the enterprising worker. Critically reviewing the stories that had
been transcribed from our interviews enabled these women to consider other
possible directions or courses of action that the central characters might
011 have taken. This was not a question of seeing the error of their ways, but
one of seeing how their identities are constructed through multiple, changing
and often contradictory discourses of work, education and domestic life.
11 In a single chapter, I cannot begin to represent the complexity of the life
histories collected and analysed in the course of this study, nor can I
summarise the varied interests and changing desires that motivated each of
these 18 women to confound the statistics and participate in continuing
education. Themes that emerged from the analysis and discussion of the
narratives include questions about public and private life, knowledge, work,
autonomy, time, agency and progress. Of particular relevance to the forgoing
0111 discussion of the gendered subject in Freire’s critical pedagogy are questions
of time and definitions of work. Freire (1972b: 41) wrote of ‘those who intend
to make the future repeat the present’ as people with a ‘ “domesticated”
notion of history’ for whom there is ‘no genuine hope’. This privileges a
linear conception of time over the seasonal, biological or cyclical patterns
of time that are associated with physical sustenance and growth. It also denies
human dependency and the need for us to ‘be there’ for each other in ways
that cannot always be predicted, controlled or accommodated in the forward
march of unremitting progress. Karen Davies (1990) cites various explana-
tions for an understanding of linear time as ‘male time’, which include male
0111 power over the development of writing, and over the belief systems of Judaeo-
Christian religions that look to the coming of a future Messiah. Instead of
a relationship to time in which a task takes ‘as long as it takes’, linear time
is the clock time that paved the way for Fordist mass production and
Taylorism, the scientific management of industrial labour. Linear, clock time
also dominates educational processes, for example in the measurement of
academic and professional competence through performance of written tasks
within the strictly controlled time limits of formal examinations. Most of
the women in my study spoke of wanting their ‘own time’, but also accepted
that they will always be available for, as one participant said, ‘just what falls
0111 in your lap’.
Being available for others in this way is not compatible with the kind of
labour that Freire dignifies with the status of ‘work’ as it is currently organ-
ised. In his argument that, unlike animals, ‘only men work’, Freire defined
4111 work as action that ‘must result in significant products’. Mechtild Hart (1992)
posits an alternative view of work that locates the production of life rather
than things as its ultimate purpose, making positive connections between life,
work and necessity. This challenges a Marxist view in which the necessity
of subsistence labour to meet bodily needs is opposed to freedom, self-
realisation and human happiness. Hart calls upon adult educators to chal-
lenge the notions of progress and development that are driven by this desire
for ‘triumph over necessity’ that ‘always takes the form of mastery: over slaves,
over women, over nature’ (1992: 121). When they first left school, all of the
18 women in my study worked in shops, offices, catering, hairdressing or fac-
tory jobs. At the time of our interviews, when all of them were responsible
for the care of dependants, many of the women also worked in part-time care
jobs and most of them included among their aspirations for the future a career
and professional qualifications in health, social welfare or community work.
Financial rewards came very low on their list of interests and desires. For those
who chose to work in commercial or manufacturing jobs, all were now suf-
fering from the ‘downward mobility’ resulting from taking time out of the
workplace during periods of rapid technological change.
As a response to such negative consequences for women who choose, or
are obliged to take on domestic and caring responsibilities, adult educators
put on courses with titles like ‘Fresh Start’, ‘Second Chance’ or ‘Women
Returners’. The notion of a ‘fresh start’ suggests that those who need such a
thing must have taken a wrong turning somewhere. When we invite women
to ‘return’ to the straight and narrow path of organised education, we are
denying the value and importance of the productive work and learning that
is denigrated when ‘domestication’ is opposed to ‘liberation’. This is not to
valorise and celebrate the drudgery, the isolation, the intellectual stagnation
and the lack of social standing or financial rewards that are so often features
of unpaid work at home. Those features are not the consequences of women’s
‘domestication’, but result from the unequal distribution of domestic labour
in the home and the low status and rewards attached to domestic and caring
occupations in the public sphere. As a feminist, my agenda for action can
include arguing for and supporting policies that seek to redress such inequali-
ties through what Melissa Benn describes as a ‘moral ecology’, which recog-
nises that for some of us to have more rewarding work and more leisure time,
others must have less.5 This would provide the moral basis for a ‘domestic
democracy’, which involves ‘all adults in a household contributing their equi-
table share to the maintenance of the place where they live’ (Benn, 1998:
244). This political agenda cannot be pursued by telling women that we need
to be liberated from our own desires, or by denying the value of the domes-
tic and caring work that we do. Instead, we can make a space for the ambiva-
lence and mutability of these desires to be explored in relation to the material
conditions of our interconnected lives.
In this chapter I have drawn upon Paulo Freire’s early work to high-
light the particularly masculine construction of liberation in opposition to
Julia Clarke 75
11 domestication that underpins much of the theory and practice of critical

pedagogy. In doing so, I owe a debt to Freire’s pedagogy for its emphasis on
language and the ‘problematization’ of key words and concepts. Freire
acknowledged that the goals of critical pedagogy would change when he
wrote,
Narratives of liberation are always tied to people’s stories, and what

stories we choose to tell, and the ways in which we decide to tell them,
form the provisional basis of what a critical pedagogy of the future might
011 mean.
(Freire, 1993: xii)
11 Although uncertain about the prospect of a ‘critical pedagogy of the future’,

I now count among my tasks as an adult educator that of deconstructing the
narratives and discourses that set up the world of education and work as a
privileged ‘real world’ in opposition to some kind of hinterland of domesti-
cation. What are we saying about women’s lives when we invite women to
‘Return to Learning’, and offer them a ‘Second Chance’ or a ‘Fresh Start’?
What are we saying about both the desire and the need to care for children
0111 or other dependants when we list these activities as ‘barriers to learning’?
There are clearly many more stories to tell about the domestic experiences
of women, and men. The challenge for adult educators is to provide the
spaces in which these stories can be told.
Notes
1 Praxis – the notion of praxis locates critical reflection in the context of trans-
formative action for material change.
2 YTS = Youth Training Scheme, one of many UK government training schemes
for unemployed young people.
0111 3 I make no attempt in this account to add in feminine pronouns or comment on
each reference to ‘man’, ‘men’ or ‘he’ since, rather than treating these as the excus-
able errors of a pre-feminist consciousness, I regard these features as evidence of
the masculine world-views and representations of humanity represented in these
texts.
4 British and international surveys on motivation and participation in continuing
education offer us various typologies of ‘non-participants’, all of which include
people who: have a significant responsibility for the care of dependant/s; are
engaged in additional part-time work outside the home; left school with few or
no formal qualifications; live in rural areas (McGivney, 1990).
5 Hewitt (1993) reports that in Britain, even when a man and a woman sharing
a household are both in full-time work, the average man has 17 hours more
0111 leisure time than the average woman.
4111
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Chapter 5
Self and experience in adult

learning
Robin Usher, Ian Bryant and Rennie Johnston
The self in adult education’s traditions of learning

What conception of the self does adult education operate with? Adult educa-
tion involves processes in which particular kinds of learners (adults) engage
in activities leading to desirable kinds of change. Thus, the very notion of
adult learning as a process where desirable changes are brought about is itself
dependent upon particular yet very often taken-for-granted conceptions of
the self. There are, however, clear if largely implied assumptions about the
nature of the self in the way in which adult learning is typically conceived.
The best way of showing this is by considering the notion of autonomy. As
Boud (1989) points out, ‘autonomy’ in the context of adult learning refers
both to a goal of self-awareness, of empowerment in the sense of an ability
to exercise choice in relation to needs, and to an approach to learning of
active personal involvement and self-direction.
Autonomy is the government of the self by the self, a freedom from depen-
dence, a situation where one is influenced and controlled only by a source
from within oneself. What prevents autonomy is therefore that which is
outside or ‘other’ to the self. Amongst the many forms that otherness can
take the most significant in the context of adult education are didactic
teachers and transmitted bodies of formal knowledge. Perhaps the most
significant characteristic of the adult learner has been that of autonomy. As
Candy (1987: 161) points out, the notion of the learner as an autonomous
self is ‘so deeply entrenched in the ethos of adult education as to be thought
“obvious” or “self-evident” and to thus be beyond question’. It is this
autonomous self in the form of the adult learner who becomes the centre or
source of experience and knowledge, including self-knowledge.
It is not too difficult to see why this notion of the autonomous self
possessing agency provides a vital rationale and ground for an educational
This is an edited version of a chapter previously pubished in Learning Beyond the Limits:
Adult Education and the Postmodern Challenge, 1997, London and New York: Routledge.
Robin Usher, Ian Bryant and Rennie Johnston 79
11 practice such as adult learning with its emphasis on personal change.

Autonomy defines both a goal for and an approach to the practice of adult
education. The rationale is that adult education, by its approach to learning,
can bring to the fore and realise the autonomy that is always potentially
present in adult selves. This is why the common theme that unites the
various and disparate strands or traditions in adult learning is that of empow-
erment – an empowerment implicated with a particular kind of self who has
a natural potential for autonomy and who can be empowered through a
particular kind of practice.
011 Boud (1989: 40–43) refers to four main traditions of learning in adult
education: training and efficiency in learning, self-directed learning or
andragogy, learner-centred or humanistic, and critical pedagogy and social
11 action. These traditions, although very different, all seek to remove some-
thing from the process of learning in order that they can attain their goal.
Training and efficiency in learning seeks to remove distractions that make
learning less efficient in the attainment of predefined learning goals. The
andragogical tradition seeks to remove the restrictions of didactic teachers
and formal bodies of knowledge from learning. The humanistic tradition
seeks to remove all internal and self-imposed distortions on learning whilst
0111 the critical tradition seeks to remove the oppressions of history and social
context from learning.
At this point, it is worth noting the negative imagery. The learning process
is characterised as one full of blockages and barriers, things that impede or
hold back the self-as-learner from attaining various ends, such as efficacy,
autonomy, self-realisation or emancipation, which each tradition posits as
the goal of learning. For the self-as-learner the learning process is one beset
by distractions, restrictions, barriers and oppressions – all varieties of negative
and feared ‘otherness’, which have to be overcome.
The tradition of training and efficiency in learning depends on a body of
0111 predefined knowledge or skills, couched in terms of objectives (often behav-
ioural in nature) and learnt in a planned and efficient way. Pedagogy becomes
a technical matter, with the learner receiving pre-planned inputs and
producing or enacting predefined outputs; learning becomes a neutral process
or system removed from the influence of sociocultural factors. The speci-
ficity of learners, differences attributable to biographical factors such as
gender, ethnicity and class are either ignored or programmed out. The self
that is operative here is the classical scientific self – individualised, undif-
ferentiated, an essentially abstract entity, the ‘monological self’, the self-
contained individual having no transactions with and unaffected by anything
0111 ‘other’ to itself – a kind of pure ‘learning machine’.
That is why it is a matter of removing distractions from a learning process
whose goal is the acquisition by the learner of new knowledge and skills.
This is what autonomy means here. Learners appear to have control of the
4111 learning process – the goal is clear, measurable and relevant, the learning
process straightforward and flexible; they can work at their own pace and
according to their particular circumstances. But, at the same time, this
control is largely illusory because the knowledge and skills to be acquired
are predefined. The control actually rests with the predefined knowledge and
skills, both of which are simply assumed to be neutral ‘givens’ rather than
socioculturally constructed and therefore problematic. Autonomy, therefore,
becomes induction into ‘givens’, predetermined meanings over which the
learner has little personal control.
The andragogical tradition has been perhaps the most influential in insti-
tutional adult education. As Boud (1989: 41) points out, it is a tradition that
emphasises ‘the unique goals and interests of individual learners and places
these as central in the teaching and learning process’. The focus of the
andragogical tradition is the adult learner’s experience, considered to be
the foundation and most important resource for learning. It is what essen-
tially characterises adults, that which uniquely defines their being as adults
(Knowles, 1978, 1985). Thus, in the andragogical tradition, experience is at
the centre of knowledge production and acquisition. Using experience
becomes not simply a pedagogical device but more significantly an affirma-
tion of the ontological and ethical status of adults, in particular, the mark of
their radical difference from children. This tradition is very anti-schooling,
seeing as an important part of its mission that of ‘liberating’ adult learners
from its unhappy consequences.
This emphasis assumes that experience provides a different knowledge, a
knowledge of the ‘real’ world drawn from ‘life’, that is either an alternative
or an enriching complement to formal knowledge. Learners are thus not to
be seen as empty vessels to be filled with formal knowledge through didactic
teaching, but rather as coming to learning situations with valuable resources
for learning and with the attributes of self-direction, i.e. knowing their own
learning needs, a knowledge not possessed by children.
The emphasis on experience constructs the adult as an active learner who
comes to learning situations with personal resources in the form of experi-
ence. On the other hand, because of the way in which the self is constructed,
this experience is taken as an unproblematic ‘given’. Experience is unques-
tioningly seen as ‘present’, as an authentic source of knowledge once learners
are left free to control their own learning and to realise their inherent self-
directing tendencies; once, in other words, they position themselves correctly
by freeing themselves from the ‘otherness’ of knowledge not based on their
own experience.
Correspondingly, children’s experience is denied a status because it is
supposedly less ‘authentic’ than adults’ experience, the assumption being that
the child cannot have a self free from otherness. If adult learners are subjected
to didactic teaching and a curriculum based on formal knowledge rather than
their experience, if, in other words, the conditions of schooling are repro-
duced, then they revert to being children with a self still dependent on
11 otherness. That the learner’s own experience may not come indelibly
stamped with the mark of authenticity is not considered.
The rejection of otherness means that andragogy cannot have a concep-
tion of experience as culturally constructed, pre-interpreted, complex and
multi-stranded. The self is therefore conceived as meaning-giver, the origi-
nary source of experience and knowledge in relation to experience, with a
corresponding failure to recognise that selves, because they are linguistically
and socioculturally embedded, are also meaning-takers. The meaning of expe-
rience comes from ‘outside’ selves, although at the same time this outside is
011 so much a part of us that we experience it as ‘inside’.
The self of andragogy is the transcendental self of the Enlightenment.
Persons are seen as individualistic and unitary with a core rationality ena-
11 bling them to systematically reflect on and know their experience. They are
pre-given and decontextualised and, although they are accorded a biography
since without it they would have no experience, the assumption is both that
they can distance themselves from it and that it is a linear record of the
unfolding of the life of an essential self that can be, in principle, always
decoded. In general, history, sociality and human practices apart from
schooling are considered formative but not essential. It is precisely the quality
0111 of remaining ‘inside’, untouched by an ‘outside’, of being fully present to
oneself, that enables the self-as-learner to exercise its own agency and realise
its autonomy. This, then, becomes the justification and potential for the
educational interventions by which autonomy can be realised through the
removal of restrictions. The emphasis on the ‘inside’ also makes the andra-
gogical tradition psychologistic (since the ‘inside’ is always associated with
mind and mental activities) and ironically this has opened the door for the
colonisation of its practice by psychology. Learners are thrown back on their
personal resources that determine the path of their learning – a seeming
control by the learner that, in practice, turns out to be illusory.
0111 The humanistic tradition has its theoretical base in humanistic psychol-
ogy, particularly the work of Carl Rogers (1967, 1983), one of its most
significant exponents. Rogers emphasised the importance, first, of ‘here and
now’ experiencing of ourselves and the world, of subjective consciousness
and awareness in knowing and acting; second, the process of ‘becoming’, of
choosing ways of living that realise an innate, authentic self, and third, the
need to think holistically, in terms of the ‘whole’ person, the integrated
biologically based organism, a unity of thinking, feeling and acting.
Rogers’ authentic self, as we have just noted, although it is in many
respects different from the rational self, is nonetheless similarly a transcen-
0111 dental non-contingent self, a unitary, self-knowing consciousness, disem-
bodied and disembedded. So long as persons can remain in touch with their
authentic core selves, their ‘organismic’ being, and can be fully themselves,
then they will act rationally and responsibly. For Rogers, people become
4111 trapped in inauthenticity through oppressive social relations. We have an
innate powerful need for external positive regard – for the love and respect
of significant others – a need that can only be met by accepting the condi-
tions that they impose for giving us what we desire. This causes us to
act inauthentically, against our true selves. As a consequence, we become
‘blocked’, unhappy and fail to develop our full potential, both generally as
persons and particularly as learners.
Social relationships, therefore, exert an oppressive authority – ‘anything
taken in from others is by definition inimical to authenticity and spontan-
eity’ (Richards, 1989: 109) – and one of the most significant forms this
authority can take is the pedagogic relationship. It is the pedagogic rela-
tionship that is the main enemy. Unless teachers are ‘facilitators’, giving
up their traditionally didactic role, then this relationship will always be
oppressive and will block rather than enable learning. As in the andra-
gogical tradition, schooling and indeed any institutional form of educa-
tion is seen as doing nothing but harm, and the need, therefore, is to ensure
that the learning situation does not replicate this in any way. It must be
learner-centred, controlled by the felt needs of learners and geared to
optimising their development as whole persons. As Boud (1989: 42) puts
it: ‘Learners may be constrained by their own early negative experiences
of learning and they need the context of a highly supportive and respect-
ful environment to be able to recognise their needs and begin to explore
them.’
Here, then, the self is essentially individualistic with an internal organ-
ismic rather than a social essence. The social is always ‘outside’ and
oppressively ‘other’. There is no recognition that selves might be socially
located and no recognition that self and others are mutually constitutive
within relationships. All social relationships are seen as inherently manip-
ulative, functioning to distort the autonomy and agency of persons. A
person’s authentic self is inherently ‘good’, i.e. it is already socialised and
eminently sociable. Social change, therefore, becomes a matter of the indi-
vidual action of authentic selves; social harmony a product of persons being
truly themselves. In learning, the learning of specific subject matter becomes
less important than learning about oneself, getting ‘in touch’ with one’s
authentic self and acting in accordance with its voice. Learning becomes a
means of eliminating self-distortions and inauthenticity in the service of
attaining a state of self-knowledge, self-presence and autonomy.
Both the andragogical and humanistic traditions have an individual–
society binary opposition at their very heart. The social becomes cast in the
role of the oppressive and feared other. As the point of origin, the authentic
self is independent of the social realm. Individual autonomy and empower-
ment lies in liberating oneself from the social and its oppressive effects. In
Rogers, for example, the social is something from the outside that gets inside
and, like an alien growth, stifles authenticity and potentiality. To be truly
autonomous we must therefore expunge the social that is inside us.
11 These traditions may make much of empowering the individual learner,

yet they have shown themselves to be wide open to hijacking by an indi-
vidualistic and instrumental ethic. The psychologism and individualism of
humanistic discourse presented as a concern for the ‘person’ can lead ulti-
mately and paradoxically to a dehumanisation through the substitution of
covert for overt regulation under the guise of ‘being human’, enabling
learners to ‘open up’, and provide access to their ‘inner’ world. This is an
infiltration of power by subjectivity and a complementary infiltration of
subjectivity by power (Rose, 1994).
011 In the critical pedagogy tradition, the emphasis is on attaining social
change rather than personal autonomy, learning in the service of group or
collective empowerment rather than individual empowerment. In the
11 critical tradition, there is a rejection of individualism and psychologism,
challenging a conception of the self that fails to recognise the effects of social
structures and forces. For example, Brah and Hoy (1989) argue that although
each of us does have a quality of individual uniqueness, we are socially posi-
tioned along power hierarchies constructed through class, race and gender.
Critical pedagogy’s self is the exploited self of ‘false consciousness’ whose
experience is rendered inauthentic by distorting ideology and oppressive
0111 social structures. Persons are first and foremost socially formed rather than
socially isolated individuals. Their experience and knowledge arises from
their social formation and positioning, but equally through these is it distorted
by false consciousness. Learning in critical pedagogy, therefore, is centred on
‘ideology critique’, a stripping away of false consciousness. Learners, in dia-
logue with other learners who are similarly positioned, can understand the
nature of their position, develop a ‘true’ consciousness and take action in con-
junction with others to change their situation. Learning becomes, therefore,
the acquisition of knowledge of an oppressive world, an awareness and under-
standing of one’s social positioning and, through this knowledge, an ability
0111 to change the world and remove oppression.
However, a strong argument can also be made that this tradition is not
actually so different from the others. Certainly, there is an emphasis here
on the social, but all are as one in seeing the social as negative and distorting.
All share a common conception of the relationship of experience to sociality.
Critical pedagogy talks, for example, of experience being ‘shaped by concrete
social conditions’ (Brah and Hoy, 1989: 71) but, as in the humanistic tradi-
tion, this shaping is conceived as generally negative in its effects. The
common feature here is that experiencing in a meaningful and authentic
way is seen as the outcome of a freeing from oppressive social relations.
0111 The social is seen in this way by the critical tradition because it is equated
with social forces that are always portrayed as oppressive and crushing. The
dimension of the social is theorised as a solid, reified ‘thing’, with the
inevitable conclusion that the social can do no other than oppress and crush.
4111 Of course, this is not to deny that there is oppression or crushing of persons
in the lived world, or that this can be explained in social terms. What we
want to point to rather is that if sociality is seen purely as social forces that
crush and oppress, then something very important is being forgotten, namely,
that sociality is the condition of being a person. This implies, therefore, that
it is our social practices that both create us as selves and enable us to be
creative, indeed that learning rather than being something located ‘inside’
is itself a social practice.
Implicit, then, in all the conceptions of the self we have studied so
far are two structuring binary opposites; individual/social and voluntarism/
determinism. Three of the traditions emphasise or privilege the ‘individual’
and ‘voluntarism’ poles whilst critical pedagogy reverses this and privileges
the ‘social’ and ‘determinism’ poles. The danger with both these positions is
that one constructs a totally ‘free-wheeling’ individualistic self, owing nothing
to the social (constructed as oppressive) and where everything important is
located ‘inside’ the person, whilst the other constructs a determined self that
owes everything to the social and where conversely everything important (and
oppressive) is located ‘outside’ the person.
There is a tendency in the critical tradition to end up with a conception
of the self that is, on the one hand, oversocialised and overdetermined and
on the other, patronising in so far as selves have to be seen as normally in
a state of false consciousness. In stressing the negative and overwhelming
effects of social relations and social structures, persons are made into social
‘victims’, dupes and puppets, manipulated by ideology and deprived of
agency.
The dominant tendency in educational theory and practice has been to
privilege the agency of the autonomous self and exclude any notion of deter-
mination on the grounds that to admit determination would be to render
educational work impossible. However, in rejecting determination a self has
to be posited as standing apart from any situatedness, outside of history, social-
ity and human practices. It is the power of the autonomous self to bestow
meanings and shape experience that makes the self the condition and agent
of knowledge. There is no situatedness other than the constraints and dis-
tortions from which the self can, exercising its agency, free itself by its own
willing. In critical pedagogy, the self is shaped by its experiences, mean-
ings are bestowed on them through ideology that becomes the sources of
(false) knowledge. The self is socially situated but frees itself and is able
to experience truly through collective dialogue and action.
In the end, both these conceptions assume a self that is a unified conscious-
ness with the power of self-presence and the capacity to act rationally.
Critical pedagogy, although locating the self in social structures, still assumes
a self capable of moving from false to true consciousness – both a unified
self, self-knowing and self-present and a rational self capable of knowing its
‘true’ position and of acting on that knowledge. The critical tradition, in
positing a socially embedded self, challenges the dominant conception of
11 the self but the challenge is only partial and ultimately fails because it must
also posit a fully rational, self-present self. In effect, then, the self that is
operative in all the traditions of adult learning is the monological self of our
dominant Western culture.
The place of experience

In all the traditions of adult learning, experience has been accorded a privi-
leged place as the source of learning in a learner-centred pedagogy and at the
011 very centre of knowledge production and knowledge acquisition. One conse-
quent danger is that experience comes to be taken as foundational and author-
itative and hence we stop asking questions about it. It has become, in effect,
11 an unquestioned ‘given’. The questions that are asked are to do with the know-
ledge or learning that is the outcome of experience. Adult educators tend to
explain learning in terms of foundational experience, since it seems incontro-
vertible that nothing could be more basic and hence more ‘truthful’ than
someone’s experience. Experience seems to be the incontestable evidence, the
secure originary point, with the clear implication that explanation must
be focused on what is learnt from experience rather than experience itself.
0111 Yet, it could be argued, and indeed we shall argue, that experience is not
unproblematic that, in fact, rather than the origin of explanation, it is precisely
that which is in need of explanation.
This conception of experience – that ‘experience is the foundation of, and
the stimulus for, learning’ (Boud et al., 1993: 8) – is at the heart of peda-
gogies of experiential learning. The problem is that to see experience as
originary in relation to learning fails to recognise that any approach to using
experience will generate its own representations of experience and will itself
be influenced by the way experience is conceived or represented, by the
framework or interpretive grid that will influence how experience is theor-
0111 ised and how it is worked with in practice. In other words, the very use of
experience presupposes a prior theory or epistemology of experience. The
discourse and practice of experiential learning presupposes and practises
something quite different – a theory of prior experience with experience as
the foundational source of knowledge. We would argue that this leads to a
failure to consider first, how experience itself represents (has meanings) and
second, is itself represented (within theories and epistemologies).
Let us explore this second point first, since it links closely with the discus-
sion we have had about the self. We have seen that the dominant conception
of the monological self has rationalistic, humanistic and critical variants
0111 that, despite the variations, also have important things in common. Simi-
larly, there is a dominant conception of ‘monological’ experience where
the latter is constructed as a ‘natural’ attribute of selves. This conception is
rooted in a rational/empiricist epistemology. Experience is constructed as
4111 transparent, giving unmediated access to the world. Language, symbolic
systems and discourses are seen simply as neutral vehicles for describing what
all rational selves can experience. Knowledge of the world is possible because
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the world and the way it is
represented through experience. Rational procedures such as reflection can
be used by all and enable experience to be sorted, validated and transformed
into knowledge. This monological conception of experience, certainly in
its rationalistic and humanistic variants, is essentially individualistic and
psychologistic. Consciousness is a key attribute with knowledge of the world
a function of the autonomous, reflective self – the self as an ideal-knower,
independent of contingency and specificity, disembodied and disembedded.
As Michelson (1996) points out, adult education has, throughout its
history, tended to construct learning as a process where knowledge is created
through the transformation of experience. Experience is raw material to be
acted upon by the mind through the controlled and self-conscious use of the
senses (observation) and the application of reason (reflection). Even the
critical tradition in adult education, whilst it seeks to distance itself from
the individualism and psychologism by emphasising the constitution of ex-
perience within social structures, still retains the notion of ‘raw material’
and of ‘transformation’.
Let us consider these similarities in more detail. First, there is a common
emphasis on the potential of selves to experience authentically. Experience
provides a privileged access to the truth of reality where reality is itself under-
stood as a given. Second, experiencing authentically and knowing truly is a
matter of positioning that, whether socially structured or individually orig-
inated, is always ultimately a matter of methodical will – in other words,
positioning is open to change by eliminating distortion through methodical
techniques such as objectivity, reflection, introspection, dialogue and
consciousness-raising. Third, there is an elimination of difference. The criti-
cal tradition appears to accept difference when it foregrounds the sig-
nificance of different social positioning but, because it tends to reify and
naturalise categories such as gender, race and class, it actually works to
eliminate differences within categories. The very notion of ‘positioning’ is,
therefore, rendered unproblematic to the extent that a potentially liberating
practice can become totalising and oppressive. Fourth, all the variants fail
to recognise that they are theorising or representing experience. What they
think they are doing is simply describing or explaining in a neutral way the
essential nature of experience or the nature of the pre-existing self. In effect,
however, they are representing or discursively producing experience in a very
particular way and with a very particular set of significations. There is
nothing neutral about this – on the contrary, it is eminently political and
contestable.
We can examine this question of representation more closely by going
back to conceptions of the self and looking at their significatory force rather
than their content. In other words, the way the self is represented does
11 not merely describe and illuminate a pre-existing self but actually influ-
ences people’s self-awareness and sense of individuality, the way their sub-
jectivities are constituted.
Representations of the self can be seen as narratives or stories about the
self, cultural texts that define subjectivity – Benhabib (1992), for example,
refers to the narrative structure of personal identity. Our sense of ourselves
as self-enclosed, independent, inner-directed, ‘sovereign’ individuals is pro-
duced and maintained by narratives and ways of speaking (Shotter, 1993).
These provide meanings through which we define ourselves, meanings that
011 function both as possibilities and constraints in relation to the forming of
subjectivity – on the one hand, a set of enabling resources through which
selves can be created; on the other, a set of limitations beyond which selves
11 cannot be easily made and remade (Shotter, 1989). Different cultural texts
present different sets of possibilities and constraints.
As we have already seen, the dominant narrative projects the self as a
natural, existent and universal category. The alternative narrative is one
where the self is rather a culturally and historically variable category. Indeed,
the very idea that this category of self is definitive of subjectivity is a speci-
fically Western cultural phenomenon. In other cultures and in Western
0111 culture at different historical periods, subjectivity, or the sense of self, has
been seen as relationally constituted – for example, in relation to family and
kinship, to community, to the natural world. Modern subjectivity, however,
is rooted in a logic of identity rather than difference and thus bound to a
predominantly individualistic or monological conception of human beings
as unique selves where subjectivity is inseparably linked to an essentialised
and non-relational self.
Feminism, in critiquing this dominant representation of the self, argues
that there is no essential pre-existing subjectivity and no universal category
of the self. Rather, the self is located in concrete social relations and cultural
0111 texts with subjectivity defined by powerful gendered narratives where gender
itself is storied into being as a ‘natural’ or biological attribute of the self
(Flax, 1990). Given its central position in the structure of oppressive patri-
archy, feminism has sought, therefore, to displace modern Western culture’s
transcendental, universal and monological self.
The postmodern critique is also directed towards the notion of an essen-
tial human nature or true self. Postmodernists would argue that this ‘true
self’ needs to be seen as a character in a narrative, a culturally produced
‘fiction’ presented in a naturalistic guise so that the narrative is concealed
and the self appears as pre-existing and ‘natural’. For postmodernists, the self
0111 is not a fact, a transcendental being, but an artefact socially, historically and
linguistically produced. All social practices, including practices where
meaning is attributed to the notion of a ‘self’, are not just mediated but
constituted through language. As Weedon (1987: 33) points out, language
4111 is the means by which:
we learn to give voice – meaning – to our experience and to understand

it according to particular ways of thinking, particular discourses which
pre-date our entry into language. These ways of thinking constitute our
consciousness, and the positions with which we identify and structure
our sense of ourselves, our subjectivity.
The postmodern story of the self is that of a decentred self, subjectivity with-
out a centre or origin, caught in meanings, positioned in language and the
narratives of culture. The self cannot know itself independently of the signi-
fications in which it is enmeshed. There is no self-present subjectivity, hence
no ultimate transcendental meaning of the self. Meanings are always ‘in
play’ and the self, caught up in this play, is an ever-changing self, caught up
in the narratives and meanings through which it leads its life (Lovlie, 1992).
As de Lauretis puts it: ‘the process is continuous, unending or daily renewed.
For each person therefore subjectivity is an ongoing construction, not a fixed
point of departure or arrival, from which one then interacts with the world’
(quoted in Gunew, 1990: 28). Thus, there is no non-linguistic or non-
historical position, no originary point, where persons can gain a privileged
access to the world or to themselves. As Flax (1993) argues, subjectivity is a
discursive effect, a character in a story as much as the ‘author’ of the story.
Representations of the self, instead of being seen as ‘truth’, need to be seen
more usefully as stories, often very powerful stories, which perform a variety
of social functions, including the construction of selves with appropriate
characteristics.
In being positioned through narratives we get a sense of ourselves, but this
sense is always changing. When we tell stories about our experience, these
are not stories simply about ourselves as entities that exist independently of
the story, although they may appear to be. They are not stories about or
emanating from essential selves, but stories that help in the construction of
selves. Subjectivity is never a once-and-for-all construction, and the experi-
ence that meaning can have is never permanently fixed. Human beings have
many stories to tell and many different ways in which they can be recognised
and give meaning to themselves through them. Subjectivity is therefore
always shifting and uncertain and has to be continually ‘re-formed’. At any
one point in time, experience can take on a specific meaning but there is no
guarantee that the question of its meaning is thereby forever settled.
Experience can be invested with a multiplicity of meanings, identity
conducted through many possible stories. Even within any one articulation,
the meaning of experience is never permanently fixed: thus, the text of expe-
rience is always open to reinterpretation. As O’Reilly (1989) points out,
experience always has a quality of incoherence – it may come with pre-
determined meanings but this is never the last word, since experience can
always be ‘reread’. One could put it this way – experience always says less
than it wishes to say, there is always more that can be read into it, it never
11 reaches the destination of total clarity and definitiveness. As ‘readers’ we

can never make it completely present. There is a sense in which experience
is always out of control, always brimming over from the social contexts
within which it is represented. This is perhaps why mechanisms that seek
to accredit or recognise prior learning in totalising experience, to make it
decidable and to bring it under control, always end up being oppressive.
As we have seen, experience in adult education discourse has mainly
signified freedom from regulation in the service of personal autonomy
and/or social empowerment. Autonomy, empowerment, self-expression, self-
011 realisation are key signifiers. Other hitherto more submerged signifiers such
as ‘application’ and ‘adaptation’ now also have a key significance. The mean-
ing of experience will vary according to different discursive practices, as too
11 will the particular significance given to learning deriving from experience.
Although experiential learning has become central to the theory and prac-
tice of education in the postmodern moment, as a pedagogy it is inherently
ambivalent and capable of many significations. There is a need to stop see-
ing experiential learning in purely logocentric terms, as a natural character-
istic of the individual learner or as a pedagogical technique, and more in terms
of the contexts, sociocultural and institutional, in which it functions and from
0111 which it derives its significations. In itself, therefore, it has no unequivocal
or ‘given’ meaning – it is inherently neither emancipatory nor oppressive, nei-
ther domesticating nor transformative. Rather, its meaning is constantly shift-
ing between and across these polarities. It is perhaps most usefully seen as
having a potential for emancipation and oppression, domestication and trans-
formation, where at any one time and according to context both tendencies
can be present and in conflict with one another. Accordingly, it offers a con-
testable and ambiguous terrain where different socio-economic and cultural
assumptions and strategies can be differentially articulated. As a field of
tension, it can be exploited by different groups, each emphasising certain
0111 dimensions over others.
Experiential learning can, for example, be deployed as a pedagogical
strategy both in a disciplines-based curriculum and within a competences-
based curriculum. Equally, it can be deployed as part of a continued question-
ing of and resistance to the forms of power that situate us as subjects. But
at the same time, even here, experiential learning can function both as a
more effective means of disciplining the ‘whole’ subject rather than simply
the reasoning part and as a strategy to subvert the dominance of an oppres-
sive universalistic reason by giving ‘voice’ to difference. What this implies,
then, is that experience is always a site of struggle, a terrain where the
0111 meaning and significance of the experience to be cultivated in learning
contexts is fought over. Central to this struggle is the reconfiguration of
emancipation and oppression in the postmodern moment.
4111
References
Benhabib, S. (1992) Situating the Self, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Boud, D. (1989) ‘Some Competing Traditions in Experiential Learning’, in S.W.
Weil and I. McGill (eds), Making Sense of Experiential Learning, Milton Keynes:
SRHE/Open University Press.
Boud, D., Cohen R. and Walker, D. (1993) ‘Introduction: Understanding Learning
from Experience’, in D. Boud, R. Cohen and D. Walker (eds), Using Experience
for Learning, Milton Keynes: SRHE/Open University Press.
Brah, A. and Hoy, J. (1989) ‘Experiential Learning: A New Orthodoxy?’, in S.W.
Weil and I. McGill (eds), Making Sense of Experiential Learning, Milton Keynes:
Candy, P. (1987) ‘Evolution, Revolution or Devolution: Increasing Learner Control
in the Instructional Setting’, in D. Boud and V. Griffin (eds), Appreciating Adults
Learning, London: Kogan Page.
Flax, J. (1990) Thinking in Fragments, Oxford: University of California Press.
Flax, J. (1993) Disputed Subjects, London: Routledge.
Gunew, S. (ed.) (1990) Feminist Knowledge: Critique and Construct, London:
Routledge.
Knowles, M. (1978) The Adult Learner: A Neglected Species, Houston, Tex.: Gulf
Publishing.
Knowles, M. (1985) Andragogy in Action, San Francisco, Calif. Jossey-Bass.
Lovlie, L. (1992) ‘Postmodernism and Subjectivity’, in S. Kvale (ed.), Psychology and
Postmodernism, London: Sage.
Michelson, C. (1996) ‘The Usual Suspects: Experience, Reflection and the (En)gen-
dering of Knowledge’, International Journal of Lifelong Education, 15: 438–454.
O’Reilly, D. (1989) ‘On Being an Educational Fantasy Engineer’, in S.W. Weil and
I. McGill (eds), Making Sense of Experiential Learning, Milton Keynes: SRHE/Open
University Press.
Richards, B. (1989) Images of Freud, London: J.M. Dent.
Rogers, C.R. (1967) On Becoming a Person, London: Constable.
Rogers, C.R. (1983) Freedom to Learn in the ’80s, Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill.
Rose, N. (1994) Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self, London: Routledge.
Shotter, J. (1989) ‘Social Accountability and the Social Construction of “You” ’, in
J. Shotter and K.J. Gergen (eds), Texts of Identity, London: Sage.
Shotter, J. (1993) Conversational Realities, London: Sage.
Weedon, C. (1987) Feminist Practice and Post-structuralist Theory, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Chapter 6
11
Promoting reflection in
professional courses
The challenge of context
David Boud and David Walker
011
11 Introduction
One of the key ideas and features of all aspects of learning from experience
is that of reflection. Dewey (1933) expressed an early view that ‘while we
cannot learn or be taught to think, we do have to learn how to think well,
especially acquire the general habit of reflecting’. Since Dewey’s time many
writers in the field have emphasised the importance of reflection: Kolb
(1984) has drawn attention to the role of reflection in Lewin’s experiential
0111
learning cycle, Schön (1983, 1987) has introduced the concept of the reflec-
tive practitioner into current discourse, and many others have taken the idea
of reflection and explored it in the context of theory and practice in expe-
riential learning. Reflection has also been a central feature of our own work
for many years (e.g. Boud et al., 1985; Boud and Walker, 1990). Different
aspects of reflection have been explored, in particular reflection-in-action
and reflection-on-action. Reflection has been used differently depending
on the tradition from which the writer or practitioner has come. More
recently the notion of critical reflection has become the centre of attention,
driven partly by the interests of critical social scientists (Walker and Boud,
0111
1992) and by practitioners who regard the idea of ‘normal’ practice as
problematic (e.g. Brookfield, 1995).
Over the past ten years or so we have seen the translation of ideas of reflec-
tion and reflective practice into courses and programmes for the initial train-
ing and continuing education of a wide variety of practitioners, particularly
in professions such as teaching (e.g. Zeichner and Liston, 1987; Clift et al.,
1990; Calderhead and Gates, 1993; Smith and Hatton, 1993; Loughran,
1996), nursing (e.g. Parlmer et al., 1994; Johns and Freshwater, 1998) and
social work (e.g. Yelloly and Henkel, 1995; Gould and Taylor, 1996), where
field experience and academic study need to be closely integrated. With this
0111
has come the challenge of incorporating ideas about reflection, which in some
This is an edited version of an article previously published in Studies in Higher Education,

4111 1998, 23(2): 191–206.
cases are only partially understood, into teaching contexts that are not con-
ducive to the questioning of experience – that is, situations that do not allow
learners to explore ‘a state of perplexity, hesitation, doubt’ (Dewey, 1933),
‘inner discomforts’ (Brookfield, 1987), ‘disorienting dilemmas’ (Mezirow,
1990), uncertainties, discrepancies and dissatisfactions that precipitate, and
are central to, any notion of reflection.
More recently, in parallel with increasing acceptance of reflective practice
as an organising framework for professional preparation, there has been a
questioning of Schön’s views on reflective practice. Greenwood (1993)
argues that he neglects the importance of reflection before action and Eraut
(1995) suggests that there is little evidence of reflection-in-action in the
crowded setting of classrooms. The unreflexive nature of Schön’s accounts of
his ideas is a concern of Usher et al. (1997), who also raise doubts about his
methodology as it applies to practice, and draw attention to its insufficiently
contextualised nature.
While we are sympathetic to the focus on learning through experience in
reflective practice and are committed to the inclusion of reflective processes
and theorising about reflection within professional courses, we believe that
there are now many examples of poor educational practice being imple-
mented under the guise and rhetoric of reflection. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to assess readily the extent of this. However, evidence from our
own observations of staff development activities devoted to reflection and
reflective practice, and reports from experienced teachers across many pro-
fessional areas enrolled in higher degree study, suggest that reality falls very
far short of the rhetoric.
What are the problems?

The problems that we have encountered cover a broad range, from inexpe-
rience in how to conduct experience-based learning activities to basic
misunderstandings of the nature of learning and reflection. Activities in
which these problems arise include various different classroom tasks, the
keeping of diaries and journals, the debriefing of workshops and placements
and drawing on the life experience of students. None of these are problem-
atic per se; it is the ways in which they are used that give rise to difficulties.
The following are some examples that we have encountered.
Recipe following. In this form of practice, class activities typically take

students through a sequence of steps of reflection and require them to reflect
on demand. Elements of models of reflection are turned into checklists that
students work through in a mechanical fashion without regard to their own
uncertainties, questions or meanings. For example, nursing students might
be asked to ‘reflect’ on a clinical experience in response to a predetermined
set of questions to which ‘answers’ are expected. While there are many
David Boud and David Walker 93
11 circumstances in which a list of reminders can be useful, in the case of reflec-

tion there is the great risk that acts of reflection become ritualised, without
reference to context or outcomes. This leads to false expectations of what
reflection is (it is linear, about external knowledge and unproblematic) and
what learning outcomes can be expected of reflective activities (those that
can be found in course statements and competency standards). When com-
bined with a teacher- rather than a learner-centred approach to education,
rule following turns ‘reflection’ into a process to be memorised and applied
unthinkingly. The one characteristic of the references to reflection cited in
011 this article is that they eschew the following of simple formulae to encourage
reflection. Where stages or elements are given, authors are careful to point
out that these are illustrative or conceptual elements, not an operational
11 process. There is a challenge to teachers in turning ideas about reflection
into tangible processes that can be commended to learners, but many are
not meeting this challenge.
Reflection without learning. While reflection is important, not all planned

reflective processes lead to learning.1 Inadequate, inappropriate, or badly
used reflective activities can become an obstacle. Just leaving time for reflec-
0111 tion does not mean that the time will be used in a productive way. In many
cases students may be able to use such time as an opportunity to take breath
in a crowded curriculum, but they may not be able to use it to reflect or
learn in ways that are meaningful to them. It is important to frame reflec-
tive activities within the learning context in which they are taking place.
Without some direction reflection can become diffuse and disparate so that
conclusions or outcomes may not emerge. Without a focus on conceptual
frameworks, learning outcomes and implications, reflection for learners can
become self-referential, inward looking and uncritical. There is inevitably a
tension between guidance that leads to the problems of recipe following
0111 (identified above) and a lack of structure that can lead to a loss of focus.
There are no reflective activities that are guaranteed to lead to learning, and
conversely there are no learning activities guaranteed to lead to reflection.
It is often in the presentation of appropriate reflective activities that the
skill of the teacher is manifest and that students are assisted in their learning.
The common strategy of asking students to take time out to make reflective
notes is only likely to prompt reflection if the course in which it is used is
one that encourages students to make their own meanings. In a different
setting it could simply lead to ‘spotting the examination question’ or
‘appearing to satisfy the teacher’.
0111
Belief that reflection can be easily contained. There is often a pretence,
or a naive assumption, that reflection can be restricted to matters outlined
by the teacher within the teacher’s comfort zone. In fact, the very nature of
4111 reflective activities is such that they may lead to serious questioning and
critical thinking, involving the learners in challenging the assumptions of

teachers or the learning context in which they are operating. For example,
clinical placement for nursing students or teaching practice for education
students can generate considerable distress, provoke students to query their
vocation and throw up ethical dilemmas related to the practice of experi-
enced professionals that cannot be resolved by making notes and having a
discussion. It is not surprising then that students may not accept the bound-
aries of reflection within a subject that teachers take for granted. Reflective
activities may lead students to focus on personal distress, oppressive features
of the learning environment, the programme of study, resources provided,
assessment practices and so on. There is no way that these can be barred,
and facilitators of reflection need to be aware that any activity can tap into
such issues. If the learning context is not supportive of a least some wider
exploration, intolerable tensions between staff and students can result, and
some students may be left in situations detrimental to them.
Not designing for a formal learning context. Even when a recipe-following

approach is avoided, there can still be a problem of a mismatch between the
type of reflection proposed and where it is used. The context of learning is
often taken to be non-problematic in educational institutions. For example,
asking students to explore their misconceptions or to reveal their uncertain-
ties (a reflective task), in a situation in which they will be assessed in terms
of understanding of the subject matter (a non-reflective requirement) on the
basis of what they write, undermines the teacher’s goal of encouraging reflec-
tion – students expect to write for assessment what they know, not reveal
what they don’t know. Assessment used in this way not only shows a poor
understanding of the relationship between assessment and learning and the
link between assessment tasks and learning outcomes, but also a limited
appreciation of how to establish a climate conducive to reflection. Another
example of a mismatch between reflection and assessment is in the use of
reflective journals. The expectation that they will be read by an assessor
leads some students to censor their reflections so much that they fail to engage
with their felt experience and avoid learning. In circumstances where it is
judged necessary to assess students’ reflection skills (a goal that might itself
be questioned – see, for example, Sumsion and Fleet (1996)), reflective
writing should be judged in terms of criteria for the recognition of reflective
writing (e.g. Hatton and Smith, 1994), not in terms of standard academic
writing conventions.
Intellectualising reflection. Because emotions and feelings are often down-

played in educational settings, it is common for reflection to be treated as
if it were an intellectual exercise – a simple matter of thinking rigorously.
However, reflection is not solely a cognitive process: emotions are central
11 to all learning. Recognition of affective dimensions of learning means

teachers taking responsibility to create a climate in which the expression of
feelings is accepted and legitimate. Unless learners are able to express them-
selves in conditions of trust and security, and know that the expression of
emotion is not likely to lead to negative consequences for them, then the
use of many forms of reflection may be inappropriate. This is a particular
dilemma in professional courses in, for example, teaching and nursing, where
expressions of feelings may lead staff to believe that a student may not be
able to cope in a practice context, and lead to doubts about whether the
011 student should be permitted to enter the profession. One of the most
common outcomes of intellectualising reflection is, ironically, that of leaving
students in emotional disarray. Denying the power and influence of emotion
11 leaves staff with no strategies for dealing with it when it inevitably arises.
Of course, allowing for emotional disclosure creates its own challenges.
Inappropriate disclosure. Because it is difficult and often inappropriate to

focus reflection tightly, there is always the potential for learners to disclose
matters that may be very confronting for staff: matters of great personal sen-
sitivity, confidential information, unethical behaviour or even knowledge of
0111 crimes. In situations in which students do not feel constrained and are com-
fortable, they can include material that embarrasses staff and reveals infor-
mation about others upon which their supervisors may feel professionally
obliged to act. Dilemmas of breaking confidentiality, undermining colleagues,
whistle-blowing and privacy can arise. At other times, learners may be asked
to disclose too much of their inner life, their relationships or work with
others. The use of personal journals that are handed in and discussed with
staff is a risky strategy. Unless they are carefully planned with these dilem-
mas in mind and students are guided in how to use them, they can become a
forum in which students reveal more than they or their teachers can handle.
0111
Uncritical acceptance of experience. While most teachers who use reflec-
tive activities would shrink from encouraging students to accept experience
without question, there are some more radical practitioners who tend to reify
felt experience as if it possessed a special truth that would be damaged by
questioning. They see reflection as a bulwark against the conformity of the
curriculum and a means of celebrating naive experience against other influ-
ences. Whilst sensations and feelings provide important data for learning,
they do not provide unambiguous messages: they are always influenced by
our presuppositions, framed by theory – be it formal or informal – and subject
0111 to multiple interpretations. As Bryant et al. (1996) argue, experience cannot
be separated from knowledge, it needs to be interpreted as a social practice;
it is not coherent, complete or masterable.
4111
Going beyond the expertise of the teacher. While it impossible to predict

the full range of possibilities in any given situation, it is necessary for teachers
to be well prepared for the most common issues that are likely to emerge.
Unfortunately this is rarely the case, and teachers have been deterred from
using some forms of reflection in their courses because of unfortunate disclos-
ures with which they could not cope. Some of these instances can be avoided
through appropriate design of activities or staff development that extends
facilitative expertise. There are reasonable expectations of learners that if
they are encouraged to disclose information about themselves, then teachers
will help them deal with the issues that are raised: teachers may not share
the same assumption. However, a more unfortunate situation can arise if
staff begin to work with issues that are beyond their expertise. Disturbed
perhaps by what they have unwittingly elicited, or feeling that they cannot
leave the student in the emotional state that they have inadvertently
provoked, they may endeavour to work further with the issues raised to the
detriment of the student. Teachers must be aware of what they can and
cannot handle, work within their capacities and develop networks with other
kinds of practitioners (e.g. counsellors) to whom they can refer when they
do not have expertise.
Excessive use of teacher power. The use of reflective activities can lead
to staff gaining far greater influence over the lives of students. Worryingly,
for a minority of staff this may be part of their attraction. More is known
about students’ experience than previously and this can be enormously bene-
ficial in facilitating learning; teaching can be better related to students’
experience and misconceptions more readily addressed. However, in less
benign environments this can be severely detrimental. When learners are
required to provide personal information to staff, there is greater potential
for the misuse of power. Problems of teacher power are compounded by the
fact that many teachers are simply not conscious of what they are doing and
would be offended if it were suggested to them that they were even exer-
cising power over students. A degree of mature awareness (Maslow, 1968)
beyond that possessed by many teachers may be needed if reflective processes
are to be used ethically.
The question that these examples pose is why have some of these ideas been
interpreted in such educationally destructive, naive or negative ways? Is it
because there are problems with the basic ideas upon which these practi-
tioners are drawing, or with the ways in which they have been presented?
Or is it because there is a problem in educational practice to which the use
of such approaches draws attention? Our view is that these aspects require
attention. However, in this chapter we focus on the last question. We explore
the nature of context and how it influences the use of reflection in courses
in higher and professional education.
11 Context and reflection

Consideration of the context in which reflective action is engaged is a seri-
ously underdeveloped aspect of discussion of reflection. The context to which
we are referring is the total cultural, social and political environment in
which reflection takes place. This broader context is so all-pervasive that it
is difficult to recognise its influence. It is, however, mirrored in and is in
turn modified by particular local settings within which learning occurs:
the classroom, the course and the institution. Context influences teachers
and learners in a variety of ways in their everyday interactions as well as in
011 learning outcomes and processes. Included here are influences on teachers,
in terms of what goals they pursue for what ends, their own competence in
handling teaching–learning situations and the resources they deploy; on
11 learners, in terms of what they aspire to and how their expectations are
framed; on learning outcomes, in terms of what teachers and learners accept
as legitimate goals and what outcomes are valued over others; and on learning
activities, in terms of what processes are acceptable in any given situation.
There is a need to acknowledge these influences if the boundaries that they
set are to be utilised or challenged, as is the case when reflective activities
are used.
0111 Some exponents of reflection, particular those Morrison (1996) identifies
as adopting a politically oriented model, encourage students to focus on their
own context and settings and change them (e.g. Smyth, 1996). However, it
is far less common to extend such reflection to an analysis by learners of the
context in which the reflective activity itself is taking place.
In an earlier model of reflection and learning from experience (Boud and
Walker, 1990), we gave considerable emphasis to what we referred to as the
learning milieu. The learning milieu, as we conceived of it then (following
Parlett and Hamilton, 1977), represented the totality of the human and
material influences that impinge on learners in any particular situation. These
0111 include co-learners, teachers, learning materials, the physical environment
and everything that was to be found therein. Whilst these influences are
undoubtedly important and provide some of the key resources for change, a
conception of milieu that focuses on these alone is far too limited a notion
to describe adequately the context of learning and its effects. Context is per-
haps the single most important influence on reflection and learning. It can
permit or inhibit working with learners’ experience.
Varieties of views on context

0111 Any view of context now must take account of the considerable theoretical
contributions in recent years of, for example, critical social science, post-
structuralism and postmodernism, which have drawn attention to the ways
in which our constructions of what we accept as reality are constituted. The
4111 context in which we operate has many features that are taken for granted
and are normally invisible on a day-to-day basis. These features have a

profound influence over who we are, what and how we think and what we
regard as legitimate knowledge. These features include inter alia the language
we use to name the world (we cannot hold concepts or draw meaning from
experiences for which we do not have language); the assumptions we hold
about ourselves and others (what we believe we can and cannot learn); what
is acceptable and not acceptable for us to do and what outcomes it is reason-
able for us to seek in any given situation; which social groups are dominant
or oppressed (who is heard and who is acted upon); who has resources and
what they are; and many other economic, political and cultural considera-
tions. These wider features of the context of learning reach deeply into the
ways in which we view ourselves and others. They impinge on our identity
and influence the ways in which we relate to others.
This broader social, political and cultural context influences every aspect
of learning. It is not possible to step aside from it, or view it ‘objectively’,
as it permeates our very being. It is reflected in our personal foundation of
experience, which, although constructed from unique experiences, is also
formed by the context in which we have developed. Context is subject to
rereading and multiple readings: while it may be experienced as ‘given’, it
is always available for reinterpretation. Institutions embody through their
rules and modes of operation cultural assumptions that are or were domi-
nant in particular aspects of society; they exemplify particular readings of
context in their operation.
The ways in which context is represented in or challenged by institutions
are of particular importance. As with individuals, institutions do not operate
independently of their context, but there is some potential for administra-
tors and teachers in key positions within them to counter, or at least draw
attention to, particular features that may be antithetical to some kinds of
learning. For example, leaders may initiate within the institution ground
rules that emphasise inclusiveness and treat individuals according to their
specific contributions and relevant differences rather than attributes (such
as gender and race) unrelated to the work at hand. This can give staff within
educational institutions more scope to create microcontexts, which operate
as enclaves that have features separate from dominant cultural influences
and which are conducive to particular kinds of reflective activity. Of course,
many reflective activities – even the notion of reflection itself – are steeped
in particular cultural practices and it may be necessary to draw attention to
these in order to avoid establishing a new mystique and terminology that
acts on some groups to exclude rather than include them.
Managing the influence of context

We believe that it is necessary to be optimistic about the extent to which
the formation of such separate microcontexts is possible. There are far more
11 opportunities for challenging undesired aspects of the broader context than

are often acknowledged, and there are many examples within higher educa-
tion of radical questioning of dominant values and practices that could be
cited. Whilst it is vital to take account of context and plan teaching and
learning activities on the basis on how context frames and influences possi-
bilities, it is especially important that the power of context should not be
used as an excuse to do nothing or to reinforce the status quo. Aspects of
context change and can be changed, some obviously more so than others.
Because context is so embedded within situations, teachers and learners
011 need to find ways of managing and working with it. It is never possible to
set it aside. Context can be foregrounded though, and the ways in which it
is manifest in any particular teaching and learning setting made the subject
11 for exploration.
Teachers and learners also need to take personal responsibility for creating
microcontexts and alternative readings of contexts that permit a wider range
of exploration and learning than might otherwise be possible, and avoid
blaming contextual factors for their own reluctance to seize the opportuni-
ties that exist in any situation. They should, however, be mindful that some
forms of context (for example, that of some forms of competency-based
0111 learning) may operate precisely to limit possibilities for alternative ways of
operating.
Limitations of individual conceptions

Individualistic conceptions of reflection fail to take account of the subtle
and powerful ways in which context legitimises and frames particular forms
and approaches to reflection, and defines those outcomes from reflection that
are accepted as valid. There are many circumstances in education and train-
ing in which it is inappropriate for teachers to be encouraging particular
0111 reflective activities as the local context is such that it is not likely that useful
outcomes will result; for example, promoting the use of reflective journals
when formal assessment is based on competitive, cognitively oriented exam-
inations, or encouraging the exploration of personal identity when anti-
discriminatory practices are not well established within an institution. It is
important to identify the conditions that may be required for productive
reflection to occur.
Many discussions of reflection imply that it is a universal process that can
be considered independently of context. However, if reflection is regarded
as universal it more easily lends itself to abuse than if it is construed as a
0111 cultural practice located in a particular time and place. Reflection might
therefore take on a variety of forms or processes, dependent on a wide range
of factors. Factors to be considered might include class, race, gender, and so
on as well as many local forms of difference. It may be necessary to contex-
4111 tualise not only the content of reflective activities, but also the process itself
– as suggested earlier. It is tempting to locate reflection as part of the set of

teaching innovations that emphasise autonomy and self-direction. However,
to do this is to run the risk of limiting the idea and its applications and to
position it as part of an individualist discourse. Michelson (1996) takes this
argument further and suggests that a consequence of this kind of positioning
is to give reflection an inappropriately masculinist character.
Creating the local context: conditions under

which reflection might be promoted
An image may help to illustrate our use of context here. When people gather
together in an organisation, certain dynamics take over so that the organisa-
tion itself begins to influence the attitudes and behaviour of those who con-
stitute it. People are drawn into it, and often act in a way that is contrary to
what they might do alone. They can be carried along with the organisational
ethos, caught up in a bigger purpose, and taken over by its character and
behaviour. Creating a local context is like making a space in the organisa-
tion for groups of members to operate apart from immediate pressures to per-
form. It can establish a different atmosphere within which people can resist
the draw of organisational requirements, and can act out of different attitudes
and values. It can act as a kind of oasis, which provides an environment
different from that which surrounds it. This is a space in which conditions
are created deliberately rather than just accepted from the larger context;
some of these conditions may be in contradiction to the larger context. The
metaphor also suggests that while it may be possible to find a space for other
activities within the wider setting, such a space is still within the organisa-
tion and ultimately subject to its influences.
While institutional contexts supportive of systematic reflection are not as
common as is frequently assumed, the local context within which a partic-
ular group is situated must be one in which there are norms that counter
negative features of the wider social context (e.g. one group norm might be
that patterns of oppression are not accepted as legitimate and are ques-
tioned). It is this local context that is the focus of learning, and it needs to
provide what is best to foster the learning process. One of the most impor-
tant steps in the creation of the local context is to filter the negative
influences of the larger context, for example, by developing ground rules for
a class that make unacceptable remarks by students that might be taken as
‘putting down’ other members of the group. However, it is sometimes easier
to counter negative influences than it is to create positive ones, especially
when models for good practice are hard to find. For example, it is easier to
filter expressions of racism through banning offensive statements than it is
to establish a climate of safety in which members of minority groups feel
valued and supported. For the latter to occur, trust is essential, but it can
only be built progressively, never assumed.
11 There are a number of factors to be considered in establishing conditions

for reflection in the light of an awareness of context. These include what
teachers are and are not able to do, the need to build trust and the prob-
lematic nature of so doing, the need to create situations in which learners
are able to make their own meaning rather than have it imposed on them,
the ways in which disciplines and professions frame what is possible in the
higher education setting, consideration of whose interests are being pursued
in reflective activities and the importance of creating and respecting bound-
aries between the institutional imperatives of learning and the personal
011 domain of the learner.
Limitations on teachers
11
It is especially important to recognise that the influence of the socio-
political, or even institutional, context on teachers can have serious conse-
quences for the local context. Teachers may be too captive to the larger
context to relate to the experience of participants and thus fail to engage
them in meaningful reflection. They themselves may be unaware of the power
of context and so operate in naive ways that ignore many of the important
0111 dynamics that affect learners: they may not be sensitive to some of the traps.
They may collude with the dominant culture and guide reflection in order to
avoid engagement with issues of power and control. Reflection on creating
the local context may help teachers become more aware of previously
unrecognised forces and the ways they are limited by them.
The influence of power and knowledge can never be avoided, though, and
it would be simplistic to imply that a reflective space can be treated by the
good intentions of a teacher alone. Teachers need to be sensitive to whether
particular reflective practices have been misused in this local context and
have thus created a negative response from participants – for example,
0111 through the intrusive use of journals or demands for disclosures from students
inappropriate to the course. Sometimes particular practices may have been
employed by a dominant group to the disadvantage of others. Such practices
need to be avoided. Also, it is important to check that participants respect
reflective processes of the kind that may be introduced, or at least are neutral
to them.
Building trust
A good reflective space or microcontext requires a level of trust commen-
0111 surate with the levels of disclosure that might reasonably be expected. Trust
inevitably involves risk however; respect for participants and norms of confi-
dentiality need to be actively worked towards and agreed to. Participants
need to be able to express themselves intellectually and emotionally, and
4111 know that such expression, and discussion of it, is legitimate and accepted.
Barriers that prevent open interaction and reciprocal communication need

to be addressed. This may involve identifying differences of power or status
among participants (i.e. when some hold public or implied positions of
authority over others) and differences in levels of contribution by members
of the group (i.e. ensuring that some members are not silenced). Oppressive
behaviour (e.g. remarks directed to others because of visible or implied differ-
ences that are not related to the content of discussion) may need to be
confronted and such behaviour worked through should it occur. The teacher
should be aware that participants may have a history of seeing others in the
group as barriers to their learning. Difference is always a challenge: in some
cultures the expression of thoughts and feelings to relative strangers is prob-
lematic. Particular ways of promoting openness may in themselves act as
barriers to disadvantage some learners.
Permitting the making of meaning

Suggestions for activities need to be sensitive to the unique characteristics
of the group and acknowledge that the outcomes desired by members may
differ from expectations of the institution with which the activity may be
associated or the teacher involved. The intent of participants must be accepted
to a significant extent in order that they can find their own meaning within
the learning situation. Their intent may not at first be apparent to themselves
or to others. Their articulated points of view are to be respected even if they
are also to be challenged. It is important to introduce activities in ways that
provide an understandable rationale for their use, allowing participants con-
sciously to opt in or opt out without direct or implied coercion, and indicating
that time will be available for debriefing. The processes selected need to take
account of emotions and work with them as appropriate to the task and con-
text. It is only when the need for learners to make their own meaning in ways
that connect with their unique experience is accepted that learners can feel
free to reflect within the limits of the activity proposed.
Framing by disciplines and professions

Everything we do is framed and situated. This framing rarely occurs through
our own volition but is part of the world we experience as given. Framing
imposes assumptions, it legitimises practices and it provides a language for
describing and analysing what we do. The processes of framing are not ones
of which we are usually conscious. Of particular significance in professional
education is the framing imposed by particular disciplinary and professional
contexts within which teachers and students operate. Disciplines and profes-
sions define what counts as legitimate knowledge and acceptable practice by
their members. The invisibility of this framing offers a major challenge for
teachers in working with students, as staff are normally enculturated into
11 their discipline or profession and take it for granted. While this framing
of context forms major barriers to the construction of microcontexts for
teaching and learning, it needs to be subject to critique and challenge by
teachers working together concertedly over time. Examples of successful
challenges can be found in the ways in which gender assumptions about
access to professional education have been successfully challenged in many
professional areas, and how traditional notions of the route of initial training
through low level non-academic work have been overturned in a number of
the health professions.
011
Whose interests are being pursued?
11 The broader context in which reflective activities take place must, then,
always be considered. ‘Who establishes the activity for whom?’ is often the
basic question to be considered. When there are differences of power between
individuals or groups, as is inevitably the case in teaching and learning, there
are many opportunities for one party unwittingly to oppress the other. For
example, if reflection is initiated by a teacher who is a member of a partic-
ular dominant social group, for those who are not members of the group
0111 there is the risk that participation in reflection will merely add to oppres-
sive activities that exist, rather than exposing or confronting them. The
most likely outcome will be compliance, in which participants go through
the motions of reflection without revealing (sometimes even to themselves)
what are fundamental learning issues. For example, a student may attribute
his or her inability to function well to a personal lack of confidence rather
than a failure on the part of their teacher adequately to address and confront
their own (low) expectations about what it is possible for that particular
student to achieve.
Under other less oppressive circumstances resistance from participants may
0111 be evident. Indeed, resistance is often a positive feature, though sometimes
inconvenient for teachers, as it can indicate that power dynamics are being
subverted. However, unless the institution or organisation in which the
activity is promoted is credibly committed to anti-oppressive practices for
all social groups (for example, being known to be active in dealing with
issues associated with sexism, racism and other dominant group practices),
then a sufficient climate of trust and safety – to offset the inherently risky
and disruptive nature of reflection itself – may not be possible to enable
effective reflection to occur.
0111
Boundaries of reflection
It is necessary to establish a common discourse for reflection within the
domain of knowledge that is being considered. The range and class of activ-
4111 ities that will be the object of reflection should be agreed. Without this there
is potential to enter inadvertently areas that are beyond the normal contract
between teacher and learner and thus to face tricky ethical dilemmas. There
is a need for boundaries on what outcomes of reflection are to be shared
with others and these boundaries should be clear from the start. The
boundary between professional space and private space is not fixed, but needs
to be clarified in any given setting in order to avoid a particular version of
what Habermas (1987) has referred to as ‘colonisation of the life-world’; that
is the intrusion of institutions – work, profession, educational institution –
into the domain that has been regarded as personal and in the hands of the
individual to share.
If boundaries of reflection are defined by ideas and concepts in the disci-
pline being studied, this should be explicit and attention given to developing
a shared vocabulary and understanding of central concepts. For example,
students may be expected in class to say what they know about the topic in
the language of concepts that are publicly accepted, rather than explore
uncertainties that may exist within their own frame of reference. If the
boundaries are to include the professional practice of the learner (as in a
work placement), then this should be agreed also. Moreover, if learning with
an emancipatory focus that might involve exploring personal and social rela-
tionships is the raison d’être (e.g. Mezirow, 1990), then this too must be part
of what is accepted by all parties as legitimate. Of course, it is also in the
disruption of such boundaries that possibilities for different understandings
occur.
When discourse crosses one or more of these boundaries without becoming
questioned and contracts of acceptable behaviour renegotiated, then trouble
will arise and ethical dilemmas will quickly emerge. The respecting of bound-
aries is of particular significance in educational institutions where the shift
in discourse from public knowledge to personal reflection is problematic for
both staff and students. For example, in religious education it needs to be
clear whether the focus of attention in any particular situation is on under-
standing the particular theological tradition being studied or exploring
personal crises of faith. The contracts of understanding between staff and
student would differ in each case. Teachers may have to mediate between
the expectations of the cultural or institutional context and that of learners
to establish a clear contract that defines the boundaries for this local context.
This does not mean that insights from personal experience or from under-
standing a particular tradition are not available to be drawn upon in either
case. However, it does imply that self-disclosure of affective responses should
not be required without prior agreement.
Perceptions of context
It is sometimes comfortable to assume that it is possible to identify what the
context might be in any given situation. Unfortunately, this is very rarely
11 the case. Understanding context is always hard-won and there are always
multiple readings of what it might be. Each participant will see it differently
as each brings their own personal foundation of knowledge and set of life
experiences with them. There will be competing views about how context
is to be interpreted, and differences of perception. Context will be manifest
in the behaviour and attitudes of each participant as each will have expe-
rienced, to a greater or lesser extent, forms of oppression from the wider
context that bring that context into their own personal world. Context will
be manifest in internal oppression of participants as they recreate the
011 external world in their own. While context is a useful organising idea, it
cannot be treated as unproblematic in conception or use.
11
Implications for those facilitating reflection
Teachers need to consider themselves, the learners with whom they are
working, the local context in which they operate, the processes they use,
and the expected outcomes as defined by each party (including external ones,
for example, the institution or accrediting body). They need to create a
microcontext within which the kinds of reflection acceptable to learners and
0111 consistent with the values of learners and teachers can occur and that does
not reproduce those aspects of the dominant context that impose barriers to
learning.
Of the many factors that are important, the following indicate some that
teachers may need to take into account.
In focusing on context
• Their awareness of what elements of the cultural, institutional or disci-
plinary context may need to be filtered or confronted in this local
0111 context, or may be used to advantage in the learning event (i.e. a partic-
ular session in a course).
• How they can cope with the demands of the institution within which
they operate.
• Their own power and the ways in which this might impact on learners
singularly and collectively.
Reflection by teachers and learners before the learning event is as impor-

tant as reflection during, or after, it. Understanding beforehand the factors
that may be operating within the future learning event is necessary in order
0111 to work creatively within that event. Teachers and learners bring with them
all the essential elements of the larger context: they are imbued with the
assumptions and practices of their culture, the demands and expectations
imposed by the educational institution, and the attitudes and ways of oper-
4111 ating that dominate the particular discipline. Periodically, and in each new
situation, teachers need to explore specifically how the subjects they are
dealing with, and the learners they are working with, are affected, both posi-
tively and negatively, by this larger context. In particular, the larger context
constructs the teacher as having specific power. The teacher needs to be
aware of this and ensure that it is used productively within the learning
event. Reflection on the larger context in relationship to the subject and
the learners can help the teacher work on how to cope with these operating
forces and develop strategies that will counter them, or use them creatively.
In focusing on learners
• Their assumptions about the particular learning event, their own intent
and how this may relate to the intent and expectations of learners.
• How they can elicit from learners responses appropriate to the learning
and reflective processes of the given activity.
• The prior experience of learners, both with regard to the substantive
learning outcomes that are sought and the particular processes of reflec-
tion that are being contemplated.
• How they can respect learners and their agendas and take these as the
focus rather than other agendas of the culture, institution or themselves.
Learners carry with them assumptions and practices of the larger context.
However, their personal experience of their culture, their institution and
the particular discipline may have affected them in different ways. It could
have given them particular expectations and demands and affected how they
approach the various processes of the learning event. It may be necessary,
for example, to find an opportunity in any part of a course to introduce
particular activities that elicit learners’ assumptions about a learning event,
and their intent or expectations of it. The planning for the event needs to
respect these elicited assumptions and intents, give them priority, and relate
them creatively to the assumptions and intent of the culture, institute or
teacher. It is especially important to elicit and work in accord with emotional
responses that learners bring to the event because these are often the most
powerful influences affecting how learners engage in the event. While some
of these insights may be known to the teacher from previous experience,
they will probably need to be verified and filled out at an early stage.
In focusing on processes
• How they can construct a learning environment in awareness of the
influence of dominant groups and intervene appropriately within it to
counter oppressive behaviour on the part of learners towards each other.
• How they can create appropriate reflection processes for this context
that will assist the learner to come to meaningful learning.
11 • How to avoid mechanistic processes that do not respond to unique

circumstances and particular learners involved.
• How they can establish patterns of reciprocal communication and create
a place of trust and respect in which reflection and exploration can
flourish.
• The need to establish agreements about what is and is not legitimate in
the particular activity and about the appropriate roles of learners and
teacher, and to respect and reinforce such agreements.
011 There is a uniqueness in each learning event that needs to be respected. To

repeat the same approaches, processes and practices with every group of
learners does not respect the variation in experience that necessarily exists.
11 If teachers are sufficiently sensitive to the climate in the group, activities
can be initiated to draw out some of the feeling of participants, and even
reveal aspects of the dynamics of power. This can help teachers build appro-
priate ways of relating that respect the different approaches and further foster
an atmosphere of trust and respect. It may be necessary to set ground rules.
These are determined by the purpose and particular composition of the group
rather than by the subject to be worked with. If the group is divided,
0111 distracted and discontented, it is unlikely that fruitful learning will be
achieved. It is only when the teacher has begun to work with these issues
of the group that it will be clear what reflective processes and modes of use
are likely to engage members of the group in meaningful learning.
This list of factors is quite daunting, but it is hard to envisage a list that is
substantially smaller yet which takes into account the issues that were
portrayed earlier. It points to the need for increasing sophistication of
teachers in professional education, and for opportunities for them to develop
these skills over time.
0111 If we return to the problems of use and abuse of reflection introduced
earlier, we can illustrate this approach with a few examples. Recipe following
is inappropriate because it does not take account of the uniqueness of the
learners, their prior experience, the particular context in which they are
operating nor the need to address any unhelpful dynamics of power or oppres-
sion which may intrude. Reflection without learning can indicate similar
inappropriate approaches, and also the inability of the teacher to offer appro-
priate reflection processes for this context. Belief that reflection can be easily
contained conflicts with all the evidence about learning that we have. It
ignores the power of the larger context and the personal history of the
0111 learner. Failure to design for context is a particular outcome of the failure to
recognise the importance of context as outlined in this article. Intellectualising
reflection can be a lack of recognition that the emotional is important in
learning, or a sign of teachers’ inability to handle the emotional aspects
4111 of the learning process. Going beyond the expertise of the teacher may indicate
the inability of the teacher to reflect on his or her own preparedness and
ability to enter into this learning situation. Inappropriate disclosure may indi-
cate the inability of the teacher to frame the reflective process or to contract
appropriately with learners. Excessive use of teacher power arises from many
aspects of the context and it may be related as much to teachers’ own
perceived powerlessness in an institution as from their failure to recognise
the primacy of the learner.
Conclusion
Reflection can obviously occur even when circumstances are less than ideal
– the capacity for humans to learn in the least auspicious conditions is quite
remarkable. Some form of learning can occur in almost any situation.
However, there is limited scope for critical reflection if the microcontext is
not created to counter many of the factors that can readily inhibit it. If
conditions of the kind discussed above are not generally found then misuse
and abuse can flourish. It is necessary for teachers to be clear about whether
they are really interested in fostering reflection and whether they are
prepared to take a sufficiently contextualised view of it into account. If they
are, they must confront themselves, their processes, and their outcomes. An
honest self-appraisal conducted in conjunction with peers is one of the hall-
marks of an effective promoter of reflection. Indeed, such an appraisal is
needed when teachers are working with any processes which have the poten-
tial to blur the differences between the personal and professional lifeworlds.
Note
1 Learning in this chapter is interpreted broadly. It includes reconceptualisation
and reframing of situations as well as more conventional outcomes which can
be readily assessed.
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Chapter 7
11
Legitimate peripheral
participation in communities
of practice
Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger
011
11 In this chapter we recast the central characteristics of historical realizations

of apprenticeship in terms of legitimate peripheral participation in commu-
nities of practice. First, we discuss the structuring resources that shape the
process and content of learning possibilities and apprentices’ changing
perspectives on what is known and done. Then we argue that ‘transparency’
of the socio-political organization of practice, of its content and of the arte-
facts engaged in practice, is a crucial resource for increasing participation.
0111 We next examine the relation of newcomers to the discourse of practice.
This leads to a discussion of how identity and motivation are generated as
newcomers move toward full participation. Finally, we explore contradic-
tions inherent in learning, and the relations of the resulting conflicts to the
development of identity and the transformation of practice.
Structuring resources for learning in practice

One of the first things people think of when apprenticeship is mentioned
is the master–apprentice relation. But in practice the roles of masters are
0111 surprisingly variable across time and place. A specific master–apprentice
relation is not even ubiquitously characteristic of apprenticeship learning.
Indeed, neither Yucatec midwives nor quartermasters learn in specific master–
apprentice relations. Newcomers to Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) do have
special relations with specific old-timers who act as their sponsors, but these
relations are not what defines them as newcomers. In contrast, tailors’ appren-
tices most certainly have specific relations with their masters, without whom
they wouldn’t be apprentices. Master tailors must sponsor apprentices before
the latter can have legitimate access to participation in the community’s pro-
ductive activities. In short, the form in which such legitimate access is secured
0111 for apprentices depends on the characteristics of the division of labour in the
This is an edited version of a chapter previously published in Situated Learning, 1991,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4111
social milieu in which the community of practice is located. Thus, the mid-
wife is learning a specialism within her own family of orientation, a form of
labour different, but not separated in marked ways, from the widely distrib-
uted ‘ordinary’ activities of everyday life; legitimate participation comes dif-
fusely through membership in family and community. Where apprentices
learn a specialized occupation, sponsorship into a community of practice –
within a community in the more general sense – becomes an issue. Intentional
relations, and even contractual relations with a specific master, are common.
It should be clear that, in shaping the relation of masters to apprentices, the
issue of conferring legitimacy is more important than the issue of providing
teaching.
Even in the case of the tailors, where the relation of apprentice to
master is specific and explicit, it is not this relationship, but rather the appren-
tice’s relations to other apprentices and even to other masters that organize
opportunities to learn; an apprentice’s own master is too distant, an object of
too much respect, to engage with in awkward attempts at a new activity. In
AA, old-timers who act as ‘sponsors’ reportedly withhold advice and instruc-
tion appropriate to later stages; they hold back and wait until the newcomer
becomes ‘ready’ for a next step through increasing participation in the com-
munity (Alibrandi, 1977). In all the cases of apprenticeship discussed in this
chapter researchers insist that there is very little observable teaching; the
more basic phenomenon is learning. The practice of the community creates
the potential ‘curriculum’ in the broadest sense – that which may be learned
by newcomers with legitimate peripheral access. Learning activity appears to
have a characteristic pattern. There are strong goals for learning because
learners, as peripheral participants, can develop a view of what the whole
enterprise is about, and what there is to be learned. Learning itself is an impro-
vised practice: a learning curriculum unfolds in opportunities for engagement
in practice. It is not specified as a set of dictates for proper practice.
In apprenticeship opportunities for learning are, more often than not,
given structure by work practices instead of by strongly asymmetrical
master–apprentice relations. Under these circumstances learners may have
a space of ‘benign community neglect’ in which to configure their own learn-
ing relations with other apprentices. There may be a looser coupling between
relations among learners on the one hand and the often hierarchical rela-
tions between learners and old-timers on the other hand, than where
directive pedagogy is the central motive of institutional organization. It
seems typical of apprenticeship that apprentices learn mostly in relation with
other apprentices. There is anecdotal evidence (Butler, personal communi-
cation; Hass, n.d.) that where the circulation of knowledge among peers and
near-peers is possible, it spreads exceedingly rapidly and effectively. The
effectiveness of the circulation of information among peers suggests that
engaging in practice, rather than being its object, may well be a condition
for the effectiveness of learning.
Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger 113
11 So far, we have observed that the authority of masters and their involve-
ment in apprenticeship varies dramatically across communities of practice.
We have also pointed out that structuring resources for learning come from
a variety of sources, not only from pedagogical activity. We argue that a
coherent explanation of these observations depends upon decentring common
notions of mastery and pedagogy. This decentring strategy is, in fact, deeply
embedded in our situation approach – for to shift as we have from the notion
of an individual learner to the concept of legitimate peripheral participation
in communities of practice is precisely to decentre analysis of learning. To
011 take a decentred view of master–apprentice relations leads to an under-
standing that mastery resides not in the master but in the organization of
the community of practice of which the master is part: the master as the
11 locus of authority (in several senses) is, after all, as much a product of the
conventional, centred theory of learning as is the individual learner.
Similarly, a decentred view of the master as pedagogue moves the focus
of analysis away from teaching and on to the intricate structuring of a
community’s learning resources.
The place of knowledge: participation, learning

0111
curricula, communities of practice
The social relations of apprentices within a community change through their
direct involvement in activities; in the process, the apprentices’ understand-
ing and knowledgeable skills develop. In the recent past, the only means we
have had for understanding the processes by which these changes occur have
come from conventional speculations about the nature of ‘informal’ learning:
that is, apprentices are supposed to acquire the ‘specifics’ of practice through
‘observation and imitation’. But this view is in all probability wrong in every
particular, or right in particular circumstances, but for the wrong reasons. We
0111 argue instead that the effects of peripheral participation on knowledge-in-
practice are not properly understood; and that studies of apprenticeships have
presumed too literal a coupling of work processes and learning processes.
To begin with, newcomers’ legitimate peripherality provides them with
more than an ‘observational’ lookout post: it crucially involves participation
as a way of learning – of both absorbing and being absorbed in – the ‘culture
of practice’. An extended period of legitimate peripherality provides learners
with opportunities to make the culture of practice theirs. From a broadly
peripheral perspective, apprentices gradually assemble a general idea of what
constitutes the practice of the community. This uneven sketch of the enter-
0111 prise (available if there is legitimate access) might include who is involved;
what they do; what everyday life is like; how masters talk, walk, work and
generally conduct their lives; how people who are not part of the commu-
nity of practice interact with it; what other learners are doing; and what
4111 learners need to learn to become full practitioners. It includes an increasing
understanding of how, when, and about what old-timers collaborate, collude

and collide, and what they enjoy, dislike, respect and admire. In particular,
it offers exemplars (which are grounds and motivation for learning activity),
including masters, finished products and more advanced apprentices in the
process of becoming full practitioners.
Such a general view, however, is not likely to be frozen in initial impres-
sions. Viewpoints from which to understand the practice evolve through
changing participation in the division of labour, changing relations to
ongoing community practices, and changing social relations in the commu-
nity. And learners have multiple structured relations with ongoing practice
in other ways. Apprenticeship learning is not ‘work-driven’ in the way stereo-
types of informal learning have suggested; the ordering of learning and of
everyday practice do not coincide. Production activity-segments must be
learned in different sequences from those in which a production process
commonly unfolds, if peripheral, less intense, less complex, less vital tasks
are learned before more central aspects of practice.
Consider, for instance, the tailors’ apprentices, whose involvement starts
with both initial preparations for the tailors’ daily labour and finishing details
on completed garments. The apprentices progressively move backward
through the production process to cutting jobs. (This kind of progression is
quite common across cultures and historical periods.) Under these circum-
stances, the initial ‘circumferential’ perspective absorbed in partial, peri-
pheral, apparently trivial activities – running errands, delivering messages,
or accompanying others – takes on new significance: it provides a first ap-
proximation to an armature of the structure of the community of practice.
Things learned, and various and changing viewpoints, can be arranged and
interrelated in ways that gradually transform that skeletal understanding.
When directive teaching in the form of prescriptions about proper prac-
tice generates one circumscribed form of participation (in school), pre-
empting participation in ongoing practice as the legitimate source of learning
opportunities, the goal of complying with the requirements specified by
teaching engenders a practice different from that intended (Bourdieu, 1977).
In such cases, even though the pedagogical structure of the circumstances
of learning has moved away from the principle of legitimate peripheral
participation with respect to the target practice, legitimate peripheral partic-
ipation is still the core of the learning that takes place. This leads us to
distinguish between a learning curriculum and a teaching curriculum. A learning
curriculum consists of situated opportunities (thus including exemplars of
various sorts often thought of as ‘goals’) for the improvisational development
of new practice (Lave, 1989). A learning curriculum is a field of learning
resources in everyday practice viewed from the perspective of learners. A
teaching curriculum, by contrast, is constructed for the instruction of
newcomers. When a teaching curriculum supplies – and thereby limits –
structuring resources for learning, the meaning of what is learned (and
11 control of access to it, both in its peripheral forms and its subsequently more
complex and intensified, though possibly more fragmented, forms) is medi-
ated through an instructor’s participation, by an external view of what
knowing is about. The learning curriculum in didactic situations, then,
evolves out of participation in a specific community of practice engendered
by pedagogical relations and by a prescriptive view of the target practice as
a subject matter, as well as out of the many and various relations that tie
participants to their own and to other institutions.
A learning curriculum is essentially situated. It is not something that can
011 be considered in isolation, manipulated in arbitrary didactic terms, or
analysed apart from the social relations that shape legitimate peripheral
participation. A learning curriculum is thus characteristic of a community.
11 In using the term ‘community’, we do not imply some primordial culture-
sharing entity. We assume that members have different interests, make
diverse contributions to activity and hold varied viewpoints. In our view,
participation at multiple levels is entailed in membership in a community of
practice. Nor does the term community imply necessarily co-presence, a well-
defined, identifiable group, or socially visible boundaries. It does imply
participation in an activity system about which participants share under-
0111 standings concerning what they are doing and what that means in their lives
and for their communities.
The concept of community underlying the notion of legitimate peripheral

participation, and hence of ‘knowledge’ and its ‘location’ in the lived-in
world, is both crucial and subtle. The community of practice of midwifery or
tailoring involves much more than the technical knowledgeable skill
involved in delivering babies or producing clothes. A community of practice
is a set of relations among persons, activity and world, over time and in rela-
tion with other tangential and overlapping communities of practice. A com-
0111 munity of practice is an intrinsic condition for the existence of knowledge,
not least because it provides the interpretive support necessary for making
sense of its heritage. Thus, participation in the cultural practice in which any
knowledge exists is an epistemological principle of learning. The social struc-
ture of this practice, its power relations and its conditions for legitimacy define
possibilities for learning (i.e. for legitimate peripheral participation).
It is possible to delineate the community that is the site of a learning
process by analysing the reproduction cycles of the communities that seem
to be involved and their relations. For the quartermasters, the cycle of navi-
gational practice is quite short; a complete reproduction of the practice of
0111 quartermastering may take place every five or six years (as a novice enters,
gradually becomes a full participant, begins to work with newcomer quar-
termasters who in their own turn become full participants and reach the
point at which they are ready to work with newcomers). The reproduction
4111 cycle of the midwives’, the tailors’ or the butchers’ communities is much
longer. In AA, its length is rather variable as individuals go through succes-

sive steps at their own pace. Observing the span of developmental cycles
is only a beginning to such an analysis (and a rough approximation that
sets aside consideration of the transformation and change inherent in on-
going practice), for each such cycle has its own trajectory, benchmarks,
blueprints and careers (Stack, 1989).
In addition to the useful analytic questions suggested by a temporal focus
on communities of practice, there is a further reason to address the delin-
eation of communities of practice in processual, historical terms. Claims
about the definition of a community of practice and the community of prac-
tice actually in process of reproduction in that location may not coincide –
a point worth careful consideration.
For example, in most high schools there is a group of students engaged
over a substantial period of time in learning physics. What community of
practice is in the process of reproduction? Possibly the students participate
only in the reproduction of the high school itself. But assuming that the
practice of physics is also being reproduced in some form, there are vast
differences between the ways high school physics students participate in and
give meaning to their activity and the way professional physicists do. The
actual reproducing community of practice, within which schoolchildren
learn about physics, is not the community of physicists but the community
of schooled adults. Children are introduced into the latter community (and
its humble relation with the former community) during their school years.
The reproduction cycles of the physicists’ community start much later,
possibly only in university (Traweek, 1988).
In this view, problems of schooling are not, at their most fundamental level,
pedagogical. Above all, they have to do with the ways in which the commu-
nity of adults reproduces itself, with the places that newcomers can or can-
not find in such communities, and with relations that can or cannot be
established between these newcomers and the cultural and political life of the
community.
In summary, rather than learning by replicating the performances of others
or by acquiring knowledge transmitted in instruction, we suggest that learn-
ing occurs through centripetal participation in the learning curriculum of
the ambient community. Because the place of knowledge is within a com-
munity of practice, questions of learning must be addressed within the
developmental cycles of that community, a recommendation that creates a
diagnostic tool for distinguishing among communities of practice.
The problem of access: transparency and

sequestration
The key to legitimate peripherality is access by newcomers to the commu-
nity of practice and all that membership entails. But though this is essential
11 to the reproduction of any community, it is always problematic at the same

time. To become a full member of a community of practice requires access
to a wide range of ongoing activity, old-timers and other members of the
community; and to information, resources and opportunities for participa-
tion. The issue is so central to membership in communities of practice that,
in a sense, all that we have said so far is about access. Here we discuss the
problem more specifically in connection with issues of understanding and
control, which along with involvement in productive activity are related
aspects of the legitimate peripherality of participants in a practice.
011 The artefacts employed in ongoing practice, the technology of practice,
provide a good arena in which to discuss the problem of access to under-
standing. In general, social scientists who concern themselves with learning
11 treat technology as a given and are not analytic about its interrelations with
other aspects of a community of practice. Becoming a full participant
certainly includes engaging with the technologies of everyday practice, as
well as participating in the social relations, production processes and other
activities of communities of practice. But the understanding to be gained
from engagement with technology can be extremely varied depending on
the form of participation enabled by its use. Participation involving tech-
0111 nology is especially significant because the artefacts used within a cultural
practice carry a substantial portion of that practice’s heritage. Thus, under-
standing the technology of practice is more than learning to use tools; it is
a way to connect with the history of the practice and to participate more
directly in its cultural life.
The significance of artefacts in the full complexity of their relations with
the practice can be more or less transparent to learners. Transparency in its
simplest form may just imply that the inner workings of an artefact are avail-
able for the learner’s inspection: the black box can be opened, it can become
a ‘glass box’. But there is more to understanding the use and significance of
0111 an artefact: knowledge within a community of practice and ways of perceiving
and manipulating objects characteristic of community practices are encoded
in artefacts in ways that can be more be less revealing. Obviously, the trans-
parency of any technology always exists with respect to some purpose and is
intricately tied to the cultural practice and social organization within which
the technology is meant to function: it cannot be viewed as a feature of an
artefact in itself but as a process that involves specific forms of participation,
in which the technology fulfils a mediating function. Apprentice quarter-
masters not only have access to the physical activities going on around them
and to the tools of the trade; they participate in information flows and con-
0111 versations, in a context in which they can make sense of what they observe
and hear. In focusing on the epistemological role of artefacts in the context
of the social organization of knowledge, this notion of transparency consti-
tutes, as it were, the cultural organization of access. As such, it does not apply
4111 to technology only, but to all forms of access to practice.
Productive activity and understanding are not separate, or even separable,

but dialectically related. Thus, the term transparency when used here in
connection with technology refers to the way in which using artefacts and
understanding their significance interact to become one learning process.
Control and selection, as well as the need for access, are inherent in
communities of practice. Thus access is liable to manipulation, giving legit-
imate peripherality an ambivalent status: depending on the organization of
access, legitimate peripherality can either promote or prevent legitimate
participation. In a study of butchers’ apprentices, Marshall (1972) provides
examples of how access can be denied. The trade school and its shop exer-
cises did not simulate the central practices of meat cutting in supermarkets,
much less make them accessible to apprentices; on-the-job training was not
much of an improvement. Worse, the master butchers confined their appren-
tices to jobs that were removed from activities rather than peripheral to
them. To the extent that the community of practice routinely sequesters
newcomers, either very directly as in the example of apprenticeship for the
butchers, or in more subtle and pervasive ways as in schools, these newcomers
are prevented from peripheral participation. In either case legitimacy is not
in question. Schoolchildren are legitimately peripheral, but kept from part-
icipation in the social world more generally. The butchers’ apprentices
participate legitimately, but not peripherally, in that they are not given
productive access to activity in the community of practitioners.
An important point about such sequestering when it is institutionalized
is that it encourages a folk epistemology of dichotomies, for instance,
between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ knowledge. These categories do not reside
in the world as distinct forms of knowledge, nor do they reflect some puta-
tive hierarchy of forms of knowledge among practitioners. Rather, they
derive from the nature of the new practice generated by sequestration.
Abstraction in this sense stems from the disconnectedness of a particular
cultural practice. Participation in that practice is neither more nor less
abstract or concrete, experiential or cerebral, than in any other. Thus, legit-
imate peripheral participation as the core concept of relations of learning
places the explanatory burden for issues such as ‘understanding’ and ‘levels’
of abstraction or conceptualization not on one type of learning as opposed
to another, but on the cultural practice in which the learning is taking place,
on issues of access, and on the transparency of the cultural environment
with respect to the meaning of what is being learned. Insofar as the notion
of transparency, taken very broadly, is a way of organizing activities that
makes their meaning visible, it opens an alternative approach to the tradi-
tional dichotomy between learning experientially and learning at a distance,
between learning by doing and learning by abstraction.
11 Discourse and practice

The characterization of language in learning has, in discussions of conven-
tional contrasts between formal and informal learning, been treated as highly
significant in classifying ways of transmitting knowledge. Verbal instruction
has been assumed to have special, and especially effective properties with
respect to the generality and scope of the understanding that learners come
away with, while instruction by demonstration – learning by ‘observation and
imitation’ – is supposed to produce the opposite, a literal and narrow effect.
Close analysis of both instructional discourse and cases of apprenticeship
011 raise a different point: issues about language, like those about the role of
masters, may well have more to do with legitimacy of participation and with
access to peripherality than they do with knowledge transmission. Indeed,
11 as Jordan (1989) argues, learning to become a legitimate participant in a
community involves learning how to talk (and be silent) in the manner of
full participants. In AA telling the story of the life of the non-drinking alco-
holic is clearly a major vehicle for the display of membership. Models for
constructing AA life stories are widely available in published accounts of
alcoholics’ lives and in the storytelling performances of old-timers. Early on,
newcomers learn to preface their contributions to AA meetings with the
0111 simple identifying statement ‘I’m a recovering alcoholic’, and, shortly, to
introduce themselves and sketch the problems that brought them to AA.
They begin by describing these events in non-AA terms. Their accounts
meet with counterexemplary stories by more-experienced members who do
not criticize or correct newcomers’ accounts directly. They gradually generate
a view that matches more closely the AA model, eventually producing skilled
testimony in public meetings and gaining validation from others as they
demonstrate the appropriate understanding.
In the Psychology of Literacy, Scribner and Cole (1981) speculate that
asking questions – learning how to ‘do’ school appropriately – may be a major
0111 part of what school teaches. This is also Jordan’s conclusion about Yucatec
midwives’ participation in biomedical, state-sponsored training courses. She
argues that the verbal instruction provided by health officials has the effect
of teaching midwives how to talk in biomedical terms when required. Such
talk only serves to give them ‘face validity’ in the eyes of others who believe
in the authoritative character of biomedicine. But Jordan argues that it has
no effect on their existing practice.
This point about language use is consonant with the earlier argument that
didactic instruction creates unintended practices. The conflict stems from the
fact that there is a difference between talking about a practice from outside
0111 and talking within it. Thus the didactic use of language, not itself the discourse
of practice, creates a new linguistic practice, which has an existence of its
own. Legitimate peripheral participation in such linguistic practice is a form
of learning, but does not imply that newcomers learn the actual practice the
4111 language is supposed to be about.
In a community or practice, there are no special forms of discourse aimed

at apprentices or crucial to their centripetal movement toward full par-
ticipation that correspond to the marked genres of the question–answer–
evaluation format of classroom teaching, or the lecturing of college profes-
sors or midwife-training course instructors. But Jordan makes a further, acute,
observation about language, this time about the role of stories in appren-
ticeship: she points out that stories play a major role in decision mak-
ing (1989). This has implications for what and how newcomers learn.
For apprenticeship learning is supported by conversations and stories about
problematic and especially difficult cases:
What happens is that as difficulties of one kind or another develop,

stories of similar cases are offered up by the attendants [at a birth], all
of whom, it should be remembered, are experts, having themselves given
birth. In the ways in which these stories are treated, elaborated, ignored,
taken up, characterized as typical and so on, the collaborative work of
deciding on the present case is done . . . These stories, then, are pack-
ages of situated knowledge . . . To acquire a store of appropriate stories
and, even more importantly, to know what are appropriate occasions for
telling them, is then part of what it means to become a midwife.
(Jordan, 1989: 935)
Orr (1990) describes comparable patterns of story telling in his research on

the learning of machine-repair work: technicians who repair copier machines
tell each other ‘war stories’ about their past experiences in making repairs.
Such stories constitute a vital part of diagnosing and carrying out new
repairs. In the process, newcomers learn how to make (sometimes diffi-
cult) repairs, they learn the skills of war-story telling, and they become
legitimate participants in the community of practice. In AA also, discus-
sions have a dual purpose. Participants engage in the work of staying
sober and they do so through gradual construction of an identity. Telling the
personal story is a tool of diagnosis and reinterpretation. Its communal use is
essential to the fashioning of an identity as a recovered alcoholic, and thus
to remaining sober. It becomes a display of membership by virtue of fulfilling
a crucial function in the shared practice.
It is thus necessary to refine our distinction between talking about and
talking within a practice. Talking within itself includes both talking within
(e.g. exchanging information necessary to the progress of ongoing activities)
and talking about (e.g. stories, community lore). Inside the shared practice,
both forms of talk fulfil specific functions: engaging, focusing, and shifting
attention, bringing about co-ordination, etc., on the one hand; and support-
ing communal forms of memory and reflection, as well as signalling member-
ship, on the other. (And, similarly, talking about includes both forms of
11 talk once it becomes part of a practice of its own, usually sequestered in

some respects.) For newcomers then the purpose is not to learn from talk
as a substitute for legitimate peripheral participation; it is to learn to talk as
a key to legitimate peripheral participation.
Motivation and identity: effects of participation

It is important to emphasize that, during the extended period of legitimate
participation typical of the cases of apprenticeship described here, new-
011 comers participate in a community of practitioners as well as in productive
activity. Legitimate peripheral participation is an initial form of member-
ship characteristic of such a community. Acceptance by and interaction with
11 acknowledged adept practitioners make learning legitimate and of value from
the point of view of the apprentice. More generally, while learning in prac-
tice, apprentice learners know that there is a field for the mature practice
of what they are learning to do – midwifing, tailoring, quartermastering,
butchering or being sober. The community of midwives, tailors, quarter-
masters, butchers or non-drinking alcoholics and their productive relations
with the world provide apprentices with these continuity-based ‘futures’.
0111 To be able to participate in a legitimately peripheral way entails that new-
comers have broad access to arenas of mature practice. At the same time, pro-
ductive peripherality requires less demands on time, effort and responsibility
for work than for full participants. A newcomers’ tasks are short and simple,
the costs of errors are small, the apprentice has little responsibility for the
activity as a whole. A newcomer’s tasks tend to be positioned at the ends of
branches of work processes, rather than in the middle of linked work segments.
A midwife’s apprentice runs errands. Tailors’ apprentices do maintenance on
the sewing machine before the master begins work, and finishing details when
the master has completed a pair of trousers; a lot of time in between is spent
0111 sitting beside the master on his two-person bench. For the quartermasters, the
earliest jobs are physically at the periphery of the work space. In many cases,
distinctions between play and work, or between peripheral activity and other
work, are little marked. In all the cases of apprenticeship mentioned here,
however, it is also true that the initial, partial contributions of apprentices are
useful. Even the AA newcomer, while reinterpreting his or her life, produces
new material that contributes to the communal construction of an under-
standing of alcoholism. An apprentice’s contributions to ongoing activity gain
value in practice – a value that increases as the apprentice becomes more
adept. As opportunities for understanding how well or poorly one’s efforts con-
0111 tribute are evident in practice, legitimate participation of a peripheral kind
provides an immediate ground for self-evaluation. The sparsity of tests, praise
or blame typical of apprenticeship follows from the apprentice’s legitimacy as
a participant.
4111
Notions like those of ‘intrinsic rewards’ in empirical studies of apprentice-

ship focus quite narrowly on task knowledge and skill as the activities to be
learned. Such knowledge is of course important; but a deeper sense of the
value of participation to the community and the learner lies in becoming part
of the community. Thus, making a hat reasonably well is seen as evidence
that an apprentice tailor is becoming ‘a masterful practitioner’, though it may
also be perceived in a more utilitarian vein in terms of reward or even value.
Similarly, for alcoholics, telling one’s life story or making a Twelfth Step call
(carrying the AA message of recovery to other sufferers) confers a sense of
belonging. Moving toward full participation in practice involves not just a
greater commitment of time, intensified effort, more and broader responsi-
bilities within the community, and more difficult and risky tasks, but, more
significantly, an increasing sense of identify as a master practitioner.
When the process of increasing participation is not the primary motiva-
tion for learning, it is often because ‘didactic caretakers’ assume responsibility
for motivating newcomers. In such circumstances, the focus of attention
shifts from co-participating in practice to acting upon the person-to-be-
changed. Such a shift is typical of situations, such as schooling, in which
pedagogically structured content organizes learning activities. Overlooking
the importance of legitimate participation by newcomers in the target prac-
tice has two related consequences. First, the identity of learners becomes an
explicit object of change. When central participation is the subjective inten-
tion motivating learning, changes in cultural identity and social relations
are inevitably part of the process, but learning does not have to be medi-
ated – and distorted – through a learner’s view of ‘self’ as object. Second,
where there is no cultural identity encompassing the activity in which
newcomers participate and no field of mature practice for what is being
learned, exchange value replaces the use value of increasing participation.
The commoditization of learning engenders a fundamental contradiction
between the use and exchange values of the outcome of learning, which
manifests itself in conflicts between learning to know and learning to display
knowledge for evaluation. Testing in schools and trade schools (unnecessary
in situations of apprenticeship learning) is perhaps the most pervasive and
salient example of a way of establishing the exchange value of knowledge.
Test taking then becomes a new parasitic practice, the goal of which is to
increase the exchange value of learning independently of its use value.
Contradictions and change: continuity and

displacement
In considering learning as part of social practice, we have focused our atten-
tion on the structures of social practice rather than privileging the structure
of pedagogy as the source of learning. Learning understood as legitimate
11 peripheral participation is not necessarily or directly dependent on pedagog-

ical goals or official agenda, even in situations in which these goals appear to
be a central factor (e.g. classroom instruction, tutoring). We have insisted
that exposure to resources for learning is not restricted to a teaching curricu-
lum and that instructional assistance is not construed as a purely interper-
sonal phenomenon; rather we have argued that learning must be understood
with respect to a practice as a whole, with its multiplicity of relations – both
within the community and with the world at large. Dissociating learning
from pedagogical intentions opens the possibility of mismatch or conflict
011 among practitioners’ viewpoints in situations where learning is going on.
These differences often must become constitutive of the content of learning.
We mentioned earlier that a major contradiction lies between legitimate
11 peripheral participation as the means of achieving continuity over genera-
tions for the community of practice, and the displacement inherent in that
same process as full participants are replaced (directly or indirectly) by
newcomers-become-old-timers. Both Fortes (1938) and Goody (1989) have
commented on this conflict between continuity and displacement, which is
surely part of all learning. This tension is in fact fundamental – a basic
contradiction of social reproduction, transformation and change. In recent
0111 accounts of learning by activity theorists (e.g. Engeström 1987), the major
contradiction underlying the historical development of learning is that of
the commodity. Certainly this is fundamental to the historical shaping of
social reproduction as well as production. But we believe that a second
contradiction – that between continuity and displacement – is also funda-
mental to the social relations of production and to the social reproduction
of labour. Studies of learning might benefit from examining the field of rela-
tions generated by these interrelated contradictions. For if production and
the social reproduction of persons are mutually entailed in the reproduction
of the social order, the contradictions inherent in reproducing persons within
0111 the domestic group and other communities of practice do not go away when
the form of production changes, but go through transformations of their own.
How to characterize these contradictions in changing forms of production
is surely the central question underlying a historical understanding of forms
of learning, family and, of course, schooling.
The continuity–displacement contradiction is present during apprentice-
ship, whether apprentice and master jointly have a stake in the increasingly
knowledgeable skill of the apprentice, as among the tailors and midwives,
or whether there is a conflict between the master’s desire for labour and
the apprentice’s desire to learn (see Goody, 1982), as among the meat
0111 cutters. The different ways in which old-timers and newcomers establish
and maintain identities conflict and generate competing viewpoints on the
practice and its development. Newcomers are caught in a dilemma. On
the one hand, they need to engage in the existing practice, which has devel-
4111
oped over time: to understand it, to participate in it and to become full

members of the community in which it exists. On the other hand, they
have a stake in its development as they begin to establish their own
identity in its future.
We have claimed that the development of identity is central to the careers
of newcomers in communities of practice, and thus fundamental to the
concept of legitimate peripheral participation. This is illustrated most vividly
by the experience of newcomers to AA, but we think that it is true of all
learning. In fact, we have argued that, from the perspective we have devel-
oped here, learning and a sense of identity are inseparable: they are aspects
of the same phenomenon.
Insofar as the conflicts in which the continuity–displacement contradic-
tion is manifested involve power – as they do to a large extent – the way
the contradiction is played out changes as power relations change. Conflicts
between masters and apprentices (or, less individualistically, between gen-
erations) take place in the course of everyday participation. Shared par-
ticipation is the stage on which the old and the new, the known and the
unknown, the established and the hopeful, act out their differences and
discover their commonalities, manifest their fear of one another, and come
to terms with their need for one another. Each threatens the fulfilment of
the other’s destiny, just as it is essential to it. Conflict is experienced and
worked out through a shared everyday practice in which differing viewpoints
and common stakes are in interplay. Learners can be overwhelmed, over-
awed and overworked. Yet even when submissive imitation is the result,
learning is never simply a matter of the ‘transmission’ of knowledge or the
‘acquisition’ of skill; identity in relation with practice, and hence knowledge
and skill and their significance to the subject and the community, are never
unproblematic. This helps to account for the common observation that
knowers come in a range of types, from clones to heretics.
Granting legitimate participation to newcomers with their own view-
points introduces into any community of practice all the tensions of the
continuity–displacement contradiction. These may be muted, though not
extinguished, by the differences of power between old-timers and newcomers.
As a way in which the related conflicts are played out in practice, legitimate
peripheral participation is far more than just a process of learning on the
part of newcomers. It is a reciprocal relation between persons and practice.
This means that the move of learners toward full participation in a commu-
nity of practice does not take place in a static context. The practice itself
is in motion.
Since activity and the participation of individuals involved in it, their
knowledge and their perspectives are mutually constitutive, change is a
fundamental property of communities of practice and their activities. Goody
(1989) argues that the introduction of strangers into what was previously
11 strictly domestic production (a change that occurred within an expanding

market in West Africa in the recent past) led masters to think more compre-
hensively about the organization of their production activities. She points
out that the resulting division of work processes into segments to be learned
has been mirrored in subsequent generations in new, increasingly specialized
occupations. Legitimate peripherality is important for developing ‘construc-
tively naive’ perspectives or questions. From this point of view, inexperience
is an asset to be exploited. It is of use, however, only in the context of
participation, when supported by experienced practitioners who both under-
011 stand its limitations and value its role. Legitimacy of participation is crucial
both for this naive involvement to invite reflection on ongoing activity and
for the newcomer’s occasional contributions to be taken into account. Insofar
11 as this continual interaction of new perspectives is sanctioned, everyone’s
participation is legitimately peripheral in some respect. In other words,
everyone can to some degree be considered a ‘newcomer’ to the future of a
changing community.
References
0111 Alibrandi, L.A. (1977) The recovery process in Alcoholics Anonymous: The sponsor
as folk therapist. Social Sciences Working Paper 130. University of California,
Irvine.
Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Engeström, Y. (1987) Learning by Expanding. Helsinki: Orienta-Konsultit Oy.
Fortes, M. (1938) Social and psychological aspects of education in Taleland.
(Supplement to Africa 11(4).)
Goody, E. (ed.) (1982) From Craft to Industry. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Goody, E. (1989) Learning and the division of labor, in M. Coy (ed.), Anthropological
0111 Perspectives on Apprenticeship. New York: SUNY Press.
Hass, M. (n.d.) Cognition-in-context: The social nature of the transformation of
mathematical knowledge in a third-grade classroom. Program in Social Relations,
University of California, Irvine.
Jordan, B. (1989) Cosmopolitical obstetrics: Some insights from the training of tradi-
tional midwives. Social Science and Medicine 28(9): 925–944.
Lave, J. (1989) The acquisition of culture and the practice of understanding, in
J. Stigler, R. Shweder and G. Herdt (eds), The Chicago Symposia on Human
Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marshall, H. (1972) Structural constraints on learning, in B. Geer (ed.), Learning to
0111 Work. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Orr, J. (1990) Sharing knowledge, celebrating identity: War stories and commun-
ity memory among service technicians, in D.S. Middleton and D. Edwards
(eds), Collective Remembering: Memory in society. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications.
4111
Scribner, S. and Cole, M. (1981) The Psychology of Literacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Stack, C. (1989) Life trajectories and ethnography. Proposal to the Group on
Lifespan Research. University of California, Berkeley.
Traweek, S. (1988) Discovering machines: Nature in the age of its mechanical repro-
duction, in F. Dubinskas (ed.), Making Time: Ethnographies of high technology
organizations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Chapter 8
11
Learning from other people at
work
Michael Eraut, Jane Alderton, Gerald Cole and
Peter Senker
011
11 Introduction
This chapter presents findings from one aspect of the Sussex University pro-
ject on the development of knowledge and skills in employment (Eraut et al.,
1998). This involved double interviews, 6–12 months apart, with 120 people
operating at a professional, management, team leader or technician level in
12 organisations. These were medium to large organisations in the engineer-
ing, business and health care sections. The approach adopted was to find out
0111
what types of work activity our respondents were currently conducting, what
types of knowledge and skill were entailed, how they had acquired the capa-
bility to do what they now did, and what factors had affected this learning
process.
Learning from other people and the challenge of the work itself proved
to be the most important dimensions of learning for the people we inter-
viewed. Although some reported significant learning from formal education
and training, this was by no means universal and often only of secondary
importance. This confirmed our view that the dominant assumption that
learning in The Learning Society comes only from recognised formal provi-
0111
sion needs to be balanced by more empirical evidence about what, how,
where and why people learn at work. There was also a need to understand
more about factors affecting this informal and mainly self-directed learn-
ing and how it was situated within working contexts and personal life his-
tories. Without such evidence the current wave of visionary literature about
learning organisations is in danger of remaining at the rhetorical level.
The research literature on informal learning at work is very thin and some-
what overshadowed by practitioner literature advocating that it be given
more attention and advising people on how to promote it. This is usually
illustrated with success stories about organisations that have established repu-
0111
tations for their innovative approaches, but backed by very little evidence
This is an edited version of a chapter previously published in Learning at Work, 1998, Bristol:
4111 The Policy Press.
from independent evaluations. Three studies stand out. Gear et al. (1995)
interviewed 150 professionals about a recent ‘learning project’. Following
Tough (1971) they defined a learning project as,
the equivalent of at least one working day over the last three years
spent developing some aspect of your professional knowledge, skills and
competence to the point where you could pass some of it on to a
colleague.
(Gear et al., 1995: 8)
Our evidence covered this semi-planned type of professional learning, but

also a wide range of learning that did not meet this particular definition.
Nevertheless their evidence both for informal learning and for significant
learning from other people (reported by 92 per cent of their respondents)
was very strong. However, they do not provide much detail about the contex-
tual factors that gave rise to this learning. The image presented is that of
an independent professional rather than that of a professional worker in a
large organisation, perhaps reflecting their very different sample. This ‘inde-
pendent professional’ ethos can also be found in a long-running programme
of excellent studies by researchers into continuing medical education in
North America (Davis and Fox, 1994; Fox et al., 1989). This research is
deeply situated in the physicians’ work environment and professional lives;
but again the sample is very different from our own. Finally Mumford et al.
(undated) have recently reported research into the learning of 144 board
members/directors of 41 organisations, concluding that in most organisations
formal management development programmes had been relatively ineffec-
tive. Informal learning on the job was of greater importance, but learning
opportunities at work were not sufficiently used.
This chapter is divided into three main sections: organised learning sup-
port; consultation and collaboration within the working group; and learning
from people outside the working group.
Organised learning support

We interpret the term ‘organised learning support’ as referring to any form
of support for people’s learning that requires special organisation. The main
kinds of activities reported (not necessarily in our terminology) were: appren-
ticeship; induction; mentoring; coaching; rotations; visits; shadowing; and
reference to experts. Though never subversive these activities were not
necessarily organised in any official way, and knowledge of them was often
confined to the immediate work unit. It was also possible to discern different
assumptions about learning underpinning the selection and transaction of
modes of learning support. Thus the practices we noted resulted from the
interaction between:
Michael Eraut, Jane Alderton, Gerald Cole and Peter Senker 129
11 • the prevailing level of formality and structure in the workplace;

• the initiator(s): the learner; the organisation; the line manager; or
another (usually more experienced) colleague;
• the assumptions about learning held (but not often overtly stated) by
the parties involved.
Assumptions about learning

Five main approaches to the facilitation of learning could be distinguished,
011 which operated sometimes on their own and sometimes in combination.
Induction and integration

11
This focused primarily on people becoming effective members of their work
unit and the organisation as a whole. The emphasis is on socialisation: under-
standing the purposes and goals of the unit and the organisation, their own
roles and others’ expectations of them; and fitting into the interpersonal
nexus in which their work is embedded. The management approach can vary
from laissez faire and light monitoring to a succession of formal events, for
0111 example, an induction course followed by other short courses. The latter will
normally be part of a whole organisation approach, which local managers
may or may not follow up. It is associated not only with new employees but
also with planned changes in the organisation’s policy or culture.
Exposure and osmosis

These are frequently used to describe the process of learning by peripheral
participation. Through observations and listening the exposed learner picks
up information and know-how by a process of osmosis. The role of the
0111 manager is limited to that of enabling sufficient exposure to a diversity of
contexts and situations, but otherwise remains passive. However, the learner
has not only to be alert and receptive but also to be able to work out what
they need to know. Shadowing and certain types of rotation and visit are
the usual methods employed.
Self-directed learning
This approach assumes that the learner takes a more active role, learning
from doing the work and finding out on their own initiative what they need
0111 to know. Such an active role is more likely to be adopted if the work is
appropriately chosen and the learner encouraged in their learning. As with
the first two approaches, managers’ hopes that employees will be self-directed
learners may not be realised if their attitude is perceived as permissive rather
4111 than positively supportive.
Structured personal support for learning

This involves the use of supervisors, mentors or coaches. Sometimes this is
an official process; sometimes the role is assumed by a manager or a more
experienced colleague; sometimes a manager asks someone to provide help
and advice; sometimes the learner is encouraged to seek advice from a partic-
ular colleague or group of colleagues. Whether officially organised or not,
the climate of the workplace is likely to affect significantly the quality of
learning support.
Performance management
This approach is being introduced by an increasing number of organisations.
It involves regular appraisal and target-setting, but its emphasis can vary from
a ‘stick and carrot’ approach to motivation, to a developmental approach
focused on learning to improve personal performance. These competing atti-
tudes towards performance enhancement have been debated by managers and
management theorists for at least 50 years. At its best, performance manage-
ment facilitates learning through discussion about and provision of learning
support. At its worst, the learning entailed in improving one’s performance
is not recognised and hence discouraged.
We shall now consider some examples of organised learning support and

comment on them in the light of the above analysis.
Mentoring and coaching
Example 1
Some middle managers approached our respondent about the idea of
mentoring. They discussed it, talked it through and found out more. The
respondent sounded out some senior colleagues who agreed to be mentors
and now they have ‘regular monthly one-to-ones’. No formal time is allo-
cated and it is not part of a senior manager’s job role. Our respondent only
involves people who are able and willing to be mentors, those who want to
contribute something and are prepared to give up the time.
If you say to every senior manager ‘You must be a mentor for someone’,
they do it probably badly and probably grudgingly. And that’s not of
much benefit to the individual.
(Senior manager, insurance company)
11 Example 2
Basically, they just give you some new death claims and they’ll sit with
you and show you what to do for the first few, then you start doing it
yourself. Then they go away and you have to do it, and you pass it on
to them to check it, and after a while you’re just left to do it all by your-
self . . . they sample your work once a month and from that they can
identify any problem areas which you might have. They look to correct
those.
(Insurance claims technician)
011
Example 3
11 I’ve been on an interviewing skills course, which was quite early on . . .
in terms of developing my skills in that area I feel I was coached quite
effectively . . . I sat in on a number of interviews to start with, then I
was interviewing along with somebody else . . . and after that I was able
to gain feedback from them as to how I had got on . . . then I just got
on with it on my own, which I much prefer . . . as long as I have got
the skills . . .
0111 (Graduate trainee, personnel)
Example 4
A radiographer wanted to expand her range by doing mammography. It was
agreed she would do a course to get the certificate. This involved some formal
teaching, visits to other departments (surgical, path lab, radiotherapy) to
find out about their involvement in diseases of the breast. In addition she
works for part of the week alongside a woman who already has the certifi-
cate and a lot of experience. This women goes out of her way to show her
0111 relevant things that come up when she’s not there, shows her lab reports on
mammograms she has done, etc., thus building up her expertise more quickly.
Comment
Mentoring is focused on problems and situations of concern to the mentee,
as well as overseeing their general progress. In Example 1, the reason for an
informal, voluntary approach was explained in terms of commitment and
quality, but the support itself was delivered in quite a structured way. In
Example 4, training was provided by a course that had a built-in requirement
0111 for visits, but the coaching aspect was offered voluntarily by a senior col-
league. The manager supported the course and arranged a rotation involving
both the exposure/osmosis and the self-directed learning approaches, but the
volunteer coach converted this into structured personal support for learning.
4111
Example 2 describes a standard coaching system designed for a particular

purpose, adaptive to individual rates of progress and incorporating phased
withdrawal of support and follow-up monitoring. Example 3 is another case
where a course provides some structure and the coaching is fairly informal
but still carefully phased. We also encountered many examples where courses
of this kind were not accompanied by any planned follow-up in the work-
place, so learners had to work it out for themselves and were generally less
clear about issues of quality.
Rotations, visits and shadowing
Example 1
I’ve been doing this job for . . . 18 months now, and essentially all the
skills that go with this technical coordinator job, I learnt from my pre-
decessor, and so I’ve taken over from somebody, and, that wasn’t sort
of a few weeks’ handover. For a good six months or more, we were
working alongside each other, and as I picked things up . . . He’d been
doing it for about two years previously . . . I’d had contact, I’d taken
over from him when he went on leave before, but that was very much,
just keep it . . . you know, caretaking.
(Engineer)
Example 2
A senior cardiac technician in a district hospital has negotiated a day a
week working in a teaching hospital. His reasons are ‘keeping in touch with
other technicians’, working on ‘more technically challenging cases’ which
‘keep your skills up’ and taking videos of local cases to get other opinions
about them.
Example 3
I went to Korea in ’85. I’d been in for half a year troubleshooting,
and the managing director and I noticed that they had some very good
systems for how they dealt with product introduction. They went
through a [type] of pilot phase before they started in serial production
– just to make sure that the serial production would not be hit by any
faults on the main product, because it would put them, the whole busi-
ness, in jeopardy, and again I learnt a skill there, a way of working.
(Engineer)
11 Comment
Examples 1 and 2 show an unusually high investment in learning. Both
comes from organisations where there are high risks associated with mis-
takes. The first concerned an important technical services role in a large
organisation where technical stoppages incurred very high costs and loss of
reputation. The second concerned quality of care for high risk patients. Both
were officially organised, though in the second case the rotation was initi-
ated and negotiated by the technician himself. Both assumed a mixture of
learning by exposure and self-directed learning.
011 Example 3 is better described as a special assignment than a rotation or
a visit. The significance is that what was learned had nothing to do with
the purpose of the assignment, which was more to do with giving than
11 receiving information.
Designated experts
This was a strong feature of a large telecommunications company with a
substantial research and development commitment. Several respondents
referred to certain people as ‘technical experts’ or ‘technical heroes’, but this
0111 designation had no official status.
Luckily the guy that actually helped me to get the job turned out to be
one of the main experts in the department . . . He’s just one of these
people that knows everything about everything that you need to know
. . . he’s a technical expert . . . And the brilliant thing is, he talks . . . I
think he’s a natural teacher anyway . . . I’m battling over something and
he’ll go up to the whiteboard and draw two circles and a line and it’ll
all fall into place.
(Software engineer)
0111
Learning who the experts were and how to use them was part of the inte-
gration or socialisation process, and reasonably reliable in this particular
company. In other companies, however, this could be a lengthy process often
involving a chain of personal contacts.
Conclusion
The examples presented in this section have been positive. Negative
examples where the absence of these kinds of organised support for learning
0111 on-the-job left people struggling were too numerous to count. Learning
was often much slower than it needed to be. Without further analysis, we
cannot judge whether these examples are representative of even positive
examples, but we are fairly confident about one distinct difference between
4111
our evidence and the prevailing perspective of the human resource devel-
opment literature. Very few of our positive examples resulted from
organisation-wide strategies or initiatives. Most were relatively informal and
initiated by middle managers, colleagues or the learners themselves. Where
there were positive examples of organisational initiatives they were more
likely to be in the financial sector than in health care or engineering.
Consultation and collaboration within the

working group
Groups and teams

Almost all the people we interviewed identified themselves as members (and
sometimes also the manager) of a group of people, but the nature of this
group and of the interactions between its members varied considerably. This
is reflected in the vocabulary used to describe it. A term like ‘department’
or ‘unit’ indicates merely that a group of people occupy a common space
on an organisational chart and share a common manager. It does not neces-
sarily mean that they work in the same place or that they are the exclusive
occupants of their normal workspace. Overt use of the term ‘group’ usually
implies either collocation or a shared function with regular liaison meetings,
as well as introducing an affective dimension to the discussion that indicates
its significance for a person’s work identity. This affective dimension is even
stronger when the word ‘team’ is used and accepted by all members of the
group, but its rhetorical use by managers is resented when the designation
of a group as a ‘team’ is not shared. The word ‘team’ implies a significant
degree of collaboration and interdependence, where outcomes should be
judged at group rather than individual level.
When studying the impact on learning, the most important variable is the
style of normal interaction in the workplace. Since departments or units can
be large and dispersed or small and intimate, co-membership is not on its
own a useful indicator of an actual or potential working relationship. Hence
we have defined the term ‘working group’ to indicate a group of people who
have regular contact with each other at work, some sense of shared purpose,
and no stronger allegiance elsewhere in the organisation. Learning from
people with whom one does not have such regular contact, even though
they may happen to be in the same unit or department, is discussed later.
We also found it useful to distinguish between normal groups with a
common manager and special groups to which people may be allocated for
a fixed period on a part-time or full-time basis: these groups are more likely
to have a leader, co-ordinator or chairperson than a manager. In normal
groups we discerned three main types of learning situation: ongoing mutual
learning and support; collaborative teamwork; and observing others in action
when one is only a peripheral participant. Special groups, intra- or cross-
11 departmental, are usually charged with a specific task – for example, review,
audit, preparation of a decision or policy brief, problem solving – and engage
in large numbers of meetings with varying amounts of independent or collab-
orative work in between. We also found that people learned from special
assignments in which they represented their working group in an external
context.
The distinction between collaborative teamwork and ongoing mutual con-
sultation is often unclear. The most obvious examples of collaborative team-
work entail group tasks on which people work together, contributing different
011 skills. If they have separate parts of the task to work on individually, the
extent to which their individual work is discussed in the group and the rela-
tive amount of time spent individually and in groups will be critical factors.
11 One obvious example would be a hospital operating theatre where interde-
pendence is crucial. The members of the theatre ‘team’ have to learn to work
together but their level of mutual consultation varies widely. We encountered
several small teams of engineers with complementary skills working together
on a succession of problems, and cross-professional teams such as cardiologist
and cardiac technician, radiographer and consultant. People reported how
such work helped them to recognise knowledge and skills that they did not
0111 themselves possess and how their knowledge of tasks and situations was broad-
ened by their continuing contact with people who had different perspectives.
The process of learning to work with other people was often mentioned as
transferring to other, less intensive kinds of group situation.
Several situations were reported that raised the question of when a
group becomes a team. Two factors in particular seemed to affect this: the
advent of a crisis and a strength of the affective dimension. Groups of indi-
viduals working in parallel with occasional consultation could become trans-
formed into teams when confronted with a major problem or deadline;
sometimes this had a lasting effect as people began to recognise each other’s
0111 contributions and group identity was strengthened.
The team I am in is absolutely fantastic. They’ve worked brilliantly,

everybody does everything, including Q who’s my manager . . . It’s like
when it’s contract round it’s everybody get round busy, they work hard
and they play hard – it’s as simple as that. And as I say, everybody mucks
in. It’s just a good working environment, you enjoy coming to work, you
know that if you’ve worked 11 hours one day you’re not expected in at
8.30 am the following day.
(Contract manager, energy supply company)
0111
Gradual development of interpersonal support that extends beyond the work-
place also contributed greatly to team feeling among certain working groups.
This is more likely to happen when the work is emotionally demanding, as,
4111 for example, with a group of nurses on a ward.
It’s getting involved with the people that you’re actually learning with
and supporting each other, I think that’s what comes through isn’t it.
It’s where you support each other, if you see that somebody’s struggling
with something and you found it particularly easy or you worked it out,
then you can help each other. The same thing happens when you’re
struggling, you can say to someone how the hell did you do that. It’s
give and take isn’t it. That’s how we tend to work on the ward as well,
we support each other, you know. It doesn’t have to be a nursing
problem, it can be anything, it doesn’t matter what it is . . . We all tend
to help each other, it’s very good team work on this ward, actually.
(Hospital nurse)
Many wards lack this collaborative ethos; yet it does not take much delib-
eration to recognise that strong affective bonding among staff is likely to
have a significant effect upon the quality of care.
Ongoing consultation and observation

When people spoke about collaborative teamwork, mutual learning tended
to be assumed as a integral aspect of it. With other types of working group,
there was more overt discussion about learning from each other. Indeed,
when we began our fieldwork we were surprised by the amount of learning
that occurred through mutual consultation and support. For many people
this was the most important mode of learning. Often learning was triggered,
almost forced upon people, by the challenge of the work itself, but even this
learning was frequently facilitated by consultation with others.
You just learn as you go along, and people are quite happy if you ask,
as I have done on several occasions . . . Q said if I get one of those, he’ll
quite happily come and give me a hand, ’cause obviously I wouldn’t be
expected to know how to do that straightaway.
(Newly qualified radiographer)
Typically such consultations would entail a request for quick advice, seeking
another perspective on a problem, help with a technical procedure or infor-
mation on whom to ask for help on a particular issue. The way in which
learning from colleagues happens can be very different in a new activity from
how it happens in an established one. In a start-up activity, knowledge and
skills are being acquired in a multitude of ways and can flow from person to
person in several directions at once. In contrast, one person may acquire a
large measure of the skills and knowledge needed directly from a predecessor
in an established activity, perhaps by means of mentoring.
Another mode of learning – observing others in action – was frequently
cited in relation to interpersonal skills (although many of the examples cited
were negative rather than positive).
11 I’ve seen customers with members of staff where they’ve almost locked
horns across the desk because the customer and the member of staff are
both, kind of stubborn, neither of them will want to back down . . .
you’ll never get anywhere if you’re like that. And I think by watching
other people you learn things yourself and pick up . . . you would see a
situation and you would know that that’s not a situation that you want
to get yourself into.
(Personal banker)
011 So you can learn by other people’s mistakes and I think that’s where I
have actually picked up a lot of things because I think, God, I wouldn’t
talk to somebody like that or, I wouldn’t like to be spoken to like that,
11 and I think to myself, I wouldn’t dream of asking anybody to do some-
thing on the ward that I wouldn’t do myself.
(Ward sister)
The role of special groups and assignments

An engineer reported learning a lot from membership of a review group.
0111
We have a trouble reporting system, which I had to learn how to use,

and then we implemented things and got processes working from here.
And I just sat in on the meetings, where . . . the other expert designers
corrected and reviewed test cases and other documentation for correc-
tions, and I just used that as a good background to bounce loads of
questions off.
(Software engineer)
0111 She then went on to describe how she had identified a member of the group
as a useful learning resource.
Others view him as arrogant, but he’s not that at all. He goes out of
his way to help people and he views his job as there to help us, because
he knows so much, and he also wants to help, like, new designers and
testers, because he feels that he can learn so much from them as well.
. . . In the review, he’s the kind of person that’ll question, ‘Why have
you done this? Who is your audience?’ The things that I’m saying that
people don’t do, he demands when he’s in a meeting . . . [but] he’s very
0111 approachable.
(Software engineer)
In contrast, a radiographer reported somewhat sceptically a move to formalise

4111 a review process that was already happening on an informal level.
She has sort of set up a monitoring programme, where every now and
again we’re supposed to look at the films we’ve done and be honest with
ourselves and assess how good they are: whether they’re perfect; whether
they’re good; or whether they’re adequate. Once you’ve done that you’re
supposed to just, you know, ask another radiographer’s opinion, to see
if you agree, and then discuss about it . . . I think the fact that she’s
got the certificate gives her the enthusiasm, she sort of sees it as her
area.
(Radiographer)
A ward sister described how becoming a member of the hospital ethics

committee gave her many valuable cross-professional perspectives. However,
a more important outcome was her development of a patient advocacy role
and the confidence to speak out for patients, not only in official meetings,
but to senior people round the hospital when appropriate opportunities arose.
When it comes to things like advocacy, and speaking for people who
can’t speak for themselves, then, I think I take that quite seriously, and
people can get away with a lot, but, there’s a fine line . . . and if I think
something is wrong I’ll say it, and whether it’s to a consultant or to a
very junior doctor, it wouldn’t bother me, because if I had confidence
in myself and knew what I was doing was right, and that whatever was
going on was wrong, then I would say it. I think some of that is just
becoming more assertive as you become more confident in your role and
in your job . . . and just as a person . . . It must be very intimidating for
a patient when you’ve got the consultant in the bay and the house officer,
and the med. student, and the registrar, and everybody standing around
the bed. They’re telling you all these things they’re going to do to you,
and you’re sitting there going, ‘Yes, doctor, OK that’s fine’. But then . . .
it is part of my role, to say, ‘Well actually, no, I don’t think that’s fair
. . . you haven’t given them a choice. You’ve told them, but when you
left they said to me, you know, that they don’t want to do this, or they’re
not happy with it’.
(Ward sister)
Another nurse described how her manager set up a management team to

discuss issues with her senior nurses, including herself. This gave her another
perspective on the work of the ward, and also enabled her to understand
what was involved in working as a manager. So she was far better prepared
when she became a manager herself.
An engineer commented that once a problem was publicly acknowledged
and a group set up to tackle it, people who had previously kept quiet started
sharing their knowledge. It was highlighting the need that triggered this
different response.
11 Feedback within the group

Feedback from colleagues is a prominent feature of the diagnostic radiogra-
phers’ environment because they are accustomed to looking at each other’s
pictures and commenting on them. This was done in a very relaxed way, so
that comments were not taken personally, and it facilitated a great deal of
group learning. They also put red dots on pictures to indicate to casualty
officers where they had noticed that something was broken, thus contributing
to diagnoses by often relatively inexperienced doctors without trespassing
on their traditional territory.
011 A community nurse described several ways in which feedback from her
manager had both given confidence and led to learning. For example, after
she had done a special project on handling and preventing falls, he asked
11
her to prepare some posters on it, to present them to students, then later to
make them available to other nurses and doctors. He gave positive feedback
on the performance of a delegated task, and, if not entirely happy, gently
asked if other possibilities could have been considered.
A couple of times he’s actually said, ‘Well, you know you could have
0111 done so and so’, and I said, ‘Oh, I never thought of that’, and he says,
‘Well you’ll know next time’, or, ‘We’ll talk about it’ or whatever . . .
He’s not actually disagreed with me, he’s said ‘Have you thought of doing
so and so?’ He doesn’t say, ‘You shouldn’t have done that’, he doesn’t
say it like that. He’ll say ‘Well perhaps you could have done such and
such’, and I think, ‘I could have done that’.
(Community nurse)
An insurance company manager described how when he first came to

the company he got most help from immediate peer colleagues, particularly
0111 in understanding the company culture, but now he was learning more from
his subordinates than his colleagues. In a vivid example he explained how
he had been to two management assessment centres in connection with a
job, then:
I got the feedback, and the first thing I did was photocopy it and take
it round my team and said ‘There you go, that’s my feedback, how
are you going to help me with this?’, or, ‘How can you help me with
this?’, or, ‘Do you agree with it?’. . . You’re actually getting some feed-
back from them, sort of validating the data really. We do it in a semi-
0111 light hearted way, I mean they sort of say, ‘Did you really say that in
this team exercise’, or whatever, and we have a chat about it.
(Insurance company manager)
4111
Another manager relied on a particular colleague for honest feedback:
One of my colleagues, Tina, is very helpful because she provides me

with feedback that other people don’t. So in fact she is very honest with
me . . . basically she says I think you may have upset such and such . . .
or maybe I could have done this . . . I can actually learn from that and
build any bridges if I need to . . . so she’s very helpful.
(Regional manager, bank)
Learning from people outside the working group

People outside the immediate working group can be usefully divided into
three categories: those in what one might call an extended working group,
with whom there is regular contact; people in one’s own organisation with
whom contact has to be specially arranged, sometimes through a common
acquaintance; and people outside the organisation altogether. Examples of
the first category – the extended working group – included a fortnightly
meeting of personal bankers from different branches, a cross-departmental
committee and health care professionals seeing the same patients. In this
last case learning from doctors often occurred by peripheral participation in
ward rounds or clinic.
People within the organisation

Various reasons were cited for seeking help from people in parallel positions
in one’s organisation. For the newly arrived or newly promoted it was often
practical help with common organisational procedures such as tendering or
preparing specifications. In one case there was also strong affective support:
In the first few weeks of starting the F grade, Liz, our G grade, was away
and our ward clerk was also away. When the two of them are away it
was basically . . . you know . . . it was me. I think that was a bit scary
but it was quite nice because I thought well if I can cope for these
couple of weeks on my own, then I’ll cope . . . You’re learning as you
go along, and if you know there’s things that you’ve never done before
then there’s lots of people that you call on. Other F grades, other G
grades in the hospital, will phone, and did phone and say, ‘Is everything
all right?’
(Hospital nurse)
For others it was keeping abreast of the micropolitics of the organisation,

getting early information about changes of people or policies, getting advice
about when, to whom and in what way to put forward a proposal. This nearly
always took place in an informal setting, over lunch or in a bar, using
networks created by people who used to work together or met on an in-
11 house training course. These meetings were also used to get feedback about
the work of one’s own unit.
Maybe somebody’s havin’ a real gripe about the way you put a new
system in, and the fact that none of the users get trained adequately or
something, and they’re much more likely to say that off the record, over
a beer or something, and have a real gripe about it.
(Manager, engineering company)
011 In several cases critical information for one’s work had to be sought else-
where in the organisation and this often required some initiative. For exam-
ple, learning where the services are located in a large and complex building
11 is notoriously difficult. One service engineer we interviewed was constantly
debriefing people about what went where. He made considerable effort to
be present wherever new services were being installed, which he might
later have to modify or repair. We also interviewed an installer who empha-
sised the need to talk to the people who designed the telecommunications
equipment he was about to install. Sometimes people realised with consid-
erable concern that an individual elsewhere in the organisation had unique
0111 knowledge that they needed:
We’ve had a callout from [a company] about performance measurements

. . . I’ve gotta get to another guy who knows about [it], and he’s got to
go in and look at it for me, and I’m saying to him, ‘Look, you really
have to sit down one day’ . . . it’s only one guy who knows about this
application, and we’ve gotta sit down with him, and he’s gotta show us.
The only other way is to do what he did. He just tinkered around, and
he’s getting knowledge through tinkering around, and we could do that,
but it takes too long . . . I don’t have time to do that, and none of the
other guys have time to do that either. So basically the quickest way of
0111 learning is to get him for a day, and say, ‘Look, just take us through the
basics of this, otherwise we’re gonna be weeks learning this’.
(Customer service engineer)
Yet another engineering example concerned cross-departmental co-

operation between a designer and a manufacturer.
I would be good at identifying the problem, the root cause of the prob-
lem – the root cause is we don’t have . . . I don’t know . . . enough force
at this point or something like that or this bit cracks because it’s
0111 not expanding, so I would identify the problem and then Mike and I
would sit down and we’d bounce ideas and I’d say ‘Well, look, you
could do this by doing that’, and he’d say, ‘Well you know, it’s a little
bit complicated, can’t we do it this way?’, or, ‘That wouldn’t work
4111 because of this’.
(Development engineer)
One company set up a special communication channel to encourage the

flow of information between departments, but informal contact was still the
preferred method and usually proved to be faster and more effective.
I got to know . . . people in test plant support quite well, which is quite
handy if you’ve got a problem and you phone them up . . . They have
a number you phone if you’ve got a problem, and then they will phone
one of the test plant support people, and then they will come out and
see you . . . They try to say, do it all officially but if you happen to bump
into them and you just want to ask a quick question, they might give
you a quick answer . . . or they might say, ‘Well phone it in, I’ll come
and see you in a minute’.
(Development engineer)
Another informant described how he got the benefit of a course in a

faster and more relevant way without having to attend it. His method was
to contact the in-house expert involved, get the course materials, read for
an hour or two then question the expert for a couple of hours on points of
particular relevance to his work.
Sometimes I pick up more important information because I ask the

specific questions and find out the exact things, you know, go down the
things which are of interest to me rather than having to [sift through
general material] . . . A lot of it can seem rather obvious and straight-
forward and the bit that I’m particularly interested in isn’t covered maybe
in sufficient detail.
(Telecommunications engineer)
Professional networks
In the health care sector, the working group was also extended by a rich
variety of professional networks. But these networks were still largely depen-
dent on personal contacts – A had previously worked or trained with B –
often renewed by finding themselves on a course together or working for a
common organisation.
Di that works here, we trained together, and I’ve known her now for
seven or eight years, and it’s a bit like having a house sister I suppose.
We’re very close, but I think it’s only natural that when you’ve been
through training together and you’ve been through a lot of different
situations that you do have that bond . . . I couldn’t imagine not having
friends who weren’t nurses or doctors. Because you can ring them up
and say if you’ve had a bad day, and they know what you mean . . . they
know exactly how you feel, and they’ll know exactly what to say . . .
11 and that’s quite important . . . Sometimes, when you have incidents that
you’d really rather forget about, and you don’t want to talk about it, but
you know that it’ll just sit inside and fester away, if it was something
that happened and you think you made the wrong decision, or what-
ever, then [to] people like Di and Liz, I can say, ‘Look, I can’t sleep, this
is worrying me’, or whatever, and they’ll know, because they’ve had –
not the same situation – but they’ll have had a similar incident where
they were really worried and couldn’t sleep about it, and it’s quite nice
just to talk it out with people.
011 (Hospital nurse)
This nurse went on to note the absence of such support among junior
11 doctors.
I think sometimes with the doctors, it seems quite different. I think they
seem to have a lot less support than we do, and I feel quite sorry for them
really, because they seem constantly to be in situations where they’ve
just never had to do it before, or they have no idea what they’re doing.
(Hospital nurse)
0111
Our experience from other research suggests considerable variation in such
support across organisations as well as between professions.
There was also some evidence of ‘invisible colleges’ in the health profes-
sions that extended beyond close personal contacts but also depended on
occasional meetings for their sustenance.
We’ve been on conferences, we do chat to the radiologist and cardiolo-

gists, and they have an input. Our radiologist is eager to develop new
ideas, so we then look into it and . . . assess whether it’s worth pursuing.
0111 We might go to Brighton or Hastings if they’re doing some new tech-
nique, to see if it would be beneficial for us to start, see what sort of results
they’re getting. But within South East Thames we might [ring up] another
centre.
(Senior cardiac technician)
We’ve got people, people who are on courses at the moment, like the
nuclear medicine course, we’ve had one last year and we’ve got one this
year, and they come back with new ideas, and they need to do this exper-
iment or do that experiment, see this or see that, they go off to other cen-
0111 tres, come back and tell us all about it.
(Senior radiographer)
A related example from the insurance sector was an informal mentoring

4111 relationship with a former boss.
My old boss from 1995, he’s moved on to become a director in the corpo-
rate pensions business, up in Kingswood, and I’ve kept in touch with
him and used him as a sounding board on things like, ‘I’m going to try
this, what do you think?’, because he’s got a lot of experience in the
area. ‘What do you think of this, what do you think of that?’ And
personal decisions, ‘What should I do about this job?’ . . . We get on
well together and on the same sort of wavelength and I know he will
be honest, so he just won’t deal in platitudes and say, ‘There you go,
yes you’re doing very well’.
(Team leader, insurance company)
Learning from suppliers and customers

The search for knowledge by some engineers is best described as entrepre-
neurial. We have already described a service engineer who went to great
lengths to be present whenever something new was being installed, and
another who ‘short-circuited’ a lengthy course. Others sought to extract
information from suppliers and/or customers, not just market information
but also technical information. One sought to get the customer perspective
on technical aspects of the equipment he installed. Another described how
he had begun to acquire a more customer-oriented view of production and
criticised his colleagues for giving this insufficient attention in their devel-
opment of new products. A third found debriefing customers and suppliers
a better way of keeping up to date than reading the journals. The follow-
ing excerpt from an interview vividly describes how an energetic, problem-
solving engineer makes use of several different personal sources of help.
A lot of that information I learnt from my predecessor . . . what is unique

to this area, how the automation works, how it thinks, and how it
progresses along its list of tasks. Because we were still developing this
software, the software had bugs, so you need to have a fairly good under-
standing of what it’s trying to do, in what sequence the software’s trying
to do things . . . I talked in depth with the two people who actually
write software and provide the hardware . . . the way things work. I would
be called upon when we had a problem, I would look into the problem,
I may be able to solve it, or I may need to go back to . . . my predecessor,
and ask for advice, and he may come and help, or he may say, ‘Oh yes,
I think you need . . .’. But it is very much thrown in at the deep end,
hands on . . . When something unusual crops up, you have to go in at
the basic level and work through the system . . . If it’s something
provided by an outside company I quite often ring up and ask for advice
. . . regularly make use of outside companies who supplied equipment,
always found that very useful, technical departments, much more than
I have done previously in my career to be honest.
(Process engineer)
11 Conclusions
At a theoretical level, our research strongly supports the importance of
informal learning, but it also shows how strongly it is situated in the work
itself and its social and organisational context. We elicited evidence of tacit
knowledge in the areas of personal relations, problem orientation, and exper-
tise in using (or repairing) particular machines or software systems, as well
as knowledge that was explicitly articulated. However, a major reason for
the prevalence of learning from other people was that this knowledge was
held by individuals rather than embedded in social activities. While some
011 knowledge was firmly embedded in organisational activities, other know-
ledge was located only with a small number of individuals – often only one.
Thus we can consider both a continuum from tacit knowledge to knowledge
11 in the form of written propositions, and a continuum from knowledge that
is individually situated, to knowledge that is organisationally situated.
At the level of practical policy, we suggest that informal learning may be
enhanced by two complementary approaches. Individuals can be helped to
become more capable learners, who can be both more reflective and more
self-directed, more proactive and more able to recognise and use emergent
learning opportunities. Managers can be helped to take more responsibility
0111 for the quality and quantity of learning in the units that they manage. Our
research suggests that a manager’s indirect impact on learning through the
allocation of work, as a role model and by creating/sustaining a microcul-
ture that supports learning from peers, subordinates and outsiders, is no less
important than their direct impact through advice and encouragement,
appraisal and feedback.
References
Davis, D.A. and Fox, R.D. (eds) (1994) The physician as learner, Chicago, IL:
0111 American Medical Association.
Eraut, M., Alderton, J., Cole, G. and Senker, P. (1998) Development of knowledge
and skills in employment, Research Report No. 5, Brighton: University of Sussex
Institute of Education.
Fox, R.D., Mazmanian, P.E. and Putnam, R.W. (eds) (1989) Changing and learning
in the lives of physicians, New York, NY: Praeger.
Gear, J., McIntosh, A. and Squires, G. (1995) Informal learning in the professions,
Hull: School of Education, University of Hull.
Mumford, A., Robinson, G. and Stradling, D. (undated) Developing directors: The
learning process, Buckingham: University of Buckingham International Manage-
ment Centre.
0111 Tough, A.M. (1971) The adult’s learning projects, Toronto: Ontario Institute for
Studies in Education.
4111
Chapter 9
Beyond the institution of

apprenticeship
Towards a social theory of learning as
the production of knowledge
David Guile and Michael Young
Introduction
Traditionally, the idea of apprenticeship has been associated with the
process of skill formation within craft and industrial production and, to a
lesser extent, within certain professions. Apprenticeship in these different
contexts has usually been characterized by a constellation of both legal and
contractual rules and relations governing the status of employment, asso-
ciated workplace entitlements and a combination of formal and informal
educational processes that help to socialize workers into specific workplace
and occupational cultures. We have defined these arrangements in a recent
article as the ‘institution of apprenticeship’ (Guile and Young, 1998a).
Apprenticeship as an institution, irrespective of its workplace context, is also
an educational process and like formal education has been assumed to rest on
a transmission model of learning. However, unlike formal education, the
institution of apprenticeship is also assumed to be underpinned by the dual
assumptions of learning by doing and a master as the role model, rather than any
model of curriculum or formal instruction. Furthermore, it is also assumed
that as a model of work-based learning, apprenticeship will produce different
outcomes of learning compared with programmes based in schools and
colleges.
There is gradually emerging, however, a body of literature that has sug-
gested that the concept of apprenticeship does not have to be restricted to
the range of occupations and contexts with which it has traditionally been
associated (Brown et al., 1989; Guile and Young, 1998a; Lave and Wenger,
1991; Teles, 1993). Once a ‘situative’ perspective on learning is adopted
(Greeno, 1997), the idea of apprenticeship can be used to conceptualize both
the process of learning and the practices, tools and resources that support
learning. As we shall suggest in this chapter, apprenticeship offers a way
of conceptualizing learning that does not separate it from the production of
This is an edited version of a chapter previously published in Apprenticeship: Towards a New

Paradigm of Learning, 1999, London: Kogan Page.
David Guile and Michael Young 147
11 knowledge or tie it to particular contexts. It can therefore be the basis of a

more general theory of learning that might link learning at work and learning
in classrooms, rather than see them only as distinct contexts with distinct
outcomes.
Following the recent work of cultural anthropologists such as Jean Lave,
we are interested in the potential of apprenticeship for conceptualizing
learning as a social process. Our particular interest is in exploring how far
this reconceptualization can lead to the development of new pedagogic
criteria for what we have referred to elsewhere as ‘reflexive learning’ (Guile
011 and Young, 1998a). The concern of this chapter, therefore, is in the main
conceptual rather than substantive. Building initially upon recent develop-
ments within sociocultural activity theory (Vygotsky, 1978), we introduce
11 the concept of the ‘zone of proximal development’ to argue that despite its
traditional association with work-based learning, the concept of appren-
ticeship can also shed light on pedagogic processes of classrooms. Such an
analysis, therefore, offers three possibilities, which we can only begin to point
to in this chapter. First, it forms the basis of a critique of ‘transmission
models’; second, it can indicate similarities and differences between work-
based and classroom-based learning; third, it can suggest the basis of new
0111 types of relationships between the two. We begin, however, by using
Vygotsky’s concept of the zone of proximal development to analyse the
model of learning traditionally associated with the ‘institution’ of appren-
ticeship, before proceeding to examine two alternative conceptions of the
zone of proximal development – what we will refer to as the ‘societal’ and
the ‘transformatory’. We argue that these conceptions offer a new perspec-
tive on the process of learning that relates to emerging features of learning
in an era of ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck et al., 1994).
Existing approaches to learning have tended to rely on behaviourist and
individualist assumptions and be dependent on transmission pedagogues.
0111 They also tend to treat the concept of knowledge transfer as a decontextu-
alized process, or associated with cognitive science accounts of learning as
the stable individual mastery of well-defined tasks. However, new models of
learning are emerging within social psychology (Greeno, 1997), the philos-
ophy of education (Prawat, 1993) and sociolingusitics (Gee, 1992) that
emphasize its ‘situative’ or social character. They focus upon the context of
learning and the importance of ideas as a resource for learning, and they
argue that all learners require opportunities to transform social practice and
develop new ideas. Neither should be the privilege of an elite; they should
be possibilities for all learners. Drawing, in particular, upon recent work in
0111 the philosophy of education, we introduce the notion of ‘ideas-based
constructivism’ to illustrate how this shift towards a social theory of learning
can be the basis for seeing knowledge production as integral to the process
of learning. In addition, we draw upon ideas derived from sociocultural
4111 psychology to highlight two aspects of the potential of information and
communication technology (ICT): first, if the potential for learning of ICT

is to be realized, it has to be on the basis of a social theory of learning;
second, ICT offers promising new ways of integrating learning with the
production of knowledge and hence of overcoming the barriers between
school and work-based learning. Finally, we outline the criteria that might
inform such a social theory of learning and production of knowledge and
offer some brief considerations about the implications of our ideas for
learning in schools and colleges and the new relationships between school
and college-based learning and learning in workplaces.
Apprenticeship, learning and the zone of

proximal development
The concept of the zone of proximal development is central to Vygotsky’s
theory. He defined it as:
the distance between the actual development level as determined by

independent problem solving and the level of potential development as
determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collab-
oration with more able peers.
(1978: 85)
Vygotsky was concerned with the progress that students make with their
studies as they relate their ‘everyday’ concepts – the understanding that
emerges spontaneously from interaction with other people and in different
situations – to the ‘scientific’ concepts that they experience through text-
book and the formal curriculum. Vygotsky saw scientific concepts as those
ideas whose analytic purchase had been deepened over a long period of time.
As Kozulin (1990) has argued, the concept of the zone of proximal devel-
opment was an integral part of Vygotsky’s programme to account for the
complex interaction between scientific concepts and everyday concepts and
hence the development of intellectual and practical expertise. He also saw
it as a framework to identify the pedagogic structure(s) needed to assist
learners to move beyond the stage of mastery that they were capable of on
their own.
Over the years the concept has been modified, developed and given a
broader interpretation within sociocultural activity theory both in the United
States (Brown et al., 1989; Griffen and Cole, 1985; Lave and Wenger, 1991;
Rogoff, 1990; Scribner and Ciole, 1971; Wertsch, 1981) and in the Soviet
Union (Davydov and Radzikouskii, 1985; Leontiev, 1978). Following the
tradition of Vygotsky’s own empirical research, most writers have restricted
the use of the concept to understanding child development. It has, how-
ever, been applied in two quite different ways within contemporary curric-
ulum theory. One interpretation has favoured a ‘practical problem-solving’
11 approach to teaching and learning, while the other has focused upon the
important role of ideas within teaching and learning (Prawat, 1993).
It is our contention, however, that there are common processes that
underlie learning in all contexts and for all ages and that Vygotsky’s concept
of the zone of proximal development is a useful way of highlighting simi-
larities as well as differences between learning in formal and informal
contexts. Moreover, we believe that more recent interpretations of this
concept help to throw light on the complex relationship between the role
of ideas, practical problem solving and the production of new knowledge
011 that could be the basis for reconceptualizing an approach to learning in voca-
tional education (Engeström, 1996b; Lave and Wenger, 1991). We also feel
that the concept, in particular, provides a useful way of taking further some
11 of our ideas about linking school and work-based learning (Guile and Young,
1998a). From our point of view, the appeal of Vygotsky’s approach lies in
the emphasis it places on the idea of mind in society, its associated focus on
cognitive development in specific contexts and the pedagogic practices that
underpin such development.
Learning and the institution of apprenticeship

0111
As we stated earlier, apprenticeship has traditionally rested upon a transmis-
sion model of learning that was supposed to develop work-related knowledge
and skill. We begin, therefore, by exploring the ideas about learning implicit
in the institution of apprenticeship. It is our intention to question the tradi-
tional assumptions of apprenticeship as an institutional approach to learning
that is radically different from learning in formal education. One helpful way
of approaching this issue, we believe, is to distinguish between the process,
the types and the outcomes of learning and the arrangements for learning.
Most studies in cognitive psychology, cultural anthropology and anthro-
0111 pology of education portray apprenticeship as lacking an explicit theory
of instruction and not dependent upon any formal teaching (Coy, 1989;
Scribner and Cole, 1971). Learning is seen as a natural process that happens
over time and occurs via observation, assimilation and emulation and with-
out any substantial intervention from more experienced others (Raizen,
1991). However, two slightly different emphases emerge within this litera-
ture. For some commentators, learning appears as a result of direct interac-
tion between apprentices and their environment. This interaction can take
the form of observation, trial and error, conditioning and so on. A different
interpretation emerges from those studies that originate from sociocultural
0111 activity theory. They are more inclined to stress the idea of mediation as an
integral aspect of the learning process (Scribner and Cole, 1971) and accord
more importance to the interaction between experienced adults and appren-
tices as a process that facilitates practical participation in, and eventual
4111 understanding or mastery of, different activities.
Nonetheless, despite the existence of these slightly different interpreta-

tions of the process of learning within apprenticeship, both groups have
assumed that formal and informal contexts involve different types of learning
and result in different outcomes of learning. Resnick has argued that
there are three broad characteristics of mental activity typical of formal
education that stand in contrast to learning in informal contexts. These,
she suggests, are that (1) learning in formal educational contexts is an
individual process; (2) it involves a purely mental activity based on the
manipulation of symbols; and (3) it results in the production of generalized
concepts. Learning in informal contexts, in contrast, is a collaborative pro-
cess; it usually involves the manipulation of tools (machinery, computers,
etc.) and it leads to highly context-specific forms of reasoning and skills
(Resnick, 1987).
These distinctions about the different process of learning and the forms
and outcomes of learning in formal and informal contexts help to sustain
the overriding and widely held belief that expertise in apprenticeship is
developed through the gradual accumulation of experience under the guid-
ance of an established master within an unspecified ‘zone of proximal
development’. Consequently, it tends to be assumed that the concept of
knowledge developed within apprenticeship is restricted to a combination
of trade or craft knowledge handed down by the master and the implicit
knowledge that is part of all practical activity.
Research from other branches of social science, e.g. post-compulsory
education and training and management science, however, has adopted a
different perspective on the processes of work-based learning and the skill
development that take place within the institution of apprenticeship. By
focusing on the arrangements for apprenticeship, it has identified models
of apprenticeship that embrace formal and informal learning within struc-
tured on- and off-the-job training provided by employers (Brown et al., 1994;
Fuller, 1996; Gherardi et al., 1988). It has also highlighted that in practice,
work contexts vary widely in the learning processes and forms of learning
that they make available. Some workplaces are relatively routine and require
little explicit knowledge, whereas others are highly knowledge-intensive.
Also, work contexts vary according to whether the explicit knowledge
involved is of a ‘traditional’ craft type or more associated with a developing
body of ‘theory’ (Gott, 1995). As a consequence, a general theory of learning
needs to take account not only of differences in the degree of expertise
needed within specific occupations, but also of differences in the content
and quality of such expertise.
In addition to the acquisition of craft-based skill through workplace learn-
ing, employers have increasingly required apprentices to acquire more
formal types of knowledge to help them cope with industrial change and the
demands of knowledge-intensive work. Consequently, there has been a
slow realization that the emergence of new contexts for, and new demands
11 upon, apprenticeship and the need to enhance workplace learning with more
formal types of learning calls for a reassessment of the traditional assumptions
about both types of learning and their relationship to apprenticeship. Among
other matters, it has become apparent that the transmission model of learn-
ing traditionally associated with apprenticeship, i.e. involving learning by
doing and the master as a role model, always implicitly involved a zone of
proximal development, albeit an informal zone, since apprentices were being
moved beyond the stage of ‘mastery’ they were capable of on their own (Guile
and Young, 1998a). This implies greater similarity between the process of
011 learning that occurs within apprenticeship and formal learning than had
previously been accepted to be the case.
11
Reconceptualizing the zone of proximal
development
Over the last decade researchers from many fields within social and psycho-
logical science have begun to adopt new perspectives on the process of
learning. One of the main reasons for this interest has been the way in which
the zone of proximal development has been reconceptualized in neo-
0111 Vygotskian theory. Cole (1985) for instance has suggested that culture and
cognition create each other within the zone via a dynamic interrelationship
between people and social worlds as expressed through language, art and
understanding.
Accordingly, Cole laid the foundations for extending the application of
the concept to human development in general, rather than restricting its
use to analyses of child development. Cole’s interpretation of the zone of
proximal development has offered contemporary researchers a way of exam-
ining the processes through which cognition is developed among individuals
and groups in different types of formal and informal context (Engeström,
0111 1996b; Lave, 1996; Wertsch, 1984). In addition it provided a new perspec-
tive on the process of learning. Instead of focusing upon the content of
formal or informal learning, it encouraged researchers to investigate how
learning may occur through common processes in different contexts.
As we have recently pointed out (Guile and Young, 1998a), Cole’s
original argument that culture and cognition create each other within the
zone of proximal development has been expanded by both Lave and
Engeström. Instead of focusing upon apprenticeship purely as an ‘institution’,
Lave, working in collaboration with Wenger, has developed it to emphasize
the dynamic interrelationship between social, cultural, technological and
0111 linguistic practices. This breakthrough was made possible because Lave
and Wenger extended the zone of proximal development to highlight the
social and cultural basis of learning (Lave, 1996; Lave and Wenger, 1991).
This approach enabled them to highlight how, over a period of time,
4111 social, cultural, technological and linguistic practices afford individuals and
groups opportunities to learn. Although Engeström’s work has not been

directly concerned with apprenticeship, he shares with Lave an interest in
overcoming the limitations of much of contemporary learning theory
(Engeström, 1987, 1995; Engeström et al., 1995; Lave, 1993; Lave and
Wenger, 1991). Engeström also took the zone of proximal development as his
starting point; however, he was interested in how people developed the capa-
bility to do something they had not previously accomplished. This led him
to adopt what Lave and Wenger (1991) have described as a transformatory
perspective on the zone of proximal development. His studies on the social
transformation of the organization of work begin to identify how individuals
and groups, through critically interrogating their work contexts, collectively
produced new understandings and hence new knowledge (Cole and
Engeström, 1993; Engeström, 1993, 1996b). It is our contention that taken
together the contributions of Lave and Engeström and recent work in the
philosophy of education provide the basis of a more comprehensive social
theory of learning.
A societal perspective on the zone of proximal

development
Lave and Wenger developed their ‘societal’ perspective on the zone of prox-
imal development, by highlighting the historical and social dimensions of
learning, and ‘connecting issues of socio-cultural transformation with the
changing relations between newcomers and old-timers in the context of a
changing shared practice’ (1991: 49). This emphasis on a historical and social
perspective is important in reconceptualizing learning, especially in a period
of continued social change. First, it directs attention to the distance (and
potentially, the links) between the everyday activities of individuals and the
historically new forms of social practice that need to be collectively gener-
ated as solutions to everyday problems. Second, it identifies learning as a
social process, and by broadening the concept of ‘social’ beyond immediate
contexts of interaction, it acknowledges the contribution that technological
and other external ‘resources’ can make in support of such learning processes,
as well as how learning is shaped by wider social forces and can shape them.
This reconceptualization of the process of learning led Lave and Wenger to
identify how social structures and social relationships influence the process
of learning over time; the importance of relationships between one con-
text of learning (or ‘community of practice’, to use their term) and another;
and the opportunities available for learning within such communities, and
the human and technological resources needed to support them. They come
to conceive of learning in terms of ‘participation [since it] focuses attention
on ways in which it is an evolving, continuously renewed set of relations’
(1991: 51). Furthermore they argue that participation:
11 can be neither fully internalized as knowledge structures [within in-

dividual minds] nor fully externalized as instrumental artefacts or
overarching activity structures. Participation is always based on situated
negotiation and re-negotiation of meanings in the world. This implies
that understanding and experience are in constant interaction – indeed,
are mutually constitutive.
(Lave and Wenger, 1991)
Viewing the relationship between learning, activity and sociocultural con-

011 texts as a mutually constitutive process within ‘communities of practice’ leads
Lave and Wenger to challenge the idea that expertise in a given field is invari-
ant and consists of mastery of discrete tasks and skills. This leads them to
11 reconceptualize intelligence as a distributed process as well as an attribute of
individuals. Their argument suggests that zones of proximal development are
constituted by such resources as physical and cultural tools, as well as other
people, and that these resources are used, or brought together to be used, to
shape and direct human activity. It follows that, from their perspective, intel-
ligence and expertise are acquired through a process of accomplishment,
rather than being a matter of self-possession.
0111 This is not to deny that individuals develop particular forms of ‘knowl-
edgeability’ (i.e. forms of knowledge and skill). However, Lave and Wenger
(1991) emphasize the collective basis through which individuals develop a
social identity, learn new forms of social practice and become ‘knowledge-
able’. By ‘knowledgeability’ they mean the combination of knowledge and
skill required to successfully operate within a ‘community of practice’.
Lave and Wenger argue that learning is not a distinct mental process.
It is better understood as a relational process that is generated socially as
well as historically in social formations where participants engage with each
other as a condition and precondition for their existence (Lave and Wenger,
0111 1991). Thus learning becomes a matter of emerging identities developing
within different ‘communities of practice’. Such a perspective adds another
dimension to reformulating existing ideas about skill transfer. Conventional
approaches usually assume contexts are invariant. They also rely upon a
narrow transmission model of teaching and play down the importance of the
meaning given to skills and knowledge by learners. The assumption of such
approaches is that the message to be transferred is always unproblematic and
clearly understood; it follows that there is a need to address how new know-
ledge might be produced within the contexts between which the knowledge
or skill is to be transferred. On the other hand, as recent research has shown,
0111 accomplishing the transfer of learning and crossing organizational bound-
aries is a complex and challenging process (Engeström and Middleton, 1996).
It involves people developing the capacity to think beyond the immediate
situation they find themselves in and understanding why it might be both
4111 possible and necessary to generate new knowledge.
A transformatory perspective on the zone of

proximal development
As we have noted earlier, in order to address how people learn to do things
that they have not previously accomplished and, in the process, generate
new understandings and new knowledge, Engeström elaborated further the
idea of the zone of proximal development being collective and the basis for
learners to transform the situation they find themselves in (Guile and Young,
1998a). Engeström concentrates upon identifying how collaborative activ-
ity is needed to reconfigure workplace activity and the knowledge that em-
ployees have (Cole and Engeström, 1993; Engeström, 1996b). He recognizes
that many existing approaches to learning assume that it involves the circu-
lation of existing knowledge rather than the production of ‘knowledgeability’
and also argues that considerable variation exists in the fundamental imprint
of the different groups with their different goals and circumstances, on what
it might mean ‘to know’ on a particular occasion, in a particular context, or
within the culture of a particular organization. Consequentially, he broadens
his framework of analysis from a sole focus upon ‘expert’ definition of what
is to be learned and how it is to be learned.
He emphasizes the importance of encouraging learners to identify contra-
dictions or puzzles within their existing knowledge or workplace practices as
a way of developing new knowledge. It is these ‘problems’ that Engeström
sees as legitimate starting points for exploring and designing solutions and
therefore as a basis for new learning (Cole and Engeström, 1993).
Engeström’s studies of the transformation of health centres in Finland
(Engeström, 1993) and learning in work teams (Engeström, 1996a) high-
light the relationship between different modes of learning, the types of out-
come arising from each mode and the influence of context and conditions
upon each mode of learning (Guile and Young, 1998b). Although he accepts
Lave and Wenger’s premise that learning is a social and reflexive process
that leads ‘communities’ to change their identities over time, he implies that
learning within ‘communities of practice’ is likely to be a slow continuous
evolution of practice rather than transformative. Nevertheless, as the health
centre and work team studies demonstrate, crisis points often occur because
the ‘communities of practice’ end up confronting conflicts or problems that
are not immediately resolvable (Cole and Engeström, 1993).
Engeström’s research indicates that two conditions need to be met if peo-
ple are to expand their understanding and transform existing ‘communities
of practice’. They are, first, the context of learning must be expandable to
include the existing organization, its purposes and ‘tools’ of work, as well as
its location in the wider community. This avoids limiting the focus of learn-
ing to ‘here-and-now’ problems and relatively ‘quick fixes’. It also enables
new possibilities for the organization of work to be extensively debated and
their likely implications for other related activities to be considered prior to
any process of change (Engeström, 1996b). Second, if the context of practice
11 is to be taken into account, it is vital that participants feel they are able to
question, criticize or reject some aspects of accepted practice and existing
wisdom.
One common thread runs through both Lave and Wenger’s and
Engeström’s argument about the process of learning. Both view learning as
a mediated activity that will benefit from access to linguistic, technological
and social resources that are not necessarily part of the context of learning
itself. In contrast to Lave and Wenger, who endorse the appropriation and
exploitation of those resources that are already available within existing
011 ‘communities of practice’, Engeström retains an explicit role for concepts
and learning technologies (ICTs) that may be located externally to an
organization’s existing culture and environment. He recognizes the value of
11 concepts and ideas that may be external to a community but be the basis
of frameworks for reconceptualizing the felt dilemmas and contradictions
within the community of practice. As Engeström’s field studies indicate,
unless these conditions prevail, it will not be possible for participants to
construct a vision of the past and the future of their specific activity systems,
nor will they be able to produce new knowledge (Engeström et al., 1996).
0111
The idea of reflexive learning
There are several conclusions that follow from our preceding argument. First,
if participation in communities of practice is a critical aspect of developing
‘knowledgeability’ or working out the meaning of an idea in the context of
its use, it raises questions about how communities of practice are established
and sustained. Second, the idea that concepts and access to learning tech-
nologies (ICTs) are important in workplace learning stands in stark contrast
to the traditional assumption that apprenticeship only involves a process of
learning by doing with a master as the main role model. Clearly there are
0111 certain workplace situations where this model may still apply (Lave and
Wenger, 1991); however, increasingly in modern workplaces, in which
continuous change is the norm, this idea is less and less tenable (Hirschorn,
1986; Shaikin, 1996; Zuboff, 1988). Third, if concepts are important to the
process and outcomes of learning, it suggests that the traditional emphasis
in apprenticeships on developing ‘tacit knowledge’ and ‘action-orientated’
skills will be inadequate, on its own, to enable apprentices or for that matter
other employees to operate effectively in future in workplaces (Gott, 1995;
Zuboff, 1988). Fourth, if the first two observations are taken together, they
imply that learning by doing may well be an inadequate model for describing
0111 work-based learning or apprenticeship.
Learning by doing or problem solving has been emphasized as a founda-
tion of both apprenticeship and school-based vocational education. More-
over, as Prawat (1993) has argued, the educational benefits of extending
4111 ‘learning by doing’ are widely accepted in learning research. This has led,
Prawat suggests, to an emphasis upon the assimilation of knowledge through

the use of existing schemata to interpret problematic situations and by a
reliance on available routines. In essence, he argues, this implies an infor-
mative, rather than a transformative relationship with the world (Prawat,
1993).
The critical question from our point of view is how powerful learning
experiences will lead individuals and groups to develop a more transforma-
tive relationship with the world that is based around collaborative activities
which can be provided in formal and informal contexts. At the heart of this
question is the relationship between what Vygotsky distinguished as ‘scien-
tific’ concepts, i.e. those which emerge from collaborative activity between
apprentices/students and more experienced adults and are immersed in
disciplinary or multidisciplinary fields, and the ‘everyday or spontaneous’
concepts, i.e. those concepts that emerge from reflection on such everyday
experiences as play, work, interpersonal interaction and so on. As different
generations of sociocultural theorists have made clear, this distinction
between ‘scientific’ and ‘everyday’ concepts is consistent pedagogically with
both ‘societal’ and ‘transformatory’ notions of the zone of proximal devel-
opment (Engeström, 1991; Wertsch, 1985). Learning becomes a process of
mediating in new contexts, ideas or concepts that have been meticulously
worked up and debated over a period of time in other social contexts in
relation to other practical problems.
Certainly, both concepts refer to learning processes. However, as Kozulin
and Presseisen (1995) have recently made clear, while the learning in a
generic sense can emerge from any of the latter processes, ‘learning activity’,
i.e. grasping the meaning of scientific concepts and using them to transform
understanding and social practice, does not occur spontaneously. Conse-
quently, from our point of view, the challenge is to redefine the relationship
between theory or scientific concepts and practice or everyday concepts. Yet,
as writers from such diverse fields as cognitive psychology and sociolinguis-
tics have begun to argue over the last decade or so, not only do ideas, or
‘scientific concepts’, play a crucial role in directing attention to important
aspects of the environment that otherwise would go unnoticed (Neisser,
1976), their transformational potential only occurs when they are discussed
and applied in a social context (Gee, 1992).
The US philosopher of education Prawat introduces the concept ‘ideas-
based constructivism’ to encapsulate this process. It is his contention that
all forms of learning are enhanced when ideas or concepts that emerged from
other contexts can be drawn upon to clarify thinking, knowing and, ulti-
mately, help to transform social practice. Prawat’s ideas fit in well with our
distinction between the ‘societal’ and ‘transformatory’ perspectives on the
zone of proximal development and the value of the concept of ‘legitimate
peripheral participation’. In Lave and Wenger’s work, meaning is developed
through immersion into and exploration of different forms of social practice
11 and this may lead to a fuller and richer understanding of the ‘ideas’ that lie
behind specific social practices. In the case of Engeström, ‘communities of
practice’ should be encouraged to use ideas to transform situations by
enabling participants to question, criticize or reject some aspects of accepted
practice and existing wisdom.
Such a development is only likely if ideas or concepts external to a situ-
ation can be called upon to clarify thought and understanding of purposes.
This raises two key questions. First, how do ‘communities of practice’ use
ideas to serve such purposes? Second, given the rapid emergence of ICT as
011 a resource for learning and hence access to new ideas, how do ‘communi-
ties of practice’ use ICT to transform thinking and practice?
Certain clues as to the answer to the first question have been provided by
11 Engeström. He has argued very persuasively that connecting ideas to practice
involves using a learning cycle that explicitly incorporates context, cognition
and contradiction (Engeström, 1995). The learning cycle Engeström proposes
is based upon his concept of ‘expansive learning’ (Engeström, 1987) and
enables individuals and groups to connect the current level of their under-
standing about practice to emerging ideas as to how to transform practice and
hence to generate new knowledge about practice. Within his learning cycle,
0111 ideas represent what Neisser (1976) has referred to as ‘anticipatory phases of
activity’. In other words, they direct attention to aspects of the cyclic process
of questioning, modelling, revising practice, etc. and in the process become
part of the cycle and help to determine how further information and/or
responses, etc. are accepted and used. Unlike Kolb’s (1984) much better-
known ‘learning cycle’, which emphasizes learning either as a process of nat-
ural reflection or formalized procedures and specifically directs participants
to rely on ‘everyday concepts’, Engeström’s ‘learning cycle’ adopts a trans-
formatory perspective. This encourages ‘communities of practice’ to find
ways of connecting ‘scientific’ and ‘everyday’ concepts to achieve changes
0111 in understanding and social practice.
A partial answer is provided to our second question about the use of ICT
as a resource for learning by the work of the Helsinki Centre for Activity
Theory (Engeström et al., 1995, 1996). They indicate an awareness that new
conceptual and technological resources must be used sensitively within ‘com-
munities of practice’ if they are to complement the forms of learning already
being engaged in within communities; however, they do not specifically
address the use of ICT as a resource for learning and the production of new
knowledge. In fact, this dual role of ICT is rarely addressed in the social and
psychological sciences. One of the most imaginative contributions to our
0111 understanding of the role of ICT as a resource for learning comes from the
work of Pea (Pea, 1993; Pea and Gomez, 1992). His work makes it clear that
although ICTs can be used to enhance individual learning within given
parameters, they can also be used to create the possibility of ‘communities of
4111 practice’ being extended to become distributed communities of learning.
These insights about the potential use of ICT need to be set in the con-
text of our earlier discussion about reconceptualizing apprenticeship as the
basis of a social theory of learning. Contrary to the assumption of traditional
approaches to apprenticeship, namely that learning is implicit and informal
and pedagogy is irrelevant, we have argued that it is possible to identify how
pedagogic structures are embedded within workplace activity. Lave and
Wenger (1991) stress the idea of situated learning that sensitizes us both to
the negotiated character of learning as a social practice and to how oppor-
tunities to participate within workplace cultures influence whether and how
we learn. Hence, their emphasis upon the social character of the zone of
proximal development. Engeström, however, goes one stage further with his
idea of ‘transformative’ learning, which, rather than only focusing upon the
transmission of existing knowledge, acknowledges the importance of new
knowledge being produced within workplace communities as part of the
process of learning. The critical issue for Engeström is that although trans-
formative learning has to be designed, design focuses on more than formal
teaching and has to take into account the context as a whole. He retains a
role for a theory of instruction as well as a focus on the social processes, rela-
tionships and resources that are needed to support learning. Instruction in
this sense involves ensuring that the goals of learning are clear and people
are encouraged to think beyond the immediate circumstances. This ensures
that the zone of proximal development is collectively organized to facilitate
the transformation of context, cognition and practice. Nonetheless, unless
communities enable their members to extend the sources of information to
which they have access and expand their sociocultural basis, they will not
develop new forms of ‘knowledgeability’ nor will they begin to use ICT to
produce new knowledge (Guile and Young, 1998b). As we have argued else-
where, such activity can be described as a process of ‘reflexive learning’
(Guile and Young, 1998a) and is the ‘micro’ expression of the ‘macro’ process
of ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck et al., 1994).
Conclusion
This chapter was stimulated by two issues, one theoretical and one practical.
Theoretically, it arose via recent developments in sociocultural activity
theory, from the possibility of using apprenticeship as a conceptual model
for a social theory linking learning and production of knowledge. Practically,
it is an attempt to respond to the recent policy interest in apprentice-
ship and the possibilities it may provide for overcoming the separation of
formal and informal learning and of educational institutions and workplaces.
Thus, it has tried to provide a more unified perspective on the different types
of learning traditionally associated with these different contexts.
The chapter has examined some of the assumptions underlying the insti-
tution of apprenticeship and the possibilities it might offer when freed from
11 its historic legacies, for overcoming barriers to learning opportunities in post-

compulsory education and training and constituting part of a strategy for the
UK becoming a learning economy.
If young people are to develop the new kinds of skills and knowledge that
are emerging as essential to a learning society, they will need to be able to
use ICT as a resource both to access information as well as to collabor-
ate with others within distributed communities of practice to produce new
knowledge (Lundvall, 1996). We have argued that exploiting the learning
potential of ICT will involve radical changes to how we organize education
011 and training. More fundamentally, it will involve exploring the implications
of recognizing learning as a social process. This chapter, therefore, argues
that critical to any such changes is that policy makers, users and education
11 and training providers rethink their ideas about learning and pedagogy as
well as developing a more critical approach to the potential of on-line
learning. To this end, the chapter draws upon the twin notions of ‘commu-
nity of practice’ and ‘ideas-based constructivism’ and suggests a transform-
ative approach to Vygotsky’s idea of the zone of proximal development as
the basis for a social theory of learning. Such a theory, it argues, could provide
a way of linking work-based and school- and college-based learning together
0111 as changes in work and society become the ideas for reflecting on changes in
pedagogic practice, and the disciplines of subject-based knowledge become
the criteria for interrogating changes in work and society.
We are not the first to suggest that the concept of apprenticeship might
serve as the basis of an alternative learning paradigm for formal education
and training (Brown et al., 1989), or on-line learning (Teles, 1993). We
draw on Prawat’s distinction between ‘problem-based’ and ‘ideas-based’
approaches to learning to differentiate between our and earlier approaches.
The former refer to those attempts to introduce a practical approach to
problem solving as the paradigmatic context for promoting higher order
0111 thinking in classrooms and elsewhere. This, we argued, leads to an informa-
tive relationship with the world, since ‘communities of practice’ are en-
couraged to accept a problem as it is posed to them, by a teacher or other
adult, and to use existing conventions, beliefs and practices to explain how
to address them. The latter refers to our argument that learning should
encourage ‘communities of practice’ either to identify problems that need
to be solved, or where problems have been identified for them to solve,
think about their relation to the problem and pose alternatives to it. Such
an approach, we have suggested, implies a much more transformative rela-
tionship with the world. This transformative approach, we contend, can
0111 only occur when the learning process explicitly involves the use of both
‘scientific’ and ‘everyday’ concepts. Although the former may direct atten-
tion to aspects of a problem that may otherwise go unnoticed, they are
ultimately only valuable when they can be used to help transform everyday
4111 problems.
Furthermore, we argued that the educative purposes of ICT have to be

rethought in relation to both the changes occurring in work as a result of
the introduction of ICT, and in relation to the new potential for learning
ICT generates. The recognition that both ‘ideas’ and ICT are equally impor-
tant resources for ‘communities of practice’ led us to argue that such
‘communities’ must have a stake in the development of new practices if they
are to establish their own future identities, develop their capacity for life-
long learning and the production of new knowledge and hence contribute
to the creation of a learning society. Accordingly, we suggested that our
concept of reflexive learning encapsulated the process whereby ‘communities
of practice’ can connect ideas to practice. We suggested this might happen
in two ways. First, through the use of a ‘learning cycle’ that specifically
incorporated context, cognition and context; second, by using ICT to create
the possibility of a ‘community of practice’ being extended to become a
distributed learning community.
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Chapter 10
11
The technology of learning
in a social world
Terry Mayes
011
11 The pedagogy of on-line learning

The rapid developments in technology-mediated learning (or just ‘on-line
learning’ or even the currently fashionable ‘e-learning’) are often accompa-
nied by claims about its effectiveness in enhancing the process of learning
itself, as well as its new efficiency in overcoming barriers of place and time
in educational provision. The question is raised: are we seeing the develop-
0111 ment of a new pedagogy? Do we need an entirely new way of thinking about
‘e-learning’ that distinguishes it from the kind of learning that takes place
in conventional educational settings? In fact, over the last two or three years
almost every sector of education and training will have developed some of
the methods associated with the new technology of learning. Almost every
existing university, for example, will have some ongoing activity that
involves creating new courses for the Internet, or web-based versions of
existing courses. Most of these developments in the traditional university
sector are attempting to apply existing methods and quality procedures to
the new conditions of learning and teaching. This is not necessarily the case
0111 with all e-university developments, some of which are emerging from areas
that have no tradition, or a very different tradition, of quality assurance.
These include corporate universities, for-profit higher education companies,
publishing and new media companies, and educational brokers.
There are probably as many aspects to the pedagogy underlying e-learning
as there are different kinds of teaching and learning in schools, universities,
training labs or home-learning, since the term simply implies that some
Internet or web technology is involved. Since a computer can play some
role in almost any kind of teaching, then e-learning can be associated with
any kind of pedagogical approach, ranging from problem-based learning to
0111 simulator training. Nevertheless, the new language in which e-learning is
largely discussed at the policy level emphasises the delivery of learning. The
implicit assumption is that learning itself is significantly enhanced by the
4111 Newly commissioned work.Mayes, T. ‘The technology of learning in a social world’. Newly
commissioned work.
new technology, rather than just the educational procedures, such as giving
access to course notes or transmitting the tutor’s comments. This view is
understandable since there are clearly powerful new capabilities for accessing,
structuring and presenting information. The ability to create virtual worlds
for exploration, for example, is so striking that it is hard not to think of it
as a new educational paradigm. Nevertheless, we have been here many times
before (see Mayes, 1995). For most of the twentieth century technological
developments were repeatedly greeted with predictions of a revolution in
educational method. In his book Teachers and Machines, Larry Cuban (1986)
has traced the history of attempts to use technology in the classroom. Some
of the illustrations in that book show, to our modern eyes, wonderfully inap-
propriate and quaint attempts to use technology. In one example, a photo-
graph entitled ‘the aerial geography lesson’ shows a class of children sitting
in orderly rows of pre-war school desks, with a schoolmistress earnestly
pointing to something on a geography globe at the front. What makes the
photograph amusing is that the ‘classroom’ is in fact the cabin of an airborne
aeroplane, and the photograph appears to illustrate that the technology of
flight has simply been used pointlessly to transport a conventional classroom
into the air. It is tempting to conclude that new technologies have failed to
revolutionise education because they are always used to support existing
pedagogy, rather than to help to develop new forms of teaching and learning.
In fact, despite the repeated raising of expectations, no new technology has
ever led to major change in education. This should not surprise us. Real
change in the way education is provided, especially to learners who may not
previously have had the opportunity to benefit, need not involve either new
technologies or new pedagogical approaches at all. The development of the
Open University provides a good example. Although it was originally con-
ceived of as the ‘University of the Air’, and was strongly associated with the
use of broadcasting as an innovative teaching method, its success has been
based more directly on the application of sound conventional principles of
carefully designed learning assignments and individual feedback from locally-
based tutors. Perhaps we have already a perfectly good understanding of what
is needed for effective learning to occur in any domain. The real challenge
is to find cost-effective ways of offering this to large numbers of learners. By
this argument, the main opportunity for on-line education is, after all, not
pedagogy but delivery. Not the ‘delivery of learning’ (a phrase that conveys
the misleading idea that learning is directly dependent on learning mater-
ials) but the delivery of new opportunities for learning. Technology may
be directed towards change in the way education and training is organ-
ised: where and when learning occurs, how resources can be accessed, how
learning can be assessed. It is not new pedagogies that we need. We need
new ways of providing existing pedagogy efficiently and flexibly.
The main aim of this chapter is to offer a way of thinking about how tech-
nology can support the learning cycle, the goal–action–feedback loop that
Terry Mayes 165
11 provides a basic model for all learning. We need to understand first how
learning technology can support this fundamental pedagogy in which indi-
vidual learners are given guidance about the performance of learning tasks
at the right level of difficulty, and then given individualised feedback on
their performance. In educational or training situations where this individ-
ualised support can be provided by personal tutors then there is no necessary
advantage to be gained from on-line technology at all. The real challenge,
of course, is to provide real support for learning in situations where there
are too many learners and too few tutors, where the cost of tutors cannot
011 be met, or where tutors and learners are unable to meet face-to-face, or where
learners simply cannot access the resources for learning.
At a theoretical level it is probably true to say that never before has there
11 been so much agreement about the pedagogical fundamentals (Jonassen and
Land, 2000), resulting in what I shall refer to as the ‘pedagogical consensus’.
There has been a widespread rejection of a view of learning in which know-
ledge is ‘acquired’ (Anderson et al., 1987), in favour of a constructivist view
in which learning is primarily developed through activity (Papert, 1990).
A second shift has been away from a focus on the individual, towards a
new emphasis on social contexts for learning (Glaser, 1990). In particular
0111 we have seen, in the work of Lave (1988), Lave and Wenger (1991) and
Suchman (1987), a very influential account of learning as ‘situated’, and
thus only properly understood within a social or organisational context. This
theoretical consensus, then, emphasises the importance of learning through
performing real tasks, made meaningful to the individual through the social
context in which they are performed, and providing the learner with the
opportunity for feedback and reflection. Of course, much of the pedagogical
debate focuses on the crucial question of how to translate such a broad
theoretical account of learning into precisely-specified effective educational
methods. Here, we focus on the role of technology. How and where can it
0111 make a real difference?
A framework for the design of learning technology

The conceptual framework I have adopted for approaching the pedagogy of
on-line learning is one that attempts to illustrate how each stage of learning
needs to be supported by a different kind of technology (Mayes and Fowler,
1999). The main value of this analysis is to emphasise where the support
most needs to be directed in the learning cycle. This offers us a pedagogical
rationale for designing the technology, and incidentally makes it obvious
0111 where we shouldn’t waste our resources. The framework describes what in
the pedagogical consensus are the three main elements of a learning process
– conceptualisation, construction and dialogue. It also incorporates the idea
of a learning cycle – acknowledging that learning is not a one-off process (a
4111 view unfortunately encouraged by the nature of our assessment methods)
but involves continuous (even lifelong) revisiting and tuning of concepts

and skills.
The three components of learning can be thought of as stages, although
not necessarily ordered in the way traditional stage models of learning have
suggested (Fitts and Posner, 1967). The stages describe the processes or
modes of learning that, according to the consensus, all successful learning
must involve. Conceptualisation is the process of coming to an initial under-
standing through contact with, and exploration of, a new exposition of some
kind. Construction involves some activity in which the new understanding is
brought to bear on a problem, and the required feedback about performance
is gained. The third, consolidating, stage involves the full integration of the
new understanding with the learner’s general framework of knowledge (if
we are considering the learning of a motor skill, we would use a different
terminology here, but the same principles will apply). This is the stage at
which aspects of expertise begin to appear, and the learner begins to use the
new understanding, or practice the new skill, in the context of real applica-
tion. This we have referred to as the dialogue stage, emphasising here the cru-
cial role of discussion and reflection as the new understanding becomes
applied to performance. Recently, Fowler and Mayes (1999) have considered
different terms for this third stage in order to give more emphasis to the moti-
vational and social dimension. This third stage can be viewed as a process
of externalising the learning and relating it to its context of application. It
may be that the term contextualisation more accurately describes this mode
of learning. In contextualisation we see those aspects of apprenticeship and
peer learning that set the social context for learning coming into play. Here,
too, we see scope for an expression of individual differences. Since the empha-
sis now will be on real-world learning, the use of the knowledge or skill
acquired through a long period of construction, then the learner will now
move close to achieving the goals that motivated the learning in the first
place, and the learning dialogues will become both more personalised and
more focused on the context of application.
Let us consider these three stages of conceptualisation, construction and
contextualisation and ask how technology might support each stage.
Conceptualisation
The most straightforward role for technology is to present the subject matter.
However, the advances in multimedia have led us into the trap of thinking
that this is where technology can make most impact on learning. Certainly,
bringing the learner into convenient contact with the subject matter is a
necessary precondition for learning. Also, presenting the subject matter in
a way that makes it easy to understand is important. Yet, as the learner inter-
acts with information presented, what is meaningful to the learner, and thus
what is learned, depends far more on what the learner already knows, and
Terry Mayes 167
11 why the learner is trying to understand this material in the first place, than
on the extrinsic properties of the presentation. Nevertheless, to the extent
that the initial presentation of subject matter allows new concepts to be cre-
ated and explored then it is supporting conceptualisation. This presentation
of subject matter is primary courseware. At its best this kind of use for tech-
nology can directly enhance understanding, in interactive graphical programs
for geometry or logic, say, or for visualisation in organic chemistry. Under-
lying the design of primary courseware should be assumptions about the level
of understanding of the learners it is intended for. As in the approaches to
011 programmed instruction in the 1960s, or to hypertext in the 1980s, it is pos-
sible to offer the learner choices in the level of detail given, which can go
some way towards achieving individualised instruction. But in general this
11 kind of courseware is only effective in adjunct mode, as a supplement to real
teaching. It cannot satisfy the need for activity, feedback and dialogue.
Construction
What role can technology play in the learners’ performance of learning tasks?
The most straightforward approach to this simply comprises descriptions and
0111 instructions for the learning tasks, and some tools to help the learner perform
them. In fact, it is perfectly viable to run an effective on-line course without
creating any new materials for it at all. The emphasis in on-line learning
should always be first on the tasks the learners are asked to perform, rather
than on the way they are going to access subject matter. The on-line envir-
onment can refer learners to existing websites, or to conventional printed
sources. We have referred to the task-support environment as secondary
courseware. Aspects of this kind of support are starting to appear in integrated
or managed learning environments. One range of tools, mindtools or cogni-
tive tools (Kommers et al., 1992) has been designed specifically to encourage
0111 users to think conceptually about the subject matter being manipulated.
However, secondary courseware involves any use of the computer to produce
output when the task is primarily for learning. Integrated together, primary
and secondary courseware provides both information and tools for learners to
develop concepts and to test their understanding through carrying out tasks
that use the concepts – by writing, by self-assessment, by carrying out exper-
iments in virtual labs, by designing artefacts, analysing, classifying, reporting,
and so on across the range of educational activities. Barab and Duffy (2000)
have used the metaphor of the ‘practice field’ (a term from American sport)
in discussing the need for learning tasks to be meaningful, and by implication
0111 for the learners to be motivated to carry them out. Ideally, these practice fields
must be situated authentically, that is, they should bear an obvious relation
to real-world tasks, and thus should make the connection between concep-
tual knowledge and its application. Examples of practice fields are problem-
4111 based learning (Savery and Duffy, 1996), anchored instruction (Cognition
and Technology Group at Vanderbilt, 1990, 1993) and cognitive appren-

ticeship (Collins, Brown and Newman, 1989).
For learning to occur, of course, the system must allow feedback about
the learners’ performance on these tasks. An absolutely key question is
whether the feedback can be automated. Can it be accomplished through
self-assessment, or automated through the indexing of performance, or
provided through ‘canned’ answers to anticipated questions? Or is it depen-
dent on further advances in artificial intelligence? To extend the metaphor
of the practice field – if feedback can be built in automatically to the
practice routine in some way then it is not necessary to have a coach per-
manently present and the required feedback can be contained within the
courseware. Some of the new on-line universities are attempting to achieve
just this solution, which tackles head-on the key problem – that individual
tutors for every student are too expensive. ‘Cardean University’, a subsidiary
of UNext.com, has been launched recently with the claim that ‘most ques-
tions will have been anticipated, leading to near-automatic guidance’ (The
Australian: Higher Education, 2000). This begs the crucial question of
whether the kind of feedback that can be built into courseware can
adequately substitute for dialogue with a tutor.
Contextualisation
The third stage in our learning cycle, the contextualisation stage, refers to
the stage at which the learner tries to make use of, and interpret, newly
acquired knowledge beyond the confines of a practice field. Feedback is
crucial here, but this will take the form of dialogue, rather than straight-
forward answers to ‘have I understood?’ kinds of questions. Tertiary course-
ware, in the sense we use the term here, includes all the resources that might
support such dialogue. These resources would include the tools that support
direct one-to-one synchronous discussion, as well as the structuring of discus-
sion around threads in conferencing environments, or even a database of
frequently-asked questions that are compiled from previous dialogues. It
should offer the new learner access to what Cumming (1993) has referred
to as the ‘discussion layer’, and the resources would extend beyond the tools
for active discussion by the current learners to databases of discussions from
previous learners. It might consist of videoclips of tutorial discussion, or
examples of previous learners’ coursework, with the feedback from the tutor
included. The concept of tertiary courseware is to offer a new kind of resource
that, instead of providing direct explanations of subject matter, tries to
capture the essence of being an active member of a community of learners
of that subject matter, providing access to the questions, comments and
dialogues of previous learners. On-line learning can offer something that has
never before been possible in classroom education: that is, the possibility of
recording all the individual dialogues that take place between tutors and
Terry Mayes 169
11 students, or between peer learners. Using technology we can capture these,

structure them in some kind of database, and make them available to new
learners. This might offer at least part of the classroom experience, where
much learning occurs as a consequence of simply observing and overhear-
ing other learners. Following Bandura (1986), we have referred to this as
vicarious learning.
The social learner

011 As we have noted, the social perspective on learning has received a major
boost from the reconceptualisation of all learning as ‘situated’. This can be
seen as a necessary correction to theories of learning in which the cognitive
11 and the social had become disconnected. Underlying both the situated
learning and constructivist perspectives is the assumption that learning must
be personally meaningful, and that this has very little to do with the infor-
mational characteristics of a learning environment. Activity, motivation and
learning are all related to a need for a positive sense of identity (or positive
self-esteem), shaped by social forces. Learning, as a deliberate activity, might
be driven by the need for self-esteem in a number of ways. In some cases,
0111 in raising self-esteem we may learn the practices of a group that actively
resists the educational process.
With the concept of a community of practice comes an emphasis on the
individual’s relationship with a group of people rather than the relationship
of an activity itself to the wider practice, even though it is the practice itself
that identifies the community. This provides a different perspective on what
is ‘situated’. For Wenger (1998) it is not just the meaning to be attached to
an activity that is derived from a community of practice: the individual’s
identity is shaped by the relationship to the community itself. To under-
stand the process, we need to examine ‘learning to become’. Social psy-
0111 chologists, such as Turner (1991), make an important distinction between
personal and social identity, a distinction that has been developed into an
approach known as self-categorisation theory. What the social identity liter-
ature seems to tell us is that the salience of a personal or social identity in
a specific situation is crucial, but very hard to predict without knowing a
very great deal about all the possibly relevant individual history. What we
can say is that where social identity becomes relatively more salient than
personal identity there is a depersonalisation of the self. The individual now
becomes defined more by a group or community and their motivation to
learn is now derived from the need to carry out the activities of the group.
0111 Almost by definition, they are given a reason to learn. But what and how
they are motivated to learn will now depend crucially on the nature of the
community to which they aspire. This is where we need to consider more
carefully the relationship between a community of practice and the kind of
4111 learning that it requires.
There are perhaps three levels at which it is useful to think of learning

being situated. At the top level is the social-anthropological or cultural per-
spective, represented by the work of Lave and Wenger, which emphasises the
need to learn to achieve a desired form of participation in a wider commu-
nity. The essence of a community of practice is that, through joint engage-
ment in some activity, an aggregation of people come to develop and share
practices. This is usually interpreted as a stable and relatively enduring group,
scientists for example, whose practices involve the development of a con-
stellation of beliefs, attitudes, values and specific knowledge built up over
many years. Yet a community of practice can be built around a common
endeavour that has a much shorter time span. Greeno et al. (1998) gives
examples of communities of practice that more closely resemble the groups
studied in the social identity literature (e.g. Ellemers et al., 1999). Some
examples are a garage band, an engineering team, a day care co-operative, a
research group or a kindergarten class. One characteristic of these groups is
that they allow a greater scope for interplay between the psychological (or
personal) and the social in determining practice than do the long-established
communities. The influence of individuals, and of individual relationships, is
likely to be greater.
However, for long-term stable communities there are two different ways
in which the community will influence learning. First, there is the sense
most directly addressed by Wenger – someone aspires to become a legiti-
mate participant of a community defined by expertise or competence in some
field of application. The learning in this case is the learning of the practice
that defines the community. This is the learning involved in becoming an
accredited member of a community by reaching a demonstrated level of
expertise, and then the learning involved in continuous professional devel-
opment. This may be formal, as in medicine, or informal, by being accepted
as a wine buff or a political activist. The second sense is that of a community
of learners, for whom the practice is learning per se. That is, a very broad
community identified by a shared high value placed on the process of contin-
uous intellectual development. This sounds fanciful but actually reflects a
basic goal of education: to create a community of lifelong learners. It is
possible to detect an irony in current policy, which aims to encourage the
development of lifelong learning by developing new forms of educational
provision aimed largely at adult learners who have failed to identify with
such a community through their experience of schooling.
At the second level of situatedness is the learning group. Almost all learn-
ing is itself embedded in a social context – the classroom, or the tutorial group,
or the virtual CMC-mediated discussion group or even the year group. The
learner will usually have a strong sense of identifying with such groups, and
a strong need to participate as a full member. Such groups can have the char-
acteristics of a community of practice but here the practice is the learning
itself, in a particular educational or training setting. Or rather it is educational
Terry Mayes 171
11 practice, which may or may not be centred on learning. While there have
been many studies of learning in informal settings (e.g. Resnick, 1987), there
are comparatively few ethnographic studies of real groups in educational
settings to compare with the many studies of group dynamics in work organ-
isations (see Greeno et al., 1998). Yet every student and every teacher knows
that there are characteristics of these groups or communities that are power-
ful determinants of the nature of the learning that actually occurs in educa-
tional institutions. Successful students are those who learn how to pass
assessments, not necessarily those who have the deepest interest in the subject
011 matter. There are, of course, many aspects of student behaviour that are deter-
mined by social goals that have little or nothing to do with the curriculum,
but much to do with peer esteem.
11 The third level is the level of individual relationships. Most learning that
is motivated by the above two levels will actually be mediated through rela-
tionships with individual members of the communities or groups in question.
The social categorisation of these individuals will vary according to the
context and nature of particular dialogues. Sometimes their membership of
a group will be most salient, in other situations their personal characteris-
tics will be perceived as more important. Such relationships will vary
0111 according to the characteristics of the groups involved, the context within
which they operate, and the strength of the relationships.
Ultimately almost all learning will be motivated at some level by the desire
to raise self-esteem by becoming a legitimate member of a community of
practice. It provides the fundamental motivational rationale for attempting
to learn in the first place, provided the group is valued, and thus can enhance
self-esteem. Unfortunately unless we can say more about why self-esteem
might be influenced by identifying with particular communities, groups or
relationships, then this social identity account has the feel (to me) of a
circular argument. For our present purpose we must be content with the view
0111 that the concept of social identity get us much closer to understanding moti-
vation to learn, and gives us a clearer framework for approaching the design
of learning environments than do accounts based solely on information flow.
Supporting social identity through vicarious

learning
How can these different levels of social or personal identity be supported
through the design of a learning environment? In their review of attempts
so far to introduce the concept of community into educational practice
0111 (e.g. Brown and Campione, 1990; Scardamalia and Bereiter, 1993), Barab
and Duffy conclude that these attempts do not yet convincingly capture
the essence of development of self through participation in a commun-
ity. These attempts are more readily interpreted as versions of problem-
4111 based learning practice fields. As a result of this conclusion that the idea of
community has not yet been fully exploited, Barab and Duffy pose the
following questions:
If educators move towards a learning-as-participation-in-community

approach, what communities are included? Is this a trade school or
professional school approach? How can the breadth of learning experi-
ences be provided that our children need if they must be members of
all the communities in order to have the necessary experiences?
(Barab and Duffy, in Jonassen and Land, 2000: 35)
One answer is to pursue the approach of vicarious learning. Mayes et al.

(2001) report the results of experiments with a system called Dissemination,
which compiled tertiary courseware from the recordings of students and
tutors engaged in a specially devised set of ‘task-directed discussions’. In an
experiment comparing subjects who were offered this material in addition
to conventional courseware they found that those students who chose to
use the vicarious resources tended to model in their own performance the
tasks, language and approaches used in the discussions they had viewed vicar-
iously. One implication was that the experience of watching other students
learn helped the new learners to model the basic task of learning more
effectively.
A possible approach to Barab and Duffy’s questions might be based
on considering more carefully the ways in which vicarious learning might
be effective. For each level of situatedness the tertiary material should
reflect the social dimension that is most salient. Ideally, the learner should
be able to choose the most appropriate. Thus the community of practice
level might provide the learner with real-world examples of practice and
the dialogues should illustrate the link between what is currently being
learned in a practice field and the real-world application in a community
of practice. What would be observed here would be the learning that brings
a peripheral member of a community into full membership. At the next
level, the level of the learning group itself, the vicarious material would
focus on the difficulties of learning successfully in the particular course or
educational context being currently experienced by the learner. This
kind of vicariousness involves the observation of a learner who can be
identified as a peer in the context of a particular learning task. Finally, indi-
vidual learning relationships might be supported by previous dialogues
from a named teacher, or from a particular expert, or even from an identi-
fied peer. (At this level we start to raise some potentially awkward ethical
issues. It must be axiomatic that any dialogue or other work that is to be
used vicariously must only be done so with the permission of the original
participants.)
It is, of course, possible to try to classify the social dimension in finer
grain than the three broad levels identified above. In an initial attempt to
study the characteristics of learning relationships, Fowler and Mayes
Terry Mayes 173
11 (1999) classified them according to the nature of the learning experience as

explorative, formative and comparative learning relationships. An explorative
learning relationship is about discovery. This relationship is often very
descriptive (discovering the ‘what’ more than the ‘why’), although some level
of explanation will be involved. A formative learning relationship focuses
more on the building of understanding through guided activity, and this
is achieved through a constructive approach – the building and testing of
hypotheses about the world, and about the nature of practice. The third kind
of learning relationship, comparative, characterises a relationship that occurs
011 once a level of expertise has been achieved or when an individual becomes
accepted as more than a peripheral member of a community of practice. It
is a relationship that allows the learner to identify their state of knowledge
11 with others, or to align their practice with that of a community or organ-
isation. The primary purpose of a comparative relationship is not necessarily
to acquire new knowledge, but to position and adjust existing knowledge by
comparison with other knowledge states. Fowler and Mayes (1999) have
reported an initial attempt to examine learning relationships empirically on
groups of 16 year olds in the UK, Portugal and Finland. Overall, the results
demonstrated that the influence of a particular kind of learning relationship
0111 deepened on the stage of learning reached. However, the results also showed
a complex interplay between cultural and contextual factors that directly
influences the interpretation of the characteristics of a learning relationship.
The support roles played by parents, teachers and peers are themselves highly
influenced by social and cultural variables. Although this analysis of learning
relationships is currently too simplistic, it is looking in the right place. For
insight into the learning opportunities offered by the new technology, the
main focus should certainly be on the relationship of the learner to other
people, rather than to information.
To summarise, this chapter has attempted to show how the design of learn-
0111 ing environments needs to follow from a consideration of the stage of learn-
ing to be supported. It has then considered how technology might support
the fundamental motivation to learn, which derives from the need to achieve
self-esteem through identifying with a community of practice. An approach
based on vicarious learning was described, proposing a new kind of course-
ware, focusing on allowing the learner to identify with the dialogues of
other learners, rather than the traditional focus on direct engagement with
the subject matter.
The last word should go to Carl Bereiter (2002) who strikes a cautionary
note that should echo loudly across the global network of e-learning:
0111
Constructivism, learning by discovery, learner-centred education,
computer-assisted instruction . . . computer conferencing, knowledge
building: each one comes accompanied by a little demon who whispers
4111 in the ear. ‘You won’t have to worry about learning anymore. It will
take care of itself. Stop teaching. Just let it happen.’
Acknowledgements
I am very pleased to acknowledge the contributions made to the ideas dis-
cussed here by colleagues with whom I have collaborated over several years.
I would especially like to thank Chris Fowler, John Lee, Finbar Dineen, Jean
McKendree, Carmel Smith, Patrick McAndrew, Jim Gallacher and Christina
Knussen.
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0111
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4111
Chapter 11
Sustainable literacies and the

ecology of lifelong learning
Mary Hamilton
This chapter rests on a theory of literacy as social practice. The discussion

is a development on from that in Barton (1994: 34–52), where contem-
porary approaches to literacy are discussed within the framework of the
metaphor of ecology. The essence of this approach is that literacy compe-
tence and need cannot be understood in terms of absolute levels of skill, but
are relational concepts, defined by the social and communicative practices
with which individuals engage in the various domains of their life world. It
sees literacy as historically and socially situated. As Brian Street (1995) puts
it, it is a shift from literacy as an autonomous gift to be given to people, to
an ideological understanding of literacy that places it in its wider context
of institutional purposes and power relationships. The focus shifts from
literacy as deficit or lack, something people haven’t got, to the many different
ways that people engage with literacy, recognising difference and diversity
and challenging how these differences are valued within our society. This
involves us in looking beyond educational settings to vernacular practices
and informal learning, and to the other official settings in which literacies
play a key role. Learning does not just take place in classrooms and is not
just concerned with methods. This approach has come to be known as the
New Literacy Studies (NLS).
Those of us working with this new approach advocate a broader under-
standing of what is included when we talk about literacy, suggesting that we
should look beyond texts themselves to what people do with literacy, with
whom, where, and how. That is, we focus attention on the cultural prac-
tices within which the written word is embedded – the ways in which texts
are socially regulated and used. This leads us to consider the differentiated
uses of literacy in varying cultural contexts. It leads us to consider not just
print literacy but other mass media including visual and oral ways of commu-
nicating, and especially the way that the use of these media, using both old
(print) and new (electronic) technologies, is interlinked. Writing becomes
This is an edited version of a paper originally prepared for the Global Colloquium on
Supporting Lifelong Learning, 2000, Milton Keynes: The Open University.
Mary Hamilton 177
11 as central as reading, and other ways of interacting with print culture are
identified. In sum, the New Literacy Studies encourages us to be reflective
about the everyday practices that we are all part of, to ask questions, rather
than to assume that we already know what literacy is.
Despite the progress in theorising a different approach to literacy, there is
still a long way to go in making the NLS credible as an approach within
education policy and practice. In a number of countries (including Australia,
South Africa and North America) standardised curricula and assessment
systems are being introduced in an atmosphere of anxiety about falling liter-
011 acy standards and the presumed effects of popular culture and the new com-
munication media. These trends move us away from strategies that would be
in tune with the NLS. They point backwards to more traditional and pre-
11 scriptive methods for teaching and learning writing and reading, and attempts
to separate print literacy from other media, especially those that prevail in
popular cultural forms. The adult basic skills strategy in England and Wales
includes a national curriculum for adults that is designed to fit seamlessly with
school achievement as part of a National Literacy Strategy (DfEE, 2000).
These developments in adult education, however, are also taking place
within a broader strategy of lifelong learning that I believe promises a dif-
0111 ferent vision of what literacy might be, a vision that is much closer, potenti-
ally, to the new understandings embodied in the New Literacy Studies. To
elaborate on this potential for developing sustainable lifelong learning in
relation to literacy, I will address three issues:
1 The empirical research agenda: the need to develop a more extensive

research base on the detail of literacy learning and use in local commu-
nities. This research should focus not just on individual learning his-
tories, but also on literacy practices within and between groups and
communities.
0111 2 The need to clarify underpinning notions of learning and knowing (both
at the individual and the group level) that are at work in the NLS and
how these relate to forms of knowing currently privileged by educational
institutions.
3 The need to pay much more serious attention to the institutional pro-
cesses whereby ‘truths’ about literacy become translated into policy and
practice – the intersection between policy and learning theory.
In what follows, I discuss these three areas starting from the perspectives
offered by a recent ethnographic study published with David Barton as
0111 Local Literacies (Barton and Hamilton, 1998). This is prefaced by a brief
explanation of key components in the theory of literacy as social practice.
4111
Literacy practices, literacy events and texts

The notion of literacy practices offers a powerful way of conceptualising the
link between the activities of reading and writing and the social structures
in which they are embedded and which they help shape. The reference to
practices, then, is not just the superficial choice of a word but the possibil-
ities that this perspective offers for new theoretical understandings about
literacy. Literacy practices are the general cultural ways of utilising written
language that people draw upon in their lives. In the simplest sense literacy
practices are what people do with literacy. However practices are not observ-
able units of behaviour since they also involve values, attitudes, feelings and
social relationships (see Street, 1993: 12; Barton and Hamilton, 1998: 6–13;
and Hamilton, 2000). This includes people’s awareness of literacy, construc-
tions of literacy and discourses of literacy, how people talk about and make
sense of literacy. These are processes internal to the individual; at the same
time, practices are the social processes that connect people with one another,
and they include shared cognitions represented in ideologies and social iden-
tities. Practices are shaped by social rules that regulate the use and dis-
tribution of texts, prescribing who may produce and have access to them.
They straddle the distinction between individual and social worlds, and
literacy practices are more usefully understood as existing in the relations
between people within groups and communities rather than as a set of
properties residing in individuals.
The other basic concepts that this approach draws on are those of the
literacy event (or moment), which are activities where literacy has a role, and
the written texts that are central to these activities. Events are observable
episodes that arise from practices and are shaped by them: they are the ma-
terial ‘traces’ of literacy practices. The notion of events stresses the situated
nature of literacy, that it always exists in a social context. It is derived from
ideas developed in sociolinguistics for the analysis of spoken language as ‘the
social event of verbal interaction’ rather than the formal linguistic proper-
ties of texts in isolation. Unlike spoken language, social interactions
involving literacy extend across time and space. This means that the term
‘literacy event’ has to be interpreted more broadly than just involving face-
to-face interactions (see Hamilton, 2000). Many literacy events in life are
regular, repeated activities, and these can often be a useful starting point for
research into literacy. Some events are linked into routine sequences and
these may be part of the formal procedures and expectations of social insti-
tutions like workplaces, schools and welfare agencies. Some events are
structured by the more informal expectations and pressures of the home or
peer group. Written texts are a crucial part of literacy events and the study
of literacy is partly a study of texts and how they are produced and used.
These three components, practices, events and texts, provide the bedrock
of a social theory of literacy. The approach can be summarised in the
form of a set of six propositions about the nature of literacy:
Mary Hamilton 179
11 • Literacy is best understood as a set of social practices; these can be

inferred from events that are mediated by written texts.
• There are different literacies associated with different domains of life.
• Literacy practices are patterned by social institutions and power rela-
tionships, and some literacies are more dominant, visible and influential
than others.
• Literacy practices are purposeful and embedded in broader social goals
and cultural practices.
• Literacy is historically situated.
011 • Literacy practices change and new ones are frequently acquired through
processes of informal learning and sense making.
11
Developing an ethnographic research base
The NLS has begun to gather detailed ethnographic data on the ecology of
literacy in everyday life. However, we still do not have enough data either
to begin to identify the range of literacies with which people are engaged,
or to begin drawing out commonalities and varieties of practice across social
groupings of different kinds We are still talking in very general terms about
0111 the roles of literacy in society. We have to further deepen and problematise
the notion of ‘community’.
This has been the focus of the ‘Local Literacies’ project, a detailed study,
lasting several years, of the role of literacy in the everyday lives of people
in Lancaster, England. The study (reported in Barton and Hamilton, 1998
and elsewhere) used in-depth interviews, complemented by observations,
photography and the collection of documents and records. It included a door-
to-door survey in one neighbourhood of Lancaster and detailed case studies
of people in 12 households in the neighbourhood, observing particular
literacy events, and asking people to reflect on their practices. Alongside the
0111 case studies were 30 interviews of people in what we called access points for
literacy, such as bookshops, libraries and advice centres. There were also
interviews of 20 adults who had identified problems with their reading and
writing and had been attending courses at the Adult College. More than a
year after the main part of the study in a phase called the Collaborative
Ethnography project we took back transcripts of interviews and drafts of our
interpretative themes to 10 of the people for further discussion.
A recurrent theme in the Lancaster interviews concerns people’s experi-
ences of situations in their day-to-day life that had motivated them to develop
a specialised expertise. These experiences launch them into new areas of
0111 learning in which they muster all the resources they can find, including lit-
eracy. Often these activities involve encounters with social institutions, deal-
ing with professionals, ways of communicating, acting and understanding that
were quite alien to people’s previous experience. To interact with these insti-
4111 tutions and to have access to the knowledge they control, literacy is a key
tool. As well as these short-term responses to urgent practical needs, people

have preoccupations and pastimes that they pursue over lengthy periods:
quests for information about family history, correspondences and leisure
activities of various sorts. These lead to a wide variation in what people know
about, and it is revealing to look across a community to investigate the types
of vernacular knowledge that exist – as Luis Moll has done in his research
with Mexican-American households in the United States. Moll (1994) refers
to funds of knowledge in communities, which are the practical exchanges and
responses to needs for information and resources shared across families,
between siblings, neighbours, friends. Moll found funds of knowledge in areas
such as agriculture, economics, construction, religion, arts and repair. In
Lancaster the areas of vernacular knowledge that we have identified include
home economics and budgeting, repair and maintenance, childcare, sports,
gardening, cooking, pets and animal care, and family and local history. Some
people had also developed knowledge of legal, political, health and medical
topics.
Ian Falk refers to these funds of knowledge and the processes whereby they
are created and circulated within a community as a part of ‘social capital’:
‘networks, norms and trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for
mutual benefit’ (see Falk and Harrison, 1998: 613; Falk and Balatti, 1999).
From his research with community-based groups in Australia, Falk has begun
to identify the informal processes whereby knowledge is created and circu-
lated, such as organising forums for discussion of issues; working collectively
in groups; encouraging wide participation among community members,
including volunteers; making routes for people to develop and move into
new positions; ‘passing the torch on’ to subsequent generations of activists;
dividing tasks up into short, recognisable and achievable goals and stages;
and making results of activities publicly visible and celebrated (Falk and
Harrison, 1998: 619).
Developing notions of ‘vernacular’ and

‘institutional’ literacies
How can we better describe the learning that takes place outside of formal
institutions where it is more fluid, and where roles/subject positions, goals
and procedures are not necessarily settled or named? One of the main organ-
ising ideas that we used in the ‘Local Literacies’ study was a distinction
between dominant (institutionalised) and vernacular (self-generated) litera-
cies. This has a parallel with James Gee’s notion of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’
Discourses and raises some of the same issues (Gee, 1990). Vernacular and
institutional literacies are not independent and for ever separated categories
of activity but they are in dialogue and the boundaries between them are
permeable and shifting.
Mary Hamilton 181
11 We defined dominant literacies as those that are associated with formal

organisations, such as those of the school, the church, the workplace, the
legal system, commerce, medical and welfare bureaucracies. They are part of
the specialised discourses of bounded communities of practice, and are stan-
dardised and defined in terms of the formal purposes of the institution, rather
than in terms of the multiple and shifting purposes of individual citizens and
their communities. In dominant literacies there are professional experts and
teachers through whom access to knowledge is controlled. To the extent
that we can group these dominant literacies together, they are given high
011 value, legally and culturally. Dominant literacies are powerful in proportion
to the power of the institution that shapes them.
Vernacular literacies are essentially ones that are not regulated or system-
11 atised by the formal rules and procedures of social institutions but have their
origin in the purposes of everyday life. They are not highly valued by formal
social institutions though sometimes they develop in response to these insti-
tutions. They may be actively disapproved of and trivialised and they can
be contrasted with dominant literacies, which are seen as rational and of
high cultural value.
Vernacular literacies are more common in private spheres than in public
0111 spheres. Often they are humorous, playful, disrespectful, sometimes deliber-
ately oppositional. When questioned about them, people did not always
regard them as real reading or real writing. Some vernacular literacies are
deliberately hidden: these include those that are personal and private, where
reading or writing are ways of being alone and private, ways of creating
personal space. There are also secret notes and letters of love, abuse, criti-
cism and subversion, comics, scurrilous jokes, horoscopes, fanzines, porno-
graphy – some but not all of which will be revealed to the researcher’s
gaze. These findings link in with a range of other research that explores
the informal literacies of different age groups. See, for example, Mahiri,
0111 1999, who has documented the uses of literacy in the popular culture of
black youth in California; Falk and Harrison, 1998; Falk and Balatti, 1999;
Lankshear and Knobel, 1999; Princeloo and Breier, 1996.
In our project we found vernacular literacies involved in a range of every-
day activities, which we roughly classified as (1) organising life; (2) personal
communication; (3) private leisure; (4) documenting life; (5) sense making;
and (6) social participation. In all of these areas, we found examples of people
becoming expert, consciously carrying out their own research on a topic of
interest to them.
A number of points can be made about the nature of vernacular litera-
0111 cies based on the data from the Lancaster study. First, vernacular literacy
practices are learned informally. They are acquired in homes and neigh-
bourhood groups, through the everyday perplexities and curiosities of our
lives. The roles of novice or learner and expert or teacher are not fixed, but
4111
shift from context to context and there is an acceptance that people will
engage in vernacular literacies in different ways, sometimes supporting, some-
times requiring support from others. Identities shift accordingly.
Second, the vernacular literacy practices we identified are rooted in action
contexts and everyday purposes and networks. They draw upon and contri-
bute to vernacular knowledge, which is often local, procedural and minutely
detailed. Literacy learning and use are integrated in everyday activities and
the literacy elements are an implicit part of the activity, which may be mas-
tering a martial art, paying the bills, organising a musical event or finding
out about local news. Literacy itself is not a focus of attention, but is used
to get other things done. Everyday literacies are subservient to the goals of
purposeful activities and are defined by people in terms of these activities.
Where specialisms develop in everyday contexts they are different from the
formal academic disciplines, reflecting the logic of practical application.
Vernacular literacies are as diverse as social practices are. They are hybrid in
origin, and often it is clear that a particular activity may be classified in more
than one way since people may have a mixture of motives for taking part in
a given literacy activity. Preparing a residents association newsletter, for
instance, can be a social activity, it can be part of leisure or political activ-
ity, and it may involve personal sense making. They are part of a ‘Do-It-
Yourself’ culture that incorporates whatever materials and resources are
available and combines them in novel ways. Spoken language, print and other
media are integrated; literacy is integrated with other symbolic systems, such
as numeracy, and visual semiotics. Different topics and activities can occur
together, making it hard to identify the boundaries of a single literacy event
or practice. This is in contrast to many school practices, where learning is
separated from use, divided up into academically defined subject areas, disci-
plines and specialisms, and where knowledge is often made explicit within
particular interactive routines, is reflected upon, and is open to evaluation
through the testing of disembedded skills.
As a starting point the distinction between ‘vernacular’ and ‘institutional’
knowing has been useful but it needs to be further developed, especially in
terms of the dialogic relationship between the two, how the one influences
and articulates with the other. One way forward is to look to other strands of
theorising that are concerned to understand the process of ‘knowing’ as medi-
ated, situated, provisional, pragmatic and contested. These strands include
activity theory (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998; Engeström, 1993)
where learning is seen in terms of initiation into a community of practice
involving apprentice-like relationships between expert and novice members
of that community; feminist theory that foregrounds the role of personal
experience and the ‘knowing subject’ in creating theory (Ramazanoglu and
Holland, 1997); and organisational learning theory, including ‘actor network’
theory (as reviewed by Blackler, 1995; Law and Hassard, 1999) that focuses
Mary Hamilton 183
11 on the interconnected institutional systems and environments within which

knowing is achieved.
Casting an eye over these related areas reveals that the New Literacy
Studies is just one part of a growing recognition that ‘knowing’ is not simply
the product of individualised skills and understandings but a relational, social
process. Neither is knowing simply a cognitive matter but it simultaneously
involves other modes of engaging with the world. We can, for example,
identify at least the following (adapted from Blackler, 1995):
011 • embodied knowing, which is experiential and action-oriented, dependent

on people’s physical presence, on sensory processes, physical cues, and
may be only partially explicit;
11 • symbolic knowing, which is mediated by conceptual understandings that
are explicit, propositional and encoded through a variety of semiotic
technologies – spoken language and other symbol systems, print and
electronic communications;
• embedded knowing, which is procedural, shaped or engrooved by prac-
tical routines that are configurations of material, technological and social
symbolic resources through which knowing is accomplished;
0111 • encultured knowing, which involves the shared understandings that are
achieved through social relationships and initiation into communities
of practice.
Some of these modes of knowing are more explicit, abstract and portable,
some are much more closely tied to physical localities and individual subjec-
tivities, and they of course vary enormously in the relatively value that is
accorded to them in different contexts. However, they are all present and
affect eventual outcomes.
A further elaboration of learning is needed to explore the features of
0111 different ‘communities of practice’, the processes that go on within them
and the resources they draw on (including the physical and material envir-
onment), and how people engage with them.
Within the communities we have studied, technical literacy skills are
unevenly distributed and people may participate in literacy practices in many
different ways. However, as the Lancaster research has shown, what counts
as ‘expert’ and what is ‘novice’ is problematic outside of an institutional
setting. People move flexibly in and out of being ‘learners’ in different roles,
notions of exchange and identity are strongly linked. The notion of appren-
ticeship does not fit all situations and we need a more fluid conceptualisation
0111 of the relationships experienced outside of institutional settings. Stephen
Reder’s notion of practice engagement theory (Reder, 1994) may point a
way toward this more fluid characterisation. He identifies three aspects of
literacy practices – the technologies of reading and writing, the functions
4111
of these activities, and the social meanings carried by them – and suggests
that people may engage with any or all of these three aspects in shifting,
and often unequal ways. Reder’s formulation could be integrated with the
different modes of engagement identified above.
Creating ‘truths’ about literacy

So far this chapter has discussed ways of developing a fuller notion of ver-
nacular literacies, based on a detailed database of ethnographic research.
But to make use of this notion of vernacular knowing and literacy we also
need to understand more about how institutions produce and privilege cer-
tain kinds of knowing as ‘real knowledge’, how they produce and recognise
‘experts’, and how in this process they devalue or redefine the vernacular for
their own purposes – a process that Wenger (1998: 57) refers to as ‘reifica-
tion’. Much more thought needs to be given to the nature of lay expertise and
its relationship to identity and to professional expertise and competence,
and the tensions between these. What is acceptable as ‘expertise’ in in-
formal and in institutional settings? What are the significant dimensions of
expertise in each case that contribute to a person’s credibility (e.g. richness
of their knowledge base, institutional affiliations, ability to communicate
effectively, breadth of perspective, ability to make links between formal and
informal networks).
In this section I offer some thoughts about how such an enquiry might
proceed. This part of the chapter is more speculative, as it projects a research
agenda, rather than reporting on work already done.
To achieve an understanding of how institutional truths about literacy are
created, I suggest that we need to focus less on what the teachers and learners
are doing (or need to do) and more on what the administrators, assessors,
quality inspectors and government agencies and policy makers are doing in
relation to literacy and lifelong learning. That is, our attention and analytic
effort has to move to the intersection between policy and learning theory.
We should be concerned to make links between the theoretical insights
offered by the NLS and the public discourses of literacy that inform edu-
cational policy and practice – and which in turn enter into popular
understandings about literacy.
To give a specific example, we should be doing more to contest the solid-
ifying international ‘regimes of truth’ that are developing through
standardised assessment and testing – which are, in their turn, organising
national and local knowledge about what literacy is. Surveys such as the
International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) (OECD, 1997) organise our
knowledge about literacy and the ‘literate subject’. They are based on a
particular set of social relations and institutions that have both national and
international dimensions, residing in government, academic and media
domains. The surveys draw on a particular discipline – the psychometric
Mary Hamilton 185
11 measurement tradition – which is dedicated to the search for universal

certainties about the relation between literacy, economy and society. They
use an information processing model of literacy and attempt to identify levels
of literacy skill that are independent of the context of use – the literacy
counterpart of the labour skills supposedly possessed by the flexible worker.
Darville (1999) and Hamilton and Barton (2000) have argued that these
surveys fit well within the globalising project of the new capitalism. They
are redefining literacy to fit in with the projected needs of an ideal, consumer-
oriented citizen who is responsive to multiple new contexts for literacy use.
011 They justify a vision of what literacy should be, rather than being based on
people’s lived experiences, and create new divisions, defining people as being
with or without the correct kinds of literacy. These activities continue to
11 be developed with large sums of research money provided by the govern-
ments of OECD countries. I would argue that this is not a democratic pro-
ject, but an institutional vision that has little to do with supporting people
to use and control literacy for their own purposes. It is important that
we reveal the institutional underpinnings and aspirations for IALS, rather
than treating the findings from surveys like this as indisputable facts about
contemporary life.
0111 Theoretical tools are already available for exploring the ways in which
institutions exercise and realise power: from Foucault (1982); from Bernstein
(1996) on how knowledge is re-framed within a pedagogical discourse when
it is imported into an educational context; and from Wenger (1998) on the
characteristics of institutional communities of practice. Methodological tools
are also available (for example in actor network theory) that would enable us
to trace the threads of an initiative such as the IALS through its creation and
dispersion from research contexts to media, policy and practice (see Law
and Hassard, 1999). These would help us analyse how literacies are em-
bedded in the institutional relationships and processes that give them their
0111 meaning and how vernacular literacies are defined in relation to dominant,
legitimated practices.
Supporting literacies through lifelong

learning policy
The fact that some literacies are supported, controlled and legitimated by
powerful institutions implies that others are devalued. Many of the literacies
that are influential and valued in people’s day-to-day lives, that are widely
circulated and discussed are also ignored by educational institutions: they do
0111 not count as ‘real’ literacy. Neither are the informal social networks that sus-
tain these literacies drawn upon or acknowledged. A social practice approach
to literacy demonstrates the changing demands that people experience at dif-
ferent stages of their lives and offers convincing evidence of the need for
4111 lifelong learning systems that people can access at critical points. Whilst
community resources and funds of knowledge exist, they also have their
limitations. They are often unevenly distributed and can be supported by var-
ious kinds of educational response. From this perspective, formally structured
learning opportunities are one important component of lifelong learning, but
they are only one aspect of a solution to sustaining literacies. The focus needs
to be wider. Literacy/lifelong learning funds could be used to:
• increase the physical spaces available for people and groups to meet/
exchange ideas/display/perform;
• strengthen access points for literacy: libraries/cyber cafes/bookshops/
advice centres etc. so that citizens can access information they are
searching for through print, video, electronic forms etc., engage in
virtual or actual meetings with experts;
• strengthen open local government structures that facilitate consultation
and access to existing routes for change/citizen action;
• support local media that help circulate and publicise news, events, space
for debating issues, ideas;
• provide structured opportunities to learn both content and process skills
and link up with others interested in the same issues.
In developing this strategy, we have to pay serious attention to the social

relationships that frame literacy in schools, colleges, classrooms and other
learning groups, and the power dimensions of these relationships in terms
of the ability to make decisions, confer value, demonstrate expertise. So long
as these relationships remain unexamined and untouched, there is very little
possibility that literacies can be sustained within a system of lifelong learning.
References
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Blackwell.
Barton, D. and Hamilton, M. (1998) Local Literacies: Reading and Writing in One
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Critique, London and Washington DC: Taylor and Francis.
Blackler, F. (1995) Knowledge, Knowledge Work and Organizations: An Overview
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Darville, R. (1999) Knowledges of Adult Literacy: Surveying for Competitiveness,
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Lave (eds) Understanding Practice: Perspectives on Activity and Context, pp. 65–103,
Cambridge: CUP.
Mary Hamilton 187
11 Falk, I. and Balatti, J. (1999) Social Capital, Literacy Ecologies and Lifelong Learning.
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Press.
011 Hamilton, M. (2000) Expanding the New Literacy Studies: Using Photographs to
Explore Literacy as Social Practice, in D. Barton, M. Hamilton and R. Ivanic (eds)
Situated Literacies, London: Routledge.
11 Hamilton, M. and Barton, D. (2000) The International Adult Literacy Survey: What
Does it Really Measure? to appear in The International Review of Education, 46(5):
377–389.
Lankshear, C. and Knobel, P. (1999) The New Literacy Studies and the Study of
New Literacies. Paper presented at the seminar Literacies Amidst Global Trans-
formation: Workplace and Community Literacies, University of Wisconsin,
Madison.
Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991) Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation,
0111 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Law, J. and Hassard, J. (eds) (1999) Actor Network Theory and After, Oxford:
Blackwell.
Mahiri, J. (1999) Literacy’s Lost Ones: Cultural Models of Learning and African
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formation: Workplace and Community Literacies, University of Wisconsin,
Madison.
Moll, L. (1994) Mediating Knowledge Between Homes and Classrooms, in D. Keller-
Cohen (ed.) Literacy: Interdisciplinary Conversions, Creshill, NJ: Hampton Press.
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0111 Practice in Contemporary South Africa, Cape Town: Sached Books.
Ramazanoglu, C. and Holland, J. (1997) Tripping Over Experience: Some Problems
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0111 Wenger, E. (1998) Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity,
4111
Chapter 12
Academic writing in new and

emergent discipline areas
Mike Baynham
Introduction
The student who is asked to write like a sociologist must find a way to
insert himself into a discourse defined by this complex and diffuse
conjunction of objects, methods, rules definitions, techniques and tools
. . . In addition he must be in control of specific field conventions, a set
of rules and methods which marks the discourse as belonging to a certain
discipline. These vary even within disciplines: a reader response critic
will emphasize one set of textual elements, a literary historian another,
and the essays produced will contain these differences.
(Ball et al., 1990: 357)
So pity the poor nursing student, who is required to write at times like a
sociologist, at others like a philosopher, yet again like a scientist and finally
as a reflective practitioner! Much of the literature on disciplinarity assumes,
even when it is discussing phenomena of heterogeneity, blurring and cross-
ing (see Klein, 1993), the lineaments of traditional disciplines. In a set of
interrelated studies conducted at the University of Technology, Sydney
(Baynham et al., 1995; Lee et al., 1995; Gordon et al., 1996; Lee, 1997) we
were particularly interested in discipline areas where complex combinations
of disciplinary influences intersect, in the ‘new’ discipline areas of the ‘new’
university.
A basic assumption is that, in order to understand the problematic of
the novice writer, we need to understand the disciplinary contexts within
which they are required to write, or more specifically the disciplines they
are writing themselves into. But I would also like you to keep in your mind’s
eye the image of the harassed first-year nursing student, hurrying from lecture
to tutorial, backpack full of photocopied journal articles, notes and guide-
lines for an essay on the sociology of nursing, a clinical report, a case study,
This is an edited version of a chapter previously published in Student Writing in Higher

Education, 2000, Buckingham: Open University Press.
Mike Baynham 189
11 a reflective journal. They are certainly living disciplinary and textual

heterogeneity.
Recent advances in the understanding of disciplines and disciplinarity (see
Messer-Davidow et al., 1993) emphasize that, rather than being neat homo-
geneous discourse communities, academic disciplines are radically hetero-
geneous and constituted in difference. Nowhere is this more apparent than
in the emergent ‘practice-based’ disciplines of the new university. Dis-
ciplinary heterogeneity and difference have significant implications for stu-
dent academic writers who can be understood as writing themselves into a
011 ‘disciplinary politics’, by which I mean the internal tensions and conflicts
over such issues as what counts as knowledge, what should be where in the
curriculum and how it should be valued, where boundaries within and
11 between disciplines should be drawn. Students are learning to take up writ-
ing positions in the context of this diversity and its accompanying tensions.
In this chapter I will explore the implications of this approach in the areas of
nurse education and adult education, drawing out implications for both
research and pedagogy in academic literacies.
I will begin by identifying three perspectives on the theorization of acad-
emic writing. The first, a ‘skills-based’ approach to the teaching of academic
0111 writing, assumes that there is a generic set of skills and strategies that could
be taught and then applied in particular disciplinary contexts. The second,
‘text-based’, linguistic approach assumes a relatively homogeneous discipline,
with text types to be discovered, analysed and taught. The third, ‘practice-
based’, approach proposed here investigates student writing as both text and
practice, arguing that, most crucially, the student writer is learning to take
up disciplinary positions in a discourse ‘community’. Where the disciplinary
positions are conflictual, overlapping or indeed blurred, the student acad-
emic writer will be working within the disciplinary politics that is produced.
This chapter will be illustrated with data from a series of related studies
0111 that investigated the discipline-specific aspects of student writing in new and
emergent disciplines, focusing in particular on the ways in which the disci-
plinary practices and politics are crucial to an understanding of student
writing (understood as both product and process) and the ways in which
students learn to construct powerful writing positions in text.
A concept like ‘writing position’ cannot be fully or richly understood
without a discipline-internal awareness of what counts as knowledge and
what counts as an authoritative disciplinary position, and this includes the
awareness of internal diversity and conflict, as realized in the politics of
the discipline.
0111 So where does this leave the student writer? In the concluding section of
this chapter I will argue that academic writing pedagogy must make the
concerns of disciplinarity, disciplinarization and consequent writing posi-
tions central – in other words, as Graff (quoted in Klein, 1993) suggests, we
4111 must ‘teach the conflicts’.
Three perspectives on academic writing

The skills-based approach to the teaching of academic writing underpins the
traditional ‘study skills’ approach to teaching academic writing and assumes
that there is a generic set of skills and strategies, such as ‘essay-writing’ or
‘referencing’, that can be taught and then applied in particular disciplinary
contexts. Using a skills-based approach, students are typically provided with
pre-sessional courses or ongoing support sessions in study preparation, often
in mixed disciplinary groups, with the implication that they can take the
skills they learn and apply them in their particular disciplinary context. A
major criticism of this approach is that it tends to ignore the discipline-
specificity of writing requirements.
The text-based approach draws on the resources of linguistic analysis, in
particular register (see Halliday and Martin, 1993) and genre analysis
(Swales, 1990; Freedman and Medway, 1994), to understand the discipline-
specific nature of writing tasks. Register analysis can characterize the lan-
guage of history or science, while genre analysis focuses on the text types
that are required – for example, the history essay, the laboratory report, the
case report. There is now plenty of evidence of the language demands of
particular discipline areas that can be used to design discipline-specific
curricula to support academic writing. One problem with the text-based
approach, however, is that it often assumes a relatively homogeneous disci-
pline, with text types to be discovered, analysed and taught. To talk glibly
about ‘the language of science or history’ can gloss over significant differ-
ences within disciplines which, as we shall see, are increasingly identified
by studies of disciplines and disciplinarity themselves.
The practice-based approach emphasizes the social and discursive practices
through which a discipline constitutes itself. A lot of the pioneer work in
this regard has been carried out in the study of scientific communities
(Latour, 1987; Bazerman, 1988; Myers, 1990). Such studies look at how
fields are constituted and maintained, how novices are socialized into the
practices that are constitutive of the field. Messer-Davidow et al. (1993)
present a collection of such studies across a broad range of discipline areas,
including accounting, social sciences, economics, art history and medicine.
From a practice perspective, we are interested in how students as novices
are brought into the typical discursive practices of the discipline, whether
it be literary criticism, ethnographic fieldwork or participating in laboratory
experiments.
In shifting the emphasis on to the ways in which disciplines are consti-
tuted it is, however, important not to lose touch with the sharply focused
specificity that text-based studies provide. Language is, after all, a major
means (if not necessarily the only means) by which disciplinary knowledge
is constituted, reproduced, contested and added to, and learned. We need
precise linguistic accounts of the linguistic means that are deployed in
Mike Baynham 191
11 specific disciplinary contexts, but we also need to recognize the complexity

and specificity of these contexts. So combining both the text and the practice
perspective (texts and practices) has a powerful potential.
New and emerging discipline areas

The authors reviewed so far have been concentrating on the disciplinary
shape of traditional university disciplines. In this chapter, however, I will
be presenting case studies of student writing practices in new and emerging
011 areas, where the focus is not on the traditional discipline, but rather on the
formation of professions, nurses, adult educators, engineers, what might be
called ‘practice-based’ disciplines.
11 These new and emerging areas will typically draw on a range of disciplines.
Let us take adult education as an example. The adult education theorist Griff
Foley (1995: 15) identifies a range of disciplines, including sociology, psy-
chology, geography, philosophy and economics, which impact on adult edu-
cation as a field of study. Knowledge from these disciplines is, of course, not
imported raw but is ‘recontextualized’, in Bernstein’s (1990) sense. Within
adult education as a field of study there are different schools of thought, with
0111 different versions of what counts as knowledge, or even the boundaries of the
field (Foley, 1995: 14). These involve major epistemological cleavages, for
example, around positivist, interpretative and post-positivist accounts of
knowledge and action. All of this adds up to the disciplinary terrain on to
which the student adult educator is introduced. To paraphrase Ball et al.,
when the adult education student is asked to ‘write like an adult educator’
this will be the terrain he/she will learn to inhabit. By mapping out the
major dimensions of this terrain, we can develop an account of the ‘disci-
plinary politics’ that the student is writing him/herself into. To illustrate this,
I would like to consider nursing education as a case study.
0111 The data I will present below were taken from a study of student acad-
emic writing practices in three discipline areas – nursing, information studies
and women’s studies – at the University of Technology, Sydney, a new
Australian university (in the sense that it was formed in the 1989 restruc-
turing of higher education in Australia) whose mission statement identifies
it as providing education for the professions. The data collected included
interviews with students and lecturers/markers, support materials for the
courses and examples of student writing. Below, first-year nursing students
and their lecturers talk about writing and the disciplinary issues of nursing.
I will also discuss issues arising in a first-year essay-writing task for a subject
0111 ‘Professional Responsibilities in Nursing’, which focuses on the changing
social roles of the nursing profession.
4111
Nursing education: a case study

One of the significant issues in nursing education has been the shift, over
the last decade or so, from a ‘practice-oriented’ to a ‘professionalized’ concep-
tion of nursing (see Gray and Pratt, 1989, 1995). This has coincided with
the shift of nursing training/education out of the hospitals and into the
universities. So one aspect of the disciplinary politics of nursing is precisely
this shift from practice-oriented to professionalized concepts of nursing.
Another tension that is central to nursing education is that between prac-
tical knowledge and theorized knowledge. Like adult education, nursing
draws on a heterogeneous disciplinary base, most strikingly in the contrast
between the science-based, clinical subjects and the ethical subjects.
Underlying these subjects are very different conceptualizations of what
counts as knowledge, the clinical subjects being underpinned by the posi-
tivist scientific paradigm, the ethical subjects by an interpretative or post-
positivst perspective on what counts as knowledge. The shift into academia
of nursing training/education produces in turn processes of disciplinization,
where nursing is pressured to constitute itself as a ‘proper’ discipline. (Again
there are interesting parallels with adult education as a field of study.) As
Webb (1992: 747) suggests:
Nursing is a relatively young academic discipline. Like other disciplines

which have attempted to establish respect and credibility, such as psy-
chology and sociology, nursing has sought to do this by imitating longer-
established disciplines and in particular the traditional or physical
sciences.
Underpinning all of this is what might be termed the ‘gender politics’ of

nursing, the construction of nursing as a handmaiden profession in relation
to its other, the medical profession. This disciplinary politics of nursing (see
Table 12.1) constitutes the context into which nursing students are writing
themselves.
In the following extracts, nursing lecturers and a nursing student discuss
some of these tensions:
Table 12.1 The disciplinary politics of nursing
Practice-based vs. Professionalized

Practical knowledge vs. Theorized knowledge
Homogeneous disciplinary base vs. Heterogeneous disciplinary base
Clinical subjects (positivist) vs. Ethical subjects (interpretative/critical)
Processes of disciplinization: nursing as a ‘proper’ discipline; nurse educators as ‘proper’
academics
Gender politics of the nursing profession: ‘doctors and nurses’
Mike Baynham 193
11 There is a big gap between those working in theoretical areas and those
in practical areas which is nowhere near being breached and it will be
a long time before it’s breached. This puts students in an interesting
position. It is probably less problematic now but 4–5 years ago when our
students went out to practise after graduation they were treated very
badly because they were seen to be trained in an institution that was
inappropriate for training nurses, by people who were too distant from
nursing and in areas that were irrelevant to nursing. Now because there
is an increasing number of university-trained nurses practising, that has
011 started to dissipate but the tension underneath this has not been
resolved. This is largely to do with the political climate in the hospi-
tals; there is a dominant natural sciences medical approach to health
11 care and there is an issue of how nurses fit into that. It’s very compli-
cated. If there is so much to be sorted out it would be hard to envisage
any sort of discipline unity or clarification as to what is appropriate in
the discipline for a long time.
(Lecturer interview)
I think those tensions reflect the tension for nursing because the univer-
0111 sities seem to be teaching people about all these airy-fairy things and out
in the real world they’re saying they can’t even fill a catheter but that’s
not true. What we do teach them is about real nursing but it’s more
than that, and I think that the faculty has to understand that people
in the practice area have legitimate concerns which must be addressed
by us, and I think the practice must address the fact that nursing has
got to develop a profession. The only way you can develop a profession
is developing thinking people. That’s the tension for nursing.
0111 Another lecturer speaks more explicitly about the tensions between the
scientific and humanities-based components of the curriculum:
The major tension I would have to face is that I started in the K.

programme which was very much a humanities programme and we did
things like important skills to develop a student’s thinking, their criti-
cal writing skills, there is much less emphasis on how to nurse. When
I came over to this campus there was very much a focus on the nursing
things, the science and the nursing, and there was less emphasis about
ethics and law and critical thinking and the humanities, the meaning
0111 of caring, the meaning of being a person. So the assignments that I had
to mark were really bad. I thought, I can’t believe that these people are
in the third year of their programme and they cannot write, they cannot
think, they cannot critique other people’s work. So that was a real
4111 dilemma for me and I think that was the tension for the faculty, we had
this terrible battleground between one group of people feeling that one
campus wasn’t teaching how to nurse and the other wasn’t teaching how
to think. Over several years we’ve got a common understanding but
there’s still tension there.
So how do students experience the disciplinary tensions between nursing

as a science-based curriculum and its ethical, humanistic dimensions? The
following student expresses her surprise about the range of what counted as
an appropriate topic in nursing journals:
When I started to look for articles, I found there were more than I
thought. I thought that, being in the nursing field, journals would focus
on hypertension, neck problems, new drugs, etc., but I was surprised they
have a lot of articles based on hazards happening in the workforce,
nurses’ perception of hazards, nurses’ fears about dealings with AIDS
patients, things like autonomy, authority, where does your responsibility
stop and what are the boundaries. It was good.
(Student interview)
The same student identifies confusing differences between the kinds of

writing that are expected of her in different parts of the programme:
But for medical, surgical, if you have to write about care for a person
with AIDS, you either know or you don’t know. This semester we had
a case on cardiac failure and that was another one where you have to
go and read how the heart works, how it pumps, where does it go wrong
and why does the patient present with such and such and you have to
learn. I did learn from that assignment. But for this assignment, I felt
that for me it was good because I spent time thinking about it, I didn’t
do much reading, I didn’t learn very much but certain things did catch
my attention, especially the need for nurses to prove that we are people
with nurses, we’re not just handmaidens, which I always felt. I felt that
it was never being argued enough about but I know now that’s not true,
but it hasn’t really made me a better nurse.
(Student interview)
In this section I have tried to sketch some of the broad parameters and ten-
sions within which nursing students are writing. My argument is that the
tension between positivist and critical hermeneutic versions of what counts
as knowledge, the shift towards professionalization of nursing, the emphasis
on nursing as a ‘proper’ academic discipline are constitutive of the con-
texts within which the students are writing. I will illustrate this in the next
section with an example from a first-year undergraduate writing task.
Mike Baynham 195
11 ‘Professional responsibilities in nursing’

essay topic
The ‘professional responsibilities in nursing’ subject comes from the first year
of the undergraduate nursing course. As suggested above, it focuses on the
changing social roles of the nursing profession and encapsulates in many ways
the tensions we have been exploring in the nursing education curriculum,
particularly in relation to the professionalization of nursing. The writing task
demanded of the students is an expository essay that explicitly invites the
students to address the professionalism issue:
011
Nurses will not be able to properly fulfil their professional responsibili-
ties until they have greater autonomy and authority – discuss.
11
Students taking up writing positions: voicing in the
nursing essay
Drawing on notions of ‘authoring’, ‘authority’ and ‘authorization’ of truth
statements (see Lindstrom, 1993), I will examine a range of ways in which
student writers authorize statements, including through the incorporation of
0111 the voices of others into their essays. Unsurprisingly, the most commonplace
strongly authorized statements in the essays tend to be supported by appeals
to the literature (theorized knowledge). Others – still highly valued, as it
turns out – produce appeals to experience (practical knowledge), ‘what nurses
think and do’, rather than ‘what the literature tells us that nurses think’ in
support of their developing argument. Both strategies interpolate the voices
of others into the text – on the one hand the voices of established academic
sources, on the other the voice of experience.
Yet, as we shall see, it is a mistake to set up a simplistic opposition between
weakly authorized statements invoking experience and strongly authorized
0111 statements invoking theorized knowledge. From other highly valued essays
we will examine data showing how the student writers can produce strongly
authorized statements by appealing to experience, apparently flouting the
‘academic’ requirement of appealing to theorized knowledge. I would suggest
that an explanation for this apparent anomaly lies in the disciplinary poli-
tics of nursing itself, in its emergence as a discipline, in the pull of different
constructions of nursing, specifically between nursing as a field of practice
and nursing as a professionalized and thus theorized discipline.
Here are some examples of the two contrasting ways in which the student
writers authorized statements in their essays. The first is an authorization
0111 based on experience of what nurses typically do:
Lack of sufficient autonomy and authority is seen when a nurse has

to have a physician authorize a pathology test when the nurse suspects
4111 the patient has a urinary tract infection. Some physicians who trust
experienced staff will leave blank signed forms for nurses to fill out if
they see the need arising (S. White, Registered Nurse, personal commu-
nication, 6 October 1994). In this instance the nurse needs more
autonomy and authority so they can fill in a form and send a sample to
the laboratory thereby saving precious time and also initiating treatment
quicker which will eventually benefit the patient. When nurses see that
a patient is being sufficiently hydrated and has no further need of an
intravenous drip, they have to inform the doctor who will then author-
ize the removal of the cannula. Nurses are sufficiently educated to make
these judgements but due to lack of autonomy and authority are unable
to do so.
(Kirsten)
Kirsten’s statements about nurses’ need for autonomy and authority, in

which greater autonomy and decision making on the part of nurses are
shown to be improving care for the patient, are authorized by examples
from experience, not from the research literature. Interestingly, this effect
is significantly reinforced when the writer uses the ‘personal communication’
referencing convention to authorize a particular statement, based on expe-
rience from the field rather than from an academic source. Immediately
following this, Kirsten authorizes a statement by sourcing it to an academic
reference:
According to Kiereini (1980) nurses have been making independent

decisions regarding management of their patients without wanting to
accept accountability for their decisions.
So Kirsten’s essay uses a mix of these two strategies, which seems to be

successful, as her essay is well received. The marker’s comments are inter-
esting, however. While giving the essay a better than average B grade, the
comment is:
The weakness in your argument lies in a lack of support for claims . . .
In contrast to Kirsten’s essay, which draws on both the authorization-from-

experience and the academic sourcing strategy, other essays, such as Sue’s
(graded A) and Lorraine’s (graded B), rely almost entirely on the academic
sourcing strategy. Virtually every statement they make can be traced back
to an academic source:
Ironically, Beaumont (1987) states that some nurses themselves are

reluctant to receive responsibility and accountability for their actions,
as they are ‘low risk takers’ and fear mistakes. However, a study done
Mike Baynham 197
11 by Kramer and Schmalenberg (1988, cited in Collins and Henderson,

1991: 25), [claims] that nurses preferred to work in an environment
which encouraged autonomous practice. Furthermore, Schoen (1992)
confirmed their claims and concluded that a number of research includ-
ing her own, have discovered a positive link between autonomy and job
satisfaction.
(Sue)
In Sue and Lorraine’s essays, what nurses say/think/feel/do is constructed

011 purely through the filter of the research literature. Nurses are present in the
text only as reconstituted or recontextualized into a body of research.
So how do these authorization strategies operate in the less success-
11 ful essays? We will look at Deirdre’s essay (graded E), and Karen’s essay
(graded C–).
In Karen’s essay we find examples both of the academic sourcing strategy,
with quoted statements attributed to sourced authors, and the attributed
appeal to experience:
In the health care system the doctors have the most autonomy and
0111 authority and this ‘male dominated profession used the path to profes-
sionalism to ensure themselves of financial security and autonomy’
(Short and Sharman 1987: 199) . . .
. . . Nurses believe that this is not true and that doctors should be edu-
cated to have a greater appreciation of nursing theory and practice,
that decision making processes should be reviewed and that changes in
hospital administration could ease tension between nurses and doctors.
(Karen)
Deirdre’s E grade, according to the subject outline, ‘represents a perfor-

0111 mance which reflects little understanding, or gives little evidence of a serious
attempt to meet the expectations of the assigned task’. Her essay starts with
the following:
Many nurses have seen the achievement of a professional standing as

an important goal in advancing the interests of nurses and health care
consumers. In particular, it has been said that it will increase nurses’
autonomy and status, and therefore their capacity to achieve the aims
of nursing and fulfil their professional responsibilities.
0111 The marker’s comments are as follows:
You have quoted this word for word from the subject outline without
acknowledgement. This is plagiarism.
4111
Deirdre’s apparent adoption of the impersonalized unattributed academic

voice is destabilized because the reader/marker can in fact trace it back to
an attributable source that is rather close at hand, the subject outline.
Later on in the essay, Deirdre shifts further into the personalized experi-
ential voice by switching to the pronoun ‘we’:
So even though nurses must still take orders from doctors, we display
professionalism through choosing appropriate care, professionalism, using
our knowledge to choose what care will give them the best benefits, while
providing emotional care.
Ivanič and others (Ivanič and Simpson, 1992) have raised the issue of such
pronoun choices as resistances to the impersonalizing academic conventions.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore why this writer made these
choices, but it is clear that the shift into ‘we’ is a significant shift into an
experiential voice. The issue, surely, is one of informed choice. As writers
we can consciously take risks, use strategies that flout dominant conventions
based on informed choice. We can also produce docile, conventional texts.
But this is based on awareness of the options. A writer who has not been
made aware of the options is not in a position to make an informed choice.
Deirdre’s appropriation of wordings that are bound to spring to the atten-
tion of the reader/marker who probably wrote them is perhaps indication
enough of her unfamiliarity with key underlying conventions of academic
writing. That plagiarism is a complex issue and that what counts as plagiar-
ism is itself a social construct is well documented (Scollon, 1995) but again
is beyond the scope of this chapter. I will conclude this case study by looking
at an essay that raises the question of docility and risk in writing.
Mark’s essay: thematizing the argument

Mark’s essay is one of the most highly rated by the marker (A–) yet it does
not rely heavily on the docile academic sourcing strategy that we saw in Sue
and Lorraine’s essays:
Due to the fact that the nursing profession is so diverse and becoming
even more so, until nurses unite, establish their practice at different
levels and situations, their levels of autonomy and authority will be
undermined. ‘Increasingly, nurses are taking responsibility for their prac-
tice and gaining a new autonomy in their work’ Reid (1993: 30) and
Flint (1993: 66) agree ‘everyone in a professional role, whether lawyer,
doctor, teacher, or midwife, must be able to practice autonomously and
use his or her professional judgement’. This brings in the argument that
some nurses want to take greater control of their workload and duties,
and to be accountable for them, whilst some want to take minimum
Mike Baynham 199
11 control. However, in direct conflict to these ideas, is the dominance

that doctors have over nurses. Leach (1993) discusses that, with few
exceptions, nurses work under medical control. The medical profession
controls admissions, discharges and what goes on in between, even if
the patient had been admitted for purely nursing care.
Instead, what Mark seems to do is thematize the argument, concentrat-

ing not on what the research literature tells us nurses think/feel/do or on what
experience tells us, but on the implications of the argument (between auton-
011 omy and subordination, between different sections of the nursing profession,
between doctors and nurses). Mark seems to take up a confident summative
voice. Where Deirdre appears to take up this voice, in the first paragraph of
11 her essay, the effect is destabilized because the reader/marker recognizes a
verbatim appropriation from the subject outline. Where Mark quotes it is to
back up or elaborate an argumentative position that he has already intro-
duced. The strategy is therefore quite different from that of Sue or Lorraine
in which the text is constructed almost entirely from sourced material.
‘Teach the conflicts’

0111
In this chapter I have somewhat complicated the picture of student acad-
emic writing practices within new and emergent discipline areas along the
lines suggested by Goggin (1995). The skills-based approach to the teaching
of academic writing assumes that there is a generic set of skills and strate-
gies that can be taught and then applied in particular disciplinary contexts.
The text-based approach assumes a relatively homogeneous discipline, with
text types to be discovered, analysed and taught. I am suggesting, in line
with writers such as Ball et al. (1990), that, most crucially, the student writer
is learning to take up disciplinary positions in discourse and that this needs
0111 to be taught explicitly.
Where the disciplinary positions are conflictual, overlapping or indeed
blurred (see Geertz, 1975, cited in Klein, 1993) the student academic writer
will be working within the disciplinary politics that is produced. So where
does this leave the student writer? In this section I argue that academic
writing pedagogy must make the concerns of disciplinarity, disciplinarization
and consequent writing positions central – in other words, as Graff (quoted
in Klein, 1993) suggests, we must ‘teach the conflicts’.
As I suggested earlier in the nurse education case study, a major conflict
is between, on the one hand, the practice-oriented account of nursing and
0111 the experiential ways of knowing that it makes authoritative and, on the
other hand, the professionalized, disciplinary account of nursing, with its
consequent impersonalization and generalization of the nursing subject. We
have seen how these conflicts work within the texts examined earlier, pro-
4111 ducing at one moment highly valued, if docile, texts in the impersonalized
disciplinary voice (Sue and Lorraine’s). Other similarly valued essays

(Kirsten and Mark’s) draw on the strategy of authorization from experience,
though running the risk of the critical marker’s comment. The less successful
essays (Karen and Deirdre’s) appear to fail both in making authoritative
statements in the impersonalized disciplinary voice and in the generalized
experiential voice of ‘what nurses think’. Mark’s essay seems to thematize
the conflict itself between the experiential/practice-based account and the
impersonalized disciplined account of nursing. While appearing somewhat
unconventional, i.e. not docile, in terms of the conventions of academic
writing, it is highly valued by the marker.
It is worth noting that the tensions and conflicts between the experien-
tial/practice-based voice and the impersonalized disciplinary voice and the
consequent availability of writing positions are a major theme of the work
of Ivanič and others (see Ivanič and Simpson, 1992) on critical language
awareness approaches to the teaching and learning of academic writing, as
they are in Ball et al. (1990). Here they map very specifically on to the shift
of nursing into the academy with its consequent professionalization and disci-
plinization. This would suggest that the disciplinary politics of nursing is not
in itself limited to nursing alone, in that it draws on issues that are clearly
broader than nursing such as the positivist/critical hermeneutic discourses
as well as theory–practice divides.
‘What every student needs to know’ about academic writing is precisely
the ways in which taking up or rejecting writing positions involves taking
up or rejecting disciplinary positions. This is not a pedagogy to be offered
instead of a focus on the technical aspects of academic writing (of course
someone needs to talk Deirdre through the social meanings of plagiarism,
to give her the skills to quote and reference effectively). It provides a comple-
mentary layer in which the student academic writer can explore the
writing/disciplinary/subject positions that are available along with the areas
of blurring, overlap and conflict that create difficulties and choices in taking
up an authoritative position in writing.
Conclusion: intrinsic and embodied readings

An underlying theme of this chapter has been, in a sense, how lecturers/
markers read student writing and how students read the circumstances within
which they are required to write. Here I take ‘reading’ in a broader peda-
gogical sense: how we read these texts as people concerned with the teaching
of academic writing. I want to suggest that there are two broad ways of char-
acterizing this: first, the idea of intrinsic reading or an intrinsic reading;
second, the idea of embodied reading and embodied readings. What do I
mean by this?
An intrinsic reading is one which reads the pedagogical issues of student
texts in terms of skills or technologies. Learner writers in this version will
Mike Baynham 201
11 have greater and lesser degrees of skill in, for example, incorporating word-
ings and meanings into text. They will to a greater or lesser extent have
available to them the linguistic technologies to do so. An embodied reading
is one that reads the text as an embodiment of the disciplinary politics within
which it is produced, and as an embodiment of the processes of subject
production at work as learner writers engage with the writing demands of
the discipline. In this chapter I argue that such embodied readings are an
essential basis for academic writing pedagogy.
011
References
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11 adolescence and adulthood, in R. Beach and S. Hynds (eds) Advances in Discourse
Processes Vol. XXXIX. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
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and disciplinary politics: What every student needs to know. Paper presented at
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(ed.) Critical Language Awareness. London: Longman.
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0111 discipline, in E. Messer-Davidow, D.R. Shumway and D.J. Sylvan (eds)
Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity. Charlottesville:
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Chapter 13
11
Pedagogies for lifelong
learning
Building bridges or building walls?
Miriam Zukas and Janice Malcolm
011
11 Situating lifelong learning

Lifelong learning pedagogies do not, as yet, exist in the UK. We have a
stratified and segmented educational system in which there is little connec-
tion between those sectors that might be regarded as contributing to the vir-
tual concept of lifelong learning. There is little conceptual connection
between adult and further education, higher education, training and profes-
0111 sional development. Even within obvious areas for overlap such as work-
related learning, each sector has tended to develop its own subspecialism. The
notion of lifelong learning implies some continuity within the system; we
argue that, so far, lifelong learning pedagogies are marked by disjunctions.
Where we might have expected to see conceptual bridges, we (and our stud-
ies) experience pedagogical walls.
These claims may seem overstated but one example demonstrates the
point. Adult education and higher education in the UK still retain their
identities as ‘separate spheres’ even when adult education is provided through
universities. Despite the evidence that the efforts of adult educators to open
0111 up higher education for older students have borne fruit (adults now consti-
tute the majority of the student population in universities), once they arrive
in higher education, students move from being ‘adult students’ to ‘mature
students’. Whilst this might be considered a mere shift in nomenclature, we
believe that it signifies discontinuity. In order to take account of these new
students, we would expect the literature of higher education pedagogy to
draw on the decades of work that adult educators have put in to developing
appropriate curricula and pedagogies for ‘non-traditional’ students. The peda-
gogic focus of large parts of adult education was, after all, on how to adapt
and transform traditional teaching practices and the content of courses to
0111 include students for whom the standard cultural capital of universities was
opaque and alienating. Instead, the new specialism of teaching and learning
This is an edited version of a paper originally prepared for the Global Colloquium on
4111 Supporting Lifelong Learning, 2000, Milton Keynes: The Open University.
in higher education has developed without reference to adult education and

takes little account of who the students are; instead it concentrates upon
the processes and outcomes of the classroom transaction, rather than its
content, context or purpose.
We have been involved in a journey, trying to understand why there are
so few connections between developments in pedagogy in the education of
adults and those in higher education. Our initial project1 was a literature-
based study intended to develop theoretical frameworks for analysing
pedagogical writing, and to trace the commonalities and divergences be-
tween pedagogic models evident in adult education and other established
sectors of education, and those emerging in the relatively new – and rela-
tively undertheorised – field of higher education pedagogy. This, we hoped,
would provide the basis for an analysis of the consequences of divergent
development for both adult and higher education teaching. The study was
UK-based, but utilised sources from throughout the Anglophone world and,
to a lesser extent, from European writing originating outside the UK.
We focus somewhat unfashionably on educators, and on the dynamic rela-
tionship between educators and learners, understanding the classroom, the
lecture theatre, the workplace as communities of practice. We believe that
much of the current rhetoric of lifelong learning obscures this essential
dynamic, and concentrates on learning in ways that, paradoxically, effec-
tively leave learners without any real identity other than that of ‘learners’.
In our continuing work, we draw on the work of Lave and Wenger (1991)
and more recently Wenger (1998) to try to understand the emerging peda-
gogic ‘communities of practice’ – particularly in higher education (Malcolm
and Zukas, 2000). These ideas provide sociocultural and pedagogic ‘lenses’
through which educational practice can be viewed, and help to clarify the
reasons for the development of the intercommunal and epistemological splits
between fields of pedagogic writing. In essence, they help us to understand
why, despite the apparent bridge building of lifelong learning rhetoric, we
find only semi-permeable walls.
Building identities
Our research has focused on identifying pedagogic ‘identities’ implicit in
current writing on higher education teaching and on creating a bibliographic
map of the literature. Our aim has been not to use these modes as reifica-
tions of educational practice, but rather to uncover the identities or ‘masks’
(Bailey, 1977) attributed to educators within the literature, and to consider
their implications. Below, we develop two of these emergent identities
to provide a synthesis of our previous work; we believe that this offers a
possible framework for considering and evaluating pedagogies in lifelong
learning.
Miriam Zukas and Janice Malcolm 205
11 We identified at least five pedagogic ‘identities’ in the literature we

surveyed:
• The educator as critical practitioner

• The educator as psycho-diagnostician and facilitator of learning
• The educator as reflective practitioner
• The educator as situated learner within a community of practice
• The educator as assurer of organisational quality and efficiency; deliv-
erer of service to agreed or imposed standards
011
These identities, or ‘versions’ of the educator, are neither exhaustive nor
mutually exclusive, but represent the range of understandings of pedagogic
11 work apparent in the ‘mainstream’ higher education literature. In the process
of arriving at and analysing these identities, which we describe below, we
used a number of conceptual ‘dimensions’ (some more useful than others)
along which we could locate the characteristics and implications of each
identity. A more detailed account of both the models and the process of
analysis has been given elsewhere (Zukas and Malcolm, 1999).
In this chapter we will compare two common conceptualisations of peda-
0111 gogic identity in the respective literatures of higher education and adult
education: the educator as ‘critical practitioner’, and the educator as ‘psycho-
diagnostician and facilitator of learning’. These polarised pedagogic identi-
ties are familiar to the adult education community of practice, representing
the extreme positions in an ideological tussle that has rumbled through the
field for several years. They are chosen precisely because they are illustra-
tive of a major difference between the two bodies of pedagogic literature:
the identities are both strongly represented and contested within adult
education, whilst in higher education, one identity is dominant, and the
other is barely visible. In each case, we explore the prevalence and charac-
0111 teristics of the identity within higher education and adult education writing,
analysing the reasons for inclusion or exclusion of particular perspectives.
We briefly describe the other three identities, although we do not incorp-
orate them in our analysis.
In order to consider analytically the commonalities and differences
between the five ‘identities’, we developed a number of conceptual dimen-
sions through a process we describe below. In this chapter, we utilise five of
the dimensions in order to gauge some of the implications of the critical
practitioner and psycho-diagnostician identities for pedagogic practice.
They are: learning within a community vs. individualised learning; disci-
0111 plinary community vs. pedagogic community; moral and social account-
ability vs. organisational accountability; educator as ‘person in the world’
vs. anonymous/invisible educator; and student as ‘person in the world’ vs.
anonymous/invisible learner.
4111
The educator as critical practitioner
The political roots of adult education and its strong social purpose tradition,
from the activities of the Chartists through to contemporary discussions of
‘diversity’, have ensured that the ‘why’ and ‘what’ of adult education have
always been as important as the ‘how’; in fact content, purpose and process
have been seen as inseparable elements of practice. The current generation
of adult education writing has borrowed from a range of political traditions
to bring a variety of critical, including feminist, social understandings to bear
on pedagogy, and to produce various conceptualisations of critical practice.
Postmodernist understandings can be seen as deriving from this same criti-
cal tradition. These diverse approaches consider the content of classroom
practice as embodying and manifesting the power–knowledge relations that
exist beyond the classroom. Of course, this is not to suggest that all adult
education writing could possibly be characterised as promoting critical prac-
tice; adult education has its share of dull and mechanistic writing on
decontextualised classroom techniques. Our point here is that it is a recog-
nisable, familiar and easily accessed ‘angle’ on the pedagogy of adult edu-
cation; adult educators are not generally surprised to be asked about the
purpose of their pedagogic work as well as its processes.
Our reading of the higher education pedagogic literature has revealed a
markedly different picture from that evident in adult education. There is a
long and respected tradition of critical writing on the purposes of higher edu-
cation and its various social, historical, epistemological and technologi-
cal functions. In Britain, Barnett’s prolific recent work on higher education
and a ‘critical being’ (1997) is a major contribution to the debate on higher
education as a social and political institution. In (inter-)disciplinary fields
where different positionalities have challenged and transformed the nature of
what counts as knowledge, e.g. in women’s studies, critical pedagogy has
emerged inevitably from the questioning of disciplinary discourses, structures
and power relations. (‘Critical’ here includes feminist approaches – although
the debate on their divergences continues (e.g. Gore, 1993).) Thus it is not
difficult to find writing on feminist pedagogy, but it tends to be found within
the specialist literature of women’s studies itself, rather than in the literature
of mainstream or ‘straight’ pedagogy. When we turn to the ‘straight’ peda-
gogic literature of higher education, which generally takes ‘teaching and
learning’, rather than knowledge or purpose, as its starting point, versions of
critical practice are much harder to find; it is almost like looking at the lit-
erature of an entirely different field of study. There are odd exceptions: Webb
(1996), Rowland (1999) and Walker (1999) are examples of writers on higher
education pedagogy who explicitly consider the ‘why’ of higher education in
conjunction with the ‘how’. Walker’s references to such familiar guiding
lights of critical adult education as Gramsci and Freire are almost unique in
11 the field of higher education pedagogy; her background in South African

teacher education may be relevant. Beyond these few independent-minded
exceptions, the educator as critical practitioner makes few appearances in the
‘straight’ higher education pedagogic literature. The instrumental focus on
‘teaching and learning’, as if it were a subject in its own right, means that
higher education pedagogy has become fragmented and artificially dispersed
over several distinct bodies of thought and literature.
011 The educator as psycho-diagnostician and facilitator

of learning
Taking the first international exchange between British and North American
11 adult educators (Zukas, 1988) as a point for comparison, a notable differ-
ence between British and North American adult education was the absence
of psychological models of the learner and the teacher from the British liter-
ature. Over the last ten years or more, this difference has been less marked
as North American adult education has moved away from psychological
models and frameworks as can be seen in examples such as the latest
Handbook of Adult and Continuing Education (Wilson and Hayes, 2000). In
0111 Britain, certain forms of psychology, particularly humanistic versions, have
influenced much adult education pedagogy but psychometrics, learning styles
and other non-social understandings of the individual have been much less
popular. In contrast, psychology has provided the dominant framework for
higher education pedagogic writing in Britain. There is a vast literature that
begins with a focus on learners and educational transactions. It assumes that
educators need to diagnose learners’ needs, e.g. by identifying or taking into
account learning styles or skills (e.g. Boyatzis and Kolb, 1991), or other indi-
vidual predispositions, according to a favoured learning theory (Brown,
1993). Once characteristics and approaches to learning are identified, educa-
0111 tors facilitate learning by using techniques and tools that meet those needs
(e.g. Gibbs, 1992; Grenham et al., 1999). With learning foregrounded to
this extent, pedagogy itself is conceptualised as little else than diagnosis and
facilitation. This diagnostic approach is favoured by many of the ‘founding
fathers’ of British higher education pedagogic research. In such approaches,
psychological theories are used as tools to inform the ways in which prac-
tice takes place; in other words, theory determines practice. But, un-
fortunately, such theories do not emerge from practice; indeed, they are
remarkable in that they discount the context and purpose of educational
events, and the disciplinary settings in which such events take place.
0111 Of course, not all psychological theory ignores context and settings.
Sociocultural psychology has transformed school teacher education and
clarified the relational elements of pedagogy; research on situated cognition
(Brown et al., 1989) has also emphasised the significance of context for
4111
teaching and learning. But such critical psychological approaches have not
had a significant impact on higher education pedagogic writing. Why might
this be? Tennant (1997: 1) argues that, if the focus is on learning rather than
on psychology, ‘it appears cumbersome and unnecessary to address the con-
ceptual and methodological problems of psychological theory and research’.
This failure to engage critically with the discipline from whence ideas about
learning originate has led to arid and somewhat outdated versions of psy-
chology being ‘applied’ to learning.
A further reason why critical psychological approaches may not have
had much of an impact has to do with the divorce of higher education ped-
agogic research from pedagogic practice, as is often the case in UK institu-
tional structures. Teachers may assume that pedagogic researchers ‘know’ how
it should be done – they are, after all, the experts. As in management edu-
cation, they may demand to know ‘how to’; and psycho-diagnostic and facili-
tative models offer apparently easy solutions. The contemporary concern with
accountability and measurability (Malcolm and Zukas, 1999) encourages the
search for such solutions, and the structural separation of higher education
teacher training from school, adult and further education teacher training also
lessens the impact of research across sectors. Furthermore, the commodifica-
tion of higher education encourages a conceptualisation of learning as prod-
uct, rather than process. The psycho-diagnostician is able to diagnose learning
needs and facilitate learning through various techniques; learning is then
measured to make sure it has happened.
The educator as reflective practitioner

This model of the educator is very common in much of the current litera-
ture. It derives in general terms from the work of Schön (Schön, 1987)
although it has been subjected to much modification and reinterpretation
(e.g. Boud and Walker, 1998; Nicol, Kane and Wainright, 1994). The range
of interpretations, and the fact that they are frequently implicit rather than
explicated in texts about teaching and learning in higher education, mean
that ‘reflective practice’ has become a rather all-embracing term, which
diminishes in significance as its applications increase. It is interesting to note
that whilst reflective practice has been much contested as a concept in the
literature of childhood education and adult education (such as Bright, 1996;
Ecclestone, 1996), its conceptual basis has only rarely been addressed in the
higher education literature (Eraut, 1995). In most of its higher education
manifestations it is presented as taken-for-granted ‘good practice’. The
clearest evidence of its conceptual dominance is the way it was incorpor-
ated, without explanation, into the language of the ILT accreditation
framework (ILT, 1999).
11 The educator as situated learner within a community of

practice
This model is seen most obviously in the work of Lave and Wenger (Lave
and Wenger, 1991) who focus on legitimate peripheral participation (through
apprenticeship) as a way of learning the ‘culture of practice’. It could of course
be argued that an informal apprenticeship is in fact the traditional learning
route for teachers in higher education. However the current focus on the use
of mentoring schemes and similar intergenerational support methods suggests
a more structured and conscious approach to the process of professional learn-
011 ing. The attraction of the ideas of cognitive apprenticeship, socialisation and
professional evolution, within a community of practitioners, may be that they
incorporate the social world into the educator’s identity.
11
The educator as assurer of organisational quality and
efficiency; deliverer of service to agreed or imposed
standards
There is a strand of writing on teaching and learning in higher education
that focuses on the contribution of teaching to the quality of an institution’s
0111 activities (e.g. Ellis, 1993; Elton, 1987). This is perhaps not a surpris-
ing development given the growth in recent years of monitoring regimes
intended to test and maintain the accountability of publicly funded services.
It does, however, raise important ethical questions about the professional
role and priorities of the university teacher, which, in this country at least,
have yet to be analysed in sufficient detail. This model frequently coexists
with the previous one (the psycho-diagnostician and facilitator), creating a
‘scientistic’ framework that ‘constructs subjects [in this case both learners
and teachers] in ways which better enable their regulation and control’
(Usher and Edwards, 1994: 33).
0111 We thus have five provisional models to work with. They are not a compre-
hensive account; for example, we omit the model of the educator as
disciplinary thinker, researcher and actor. There is a long tradition of
attempts to analyse the epistemological and other characteristics of disci-
plines, and their impact on people and structures in higher education (Kuhn,
1970; Lodahl and Gordon, 1972; Biglan, 1973; Becher, 1989). Within the
general literature of teaching and learning, however, this approach has not
really taken root in terms of considering the pedagogic implications of the
conceptual frameworks of disciplines. Disciplinary questions have moved
relatively recently to a new and central position that promises to generate
0111 fruitful conceptualisation (e.g. Caddick, 1999). Once again, we need to
analyse instances of this approach in more detail before incorporating it into
our ‘map’ of the field.
In addition to omissions, there are some absences – ideas that we might
4111 expect to find in the literature, but that seem to occur either exceptionally
or not at all. The most noticeable absence is that of the nature of know-
ledge, and the teacher’s role in its production – a question that has exercised
the minds and pens of childhood and adult educators for many years, but
around which much of the pedagogic writing in higher education seems to
tiptoe with excessive caution. This is clearly linked to the previous point
about disciplinary frameworks, and also to the vexed question of who is
involved in the production and analysis of pedagogic knowledge. The focus
on ‘learning’, and on individuals, often enables writers to sidestep –
consciously or otherwise – the question of what exactly is being learned, by
whom and why.
Analysing identities
Having tentatively identified certain identities of the educator from the liter-
ature, we needed to create tools for analysing them. Our first attempt was
to use repertory grid techniques (Fransella and Bannister, 1977) in order to
tease out the underlying assumptions of each identity through the genera-
tion of constructs. This is useful principally as a ‘rough draft’ for further
analysis, since the constructs identified are inevitably rather crude and
approximate.
Briefly, the technique entailed a series of comparisons; each comparison
involved three identities, and we considered how, conceptually, two were
alike and one was different. We then gave a meaningful name (meaningful
to us) for each end of the dimension we had generated. We continued to
compare different combinations of identities until we found that we were
re-using the same ideas (that is, we had run out of meaningful dimensions).
The process helped us identify ten dimensions against which the five usable
models could be assessed. In the process of assessment, we rejected one, since
it was pertinent to one model only. The final dimensions we identified are
shown in Figure 13.1.
We now consider how the two identities most developed in this
chapter, the educator as critical practitioner and the educator as psycho-
diagnostician, differ along five of the most significant dimensions of peda-
gogic identity and practice.
Learning within a community vs. individualised learning

The ‘critical practice’ identity is not difficult to situate along this dimen-
sion. It focuses on learning within a community; students and teachers are
considered to be social and cultural actors with identities emerging from
their wider social experiences. The nature of and relations between their
communities are likely to be contested, and this will have a bearing on the
processes and content of classroom activity. The conscious social orienta-
tion of much adult education practice means that ‘student-centred’ pedagogy
11
Learning in community Individualised learning
Disciplinary community Pedagogic community
Moral/social accountability Organisational accountability
Educator as person in the world Anonymous/invisible educator
011 Learner as person in the world Anonymous/invisible learner
Learner-centred evaluated Objective measures of learning

11
Focus on process Focus on product
Content contested Content as given
Social orientation Psychological orientation
0111 Figure 13.1 Dimensions of pedagogic identity.
has to involve the consideration of community identities. The ‘educator as

psycho-diagnostician’, on the other hand, inevitably focuses on the learner
as an individual – specifically, as a manifestation of psychological tenden-
cies, processes and dispositions, which can be understood and utilised for
the purpose of learning. Whilst this perspective does not acknowledge rela-
tions between individuals, it does not generally extend its scope beyond
the classroom transaction to the broader social or cultural context, or the
0111 community identities to which this gives rise.
Disciplinary community vs. pedagogic community

Higher education teachers usually conceive of themselves as members of
a disciplinary community. The critical practice identity enables teachers
to question the content and purpose of their teaching, just as their research
questions orthodoxies within the discipline. Within adult education, the
knowledge-content of and between disciplines has been interrogated, pre-
cisely because the pedagogic role of adult educators could not be divorced
0111 from the content of teaching. Critical practice thus allows educators to
inhabit ‘knowledge-practice’ communities, which are simultaneously (inter-)
disciplinary and pedagogic. The educator as psycho-diagnostician, on the
other hand, separates the pedagogic from the disciplinary role, assuming
4111 the existence of two separate communities. This assumption enables
pedagogy to be analysed simply in terms of ‘teaching and learning’ rather

than as an aspect of knowledge production, and in effect creates a super-
fluous community of (decontextualised) pedagogues. Even where pedagogy
is discussed within a disciplinary context, for example in geography or
chemistry, disciplinary content is assumed to be intact and unquestioned;
the pedagogic role is simply to enable students to learn it. Again, the social
purpose of higher education is divorced from action in the classroom. This
could change with the recent introduction of subject-specific learning and
teaching support networks such as Escalate (intended to support staff devel-
opment related to teaching and learning for academic staff working in
education and continuing education; see http://www/escalate.ac.uk), but we
wait to see.
Moral and social accountability vs. organisational

accountability
Educators are always accountable to their organisation, but this dimension
focuses on the primacy of organisational accountability over other forms of
accountability. All educators are now under pressure to consider the conse-
quences for their organisations of inadequate performance on quality meas-
ures, and to adhere to organisational requirements through ever-increasing
scrutiny. Sophisticated methods of checking and measuring have been devel-
oped (commonly called quality assurance processes), which ensure that the
individual educator works in an organisationally appropriate manner.
The psycho-diagnostician can call on any number of procedures and
instruments for describing and measuring pedagogic processes and student
learning, which makes it easier for her or him to fulfil these new organisa-
tional requirements. The absence of content and purpose from the teaching
and learning in higher education approach means that few contradictions
should be encountered between ‘good’ pedagogic practice and organisational
requirements; measurable evidence of ‘student learning’ constitutes fulfil-
ment of both. This may indeed be why so many universities are keen to
promote the empiricist quick-fixes of the psycho-diagnostician.
But the advent of subject and academic review, the latest articulation of
quality assurance in British higher education, has made it increasingly dif-
ficult to prioritise moral and social over organisational accountability. Organ-
isational scrutiny demands approved and codified course objectives and
content for quality assurance purposes, reducing the scope for pedagogic
responsiveness. Thus, for example, the negotiation of the curriculum with
students (a prevalent ideal in adult education pedagogy until recently) is quite
incompatible with current organisational demands; where knowledge is a
commodity, the customer must be given full, or at least convincing, product
information. ‘The skills of being an academic are increasingly becoming
isolated and fragmented in contexts in which the paramount requirement is
11 to make the work more explicit, so that it can be more easily codified and
measured by performance indicators’ (Smyth, 1995: 14).
Educator as ‘person in the world’ vs. anonymous/

invisible educator
The educator as a person in the world – as someone with social identity,
and conscious of the ‘worldly’ baggage present in the classroom – is perhaps
such an obvious element of pedagogic identity in adult education that it is
011 taken for granted. We agonise over power relations with students, and
conduct vigorous debates about how our gender, class, sexual, or ethnic iden-
tity affects what and how we teach. These concerns extend to the content
11 and inclusivity of our disciplines, doubtless informed by the social purpose
tradition of adult education and the sociological perspectives that have
informed its growing body of theory over time. The ‘educator as critical prac-
titioner’ is indisputably a person in the world, and this may account for the
appeal of, for example, Brookfield’s work (1995) to teachers; he addresses
them as real people, with real anxieties and frailties. If we turn to the
‘educator as psycho-diagnostician’, the teacher’s reality is generally absent;
0111 the teacher has a pedagogic function rather than a social identity. The focus
is on the (equally anonymous) learner and the processes occurring within
the learner that enable learning to take place. Thus higher education peda-
gogy, where this model is dominant, detaches itself from those issues, such
as diversity, that are addressed through social purpose approaches to higher
education policy.
The learner as ‘person in the world’ vs. anonymous/

invisible learner
0111 Within the literature of teaching and learning in higher education, despite
its frequent focus on ‘the learner’, there is little recognition of the socio-
cultural situatedness of the individual. The learner frequently appears as an
anonymous, decontextualised, degendered being whose principal distin-
guishing characteristics are ‘personality’ and ‘learning style’ (Brown, 1993).
This approach, typical of psychometrics, can be traced back to the belief in
psychology that it is possible, indeed desirable, to be able to predict people’s
behaviour. In order to do this, it is presumed that we all have characteristics
that determine future actions (e.g. learning styles that determine how you
learn). But this implies that learners ‘have’ learning styles, preferences and
0111 behaviours located somewhere inside them, which exist free of history, cul-
ture or context. Indeed, in order to study the individual, contextual and other
factors are deliberately excluded from the scientific equation in order to dis-
cover universal truths. Thus, the psycho-diagnostician does not need to con-
4111 sider the possibility that ‘learning styles’ may be constructed through
discursive practices or may arise from the learner’s history or sociocultural

position, and may not be an ‘essential’ part of a human being; they are, for
the purposes of pedagogic practice, simply there.
The critical practitioner situates the learner very firmly in the social world
and in the community of practice. It is impossible to disentangle the learner’s
situatedness from the educative process. Indeed, in much adult education
literature, the age, class, race and gender of learners have been the prime
focus of discussion, practice development and policy contestation; an under-
standing of positionality is integral to an understanding of pedagogy. This
has yet to be developed in the literature of higher education pedagogy to
any significant degree, despite the vast changes in the student body that
have occurred in recent years.
Protective walls
In our exploration of two caricatures of pedagogic identity, we have tried to
show the consequences of the split between adult education and higher
education pedagogical thinking and writing. We have explored elsewhere
some of the reasons why the psycho-diagnostician has gained ascendancy in
higher education (Malcolm and Zukas, 2001). Briefly, we have argued that
part of the problem lies in the relationship between theory and practice.
Theory, rather than representing forms of critical engagement with, and
understanding of, practice, appears to take the form of a set of rules for profes-
sional behaviour. Teaching, assessment or learning procedures – seating
arrangements, student journals, group exercises, action research projects, for
example – can be attributed to ‘teaching and learning theories’, which in
turn can be attributed to research on teaching and learning processes. The
role of research is to create and refine theories and thus to contribute to the
development of rules for practice – in some ways rather like trying out recipes
to see if they work.
We are troubled by the epistemological confusion suggested by such a
model of research. The psycho-diagnostic higher educator resembles Holmes’
‘homunculus with a toolkit’ (1999: 89): an anonymous worker, equipped
with a portable set of scientistic theories that can be selected as required,
and applied systematically to the teaching situation. There is little recogni-
tion of theory informing and shaping research, determining the kinds of
questions that are asked and the answers that are sought; most crucially there
is no hint that the theories that shape research are situated and contestable.
We believe that this naive version of theory has come about in part because
of the separation of disciplinary and pedagogic communities in higher edu-
cation, and the fracture between research-based and pedagogic communities
of practice. A new field of practice, staff and education development in higher
education, has emerged separate from disciplinary communities. With its
foundations in training, the field has promoted a particular set of under-
11 standings and language conventions: outcomes, objectives, assessment and

reflection, for example. But this separate language encourages the idea that
teaching is a separate and essentially different activity from research. It pro-
motes the dislocation of pedagogic thought and practice from disciplinary
knowledge and development.
One of our concerns is that such an approach could be seen to support
lifelong learning – after all, if one is able systematically to develop teaching
as a distinct activity that bears no relation to context, content or purpose,
it could be argued that this would then be transferable across sectoral walls.
011 The setting up of a learning and teaching support network generic centre
could be seen in this light (http://www.ltsn.ac.uk/about/generic_centre.asp).
This could be the basis for a new pedagogy for lifelong learning and teach-
11 ing. But we believe such an approach omits the most important elements
of pedagogy: the relations between educator, student and institution, the
social context, purpose and ethical implications of educational work, and
the nature and social role of educational knowledge.
For us, the way forward is try to build bridges across the sectoral walls in
order to analyse the purposes and consequences of our professional activities.
Pedagogy is more than teaching and learning. We assume that it incorpor-
0111 ates a critical understanding of the social, policy and institutional context, as
well as a critical approach to the content and process of the educational/train-
ing transaction. If lifelong learning is the rhetorical vehicle for building such
bridges, we should be sure not to undermine its foundations by its narrow lin-
guistic focus on learning.
Note
1 ESRC project no R000222794, Models of the Educator in Higher Education: A Bibliographic
and Conceptual Map. 1998–9.
0111
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0111
0111
4111
11 Index
011
11 abstract conceptualizations 18 coaching 4, 128, 130–2

abstraction 118 cognitive theories 8, 10–11
academic writing 188–201 collaboration 134–40, 154
acceptance 29–30 communication 13, 42, 59, 102,
access 116–18 142
accountability 212–13 communicative learning 14
action-orientated skills 155 communities of practice 3, 5, 6, 111–25,
active learners 21 154, 157, 160, 170
0111 actor network theory 182 comprehension 10
actualization 32 conceptualization 166–7
adaptation 89 concrete knowledge 118
adult education 191 consciousness 85
agency 82 consolidation 166
analysis 11 construction 166, 167–8
andragogy 79–81 consultation 134–40
application 11, 41, 89 context 97–9, 105–6
applied science 41, 47 contextualization 168–9
apprenticeships 111–14, 119–20, 121, continuity 122–3
128, 146–51, 158 control 12, 79
0111 artefacts 117 co-operation 141
assessment 94 craft-based skill 150
assignments 137–8 crating theory 182
autonomy 12, 78–80, 82, 84, 89 critical pedagogy 62–75, 79, 83–4
critical practice 205, 206–7, 210
banking education 65 critical reflection 4, 16
behavioural theories 8, 9–10 culture of practice 113, 209
belonging 122 curiosity 26
border pedagogies 70–1 curriculum 112
boundaries 103–4 customers, learning from 144
0111
change 26, 122–3 decision making 19
children 80 deconstruction 62, 71–2
class 99 determinism 84
class activities 92–3 dialogue 166
4111 climate 32 difference 86, 99, 102
220 Index
disciplinary community 211–12 hegemony 65

disciplinary politics 191 history 66
disclosure 95 human communications theory 13–14
discourse 119–21 humanist theories 11–12, 79, 81
discovery 33, 53
discussion layer 168 IALS see International Adult Literacy
displacement 122–3 Survey
distractions 79 ICT see Information and
divergent skills 49 Communication Technologies
domestication 62–75 ideas-based constructivism 147, 156
identity 3, 87, 120, 121–2, 169, 204–5,
education 8–9, 58, 65 210–14
educators 204–15 ideology critique 64, 69, 83
efficiency 79 independent professional 128
e-learning 1, 163, 173 induction 128, 129
emancipation 4, 14 informal learning 1, 5, 113, 127, 145
emancipatory knowledge 68 Information and Communication
emancipatory learning 15, 20 Technologies (ICT) 5, 148, 157, 159
embedded knowing 183 in-service education 58
embodied knowing 183 institutional literacies 180–4
emotions 94–5 institutions 98, 206
empathic understanding 30–1 instructional discourse 119
encultured knowing 183 instructors 36–7
environmental learning theories 13–16 instrumental learning 14
equality 64 integration 129
ethical dilemmas 94 International Adult Literacy Survey
evaluation 11 (IALS) 184
everyday concepts 156 interpersonal relationships 25–29
experience 18, 80, 83, 85–9, 91, 95 intrinsic reading 200
experiential learning 16–19, 85, 89, 91 invisible colleges 143
experiment 58
experimental learners 21 judgement 50
experts 128, 133
exposure 129 knowing 183
extended working group 140 knowing-in-action 50–2, 55
knowledge 5, 10, 18, 55, 80
false consciousness 63, 83 knowledgeability 153, 154
feedback 9, 10, 139–40
feelings 28, 29, 31–2 language 6, 51, 72, 85, 88, 98, 119, 151,
feminism 62, 71–2, 87 190
frame experiment 57 learners 106
framing 102–3 learning 1, 122; activity 156;
Fresh Start courses 63, 74 apprenticeship 149–51; barriers 75,
102; by doing 146, 155; constructivist
gender 99 view 3–4, 165; critical pedagogy 83;
gender politics 192 curriculum 114–15; cycle 16–19, 91,
goals 12, 80 157, 165; episodes 22–3; experiential
groups 134–6 theories 4; facilitating 27–9;
Index 221
11 facilitators 207–8; from other people organisations 100–1

127–45; groups 170; maps 15; milieu organised learning support 128–9
97; project 128; relationships 173; as osmosis 129
social 2–3, 5, 147, 152, 154, 159;
styles 20–2, 23, 213; support 128–9; paradigm transformation 15
technologies see Information and parallel positions 140
Communication Technologies; participation 113, 117, 121–2,
theories 3, 8–16, 147; traditions 79; 152–3
as transmission 2, 124, 147 pedagogic community 211–12
levels of consciousness 66 pedagogies of desire 70
011 liberation 62, 66–7, 74 pedagogy 79, 113
life-world 104 perception 105
linear time 73 performance management 130
11 linguistic analysis 190 personal construct theory 15
literacy 176–86 personal contacts 142
literacy events 178 personal identity 87
literacy practices 6, 178 personality 213
low-level learning 10 personality theories 12–13
person-centred classrooms 33
managers 145 Positivism 43, 44
master-apprentice relations 111 postmodernism 87
0111 masters 146 power 3, 96, 102, 103, 185
meaning 88, 102 practical knowledge 44
mediation 149 practice 56–7, 117, 119–21
medicine 43 practice-based disciplines 189
mental activity 150 practice engagement theory 183
mentoring 4, 128, 130–2 practice field 167
metaphysics of presence 72 primary courseware 167
misconceptions 94 prizing 29–30
moral ecology 74 problem solving 46–7, 148, 154
motivation 121–2 processes 106–7
mutual learning 136 professional networks 142–4
0111 professions 40, 42, 47–8
narrative structure 87 progression 114
National Literacy Strategy 177 psycho-diagnostics 205, 207–8
New Literacy Studies (NLS) 176, psychotherapy 27
179
NLS see New Literacy Studies race 99
nursing education 192–9 radical education 69–70
rationality 67
observation 136–7 reflecting-in-action 52, 55–7, 59–60,
on-line learning 163–5 92
on-the-spot reflection 58 reflection: boundaries 103–4;
0111 Open University 164 facilitating 105–8
oppressive behaviour 102 reflective journals 94
organisational learning theory reflective learners 21
182 reflective practice 2, 56–7, 91–108, 205,
4111 organisational quality 209–10 208
222 Index
reflexive learning 155–8, 160 tacit knowledge 51, 155

relevance 48–9 talking 120
religious education 104 teacher power 96
representation 86–7 teacher-agent 9
reproduction cycle 115 teaching 25, 28, 38, 82, 91, 101
research 46 teaching curriculum 114
responsibility 99 teaching–learning encounter 8
rigour 48–9 teams 134–6
rotations 128, 132–3 teamwork 135
Technical Rationality 40–60
science 41, 44, 49 technology 163–73
scientific concepts 156 tertiary courseware 168, 172
secondary courseware 167 theorising learners 21
self 78–85, 122 theory 85
self-directed learning 79, 129 theory-in-action 53–5
self-expression 89 training 79, 91
shadowing 128, 132–3 transformative learning 68–9, 158, 159
situated learning 158, 205, 209 transparency 111, 117–18
skills 43, 124, 127 trust 29–30, 32–3, 100, 101–2
social: action 79; capital 180; change
68, 82; forces 83–4; identity 171–3; understanding 30–1, 118
learner 169–71; learning theory 14, universities 45
146–60; positionings 70; practice
185; relationships 82; reproduction verbal instruction 119
123; workers 42 vernacular literacies 180–4
socialisation 129 vicarious learning 171–3
sociocultural activity theory 148 visits 128, 132–3
special groups 137–8 vocational education 155
specialization 56 voice 195
spirituality 68 voluntarism 84
sponsors 112
status 102 women 62–75
stimulus–response theories 9–10 work 73–4
stories 120 working class 69
study skills 190 working group 134
subjectivity 88 writing position 189, 195
success 55 written texts 178
suppliers, learning from 144
symbolic knowing 183 zone of proximal development 147,
synthesis 11 148–55

Supporting Lifelong Learning

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What are the main topics covered in the document?

What are the main topics covered in the document?

What are some of the learning theories discussed in the document?

What are some of the learning theories discussed in the document?

Chapter 2

Roger Harrison is a Lecturer in Education at The Open University.

Supporting Lifelong Learning, Volume 1:

4111 London and New York

ISBN 0–415–25926–6 (hbk)

11 List of illustrations vii

Introduction: perspectives on learning 1

2 The interpersonal relationship in the facilitation of learning 25

3 From Technical Rationality to reﬂection-in-action 40

0111 4 Deconstructing domestication: women’s experience and

5 Self and experience in adult learning 78

6 Promoting reﬂection in professional courses: the

7 Legitimate peripheral participation in communities of

8 Learning from other people at work 127

9 Beyond the institution of apprenticeship: towards a

10 The technology of learning in a social world 163

11 Sustainable literacies and the ecology of lifelong

12 Academic writing in new and emergent discipline areas 188

13 Pedagogies for lifelong learning: building bridges or

1.1 Learning theories 9

Chapter 1: Rogers, A. (1996) ‘Learning and adult education’, in A. Rogers

Chapter 2: Rogers, C. (1967) ‘The interpersonal relationships in the facili-

Chapter 3: Schön, D. (1983) ‘From technical rationality to reﬂection-in-

Chapter 4: Clarke, J. ‘Deconstructing domestication: women’s experience

Chapter 5: Usher, R., Bryant, I. and Johnston, R. (1997) ‘Reconﬁguring the

Chapter 6: Boud, D. and Walker, D. (1998) ‘Promoting reﬂection in profes-

Chapter 7: Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991) ‘Legitimate peripheral participa-

Chapter 9: Guile, D. and Young, M. (1999) ‘Beyond the institution of appren-

Chapter 10: Mayes, T. ‘The technology of learning in a social world’. Newly

Chapter 11: Hamilton, M. (2000) ‘Sustainable literacies and the ecology of

Chapter 12: Baynham, M. (2000) ‘Academic writing in new and emergent

11 In recent times we have seen a loosening of the boundaries around concepts

The Introduction was written especially for this volume.

11 generated through co-participation in ‘communities of practice’. Here the

learner is the central actor, and knowledge is seen as temporary, contingent

this move. Viewing learning as a social rather than an individual process

11 possibility, or even desirability, of continuity or connectivity between the

Learning and adult education

This is an edited version of a chapter previously published in Teaching Adults, 1996,

Behavioural; Reinforcement of Exploration of

Cognitive; Discipline Discovery learning

attitudinal learning as well – to the understanding of historical processes and

11 concrete situations; then exploring each new situation by breaking it down

Cognitive Affective Signal

Figure 1.2 Bloom and Gagné: hierarchies of learning.

11 they may tend to lack self-conﬁdence, to possess feelings of inferiority, even

Environmental learning theories

sent. Interpretation is an essential element of the transaction, and in this

• instrumental learning – how to manipulate the environment; the acqui-

11 • emancipatory learning – self-understanding, awareness and transformation

Habermas suggests that these different kinds of learning have different

knowledge is contingent; it is ‘contested and provisional’. What exist are

Experiential learning and the learning cycle

Concrete Critical reflection

Figure 1.3a The learning cycle.

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