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Seeking common ground. Petroleum and

Indigenous Peoples in Ecquador's Amazon
Sixto Mendez , Jennifer Parnell & Robert Wasserstrom
Published online: 25 Mar 2010.

To cite this article: Sixto Mendez , Jennifer Parnell & Robert Wasserstrom (1998) Seeking common ground. Petroleum
and Indigenous Peoples in Ecquador's Amazon, Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 40:5,
12-20, DOI: 10.1080/00139159809604587

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Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 07:00 04 October 2014
 A usual meeting took place at Arc0
ional Oil and Gas headquarters
, Texas, on 4 March 1994. Sit-
ting side by side around a conference
table, Indian leaders, oilmen, and envi-
ronmental advocates talked well into the
night. They discussed native land claims,
health care, and the lack of adequate
schools throughout the Oriente,
Ecuador’s Amazon region. At midnight
they reached a decision: They would pur-
sue a dialogue to resolve the issues sur-
rounding Arco’s proposed development of
the Villano oil field. Located deep within
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the Oriente, in a region of ~ a s t a z a

province known as Block 10, the Villano
field had become a battleground in the
often difficult and contentious relation-

PETROLEUM and ship between Arc0 and Ecuador’s indige-

nous Indian communities.
This agreement represented a major

INDIGENOUS turning point. A few years earlier, the

Organization of Indigenous Peoples of
Pastaza (OPIP),one of Ecuador’s most

PEOPLES powerful Indian federations, had

demanded a 15-year moratorium on
all petroleum exploration in Pastaza

in ECUADOR’S province. Yet that night in Plano, OPIP

representatives promised to work with
Arco. This article outlines the process by

AMAZON which that agreement was reached and

where it has led since 1994, assessing
what larger lessons Arco’s unique experi-
ence holds for hydrocarbon companies
working to build relationships with
indigenous peoples elsewhere. To build
such relationships in Ecuador, the com-

by Sixto Mendez, Jennifer Parnell,

and Robert Wasserstrom
 pany discovered, requires some appre- aging landless highland peasants to That same year, Shuar Indians living
ciation of history. settle empty areas of the Oriente. Most in the rainforest adjacent to Macas
of the eastern rainforest had been formed the Shuar Federation to defend
Setting the Stage: Ecuador’s legally declared public land (open for their territory and obtain legal title to
Amazon, 1964-88 homesteading and colonization) since their lands.3 Subsequently, the pace of
at least the 1930s. The Agrarian colonization did slow for several
In 1964, the Ecuadorian government Reform and Colonization Law reaf- years, but the land race soon began
passed the Agrarian Reform and Colo- firmed this declaration. It also creat- again in earnest. In 1973, the govern-
nization Law. Recognizing the im- ed a new government agency-the ment issued a stronger agrarian reform
mense disparities between the nation’s Ecuadorian Institute for Agrarian law followed by a new homesteading
upper-class landowners and its nearly Reform and Colonization-which was act in 1978, which included additional
landless peasants, the law allowed im- authorized to grant 50 hectares (125 inducements for settlers. Texaco lnc.,
poverished farmers to receive under- acres) of forestland to any farmer who on the heels of its 1967 discovery of it
utilized or surplus fields annexed from put 65 percent of his tract to produc- major petroleum reservoir in Napo
private estates. Throughout the An- tive use. province, built a new road into the
dean highlands, where most of these The prospect of settlers drew heated region, which effectively paved the
estates (or haciendas) were located, reactions from the lowland Indians liv- way for immigration.
peasant communities slowly began to ing in the Oriente. Most of these peo- As fresh waves of settlers streamed
petition for land, eventually forming ple inhabited small, dispersed commu- down the road into Nap0 province i n
local and regional organizations to nities, often made up of no more than the 1970s, lowland Indian communi-
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press for their rights under the law.’ one or two extended families, located ties organized to resist the invaders.
Many hacienda owners, however, within territories that had been occu- They formed the Federation of Indige-
filed lengthy and expensive lawsuits pied for centuries. Over hundreds of nous Organizations (FOIN) in Nap0 i n
that effectively blocked confiscation years, they had developed a way of life 1975 and OPIP in Pastaza province in
of their properties. As a result, little based on hunting and gathering and 1979. In 1980, FOIN, OPIP, and the
land actually changed hands, and what shifting cultivation. In 1964, the ap- Shuar Federation banded together to
acreage did tended to be the least pro- pearance of the first wave of settlers create the Confederation of Indige-
ductive. Meanwhile, highland popula- near the town of Macas threatened to nous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian
tions continued to grow. disrupt this existence, in which mini- Amazon (CONFENIAE). This organi-
Many senior Ecuadorian officials mizing ecological disruption guaran- zation eventually united disparate
argued that the solution lay in encour- teed long-term survival.2 native federations in all five of
Ecuador’s Oriente provinces. In 1986,
CONFENIAE and several organiza-
tions of highland Indians founded the
Confederation of Indigenous Nation-
alities of Ecuador (CONAIE) to repre-
sent indigenous peoples throughout
the c o ~ n t r y . ~
In 1988, OPIP organized a bahe
group or local chapter in Villano, a
cluster of seven or eight comrnunitics
located in Pastaza province.s That
same year Arco and its partner Agip
acquired oil exploration rights (from
the Ecuadorian government) to an area
known as Block 10 (see Figure 1 on
page 15). This area included Villano.
The Block 10 project put Arco firmly
on a collision course with OPIP and
other indigenous groups. In relatively
short order, the company stood
accused of willfully violating indigc-
Native villagers in Pastaza at a meeting to discuss the environmental impact that foreign nous rights and causing widespread
companies will have on the surrounding lands. environmental damageU6

14 ENVIRONMENT June 1998

 Enter Arc0
Figure 1. Map of Ecuador includlng Block 10
Arco planned a four-stage explo-
ration of Block 10. It would first con-
duct a seismic study, followed by a
four- to six-month review of the data
attained. It would then drill at least
three exploratory wells in the most
promising locations and, if it discov- Mxunti
ered an important reservoir, develop
and operate the field for roughly 20
years. Arco knew that it would have
to resolve many problems-some
small and some not so small-along II Ambato
PUYO
Block10 1
SOUTH AMERICA

the way. For example, most of Block

10 lay in virgin rainforest or mature
secondary growth located at least 100
miles from the Trans-Ecuadorian
Pipeline System. If Arco discovered
oil, a feeder line would have to be
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built through sensitive and pristine

forestland to connect the field to the
pipeline. In 1988, however, company
SOURCE: Arc0 Oriente, Inc.
representatives believed this and
other obstacles lay at least several
years ahead.
Arco’s successful operations in local people, fix the airstrip, maybe days, the delegation left Sarayacu
other ecologically sensitive areas such even build a school or clinic, or give only after signing the Sarayacu
as the North Sea convinced company them school supplies or medicines. Accords. Among other things, the
managers that they could overcome As long as it was reasonable, we just accords called on the government to
the environmental challenges of work- gave it to them.”7 end colonization and homesteading in
ing in the rainforest. Even so, the strict Arco supported this approach, the rainforest, resolve disputed land
deadlines in Arco’s contract with which seemed to work well until April claims, place a 15-year moratorium
Ecuador’s national oil company, 1989, when CGG workers arrived on petroleum exploration, grant
Petroecuador, were a major concern. near Sarayacu, a Quichua Indian com- indigenous territories semi-auto-
These deadlines required Arco to com- munity located just outside of Block nornous political status, and impose a
plete 1,200 kilometers of seismic 10 but included within the seismic levy on oil production whose pro-
investigation within 24 months and to program. The same crew chief re- ceeds would go to indigenous com-
conclude its entire exploration pro- members initial contacts as friendly, munities. The accords also estab-
gram in just four years. but when he returned to Sarayacu the lished a so-called Bilateral Com-
Arco hired an experienced seismic following week, he encountered sev- mission, composed of representatives
contractor, Compagnie Gdnerale de eral angry OPIP officials. Demanding from indigenous organizations and
Gdophysique (CGG), to conduct the compensation for trees that had been the Ecuadorian government, to report
fieldwork in Block 10. CGG began to cut and accusing CGG of driving fish on the status of native communities.
cut seismic lines in November 1988. from the rivers and wild game from In retrospect, it seems clear that
Following standard industry practice the forest, they requested a meeting OPE’ and the other federations de-
at the time, CGG took no special with general managers from CGG, signed the accords to provoke a dis-
measures to contact indigenous com- Arco, and Petroecuador. cussion of broader issues with the
munities before it started work. In- The Ecuadorian government quick- Ecuadorian government rather than to
stead, as one former seismic crew ly sent two senior officials (accompa- redress specific grievances related to
chief recalls, “As we got to each vil- nied by mid-level representatives Arco’s operations in Block The
lage, we would walk in and ask them from CGG and Petroecuador) to accords essentially amounted to what
what they wanted. Whatever they negotiate “transit rights” through the one indigenous leader describes as a
asked for, we would do: hire a few village. Involuntarily held for 12 way of “telling the government that

Volume 40 Number 5 ENVIRONMENT 15

 they needed to begin a dialogue with change in plans. The company got per- and got back to work, completing the
Indian organizations and other groups mission from the Ecuadorian govern- rest of the seismic study.
on the country's oil policy and natu- ment to declare force majeure on its In January 1991, Arco began
ral resources.'* seismic studies around Sarayacu. It drilling its first exploratory well at
For Arco, however, the Sarayacu then amended its contract with Petro- Moretecocha, a village located a few
Accords precipitated a significant ecuador to exclude the disputed area kilometers from Sarayacu. The com-

A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, 1964-98

1964: 'l'he Agrarian Reform and Colo- to demand additional benefits. the Ministry of Energy and Mines,
nization LAW is signed. August 1991: Arco signs second com- OPIP, FIPPRA, ASODIRA, CONFENI-
1967: Texaco makes a major petroleum munity assistance agreement with AE, CONAIE. and Oxfam America
discovery in Niipo province. Moretecocha; agrees to allow University meet at CONFENIAE's Union H;rw
1972: Texaco begins oil production at of California, Berkeley (UCB) re- headquarters.
the Shushufindi field in Sucumbios and searchers to evaluate its environmental June 1994: CONAIE organizes Nution-
Nupo provinces. performance in Block 10. al Mobilization for Life to prolest new
1973: Agrarian Reform Law revised, August 1991September 1991: Villano Agricultural Development Law that
;illowiiig government to deprive benefi- seismic work completed. transfers communal land titles to indi-
ciurics ot' land rights if they do not meet November 1991-January 1992: Vil- vidual property owners; demands mar+
production requirements; Indian com- lano exploratory drilling completed. torium on seventh bidding round.
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munities and settlers begin cutting January 1992: UCB researchers visit 21-22 September 1994: Technicd
m i t i r e forest in the Oriente to plant pas- Ecuador. committee's first meeting.
ture griisses. March 1992: UCB researchers release November 1994: ASODIRA informs
19711: Aniazon Region Settlement Act findings. Arco that it will no longer accept OPIP
passes, declaring most of the Oriente April 1992: OPIP organizes March to involvement in the Block 10 envimn-
puhlic Iund. Quito; demands recognition of semi- mental assessment.
December 1979: Organization of Indige- autonomous territories in Pastaza and a December 1994: Arco submits Villiino
nous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP) forms. single land title to all indigenous com- development plan to Ministry of' Energy
1980: Federation of Indigenous Organi- munities. Arc0 announces Villano dis- and Mines.
zetions (FXXN), Federaci6n Shuar, and covery. January 1995: OPIP and FlPPRA
OPIP fonn the Confederationof Indige- June 1993: DIClP (later the Association demand that Arco suspend all discus-
nous Nationalities of' the Ecuadorian for Indigenous Development, Amazon sions with ASODIRA.
Amazon (CONFENIAE). Region (ASODIRA)) forms. April 1995: Ministry of Energy arid
1986: CONFENIAE and other groups July 1993 Arc0 signs Villano assistance Mines approves Villano development
Ibmi the Confederation of Indigenous agreement with DICIP/ASODIRA. plan.
Nalionalities of' Ecuador (CONAIE). September 1993: OPIP requests meet- Mny 1995: Arc0 declates force majeure
November 1987: Arco bids for explo- ing with Arco; ASODIRA protests on Villano development until Petro-
ration and production rights in Block 10. meeting: OPIP/Arco discussions break ecuador agrees to build required feeder
1988: OPIP organizes base group in Vil- down. link to Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline Systeni.
lanu, future site of Arco's major petrole- December 1993: OPIP convenes the December 1995: Arco contracts wilh
um discovery; government awards Arco Villano Assembly. FugroPetrokem to conduct retrospec-
Rlwk 10 exploration rights. January 1994: OPIP, CONFENIAE, tive environmental impact assessment.
November 1988-May 1989: Arco's and CONAIE occupy Ministry of Ener- May 1996: Eight niernhers of the
seismic studies begin. gy and Mines in Quito to protest seventh indigenous political party, Pachakutik-
July IWk First phase of seismic stud- bidding round on exploration rights and Nuevo Pals, elected to Ecuador's Con-
ics completed. exclusion of native organizations from gress.
August 1990: Ecuador's President major policy decisions. March 1997: Arco resolves pipeline
Rodrigo Borja refuses to repeal the Col- February 1994: Minister of Energy and dispute with Peuoecuador; issue&declil-
onization Law or to grant Pastaza's Mines meets with CONFENIAE, ration of commerciality signaling star1
indigenous territories semi-autonomy. CONAIB. OPIP, and other indigenous of development phM.
October 1990: Arco begins building federations in Puyo to discuss oil policy. June 1997: Arco rejects Fugro/
exploration well at Moretecocha. 4 March 2994: OPIP and Arc0 repre- Petrokem's draft report; hires ENTRIX
November 1990: Arco signs communi- sentatives meet in Plano, Texas. to conduct second environmental assew-
ry assistance agreement with Morete- April 1994: OPIP, ASODIRA, and Fed- ment.
cwha. eration of Indigenous Peoples of Pas- April 1998 Ministry of Energy and
January 1991: Exploratory drilling taza, Amazon Region (FIPPRA) form Mines approves Arco's environmental
hegins at Moretecocha. the Indigenous Front to negotiate with impact assessment and management
Mid-1991:Moretecocha blocks con- Arco and Pemcuador. plan; Arco begins construction of Vil-
struction of airstrip, stalling Arco's work May 1994: ArcoIAgip, Petroecuador, lano field wd pipelines.

16 ENVIRONMENT June 1998

 pany plugged and abandoned
that well after finding insuffi-
cient oil. In 1992 and 1994,Arc0
drilled two additional wells at
Villano, 25 kilometers to the
north of Sarayacu. There, it dis-
covered recoverable reserves of
200 million barrels of medium-
grade oil.

Sarayacu’s Aftermath
During the seismic studies,
Arc0 supported CGG’s “pay
whatever they ask as long as it’s
reasonable” approach. But when
the company decided to drill an
exploration well at Moretecocha,
it negotiated a formal community
assistance agreement with the Arco’s contract with the national utility, Petroecuador,set a strict deadline for the company to
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village. Signed in 1990and even- finish its explorationprogram in just four years.
tually extended through 1996,
this agreement required Arc0 to provide despite the researchers’ strong ties to Berkeley research team acknowl-
villagers with training in carpentry and OPIP and RAN. (Several months ear- edged that many of these issues had
sewing, medical services, and one air- lier, RAN, with OPIP’s blessing, had been re~olved.’~ It concluded that Ar-
plane flight per week to the provincial launched an international campaign to CO’Sconduct in Moretecocha and Vil-
capital in Puyo as well as direct finan- support the Quichua people of Pastaza lano “appears to represent a new envi-
cial support. province that attacked Arco’s opera- ronmental standard for oil exploration
Behind Arco’s willingness to negoti- tions in particular.) in Ecuador.”14
ate with Moretecocha lay its aware- The Berkeley team visited Ecuador
ness of a basic economic fact: Seismic in January 1992 and released its The Plot Thickens
studies might cost several hundred report two months later. The report
thousand dollars; drilling an explo- criticized Arc0 for failing to conduct Although it ended on this positive
ration well typically costs several mil- baseline environmental studies before note, the Berkeley report was widely
lion. For Arco, this greater level of beginning its seismic investigations cited as evidence of Arco’s poor con-
investment justified its support of larg- and for not issuing environmental Yet in the spring of 1992, the
er, longer-term community benefit guidelines to its contractors until well report was actually the least of Arco’s
programs. The company pursued a after exploration work had begun.” It problems. In April, OPIP organized u
similar strategy in Villano, where it also outlined the negative impacts of a highly publicized march to Ecuador’s
signed a community assistance agree- series of technical problems re- capital city Quito, calling international
ment in July 1993,’O searchers claimed had arisen during attention to its demands for a “plurina-
During this period, Arco continued the exploratory drilling and the recla- tional indigenous state.” OPIP wanted
working to resolve the issues OPIP mation of the abandoned well sites.12 the government to issue it a single title
raised at Sarayacu. In August 1991, at In particular, they noted that indige- to the land occupied by Pastaza’s
OPIP’s request, company representa- nous inhabitants reported a decrease indigenous communities (more than
tives met with Rainforest Action Net- in wild game near these sites; they 1.1 million hectares or 2.75 million
work (RAN) members and researchers also observed that Arco’s revegetation acres). This demand sparked angry
from the University of California Col- efforts at Moretecocha were largely demonstrations organized by settlers
lege of Environmental Design at unsuccessful. While faulting the com- and rival indigenous political groups,
Berkeley. OPIP wanted the Berkeley pany for its initial “lack of ecological including the Federation of Indige-
team to conduct an independent envi- understanding, weak environmental nous Peoples of Pastaza, Amazon
ronmental impact assessment of analysis and documentation, and inad- Region (FIPPRA).
Arco’s activities in Block 10. Arc0 equate procedures for consult[ing] In part, the antagonism between
agreed to participate in the assessment with indigenous communities,” the OPIP and FIPPRA can be traced to

Volume 40 Number 5 ENVIRONMENT 17

 religious differences. Starting in the mid-1993, all but one group out of 120 impact of their actions. Nonetheless,
late 1960s, U.S. Protestant missionar- Catholic and Protestant families aban- what they did merely confirmed
ies successfully converted large num- doned OPIP to form their own inde- OPIP’s worst fears. To make matters
bers of Quichua Indians and other pendent organization, the Association worse, when OPE’ approached Arco
indigenous peoples in the region. Con- for Indigenous Development, Amazon in September 1993 to suggest opening
versions typically involved extended Region (ASODIRA, originally new discussions, ASODIRA refused
families and, in some cases, entire DICIP). United in the hope of negoti- to participate.
Communities. Where villages split ating a substantial community assis-
between Protestants and Catholics, tance agreement with Arco, ASODI- Shifting Priorities
one group often moved a short dis- RA members openly admit they left
tance away to establish a separate OPIP rather than agree to its demand ASODIRA and OPIP’s battle over
community and, in many cases, sepa- that they share benefits with other community development funds in Vil-
rate political organizations. Most of communities in the region.” lano mirrored many other indigenous
OPIP’s members were Catholic; how- The community assistance agree- organizations’ struggles throughout
ever, FIPPRA’s membership was pre- ment Arc0 signed with ASODIRA in Ecuador during this time period.
dominantly Protestant. July 1993 infuriated OPIP. The feder- By this point, the indigenous organi-
FIPPRA members in Moretecocha ation accused Arc0 of deliberately zations had won many of the battles
were already embroiled in a territorial promoting ASODIRA’s creation as they originally set out to fight, suc-
dispute with Sarayacu residents when part of a “divide and conquer” strate- cessfully focusing national and in-
Arc0 arrived on the scene. After the gy. Several years earlier, Ecuadorian ternational attention on land reform,
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Ecuadorian government issued prelim- government officials had actively racial discrimination in basic govem-
inary land titles to the two villages in encouraged alternative groups like ment services, and other political
1990, a group of Sarayacu men occu- ASODIRA in an attempt to weaken issues.20 Under President Rodrigo
pied hillsides near the proposed site of OPIP and other strong federations.I8 Borja (1988-92), the Ecuadorian gov-
ernment gave many indige-
, nous communities title to their
lands and took important steps
toward eliminating inequali-
ties in education, health care,
b A and infrastructure.2’By 1992,
most observers concur, street
demonstrations and marches
had forced most of the prob-
lems that needed to be ad-
dressed by government action
onto the national agenda.22
Deeper, more intractable is-
sues lay beneath such prob-
lems, however. Building i t
road or schoolhouse is one
thing; eliminating poverty or
increasing family income is
another, As the government
began to eliminate outright
Pinrhuza village in Ecuador’s Oriente is home to Shuar Indians.
discrimination, indigenoul;
organizations faced new and
Arco’s exploratory well that had been By negotiating with ASODIRA, Arc0 unfamiliar challenges. As a team of
assigned to Moretecocha. They ac- did appear to be doing the same thing. Ecuadorian and international special-
cused Arco of pulling strings with However, W. Ken Keag, Arco’s then ists wrote in 1992, “now that many of
government officials to get the land resident manager in Ecuador, reports the problems of land rights and cultur-
assigned to the more sympathetic FIP- that ASODIRA’s formation caught the al marginalization have been amelio-
PRA members.Ih company equally off-guard.” In the rated, both sympathetic outside
Similar events occurred in the com- end, Arco’s managers in Ecuador observers and local members wonder
munities surrounding Villano. But in basically underestimated the political if these organizations are becoming

18 ENVIRONMENT June 1998

 remote from the pressing demands of
daily life,”23
Many federations foresaw the need
to begin focusing on community devel-
opment during the late 1980sand there-
fore sought financial and technical sup-
port from foreign nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) or other donors.
Slipshod management practices, inex-
perience, and a constant shortage of
resources, however, often conspired to
undermine nascent agricultural cooper-
atives, community stores, and other
ventures.24 As economic setbacks
mounted, federation leaders found
themselves accused of favoritism, dis-
honesty, or outright theft.
Such problems threatened OPIP
and FIPPRA’s relationship. With sup-
port from RAN, OPIP created the
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Amazanga Institute, a forum where

researchers and activists could work
out a regional development scheme.
OPIP earmarked a large part of
Amazanga’s budget to finance the
installation of a state-of-the-art com-
puterized geographic information
system (GIS)at its Puyo headquar-
ters. When President Borja rejected
OPIP’s demand for a single land title
to all of Pastaza’s indigenous com-
munities in May 1992, the rationale
for investing in the GIS system disap-
peared. Afterward, Villano and other
communities complained that the In Shushufindi,pipelines from the Lago Agrio oil rejinery interrupt the lamkcape.
money had been misappropriated or,
at the very least, that they had bene- with Petroecuador, Arc0 and its part- president refused to meet with them.25
fited little from 0PIF”s use of interna- ner Agip did not own the oil in Block Former OPIP officials, however, recall
tional donations. 10, even after the company invested all two meetings where Arc0 raised
This history partly explains the of the capital required to find and pro- “insulting” questions about their au-
political impact of Arco’s community duce it. As hired operators, they would thority to represent indigenous com-
assistance agreement with ASODIRA. be reimbursed for their expenses if oil munities in the region.26Rather than
In their defense, company representa- were to be found and paid in oil for bow to “unacceptable conditions that
tives felt obligated to negotiate with managing the Villano field. But trample the dignity of the future of
local landowners for access to com- Petroecuador had to approve every indigenous people in Pastaza,” as one
munal territory within Block 10, Over- dollar in Arco’s budget, including official wrote, OPIP convened a public
whelmingly, those landowners be- funds spent on local development and assembly of base-level leaders from
longed to ASODIRA, not OPIP. community relations. Hence, Arc0 had each of its 133 member communities
Petroecuador’s reluctance to deal to walk a fine line, conciliating Petro- to debate Arco’s presence in Block
with OPIP after the events in Sarayacu ecuador and meeting indigenous lead-
also played a part in the decision. Arc0 ers’ expectations. For addjtional perspectives on this
officials felt they could not afford to Under the circumstances, conflict article, turn to Commentary on
take such reluctance lightly. Under the was inevitable. Arc0 staff members
terms of their risk service agreement state that by late 1993, OPIP’s then

Volume 40 Number 5 ENVIRONMENT 19

 I O.?’ The assembly took place in Vil- sentatives and OPIP’s new president, engulf the Block 10 project. Soileau
lano in December 1993. Hector Villamil. OPIP leaders contin- and his team knew they needed to
This gathering accomplished two ued to claim that Arco had created establish working relationships with a
objectives. First, it demonstrated that ASODIRA to undermine them and broader range of stakeholders, includ-
OPLP remained a strong organiza- demanded that Arco agree to negotiate ing OPIP and nongovernmental or-
tion with a broad-based membership solely with OPIP in the future. ganizations like Oxfam America and
throughout the province. Second, it In March 1994, RAN and Oxfam RAN. Villamil and Viteri, as one syni-
sent a message to ASODIRA that America helped Villamil and another pathetic observer relates, realized that
OPIP intended to speak for all Indi- OPIP leader, Leonard0 Viteri, travel to stay relevant to its base communi-
ans in Pastaza, including those in Vil- to the United States to plead their ties, OPIP had to provide them with
lano where at least one important case to advocacy groups and journal- lasting economic benefits.30The Plano
family retained its OPIP membership. i s t ~ . At
* ~ the end of this trip, Oxfam meeting offered both parties the
After three days of heated debate and America and another nongovernmen- opportunity to start fresh.
discussion, the assembly issued a tal organization, the Seventh Genera-
statement calling on Arco to “lessen tion Fund, suggested that Arco The Search for Common
and avoid the social, cultural, and representatives and the two leaders Ground
environmental impact of its project try meeting again at the company’s
on native communities.”28 Texas headquarters. At the Plano meeting, Arco repre-
This declaration signaled a subtle By this time, a new team at Arco had sentatives and OPIP leaders outlined
but significant shift in OPIP’s stance. turned its attention to Block 10. With two major objectives: minimizing the
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Four years earlier in Sarayacu, OPIP the exploration phase complete, an environmental and social impacts of
had demanded a 15-year moratorium operations group had come onto the oil production in Villano and creating
on petroleum activities. The organiza- scene to begin preparing a develop- a plan to ensure the long-term wel-
fare of Pastaza’s indigc-
nous communities. “We all
agreed that we had no desire
to see another Nap0 pro-
vince,” Soileau recently
recalled. “But to avoid that,
we had to lay out a plan for
future resource develop-
ment here.”31
The Arc0 team also want-
ed to resolve an outstanding
problem raised two years
earlier in the Berkeley re-
searchers’ report: the lack of
baseline environmental stud-
ies on Block 10. The team
knew the time for such stud-
ies had passed, but wanted to
conduct a retrospective en-
A Ii ’ o engineers designed Villano’s well and production facilities to be operated remotely, unlike the
vironmental impact assess-
ulternotivr shown here. ment. This assessment, in
addition to being a gesture of
tion issued similar ultimatums in 1992 ment plan for the Villano field. The good faith, could provide a baseline for
during the march to Quito. Now, manager leading that group, Louis future development and production
instead of opposing Arco outright, Soileau IV, understood the need to activities around Villano.
OPIP’s leaders were asking the com- build a serious, long-term relationship The Plano meeting attendees
pany to only “moderate” the impact of between Arco and the indigenous agreed. Acknowledging the need to
its activities. communities that could last for the involve other stakeholders in future
Despite this apparent change in atti- next 20 years. Such a relationship was discussions, they decided to form a
tude, little was achieved at the January the key to avoiding the kind of grind- subcommittee with representatives
I994 meetings between Arco repre- ing, daily conflict otherwise likely to (continued on puge 3b)

20 ENVIRONMENT June 1998

 ~~

The committee, composed of three widely from that of Arco, Agip, and
Common Ground Petroecuador representatives, three Petroecuador. Arco arrived at the
(conrinuedjiwt page 20) Arco/Agip officials, and two members meeting hoping to approve a general
each from OPIP, RPPRA, and plan for the environmental impact
~ ~

from Petroecuador, ASODIRA, and ASODIRA, had three immediate assessment in Block 10 and agree on
FIPPRA to flesh out the assessment’s responsibilities: define the scope of selection procedures for potential con-
terms. A second subcommittee would Arco’s retrospective environmental tractors. The indigenous groups’ pro-
examine near- and mid-term commu- impact assessment; set the level of posed agenda articulated very differ-
nity assistance opportunities within indigenous organizations’ participa- ent priorities, namely the need to
Block 10. A larger group, including tion in this study; and =view the qual- commit financing for the development
perhaps the local government and ifications of prospective envhnmen- plan. Indigenous leaders wanted near-
other companies operating in Pastaza, tal contractors. As operator, Arco ly $150,000 to conduct their own envi-
would be invited to help explore would select the winning bidder. The ronmental/community study and train-
options for long-term development committee would then draft terms for ing Program.
planning and resource use. the scope of the study and Arco’s envi- Company representatives ultimately
Before they adjourned at midnight, ronmental management plan for the suggested that senior managers at
the Plan0 group wrote a sim-
ple, five-point memorandum.
In it, OPIP agreed to prepare a
proposal for an initial devel-
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opment fund to finance the

territorial plan.32 It also prom-
ised to seek a consensus
among the three organizations
representing indigenous com-
munities in Pastaza. Arc0
agreed to seek Petroecuador’s
support for further discus-
sions and to encourage
ASODIRA to talk with O P E
The company also promised
to considerestablishinga fund
to finance the long-term re-
gional development plan.
Lastly, participants agreed to
schedule a meeting in Ec-
uador between all concerned
groups for the following
month, and stipulated that
Oxfam America would be Indigenous rechnical committee members became involved in operations at Villano as trained
“environmentalmonitors.”
allowed to attend as an inde-
pendent observer. Villano field, incorporating basic Arc0 and Petroecuador should take up
After several delays, this second socioeconomic and cultural infoma- these funding proposals separately.
meeting took place in May at CONFE- tion that could be later used in design- After much negotiation, the parties
NIAE’s Union Base headquarters. The ing a long-term community develop agreed that the technical committee
meeting attracted representatives from ment program. would only address environmental
CONAIE, CONFENIAE, Oxfam, issues and that a higher-level group
OPIP, ASODIRA, and FIPPRA. as would deal with financial support and
A Wrench in the Works
well as Arco, Agip. Petroecuador, and community development issues. This
Ecuador’s minister of energy and After a series of delays, the techni- higher-level group came to be known
mines, Francisco Acosta. With Acos- cal committee held its first meeting on as the Political Front.
ta’s blessing, attendees drafted an 21-22 September 1994. At this gather- Before concluding the meeting, the
agreement formally establishing a ing, OPIP, FIPPRA, and ASODIRA committee members signed a general
technical environmental committee. presented an agenda that diverged work program for the environmental

36 ENVIRONMENT June 1998

 to minimize ecological disrup-
tion, company engineers de-
signed the well and production
facilities to be operated re-
motely from a town near Puyo,
applying a variation of an off-
shore production model devel-
oped for one of Arco’s North
Sea operations.
The escalating conflict
threatened to derail the techni-
cal commission’s work. Arco
resident manager W. Ken Keag
sent a letter to all three groups
reasserting that the company
had the right to proceed with
its development plans (once
the relevant permits were
issued) whether or not the
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environmental assessment was

ever completed. He wrote “the
Most of Block 10 is covered by virgin rainforest or mature secondary growth. Arco eventually indigenous organizations have
decided to build a roadless pipeline at Villano to minimize ecological disruption. once again imposed various
conditions that must be ful-
assessment and finalized selection Several factors precipitated this filled before the next meeting can take
procedures for potential contractors. conflict. After returning from Plano, place. We want to emphasize that the
In addition, they agreed to review a OPIP did try to unite the three organi- work of the Technical Commission is
long list of consulting f m s whose zations as Arc0 had asked. It invited not a process of negotiation, but rather
credentials met initial screening cri- FIPPRA and ASODIRA to form a an effort of mutual c~operation.”’~
teria. With the ground rules for mak- new alliance called the Indigenous Keag’s letter apparently broke the
ing technical decisions in place, Front. FIPPRA and ASODIRA agreed logjam. ASODIRA withdrew its
members agreed to meet again on 12 and the Front did prepare a prelimi- threat, and OPIP and FIPPRA backed
December 1994 to designate the nary document describing its plans for down. The technical committee,
short list of consultants. an integrated environmental manage- including all representatives from the
A few weeks later, Arc0 officials ment and community development three federations, met again in late
received a letter from ASODIRA’s plan. But internal differences inter- January 1995 to start drafting the envi-
president Hector Mayancha that total- vened to upset this alliance. ASODI- ronmental assessment’s final outline.
ly surprised them. The letter an- RA wanted Arco to build a road con- Committee meetings continued over
nounced ASODIRA’s categorical necting Villano to the main highway the next few months and members
rejection of OPIP’s continued partici- 35 kilometers (20 miles) away. OPIP selected three potential contractors to
pation in planning the environmental opposed this proposal in light of conduct the study.
assessment. Noting that OPIP and indigenous experience in Nap0 pro- In April 1995, the Ministry of Ener-
FIPPRA had each asked to delay the vince where potential squatters used gy and Mines approved Arco’s devel-
12 December meeting until January, the road built by Texaco to invade opment plan for Villano. Instead
Mayancha suggested going ahead native territory. According to Mayan- of mobilizing to begin construction,
without both other groups. In re- cha, ASODIRA members interpreted however, the company again declared
sponse, OPIP and FIPPRA removed these objections as yet another exam- force majeure, this time because
ASODIRA as co-sponsor of the pro- ple of OPIP’s indifference to their Petroecuador could not promise to
posed integrated community develop- needs. “If it were up to OPIP,” he said, build a required feeder line from the
ment plan and resubmitted it to Arco. “we would be walking around naked. Villano oil field to the Trans-Ecuador-
They also demanded that the company They don’t want anything to ian Pipeline. Pending resolution of
recognize them as the sole legitimate change.”33Arco’s ultimate decision to this issue, the project remained in
representatives of Pastaza’s indige- build a roadless pipeline at Villano limbo for almost two years until
nous communities. only intensified this feeling. Anxious March 1997, when Arc0 finally issued

Volume 40 Number 5 ENVIRONMENT 37

 a declaration of commerciality signal-
ing the start of work.
During this 20-month hiatus, com-
mittee members focused on refining
the environmental assessment study,
reviewing contractor qualifications,
and setting standards for fieldwork.
In December 1995, Arco selected
Fugro International and Petrokem (an
Ecuadorian firm) to jointly conduct
the study. Thereafter, Arco and
FugroPetrokem trained indigenous
representatives to the technical com-
mittee as field technicians so that they
could assist in data collection, analy-
sis, and research design.
FugroPetrokem completed the
fieldwork and submitted its draft
report to the committee in December
1996. After a lengthy review, nearly
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everyone on the technical committee

agreed that the work did not include
key biological and social data. In
particular, indigenous representatives
were concerned that botanical invento-
ries were incomplete and that impor-
tant local species were missing. Virtu-
ally all other members agreed. The
committee sent a list of corrections
and other issues the final report need- Arc0 needed to find the most environmentally sound way to connect the oil field in R l o d
ed to address to FugroPetrokem in 10 to the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline System, some 100 miles away.
June 1997.
By this time, however, Arco had Assessing the Technical deliberations, Louis Soileau of Arc0
issued its declaration of commerciality Committee believes the results have justified the
and had begun to design the environ- effort: “It was a slow, painful process,
mental impact study and long-term Not surprisingly, technical commit- but I always felt that anything we
environmental management plan for tee members offer widely different could do to get people to sit down and
construction and operations at Villano. assessments of the group’s success. talk to each other was better than not
Rather than wait for a revised Fugro Arco believes the committee has ful- talking to each other.’’36
study, the technical committee mem- filled its main purpose, serving as an OPIP’s Leonard0 Viteri expresses
bers decided that missing data should effective communications channel similar sentiments. Viteri thinks the
be collected as part of this new inves- between the company and indigenous committee helped OPIP accomplish
tigation. With committee endorse- organizations. Arco’s operations man- one of its explicit objectives. “When we
ment, Arco contracted with Houston- agers knew that once the Villano went to Plano, we had several objec-
based Entrix to complete the impact development began, it would have a tives in mind, one of which was to
study and train indigenous committee major impact on indigenous commu- make sure that our organizations, espe-
members as “environmental monitors” nities. The technical committee cially our technical people, would be
in the field. It also hired 30 additional offered a way for them to involve broadly involved in planning, imple-
Indians- I0 from each organization- “indigenous people in the process menting, and monitoring the environ-
as part of its workforce. The environ- [which was desirable] because they mental management program in Block
mental impact study began in Septem- have a lot of [unique] knowledge He also believes working on the
ber 1997 and was completed in March about their envir~nment,”~~ Although committee has fostered transparency
1998. Arco’s environmental permit external politics and internal rivalries and trust: “I think we have taken big
was approved one month later. have complicated the committee’s steps [and while] we haven’t complete-

38 ENVIRONMENT June 1998

 ly reached our goal yet, we’re getting Block 10 environmental management Competing models for the develop-
there.”’R Hector Mayancha, ASODI- program. Arco reserves the right to ment plan also spark some concern.
RA’s president, concurs. choose the environmental contractors ASODIRA and FIPPRA favor a model
Petroecuador and the energy min- after consulting with the committee, that would focus exclusively on Block
istry representatives, however, ques- and the company does not involve the 10 communities and evolve from a
tion the utility of involving nonspe- committee in its budget decisions. diagnostic study into a 20-year pro-
cialists with little formal training in Lastly, indigenous committee mem- gram, sponsored by Arco, to improve
technical environmental management bers wonder why discussions of the health, education, and household
decisions. One former senior official, size and shape of the Pastaza regional incomes. The second model, favored
who has served on the committee development plan have yet to make by OPIP, takes a much broader
since its inception, stated that “com- the agenda. approach. This model incorporates a
panies like Arco can’t operate in For its own part, Arc0 remains type of trust fund that could be used by
Ecuador unless they meet strict envi- troub- led by the indigenous organiza- all of Pastaza’s indigenous communi-
ronmental requirements that are set tions’ lack of unity. After three years, ties. OPE’ claims the fund could be
by law. We really don’t need another they still do not speak with a single underwritten initially by assessing a
level of review by groups or organiza- voice. Old divisions appear to lie just levy on oil production (on the order of
tions that have no technical qualifica- below the surface and could easily $2 per barrel). This levy could be
Petroecuador specialists erupt once a major issue like the expanded later to include income from
share these opinions. “We’re still regional development plan finds its logging companies and other sources.
waiting to see if these dialogues real- way to the table. The indigenous rep- With a constant stream of income,
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ly bear fruit,” one of them comment- resentatives acknowledge such fears indigenous communities would have
ed recently.40 are well-founded. ASODIRA presi- the resources to implement, manage,
Arco acknowledges the validity of dent Hector Mayancha, for example, and direct their own integrated sus-
these reservations. Indeed, one for- feels that working within the technical tainable development plans.
mer staff member recently recalled committee has helped overcome Both models raise a number of troub-
that at the outset “there were people “about half of the earlier distrust”; ling issues, perhaps the most pressing
who felt the dialogue was wasted OPIP’s Leonard0 Viteri puts the level of which is figuring out a system
effort. . . . Our contract said that the closer to “60 or 70 percent.”42Still, whereby remote communities rather
government was supposed to deal both OPIP and ASODIRA are contin- than a bureaucracy of professional
with the Indians; we were there only uing to prepare separate regional leaders in the provincial capital can
to develop the Yet Arc0 now development plans. play a meaningful planning and deci-
sees the technical committee as a
model for resolving potential contro-
versies and ensuring community par-
ticipation in project planning.
Is the
Future Challenges Temperature
Even so, indigenous representatives
to the committee still believe they
Rising?
continue to operate at a disadvantage The UncertainScience of Global Warming
concerning access to technical infor- 5. George Philander
mation. First, Petroecuador deter- s.Georgemnanderprwidesant?xctam
mines which technical documents the introductionto climate and-, written in
committee can discuss and review, SraQhtlrXward,mtechmcal langwge.This is i
and indigenous committee members book for anyone who has ever w x h d how
waher’works!
complain that it has taken a relatively ‘ma aumor Bxplelnsunnpkx
restrictive and bureaucratic approach
--InaprrdseImgw(le
to disclosure. Second, they feel that inaWlmMlmhJR~”
they do not always have the training -Hansvon starch,Nature
or background they need to adequate- Cbth $35.00 lSBNO-691-05175-3
ly address complex technical ques-
tions. Third, they chafe at the limits Princeton University Press
imposed on their ability to shape the AT FINE BOOKSTORES OR CAlL 800-777-4726 HTTP: //WP.PRlNCETON.EDU

Volume 40 Number 5 ENVIRONMENT 39

 sionmaking role. Leaving aside the ment options or plans. In retrospect, one deputy energy minister recently
fact that national legislation would be according to Herbert Vickers (Arco’s observed, “they have absolutely no
required to impose a levy on oil pro- current resident manager in Ecuador), understanding of [our] politics. In fact,
duction, OPIP faces an uphill battle this decision was a mistake: “Arco they don’t want to understand. They
on this count. The organization’s compromised the effectiveness of [its] don’t think it’s their job.”46 In Arco’s
membership embraces more than 100 initial agreement because we waited experience, Ecuadorian government
widely scattered communities located for three years to talk about the most officials frequently encouraged this
in half a dozen major watersheds. In important issues. This has created an view, finding a variety of reasons to
the past, OPIP has been most success- atmosphere of mistrust. [As a result], exclude indigenous organizations
ful in mobilizing broad support for every new piece of work we undertake from discussions about Block 10. Nev-
political initiatives, such as the 1992 requires new negotiation.”44 ertheless, the ongoing dialogue facili-
March to Quito, or more recently, the Arc0 has tried to address these prob- tated by the technical committee has
Women’s March to Save the Rainfor- lems. In March 1997, it invited spe- helped Arc0 develop its own perspec-
est in October 1997. Even sympathet- cialists from the regional office of the tive on the indigenous communities,
ic observers admit OPIP has had United Nations Food and Agriculture environmental groups, and other
much less success designing and man- Organization’s Forest, Trees, and Peo- stakeholders in Pastaza province. This
aging community development initia- ple Program to conduct a workshop perspective has enabled the company
t i v e ~Unless
. ~ ~ OPIP can build internal for technical committee members on to take the initiative in trying to
consensus for its economic proposals, participatory methods for managing resolve conflicts.
it will likely face growing conflict and socioenvironmental conflicts. Indige- Throughout Latin America, indige-
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opposition within its own ranks, as its nous committee members found this nous organizations, environmental
I2 regional associations (or fragments workshop particularly useful because groups, and nongovernmental organi-
of those associations) fight over “our organizations suffer from a lack zations have objected to oil projects on
potential benefits. Recognizing this of people who are trained in conflict environmental grounds to focus public
danger, Arc0 has offered to hire spe- management, negotiation, and resolu- attention on social and economic ques-
cialists in participatory community ~ ~ currently plans to spon-
t i ~ n . ”Arc0 tions. This strategy has generally paid
development planning. sor additional workshops and other off, but at the price of confusing real
In the final analysis, despite three initiatives involving communities technical problems with thornier
years of cooperative effort, suspicions throughout Pastaza in an effort to fos- issues of sustainable development,
toward Arc0 persist. During the almost ter a culture of dialogue. stakeholder equity, and grassroots par-
two year period of force majeure (May ticipation. The technical committee
1995-March 1997), Arc0 reduced its has helped Arc0 and its partners avoid
Lessons Learned
involvement and trimmed its expenses this pattern. The technical training
in Ecuador to the bare minimum. Technical committee members all indigenous organizations and their
Although Arc0 representatives contin- point out that face-to-face discussions members have gained has enabled
ued to meet with the technical com- laid the foundations for resolving them to better distinguish between real
mittee, they consistently postponed major issues. Despite false starts and ecological threats and more routine
any discussion of long-term develop- missed opportunities, the committee environmental challenges, thereby
has provided an arena where OPIP, strengthening their ability to act and
__ ____ ASODIRA, FIPPRA, Arco, and negotiate as equal partners.
OIL UPDATE Petroecuador have learned to find In the long run, forums like the
common ground. Many committee Block 10 technical committee, which
In February 1998, Petroecuador members have come to appreciate that facilitate discussions between compa-
allocated a further block of land, nies and indigenous communities
known a8 Block 24. to Arco. On 27 one group’s gain is not necessarily
April 1998, Arco signed an agree- someone else’s loss. This represents about social, political, and environ-
ment with the Ecuadorian govem- an essential step in reforming the cul- mental issues, play an enormously
ment for the rights to explore the ture of confrontation built on the polit- positive role in demonstrating a com-
area and drill for oil. Early reports ical calculus “if you win, I lose” that pany’s good faith-the most basic arti-
estimate reserves of 120 million has traditionally prevailed in Ecuador cle of sound and morally responsible
bamls within the block. Petro-
ecuador projects that Arc0 will and elsewhere in Latin America. business practice.
invest $6 million to develop and Arc0 has realized that it and all
drill in the area, beginning in early other hydrocarbon companies need to Sixto Mendez, lewifer Pamell, and Robert Wahscr-
1999. strom are, respectively, manager of environment,
be smarter about local politics. “When health. and safety for Arc0 Oriente in Quito. Ecuador;
__ foreign companies come to Ecuador,” senior environmental engineer for Arco in Plsno.

40 ENVIRONMENT June 1998

 Texus: and senior p m r in The Terra Group. an inter- 1 I. Ecuador’s govemment first reguired envimnmental with the authors. July 1997.
national consulting fimr in Houston. Texas. impwt evaluations in 1994. 31. Louis Soikau 1% manager of operations.A m , DaI-
12. After an internal analysis of the rew’stechnical Ias. Texas, interview with the authors, June 1997.
objections, Arc0 decided that most were either ex*
gcratcd or untrue. par exalnple. mosl oflhe Berkeley
32. AKO Oriente, “Meeting of Arc0 and tha wmia-
NOTES tion of Indipnous Peoples of prstaaa, Plano. Texas,
group’s recommendations focused on environmental Merch 4. 1994,” (unpublished memorandum, Quito,
assessment pmceduns and recordkeeping and Arco Ecuador).
I. For a brief discussion ofthe 1964 h w and its impact had voluntarily implemented an assessment p r o w s by
33. Hector Mayancha, note 17 above.
on highland Indians, see M. H.Selverston,“The Poli- chs timethe Momtacochawell was drilled (that is. lhret
years before such assessments were requimd by 34. W.K.Keag, “A 10s miembms dc las organizwiones
lics of Culture: Indigenous Peoples and the State in indlgenas ante la Comisi6n TCcnica Ambiental para el
Ecuador,” in D. L. Van Cott, ed.. Indigenous Peoples Ecuadorian law). Moreover, Arc0 managers flatly dis-
aped with the gmup’s judgment h t A m ’ s environ- Blque 10 opedo por el Consorcio WAgip:’ (Tb
wid Denwwcy in h t i n America (New Ymk: The the members of indigenous organizations represantcd
Inter-American Dialogue, 19941, 131-52. mental studies “failad to target the m a t significant
issues for investigation:’ as the report charged. Compa- on the Technical Environmental Committee for Block
2. For a case study of Indians’ responses, scc T. Mac- ny officiols also pncsivsd the Berkeley team’s criti- 10 by the M A & Cansortium)AOl-Ol2-95
donald, “Indigenous Response to an Expanding Fmn- cism of their envimnmentd assessment pmcedums as (Quito, Ecuador, 13 January 1995).
tier: Jungle Quichua Economic Conversion to Cattle unjustified. Arc0 had hired qualified independent con- 35. Louis Soileau IV, note 31 above.
Ranching,” in N. Whitten Jr.. ed., Cultural lkansforma- tractors to conduct envimnmenlalstudies for each of its
tion.$and Ethnicity in Madern Ecuador (Urban& 111.:
36. bid.
exploratory wells and had implemented extensive
University of Illinois prtss. 1981). 35-3. A mom 37. Leonardo Viteri, note 9 above.
reforestation programs at Villano and Moretecocha
extensive discussion is included in T.Macdonald, De when commercial deposits of oil had not betn found. 38. Ibid.
cmtrJorrs a ganadem (From hunters to cattlemen) 39. Oiovanni Rossuria. former subsecretary for envi-
(Quito. Ecuador: EdicioncsAbyaYah. 1997). 13. S. McCreary et al., ‘‘Indepdent Review of Emi-
mnmental Documentation for Petroleum Exploration ronmental protection, Ministry of Energy and Mines,
3. For a description of these events, see E. Salazar. An in Block 10,Oriente. Ecuador” (paper prepaml for the Quito, Ecuador, interview with the authors, August
Indiun Fedemtion in Lowland Ecuador. WGIA Docu- University of California at Berkeley. College of Envi- 1997.
ment 28 (Copenhagen, 1977); and, mom recantly, E. ronmental Design, 17 June 1992). 1. 40. Oswaldo Tapia, Petroecuador’s contracts unit.
Salazar. “La federacih shuar y la fmntera de la colo Quito, Ecuador, interview with the authors. July 1997.
nizaci6n” (The Shuar Federation and the settlement 14. Ibid., page 37.
15. For an example. scc ViUunil, note 8 above. 41. Louis Soileau IV, note 31 above.
frontier) in N. Whitten Jr. ed.. Amaz& ecuatoriana:
Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 07:00 04 October 2014

La utra caw drl pmgroso (Ecuadorian Amazon: The 42. Leonard0 Viteri. note 9 above.
16. Gamboa, note 7 above.
other face of pmgnss) (Quito. Ecuador: Ediciones 43. Pablo Ortfz and Victor Upcz, Quito, Ecuador,
Abya Yala. 1989). 17. Patricio Manya, former ASODIRA president. Shell. interview with the authors. July 1997.
Ecuador, interview with the authors. May 1995; and
4. For a brief history of indigenous organizations in Hector Mayancha, ASODWA president, Puyo. 44. Herbert Vickers, resident manager, Arco, Quito.
Ecuador, see M. Becker, “Nationalism and Pluri- Ecuador. interview with the authors. July 1997. Ecuador. interview with the authors, July 1997.
Nationalism in a Multi-Ethnic State: IndigenousOrga- 45. Leonudo Viteri. note 9 above.
nizations in Ecundnr‘‘ (paper presented at the Mi- 18. See T. M.odmrrld. Eeuador’r &wland Quichua
Indians:An Amazonian Response to Political and Envi- 46. Jorge AlbBs. deputy energy minister, Quito.
America Conference on H i s t q nt the University of
Kansas, Lawrence, 17-19 September 1992). See also mnmental Change (New York: Allyn and Bacon, in Ecuador, interview with the authors, August 1997.
CONAIE. CONAIE: A Brief Histmy (document pub- PlW.
lished on Nativeweb at <http:/hvww.nativewe~o~ 19. W. Ken b a g . Arc0 resident manager, London,
abyayala/cullures/ecuador/conaie/conaiel .html>, O T S1997.
England. interview with the ~ U ~ ~ July ,
1992). 20. For an extremely hcid account of this pnmsa, sec
5 . “Villano” refers to a cluster of m e n or eight com- A. Bebbington et al., ‘The Evolution of Indigenous
munities, including amund 300 families, located near Federations in Ecuador:’ Grassmots Development 16, announces its 1998 edition of
no. 2 (1992): 11-20.
an old airstrip of the same name. OPIP was founded in
a village called Santa Cecilia. 2 1. For a sympatheticdiscussion of Borja’s policies by
Water in the West.
6. Rainforest Action Network first published these alle- a former education minister, see R. Vallejo, Crdnica
gations in 1990. For a summary, see S. Sawyer, mestiza del nuevo Pcrchakutik (Mestizo account of the
“Indigenous Initiatives in Petmleum poliflcs in the new Pachakutik) Latin American Study Center Work-
Ecuadorian Amazon.” Culrural Survival Quarterly 20, ing Paper no. 2 (College Park, Md.: University of
no. l(1996): 26-30. Msryland, 1996).
7. Gustava Gamboa. former COO seismic operations 22. Bebbiigton et al., note 20 above: and Vallejo, note
field supervisor, Quito, Ecuador, interview with the 21 above.
authors. July 1997. 23. Bebbigton et al., note 20 above.
K. For an indigenous perspwtive on Sarayacu, scc H. 24. kbbington and his calleagues doscribe several
Villamil. “El manejo del conflictocon las petroleras: El examples of this trend. Other cases w analyzed by R.
CLLPO de la ARCO-OPIP (Conflict management with C. Smith. C. C. Tnpuy. and N. Wray, Amazonirr:
oil companies: The case of Arco-OPIP) in A. Vam, econami& indigena y memado. h dcsaf(ar &I desar-
ed., Mamu negra en la amazonia (Black tide in the m/to (Ammonia: indigenouseconomy and market.The Water in the West
Amazon) (Quito, Ecuador: Ediciones Abya Yala, challenges of development) (Quito. Ecuador: Coordi-
1995). 339-66. A summary of the Sarayacu agreements nruiora de Ins OrganizacionesIndtgenas de la Cuenca is an up-to-date overview of
is included in P. Oniz, “Cultuns y Muniento de con- Amnzhnica and Oxfun America, 1996). For a discus-
flictos socioambientales” (Management of sociocnvi- sion of F0I”s experience with community-based
major Western water issues.
ronmental conflict) (unpublished manuscript. Quito, forestry projects in Napo province. sw Macdonald.
Ecuador. 1997). In June 1990. CONAIE and CONFE- Each 360 page comb-bound book
NlAE published a follow-up document, ”R~puesta
paru poner en marcha el acuerdo de Sarayacu” (Pm-
note 18 atma.
25, Marcelo Sda and Gustavo Gambon, community
relations manager and coordinator respectively, for
-
costs $30 postage paid
(CO resldenta please rdd 3%snles tax)
poaal to implement the Sarayacu Accords) which may Arc0 Oriente. Quito, Ecuador, interview with the
be found in 1. Juneosa. comp., Docwnentos indlar authors. July 1997.
(Indian Documents) (Quito, Ecuador: Ediciones Abya
Yda, 1991), 171-87. 26. Leonardo Viteri, note 9 above. HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
9. Leonardo Viteri. f m e r OPIP president. Puyo. 27. Villamil, note 8 above. is the newspaper for people
Ecuador, interview with the authors, July 1997. 28. Villamil, note 8 above. For an alternative prspec-
tive, see Sawyer, noto 6 above.
who care about the West.
10. The other clement in this calculation is risk. Arc0
onicials note that they arc generally willing to make 29. Eventually. the OPIP leader# visited seven major Just$28 per year for 24 issues
jpater investments in community programs during U S , cities, Including Washington, New York, San
exploration activities when they believe there’s a high Francisco. and Los Angeles. Call 1-800-905.1155 for a eubrcrlption
probability of finding commercial hydrocarbon 30.Pablo MZ. United Nation6 Food and Agriculture P.0, Box 1090, Paonia, CO 81428
deposits. Orpization consultant, Quito, Ecuador. interview

Volume 40 Number 5 ENVIRONMENT 41