Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy

March 2014, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 103-114

ISSN: 2333-5866 (Print), 2333-5874 (Online)
Copyright © The Author(s). 2014. All Rights Reserved.
Published by American Research Institute for Policy Development

Regime Survival Strategies in Zimbabwe after Independence

Simbarashe Moyo1

Abstract

At her birth in 1980 Zimbabwe saw herself trapped by forces of regime change
which threatened the existence of the newly born state. These forces of regime
change used both external and internal drives to achieve their goals in Zimbabwe. It
was however the desire to keep the regime the revolutionary spirit afloat that led
ZANU PF to adopt policies or politics of regime survival which then gave birth to
political tensions between ZANU PF and its political rivals. Such policies were
marred by reports of violence, instability and abandonment of the rule of law, which
poised serious challenges to modern developments on democracy and human rights.
It is however from such a stand point that this paper seeks to analyse regime
survival strategies in Zimbabwe after independence in 1980.

Keywords:Zanu Pf, Mdc, Zipra, Zanla, Gukurahundi, Regime

Introduction

Regime survival is the, primary concern of rulers, it follows that state

formation depends on the compatibility of regime interests on the one hand, and state
formation on the other (Boone, 2003; Doner, Richie and Slater, 2005; Migdal, 1988).
By definition a regime is the centre of political authority and its relations with the
broader society. Regime change occurs argues Fishman (2001:149) when there is a
change or an abandonment of rules, norms, principles and decision making
procedures that govern the nature of the regime.

1 PhD Candidate, Lecturer in The Department of Politics and Public Management Studies, Midlands
State University, Bag 9055, Gweru, Zimbabwe. E-mail: [email protected]
Tel: 00263 77 2 891 884.
104 Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Vol. 2(1), March 2014

With regards to Zimbabwe the regime change agenda is a scheme hatched by

domestic opposition forces and foreign actors to remove Robert Mugabe and the
ZANU PF government from power. Regime change in Zimbabwe is an old
phenomenon which can be traced back to the pre-colonial era and the colonial period.
In the 21st Zimbabwe saw herself under attack from the West predominately because
of her step to embark on the controversial land reform programme which saw the
Zimbabwean government confiscating farms owned by White farmers for
resettlement purposes, it is also worth noting that the land reform programme has
been viewed differently by various scholars: some believe that it was used for political
reasons in order to gunner support for ZANU PF which was now growing under.

In this post-colonial period, Zimbabwe is currently involved in a struggle for

survival from a regime change agenda. For a political regime to survive it requires
various instruments to either mobilise its support from the masses, intellectual
property or military power to suppress discontentment from the general populace
from within its borders and beyond. Regime interests are best served by strengthening
state institutions, political regimes which for whatever reason fail to do this eventually
give way to new political orders. It should be noted that a regime is more permanent
than a government but less permanent than the state. Governments succeed one
another and regimes come and go but the state endures.

Independence, Regime Survival and Security

Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, and her domestic and foreign

policies were strongly influenced by the history of the Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU) as a liberation movement. The party was brought to the government
by Mugabe’s victory in the Zimbabwe’s first election, and the government established
in 1980 privileged values such as nationalism, non-alignment, anti-colonialism, anti-
racism, socialism and, like other African states, sovereignty and equality among
nations, emphasizing theprinciples of self-determination and independence. The 1980
victory over Ian Smith’s colonial regime made way for Prime Minister Robert
Mugabe’s ZANU PF after elections in which ZANU PF won 57 seats, its closest rival
PF-ZAPU got 20 seats while South Africa and Britain’s preferred candidate Abel
Muzorewa of the United African National Congress (UANC) got 3 seats despite a
well funded vigorous campaign. The twenty seats reserved for whites were swept by
the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe, formerly the Rhodesia Front.
Simbarashe Moyo 105

It was at this stage that in1980 ZANU PF assumed dominance over the
political affairs of the country Zimbabwe.

According to Chigora and Guzura (2008:2) ZANU PF won the 1980 election
on the back of popular support. It found its way to the general mass through
appealing to the problems that were faced by the black majority such as general
segregation, discriminative policies and disenfranchisement which appealed to both
the urbanites and rural population. Popularity and appeal aside, ZANU PF also won
the elections on the back of a campaign of violence and intimidation in the
countryside.

In the 1980 elections ZANU PF obtained 63 percent of the vote which can be
explained as having been a result of support from the predominantly Shona people
who voted for ZANU PF largely because it had recruited and operated from Shona
speaking areas. Martin and Johnson (1981:259) point out that with the Shona forming
the majority of the population in Zimbabwe it should not have surprised many that
Mugabe emerged as victor against Nkomo who got his 20 seats in Ndebele speaking
regions where ZANU PF did not even bother to campaign.

However no sooner than later did the regime that had won a decisive victory
against white imperialism came under threat from beyond its borders and from within
its borders.Its also important to note that the new regime was insecure from the
beginning, Mugabe adopted a Marxist –Leninist stance and the decision to form a
socialist state ruffled the capitalist and right wing interests. Apartheid South Africa felt
most threatened by a powerful socialist state at its door. Having failed to get its
preferred candidate, Muzorewa to power, South Africa’s principle objective became
one of keeping Zimbabwe weak and in a defensive position thus making it unstable
and vulnerable to regime change.

South Africa began by disrupting Zimbabwe’s economy by blocking trade

routes and before long military activities were underway. In August of 1981 a huge
armoury at Inkomo Barracks, near Harare was blown up by a white army engineer
working for South Africans and in the same month Renamo forces under South
African control began attacks on the railway, road and pipeline linking Zimbabwe to
Mozambique’s port of Beira.
106 Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Vol. 2(1), March 2014

On 26 December a massive bomb blast tore apart ZANU PF headquarters

the government blamed South Africa as well as the Rhodesia Front (Smith, 2001:374)

After the bombing of the ZANU PF headquarters in Harare, ZANU PF

headliners and sympathisers strongly thought and believed that either unrepented
former Rhodesians or South Africans could have done it because the ZANU PF
headquarters was considered to be the most closely guarded point in the capital since
no white man was permitted entrance. In July of 1982 the South Africans struck again
destroying 13 aircraft at Thornhill Airbase in Gweru (Meredith, 2002:52) after these
events Mugabe’s attitude towards the whites changed. Mugabe broadened his attacks
and referred to them as unrepentant and ungrateful spies and saboteurs.

During this period the perceived peace and tranquility under the banner of
reconciliation and national unity was now at stake, it is argued that the suspicion
which was simmering within the ZIPRA forces who were owed their allegiance to
Nkomo and ZAPU were disgruntled by the election results prompting ZANLA to
suspect that they might attempt insurrection. This suspicion and tension between
ZIPRA and ZANLA which dates back to the liberation struggle then found a
lucrative crevice to express itself with violent clashes occurring at various assembly
points in Chitungwiza, Connemara and Entumbane which had to be quelled by old
Rhodesian army units after 300 casualties (Meredith, 2002:62).Nkomo was then
accused of wanting to come to power through the barrel of the gun and Mugabe was
head to say “if those who have suffered defeat adopt and reject the verdict of the
people then reconciliation between victor and vanquished is impossible” (Meredith,
2002:63).Such mistrust and suspicion between the two liberation movements in
Zimbabwe sparked protests against ZAPU leadership and meanwhile the Prime
Minister Robert Mugabe ousted from government on the 16 of February 1982 on
allegations of caching arms with the intention of countering the gains of the liberation
struggle ; two ZIPRA army leaders DumisoDabengwa and General Lookout Masuku
were arrested and tried for treason and illegal possession of weapons and
subsequently acquitted but were kept in custody by the but Lookout Masuku died in
detention. The former ZIPRA combatants who though and felt they had been treated
unfairly responded to the arrest of their leaders by deserting the army and took to the
bush, they also pointed unfair treatment by former ZANLA superiors in the armed
forces as a reason for deserting the army.
Simbarashe Moyo 107

The south western parts of the country became haunted by armed men who
terrorized the innocent civilians and came to be known to as dissidents.

At first the government sent some police units to quench the disturbances in
the South Western parts of the country but with no avail then it dispatch an integrated
battalion from the Zimbabwe National Army which mainly comprised of the ZANLA
combatants to deal with the dissidents. Finally in search of a lasting solution for
regime, the government finally unleashed the North Korean trained fifth brigade to
decisively deal with the disturbances. The troops dealt with the dissent in a heavy
handed manner resulting in the deaths of an estimated 30 000 people in the
Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. (Moyo, 1992:26).It should be however noted
that the provision to come up with 5th Brigade tore the government apart with those
who were former ZIPRA arguing that the 5th Brigade was more of a ZANU PF party
military instrument since it was formed and not integrated in the Zimbabwe National
Army.

Following the 1985 elections it became quite clear to ZANU PF that a

confrontational approach against ZAPU would not work in the best in interest for
ZANU PF to remove PF ZAPU as an obstacle political dominance, since Joshua
Nkomo’s PF-ZAPU swept all 20 seats in Matabeleland as it had done in the 1980
elections. And thus the stalemate between the two liberation movements was then
resolved through negotiation which gave birth to the Unity Accord in 1987 between
ZANU PF and PF ZAPU,wereNkomo ascended as the vice-presidency with Mugabe
as president to merge the two parties to form a single united ZANU PF thus ending
the conflict.

The Unity Accord between ZANU PF and PFZAPU was received differently
by various sectionsof the population; some thought that the Accord had brought in
an end to political rivalry which had inhibited virtually all democratic expressions
about national problems. But however to some, it appeared that the Unity Accord
afforded the government the opportunity to curtail peoples’ freedoms and
expressions. However, the Unity Accord of 1987 revived the grand coalition
established at independence. The Unity Accord aimed to do what the Gukurahundi
had failed to do, that is, conquer the last frontier of resistance to ZANU-PF
hegemony by delivering the Ndebele-speaking region to the Shona-dominated party.
108 Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Vol. 2(1), March 2014

With the unity accord ZANU PF’s political hegemony was now undisputed
and regime survival and security was assured, with dissidents and South African
regime change schemes having been overthrown and PF-ZAPU swallowed.

Consolidation of State Power and Administrative Institutions

Guided by Kwame Nkrumah’s injunction to “seek ye first the political

kingdom,” the ZANU-PFgovernment of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe instead gave
priority to the consolidation of political power, especially by strengthening the
coercive organs of the state. The first key task was to ensure party control over key
institutions by appointingparty loyalists from the nationalist struggle to top positions
in Cabinet and the state security apparatus. The latter included EmersonMnangagwa
and Rex Nhongo (the late Solomon Mujuru) who took up leadership posts in the
intelligence service and armed forces respectively. Because other senior leaders from
the front lines of the liberation struggle – Leopold Takawira, Herbert Chitepo,
JosiahTongogara, and J.Z. Moyo – had died or been killed during the liberation
struggle , the composition of the Cabinet tilted towards younger intellectuals like
DzingaiMutumbuka, who drew the Education portfolio, and Herbert Ushewokunze,
appointed Minister of Health. And provincial barons like the late Dr Edison Zvogbo
(from Masvingo) and KumbiraiKangai (from Manicaland) wereall brought on board,
not only for their professional expertise but also for regional balance. Initially,
Mugabe even sought to bring nationalist rivals into the fold: as well as appointing four
Cabinet Ministers from the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-
ZAPU), he offered Joshua Nkomo the ceremonial position of President of
Zimbabwe, who turned it down in favour of a ministerial post as the minister of
Home Affairs.

Thus the leadership of ZANU-PF at independence was a coalition of

nationalists made up of the liberation struggle old-guard, young radicals, battle-
hardened guerrilla commanders, and professionals who had returned from exile.
Unlike Nkomo, who bestrode the pinnacle of his party in the typical dominant style
of an African “big man,” Mugabe at first occupied a less secure position. Historically,
ZANU had always been split by roiling internal divisions between generations of
political activists (some free and some in prison), among armed factions within the
guerrilla armies, and between the fighting forces on the frontlines and the political
leaders involved in international negotiations
Simbarashe Moyo 109

On the military front, a Joint High Command was set up to merge three rival
forces – ZANLA, ZIPRA, and elements of the Rhodesian Army – into a integrated
Zimbabwe National Army. At this time the Zimbabwe Republic Police, was
Africanized, but not politicized. From the outset, Mugabe drew defence affairs into
the Office of the Prime Minister, adding intelligence and provincial administration to
his portfolio by 1985. The promotion of ex-ZANLA commanders as heads of the
security forces and the creation of an exclusively Shona Fifth Brigade ensured the
loyalty of the army, both to the party and to the top leader personally. The coherence
of the security forces was tested in the early 1980s by sporadic insurgent activities by
ex-ZIPRA “dissidents,” which gave Mugabe an excuse to dismiss Nkomo and other
PF-ZAPU ministers from the Cabinet in 1982 and unleash a violent pogrom against
the rural population of Matabeleland, whom he accused of aiding and abetting South
African interests.

Thus, the elite coalition between the two leading nationalist parties –ZANU
(PF) and (PF) ZAPU – effectively unraveled within a couple of years of
independence. Former allies were castigated as “enemies of the state,” fit only for
destruction.

Given its roots as a national liberation movement, ZANU-PF also moved

quickly to penetrate the state apparatus in the peasant farming areas, for example by
appointing party loyalists as District Administrators and replacing the old system of
native administration with representative District Councils. The party leadership
worked hard to get its candidates elected to these local government bodies and to a
hierarchy of provincial and district planning boards and ward and village development
committees, successfully so in all areas but Matabeleland. Because District Councils
were responsible for the delivery of an expanded range of social services after
independence, ZANU-PF used this presence in the locality to claim political
legitimacy for itself. At the same time, the party made the most of the patronage
opportunities presented by a District Development Fund disbursed to councils by the
powerful Ministry of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development. Reflecting
the dualistic nature of the inherited state, however, the white-controlled Rural
Councils governed the commercial agricultural areas. Only commercial farmers were
eligible to vote for these bodies and they used this power to protect their favourable
tax base and to resist amalgamation with neighbouring District Councils, which were
black controlled.
110 Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Vol. 2(1), March 2014

Thus ZANU-PF was much less successful in capturing institutions controlled

by white agricultural elites. And, because black farm workers – many of whose
families hailed from Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique – were ineligible to vote in
Rural Council elections before 1998, the party also failed to build alliances with this
constituency.

To assert political control over the strong settler state at the centre, ZANU-
PF elite moved quickly to Africanize the civil service. On one hand, the Cabinet
constituted a thin veneer atop a largely untransformed state apparatus still manned by
unsympathetic white personnel who could not be relied upon to implement reform
policies. At the outset, a politically neutral and professional Public Service
Commission protected the principle of merit recruitment. On the other hand,
Africanization was facilitated by a doubling of the size of the civil service, the
promotion of blacks long held back from advancement, and an influx of skilled
returnees from the overseas diaspora. These institutional developments strengthened
the state bureaucracy in relation to the regime and the ruling party; and helped to
maintain commitments to legal and technocratic standards in public management. As
a signal of reassurance to the West, Prime Minister Mugabe appointed Bernard
Chidzero, a former senior United Nations official noted for his orthodox approach to
economic policy, as Minister for Economic Planning and Development. By contrast,
EnosNkala, a hard-liner and party loyalist, was soon moved out of his position as the
first Minister of Finance. Over the course of the next few years, Benard Chidzero
gradually expanded his influence by taking over the finance portfolio, moving
economic decisions from party to Cabinet, and emerging as the chief architect of the
country’s economic strategy.

Gukurahundi

In post colonial Zimbabwe soon after independence in 1980 the ZANU PF

regime which had won the majority in the 1980 general elections against the Ian
Smith’s colonial regime and made way for Robert Mugabe to become the Prime
Minister of Zimbabwe, in the elections ZANU PF won 57 seats, its closest rival PF-
ZAPU got 20 seats while South Africa and Britain’s preferred candidate Muzorewa of
the United African National Congress (UANC) got 3 seats despite a well funded
vigorous campaign.
Simbarashe Moyo 111

The twenty seats reserved for whites were swept by the Conservative Alliance
of Zimbabwe, formerly the Rhodesia Front. In 1980, ZANU PF assumed dominance
over the political affairs of the country.

It was however under this pretext that ZANU PF saw PF ZAPU as a

potential threat to its political dominance and thus started accusing PF ZAPU and
Nkomo of wanting to derail the gains of the hard won independence. Nkomo was
accused of holding back ZIPRA forces during the war of liberation to fight in a final
struggle to overthrow a ZANU PF government if it came to power. They further
argued and accused Joshua Nkomo that him having failed to come to power through
the ballot was now trying to compensate through the bullet. Mugabe commented “if
those who have suffered defeat adopt and reject the verdict of the people then
reconciliation between the victor and vanquished is impossible” (Meredith, 2002:63).

On 17 February 1982 Joshua Nkomo and Josiah Chinamano who were PF-
ZAPU leaders were expelled from government on allegations of caching arms with
the intention of counter revolution. PF-ZAPU was now recognized as an enemy of
the government. The party’s farms and businesses were seized by the state; two
ZIPRA army leaders DumisoDabengwa and General Lookout Masuku were arrested
and tried for treason and illegal possession of weapons and subsequently acquitted but
the state kept them in prison where Masuku died.

Former ZIPRA combatants responded to the arrest of their leaders by

deserting from the army and took to the bush. They also cited persecution by former
ZANLA superiors in the armed forces as a reason for deserting. The south western
parts of the country came to be roamed by armed men who terrorized the population
and came to be referred to as dissidents.

The integrated Zimbabwe National Army with a 60% ZANLA majority had
to deal with dissent in the south-western parts of the country where bandits formerly
with ZIPRA and supported by apartheid South Africa terrorized the population and
sabotaged government development projects. In search of regime security the
government responded by unleashing the North Korean trained fifth brigade to quell
the disturbances. The troops dealt with the dissent in a heavy handed manner
resulting in the deaths of an estimated 30 000 people in the Matabeleland and
Midlands provinces. (Moyo 1992:26).
112 Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Vol. 2(1), March 2014

Moves to One-Party Regime

When the Lancaster House agreement expired in April 1990, the ruling
coalition in Zimbabwe was freed from a restrictive political constraint: the last legal
obstacle was removed to the creation of a de jure one-party state in Zimbabwe.
Constitutional Amendment No 7 of 1987 abolished the position of prime minister
creating an executive president. The President now wielded immense power which
practically could allow him to run the country with little interference from the
judiciary or parliament thus virtually making Zimbabwe a de facto one -party state.

Basically the whole idea to come up with a one party state was the needed by
the ZANU PF regime to make sure that there would be no political rivalry from other
political parties. To ZANU PF, creating a one party state was important because in its
opinion multi-power politics led to contestation and divisions which are
undevelopmental.

Leaders had already ensured the passage of a resolution favouring the one-
party idea at ZANU-PF’s National Congress of December 1989 and incorporated a
clause to this effect in the Unity Accord. They made the same well-worn arguments as
their predecessors in other African countries: that single-party rule was consistent
with African traditions, suitable for a “unified” and “classless” African society, a
necessary alternative to imported multi-party models, internally democratic, and a
prerequisite for coherent development planning. Mugabe was especially effusive on
the theme that Britain had no right to teach democracy to Zimbabweans.

Mounting internal and societal opposition ensured that the position articulated
by former President Canaan Banana carried the day, since ZANU-PF had already
attained a de facto one-party state via popular acclaim at the ballot box, there was no
need to legally entrench the arrangement in the constitution. In any event, such a
move would have been anachronistic since, at the time, other countries – notably
neighbouring Zambia, Kenya, and Mozambique – were in the process of abandoning
one-party rule and opening up to multiparty competition.
Simbarashe Moyo 113

Regardless of the formal rules of the political game, the ruling elite in
Zimbabwe had long demonstrated an inability to tolerate the expression of political
dissent. In 1990, ZANU-PF marshaled all its efforts, legal and otherwise, to frustrate
an emerging opposition movement. Edgar Tekere, a firebrand populist who was once
ZANU-PF’s Secretary-General and a cabinet minister had been dismissed from the
party in 1988 for blowing the whistle on what he called “vampire class” of corrupt
leaders. Mugabe’s grand plan of establishing a one party state was torpedoed by Edgar
Tekere, a senior ZANU PF member. He was opposed to the idea of a one –party
state “I fear we are heading towards the creation of a dictatorship….democracy in
Zimbabwe is in the intensive care…” he said. In 1989 Tekere formed the Zimbabwe
Unity Movement (ZUM) on a platform that promised employment, housing and
market reforms, as well as opposition to a one-party state.

In a move guaranteed to infuriate the incumbent leadership, Zimbabwe Unity

Movement formed an electoral coalition with the white-led Conservative Alliance of
Zimbabwe. Although Edgar Tekere made national appeals and ran strongly in Harare
and Bulawayo in the 1990 elections, he enjoyed his largest popular base in
Manicaland, his home province. ZANU-PF had reason to fear a political challenge
from a region where people were still asking awkward questions about the mysterious
death of a favourite son Herbert Chitepo in 1975 – was he a victim of intra-party
fratricide? – and where pockets of supporters of Abel Muzorewa (UANC) and
NdabaningiSithole (ZANU-Ndonga) who continued to resist ruling party hegemony.

Conclusion

From the events highlighted above it is quite clear that the regime in
Zimbabwe was at the mercy of regime change from foreign forces which used
domestic agents to achieve their goal in the country since its birth in 1980. And the
desire to keep the regime afloatled ZANU PF to adopt policies or politics of regime
survival which then gave birth to the political tension between ZANU PF and its
political rivals. This then led to economic and political meltdown in Zimbabwe. As
the tensions grew the internal and external political tension also grew finally leading
Zimbabwe being slapped by sanctions by the West and /or West controlled
institutions.
114 Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Vol. 2(1), March 2014

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