A

THE PHILIPPINES
Debt and Poverty

OXFAM
LATIN AMERICA
CARIBBEAN
DESK

Rosalinda Pineda-Ofreneo

Oxfam
© Oxfam 1991

A catalogue record for this book is available from

the British Library

ISBN 0 85598149 0
ISBN 0 85598150 4 pbk

Published by Oxfam UK and Ireland, 274 Banbury Road, Oxford 0X2 7DZ
Designed by Jeffrey Meaton 0X583 JM 91
Printed by Oxfam Print Unit
Typeset in 1 Opt Palatino

This book converted to digital file in 2010

 CONTENTS

Foreword

Acknowledgements vii

1 Introduction 1

2 The origins of the problem 3

3 What the debt means to the poor 13

4 Health: a life or debt question 17

5 Education: down from number one 24

6 Debt, labour, and employment 28

7 Debt and the agrarian crisis 37

8 Debt and the fishing communities 49

9 Debt and the tribal Filipinos 59

10 Debt and the urban poor 68

11 Towards an alternative strategy for

debt and development 77

12 The need for international cooperation 87

13 Conclusion: how the creditors could help 91

Notes 99

Further reading 110

Useful addresses 111

Foreword

It is commonly assumed that the international debt crisis is so complex

that it should be left to economists to solve. Perhaps, however, we have
relied for too long on 'experts' to address the problem. The debt crisis has
not abated: indeed, it is getting worse. Agencies like Oxfam, working
alongside the poor in countries like the Philippines, daily witness the
human suffering caused by the enormous debts owed by their govern-
ments to financial institutions in the 'developed' world.
Poverty at national level soon permeates down to the level of the
poorest and most vulnerable. The burden of the debt contracted by the
government of the Philippines is borne by the poor, who pay for it in
terms of reduced incomes, and the under-funding of the health and
education services on which they depend. In stark terms, the debt leads to
deprivation and marginalisation, wasted lives and even death.
Some observers may question why a charitable agency like Oxfam
involves itself in the debate on the international debt crisis. Charities, it
might be argued, should concentrate on development projects and on the
direct relief of suffering. Of course, such work is Oxfam's primary mandate
- a mandate which is fulfilled in the Philippines by our continuing support
for such projects as training programmes in fishing communities, literacy
work and credit funds for women in shanty towns, income-generation
schemes with tribal people, and reconstruction work in disaster-stricken
areas.
But if 'regular' development and relief work serves to maintain the
myth of a net flow of resources from the relatively rich North to the
relatively poor South, we feel we have an obligation to point out the error
of such an assumption. The fact is that, in terms of the flow of resources,
the South is actually supporting the North. The issue of debt is central to
this inverted (or perverted) 'development'. To cite just one example: for
the past two years, Oxfam UK/Ireland has devoted an average of about
£300,000 a year, donated by the British and Irish public, to development
and relief efforts in the Philippines. By the standards of non-governmental
organisations, this is a considerable amount - but really only a drop in the
ocean, when compared with funds allocated by the Philippine government
vi The Philippines: Debt and Poverty

to debt payment. During 1990 the average payment of interest (not actual
repayment!) on the country's debts amounted to about £3 million a day.
The daily interest payment on the debt incurred for the controversial
Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, mothballed since President Aquino came to
power, amounts to almost £200,000 a day.
Not all debt payment goes overseas; it is true that nowadays much of
the burden of Philippine debt is due to domestic borrowing. Still, much of
the domestic debt was and is being incurred to enable the Philippine
government to buy foreign exchange to pay for its international
borrowing: a roundabout way of paying for the same thing. It is also true
that debt is not by any means the sole cause of all the problems afflicting
poor people in the Philippines; nevertheless, the burden of the national
debt aggravates the whole range of difficulties which they have to cope
with daily.
In reflecting on its experience of working with poor communities,
Oxfam has come to appreciate the crucial significance of the debt
problem. We support the research work of the Freedom From Debt
Coalition, a broad-based Filipino network of church groups, academic
and professional bodies, and community organisations, which studies
the social and environmental impact of debt, to try to find solutions to the
crisis which will ease poverty and suffering in the Philippines.
The perverse flow of resources from South to North is one factor
impelling concern by agencies such as Oxfam. But an equally powerful
factor is the increased pressure on them to deliver services that the
Philippine government can no longer provide. (The administration of
President Aquino is allocating about 40 per cent of its budget to debt
service - a higher proportion than the British government allocates to
spending on defence, social security, welfare, and housing combined.) But
charities should never assume the role of governments. Non-
governmental organisations can never even contemplate being able to
compensate for what national ministries can no longer provide: such
things as affordable medical care, fair salaries for teachers, and invest-
ment in basic infrastructure.
The Philippine government has so far opted to repay the nation's debt
'as a matter of honour', and at all costs. The stories in this book give some
idea of what those costs are in human terms - and what grassroots
organisations in the Philippines are trying to do to reduce them.
Paul Valentin
Oxfam UK/Ireland Representative, Manila
July 1991
 Vll

Acknowledgements

Rene Ofreneo, Dean of the School of Labour and Industrial Relations at

the University of the Philippines, contributed to Chapters 6 and 7 of this
book. Vincent Homolka, an independent researcher and economist
working with the Development Policy Unit of Oxfam UK and Ireland,
wrote the concluding chapter, to add a Northern perspective on measures
which international creditors might take to help to solve the debt crisis in
the Philippines. The Philippine Resource Centre in London helped to
compile details of contacts and resources. The author gratefully
acknowledges all these contributions.
 1
Introduction

Margie Amblon is now childless. Her two small children died of measles
and its attendant complications, one after the other. In her poor commu-
nity, like many other urban communities in the Philippines, there is no
health centre. ... Carolina Agustin, a domestic helper in Kuwait, came
home to the Philippines in September 1989 with her two feet in plaster.
The reason: she jumped from a window when her employer tried to rape
her. Another domestic worker, Emelieta Edrosolan, returned to the
Philippines in April, exhibiting black welts on her thighs from beatings by
her employer.1 ... Lupo Masaclao used to be a fisherman living off the
bounty of Laguna Lake. Now that the lake is dying and being diverted to
uses other than fishing, he has turned into a shoemaker, together with
most fisherfolk in his community. ... Up north, in the Cordilleras, the
indigenous peoples of Itogon have mounted human barricades to stop
open-pit mining operations that would tear up the mountains and
destroy the sources of their livelihood. ... In the centre of Manila, the
laundrywomen of Tondo eke out a precarious existence from a monthly
income of P300 (£6.25), even while trying to learn how to read and write.
Margie Amblon's children could have been saved if there were a
health centre in their community. But servicing the nation's foreign debt,
which at one point took up almost half the national budget, prevents the
government from providing such facilities. Carolina Agustin might
perhaps not have ventured to work abroad for an abusive employer had
the debt problem not driven the government to encourage the export of
labour at whatever cost. Lupo Masaclao and the indigenous peoples of
Itogon would perhaps not be threatened by pollution and the destruction
of mountains and forests had the environment not been sacrificed for the
sake of debt-connected and dollar-oriented 'development'. The laundry-
women of Tondo would not be in such desperate straits had they not
been afflicted by widespread unemployment, rampant inflation, housing
problems, and lack of basic social services, all of which are directly
linked to the debt crisis.
All these people are victims of a raging debt crisis which takes most of
its toll on the poor and the vulnerable. They are paying the price of a
2 The Philippines: Debt and Poverty

debt policy which puts creditors first and people last. The government of
the Philippines has adopted a debt-fuelled model of development that is
based on earning cash by exploiting its human and natural resources,
some of them irreplaceable.
The Philippines is a country rich in resources. So why are at least half
of its 62 million people poor?2 The answer lies partly in the wealth that is
taken from the country in the form of debt service. When the foreign debt
was at its peak of $28 billion in 1988, the debt burden of each Filipino
man, woman, and child was estimated at P10,000 (£208.33). Even the
unborn are already indebted. But this burden is not equitably shared,
because in the final analysis, the poor pay more in terms of higher prices
and increased taxes for basic goods and services. Their wages stagnate or
barely rise in the midst of rapid inflation, as the peso devalues and
erodes their purchasing power. They have less access to social services,
because the government is too short of cash to provide proper services.
Yet they are earning dollars for their country, either by being obliged to
work in export production, or by remitting money from better-paying
jobs abroad.
Because they are the most affected by the debt crisis, the poor and
vulnerable are driven to respond to it in a new and effective way. People's
initiatives, exemplified by the Freedom From Debt Coalition and other
action-oriented organisations dealing directly or indirectly with the debt
issue, have devised novel and alternative approaches that could prove
viable and sustainable in the long run.
The people of the Philippines cannot wait. Their country needs imme-
diate debt relief. The extensive devastation wrought by the earthquake
of July 1990 (which killed 1,600 people, injured 3,200, made over 100,000
homeless, and damaged property worth £305 million), and the eruption
of the volcano Mount Pinatubo in June 1991 (which caused even more
damage) makes a solution to the problem of the debt crisis an urgent
necessity.
 2
The origins of the problem
The Philippines is aspiring to be a Newly Industrialising Country (NIC)
like Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand who are her neighbours
in East Asia. The reality is that this is just a severely indebted country,
ranking sixth (after Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, and Thailand)
in the World Bank Debt Tables for 1989-1990.1
Being a severely indebted country means being in a state of perpetual
financial haemorrhage. For the Philippines, debt service for 1990 totalled
$4,719 billion, more than a billion dollars higher than the $3,670 billion
recorded in 1989. Because more money has gone out of the country as
interest and principal payments than has come in as 'new money', nega-
tive net resource outflows or transfers have been building up. In the
years 1988-1990 these totalled a minus of $6,893 billion.2
Such a debilitating outflow robs the people of resources that could go
into economic recovery and development, basic utilities and social
services, and structural reforms to empower the poor and spur sustainable
development. What is worse, the people pay for the outflow in terms of
new taxes exacted by the government to earn more revenues for debt
service. They work harder and longer, but earn less real income, due to
devaluation and inflation that stem from policies demanded by the
nation's creditors. The people shoulder much of the debt-service burden
through the dollars they remit from overseas employment, into which
they have been forced by debt-connected structural unemployment and
underemployment. The continuing export of Filipinos to help pay the
debt, despite the loneliness, uncertainty and humiliation they often
suffer, is perhaps the worst effect of the debt crisis.
Future generations will suffer from the environmental degradation
accelerated by the debt problem. Only one-fifth of Philippine forests is
left, due partly to massive exportation and smuggling of logs and other
forest products for the sake of generating desperately-needed foreign
exchange.3 Whole mountains are being torn up, and formerly productive
rivers and lakes are being destroyed by export-oriented gold and copper
mines and other industries. Only one quarter of Philippine coral reefs is in
good condition, and fisheries production has dropped by half as a result
of the use of cyanide, dynamite and other destructive forms of fishing.4
4 The Philippines: Debt and Poverty

Chris Daniel/Oxfam
Logs from the tropical rainforest of Quezon Province being loaded on board ship at
Real. Illegal logging is a major problem.

Debt-connected poverty has driven fisherfolk to resort to such desperate

methods, even as the landless rural poor try to eke out a living by
encroaching farther and farther into forest lands. If current trends
continue, Philippine forests will completely disappear within this decade,
which will mean ever more disastrous floods, droughts, and landslides.
This indeed is a 'fate worse than debt'. It is not a result of recent
developments, but of a long historical process which is worth recalling.

Where did it all start?

The Philippines was a direct colony of Spain, and then of the United States
of America, for about four hundred years. In 1946, the Americans granted
the country what is best described as 'flag independence', because in many
ways, and especially in economic terms, that independence was hollow.
The post-liberation period saw a Philippine economy ravaged by
World War II. Rehabilitation assistance from the United States became an
overriding consideration for Filipino leaders. In exchange for such aid,
they allowed 'parity rights' for American businesses, which meant the
latter could operate public .utilities and exploit the country's natural
resources. Free-trade policies were also adopted, leading to the flooding
of the domestic market by North American goods, and an acute balance-
of-payments crisis by the late 1940s.
 The origins of the problem 5

To ward off bankruptcy and prevent the growth of a communist-led

rebellion, the government imposed import and exchange controls, with
the approval of US President Truman. Twelve years of such controls
made possible the rise of Filipino businesses, especially light industries
to produce goods that would take the place of previously imported
commodities. The entrepreneurs who set up these businesses were the
force behind the 'Filipino First' policy adopted in 1958, which gave pref-
erential treatment to Filipinos in the economic development of the country.
The foreign business community went on a counter-offensive. Pressures
from foreign interests eventually succeeded in 1961 with the onset of the
Macapagal administration, which immediately dropped the 'Filipino
First' slogan, abolished import and foreign-exchange controls, and
devalued the peso PI'S a vis the US dollar. Decontrol led to unlimited
repatriation of profits by foreign corporations. Unrestricted imports
resulted in an increasingly unfavourable balance of trade,5 and subjected
Filipino-manufactured goods to overwhelming competition. The deple-
tion of foreign-exchange reserves led the Philippines into the 'debt trap',
the cycle of permanent dependence on global financial institutions,
principally the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since the beginning
of the Macapagal administration, the Philippines has had to adopt the
prescriptions of the IMF on matters regarding economic policies and
programmes in exchange for 'stabilisation loans'.6
IMF-imposed devaluation in the early 1960s had the most crippling
effects on Filipino businesses, which had to pay almost double for every
dollar's worth of capital goods they had to import. On the other hand, it
was most advantageous to foreign investors, whose dollars could buy
almost twice as much as they used to. Under these circumstances, it was
very easy for North American corporations to take over struggling
Filipino industries.
Policies favourable to foreign interests continued during the
administration of President Ferdinand Marcos. In 1967, the Investment
Incentives Act allowed even business enterprises not possessing the
required proportion of Philippine ownership and control to operate in
preferred, non-pioneer areas of investment under certain conditions.
After the 1969 elections, characterised by massive electoral overspending
which pushed the country to the verge of bankruptcy, the Philippine
peso was again devalued against the US dollar, as a result of IMF
pressure. The Philippine government had to bow to the pressure or
accept an end to the aid and credit which it desperately needed.
Devaluation was again a boon to foreign investors and exporters. The
6 The Philippines: Debt and Poverty

losers were the Filipino manufacturers, who had to bear higher costs of
imports and repayments of foreign borrowings, as well as tighter credit
restrictions. Many Filipino industries folded up or were taken over by
foreign-owned competitors. The inflation resulting from devaluation also
greatly reduced the real income of the Filipino working people.7
Foreign domination of the Philippine economy was considerably
strengthened during the martial-law years (1972-1986). The country was
placed even more firmly in the debt trap, with its foreign obligations
estimated at $25-$30 billion. In securing those loans, it had to accede to the
demands of its creditors, principally the World Bank and the IMF, together
with 483 foreign commercial banks. Such demands involved the virtual
surrender of the country's economic sovereignty. Transnational
corporations (TNCs) increased their production of relatively inexpensive -
and therefore competitive - products for the world market, using low-cost
Filipino labour and raw materials.
The 53 per cent devaluation of the peso in 1983, which even the
government-influenced media admitted to be an IMF imposition, ruined
many Filipino businesses (now an 'endangered species'). It benefited
only foreign firms whose dollars could facilitate their takeover of
floundering enterprises, and dollar-earning export industries tied to the
global market controlled by TNCs. The mass of Filipino consumers,
already reeling from the soaring inflation triggered by the double
devaluation, had to bear increased water and electricity rates and higher
taxes and charges for government services, which again were World
Bank-IMF recommendations.
The Philippine debt crisis became a full-blown one during the Marcos
regime. In 1965, the beginning of the Marcos administration, the country's
debt burden was a mere $599 million. By 1970, this had risen to $2.3
billion; by 1975 to $4.9 billion; by 1983 (the beginning of the end for the
Marcos dictatorship as waves of protest followed the assassination of
Benigno Aquino, Jr., the most prominent opposition leader), to $24.1
billion; and by February 1986 (when the Marcos regime collapsed and the
administration of Corazon Aquino took over), to $26.3 billion.8
Two factors contributed to this increasing debt burden. One was the
over-eagerness of the big North American, Japanese and European banks
to lend billions of petrodollars to developing countries, including the
Philippines, in the 1970s. The other was the borrowing spree which
Marcos' allies engaged in, to finance business empires which piled up
debts which were later passed on to the government to assume. These
two factors aggravated the long-standing problem of balance of payment
 The origins of the problem 7

John Clark/Oxfam
In the foreground: shanty houses; in the background: a grandiose legacy of the Marcos
regime, poorly constructed and already crumbling.

deficits caused by trade deficits and profit remittances, which had to be

financed by more and more foreign borrowings. It is noteworthy that
during the entire post-war period, the Philippines enjoyed a trade surplus
only three times (1963,1966, and 1973).9
The profligacy of the Marcos family was legendary. Luxurious build-
ings and 'white elephants' abound to this day as testimonials to the First
Lady's truly impressive 'edifice complex'. All this, plus the vast array of
shoes, clothes, art works, and other worldly possessions now on display
at Malacanang Palace, must have cost millions of dollars and brought
pressure to bear on the foreign-exchange reserves.
The administration of President Cory Aquino, instead of making a
clean break with the Marcos past, promised to pay the Marcos debts 'if
only for honour'. Her administration also adopted the same economic
policies so closely identified with IMF-World Bank prescriptions.

Who gains from the debt?

We can find the answers to this question by looking at who borrows,
who lends, and where the borrowed money goes.
Using 1989 figures, we find that more than 80 per cent of the $28
billion debt was owed by the public sector, meaning the Central Bank,
and government-owned or controlled corporations such as the Philippine
8 The Philippines: Debt and Poverty

National Bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National

Power Corporation, etc. This means that ultimately, most of the debt will
be paid by government from the national budget. Taxpayers will have to
shell out more money, and people will have to forego much-needed social
services. The other 20 per cent of the national debt was accounted for by
the private sector, meaning the large banks, manufacturers and traders,
many of which are global or transnational corporations.
More than half of the debt was owed to commercial banks, which
means that the country was hostage to fluctuating interest rates in the
international financial market. Because a one per cent increase in
interest rates results in a $130 million rise in interest payments, an
additional $260 million had to be released in 1988 because of the two per
cent increase in interest rates. Almost one quarter of the debt was owed
to the governments of countries like the United States and Japan, while
almost one fifth was owed to multilateral institutions such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development
Bank.10
The creditors benefit from the debt by profiting from interest
payments. They make sure that old debts are paid through new debts, so
nobody loses money through debtor default. (From 1972-1983, an average
of 53.5 per cent of new borrowings went on repayments.11) In fact, there
seems to be a shift from direct investments to interest payments as the
main source of extracting surplus from the developing countries.
In exchange for new loans, multilateral financial institutions such as
the IMF and World Bank, and various consultative groups of creditor
banks and countries, are also able to influence governments to
implement policies favourable to them. These policies can be collectively
described as 'structural adjustment', which according to the World Bank
includes:

... a range of measures intended to reduce internal and external

deficits, increase efficiency in the economy, and reduce
government expenditure. Typically, they would include (1)
changing the exchange rate to reflect more closely the true value
of the currency ... (2) reducing government payrolls; (3) selling to
private interests or dismantling government-owned enterprises;
(4) raising agricultural prices closer to world market levels ... and
(5) reducing subsidies both on consumption items, including
food, and to producers.12
 The origins of the problem 9

In the Philippine experience, creditor-imposed policies also include

the liberalising of controls on imports, new taxes, higher public utility
rates, wage freezes, credit squeezes, and efforts to increase foreign-
exchange earnings, in particular through the expansion of exports. As
summarised by one source, the principle of the conditions imposed by
the International Monetary Fund is that 'the debtor country must tighten
its belt so it would spend less and earn foreign exchange'.13
All this favours foreign creditors in particular and foreign business in
general in a number of ways. Deregulation and import liberalisation leave
the market wide open for penetration and inundation by foreign products.
Imported apples, for example, are now on sale in most shopping areas.
They are cheaper than local mangoes, which have become scarce.
Privatisation drives government out of the scene, leaving the field to
global concerns which are in the best position to take over even the most
lucrative public corporations. Devaluation and wage freezes make Filipino
labour even cheaper than before, and render transnational exports even
more competitive in the global market.
No wonder foreign investors are having a heyday, at the expense of
the Filipino people. The Freedom From Debt Coalition cites Central Bank
data which show that from 1970-1987, more dollars were pumped out of
the country in the form of profit remittances, royalties, fees, etc. than the
dollars that came in as investments. In-flow totalled $2,557 billion, versus
an out-flow of $3,734, resulting in a net out-flow of $1,177 billion.14
The Filipino elite also benefited from the debt. During the Marcos
regime, there were claims that negotiators and their staff benefited from
payments to make 'feasibility studies' (often with the advice of expensive
foreign consultants) and to go on expensive trips abroad.
The bureaucracies and officialdom of corporate borrowers also
benefited, accused by one observer in 1984 of building 'five-star staff
houses, rest houses, and sports complexes all over the country; [they]
acquire helicopters and charter private planes; and raise salaries to astro-
nomical levels ...\15
'Lobbyists', 'high-level fixers', and businessmen-supporters of the
political elite (commonly known in the Philippines as 'cronies') benefited
as they 'negotiated' with lending institutions and 'liaised' with suppliers
and contractors in return for a share of the total loan. The most notorious
case involving bribery was that of the Bataan nuclear power plant, where
evidence compiled by a member institution of the Freedom From Debt
Coalition suggests that a Marcos 'crony' (Herminio Disini) received a five
per cent commission from the US corporation Westinghouse in exchange
10 The Philippines: Debt and Poverty

for clinching the deal. Estimates of this commission range from $55
million to $80 million.16
Private corporations owned by 'cronies' also benefited as they incurred
loans they did not deserve, and later passed on the loans for government
to assume. During the Marcos period, such 'crony corporations' had loan
exposures in the hundreds of millions of dollars.17
It is also quite likely that corrupt Filipino officials, like their
counterparts elsewhere in the Third World, siphoned out money to
foreign banks, which re-lent the money to the country, only to be
siphoned out again by the local elite.

The price of honour

Central Bank figures show that for 1989, the debt-service burden reached
$3,116 billion, $2,217 billion for interest and $899 million for principal.18
The World Bank estimated that total debt service for the years 1989 and
1990 would reach $7.3 billion.19
The Aquino administration, as mentioned earlier, has pledged to
honour all the debts accumulated by the country. It has chosen a
conciliatory, non-confrontational stance towards foreign creditors,
preferring to renegotiate for better terms of repayment and also for more
borrowings to repay old loans. It offers attractive options like debt-for-
equity swaps, by which foreigners buying debt papers in dollars can
convert them into pesos and buy into Filipino corporations at a huge
discount.
Debt service as a percentage of the national budget rose from 24.5 per
cent in 1986, the year the Aquino administration took over, to 44 per cent
in 1989. Ironically, the government still follows a decree left over from
the Marcos era, stipulating that national funds be automatically provided
for debt service without having to be approved by the legislature. In so
doing, the Aquino administration violates the 1987 Constitution that it
brought into being, which specifies that Congress is the only entity
which can make appropriations.
Debt negotiations have always been the responsibility of the Central
Bank and the Department of Finance. The terms of such negotiations
have always been shrouded in secrecy; the people who would be most
affected by the outcome have always been excluded from influencing the
negotiating strategy.
Invariably, the government position is circumscribed by the condition-
alities imposed by creditors, principally the IMF, within the framework of
'adjustment'. Together with the stick, there is always a carrot: in the
 The origins of the problem 11

Philippine case, the promise of 'new money' and more 'aid' in the form of
such initiatives as the Philippine Aid Plan (which is described later in this
chapter).

The 'Letter of Intenf

The 'Letter of Intenf (LoD, which contains a Memorandum of Economic Policy
from the Philippines to the IMF, was formulated by a small group of officials with
guidance from IMF officials. Issued in March 1989, it prescribes economic targets
for 1989-1992, on the basis of which the government secured a new $1.3 billion
loan, $1.1 billion of which will be used to repay old loans. As one source
exclaimed, We borrow again in order to pay back what we borrowed before!'20
As expected, the Lol prescribed the usual adjustment formula, which
consists principally of austerity measures so that the government can pay
back its debt. These measures include:

- increasing taxes;
- transferring the debt of private corporations to the national govern-
ment (which means that ordinary citizens will ultimately pay for it in
terms of higher taxes or foregone services);
- the removal of government subsidy for and control over the price of
rice;
- increasing charges exacted by public utility corporations;
- limiting government expenditure on its own employees.

These measures are fundamentally opposed to the interests and welfare

of the poor, as we shall see in the next chapter.
Solita Collas-Monsod, former Economic Planning Secretary who left
the government after she had unsuccessfully opposed IMF condition-
alities, shed light in subsequent papers and interviews on why the
government rushed into such an onerous commitment. She claimed that
during her time, The IMF framework was unacceptable to the Philippine
authorities.' 21 Its growth targets were too low, and would result in
'decreases in what were considered vital infrastructure and current expen-
ditures'. Negotiations with the IMF were suspended but were later
revived, only to culminate in the Lol.
According to Solita Monsod, the proponents of the Lol justified its
hasty issue by citing Philippine arrears which might lead to the
suspension of loan disbursements. They also emphasised the need to
make progress towards the realisation of the Philippine Aid Plan.
12 The Philippines: Debt and Poverty

The Philippine Aid Plan

The Philippine Aid Plan (PAP) is supposed to be a mechanism by which
developed countries, particularly the United States and Japan, can
provide economic assistance to the Philippines. Its history is linked to the
negotiations on the US military bases in the country, as the Washington
administration, with its huge budgetary and trade deficits, tries to share
the burden of retaining these bases with others in lieu of direct
compensation or rental.22
The PAP is based on a comprehensive country programme which
contains virtually the policies and prescriptions of the World Bank and
the IMF. This programme, entitled The Philippine Agenda for Sustained
Growth and Development', served as the basis for discussion during the
pledging session for the PAP which took place in Tokyo in July 1989; this
session supposedly resulted in a total of $3.5 billion in grants and loans
for 1989. However, Solita Monsod, former Secretary for Economic
Planning, says that new pledges amount only to $251.3 million for 1989,
and $986 million for 1989-1992.23 In brief, the PAP could never be the
solution to the debt problem of the Philippines!
 3
What the debt means to the poor
When we talk about the poor, we are talking about at least half of the
Filipino population of 62 million people. According to official data, the
incidence of poverty in the population in 1988 was 49.5 per cent. This
figure is based on a poverty threshold of P2,709 (£56.43), defined as the
'minimum amount of monthly income that a family of six members need
to meet its nutritional requirements and other basic needs'.1
Government data, however, contrast sharply with unofficial sources.
Many economists in the same period counted 70 per cent of the
population as living in absolute poverty, meaning that they 'cannot buy
for their families recommended nutrient requirements, cannot permit
two changes of garments, cannot permit Grade 6 schooling for the
children, cannot cover minimal costs of medical care and cannot pay for
fuel and rent'.2
It is enough to say at this point that too many of the people are poor.
Among them are farmers (upland and lowland), agricultural workers,
fisherfolk, and the low-paid and marginalised sectors in the urban areas
who are collectively known as the 'urban poor'. In general, there have
always been more poor people in the rural areas than in the urban areas.
In general, too, there are more women and female-headed households
among the poor, because of their low status in society, and the commonly
low remuneration for women's work.
One reason why there are so many poor Filipinos is that the rich
monopolise so much of the wealth and income. The 1988 World Develop-
ment Report shows that the Philippines 'has one of the most inequitable
distributions of income in Asia compared to India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka,
and Bangladesh'. The basis for such a conclusion is that "The percentage
share of Philippine household income for the bottom 20 per cent was
pegged at 5.2 per cent in 1985', while 'the highest 10 per cent of house-
holds in the Philippines accounted for a hefty 36.4 per cent share'.3
Figures for 1988 were about the same.
The UNICEF study on the Philippines (included in the book Adjustment
with a Human Face) says that 'low-income families are characterized by
(a) lack of productive assets or control over such assets; (b) limited
use of modern technology in their production activities; (c) limited
14 The Philippines: Debt and Poverty

Belinda Coote/Oxfam
Urban poverty: Barrio Simento, Davao City.

access to basic economic and social services; and (d) limited human
capital'.4
This same study revealed some of the causes and the dynamics of
poverty. Referring to the 'lack of resource base and asset control', it noted
primarily the highly distorted distribution of land: fifty-two per cent of
low-income families did not own the land they were cultivating, and 35
per cent cultivated farms smaller than a hectare.
Most low-income families use traditional subsistence methods of
agriculture, partly because modern technology is too expensive for them.
Thus 'only one-fifth have irrigated land, a little more than one-third use
pesticides and fertilizers, less than a quarter use high-yielding varieties,
and less than a third practise interplanting or double cropping'.
'Limited human capital', according to the UNICEF study, is
manifested in lower levels of literacy and education among low-income
families. The study cites the 1983 Integrated Survey of Households
 What the debt means to the poor 15

which shows that of those over 15 years of age among low-income

families, '10 per cent did not go to school, 37 per cent had some
elementary schooling, 26 per cent completed elementary schooling, and
13 per cent had attended high school'.5 If it takes at least seven years of
schooling to ensure functional literacy, then about three-quarters of the
poor who did not complete the six-year elementary schooling may not
really be able to read and write.
In more direct terms, how then does the debt affect the poor? First,
because of the huge amount that government has to allocate for debt
servicing, very little is left to provide for the needs of the poor. Working
on the 1989 budget figures (43.9 per cent for debt service versus 38.7 per
cent for economic and social services), one source claims 'each family
loses PI 0,000 (about £208) worth of government services simply because
of the foreign debf .6
The poor use government schools and government hospitals, if they
can, because they cannot afford to pay fees for private educational and
medical services. In 1989, the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports received only P24.675 billion (£514 million), and the Department
of Health only P7.024 billion (£146 million) compared to P97.712 billion
(£2.03 billion) spent on debt service.7
The problem, however, does not end here. Out of the allocated sums for
social services, the amount that is actually spent on the poor (conservatively
estimated at 50 per cent of the population), after subtracting the salaries of
government personnel,, as well as maintenance and other operating
expenses, is only P880 per capita or P5,280 (£110) per family.8
This figure should be compared with what the government takes from
the poor in the form of taxes (P8,000 per family),9 much of which is
exacted by government in response to debt-related financial difficulties.
The system of taxation is regressive, which means that indirect taxes on
goods and services (of which the poor consume more) account for a
greater percentage of total taxes than taxes on income and property. The
poor pay taxes every time they take a bus ride, every time they use gas to
cook a meal, and every time they see a movie.
These taxes are in compliance with the provisions of the 1989 Letter of
Intent (Lol), which endorses the government's economic policies in
response to conditions imposed by the IMF. The Lol seeks to raise
revenue collection by P25.9 billion, not only through new taxes but also
by increasing charges for services provided by government corporations,
which means higher electricity, water and port rates, which the poor also
pay for.
16 The Philippines: Debt and Poverty

L Freeby/Oxfam
Family shoe-repair stall in Manila.

The poor are affected by IMF-imposed policies in other ways, too. The
removal of government subsidy on and control over the price of rice has
already resulted in a steep price rise. Filipino families who rely on rice to
provide the bulk of their meagre diet now face the prospect of increasing
hunger. The rapid devaluation of the peso against the US dollar means a
drastic rise in the prices of imports, primarily oil, industrial raw materials,
and equipment. This drives up the cost of transportation and basic goods.
With devaluation and the resultant inflation, the purchasing power of
the poor is fast decreasing. Whatever increase in pay or income they
manage to win through concerted effort is seldom sufficient even to
regain what they have lost. Workers who are unorganised, unheard, and
invisible, many of them women and children, have to make do with stag-
nant earnings while prices escalate.
Out of desperation, many Filipinos, conservatively estimated at one
and a half million, now work overseas, where they can earn dollar incomes
many times the maximum they could get were they to remain at home.
With the estimated $2.5 billion they remit annually, they are, in a very real
sense, the ones paying for the country's debt.