Civil Law Review – Property utendi, fruendi, abutendi, disponendi et

Atty. Melissa Romana P. Suarez vindicandi.

Cases on Easements and Servitudes Art. 428 is explicit that the owner
has the right to enjoy and dispose of a
Art. 613. Real Easement thing, without other limitations than those
Borbajo v. Hidden View established by law. A co-owner, such as
GR 152440. Jan 31, 2005 Borbajo, is entitled to use road lots
2nd Division: Tinga, J p: owned in common under Art. 486.
Therefore, the homeowners cannot close
Facts: the road lots to prevent Borbajo from
Jose Bontuyan developed a using the same.
subdivision which was later named Likewise, with Borbajo as a
Hidden View Subdivision. Bontuyan sold registered co-owner of the road lots, it is
the subdivided lots to different utterly pointless to discuss whether she is
individuals. entitled to the easement of right of way.
Among the lots sold are 3 road lots Both from the text of Art. 649 and the
sold to Felicitacion Borbajo. Borbajo also perspective of elementary common sense,
decided to develop into a subdivision, the dominant estate cannot be the servient
other lots which she acquired, adjacent to estate at the same time.
HVS. One of the characteristics of an
The homeowners of HVS easement is that it can be imposed only
constructed a guardhouse at the entrance on the property of another, never on one's
of HVS and hired security guards to own property [Art. 613]. An easement
prevent unauthorized persons and can exist only when the servient and the
construction vehicles from passing dominant estates belong to different
through HVS. The measures adversely owners.
affected the residents of the subdivisions
at the back, as well as Borbajo herself Art. 613 & 614 – Personal and Real
since her delivery trucks and heavy Easements
equipment used in the construction of her Art. 617 – Inseparability or Easements
housing projects then on-going had been Solid Manila v. Bio Hong
effectively prevented from passing GR 90596. Apr 8, 1991
through the road lots. 2nd Division: Sarmiento, J p:

Issue: Facts:
May the homeowners of HVS legally Solidbank is the owner of lot in
prevent Borbajo from using and passing Ermita. It lies in the vicinity of another
through the 3 road lots within the lot, registered in the name of Bio Hong
subdivision? under TCT 128784.
Bio Hong's title came from a prior
Held: owner, and in their deed of sale, the
No. parties thereto reserved as an easement of
Borbajo is one of the registered co- way: “. . . a portion thereof measuring
owners of the road lots. As a registered 914 sqm, had been converted into a
co-owner of the road lots, Borbajo is private alley for the benefit of
entitled to avail of all the attributes of neighboring estates.”
ownership under the Civil Code — jus As a consequence, an annotation was
entered in Bio Hong's title
 Solidbank claims that ever since, it Under Art. 617: “Easements are
(as well as other residents of neighboring inseparable from the estate to which they
estates) had made use of the above actively or passively belong.”
private alley and maintained and Servitudes are merely accessories to
contributed to its upkeep, until sometime the tenements of which they form part.
in 1983, when, and over its protests, Bio Although they are possessed of a separate
Hong constructed steel gates that juridical existence, as mere accessories,
precluded unhampered use. they cannot, however, be alienated from
In 1964, Solidbank commenced suit the tenement, or mortgaged separately.
for injunction against Bio Hong, to have The fact, however, that the alley, as
the gates removed and to allow full an easement, is inseparable from the main
access to the easement. lot is no argument to defeat Solidbank's
Bio Hong alleged that the easement claims, because as an easement precisely,
referred to has been extinguished by it operates as a limitation on the title of
merger in the same person of the the owner of the servient estate,
dominant and servient estates upon the specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).
purchase of the lot by Bio Hong from its Hence, even if Bio Hong did acquire
former owner. ownership over the lot—including the
disputed alley — he did not acquire the
Issue: right to close that alley or obstruct it and
Did Bio Hong have the right to close thus prevent the public from using it,
the right of way? because as a servitude, the alley is
supposed to be open to the public.
Held:
No. There is no question that an Issue:
easement, as described in the deed of sale Was there a merger that caused the
executed between Bio Hong and the extinguishment of the easement?
seller, had been constituted on Bio
Hong's property, and has been in fact Held:
annotated at the back of TCT 128784. No. A merger exists when ownership
Bio Hong’s act was in defiance of of the dominant and servient estates is
these conditions and a violation of the consolidated in the same person.
deed of sale, and, of course, the servitude The servitude is a personal servitude.
of way. One constituted not in favor of a
It is hardly the point that Bio Hong is particular tenement but rather, for the
the owner of the lot on which the right- benefit of the general public.
of-way had been established and that an In a personal servitude, there is
easement cannot impair ownership. therefore no "owner of a dominant
Solidbank is not claiming the easement as tenement" to speak of, and the easement
its own, but is merely seeking to have pertains to persons without a dominant
Bio Hong respect the easement already estate, in this case, the public at large.
existing thereon. Merger presupposes the existence of
It is true that the sale did include the a prior servient-dominant owner
alley. SC rejects Solidbank's contention relationship, and the termination of that
that the deed of sale "excluded" it, relation leaves the easement of no use.
because as a mere right-of-way, it can not Unless the owner conveys the property in
be separated from the tenement and favor of the public — if that is possible
maintain an independent existence. — no genuine merger can take place that
would terminate a personal easement.
Art. 617, 618, 619 1. "[t]he easement is personal. It was
Unisource v. Chung voluntarily constituted in favor of a
GR 173252. July 17, 2009 certain Hidalgo, the owner of Lot 2.
2nd Division: Quisumbing, J 2. "the voluntary easement of the right
of way in favor of Hidalgo was
Facts: constituted simply by will or
Unisource is the registered owner of agreement of the parties.
a lot [T-176253]. The title contains a Having made such an admission,
memorandum of encumbrance of a Unisource cannot now claim that what
voluntary easement which has been exists is a legal easement and that the
carried over from the OCT of Sandico. same should be cancelled.
The annotation reads: The opening of an adequate outlet
“By order dated Oct 1924 of the to a highway can extinguish only legal
CFI, it is declared that Hidalgo has the or compulsory easements, not voluntary
right to open doors in the course of Lot 2 easements like in the case at bar. The fact
and to pass through the land of that an easement by grant may have also
Encarnacion Sandico, until the bank of qualified as an easement of necessity
the estero that goes to the Pasig River…” does not detract from its permanency as a
As Sandico's lot was transferred to property right, which survives the
several owners, the MOE of a voluntary termination of the necessity.
easement in favor of Hidalgo was A voluntary easement of right of way
consistently annotated at the back of can be extinguished only by mutual
every title covering Sandico's lot until agreement or by renunciation of the
TCT 176253 was issued in Unisource's owner of the dominant estate.
favor. Hidalgo's lot was eventually
transferred to Joseph Chung. Issue:
On May 2000, Unisource filed a Is the easement personal only to
Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Hidalgo since the annotation merely
Voluntary Easement of Right of Way on mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without
the ground that the dominant estate has equally binding their heirs or assigns?
an adequate access to a public road which
is Matienza St. Held:
No. A voluntary easement of right of
Issue: way is like any other contract. As such, it
Should the easement be cancelled? is generally effective between the parties,
their heirs and assigns, except in case
Held: where the rights and obligations arising
No. Under Art. 619, easements are from the contract are not transmissible.
established either by law or by the will of Although the easement does not
the owner. The former are called legal, appear in Chung' title over the dominant
and the latter, voluntary easements. estate, the same subsists. Registration of
In this case, Unisource itself the dominant estate without the
admitted that a voluntary easement of annotation does not extinguish the
right of way exists in favor of Chung. easement. It is the registration of the
In its petition to cancel the servient estate as free, that is, without the
encumbrance of voluntary easement of annotation of the voluntary easement,
right of way, Unisource alleged that: which extinguishes the easement. [Art.
617]
Issue: Dela Cruz claimed that such use was
Does the fact that Chung divided the with the knowledge of Ramiscal. Dela
lot extinguish the easement? Cruz alleged that they asked Ramiscal to
give them a 1.5-m x 40.15-m easement.
Held: Ramiscal did not want to give them the
No. Art. 618 provides that if the easement on the eastern side of her lot,
dominant estate is divided between two towards Boni but, instead, offered to
or more persons, each of them may use them the said 1.1-m wide path towards
the easement in its entirety, without 18th Ave., which offer they had accepted.
changing the place of its use, or making it
more burdensome in any other way. Issue:
Did Ramiscal voluntarily accord
Dela Cruz a right of way?
Art. 619. How Easements are
Established Held:
Art. 649. Easement of Right of Way No. Dela Cruz failed to show by
Dela Cruz v. Ramiscal competent evidence other than their bare
GR 137882. Feb 4, 2005 claim that they entered into an agreement
2nd Division: Chico-Nazario, J p: with Ramiscal, through her foreman,
Mang Puling, to use the path to 18th Ave.
Facts: It was only the foreman, Mang
Olga Ramiscal is the registered Puling, who talked with them regarding
owner of a lot located at the corner of 18th said pathway on Ramiscal's lot. It is,
Ave. and Boni Serrano Ave. QC. therefore, foolhardy for Dela Cruz to
Dela Cruz are occupants of a lot in believe that the alleged foreman of
the name of Concepcion de la Peña, Ramiscal had the authority to bind the
located at the back of Ramiscal's lot. Ramiscal relating to the easement of right
This case involes a 1.1-m wide x 2.6- of way.
m long strip of land owned by Ramiscal
which is being used by Dela Cruz as a Issue:
pathway to and from 18th Ave. Dela Cruz Are Dela Cruz legally entitled to a
had enclosed the same with a gate, fence, right of way?
and roof.
Later, Ramiscal discovered that the Held:
pathway being occupied by Dela Cruz is No. Likewise futile are Dela Cruz'
part of her property. Ramiscal attempts to show that they are legally
immediately demanded that Dela Cruz entitled to a pathway under Art. 649.
demolish the structure constructed on Concepcion de la Peña had provided
said pathway without her knowledge and Dela Cruz with an adequate ingress and
consent. egress towards Boni Ave. Inasmuch as
Ramiscal filed a complaint seeking Dela Cruz have an adequate outlet to a
the demolition of the structure Boni, they have no right to insist on using
constructed by Dela Cruz. Ramiscal Ramiscal's lot as pathway towards 18th
asserted that Dela Cruz have an existing Ave. and for which no indemnity was
right of way to a public highway which is being paid by them.
a 1.5-m wide alley on the lot of de la
Peña, which serves as path to Boni Ave.
Issue: Jose alleged that they are owners of a
Dela Cruz claimed that de la Peña 66,819 sqm lot in Cavite covered by TCT
had constructed houses on the pathway T-957323. Sometime in 1970, Paulo
given to them. Campos, brother of Jose, verbally
requested Jose to grant NPC a right-of-
Held: way over a portion of the lot. Wooden
The isolation of Dela Cruz' lot was posts and transmission lines were to be
due to the acts of de la Peña, who is installed. Jose acceded to this request
required by law to grant a right of way to upon the condition that the installation
the occupants of her property. would only be temporary in nature. NPC
Art. 649 provides that the easement assured Jose that the arrangement would
of right of way is not compulsory if the be temporary. 
isolation of the immovable is due to the Contrary to the verbal agreement of
proprietor's own acts. To allow Dela Cruz the parties, however, NPC continued to
access to Ramiscal's lot towards 18 th Ave. use the lot for its posts and lines without
simply because it is a shorter route to a compensating Jose therefore.
public highway, despite the fact that a Citing Art. 620, NPC contends that it
road right of way, which is even wider, had already acquired the easement of
although longer, was in fact provided for right-of-way over the portion of the lot
them by de la Peña towards Boni Ave. by prescription, the said easement having
would ignore what jurisprudence has been allegedly continuous and apparent
consistently maintained that "mere for a period of about 23 years, i.e., from
convenience for the dominant estate is about the middle of 1970 to the early part
not enough to serve as its basis. To of 1994. 
justify the imposition of this servitude,
there must be a real, not a fictitious or Issue:
artificial necessity for it. ". . . Did NPC acquire the easement of
Under Art. 649, it is the owner, or right-of-way by prescription?
any person who by virtue of a real right
may cultivate or use any immovable Held:
surrounded by other immovable No. NPC’s claim that, under Art.
pertaining to other persons, who is 620, it had already acquired by
entitled to demand a right of way through prescription the easement of right-of-way
the neighboring estates. Dela Cruz fell over that portion of the lot where its
short of proving that they are the owners wooden electric posts and transmission
of the supposed dominant estate. Nor lines were erected is untenable. 
were they able to prove that they possess Art. 620 provides that: Continuous
a real right to use such property. and apparent easements are acquired
either by virtue of a title or by
Art. 620
prescription of 10 years.
NPC v. Spouses Campos
Prescription as a mode of acquisition
GR 143643.  June 27, 2003
requires the existence of the following:
2nd Division: Callejo, J
1. capacity to acquire by prescription;
2. a thing capable of acquisition by
Facts: prescription;
In 1994, Jose Campos filed an action 3. possession of the thing under certain
for sum of money and damages against conditions; and
NPC.  4. lapse of time provided by law.
 Acquisitive prescription may either Issue:
be ordinary, in which case the possession Did Javier acquire through
must be in good faith and with just title, prescription an easement of light and
or extraordinary, in which case there is view which would prevent Cid, the
neither good faith nor just title.  In either owner of the adjoining lot, to build
case, there has to be possession which something which would obstruct it?
must be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Facts:
As a corollary, Art. 1119 provides No.
that: “Acts of possessory character The windows in question are
executed in virtue of license or by mere admittedly in Javier’s own building
tolerance of the owner shall not be erected on her own lot. The easement, if
available for the purposes of there is any, is therefore a negative one.
possession.” The alleged prohibition having been
NPC’s possession of that portion of avowedly made in 1913 or 1914, before
the lot was clearly upon the tolerance of the present Civil Code took effect, the
Jose. This permissive use by NPC, no applicable legal provision is Art. 538 of
matter how long continued, will not the Spanish Civil Code which provides:
create an easement of right-of-way by
prescription.  ART. 538. In order to acquire
Possession is the fundamental basis by prescription the easements…
of prescription, whether ordinary or x x x …, the time of the
extraordinary. NPC never acquired the possession shall be computed, . .
requisite possession in this case.  Its use . in negative easements, from
of that lot where it erected the poles and the day on which the owner of
lines was due merely to the tacit license the dominant estate has, by a
and tolerance of Jose. As such, it cannot formal act, forbidden the owner
be made the basis of the acquisition of an of the servient estate to perform
easement of right-of-way by prescription. any act which would be lawful
without the easement."
Art. 621. Easements Acquirable by
Prescription As may be seen, the only question
Cid v. Javier hinges on the interpretation of the phrase
GR L-14116 Jun 30, 1960 "a formal act".
En Banc: Barrera, J p: The phrase "formal act" would
require not merely any writing, but one
Facts: executed in due form and/or with
Javier is the owner of a building solemnity. That this is the intendment of
standing on their lot with windows the law although not expressed in exact
overlooking the adjacent lot. She alleges language is the reason for the
that more than 20 years ago, she made a clarification made in Art. 621 which
verbal prohibition upon the PII of specifically requires the prohibition to be
Laureana Cid [owner of the adjoining in "an instrument acknowledged before a
lot], not to obstruct her light and view. notary public". This is as it should be.
She contends that pursuant to said
verbal prohibition, that she has acquired
by prescription an enforceable easement
of light and view
Art. 619. How easements established owner, possession, however long, will
Art. 620/622. How easements acquired not confer title by prescription.
Bogo-Medellin v. CA It was merely an easement of right of
GR 124699. July 31, 2003 way which was actually granted to
3rd Division: Corona, J p: Bomedco for which reason Bomedco was
able to occupy Lot 954.
Facts: An easement exists only when the
Magdaleno Valdez purchased from servient and dominant estates belong to 2
Feliciana Santillan, on Dec 9, 1935, an different owners. It gives the holder of
unregistered lot. the easement an incorporeal interest on
Prior to the sale, in 1929, Santillan the land but grants no title thereto.
granted Bomedco a railroad right of way Therefore, an acknowledgment of the
for 30 years. When Valdez acquired the easement is an admission that the
land, he respected the grant. The entire property belongs to another.
length of the land was therefore traversed
in the middle by railroad tracks owned by Issue:
Bomedco. The tracks were used for Did Bomeco acquire the easement of
hauling sugar cane from the fields to right of way by way of prescription under
Bomedco's sugar mill. Art. 620?
When Valdez passed away in 1948,
his heirs inherited the land. The right of Held:
way expired sometime in 1959 but No.
Valdez heirs allowed Bomedco to The easement of right of way is
continue using the land. considered discontinuous because it is
In 1989 Valdez demanded the legal exercised only if a person passes or sets
basis for Bomedco's claim over Lot 954 foot on somebody else's land. Like a
and payment of compensation for the use road for the passage of vehicles or
of the land. persons, an easement of right of way of
Bomedco contended that the Valdez railroad tracks is discontinuous because
heirs’ claim was already barred by the right is exercised only if and when a
prescription because of Bomedco's open train operated by a person passes over
and continuous possession of the another's property.
property for more than 50 years. In other words, the very exercise of
the servitude depends upon the act or
Issue: intervention of man which is the very
Did Bomedco acquire Lot 954 essence of discontinuous easements.
through acquisitive prescription under The presence of more or less
Art. 1137? permanent railroad tracks does not in any
way convert the nature of an easement of
Held: right of way to one that is continuous. It
No. is not the presence of apparent signs or
Lot 954 has been in the continuous physical indications showing the
possession of Bomedco since 1929. But existence of an easement, but rather the
possession, to constitute the foundation manner of exercise thereof, that
of a prescriptive right, must be categorizes such easement into
possession under a claim of title, that is, continuous or discontinuous. The
it must be adverse. Unless coupled with presence of physical or visual signs only
the element of hostility towards the true classifies an easement into apparent or
non-apparent.
 The presence of railroad tracks for Facts:
the passage of Bomedco's trains denotes Fe Velasco filed in the CFI an action
the existence of an apparent but against Davao City to quiet title to her lot
discontinuous easement of right of way. known as Lot 77-B-2, a portion of which
Unfortunately, Bomedco never she claims to having been occupied
acquired any title over the use of the right illegally as part of Bolton St.
of way whether by law, donation, In 1970, Velasco discovered that
succession or contract. Its use of the right Bolton St. had encroached upon her lot a
of way, however long, never resulted in portion of 2.5m wide 10m long, along
its acquisition of the easement because; said St. She also discovered that Bolton
under Art. 622, the discontinuous Street was delimited to 9m wide, but the
easement of a right of way can only be proposed width was 15m, and in that
acquired by title and not by prescription. same year 1970, the Bolton St. had
In 1959 when the original 30-year already encroached on her lot.
grant of right of way given to Bomedco
expired, its occupation and use of Lot Issue:
954 came to be by mere tolerance of the Has an easement of right of way
heirs. Thus, upon demand by Valdez been acquired by the City of Davao?
heirs for return of Lot 954 and removal of
the railroad tracks Bomedco which had Held:
no title to the land should have complied. Yes.
Bolton St. has been where it is from
Issue: time immemorial. When the mother title
When is a party deemed to acquire of Velasco's TCT T-7000, which is OCT
title over the easement of right of way? 638, was issued in 1911, it was issued
subject to the provisions of Sec. 39 of
Held: Act 496 which reads:
If the party had: "Sec. 39.Every person receiving a
1. subsequently entered into contractual certificate of title in pursuance of a
right of way with the heirs for the decree or registration, and every
continued use of the land under the subsequent purchasers of registered land
principles of voluntary easements or who takes a certificate of title for value
2. filed a case against the heirs for in good faith shall hold the same free of
conferment on it of a legal easement all encumbrances, except those noted on
of right of way under Art. 649, then said certificate, and any of the following
title over the use of the land is encumbrances which may be subsisting
deemed to exist. namely:
xxx xxx xxx
None of the above to acquire title "Third. Any public highway, way,
over the railroad right of way was ever private way, . . . or any government
pursued by Bomedco. irrigation, canal, or lateral thereof . . ."
Therefore, Bolton St. which is a
public highway, already subsisting when
Art. 622. Easements acquired by Title OCT 638 was issued, as this fact is
Velasco v. Cusi apparent too from the face of the
GR L-33507. July 20, 1981 complaint itself, is deemed to have
2nd Division: DE CASTRO, J p: attached as a legal encumbrance to the lot
originally registered, Lot 77,
notwithstanding the lack of an annotation 2.9 km long. The road was used by B-
thereof on OCT 638. Sugar in hauling and transporting
Velasco, therefore, cannot rely on sugarcane to and from its mill site and
Sec. 39 without making mention, perhaps has thus become indispensable to its
conveniently, of the exception as sugar milling operations.
expressly provided in the later part. On Oct 1992, B-Agro acquired the
Velasco's lot, Lot 77-B-2, which assets of B-Sugar. On Apr 1993, B-Agro
admittedly was originally a part of Lot filed a Complaint against Obias, et al,
77, must have to remain subject to the alleging that Obias unjustifiably
same legal encumbrance of a public barricaded the road, preventing B-Agro's
highway. and the other sugar planters from passing
through the road, thereby causing serious
Issue: damage and prejudice to B-Agro.
Velasco alleges that a road right of B-Agro alleged that:
way is discontinuous and can therefore 1. B-Sugar constructed the road
only be acquired by title and not by pursuant to an agreement with the
prescription. owners of the ricefields the road
traversed.
Held: 2. through prolonged and continuous
The easement of right of way was use of the disputed road, B-Sugar
acquired by virtue of title. Bolton St. acquired a right of way over the
constituted an easement of public properties of the landowners, which
highway on Lot 77, from which Velasco's right of way in turn was acquired by
lot was taken, when the said bigger lot it when it bought B-Sugar 's assets.
was originally registered. B-Agro prayed that Obias be
It remained as such legal permanently ordered to restrain from
encumbrance, as effectively as if it had barricading the disputed road and from
been duly noted on the certificate of title, obstructing its free passage.
by virtue of the clear and express
provision of Sec. 39 of Act 496, it being Issue:
admitted that at the time of the Did an easement of right of way
registration of Lot 77, the public highway exist between B-Sugar and Obias?
was already in existence or subsisting.
This fact erases whatever cause of Held:
action Velasco may have to bring the No. An easement of right of way —
complaint she filed for quieting of title on the privilege of persons or a particular
a portion of the street which she claims to class of persons to pass over another's
be part of her lot, free from encumbrance land, usually through one particular path
of any kind. or linen — is characterized as a
discontinuous easement because its use is
Art. 622 in intervals and depends on the act of
Bicol Agro v. Obias man.
GR 172077. Oct 9, 2009 Because of this character, an
3rd Division: Peralta, J easement of a right of way may only be
acquired by virtue of a title. Art. 622 is
Facts: the applicable law.
In 1972, B-Sugar was established. B- In order for B-Agro to acquire the
Sugar constructed a road 7 m wide and disputed road as an easement of right-of-
way, it was incumbent upon B-Agro to
show its right by title or by an agreement Facts:
with the owners of the lands that said FHDI is the original owner of a lot
road traversed. which it subdivided into 39 lots. FHDI
It is clear that B-Agro failed to sold 22 lots to Aneco and 17 lots to
present any concrete evidence to prove Landex.
that there was such an agreement Landex started the construction of a
between B-Sugar and Obias. concrete wall on one of its road
lots.  Aneco sought to demolish the
Issue: newly-built wall.
Did B-Agro acquire an easement of Landex alleged that Aneco was not
right of way thru prescription? deprived access to its lots due to the
construction of the concrete wall. 
Held: Landex claimed that Aneco has its own
No. It is already well-established that entrance to its lot along other streets.
a right of way is discontinuous and, as Landex also claimed that FHDI sold
such, cannot be acquired by prescription. ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to
The presence of more or less Aneco based on the express stipulation in
permanent railroad tracks does not, in any the deed of sale that FHDI was not
way, convert the nature of an easement of interested in pursuing its own subdivision
right of way to one that is continuous. project.

Issue: Issue:
Did B-Agro acquire an easement of Was there an apparent sign of an
right of way through laches or estoppel? easement under Art. 624?

Held: Held:
No. The positive mandate of Art. 622 No.
— which requires title as basis for the Aneco knew at the time of the sale
acquisition of an easement of a right of that the lots sold by FHDI were not
way — precludes the application of the subdivision units based on the express
equitable principle of laches. stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI,
The fact that the law is categorical the seller, was no longer interested in
that discontinuous easements cannot be pursuing its subdivision project, thus: It
acquired by prescription militates against ceased to be a road lot when FHDI sold
B-Agro's claim of laches. To stress, it to Aneco not as subdivision lots. 
discontinuous easements can only be There is no question that Art. 624
acquired by title. allows the continued use of an apparent
As to the issue of estoppel, B-Agro easement should the owner alienate the
did not present any evidence that would property to different persons. Originally,
show an admission, representation or the lot was provided by FHDI as a road
conduct by Obias that will give rise to lot because of its intention to convert it
estoppel. into a subdivision project. 
However, when the 22 lots were sold
Art. 624 to Aneco, it was very clear from FHDI’s
Aneco Realty v. Landex deed of sale that the lots sold ceased to
GR 165952; Jul 28, 2008 be subdivision lots. 
3rd Division: Reyes, J Aneco knew from the very start that
   at the time of the sale, the 22 lots sold to
it were not intended as subdivision units.
 Consequently, the easement that common areas it allegedly encroached on
used to exist on the road lot ceased when and to remove the structures it built
Aneco and FHDI agreed that the lots thereon. Cypress sought to remove the
would be consolidated and would no door erected by Goldcrest along the
longer be intended as a subdivision. stairway between the 8/F and 9/F floors,
as well as the door built in front of the
Issue: 9/F elevator lobby, and the removal of
Aneco insists that it has the intention the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck.
of continuing the subdivision project Ocular inspections discovered that:
earlier commenced by FHDI.  It also 1. Goldcrest enclosed and used the
holds on to the previous development common area fronting the 2 elevators
permit granted to FHDI.  on the 9/F as a storage room.
2. Goldcrest constructed a permanent
Held: structure which encroached 68.01
Aneco did not acquire any right from sqm of the roof deck's common area.
FHDI since FHDI itself expressly stated 3. Goldcrest failed to secure an
in their agreement that it has no more alteration approval for the said
intention of continuing the subdivision. If permanent structure.
Aneco desires to convert its lots into a
subdivision, it has to apply in its own Goldcrest contends that since the roof
name, and must have its own provisions deck's common limited area is for its
for a road lot. exclusive use, building structures thereon
and leasing the same to third persons do
Art. 625, 626, 627 not impair the subject easement.
Goldcrest v. Cypress Gardens Cypress insists the said acts impair
GR 171072. Apr 7, 2009 the subject easement because the same
nd
2 Division: Quisumbing, J are already beyond the contemplation of
the easement granted to Goldcrest.
Facts:
Goldcrest is the developer of Issue:
Cypress Gardens. In 1977, Goldcrest W/N there was an impairment of
incorporated Cypress Gardens Condo easement.
Corporation to manage the condo project
and to hold title to all the common areas. Held:
Title to the land on which the condo Yes. Goldcrest has no right to erect
stands was transferred to Cypress. But an office structure on the limited
Goldcrest retained ownership of the 2- common area despite its exclusive right
level penthouse unit on the 9th and 10th to use the same. Goldcrest's act impaired
floors of the condo. the easement.
Following the turnover of the Any violation of Art. 625, 626, 627
management of the Condo to Cypress in constitutes impairment of the easement.
1995, it was discovered that certain Here, Goldcrest's acts shows that it
common areas pertaining to Cypress were breached a number of said restrictions:
being occupied and encroached upon by 1. The construction and the lease of the
Goldcrest. office structure were neither
In 1998, Cypress filed a complaint necessary for the use or preservation
against Goldcrest before the HLURB, of the roof deck's limited area.
seeking to compel Goldcrest to vacate the 2. The weight of the office structure
increased the strain on the condo's
 foundation and on the roof deck's closed the gate that built. Unable to use
common limited area, making the the old right of way, V lodged a
easement more burdensome and complaint against Tan. Tan filed an
adding unnecessary safety risk to all action with the RTC against V for
the condo unit owners. extinguishment of easement on Lot B.
3. The construction of the said office
structure clearly went beyond the Issue:
intendment of the easement since it Is V entitled to the easement of right
illegally altered the approved condo of way?
project plan and violated Sec. 4 of the
condo's Declaration of Restrictions. Held:
No. The true agreement of the heirs
Art. 631 was for the establishment of an easement
Spouses Salimbangon v. Tan of right of way for the benefit solely of
GR 185240; Jan 20, 2010 the lots that did not have direct access to
2nd Division: Abad, J the street, namely Lots D and E. 
  Lots A and B did not need this alley
Facts: since they were facing the street. 
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate in Consequently, when the owner of
1951, leaving a lot. In 1973 his children Lots D and E also became the owner of
executed an EJP, adjudicating and Lot B, the easement of right of way on
dividing the lot among themselves. Lot B became extinct by operation of
law. The existence of a dominant estate
Lot D Lot E and a servient estate is incompatible with
Lot A [V] Lot B Lot C the idea that both estates belong to the
Street same person.
Wth the ownership of Lots B, D, and
Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a E now consolidated in a common owner,
city street.  But Lots D and E were not, namely, Tan, then the easement of right
they being interior lots.  To give these of way on Lot B may be said to have
interior lots access to the street, the heirs been extinguished by operation of law.
imposed a 3-m wide alley, an easement  
of right of way, that ran exclusively along Art. 642. Easement of Aqueduct
the southwest boundary of Lot B from Estate of Banzon v. Mariano Banzon
Lots D and E to the street. GR 27296. Oct 8, 1927
The partition that embodied this En Banc: Villa-Real, J p:
easement of right of way was annotated
on the individual titles issued to the heirs. Facts:
V was owner of Lot A. V constructed This deals with 2 irrigation canals
a house on Lot A and built two garages crossing a land belonging to the estate of
on it. One garage abutted the street while Jose Banzon.
the other, located in the interior of Lot A, Gonzales, administatrix, alleges that
used the alley or easement of right of way Mariano Banzon, brother of Jose and
existing on Lot B to get to the street. V owner of adjoining estate, without her
had this alley cemented and gated. knowledge or consent:
Later, Tan bought Lots B, C, D, and 1. in April 1919, opened a canal across
E.  Tan built improvements on Lot B that said land from east, to west, for the
spilled into the easement area. Tan also
 purpose of drawing water from Which of these 2 kinds of easements
Talisay River to irrigate their lands; is contemplated by Act 496 Sec. 39?
2. in Dec 1922, opened another canal
almost parallel to the former, on the Held:
same land on the north side, to Voluntary.
irrigate their lands from the river; Sec. 70 of Act 496, says: "..Nothing
Gonzales prays that Mariano be contained in this Act shall in any way be
ordered to close said canals. construed to....change or affect in any
other way any other rights or liabilities
The facts show that: created by law and applicable to
1. the first canal was built in 1905, as unregistered land, except as otherwise
part of an irrigation system for the expressly provided in this Act or in the
use of the water of Talisay River for amendments hereof."
the benefit of the owners of the If Act 496 do not affect rights
adjacent lands; created by law, the easements meant by
2. upto now many landowners have Sec. 39 cannot be other than voluntary
made use of said water through said and not legal easements duly constituted.
system for watering of their lands,
including Jose during his life, and his Issue:
heirs after his death; Does Mariano have the right to the 2
3. Sep 1918, Mariano, with knowledge canals?
and consent of Jose, and after having
applied to the DPWH for permission Held:
to use the water of the Talisay River, The 1st canal was opened by Mariano
opened the 2nd canal, through a place across Jose's land with his knowledge and
that was most convenient and least consent, and is therefore a voluntary
onerous to 3rd parties; easement.
4. OCT 2502 in favor of the heirs of Since its existence does not appear in
Jose Banzon, does NOT show the OCT 2502, in conformity with Act 496,
existence of any easement of Sec. 39, said easements was extinguished
aqueduct in favor of any person. and Mariano lost his right to the use of
said canal.
Gonzales argues that since the 2 As to the 2nd canal: Mariano
canals do not appear in OCT 2502, said obtained from the Director of Public
lot is free of said easements and Mariano, Works a grant to use water from the
has no right to continue using them. Talisay River to irrigate his lands, and,
According to Act. 496 Sec. 39, the in accordance with Art. 642 & 643, he
registration of a servient estate asks that he be authorized to open,
extinguishes all easements to which it is maintain and preserve a canal on
subject and which have not been noted on Gonzales's land upon payment of the
the TCT. proper indemnity to Gonzales, alleging
It will be noted that the law makes that the place where said canal passes is
no distinction as to the kind of easement the most convenient and least onerous to
and it is well known that there are two third parties, and that there is no other
kinds of easements — legal and place more appropriate and less
voluntary. prejudicial.
To enjoy the right granted by Art.
Issue: 642, the requisites established in Art. 643
must be complied with.
 Mariano has complied with these Torrens title because servitudes are
requirements. It has been proved that: inseparable from the estates to which
1. he was granted the water from the they actively or passively belong.
Talisay River, a sufficient amount to 2. Villanueva was bound by the
irrigate his land; contract of easement, not only as a
2. the passage opened by him is the voluntary easement but as a legal
most convenient and least onerous to easement
third parties, and 3. a legal easement is mandated by law,
3. he is willing to indemnify the and continues to exists unless its
intestate estate of Jose, owner of the removal is provided for in a title of
servient estate conveyance or the sign of the
easement is removed before the
Art. 649. Easement of Right of Way execution of the conveyance
Villanueva v. Velasco conformably with Art. 649 in
GR 130845. Nov 27, 2000 accordance with Art. 617
2nd Division: QUISUMBING, J p:
Issue:
Facts: W/N the easement binds Villanueva.
Villanueva is the registered owner of
lot covered by TCT-127862. He bought it Held:
from Pacific Bank. PB acquired it from Yes.
Gabriel at a public auction. The easement of right of way
When Villanueva bought the lot originally was voluntarily constituted by
there was a small house on it. It occupied agreement between Gabriel and
1x2 meter wide easement of right of way Espinolas [PII of Sebastian].
Gabriel granted to Sebastian. But the easement in the instant
Unknown to Villanueva, even before petition is both:
he bought the land, Gabriel had 1. an easement by grant or a voluntary
constructed the small house that easement, and
encroached upon the 2-meter easement. 2. an easement by necessity or a legal
Villanueva was also unaware that easement.
Sebastian had filed a civil case for
easement against Gabriel to enforce the The small house occupying 1x2-m
contract of easement. easement obstructs the entry of
Sebastian won the case where the Sebastian’s cement mixer and motor
RTC ruled that a legal easement of right vehicle. 1-m is insufficient for the needs
of way existed in his favor. of Sebastian.
Villanueva argues that: It is well-settled that the needs of the
1. a right of way cannot exist when it is dominant estate determine the width of
not expressly stated or annotated on the easement. Villanueva ought to
the Torrens title demolish whatever edifice obstructs the
2. a person dealing with registered land easement in view of the needs of
is not required to go beyond what is Sebastian’s estate.
recorded in the title Villanueva's proposition, that he is
not bound by the contract of easement
Sebastian alleged that: because the same was not annotated in
1. a right of way can exist even if not the title is unmeritorious.
annotated as an encumbrance in a It is in the nature of legal easement
that the servient estate is legally bound to
provide the dominant estate ingress from pathway which they had been using since
and egress to the public highway. 1995.  Thus, he asserted that Obra was
prohibited from closing said passage. 
Art. 649. Easement of Right of Way
Obra v. Spouses Badua Issue:
GR 149125; August 9, 2007 Does Badua have a legal easement of
VELASCO, JR., J.: right on way on the southern portion of
  Obra’s lot?
Facts:  
Badua owned a house and lot west of Held: 
the lot owned by Obra. Badua’s access to No.
the highway was a pathway traversing When RTC dismissed the original
Obra’s lot which was more than 1-m case, it ruled that Badua had no cause of
wide and 16-m long.  action against Obra, because he failed to
Badua claimed that this pathway had satisfy one of the 4 requisites for the
been established as early as 1955.  In entitlement of a right-of-way. RTC took
1995, however, Obra constructed a fence note of the fact that the new path which
thus, blocking Badua’s access to the traversed the south portion of Obra’s lot
highway. Badua demanded demolition of is an adequate outlet to a highway. 
the fence, but Obra refused.  Apparently, no pronouncement was
Badua then filed a Complaint for ever made regarding the nature and
Easement of Right-of-Way against Obra. legality of this “new” pathway; therefore,
Obra averred that Badua had not no easement was established by RTC on
established any easement of right-of-way Obra’slot. Thus, their claim for a right-
either by law or agreement.  Obra alleged of-way on the south portion had no
that Badua had another access as ingress basis. 
and egress to the public road other than
the one traversing her lot.  Issue:
RTC dismissed the complaint.  It Was there a voluntary right of way
held that Badua “was not able to satisfy issued in favor of Badua?
all the requisites needed for their claim of
an easement of right of way.” It observed Held:
that when Obra fenced her lot, Badua was No.
able to use another pathway to the   A right-of-way is an interest in the
highway which is more than adequate for land, any agreement creating it should be
Badua’s use. RTC Decision became final drawn and executed with the same
and executory.   formalities as a deed to a real estate, and
The “new” pathway used by Badua, ordinarily must be in writing. No written
however, traversed the south part of instrument on this agreement was
Obra’s lot.  adduced by Badua.
In 2001, Obra constructed a fence on         
the south of her lot, which restricted the Art. 649
use of Badua’ “new” pathway.  St. Michael v. Masaito
Aggrieved by Obra’s action, Badua GR 166301; Feb 29, 2008
filed a Motion to Enforce the earlier 2nd Division: Velasco, J
decision of RTC.  Badua alleged that the
Decision of the RTC dismissing the case Facts:
was based on the existence of a new
 St. Michael School is owned by immovables pertaining to other persons
spouses Claveria. Masaito owns and without adequate outlet to a public
Citihomes. St. Michael is located outside highway, is entitled to demand a right of
the perimeter fence of Citihomes. Its way."
passageway occupies a portion of the 61- Clearly, the school is a real party-in-
sqm lot, Lot 4, Block 7, Phase 1 of interest since it has established a right to
Citihomes. use the passageway for the benefit of its
The gate to the school is located at students. More importantly, the records
Ciithomes' northern perimeter fence and reveal Claveria are the owners of the lot
is the only entrance and exit for the entire where the school is located and they are
school population. the incorporators, trustees, and officers of
Masaito offered to sell Lot 4, Block St. Michael.
7 with the right-of-way through the They are also authorized to represent
private roads/drainage facilities of the corporation in the complaint and
Citihomes for P2M. Claveria refused the subsequent actions. Thus, Claveria are
proposals, reasoning that the school did real parties-in-interest and we rule that
not need the entire area. the dismissal of the complaint is patently
Claveria and some students, teachers erroneous and bereft of any legal basis.
and parents then filed a complaint against Claveria must be allowed to pursue their
Masaito before the RTC for easement of case.
right-of-way under Art. 649.
Masaito contends that the students,
teachers and parents have no cause of
action to file the complaint for right-of-
way. M alleges that the claimant in such
an action must be the owner of a
dominant estate and as such, the parents
were not real parties-in-interest. M also
adds that the school is not the registered
owner of the lot it occupies.

Issue:
Do the plaintiffs have the personality
to file?

Held:
Yes. For a complaint to state a cause
of action in an easement case, more
specifically, Art. 649 requires that: (1)
the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) there is
payment of proper indemnity; and (3) the
isolation is not due to the acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate.
It will suffice under Art. 649 that
"any person who by virtue of a real right
may cultivate or use any immovable
which is surrounded by other