Casil VS Ca

9/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 285
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Casil vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 121534. January 28, 1998.
JUAN M. CASIL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS;

HON. URBANO VICTORIO, SR., BRANCH 50,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA; and ANITA U.
LORENZANA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Rule that the denial of a motion to

dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory, cannot be questioned by
certiorari or be the subject of appeal, until final judgment or order
is rendered not absolute.—Indeed, basic is the doctrine that “the
denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory,
cannot be questioned by certiorari; it cannot be [the] subject of
appeal, until final judgment or order is rendered.” But this rule is
not absolute.
Same; Same; Instances where certiorari is an appropriate
remedy to assail an interlocutory order.—Additionally, certiorari
is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order (1) when
the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion and (2) when the assailed
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.
Same; Actions; Litis Pendentia; Requisites in order that an
action may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia.—In
order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia, the following requisites must concur: (a) the identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of
the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res adjudicata in the other.
Same; Same; Same; Guidelines for the dismissal of a
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.—As a final note, the
following guidelines for the dismissal of a complaint on the
ground of litis pendentia laid down by this Court in Allied
Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals should be taken into
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001748620dec069f763cb003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/19
account: “Given, therefore, the pendency of two actions, the

following are the relevant considera-
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* THIRD DIVISION.
265
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 265
tions in determining which action should be dismissed: (1) the

date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action
filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed
was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its
filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the
action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between
the parties.”
Same; Same; Same; Res Adjudicata; Requisites of Res
Adjudicata.—The requisites of res adjudicata are as follows: “(a)
The former judgment or order must be final; (b) It must be a
judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the
parties at the trial of the case; (c) It must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and (d) There must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. This
requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between
the same parties.”
Same; Pleadings and Practice; The Rules of Court seek to
eliminate undue reliance on technical rules and to make litigation
as inexpensive, as practicable and as convenient as can be done.—
It must be stressed that the Rules of Court seek to eliminate
undue reliance on technical rules and to make litigation as
inexpensive, as practicable and as convenient as can be done. This
is in accordance with the primary purpose of the Rules of Court as
provided in Rule 1, Section 2.
Same; Same; Splitting a cause of action makes a mockery of
the Court’s crusade to unclog the dockets of the judiciary.—Private
respondent’s insistence on the continuation of the Second Case,
separate from the First Case, violates this hallowed objective of
the Rules of Court. Splitting a cause of action makes a mockery of
this Court’s crusade to unclog the dockets of the judiciary.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Vicente D. Millora for petitioner.
Puno and Puno for private respondent.
266

PANGANIBAN, J.:
When may a complaint be dismissed on the ground of litis

pendentia? When is an interlocutory order assailable by
certiorari under Rule 65?
The Case
These are the main questions raised in this petition 1 for

review on certiorari seeking to
2
set aside the Decision of
Respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37626
promulgated on August 21, 31995. The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for

Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, with a prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.”
4
The Court of Appeals affirmed, in effect, the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50, which denied
petitioner’s motion to dismiss grounded on litis pendentia.
The Facts
The facts are undisputed. Private Respondent Anita U.

Lorenzana is the lessee of a government property located
on Bilibid Viejo Street, near Quezon Boulevard, Manila.
After the building on said land was destroyed by fire,
Petitioner Juan M. Casil and private respondent entered
into a written agreement authorizing the former to develop
and administer the property. They also agreed that rentals
from the tenants would be divided equally between them.
Thus, buildings,
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 18-24.

2 Ninth Division composed of J. Pacita Cañizares-Nye, ponente; and JJ.
Jorge S. Imperial and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., concurring.
3 CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 24.
4 Rollo, p. 61.
267
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 267

stalls and cubicles were constructed on the subject property5

and leased to tenants. According to private respondent,
petitioner remitted the amount of P64,000 for the months
of March and April 1994. Thereafter, the remittances
decreased. Private respondent allegedly found that the
tenants, except for one or two, had been paying their
rentals on time, but that petitioner was not properly
remitting her share thereon. Thus, she wrote the tenants
informing them that she had already terminated her
contract with petitioner and urging them to pay directly to
her. Petitioner countered by asking them to ignore private
respondent’s letter. 6
On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint
against private respondent for “Breach of Contract and
Damages” docketed as Civil Case No. 94-72362 before
Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, hereafter 7
referred to as “First Case.” Petitioner prayed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully

prayed that, after hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant ordering her:
(1) to respect, abide by and comply with the terms and

conditions of the agreement after the Honorable Court
shall have upheld its existence and validity;
(2) in the alternative and at the option of the plaintiff, to
order the defendant to reimburse and refund the plaintiff
of his investments in the property in question in the
amount of more than P1,000,000.00, with legal interests
from January 1994 and until the said amount is fully paid;
(3) to pay the plaintiff moral damages suffered by him in the
amount of P1,000,000.00, more or less;
(4) to pay the plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of
P500,000.00, more or less;
(5) to pay the plaintiff by way of attorney’s fees in the amount
of P200,000.00, plus the costs of suit.”
_______________
5 Private Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 7; rollo, p. 145.

6 Then represented by Atty. Abelardo E. Rogacion.
7 Petitioner’s Complaint, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 31-32.
268

Private respondent filed 8 her answer in the First Case on

March 14, 1995, praying:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is respectfully prayed:
a. That the complaint be dismissed for lack of cause of

action;
b. That plaintiff be ordered to render accounting on the rents
he received from the stall holders from the time he
collected the deposits/advance rentals to the present and
to deposit such amounts as were given/deposited with him
in court;
c. That the Honorable Court orders the collection of the
rentals in the stalls and that the same be deposited in
court subject to the disposition of the Honorable Court;
d. That the plaintiff be ordered to pay the defendant the
following:
1. The amount of P500,000.00 as the unremitted amount of

owner’s share of the defendant but which the plaintiff had
withheld; the additional amounts which continue to grow
because of the continued forbearance by the plaintiff in
remittance;
2. The amount of P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, expenses of litigation and attorney’s fees;
3. To pay moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
4. To pay corrective and exemplary damages in the amount
of P100,000.00;
Defendant prays for such other reliefs as are just and equitable
in the premises.”
However, before submitting

9
her answer in the First Case,
private respondent filed on January 11,1 995, before
Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, her own
separate
_______________
8 Private Respondent’s Answer, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 44-45.

9 Then represented by Atty. Salacnib F. Baterina, who also signed
private respondent’s Answer with Counterclaim.
269
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 269

complaint against petitioner for “Rescission of Contract, Ac
counting and Damages,” docketed as Civil Case No. 95-

72598, hereafter referred to as “Second10 Case.” Private
respondent prayed for the following reliefs:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed

of the Honorable Court that after hear[ing] judgment be rendered:
a. Ordering the deposit of the rental into the Court’s custody

for proper disposition of the collected amount in
accordance with the judgment of the Court;
b. Ordering the defendant the payment of plaintiff’s share in
accordance with Annex ‘A’ of this complaint;
c. Ordering the defendant to pay his arrears, unremitted to
plaintiff in the amount of P245,000 or more;
d. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P50,000 as actual and compensatory damages and
expenses of litigation and attorney’s fees;
e. Ultimately ordering the agreement known as Annex ‘A’ as
canceled due to violations thereon perpetuated by the
defendant making implementation impractical;
f. Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs as are just and
equitable in the premises.”
On March 13, 1995, petitioner countered with a motion to11

dismiss the Second Case on the ground of litis pendentia.
Subsequently,
12
private respondent filed her opposition to
said motion.
_______________
10 Private Respondent’s Complaint, p. 6; rollo, p. 51.

11 Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides:
“SEC. 1. Grounds.—Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action
may be made on any of the following grounds: x x x
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause.”
12 Rollo, pp. 56-61.
270

Thereafter, on June131, 1995, Judge Urbano C. Victorio, Sr.

denied the motion. The Court of Appeals subsequently
dismissed the petition for certiorari, thereby affirming the
trial court’s denial of the14 said motion.
Hence, this recourse.
The Issue
15
Petitioner raises a single issue:
“The central issue that is before this Honorable Court is whether

or not the two cases, Civil Case No. 94-72363 x x x and Civil Case
No. 95-72598, x x x, both of which involve the same contract and
same transaction, should be allowed to be litigated independently
and separately of each other.”
Respondent Court’s Ruling
In holding that there was no litis pendentia, the Court of

Appeals ratiocinated as follows:
“Jurisprudence dictates that:
‘x x x x x x x x x
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to sres [sic] adjudicata to the other. (Ramos v.
Ebarle, 182 SCRA 245 citing Marapao v. Mendoza, 119 SCRA 97 and
Lopez v. Villaruel, 164 SCRA 616.)
_______________
13 Rollo, p. 61.
14 The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon this Court’s
receipt of private respondent’s Memorandum dated February 23, 1996 on
March 7, 1996.
15 Petition, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 10-11.
271
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 271

Applying the foregoing criteria to the case at bar. We note that

except for the identity of parties, there appears to be a great
disparity between the cause of action and reliefs prayed for in
Civil Case No. 94-72362 and that in Civil Case No. 95-72598.
x x x x x x
In fine, while plaintiff [petitioner herein] in Civil Case No. 94-
72362 seeks to enforce the agreement allegedly entered into
between the parties on 04 May 1994 or in the alternative, for the
reimbursement and refund of his investment in the property
subject of the suit plus damages, the plaintiff [private respondent
herein] in Civil Case No. 95-72598 prays for judgment ordering
the deposit of rentals, damages and the cancellation of the
agreement known as Annex “A” for violation of its terms and
conditions by the defendant therein.
In recapitulation, Civil Case No. 94-72362 seeks to enforce the
Agreement, Annex “A,” while Civil Case No. 95-72598 is for the
repudiation or cancellation of the said agreement on the ground of
violation of its terms and conditions. It is therefore clear that the
ground relied upon in petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss is without
basis in fact or in law. Consequently, this Court does not find that
respondent Court acted in any manner in contravention of law to
justify the relief prayed for.”
The Court of Appeals also held that an interlocutory order

denying a motion to dismiss could not be the basis of a
petition for certiorari.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Issue: When May an Interlocutory Order

Be Reviewed on Certiorari?
Reiterating the position of the Court of Appeals, private

respondent contends that the June 1, 1995 order of the
Regional Trial Court denying the motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order 16 which cannot be questioned in a
petition for certiorari.
_______________
16 Private Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 9; rollo, p. 147.
272

Indeed, basic is the doctrine that “the denial of a motion to

dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory, cannot be
questioned by certiorari; it cannot be [the] subject 17
of
appeal, until final judgment or order is rendered.” But
this rule is not absolute.
In National Union Fire Insurance18 Company of Pittsburg
vs. Stolt-Nielsen Philippines, Inc., an insurer filed an
action against a carrier for the recovery of a sum of money
it had allegedly paid to the insured shipper. The carrier
filed a motion to dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the
trial court, claiming that the case was arbitrable in
accordance with the bill of lading and charter party. The
trial court initially denied the motion but subsequently
ordered the suspension of its resolution, “since the ground
alleged in said motion does not appear to be indubitable.”
Through a petition for certiorari, the carrier questioned the
order of the trial court. Invoking the argument now raised
by private respondent, the insurer in that case challenged
the resort to certiorari. In sustaining19 the propriety of a
petition for certiorari, this Court ruled:
“Generally, this would be true. However, the case before us falls

under the exception. While a Court Order deferring action on a
motion to dismiss until the trial is interlocutory and cannot be
challenged until final judgment, still, where it clearly appears
that the trial Judge or Court is proceeding in excess or outside of
its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would
be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings
(University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 439, [1959]
citing Philippine International Fair, Inc., et al., vs. Ibañez, et al.,
94 Phil. 424 [1954]; Enrique vs. Macadaeg, et al., 84 Phil. 674
[1949]; San Beda College vs. CIR, 97 Phil. 787 [1955]). Even a
cursory reading of the subject Bill of Lading, in relation to the
Charter Party, reveals the Court’s patent lack of jurisdiction to
hear and decide the claim.”
_______________
17 Santiago Land Development Company vs. Court of Appeals, 258

SCRA 535, 540-541, July 9, 1996, per Torres, J.
18 184 SCRA 682, April 26, 1990, per Melencio-Herrera, J.
19 At p. 686.
273
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 273

Additionally, certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail

an interlocutory order (1) when the tribunal issued such
order without or 20in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion and (2) when the assailed interlocutory
order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief.
21
Here, the Court
may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in 22
his Remedial Law
Compendium, cited these exceptions:
“However, even when appeal is available and is the proper

remedy, the Supreme Court has allowed a writ of certiorari (1)
where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate
remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil. 77), as where 33
appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding
which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals
(PCIB vs. Escolin, et al., L-27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2)
where the orders were also issued either in excess of or without
jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, Jan. 30, 1970; Cf. Bautista,
et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept. 23, 1985); (3) for certain
special considerations, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose
vs. Zulueta, et al., L-16598, May 31, 1961 and cases cited therein);
(4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence
for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal there could be no
remedy (People vs. Abalos, L-29039, Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the
order is a patent
_______________
20 Pacete vs. Carriaga, Jr., 231 SCRA 321, 327, March 17, 1994; Lina vs. Court
of Appeals, 135 SCRA 637, April 9, 1985; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA
732, June 11, 1992; Dimayacyac vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 265, September 27,
1979; Government Service Insurance System vs. National Food Authority, 249
SCRA 522, October 25, 1995; Planters Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 563, 570, February 6, 1991; De la Paz, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
154 SCRA 65, September 17, 1987; Del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA
432, January 29, 1996.
21 Salcedo-Ortañez vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111, 114, August 4, 1994,
citing Marcelo v. De Guzman, 114 SCRA 657, June 29, 1982.
22 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, fifth revised edition, pp. 458-
459.
274

nullity (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982);

and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future
litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Campos, et al., L-
38280, Mar. 21, 1975).
The foregoing clearly show that the rule invoked by private

respondent is not ironclad. As will be shown later, the
present case constitutes an exception because the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss. An
appeal, while available eventually, is cumbersome and
inadequate, for it requires the parties to undergo a useless
and time-consuming trial. The Second Case constitutes a
rude imposition on the time and the docket of the judiciary.
Single Issue: Is there Litis Pendentia in this Case?
Petitioner contends that the First and the Second Cases

“are exactly the same.” He avers that the “allegations in
the Affirmative Defenses in the Answer, as well as in the
Counterclaim in this 1st case are, word for word, the same
as the allegations in the complaint in the 2nd case,
EXCEPT THAT IN THE 2nd CASE, there is an additional
prayer, namely,23for the rescission of the contract, subject of
the two cases.” Thus, the filing of the Second Case by
private respondent constitutes splitting a single cause 24of
action, contrary to Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
Private respondent disagrees with the above contention,
arguing that there is no identity of reliefs sought or of
causes of action in the two cases. She points out that in the
First Case, petitioner prayed for the enforcement of the
agreement; in the Second Case, on the other hand, private
respondent asked for the rescission of the agreement.
Furthermore, she argues that res adjudicata does not
apply, thus: “[i]n the
_______________
23 Petition, p. 9; rollo, p. 10. Capitalizations found in the original.

24 “Section 3. One suit for single cause of action. A party may not
institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.”
275
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 275

event that the trial court in Civil Case No. 94-72362 [First
Case] renders a decision finding that no breach was
committed by Private Respondent here and that no
damages are awarded in favor of Petitioner, this judgment
would not constitute res adjudicata in the present case
because a judgment declaring that the contract should be
rescinded can still be rendered in the [S]econd [C]ase.”
We sustain the petitioner. In order that an action may
be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the identity of parties, or at
least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party 25is successful, would amount to
res adjudicata in the other.
It is undisputed that the parties in the two civil actions
are the same. In both actions, the two parties invoke their
respective rights: petitioner wants to be respected as
administrator and developer of the subject property, while
private respondent asserts her right as a lessee of the
subject government property, and her entitlement to an
equal share from rentals collected by petitioner. Moreover,
the reliefs prayed for are in substance the same. First, it
should be noted that the reliefs prayed for by all parties are
founded on the same facts and will thus require identical
evidence. Private respondent as lessee of the government
property and petitioner as developer of the same have
agreed to share equally between them the rentals from the
developed property. Second, private respon-
_______________
25 Cokaliong Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Amin, 260 SCRA 122, July 31,
1996, per Mendoza, J.; Olayvar vs. Olayvar, 98 Phil. 52, 54, November 29,
1955; Manuel vs. Wigett, 14 Phil. 9, August 18, 1909; Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank vs. Aldecoa and Co., 30 Phil. 255, March 23, 1915; J.M.
Tuason & Co. vs. Rafor, 5 SCRA 478, 483-484, June 30, 1962; Del Rosario,
et al. vs. Jacinto, et al., 15 SCRA 15, 17, September 10, 1965; Pampanga
Bus Co. vs. Ocfemia, et al., 18 SCRA 407, 409-410, October 20, 1966.
276

dent’s complaint in the Second Case and her answer in the

First Case contained basically the same allegations, except
the prayer for rescission in her complaint.
Furthermore, any judgment in the First Case will serve
as res adjudicata to the Second
26
Case. The requisites of res
adjudicata are as follows:
“(a) The former judgment or order must be final;

(b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that
is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at
the trial of the case;
(c) It must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and
(d) There must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two
actions are substantially between the same
parties.”
The Court of Appeals held that there can be no res

adjudicata, because there is no identity of causes of action
between the two cases. We do not agree. In the two cases,
both petitioner and private respondent brought to fore the
validity of the agreement dated May 4, 1994. Private
respondent raised this point as an affirmative defense in
her answer in the First Case. She brought it up again in
her complaint in the Second Case. A single issue cannot be
litigated in more27than one forum. As held in Mendiola vs.
Court of Appeals:
_______________
26 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, fifth revised edition, p.

308.
27 258 SCRA 492, July 5, 1996, per Hermosisima, J. See also Olayvar
vs. Olayvar (supra, at pp. 54-55, November 29, 1955, per Bautista Angelo,
J.) where it was ruled:
“In order that an action may be dismissed on the ground that ‘there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause’ [Rule 8, section 1 (d)],
the following requisites must concur: (1) the identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded
277
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 277

“The similarity between the two causes of action is only too

glaring. The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form
of an action but on whether the same evidence would support and
establish the former and the present causes of action. The
difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. In
Civil Case No. 58713, the action is to enjoin PNB from foreclosing
petitioner’s properties, while in Civil Case No. 60012, the action is
one to annul the auction sale over the foreclosed properties of
petitioner based on the same grounds. Notwithstanding a
difference in the forms of the two actions, the doctrine of res
judicata still applies considering that the
_______________
on the same facts; and (3) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the other. (Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. I, p. 169.) Do these requisites concur in the two cases under
consideration?
An analysis of the facts deducible from the pleadings would reveal an
affirmative answer. Note that the present action is for support not only of plaintiff
but of her children. The action is predicated on the infidelity of defendant who
because of his propensity towards other women made him neglectful of his marital
duties. The case of legal separation, on the other hand, asserts adultery on the
part of plaintiff which is a valid defense against an action for support (Quintana
vs. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285). Our new Civil Code provides that the obligation to give
support shall cease ‘when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed
some act which gives rise to disinheri-tance’ [Article 303 (4)], and under Article
921 of the same Code, it shall be sufficient cause for disinheritance ‘when the
spouse has given cause for legal separation.’ It further appears that in the
separation case the wife interposed an answer wherein, repudiating the charge of
adultery, she demanded that she and her children be given the proper
maintenance and support to which they are entitled under the law.
All the foregoing show that the two cases raise practically the same issues.
There is therefore no need of prosecuting them separately and independently for
that would amount to duplicity of action. And as it appears that the case of legal
separation was instituted earlier than the one for support, it is fair that the latter
be dismissed as was correctly done by the lower court.”
278

parties were litigating for the same thing, i.e, lands covered by
TCT No. 27307, and more importantly, the same contentions and
evidence as advanced by herein petitioner in this case were in fact
used to support the former cause of action.” (Italics supplied.)
In this light, there is identity of subject matter and of

causes of action, for the same evidence presented in the
First Case will necessarily be presented in the Second
Case, and the judgment sought in the Second Case will
either28 duplicate or contradict any judgment in the First
Case. It is beyond dispute, therefore, that a judgment in
the First Case will constitute res adjudicata to bar the
Second Case.
Manifestly, there is no legal basis for allowing the two
actions to proceed29 independently of each other. In fact, a
mere amendment in the private respondent’s Answer in
the First Case to include a prayer for rescission would
render the 30
assailed complaint unnecessary and
redundant. And even
_______________
28 Mangoma vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 21, February 1, 1995;

Gitgano vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 437, November 29, 1984; Vda. de Vocal
vs. Vda. de Suria, 90 SCRA 336, May 31, 1979; Aroc vs. People’s Homesite
and Housing Corporation, 81 SCRA 350, January 31, 1978; Tan vs.
Valdehueza, 66 SCRA 61, August 6, 1975; Cayco, et al. vs. Cruz, et al., 106
Phil. 65, August 21, 1959; I Martin, pp. 161-162, citing 34 C.J. 805.
29 Section 1, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads:
“Section 1. Amendments in general.—Pleadings may be amended by adding or

striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in
the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any
other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be
determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner.”
30 The similarity in the allegations in both Complaint and Answer is

apparent as shown below:
On allegations for cancellation of Contract:
In the Answer with Counterclaim in the Second Case (Rollo, pp. 42-43):
279
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 279

without such amendment, rescission may still be granted

in view of the general prayer invoking such other reliefs as
are
_______________
“11.13. That the defendant repleads and incorporates the pertinent

allegations of the preceding paragraph in this affirmative and
special defenses; that by reason of the unlawful withholding by the
plaintiff, Juan M. Casil of the share of the defendant’s, defendant
wrote the plaintiff for the cancellation of the contract Annex ‘B’
because the same plaintiff has not observed its provisions, much
less talk about the matter, the letter of the defendant is hereto
attached as Annex ‘3’ and is made an integral part hereof;
11.14. That the plaintiff instead of meeting with the defendant to put the
parties in harmony has sent the latter a strongly worded answer
which neither admitted that he was remiss of his obligation under
Annex ‘4’ nor has alleged that he has fully satisfied the provisions
thereof, but assailing the letter, Annex ‘3’ as unchristian and
unfriendly and categorically stating that he does ‘not see any
possibility of any amicable or friendly settlement of the matter
except through the courts’ and in the meantime, plaintiff’s
collection remains unabated, refusing to remit the lawful share of
the defendant; x x x”
In the Complaint in the First Case (Rollo, pp. 49-50):
“16. That by reason of the unlawful withholding by the defendant of
the share of the plaintiff, wrote the defendant in order to cancel
the contract Annex ‘A,’ because the same defendant has not
observed its provisions, much less to talk about the matter, the
letter of the plaintiff is hereto attached as Annex ‘B’ and is made
an integral part hereof;
17. That the defendant instead of meeting with the plaintiff to put the
parties in harmony has sent the latter a strongly worded answer
which neither admitted that he was remiss of his obligation under
Annex ‘A’ nor has alleged that he has fully satisfied the provisions
thereof, but assailing the letter, Annex ‘B’ as unchristian and
unfriendly and categorically stating that he does ‘not see any
possibility of any amicable or friendly settlement of the matter
except through the courts’ and in the meantime, defendant’s
collection remains unabated, refusing to remit the lawful share of

the plaintiff”;
280

just and equitable in31the premises. Of relevance in this case

is Pichay vs. Kairuz, in which this Court ruled:
“We find no merit in this appeal. To begin with, it cannot be

disputed that the present case is predicated upon the plea that
the power of attorney and the deed of mortgage which were
allegedly executed by appellants are null and void on the ground
that their consent thereto was obtained through fraud and
intimidation. Here, the principal defendant is Michael Kairuz. On
the other hand, in Civil Case No. 423, the complaint was filed by
Michael Kairuz to recover certain amount of money making as
defendants the same parties who appear as plaintiffs herein. And
in both cases the parties brought to the fore the validity of the
same documents. Then, while the second case was pending trial,
the court rendered judgment in the first case dismissing the
complaint based on the finding that said two documents are null
and void. The court even went further. It ordered plaintiffs to pay
to defendants the sum of P12,650.00, as damages, plus an
additional sum of P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees. These facts show
that the two cases really involve the same parties, the same
subject matter, and the same cause of action. Indeed, appellants
herein not only obtained in the first case the relief they sought to
obtain in the second but even obtained a judgment in their favor
by way of damages and attorney’s fees. The attitude of appellants
in insisting on prosecuting the second case in spite of such
favorable judgment is indeed beyond comprehension.”
Rules Require Liberal Construction

It must be stressed that the Rules of Court seek to
eliminate undue reliance on technical rules and to make
litigation as inexpensive,
32
as practicable and as convenient
as can be done. This is in accordance with the primary
purpose of the Rules of Court as provided in Rule 1, Section
2, which reads:
_______________
31 5 SCRA 29, 30-31, May 18, 1962, per Bautista Angelo, J.
32 Francisco, Vicente, J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,

Vol. I, 1973 ed., pp. 155-156 citing an article of Professor Sunderland in
the University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. XIII, No. 1.
281
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 281

“Section 2. Construction.—These rules shall be liberally construed

in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.”
Private respondent’s insistence on the continuation of the

Second Case, separate from the First Case, violates this
hallowed objective of the Rules of Court. Splitting a cause
of action makes a mockery of this Court’s crusade to unclog
the dockets of the judiciary.
As a final note, the following guidelines for the dismissal
of a complaint on the ground of litis pendentia laid down by
this Court in Allied Banking Corporation
33
vs. Court of
Appeals should be taken into account:
“Given, therefore, the pendency of two actions, the following are

the relevant considerations in determining which action should be
dismissed: (1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to
the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought
to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to
anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3)
whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the
issues between the parties.”
Since the First Case was filed earlier, it will be in accord

with jurisprudence to abate the Second Case.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Private Respondent Anita U. Lorenzana’s
Complaint in Civil Case No. 95-72598 is hereby
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Romero, Melo and

Francisco, JJ., concur.
Assailed decision reversed and set aside.
_______________
33 259 SCRA 371, July 26, 1996, per Mendoza, J.
282

People vs. Bahatan
Note.—If a party-litigant splits his single cause of

action the other action or actions may be dismissed by
invoking litis pendentia. (Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, 263
SCRA 275 [1996])
——o0o——
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9/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 285

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

JUAN M. CASIL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS;

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Rule that the denial of a motion to

account: “Given, therefore, the pendency of two actions, the

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 265

Casil vs. Court of Appeals

tions in determining which action should be dismissed: (1) the

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

When may a complaint be dismissed on the ground of litis

These are the main questions raised in this petition 1 for

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for

The facts are undisputed. Private Respondent Anita U.

1 Rollo, pp. 18-24.

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 267

stalls and cubicles were constructed on the subject property5

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully

(1) to respect, abide by and comply with the terms and

5 Private Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 7; rollo, p. 145.

268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Private respondent filed 8 her answer in the First Case on

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is respectfully prayed:

a. That the complaint be dismissed for lack of cause of

1. The amount of P500,000.00 as the unremitted amount of

However, before submitting

8 Private Respondent’s Answer, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 44-45.

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 269

complaint against petitioner for “Rescission of Contract, Ac

counting and Damages,” docketed as Civil Case No. 95-

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed

a. Ordering the deposit of the rental into the Court’s custody

On March 13, 1995, petitioner countered with a motion to11

10 Private Respondent’s Complaint, p. 6; rollo, p. 51.

12 Rollo, pp. 56-61.

270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Thereafter, on June131, 1995, Judge Urbano C. Victorio, Sr.

“The central issue that is before this Honorable Court is whether

Respondent Court’s Ruling

In holding that there was no litis pendentia, the Court of

“Jurisprudence dictates that:

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 271

Applying the foregoing criteria to the case at bar. We note that

The Court of Appeals also held that an interlocutory order

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Issue: When May an Interlocutory Order

Reiterating the position of the Court of Appeals, private

16 Private Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 9; rollo, p. 147.

272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Indeed, basic is the doctrine that “the denial of a motion to

“Generally, this would be true. However, the case before us falls

17 Santiago Land Development Company vs. Court of Appeals, 258

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 273

Additionally, certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail

“However, even when appeal is available and is the proper

274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

nullity (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982);