Society for Cinema & Media Studies

"Film Experience and the Formation of Illusion: The Spectator as 'Surrogate Body' for the
Cinema," by Christiane Voss
Author(s): Inga Pollmann and Vinzenz Hediger
Source: Cinema Journal, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Summer 2011), pp. 136-150
Published by: University of Texas Press on behalf of the Society for Cinema & Media Studies
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ffig"

"Film Experience and the

Formationof Illusion:The
Spectator as 'Surrogate Body7for
the Cinema/7 by ChristianeVoss
translatedby Inga Pollmann,SCMS TranslationCommittee
withIntroductionbyVinzenzHediger
Introduction
a criticaljuncturein thehistoryof filmtheory, about twentyyearsago, the
two main concernsof filmtheorywerepositioningand processing. Feminist
filmtheoryand semio-psychoanalytic approaches were interestedin how the
filmpositionedthespectatorand definedhersubjectivity. Meanwhile,arguing
againsttheidea of a passivelyconstructed spectator, filmtheoryconceived
cognitivist
of thespectatorin termsof information processing: thefilm offereda matrixof infor-
mation, a series
of cues,which the spectatorprocessed in an exerciseof mostlyplea-
surableproblemsolving.For all the turbulent sexual desirereflected on in feminist
and psychoanalytic filmtheory, and forall thejoy and peace of mindthatemanates
fromdulyprocessedchunksof information, bothapproacheswere,in a way,intensely
cerebral,wary or sometimeseven distrustfulof thecorporealaspectsof thefilmexpe-
riencein thecase of feministfilmtheory, and mostlyobliviousto anypossibility of an CO
embodiedversionof information processing in thecase of film
cognitive theory. CD

Since then,however,and mostlybecause of the impactof philosophyon film

theory,the body has re-enteredthe frameand become a keyfocusof filmthe-
ory.To cite two particularly influentialexamples,the workof Vivian Sobchack <>
and RaymondBellourmayillustratethispoint.Drawingon theworkof Maurice oo
x
Merleau-Ponty and arguingexplicitly againstthebody-skepticism of feminist and COO
psychoanalytic filmtheory,Sobchackarguedin her 1992 book TheAddress oftheEye, ó
and again in CarnalThoughtsfrom2004, notonlythatwe shouldthinkof thespecta-
toras an embodiedbeingbut thatthefilmitselfhas a body- thatis, thatthereis
a corporealdimensionto theaestheticsof thefilmthattranscends, even thoughit
interactswith,theindividualbodyof thespectator.1

1 Vivian
Sobchack, TheAddress
oftheEye-. ofExperience
ThePhenomenology NJ:Princeton
(Princeton, Press,
University
1992); CarnalThoughts:
EmbodimentandMovingImageCulture
(Berkeley: ofCalifornia
University Press,2004).

IngaPollman
works andis a doctoral
as a translator candidate at theUniversity
in CinemaandMediaStudies of Chicago.

of Media Studiesat RuhrUniversity

is Professor
VinzmzHediger Bochum andco-editor
in theNetherlands, of Films
That Work(Amsterdam Press,2009).
Unweristy ©

1 36 Summer201 1 | 50 | No. 4 www.cmstudies.org

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 Cinema Journal50 No. 4 | Summer2011

Meanwhile,startingfromwithinthe scope of psychoanalytic filmtheoryand in-

spiredby GillesDeleuze and his thinkingof thefilmin termsof image and affect,
and
moreparticularly in termsof how affecttraversesand transforms thesubject,Bellour
has developedseminalelementsof a theoryof the cinematicbody,or ratherof the
film-as-body, overthepasttwenty years."Le filmestun corpsde mémoire"(thefilmis
a body of memory)is theopeningline of one of Bellour'smostrecentbooks,a brief
studyof "Menschenam Sonntag."In just a fewwordsthisline sumsup an argument
aboutbody,memory, and spectatorshipwhichBellourdevelopsmorefullyin themore
thansix hundredpages of his 2009 book Le corpsdu cinema, focusingin particularon
the filmexperienceas a stateof quasi-hypnosis and on aestheticemotionson a pre-
semantic,somaticlevel.
As differentas theirapproachesand philosophicalreferences -
maybe Sobchack,
forinstance,argues fromwithina phenomenologicalframeworkand develops her
theoreticalargumentat a level of media theory,whereasBellour,much like André
Bazin beforehim,comes to theoryfromthe engagementwithspecificworks - both
Sobchack and Bellourconvergeon the idea of the film'sbody,or the film-as-body,
whichgoes beyondany psychologically groundedattentionto the tactileand other
somaticaspectsof filmviewingas an individualand individuallyattributable experi-
ence. We chose to presentthe followingessay by ChristianeVoss to the readership
of CinemaJournalnot least because her work marksa notable contributionto the
fieldof thinkingabout the corporealdimensionsof filmdelineatedby the workof
suchauthorsas Sobchack and Bellour.Writingin German and comingfroma philo-
-
sophicalbackground herpreviousworkwas on thephilosophyof emotions,witha
- Voss
particularfocuson contributions fromanalyticphilosophy picksup a thread
fromSobchack's argumentabout the corporeal dimensionsof the filmexperience
and combinesitwitha philosophicalargumentabout illusionas a keyelementof aes-
theticexperience.Revivinga Kantian approach to illusionwhichpositsit as a com-
plex mode of cognitionratherthan a defectof human understanding withpossibly
deleteriousconsequences,Voss arguesthatcinema is an "illusion-forming medium"
and thatcinematicillusionemergesfromthe spectator'sengagementwithwhat she
proposes to call the "Leihkörper,"the virtualor "loan" body of the film.Unlike
Bellour,but ratherlike Sobchack, then,Voss developsher argumentat an abstract
level of media theory,or of filmtheoryas a general theoryof the filmmedium.
In fact,her interestis in a "generalstructureof cinematicillusionand experience"
whichcan thenbe "neurallyappliedto specificfilmgenres."What she proposes,then,
is indeed a critiqueof illusionin Kantian terms - that a definition and determina-
is,
tionof illusion,and of the illusorybody of film,as an irreducibledimensionof the
filmexperience.Beforeand perhapsbeyondbeinga bodyof memory, then,cinemais
a body of illusion,an illusorybodywhich,as theoreticalreflection shows,thespecta-
torin his livedexperiencehas alwaysalreadyembraced. H«

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Cinema Journal50 No. 4 | Summer2011

Aesthetic Experience in the Lightof the Cinematic Formation of Illusion.The

theory of aestheticexperience, as ithasbeenformulated byJohnDeweyand others,
constitutesthephilosophical background formyremarks onthespecific characteristics
ofcinematic aesthetics.According tothistheory, an objectcannotbe classified as aes-
theticonthebasisofobjective qualities, andsucha qualification canneverbe timeless
andtranscultural. NordoesDewey'stheory of aesthetic experience aimtoreducethe
quality(orqualities)oftheaesthetic solelyto the contingent effectsan objectis ableto
evokeina spectator. Thiswouldunjustly reducetheaesthetic object thestatusof a
to
mereperceptual stimulus,andonecouldcallsomething aestheticonlyinsofar andfor
so longas itcontinues to producede factoeffects (though which effects would these
be?) on an observer.A theory of aesthetic experience that observes only a difference
of degree,rather thana categorical difference, between theexperience of artandof
otheraesthetic objectsshould to
avoid,according Dewey,objectivist as well as subjec-
biasesin itsdefinition
tivist of theaesthetic. A thirdway,oriented towardthenotion
of experience, thusseeksto comprehend theaesthetic as an irreducible and simulta-
neouslyreciprocally dynamic relation of aesthetic and
presentation reception. As a
consequence, those means of representation to which one can ascribe aesthetic value
dependonthepractices ofreception specifictotherespective disciplines.2 Conversely,
aestheticmodesof representation, for
as, example, inthecaseofworks ofart,always
addressoneinsucha waythattheyputtheiraesthetic valueup fornegotiation against
thebackground ofa history thatdetermines theaesthetic canon. If itis true,as I will
assumeinwhatfollows, thattheaesthetic is constituted byan intrinsic interwovenness
of reception and production/presentation, thenone should able to gaininsight
be
intotheaesthetic natureofa medium bylooking atthewayinwhich, inan idealcase,
representativerecipients interact witha specific medium ina specific context.
The desireforand expectation of a specialkindof illusionformation in thecin-
emais oneof therepresentative waysof dealingwiththemediumoffilm, anditwill
thereforeserveas a methodical pointof departure forthedeliberations thatfollow. In
thecaseof "successful" filmreception, we ascribetotheactionson thescreena kind
ofrealitythataffects usdirectly. If wefollow Sartre's understanding ofaffect, accord-
ingto whichaffects constitute a distinct formof belief-phenomena thatare based
lesson rational reasonsthanon impressions, thenaffection-by-something includesa
temporary (andnotautomatically irrational)beliefinthebeing- thusofan objectthat
appears.4Withrespect tothespecific dimension ofillusion propertothecinema,this
wouldmean:we areaddressed bythereality thatis appearing on thescreenin a way

1 See JohnDewey,Artas Experience(New York:Minton,Balch, 1934).

2 The practices of reception in the realms of literature,dance, theater,film,and paintingdifferforthe simple reason
canon formation,and formallanguage of the artformsdiverge.Whether
thatthe materialityas well as the historicity,
and to what an extentthe tendency in art towarda dissolution of boundaries also leads to new formson the level
of reception is a far-reachingquestion that does not concern the differences,which are primarilyhistoricallygiven,
among the arts.
3 Fromthe perspectiveof approaches such as Dewey's, which place the concept of experience at the center of their
the aesthetic is a- differently
aesthetic theory,the aesthetic is a processual concept. Accordingly, interpretable-form
of communication in a specific context,in which the encounter between object and recipientis at the same time
mobilized and configuredalong the lines of specific norms.
4 Jean-Paul Sartre,Sketch fora Theoryof the Emotions(London: Methuen, 1962).

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 Cinema Journal50 No. 4 | Summer2011

thatallowsus to believe,at leasttemporarily, in itsbeing-thus. Whenever thisis not

thecase and,facedwithan artificiality and "constructedness" thatdistances us,we
remainin ourseats,unmoved and disbelieving, thecinematic performance (andthus
itsconstitutiveformation ofillusion) hasfailed.
I wouldliketoproposetwointerrelated theses. I argue,first, thata certain degreeof
affectiveentanglement isnecessarily and
part parcel of the cinematic formation ofillu-
and
sion, second, that the spectator is neither nor
object viewing of a
subject technique
ofillusion thatcouldbe described independently ofhimorher.Rather, thefilmspec-
tatorconstitutes, as a resonating body in need of further determination, theillusion-
forming medium of cinema. Reflection on the formation of illusion by means of and
inthecinemathusleadstoa new,expandedconceptofcinemaitselfthatincludes the
-
spectator'sbody a conceptof cinemathatemphasizes therelevance of intertwined
sensations, and theinterpretation of thesesensations, fortheaesthetic experience of
themedium. The cinemaandcinematic experience remainphenomenologically and
philosophically undertheorized, in myview,so longas theeventson-screen and the
spectator areeachconsidered individually, as isolatedentities separatefromone an-
other.One needstoenlargetheframe of description andknowhowtodraw- behind
thebackofthespectator, -
sotospeak a secondscreenonwhichtheosmotic exchange
between theso-called spectator andtheevents on theprimary screenbecomesvisible.
Onlythenisoneabletoconsider allthosedifferent elements andtheirrelations toone
another, which, whencombined, constitute thespecific aesthetic of cinema.
Inordertomakemoreexplicit whatprecisely itmeanstospeakofanillusion-forming
mediumin an aesthetic sense,I turn,as a first step,to a terminological discussion of
thevariousmeanings of theterm"illusion." Following that,I move on to consider an
originalsuggestion byRobertMusil,whosought torethink thespecific rolethatprojec-
tionplaysinthephenomenon ofillusion foraesthetics moregenerally. In a third step,I
discusshownotonlyvisualbutalsosynaesthetic reactions tothesound-image events in
themovietheater contribute tothecinematic formation ofillusion. Ifitistrue, as I argue
here,that,according toa specific definition ofillusion formation, thecinemacanbe un-
derstood as an illusion-forming medium, then one should be able todescribe a general
structureof cinematic illusionandexperience thatappliestoall (oratleastmost)cases
offilmperception andcanbe neutrally appliedtospecific filmgenres. The notion ofthe
as
"spectator surrogate body"[Leihkörper, "loan
literally body"] help will to describe this
basicstructure of illusion thatinforms thecinematic experience. In this context, I also
discusstherelationship between thesomatic quality of spaceandthenarrative quality
oftime.In thefinalstepofmyargument, I addan epistemic dimension totheprogram
ofa phenomenology ofcinematic experience thatI am developing here.AsI show, the
phenomenological dimension of empathy for the events in the cinema proves to be not
an esotericfactor,buta specific form ofimplicit knowledge.

Spectrumof Meaningsofthe Conceptof Illusion.The etymology oftheconcept

of illusion leads
initially us to the of
meanings "to "to "toderide,"
deceive," betray,"
butalso "to play"and "to engagein farce."5The conceptthatseemsto formthe

5 FriedrichKluge, EtymologischesWörterbuchder deutschen Sprache (Berlin: W. de Gruyter,1989), 395.

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Cinema Journal50 | No. 4 | Summer2011

backgroundforthemeaningof theconceptof illusionis thatof "reality."According

to an etymologicalreading,the formationof illusionapparentlyimpliesan interpre-
tationof realitythatis in some way incorrect.Eitherone made a mistakeor one fell
victimto an intentional deception,game,or trick.Wherethereis deception,therehas
to be- at least in principle - the
possibilityof correction,as otherwisetherewould
not be anythingreal or truefromwhichthe deceptionor misapprehension could be
distinguished. The notion that if
illusions, they are understood in the senseof decep-
tion,misapprehension, or falsepretences,seem to necessitatecorrectionis dependent
on the functionalrelationof our perceptions, withinour empiricalworld,to actions.
We requiresuitableand verifiable perceptions a reliablebasisfororientation
as in our
environment. In cases in whichthisfunctionbecomestenuous,our awarenessof real-
ityindeedbreaksdownand endangersour existence[Dasein]in theworldexistentially.
If theconceptof illusionis limitedin itsmeaningto thisstrongtheoryof deception,
filmclearlycannotbe understoodas a mediumthatcreatesillusions,since normally
filmperceptionleads neitherto a breach of our idea of realitynor to a revisionof
our empiricalunderstanding Yet if the cinema does not belie reality,
of reality. what
kindof sensedoes itmaketo talkabout it as a mediumthatcreatesillusions?The fact
thatin thecinemawe are relievedof action(because we don'thave to fleethemovie
theater,forexample,as soon as we see somethingdangerouson the screen)servesas
anotherindicatorthatperceptionof realityin thecinemaand perceptionof realityin
theworldare fundamentally different.
At thispoint,one could end thedebateand declarethatthethemeof illusionis ir-
relevant, especiallyforthephilosophicalquestionof something like"theessenceof cin-
ema." (Those whowouldtakethisroutewillnotbe convincedbywhatfollows, sincemy
deliberations are based on different conceptualpremises.)If,though,one nevertheless
wantsto followtheintuition thatthecinemais fundamentally relatedto illusionforma-
tion,an alternative possibilityarises:todistanceoneselffromthestrongdeceptiontheory
of illusionand to seekotherpossibleinterpretations of theconceptof illusion.
One suchdifferent perspectiveon theconceptof illusionpresentsitselfif we con-
sideran aspect of itslexical and psychiatric definitions. Both definitionsunderstand
"illusion"to referto a modifiedor distortedperceptionof something. Yet bothdefini-
tionsdistinguishthismode of perceptionfromcompletelyfree-floating "hallucina-
tions,"so to speak.A medical-psychiatric dictionaryputsit thus:illusionis "an errant
perceptionof objectsgivenin realityor an additionof supposedperceptions
[verfälscht]
to real ones,suchthattheobjectsof perceptionappear differently (forexample,a tree
stumpas a squattingperson).In contrastto hallucination, thereis thusa sensorystimu-
lus,butitis reinterpreted subjectively."

6 Uwe-HenrikPeters, Wörterbuchder Psychiatrieund medizinischen Psychologie (Augsburg: Bechtermünz, 1997),

253. In addition,see as well the lexical definitionof illusionas "[deception, eitheron the basis of incorrectand pre-
mature interpretations of given perceptionsor on the basis of mere semblance (in contrastto objective appearance).
I. is a delusive perception[Trugwahrnehmung] caused bya givenexternalsituation(opposition: hallucination- decep-
tion of the senses [Sinnestäuschung])," in Bertelsmann-Lexikon (Gütersloh,1964), 593. Hallucinationsare defined
here as "[deceptions of the senses that occur withoutreal causes and withthe cooperationof the sense organs, in
real sense impressions"(339).
contrastto illusion,which misinterprets

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 Cinema Journal50 | No. 4 | Summer2011

This textidentifiesa mode of perceptionin whichthesubjectof illusionperceives

an objectin his environment notsimplyincorrectly, but ratherselectively on thebasis
of itsaffectiveimportance, and reinterprets it in thissense.7In a state of anxiety,for
example, one is certainlymore to
prone "recognize"livingfigures in the silhouettesof
treesin a darkforestthanone would be in a stateof untroubledcheerfulness. Those
who hallucinate,by contrast,freelyprojectwhatevertheythinktheyare perceiving
as a givenrealitythatis independentfromthemselves.The finedistinction between
illusionaryperception and hallucination consists in the factthat only illusionincludes
an aisthetic8dimensionin whichperceptionand projectioninseparablyinteract, while
theaspectof perceptioncan be completelyabsentin hallucination.
Yet eventhispsychiatric definitionof illusioncan be interpreted in termsof a the-
of
ory deception, sinceaccordingto thisdefinition, is
something supposedlyperceived
"in distortedfashion"and "reinterpreted affectively," butwouldappear differently if it
wereperceivedwithoutdistortion or soberly. Moreover,thequote citedabove explicitly
speaksof illusionas "errantperception,"so that,again,one has to ask how thisdefini-
tiondiffers froman understanding of illusionin thelightof a theoryof deception.In
orderto showhow thiscan be thecase, a further analysisof wordsemanticsalone will
not help us. We need a new contextualization forthe phenomenonof illusion- and
thisisjust whatRobertMusil'sessayon aestheticsand filmdramaturgy provides.

Illusionas Projective Totality.Musil primarily considersillusionnotwithrespectto

itspossibledisruptionof,or itsfunctionfor,empiricalawarenessof action [Handlungs-
bewusstsdn], but ratherwithrespectto itsfunctionin the contextof a perceptionthat
"relieves"actionfromresponsibility - that in thecontextof aes-
[handlungsentlastend] is,
thetics.On thebasis of thispremise,he is able to stressthecreativeaspectof illusion.
ForMusil,itis preciselytheaspectof reinterpretation and theadditionof perceptions
to thatwhichis sensuallygivenwhichconstitutes the trickof illusion.Thus, forhim,
illusionconstitutes the primarycharacteristic of aestheticreceptionmore generally.
Insteadof interpreting aestheticillusionas misunderstanding and deceptionconcern-
ing facts,Musil accords to illusiona fundamentally constructive importancein the
reception of art,on account of itsprocessof additionand reinterpretation:
We are accustomedto havingthe effectof the workof art describedas an
elevated,perhapseven as an alleviated,conditionof life;we used to call this
conditionimagination[Phantasie],and maybetodaywe call itillusion.Butone

7 See WernerStrube, "Illusion," in HistorischesWörterbuchder Philosophie,ed. JoachimRitterand KarlfriedGrün-der,

vol. 4 (Basel: Schwabe, 1976), 204-215; as well as "Ästhetische Illusion: Ein kritischerBeitragzur Geschichte der
des 18. Jahrhunderts"(dissertation,Ruhr-Universität
Wirkungsästhetik Bochum, 1971).
8 Translator'snote: In contrastto the currentuse of the term "aesthetics" in English,which tends to referprimarily to
experiences ofart,the Greekroot"aisthesis" refersmore broadlyto sense perceptionof concrete objects, independent
of the natureof the object and judgmentsof beauty.Thus Gertud Koch calls the "imbricationof the technologically
produced and the psychophysiologicallyperceived the aisthetic (aesthesis) quality of film,which is based in the
propertiesof the medium priorto the differentiation of filmaccording to particularobjects (such as genres). The ais-
theticdimension of filmis thus the dimension that constitutesillusion.This does not at all mean that filminevitably
constitutesillusions at the aesthetic level, in the sense that all those objects we take to be filmswould necessarily
base theiraesthetic formationon the framingof medium as aisthetic." Koch, "Carnivoreor Chameleon: The Fate of
Cinema Studies," CriticalInquiry35 (Summer 2009), 926.

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Cinema Journal50 | No. 4 | Summer2011

rarely,ifever,strikes
upontherecognition of thepossibility
thatthisillusion,
forall itsdistinctive is
qualities, analogousto what meansbyillu-
psychiatry
that
sion, is, a in
"disturbance" which elementsof are
reality reconstitutedas
an unrealwholethatusurpsthevalueof reality.

Here,a different notionof reality comesintoplay,bymeansofwhichMusiladds

a newtwist tothethematic ofillusion.Initially,Musilalsounderstands thenewwhole
thatis composedof elements of theperception of empirical and
reality of fantasy-
likeprojection to be something unreal.The squatting figure an anxiousperson
that
seesin a treestumpduringa walkin thewoodswillnotstandthetestof reality that
thetreestumpitselfwill,and in relation to thelatter, thesquatting figure is unreal.
However, a little
further on,Musilwrites thatthisunrealconstruction "usurps"forit-
selfitsownformof "reality." Howarewesupposedtounderstand this?Atthispoint,
we needto remindourselves thatfromtheoutset, Musilis investigating theroleof
illusionin thecontext of aesthetics, where"reality checks," whichareimportant for
ourbehavior intheempirical world, playabsolutely no role.No onewouldeverthink
of touching thefigures of lighton thefilmscreenin orderto testin thiswaytheir
degreeof reality.
Musil,rather, startsfrom thethought thatitisa general peculiarity ofartworks that
theyalwaysturnouttobe lessimpressive andmoreabstract thantheextra-artistic ob-
jectsofourreality.10 Yetinthereception ofartworks, thisrelativeabstractness ofeven
naturalist,figurative,andnarrative artworks is supplemented automatically, bymeans
ofprojection, withthemissing dimensions ofplasticity andmobility. Forexample, the
underdetermined corporeality of a classicalsculpture in relationto a realhuman body
is,according to Musil,notsimply an incomplete representation of reality, sincethe
sculpture's is
corporealityalwaysalreadybeingcompleted in the observer's imagina-
tion,whichaddstheaspectsof thebodythatareunrepresented. Thisprocessmeans
thatartreception is morethanmerely passiveperception; itis rather a creativelypro-
- and therefore, - act. "Disturbances of of the
jecting illusion-forming equilibrium
senseof reality," as Musilputsit,arebalancedoutin theact of reception and thus
transformed by means of theformation of illusions.11
According to Musil,whenever aesthetic representation is successful,it is able to
narrowdowntheobserver's consciousness by means of discipline-specificprocesses

9 Robert Musil, "Towarda New Aesthetic: Observationson a Dramaturgyof Film (1925)," in Precision and Soul:
Essays and Addresses, ed. and trans. BurtonPike and David S. Luft(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1990),
196. These artisticproceduresof condensation and displacement are simultaneouslypsychoanalyticalcategoriesof
dream work,and Musil explicitlyrelates them to both Freud and Levy-BruhI's investigationsintothe magic world-
relationsof primitivepeoples. See ibid., 197ff.
10 Ibid., 194ff.
11 Sartrealso understandsthe actual functionof affectsto be the transformation of reality(see the essay cited above).
Accordingto him, affectshelp us to perceive potentiallydesperate situationsdifferently, as transformed, such that
suddenly,possibilitiesappear that would not have been apparent or achievable in a state of sober deliberation.For
example, a person faced witha mathematical problem he cannot solve becomes so enraged that he tears up the
sheet containingthe equation instead of continuingto torturehimselfin the attemptto findthe solution.This is an
example Sartre himselfcites in orderto demonstratehow the solution to a problem becomes possible affectively
and can be effective,at least in the shortterm.

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 Cinema Journal50 No. 4 | Summer2011

-
of condensation,displacement,rhythm, and monotony, "overvaluing" as in a state
-
of lighthypnosis "the suggestiongiventhroughdepressionof the psychicenviron-
ment." Relatingthisthoughtback to thespecialcase of thecinema,thesituationcan
be describedas follows:because of thedarkenedroomand therelatively limitedmobil-
ityallowed by themovie seat,the vital
valence of
Wertigkeit]
[lebendige thefilm spectator's
immediatesurroundings is reducedforhis or her consciousness.Thus, attentioncan
be absorbedby sound and image sequences,so thatin theirvisibleand audiblemove-
mentthesebecome overvaluedby the consciousnessof the spectator.The difference
betweenthe mode of presenceof the eventson-screenand thatof (empirical)reality
may remainlatentlyperceptible, but it is forcedfromthe spectator'sconsciousnessto
thebenefitof a perceptionof theeventson-screenthatincludesprojectiveadditions.
It is at thispointnecessaryto add thatwithrespectto theeventsdepictedon-screen
in thecinema,whatalso belongsto projectiveadditions,as describedby Musil,is the
dispositionto endowthefilmcharacterswithone's own biographicalexperiencesand
memories,as well as the abilityto update mentallythe narrativeorderof the essen-
tiallyfragmented (sinceedited)filmevents.Over thecourseof thetimethatwe devote
to themediumof cinema,we acquire,by means of thecinemaitself,a knowledgeof
genrethatwe can in turnapplyinterpretatively to filmsas we are watchingthem.The
inneranticipationof an expectedeventis thenused as a foilforbuildingsuspensein
filmreception,and itlikewiseforcesa psychophysical entanglement withthefilmnar-
rativemoregenerally.
In Musil'swritings, one can thusfinda productivefunctionaldefinition of thefor-
- a definition when
mationof illusionvis-à-visaestheticperception that, appliedto the
cinematiceventitself,explainsthislatter.In contrastto the "deceptiontheoryof illu-
sion,"forMusil,thedecisivecontrastrelevantto aestheticillusionis notthatof "decep-
tion"versus"truth,"butratherthatof "abstract/ nonliving"versus"plastic/living."
I initiallyclaimedthattheconceptof illusionrefersat leastimplicitly to theconcept
of reality. One can further thisclaimon thebasisof theMusileanapproachto the
clarify
conceptof illusionbymeansof thefollowing passagefromfilmtheorist Béla Balázs:

There can be no doubtthattheneed forrealityoriginally arose froma rebel-

lion againsta deceptiveromanticism. But individualrealitiesdo not add up
Factsdo notamountto thetruth.In contrast,even a fairy-tale
to reality. can
the of the
convey meaning largercomplexes, meaning reality. of . . . For the
opposite of "false" is not "real" but "genuine." The of
opposite "deceptive"
is not "real" but "truthful." Even the oppositeof the "unreal" in art is not
documentary factuality buttheliving,thepalpablyconcrete.Even a Chaplin
then,
fairytale, can be genuine,truthful and alive.
One could add thatfilm,bymeansof itsnarratively editedsound-imagepower,is able
to seem "genuine"[echt]to thespectatorif itis able to put himintoa stateof affective-
mentalresonance.It is notthedeceptive[attrappenartige] imitationof an empiricalevent

12 Musil, "Towarda New Aesthetic," 196.

13 Béla Balázs, "The Spiritof Film," in Béla Baláis-. EarlyFilm Theory;Visible Man and the Spiritof Film,ed. Erica
Carterand Rodney Livingstone(New York:BerghahnBooks, 2010).

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thatconstitutes thepowerof filmto producean effect. Rather,itis theovervaluation of

thecinematiceventas a whole,whichforthedurationof thefilmpresentation takeson
theroleof a dominatingenvironment forthespectator,who psychophysically interacts
withit.We couldapplyMusil'sapproachherebysayingthatitis literally in thismental-
affectiveinteractionwiththefilmthatthespectatorundertakestheprojectiveaddition
Musilhad emphasizedas relevantforall artreception.As a resultof itsaffective-projec-
tivetransformation bythespectator, theaestheticobjectis vivifiedforthespectatorand
is thusreal,in thesenseof Musil'sseconddefinition .
of "real" [wirklich]
Consequently, one can speak of a aesthetic
specifically formation of illusionin
thosecases in whichthe recipientof an aestheticobject is placed, by the object and
in a controlledfashion,intothestateof affective -
attempts-to-comprehend attempts
thatlead to theprojectiveadditionsto theobjectnotedabove.This causality -
namely,
theawarenessof thefactthatfilm,as a consequenceof itsspecificcharacteristics, also
- -
causes a specifickindof illusion and associationformation is therefore a relevant
aspect of "reception,"since we would otherwisenot be able to speak of aesthetic
receptionin a narrowsense.A film,or any otheraestheticconstruct, is not simplya
random,formlessobject,and our reactionsto it are notformlessand randomprojec-
tions.To be sure,itis also possibleto takeup an aesthetic- or rather, -
aestheticizing
attitudetowardnonaestheticobjectssuch as a landscape or a mathematicalproblem.
However,thesecases are derivativewithrespectto theparadigmof aestheticexperi-
ence,understoodas theexperienceof an objectthat,likefilm,alreadyclaimsforitself
an aestheticstatuson thebasis of itsmode of presentation and itscontext.

Film's Surrogate Body. In orderto workout thespecificity of cinematicexperience,

I wouldliketo drawon theconceptof the"anestheticbody"thatVivianSobchackin-
troducedto filmtheory.Sobchackdescribedthesynaesthetic and prereflexive,sensually
emphatic reactionsto the medium of film as theprimary and meaning-founding ways
of dealingwiththismedium.Accordingto her,it is preciselybecause of corporeally
groundedreactions tofilm,ratherthananalytical efforts on a filmevent,thatthe
toreflect
vis-à-vis
senseof reality[Wirklichkeitsbewusstsein] thecinematicpresentationis heightened:
All thebodiesin thefilmexperience - thoseonscreenand offscreen
(and pos-
- are subversivebodies. They have
siblythatof the screenitself) potentially
thecapacitiesto functionbothfiguratively . . . Yet thesebodies
and literally.
are also materially
circumscribed and can be located,each argu-
specifically
the
ablybecoming "groundingbody" of sense and meaningsinceeach exists
in a dynamicfigure-ground withothers... [s]o that
relationof reversibility
is
meaning,and whereit made, does nothave a concreteoriginin eitherspec-
but
tators'bodiesor representation emerges in theirconjunction.14
Sobchackthusrefersto thespectatoras a "anestheticsubject/body" - thatis,witha
neologismthatmerges"cinema" and "synaesthetic experience."Philosophically, this
termseeksto abolisha rigiddistinctionbetweensubjectand objectwithrespectto the

14 VivianSobchack, "What My Fingers Knew: The Cinesthetic Subject, or Vision in the Flesh," in Carnal Thoughts:
Embodimentand MovingImage Culture(Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress, 2004), 67.

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 Cinema Journal50 No. 4 | Summer2011

relationship betweenscreeneventand spectator position, insofar as the"anesthetic

body," as a third term, includes both aspectsand enables us toperceive theirrelation-
as
ship reciprocally It is
dynamic. precisely thisto which Sobchack, in the quoteabove,
refers bymeansof theconceptof thereversibility offigure andground.
Referring backto MauriceMerleau-Ponty's phenomenological theory of percep-
tion, Sobchack focuses on the corporeal-somatic existence and understanding offilm,
in contrast to a semantic-narratological hermeneutics of film,and takesliterally the
metaphorical of or
descriptions "exciting" "touching" films.15 Without entering into
thequestionof whether thesefilm-theoretical positions couldbe reconciled, I would
insteadliketo pursuetheidea of a kinesthetic of and
reversibilityfigure groundby
meansof a further reflection on thespecific spatiotemporality of cinematic experi-
ence,whichseemsto me to be especially decisivefortheimmersive-illusive power
ofcinema.
In myopinion,thetwo-dimensionality of screeneventsis themostimportant -
- in filmthatthespectator
thoughnottheonly abstraction hasto counter byillusion
formation in orderforfilmto seem"alive"and "real."My thesisis thatitis onlythe
spectator's body,in itsmentaland sensorial-affective resonance withtheeventson-
screen, which(as I described earlier)"loans"a three-dimensional bodyto thescreen
andthusflipstheseconddimension of thefilmeventoverintothethirddimension of
thesensing body.The spectator thusbecomesa temporary "surrogate body"forthe
screen,and thisbodyis,foritspart,a constituent feature of thefilmic architecture.
Thisclaimrepresents an additionto Sobchack'stheory, insofar as I am interested in
shifting theemphasis awayfromthesenso-motorical self-perception of thespectator
and towardan objective qualityof thespaceof thecinemaitself. Whilethebodyof
theanesthetic subjectcertainly remains a "surrogate space for the filmevent," itis in
facta space- namely, a somaticspaceof meaning - andit
provides the third dimen-
sioninwhichthefilmevents canbe embedded sensitive-affectively.
Thissurrogate - -
space thatis,theresonant bodyof thespectatornecessarily fea-
turesa temporal dimension thatis attheveryleastdouble.Alongside thebackground
perception of thepresenceof theempirical environment (whichreceivesdecreased
the
attention), surrogate body,by means of resonance, alsofollows
now thefictitious
temporal flow of the edited film narrative.On the narrative level, will,ifnecessary,
we
in tandem with the screen events across - even -
leap gigantic galacticorparadoxical
durations, while at the same time, on the levelof empirical we
space-time, mayregret
thefactthatouraesthetic entanglement willde factosoonend- at thelatestwhen
thelights go on againandtheobligatory 90 to 120 minutes of realtimein themovie
theater areover.The moreor lesslatently senseddifference between present timein
themovietheater andthefictitious temporalitiesthat are perceived at the same timeis
oneof theachievements of differentiation thatfacilitatethefilmspectator's ability to

15 Thebodyis "generalactionofbeingintheworld"and "a ready-made system ofequivalents from

andtranspositions
one senseto another";
thus"thesightofsoundsand thehearing ofcolors... are [not]exceptionalphenomena.
Synaestheticperceptionis therule."See MauriceMerleau-Ponty,Phenomenology of Perception
(London:Rout-
ledge,2002), 273, 272, 266. On the profoundsensualistaestheticsalreadyevidentin Siegfried see
Kracauer,
GertrudKoch,Kracauer: AnIntroduction NJ:Princeton
(Princeton, UniversityPress,2000), 106.

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Cinema Journal50 | No. 4 Summer2011

distinguishbetween a stateofconsciousness basedon aesthetic entanglement andone

basedon deception concerning empirical reality.
In thisrespect we can also makea connection, in ourpresent moment, withthe
insightintoaesthetic illusionformulated byMosesMendelssohn fortheeighteenth
century.He conceived of aesthetic illusionas a doubleimplementation of theimagi-
nation.First,by means of the "lower powers of thesoul," among which he counted
drives,emotions, and corporeal excitations, an objectthatis aesthetically presented,
is,as such,imagined to be alive.Atthesametime,whathe calledthe"higher pow-
ersof thesoul"- we wouldtodaysaythereflexive-cognitive -
abilities generate the
convictionthattheperceived object(a narrated an an
story, event, image) is aestheti-
callystaged.16The moment of seeingthrough theaesthetic illusionis understood as
permanently co-present, rather than as an intermittent moment. It is worth noting
thatin thecaseof an aesthetic illusion, we aredealingwithan actof differentiation
thatimmanently factors in thedifference between reality thatis artistically
presented
and realitythatis extra-artistic. Thisact of differentiation actuallyfunctions as the
conditionforpleasurein aesthetic a
illusion, pleasure that is alsomaintained, even
or
enhanced, in cases in which one is confronted withhorrible scenarios.17
Whilethespectator's surrogate bodythuscontributes totherealism andenlivening
of
[Verlebendigung' cinematic reality byspatializing the film and
somatically semantically,
a fictitious-narrative
temporalization of thissurrogate bodybecomespossible in turn,
suchthatitsliving entanglement withthefilmevents arefurther reinforced. To return
tothebeginning ofthisessay, wecannowconclude thatfilm performance failsinthose
casesin whichthespectator's surrogate bodyremains literallyuntouched, becauseits
complicitywiththemedium as "surrogate bodyforthescreenevents" isdeactivated.

AestheticEmbodimentas a Formof ImplicitKnowledge.The courseof the

argument sofarhasledfrom distinction
theinitial between theconceptofillusion and
thatof hallucinationtoMusil'stheory constructive
of theillusion-enforcing, function
of aestheticreception,understood as a complementary projectionthatadds to the
necessary abstractness objectsthemissing
of aesthetic dimensions of plasticity
and
autonomous mobility.Fromthere,viathedoubledetermination ofaestheticillusion
as
thesimultaneously entangled and distanciatingsenseof therealityof something, we
arrivedatthecinestheticorsomatological dimension ofthecinemaas laidoutinSob-
chack's(andothers') phenomenology of film.Thisapproachled to thedevelopment
oftheideathatthetwo-dimensional screenevents "flipover"intothethird dimension
of a resonant body.Addingto thisthereciprocal,
surrogate dependent elementof
narrativetemporalizationofthesurrogate bodybymeansoffilmnarration, wefinally
arrivedata phenomenological foundation of thecinematic formationofillusion.
of a certaintypeof knowledge - thatof tacit
Bymeansof thestructural analysis
as ithasbeenpresented ofscienceMichaelPolanyi - I wouldfi-
knowledge, bytheorist
nallyliketoelaboratebrieflyontherelationship between surrogatebodyandcinema's

16 Moses Mendelssohn, "Von der Herrschaftüber die Neigungen," in Schriftenzur Philosophie und Ästhetik,Gesam-
melte Schriften,vol. 2 (Stuttgart:F. Frommann,1972), 149-155.

17 See Konrad Paul Liessmann, Reiz und Rührung:Über ästhetische Empfindungen(Vienna: WUV,2004), 30ff.

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 Cinema Journal50 | No. 4 Summer2011

semantic dimension, thelattertakenin a narrower sense.Atthispoint,we stillneed

toclarifythequestionof howexactly themeaningful aspectof theillusionary events
thatweexperience inthecinemacanbe mappedontotherelationship oftheaffective
surrogate bodytothescreenevents.
Tacitknowledge, according to Polanyi, is alwaystherein thoseinstances in which
we knowmorethanwe can say.Examplescan be derivedfromrealmsof knowledge
ranging from simpleperception tocomplexforms ofpractical andintellectual knowl-
edge. We are able to a
recognize physiognomic feature a
(forexample, face) without
needingto be able to identify itsdetails.A musicianmasters theartof playingthe
- an artthatcannotbe made - without
piano explicit having payattention
to to the
detailsofhisfinger movements, andan academicformulates thesolution toa problem
byapplying a theory, thedetailsof whichhe wouldnotbe abletoexplain.Theseare
allforms of tacitknowledge.18
Polanyimaintains thattacitknowledge is theresultof an activeshapingof expe-
rienceduringtheprocessof cognition [Erkenntnisvorgang] : "Thisshapingorintegrat-
ingI holdto be thegreatand indispensable tacitpowerbywhichall knowledge is
discovered and,oncediscovered, is heldtobe true."19 In ordertoprovideexamples
of theacquisition of knowledge whichitselfremainstacit,Polanyirefers topsycho-
logicalresearch on subliminalperceptions. Testsubjects werepresented withnumer-
ous nonsensesyllables whilean electricshockfollowedtheoccurrence of certain
After
syllables. a shorttime,thesubjects showedevidencethattheywereanticipating
theshockwithout beingableto say,uponquestioning, withwhichsyllables theyan-
ticipatedit.Theyhadacquireda knowledge thattheycouldnotexpress. Polanyithus
concludesthat"theshock-producing particulars remained tacit.The subjectcould
notidentify them,yethe reliedon hisawareness of themforanticipating theelectric
shock."20
Polanyiconsiders thebasicstructure of tacitknowledge alwaysto involvean in-
terplay between two which
aspects, he callsthe firstand second termsof tacitknowl-
edge. Test subjects are awareof the second term of the relation,theelectric shock,
sincetheyattendto it,and therefore havea "specifiable" knowledge of it.The par-
ticularsofitsoccurrence, however, areknowntothemonlybyattending tosomething
else- thatis,theelectric shock.The subjectsthushavea knowledge of theshock-
producing particulars, butthisknowledge is tacit;it is knowledge mediatedbythe
secondtermoftherelation (the electric shock).
Allmeaning, Polanyicontinues, consists in concentrating^om something tosome-
thing else.As a consequence, meaninggenerally tends to move away from us. Ap-
the of
propriating language anatomy, Polanyi thuscalls the first
term "proximal" and
thesecondterm"distal."In anatomy, "proximal" denotes the location of those parts
of an extremity thatarepositioned closeto thetrunk, in contrast to "distal,"which,
18 As a formof knowledge,tacit knowledgepresentsan irreduciblevariable that is sui generis,and to whichone of our
most importantinstrumentsof knowledge- namely,intuition- is indebted. See Michael Polanyi, The TacitDimen-
sion (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1966; repr.,2009), 23ff.
19 Ibid., 6.
20 Ibid., 9.
21 Ibid.

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correspondingly, denotesthelocationof partsthatarefarther awayfromthetrunk.

It is theproximal term,then,of whichwe havea knowledge thatwe cannotputinto
words. Amongtheproximal termsare,forexample,our neuronal, organic,and
sensp-motorical movements, of which we become aware in lightof distaltermssuch
as theposition, shape,form, and movement of an object to which we attend ina given
situation.In boththeprocesses of perceptionand theexecution of practicalorintel-
lectualskills,we thusattendfromtheseinternal processes (theproximal terms)tothe
qualitiesof external things(thedistal
terms),and itis in
only light of thelatterthatwe
becomeawareoftheformer. In Polanyi'swords,"The of
transpositionbodilyexperi-
encesintotheperception of thingsoutsidemaynowappear,therefore, as an instance
of thetransposition of meaning away fromus, which we have found tobe present to
someextent in all tacitknowing."23 to this
According Polanyi, transpositionbodily of
experiences intothemeaningful perceptionof things outsidealso characterizes the
structure ofallprocesses ofempathy .24
[Einfühlung]
The following quoteillustrates
theintersection of Polanyi's analysisof empathy
andtheanalysis oftheillusion-forming surrogatebodythatI developed above:

[O]ur awarenessof ourbodyforattending to thingsoutsideit suggestsa

widergeneralizationof thefeeling
we haveof ourbody.Whenever we use
certainthingsto attend
fiomthemto otherthings, in thewayin whichwe
always useourown body,these
thingschangetheir
appearance.Theyappear
tousnowinterms oftheentities
towhichweareattending^ww them, justas
wefeelourownbodyinterms ofthethingsoutside
towhichweareattending
fiomourbody.In thissensewecansaythatwhenwemakea thing functionas
theproximal termoftacitknowing,weincorporateitinourbody- orextend
ourbodytoincludeit- so thatwecometodwellinit.25

Usingthetermsof thistacit,binaryrelation,theaesthetic experience of cinemacan

be
finally reconstructedas follows:the surrogate
spectator's bodyplaystheroleof
theproximal which,as such,is giventacitly
term, through itssomatic excitations and
vibrations.
We becomeawareof thesemovements in thecinema,though, in lightof
theeditedfilmevent,whichfunctions as thenarratively predicable distalterm.This
meaningfulexplicationof in
ourselves termsof thefilm event is simply a differentfor-
mulationof thefact,notedabove,that,as surrogate the
body, spectator, by means of
hisorherinvolvement inthefilmevent, experiences a narrative temporalization from
thefilmin turn.Yetin contrastto theexperimental situation of thetestsubjects in
Polanyi's explicit
description, self-interpretation
by the film recipientis more complex
thanthatbythosewhoextrapolate theirlatentefforts in termsof shocksyllables that
occuroverthecourseof a shortperiod.Forwhatfunctions as thedistaltermin the

22 Ibid., 12.
23 Ibid., 14.
24 Translator'snote: The theoryof Einfühlung(empathy,literally"feeling into") was developed in late nineteenth-
centuryGerman theoryof art by FriedrichTheodor and Karl Vischer,Adolf Hildebrandt,August Schmarsow, and
others; its most thoroughconceptualization can be found in philosopher-psychologistTheodor Lipps's Ästhetik:
Philosophie des Schönen und der Kunst,2 vols. (Leipzig: Voss, 1903-1906).
25 Polanyi, The TacitDimension, 16.

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 Cinema Journal50 | No. 4 | Summer2011

settingofthecinemaisnotjusta syllable, a simplesentence, ora detachable claim,but

theentire complexdramaturgy of a film'snarrative.
In contrast to theextra-aesthetic, everyday setting of tacitknowledge formation,
in thecase of cinematheaesthetic elementconsists in thefactthatitis thespecial
sound,speech,andimagesequences ofthecondensations specifictoeachfilmthatfor
us takeon,temporarily, thefunction of ourownexplicit self-meaning. Byourselves
cooperating as the instance of a surrogate-bodily of a
spatialization film, weholdthat
whichwesomatically in
(co-)constitutethiswayandsimultaneously experience inthis
formtobe immediately truthful . Itisthusintheformofthefilmnarrative
[wahrhqflig]
thatweexperience oursomaticexcitement inthecinema.In thosecasesinwhichwe
do notallowthefilmnarrative tofunction as thedistaltermof thosesomaticmove-
mentsthatarenevertheless causedbythefilm, andinstead, forexample, associatively
driftin ourthoughts toourprivate biography, we havealreadyinwardly lefttheaes-
theticscenarioof thefilm.Onlyinsofar as we allowourpsychophysical attention to
be led,withrespectto bothcontent and dramaturgy, bythescreeneventscan that
figure-ground reversibilitynotedabovetakeplace; thisreversibility simultaneously
constitutesthecondition forwhatI called"surrogate corporeality" and suppliesthe
suggestive powerof cinematic illusionformation. The experience of heightened vi-
talitythatattends thisreversibilityat thesametimemakespossibletheenjoyment of
thefilm-aesthetic illusion.How,beyondwhatI'vealreadysaid,therelationship ofthe
discretefilmreality sketched outheretoempirical realityis formed is a questionthat
must,at thispointinmydeliberations, remainopen.Atanyrate,usingthenotionof
surrogate corporeality to explaintheaesthetic experience of thecinemais compat-
iblewitha definition of theaesthetic as autonomous, evenwhensucha definition is
notreliant on a dissociation oftheaisthetic dimensions as pureepiphenomena ofthe
aesthetic.Fromtheperspective, advancedin thisessay,of a definition of aesthetic
basedon a theory of experience, theconceptof surrogate corporeality witha
deals
réévaluation of aisthetic with to itsrole- whichis alsonormative -
potential respect
forthecreation of theaesthetic itself.
To conclude, onefinds inDeweya quoteconcerning therelationship between aes-
theticsand world;thisquotemightseemexcessive in itstendency towardextremes,
yetitexpresses an irrational hopevis-à-vis aesthetics, onethat,as muchfortherealists
as forthetranscendentalists among aesthetic theorists,pointsto a compelling back-
ground motive for their turn tothe experience of the aesthetic:
A workof artelicitsand accentuates thisqualityof beinga wholeand of
belonging to a larger, wholewhichis theuniverse
all-inclusive, in whichwe
live.Thisfact,I think,is theexplanationof thatfeeling
of exquisite
intelligi-
bilityandclaritywehaveinthepresence ofan objectthatisexperiencedwith
aesthetic It explainsthereligious
intensity. feelingthataccompanies intense
aestheticperception. We are,as itwere,introduced intoa worldbeyondthis
worldwhichisnevertheless thedeeperrealityoftheworldinwhichwelivein
ourordinary experiences.26

26 Dewey,Artas Experience, 195.

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Cinema Journal50 | No. 4 | Summer201 1

To bothcomplement andsoften Dewey'spoint,onecouldadd thatthefactthatsuch

of
experiences deepening and inaesthetics
self-transcendence canbe experiencedjust
as wellas a unity
ofbodyandspirit be
might theentirely andsecularben-
unreligious
efitof aesthetic
experience. *

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