G.R. No. 112287 December 12, 1997 G.R. No.

125948 December 29, 1998

NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner, FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND VLASONS SHIPPING, INC., respondents. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE PATERNO V. TAC-AN, BATANGAS CITY and
ADORACION C. ARELLANO, in her official capacity as City Treasurer of Batangas,
G.R. No. 112350 December 12, 1997 respondents.

VLASONS SHIPPING, INC., petitioner, FACTS: FPIC is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387, as
vs. amended, to contract, install and operate oil pipelines. The original pipeline concession was
COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, respondents granted in 1967[1] and renewed bythe Energy Regulatory Board in 1992.In January 1995,
FPIC applied for a mayor's permit with the Office of the Mayor of Batangas City.
Facts: Plaintiff National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Charterer and defendant Vlasons
Shipping, Inc. (VSI) as Owner, entered into a Contract of Voyage Charter Hire whereby However, before the mayor's permit could be issued, the respondent City Treasurer
NSC hired VSI’s vessel, the MV Vlasons I to make one voyage to load steel products at required FPIC to pay a local tax based on its gross receipts pursuant to the LGC. In turn,
Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor, Manila. The handling, loading and FPIC filed a letter-protest addressed to the respondent City Treasurer, alleging exemption
unloading of the cargoes were the responsibility of the Charterer. under Section 133 (j) of the LGC which was denied by the City Treasurer as FPIC cannot
be considered engaged in transportation business, thus it cannot claim.
The skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets shipped were allegedly found to be wet and
rusty. Plaintiff, alleging negligence, hence the plaintiff filed a claim for damages against the ISSUE:Does Section 133 (j) of the LGC only refer to common carriers via land, water and
defendant who denied liability claiming that the MV Vlasons I was seaworthy in all respects air AND via motor vehicle?
for the carriage of plaintiff’s cargo; that said vessel was not a “common carrier” inasmuch as HELD: No. FPIC is already paying three (3%) percent common carrier's tax on its gross
she was under voyage charter contract with the plaintiff as charterer under the charter party; sales/earnings under the National Internal Revenue Code. To tax FPIC again on its gross
that in the course its voyage, the vessel encountered very rough seas. receipts in its transportation of petroleum business would defeat the purpose of the LGC.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers pursuant to
which there exists a presumption of negligence against the common carrier in case of loss
or damage to the cargo are applicable to a private carrier.
Held: No. In a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and
obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a
common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent
provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.
G.R. No. 147246            August 19, 2003 G.R. No. L-47822 December 22, 1988

ASIA LIGHTERAGE AND SHIPPING, INC., petitioner, PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDANA, respondents.
INC., respondents.
Facts: Cendena was a junk dealer and was engaged in buying used bottles and scrap
Facts: Wheat in bulk, was shipped on board the vessel for delivery to the consignee in materials in Pangasinan and resale them in Manila.
Manila which was insured against loss or damage. The carrying vessel arrived in Manila
and the cargo was transferred to the custody of the petitioner. He used 2 trucks in transporting scraps and on his return trip, he would load his trucks with
cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to Pangasinan with a freight lower than
The petitioner was contracted by the consignee as carrier to deliver the cargo to regular rates. General Milk Co. contacted with him for the hauling of 750 cartons of milk.
consignee's warehouse which was loaded on barge for delivery to consignee. However, the
cargo did not reach its destination due to a warning of an incoming typhoon. Thereafter, the On the way to Pangasinan, one of the trucks was hijacked. Only 150 cartons of milk were
barge developed a list because of a hole. To avoid the complete sinking of the barge, a delivered. The Milk Co. sued to claim the value of the lost merchandise based on an alleged
portion of the goods was transferred to three other barges while the next day, the towing contract of carriage.
bits of the barge broke. It sank completely, resulting in the total loss of the remaining cargo.
Issue: Whether or not Cendena is a common carrier?
Private respondent indemnified the consignee.15Thereafter, as subrogee, it sought recovery
of said amount from the petitioner, but to no avail. Held: Yes, Cendena is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely
backhauled goods for other merchants, and even if it was done on a periodic basis rather
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that it is not a common carrier. than on a regular basis, and even if his principal occupation was not the carriage of goods.
Issue: WON the petitioner is a common carrier
Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
Held: Yes.  Petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done on an
irregular rather than scheduled manner, and with an only limited clientele. A common carrier activity.
need not have fixed and publicly known routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or It also avoids making a distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
issue tickets. To be sure, petitioner fits the test of a common carrier as laid down in Bascos services on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering service on an occasional,
vs. Court of Appeals.
episodic or unscheduled basis.
The test to determine a common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is a part of the Neither does it make a distinction between a carrier offering its services to the general
business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his public and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of
occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted." In the case at bar, population.
the petitioner admitted that it is engaged in the business of shipping and lighterage, offering
its barges to the public, despite its limited clientele for carrying or transporting goods by
water for compensation.
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991 G.R. No. L-31379 August 29, 1988

REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner, COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, petitioner,

vs. vs.
ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE CONCEPCION, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner boarded as paying passenger a minibus owned by respondents. FACTS: The petitioner is engaged in a contract for the construction of the airport where he
had to ship his construction equipment such as payloader through Compañia Maritima.
While the bus was running along the highway, a “snapping sound” was heard, and after a During the unloading of the payloader, the swivel pin of the heel block of the port block gave
short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. way, causing the payloader to fall. Due to the damage, petitioner demanded a replacement
of the payloader as a complete loss, and filed a claim for damages.
The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by respondent’s
spouse and had the injured passengers, including the petitioner sign an already prepared Meanwhile, Compañia found that the payloader weighed 7.5 tons and not 2.5 tons as
affidavit waiving their claims against respondents. declared in the Bill of Lading. Compañia denied the claim for damages, contending that had
Concepcion declared the actual weight of the payloader, damage to their ship as well as to
Issues: Whether there was a valid waiver his payloader could have been prevented.

Held: No. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SHIPPER’S UNDERDECLARATION OF ACTUAL

A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and WEIGHT OF THE PAYLOADER WAS THE PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE OF ITS
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or DAMAGE ABSOLUTELY EXEMPTING THE CARRIER FROM LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.
benefit which legally pertains to him.
RULING: NO. While petitioner has proven that Concepcion did furnish it with an inaccurate
What is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by weight of the payloader, petitioner is nonetheless liable, for the damage caused to the
passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary machinery could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable skill and attention on its
diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common part in overseeing the unloading of such a heavy equipment.
carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured
passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and The general rule under the Civil Code is that common carriers are presumed to have been
weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers at fault or to have acted negligently in case the goods transported by them are lost,
and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is destroyed or had deteriorated. To overcome this presumption of liability, the common
offensive to public policy. carriers must prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.
It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and "to
use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for
shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage including such methods as
their nature requires."
While the act of private respondent in furnishing petitioner with an inaccurate weight of the
payloader cannot successfully be used as an excuse by petitioner to avoid liability to the
damage thus caused, said act constitutes a contributory circumstance to the damage petitioner’s vessel. A carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
caused on the payloader, which mitigates the liability for damages of petitioner. destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.

G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989 G.R. No. 118126 March 4, 1996

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner, TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS.
ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING vs.
CORPORATION, respondents.
COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. RENATO T. ARROYO, respondents.
Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded a vessel owned by petitioner bound for Manila. The vessel
arrived in Manila and was taken over by Pioneer Stevedoring for the unloading of cargoes FACTS: Atty Renato Arroyo purchased a ticket from the Petitioner bound for Cagayan de
from the said vessel. An hour after the passengers and Viana had disembarked the vessel, Oro from Cebu City. Upon boarding he noticed that engines of the vessel were being
the crane operator began its unloading operation. While the crane was being operated, repaired. Regardless, he boarded the same.
Viana who had already disembarked the vessel remembered that some of his cargoes were
still loaded there. He went back and while he was pointing to the crew where his cargoes The vessel departed on time with only 1 engine running. It stopped near Kawit Island and
were, the crane hit him resulting to his death. A complaint for damages was filed against after half an hour of stillness, the passengers, who already were suffering from mental
petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner contends that Viana ceased to be a distress, demanded that they be brought back to their port of origin.
passenger when he disembarked the vessel and that consequently his presence there was
no longer reasonable. At Cebu City, passengers who wished to disembark were allowed and given 10 minutes.
Atty. Arroyo as one of the passengers. After which, the vessel continued its voyage.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the latter had
already disembarked the vessel. On this account, Passenger Arroyo filed before t
he trial court a complaint for damages against Trans-Asia Shipping Inc. for failure of
transporting the former to his place of destination.
Ruling: YES. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the
passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock
ISSUE: WON a vessel being unworthy of the sea is tantamount to a breach of contract?
or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger
has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a
HELD: Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, the petitioner was bound to observe
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the
extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the private respondent. That meant that the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers,
petitioner was, pursuant to Article 1755 of the said Code, bound to carry the private
and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined
respondent safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost
from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In this case,
prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by
we are in full accord with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner failed to discharge this
the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such
obligation.
person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.
Before commencing the contracted voyage, the petitioner undertook some repairs on the
The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the cylinder head of one of the vessel's engines. But even before it could finish these repairs, it
presence of the victim on or near the petitioner’s vessel. When the accident occurred, the allowed the vessel to leave the port of origin on only one functioning engine, instead of two.
victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from Moreover, even the lone functioning engine was not in perfect condition as sometime after it
had run its course, it conked out. This caused the vessel to stop and remain a drift at sea, more passengers than it was allowed to carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for
thus in order to prevent the ship from capsizing, it had to drop anchor. Plainly, the vessel damages to the full extent. Prior to this case, a previous case was brought for the death of
was unseaworthy even before the voyage began. For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be other passengers. Said case is entitled Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court. In that
adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent case it was found that although the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of
officers and crew. 21 The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent as it
vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty prescribed in Article found that the latter’s master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the time
1755 of the Civil Code. of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he
failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This Court
G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997 found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to
prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC., petitioner, of the ship. Petitioner Negros Navigation was found equally negligent in tolerating the
vs. playing of mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members while on board the ship
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON MIRANDA, SPS. RICARDO and VIRGINIA DE LA and failing to keep the M/V Don Juan seaworthy so much so that the ship sank within 10 to
VICTORIA, respondents 15 minutes of its impact with the M/T Tacloban City. In addition, the Court found that the
Don Juan was overloaded. On the Doctrine of stare decisis: Adherence to the Mecenas
Doctrine: The carrier is liable for the damages to the full extent and not up to the value of case is dictated by this Courts policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance
the vessel if it was established that the carrier was guilty of negligence, in failing to maintain with the legal maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere (Follow past precedents and do not
the ship as seaworthy and in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to the
to carry. FACTS: Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case
Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets for his wife, daughter, son and niece. The litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt
tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan. The Don Juan collided with the to relitigate the same issue.
M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC)
and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don G.R. No. L-30309 November 25, 1983
Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of the four
members of private respondents families were never found. Private respondents filed a CLEMENTE BRIÑAS, petitioner,
complaint in the RTC against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company vs.
(PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE COURT OF
damages for the death of their family members. The RTC ruled in favor of the complainants APPEALS, respondents.
and ordered petitioner to pay for the damages. The CA affirmed the said decision. ISSUE:
FACTS: Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Quezon for his 55-
Whether petitioner is liable for damages to the full extent. year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo, who were
bound for Barrio Lusacan. At about 2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan with the old
RULING: woman and her granddaughter among the passengers. At Hondagua, Victor Millan took
over as engineman, Clemente Briñas as conductor, and Hermogenes Buencamino as
YES. assistant conductor. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag at about 8:00 p.m, the train slowed
down and the conductor shouted 'Lusacan', 'Lusacan'. Because of that, the old woman
The rule is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a shipowner may be held liable for walked towards the left front door facing the direction of Tiaong, carrying the child with one
injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of hand and holding her baggage with the other. When Martina and Emelita were near the
maritime law if fault can be attributed to the shipowner. Petitioner is guilty of negligence in door, the train suddenly picked up speed. As a result the old woman and the child stumbled
(1) allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the and they were seen no more. It took three minutes more before the train stopped at the next
voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry
barrio, Lusacan, and the victims were not among the passengers who disembarked thereat. It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop when said stop
The accused wilfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless was still a full three minutes ahead. The negligence of petitionerappellant in prematurely
and imprudent manner, without due regard to existing laws, regulations and ordinances, and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of
that although there were passengers on board the passenger coach, they failed to provide Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo.
lamps or lights therein, and failed to take the necessary precautions for the safety of
passengers and to prevent accident to persons and damage to property, causing by such Any negligence of the victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused
negligence, carelessness and imprudence, as a result of which, they were over run, causing from criminal liability.
their instantaneous death.

(2) No. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced is culpa contractual, not an act or
CFI Decision: CFI of Quezon convicted defendant-appellant Clemente Briñas for double omission punishable by law. We also note from the appellant's arguments and from the title
homicide thru reckless imprudence but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino and Victor of the civil case that the party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company and not
Millan. For lack of sufficient evidence against the defendant Hermogenes Buencamino and petitionerappellant Briñas Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are
on the ground of reasonable doubt in the case of defendant Victor Millan the court hereby two distinct sources of obligation.
acquits them of the crime charged in the information and their bail bonds declared
cancelled. As to the responsibility of the Manila Railroad Company in this case, this will be
the subject of court determination in another proceeding. A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the criminal action for
double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to file an
independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the Manila Railroad
CA Decision: Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court. During the Company.
pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the heirs of
the deceased victims filed with the same court, a separate civil action for damages against
the Manila Railroad Company. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it of the separate civil
action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still awarded death indemnity in the
judgment of conviction against the petitioner-appellant.
Issues: WON (1) the CA gravely erred in convicting petitioner-appellant under the facts as
found by said court; (2) the CA erred in including the payment of death indemnity by the
petitionerappellant, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, after the heirs of the It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the
deceased have already commenced a separate civil action for damages against the railroad following items of damages may be recovered: (1) an indemnity for the death of the victim;
company. (2) an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest in proper
cases. 
Ruling: (1) No. There is no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the
conclusion drawn from those findings. It is undisputed that the victims were on board the
second coach where the petitioner-appellant was assigned as conductor and that when the
train slackened its speed and the conductor shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan", they stood up
` C
and proceeded to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the
train unexpectedly resumed its regular speed and as a result "the old woman and the child
stumbled and they were seen no more.