Saine Soldierturnedpresidentialcandidatecomparison 2000
Saine Soldierturnedpresidentialcandidatecomparison 2000
Saine Soldierturnedpresidentialcandidatecomparison 2000
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THE SOLDIER-TURNED-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE:
A COMPARISON OF FLAWED "DEMOCRATIC" TRANSITIONS
IN GHANA AND GAMBIA
ABDOULAYE S. SAINE
Department of Political Science
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio
Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings ' successful coup d'état in 1981 and his
subsequent rise to the presidency of Ghana in January 1993 has had both a
demonstration and contagion effect . In the former British West Africa colonies
of Nigeria , Gambia, and Sierra Leone, military leaders either tried or have
replicated Rawlings ' tactics to obtain and stay in power. In fact, of the 15
countries in West Africa, "soldier-tumed-civilian" presidents hold " elected "
office in 6. The soldier-turned-civilian transition model (STC) involves the use
of controlled multiparty elections by ex-military, presidential candidates, who
once in office continue to use force to maintain power. This is a new and
growing political phenomenon in former British West Africa that deserves
careful scrutiny. The 1992 and 1996 presidential elections in Ghana and
Gambia, respectively, were emblematic of this process, a process in which
incumbent military leaders engineered their countries' transition and tilted an
already uneven playing field in their favor. These transitions did not necessarily
result in a more democratic environment.
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192 Journal of Political and Military Sociology
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Soldier-Turned-Presidential Candidate 193
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194 Journal of Political and Military Sociology
were common, and inflation then, perhaps the highest in the world, climbed
from 443 percent in June 1975 to 738 percent in December 1979 (Hutchful,
1979:36).
By the end of 1981, Rawlings characterized Ghana as "a running
train, rushing downhill toward a broken bridge." The economy and the
moral fiber of the people appeared to have reached a point of no return
(Novioki, 1984:4). Chazan also noted that, by early 1980, it was apparent
that Ghana had forfeited its elementary ability to maintain internal or
external order and to hold sway of its population. The popularly elected
Limann government proved inadequate and unequal to the immense
challenges those years of neglect, mismanagement, corruption, and abuse
had created. Rawlings and Kojo Tsikata, both of whom had earlier retired
from the military, seized power in the dying hours of December 31, 1981
(Agyeman-Duah, 1987:617). The provisional National Defense council
(PNDC) was established and headed by Rawlings.
Upon assuming power, Rawlings proclaimed a "people's revolution,"
a holy war against local exploiters and international imperialism. Through
People's Defense Committees, Rawlings sought to reform Ghana's political
landscape. The committees acted as both official watchdogs and instruments
of mass mobilization. Public tribunals were created to hear economic crimes
against the state. In factories, worker participation increased, and university
students were mobilized to assist cocoa farmers transport their produce to
market, while the military engaged in other development tasks. Motivated
by a combination of idealism and frustration with the status quo, the
vigilantism that arose threatened the country with anarchy. With the
abduction and shooting of three high court judges and a retired army officer,
the Christian Council and the dissident Bar Association demanded the
PNDC's resignation (Enchill, 1982:1797). With domestic pressure mounting,
Rawlings reined in the "leftist faction."
Lawlessness as well as political and economic dysfunction
characterized the first two years, according to Agyeman-Duah. The PNDC
seemed incapable of controlling the revolutionary expectations that its own
pronouncements had created. The general despondency of the people and
their strange aloofness toward the regime prompted Rawlings to lament the
"culture of silence." Owuso argues that the decision taken by the PNDC in
late 1984 to abolish and replace People's Defense and Worker Committees
with Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) was a timely and
courageous recognition of the serious threat to the struggle for true
democracy posed by the PDCs/WDCs (Owuso, 1996:309).
Faced with an increasingly desperate economic situation, the PNDC
undertook a reform program in the economic sector, contrary to its populist
image and to the dismay of the "left." The Economic Recovery Program
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Soldier-Turned-Presidential Candidate 195
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196 Journal of Political and Military Sociology
Elite Gambians have historically felt uneasy about closer relations with its
much larger neighbor, Senegal, for fear of losing their local identity and
being disadvantaged in a monetary and customs union (Hughes, 1992:222;
Bayo, 1977:87).
Political reconciliation and economic reform typified post-aborted
coup government policy. Like Ghana, Gambia initiated one of the most
comprehensive Economic Recovery Programs (ERP) in 1985. The broad
objectives of this program were two-fold - halt the deteriorating economy
and lay the foundation for sustained economic growth (Sallah, 1990:628). By
mid- 1986, just a year later, the revival of the economy had begun, but while
Gambia's macro-economic policies engendered modest growth and curbed
inflation (Mcpherson & Radelet, 1995:3), politically, the promised reforms
after the 1981 aborted coup did not take root. Clientelism and patronage
continued to characterize the Jawara regime. By 1992, the PPP government
faced its greatest crisis. Endemic corruption, divisive politics, internal party
fragmentation, and growing loss of confidence in the regime's ability to
reverse what to many was a deepening economic crisis set the public
expectation for a coup.
Also problems internal to the army, an institution unwittingly set up
in 1981 by Jawara to pre-empt further instability, increased resentment
against the regime. In particular, the disparity in living conditions between
Nigerian senior officers who led the army and junior Gambian officers was
a source of resentment against the Jawara regime (Saine, 1996:104). Pay
disputes and reduced opportunities for promotion created by Nigerian
officers in positions of power negatively affected junior officer morale. When
Jawara returned to Gambia following a trip overseas on July 21, 1994, the
atmosphere at the airport reeked of a coup plot. The soldiers who arrived
at the airport to receive him were promptly disarmed. Such public
humiliation was to be the last straw and within twenty-four hours a bloodless
coup was executed. The Armed Forces Provisional Ruling council was
established and headed by Lt. Yahya Jammeh who at the time was under
thirty years old. The ex-president and a good number of his cabinet took the
U.S. Warship La Moure County to Senegal where they were granted asylum.
While the AFPRC enjoyed initial public support, domestic and
international pressure began to mount for a return to civilian rule. Gambia's
major economic donors, Germany, Japan, and the U.K. together with
international lending agencies froze financial assistance. A British
government travel advisory to British and other European tourists set in
motion severe economic contraction, in tourism specifically. These measures
combined to exacerbate an already volatile economic situation arising in part
from a devalued CFA franc in Senegal and from Senegal's decision to stem
Gambia's re-export trade by closing its borders. The AFPRC's popular image
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Soldier-Turned-Presidential Candidate 197
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198 Journal of Political and Military Sociology
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Soldier-Turned-Presidential Candidate 199
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200 Journal of Political and Military Sociology
support of Rawlings. Jeffries and Thomas agree that the total of 8,255,056
registered voters was an impossibly large number for a population variously
estimated at between 14 and 15 million (Jeffries & Thomas, 1992:349).
Following the referendum, the PNDC lifted the ban on party activity and
began preparations to hold a vote for president in November 1992 and for
parliament a month later. The New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by Adu
Boahen objected to the Government's continued restriction on political
freedoms. While the opposition had from April to November to prepare for
the elections, in reality, registration "difficulties" alluded to by Boahen and
others cut the preparation and campaign period to about three months.
Meanwhile, Rawlings had since December 1991 engaged in campaign
activity, by way of official tours to promote his agenda on development and
stress achievements of the PNDC.
In Gambia, the Constitution was endorsed by a majority at a
referendum on August 8, 1996, but unlike Rawlings who allowed his
opposition three months to campaign, Jammeh maintained the ban on
politics and political parties and allowed opposition parties barely two weeks
to prepare and contest the presidential elections. On August 12, four days
after the referendum, Jammeh again banned the three major political
parties, the ex-president, and almost all of his ex-ministers from all political
activity for periods ranging from five to twenty years. On August 17,
Jammeh declared his candidature for the presidency and announced the
formation of his Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction
(APRC) party. He also "lifted" the ban on political activity and political
parties, but this did not include the three major parties. The only pre-coup
parties that were not banned were small and poorly financed ones, like the
People's DemocraticOrganization for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS),
whose chances of winning were negligible. While strongly committed to
principles of equality and change in Gambia, PDOIS still lacked popular
support.
Jammeh then set the "official" period for political campaigning from
September 9-24, 1996. Like Rawlings, though, he had also been campaigning
since his " meet the farmers" tours on coming to office in 1994. Jammeh
often evoked excesses of the old politicians, just as Rawlings had earlier
chastised "intellectuals" in Ghana to enhance his already positive image with
rural voters. Both men and their respective campaigns were widely covered
by radio and television. The use of these media outlets, especially in
Gambia, tilted an unlevel playing field further in these incumbents' favor.
While Electoral Commissions in both Ghana and Gambia,
especially, sought to enforce electoral laws to ensure fair and unfettered
access to media outlets, Jammeh more so than Rawlings ignored such
appeals and in the process continued to subvert their already weakened and
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Soldier-Turned-Presidential Candidate 201
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
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202 Journal of Political and Military Sociology
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Soldier-T urned-Pr esidential Candidate 203
in Banjul. They vowed to leave only if assured of their safety. They left four
days later after Jammeh assured them of their safety. The actual use of
violent speech is reflective of a political game in which "winner takes all"
fight to the finish. Here, defeat means a loss not only of the emoluments
and status that office brings but sometimes life itself. One must win by any
means necessary. Since regimes such as those in Ghana in 1992 and Gambia
in 1996 had a monopoly over the instruments of violence and their use, the
political process was neither fair nor level. The latter should however be
qualified to note that Ghana's transition was less encumbered, compared to
Gambia's, but it was constrained nonetheless. Perhaps the difference lies
more in degrees of severity of tactics used than the outcomes per se, yet in
the end it was the ultimate outcome, winning, that mattered. And the
parliamentary elections in Ghana as in Gambia may have only consolidated
"military" rule and control.
Albeit by a smaller margin of victory both Rawlings and Jammeh
could have won under more open and competitive conditions. Assessments
of the presidential election of 1992 in Ghana suggest that Rawlings won the
majority of votes in each region, except Ashanti. He lost in many urban
communities including Bolgatanga and Navorongo, Sunyani East (Brong-
Ahafo), Yendi, Sekondi, and Takoradi. In the central region, he won Cape
Coast but with only 45.85 percent of the vote (Bawumia, 1998:48). Similarly,
Jammeh won a majority of the constituencies including Saloum, Serrekunda,
and Banjul North and South. Jammeh lost Wuli, Jarra, and Kiang to his
opponents. In Ghana particularly, the result of the presidential election
suggested that Rawlings derived much of his support from rural
constituencies. The results show a rural-urban split in voter behavior.
Similarly, Jammeh's support seems to have come mostly from the rural areas
and the youth in poor and urban communities.
Another reason why both Jammeh and Rawlings could have won
was their respective successes in enhancing rural standards of living. In
Ghana, a major extension of the national electric grid to the deprived
Northern region and the widespread repair of roads, railways, and bridges
could have won the hearts of northerners. Upon coming to power, Jammeh
also constructed two high schools, numerous middle schools, roads,
overpasses, refurbished Radio Gambia studios and the national airport, gave
Gambia its first television station, and revealed massive corruption of the
deposed Jawara regime. Almost thirty years of PPP rule had left Gambia
with only two government high schools and hospitals to complement
privately owned ones. These revelations of corruption (Wiseman, 1996:931)
in particular and the development projects endeared Jammeh to the
populace.
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204 Journal of Political and Military Sociology
CONCLUSION
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Soldier-Turned-Presidential Candidate 205
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206 Journal of Political and Military Sociology
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