Dinamling vs. People, GR No.

199522, June 22, 2015

FACTS:

Ricky Dinamling, a policeman, was in a 5-year relationship with AAA. They had 2 common children, aged
4 and 2. One night, he went to AAA’s boarding house with a friend after a drinking session. As AAA was
putting the children to bed, he started to evict her for the reason that she was using the place as a
“whore house” wherein she “brought her partners.” She did not want to leave but he threw a baby’s
feeding bottle outside. She went to BBB’s house and requested to fetch her children. However,
Dinamling already left the boarding house with the older child and only the baby was left.

In the past, he would hit AAA’s head, pull her hair, and kick her When AAA went to the police, she was
merely told that it was a family problem that could be talked over.

6 days after the incident, AAA was at CCC’s house when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted
down for AAA to come out. When she came out, Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which
subsequently bled. When AAA asked him why he kept on following her when she already had left him,
Dinamling shouted her family name and told her she was “good-for-nothing.” AAA left for the barangay
captain's house, but Dinamling caught up with her and kicked her until she fell to the ground. On the
road, Dinamling pulled down AAA's pants and panty and shouted at her while people looked on.
Dinamling then threw the pants and panty back at AAA and shouted her family name. Dinamling, then
intoxicated, left on a motorcycle. AAA stayed at her friend's home until she felt some back pain in the
next morning. She found out she was bleeding and about to miscarry so she was immediately brought to
the hospital. There, she was told that she was 19 weeks pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She
was hospitalized for four days. Dinamling visited her but showed no remorse over his acts.

Dinamling was charged with (2) criminal Informations in the RTC for violation of Section 5(i), in relation
to Section 6(f) of RA No. 9262.

His defense was denial and alibi, claiming that he was on duty at the town’s police station at the time
that the offenses were committed. RTC found Dinamling gulty of both charges. CA affirmed but modified
the penalty by applying ISLaw.

ISSUE:

It matters not that no other eyewitness corroborated AAA's testimony of the actual incidents. The
testimony of the complainant as a lone witness to the actual perpetration of the act, as long as it is
credible, suffices to establish the guilt of the accused because evidence is weighed and not counted.26
If, in criminal cases of rape27 or homicide,28 the positive, categorical and credible testimony of a lone
witness is deemed enough to support a conviction, then, in the case at bar, involving a case of violation
of Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262, this Court shall treat in the same manner the testimony of a single but
credible witness for the prosecution. Especially if the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and
sincerity and was delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner, corroborative
testimony is not needed to support a conviction.29
It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on
victims who are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual
and economic violence, are addressed and penalized in other sub-parts of Section 5.

The law defines psychological violence as follows:

Section 3(a) Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage
to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the
family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to
pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish
caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of
the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it
is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.30 All
of this was complied with in the case at bar. In the face of the strong and credible testimony of AAA,
petitioner Dinamling relies on a defense of denial and alibi. On the nights of March 14 and 20, 2007, he
claimed that he was on duty at XXX Police Station.31 He denied seeing AAA on those dates.32 However,
on cross examination, he admitted that it takes only two to three minutes to go from the police station
to AAA's boarding house.33

In the case at bar, nothing in Dinamling's defense overcomes the clear, straightforward, unequivocal and
positive declarations of AAA. For one, the positive identification of Dinamling as the perpetrator is not
an issue. It is not disputed that he and AAA knew each other very well as, in fact, they were at that time
carrying on a five-year relationship which had borne two common children.

Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if the accused was able to prove that not only was
heat some other place when the crime was committed, but also that he could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, during its commission.38 Using such
standards, Dinamling's alibi holds no water. Not only was his alleged location at the time of commission,
that is, the XXX Police Station where he was on duty, in the same municipality as the crimes' place of
commission, Dinamling himself also admited that this police station is just "two to three minutes" away
from AAA's boarding house. Where the accused admits that he was in the same municipality as the
place where the offense occurred, it cannot be said that it was physically impossible for him to have
committed the crime, and his defense of alibi cannot prosper.39
Therefore, the trial and appellate courts correctly found petitioner Dinamling guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and such conviction must be upheld. To reiterate, the denial of the accused is a negative assertion
that is weaker than the affirmative testimony of the victim.40 It almost has no probative value and may
be further discarded in the absence of any evidence of ill motives on the part of the witness to impute
so grave a wrong against the accused.41 As for alibi, it is not given weight if the accused failed to
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the
crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.42

But petitioner Dinamling also harps on the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, the substance of
which allegedly frees him from responsibility for the incomplete abortion of AAA's unborn child.

By way of background, a witness, who is an officer of the Ifugao Provincial Hospital, brought a copy of a
medical certificate issued by a Dr. Johan Baguilat stating that:

a) AAA was hospitalized at the said hospital from March 21 to March 24, 2007;

b) AAA had an incomplete abortion secondary to the mauling, and;

c) AAA had anemia, contusion, hematoma and abrasion of the left elbow.43

The witness testified that she herself typed the medical certificate and had it signed by Dr. Baguilat.44
Dr. Baguilat, however, was unable to testify, due to the alleged distance of the court from his current
place of work.45 Instead of Dr. Baguilat, it was Dr. Mae Codamon-Diaz, an obstetrician-gynecologist of
the Ifugao Provincial Hospital, who testified that the medical certificate indicated that AAA was
pregnant, but that her incomplete abortion might or might not have been caused by her "mauling."46
Dr. Diaz added that the anemia was caused by profuse bleeding, while the contusion and hematoma
were caused by a fall, trauma, blow or impact to the patient's body.47 When cross-examined, Dr. Diaz
stated that other possible causes of abortion include infection of the reproductive organ or urinary tract
infection and intake of strong medicines, while another cause of anemia is malnutrition.48

Petitioner Dinamling's position is that such testimony of Dr. Diaz, which expresses an uncertainty as to
whether the mauling of AAA caused her abortion, exculpates him from the crime.

The Court disagrees. Petitioner barks up the wrong tree because the fact of AAA's physical injuries from
the mauling, including her abortion, do not constitute an element of the crime with which he is charged.
Such injuries are likewise not alleged in the two informations against him. Therefore, the testimony of
Dr. Diaz or any physician as to the fact or existence of such physical injuries is not indispensable to
petitioner's conviction or acquittal. Simply put, AAA's physical condition is not an element of the crime
that petitioner was charged with, hence, proof of the same is, strictly speaking, unnecessary.

In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done by the
perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA
9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by the accused is
alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of physical violence
must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of causing mental or emotional
suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical violence translates to
psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or emotional well-being. In the
case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping AAA of her pants and
underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence since
it was alleged and proven that they resulted in AAA's public ridicule and humiliation and mental or
emotional distress. The clear, unrebutted testimony of the victim AAA, as to the physical violence done
on her as well as to the mental and emotional suffering she experienced as a result thereof, suffices to
prove such facts.

The victim's resulting actual bodily injuries are immaterial unless such injuries are also alleged to have
led to her mental or emotional anguish. There was no such allegation in the information in the case at
bar. Thus, proof of physical injuries is not needed for conviction. Likewise, proof of the absence thereof
or lack of proof of such injuries would not lead to an acquittal. Physical violence or physical injuries, in
isolation, are not elements of this particular crime.

As earlier discussed, the focus of this particular criminal act is the causation of non-physical suffering,
that is, mental or emotional distress, or even anxiety and social shame or dishonor on the offended
party, and not of direct bodily harm or property damage which are covered by the other subsections of
the law's provision. The use of physical violence, whether or not it causes physical or property harm to
the victim, falls under Section 5(i) only if it is alleged and proven to have caused mental or emotional
anguish. Likewise, the physical injuries suffered are similarly covered only if they lead to such
psychological harm. Otherwise, physical violence or injuries, with no allegation of mental or emotional
harm, are punishable under the other provisions of the law.

As to the alleged miscarriage or incomplete abortion, the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, or
even the complete disregard of any evidence surrounding such fact does not lead to petitioner
Dinamling's acquittal. Like the physical injuries that was discussed above, the fact of AAA's miscarriage
or incomplete abortion is not essential to proving the elements of the crime, unless it is alleged to have
caused mental or emotional suffering. It is not among the crime's elements. In fact, it is not abortion but
the mere fact of pregnancy of the victim at the time of commission which is an aggravating
circumstance, not an element, of the offense. Section 6 of RA 9262 reads:

SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof
shall be punished according to the following rules:

xxxx

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her
child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos
(₱300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall
report compliance to the court.49

For this crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating circumstances which
increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent evidence for the
penalty to be properly imposed.50

It is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or miscarriage does not establish any of the crime's
elements, as indeed the information itself did not allege the same. However, from the fact of
miscarriage one may logically derive the fact of AAA's pregnancy, which is an aggravating circumstance
for the crime and which is alleged as such in the information. The pregnancy is proven by AAA's
unrebutted testimony as well as by the medical certificate that she presented in the course of such
testimony to show that she was indeed hospitalized and suffered an "incomplete abortion secondary to
the mauling."

Although petitioner Dinamling, up to this stage of the case, denies having caused the incomplete
abortion or miscarriage, he does not deny the fact of pregnancy itself. He did not present contradictory
evidence during trial to controvert the prosecution's assertions and proof of pregnancy. The pregnancy
was never put in issue during trial and on appeal. Neither is the same in question in this petition.
Therefore, it may be safely concluded that the fact of AAA's pregnancy has been established and it may
be taken account of and considered as a circumstance that aggravates Dinamling's criminal liability.

Therefore, given such finding, this Court will now accordingly modify the penalties imposed by the trial
court and appellate court.51

As for Criminal Case No. 1701, no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance attends the
crime.1âwphi1 Although it was stated during trial that the offense was committed in the presence of
AAA's children, such fact was not alleged in the information and therefore will not be taken into
consideration.52 Nighttime, though alleged, is not considered aggravating because it neither facilitated
the commission of the offense nor was it shown to have been purposely sought by the offender.53 The
fact of AAA's pregnancy during the crime's commission, however, has been alleged and established. This
single circumstance aggravates the accused's liability and automatically raises his penalty to the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA 9262 and also Article 64(3) of the
Revised Penal Code. Hence, petitioner Dinamling should be sentenced to a maximum penalty that is
derived from prision mayor in its maximum period, which is imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,54 the minimum penalty should
come from the penalty one degree lower than prision mayor which is prision correccional, whose range
is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.55 Therefore, this Court modifies the trial court's
Order dated September 17, 2009,56 which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and imposes on
petitioner Dinamling an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor as maximum. The
trial court's order for petitioner to pay a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to
undergo psychological counseling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is upheld.

As for Criminal Case No. 1702, there is likewise no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance.
Again, the single circumstance of pregnancy aggravates the accused's liability and automatically raises
his penalty to the maximum period of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA No. 9262 and Article
64(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals are to be
modified. The maximum penalty should be derived from prision mayor in its maximum period, which,
again, is imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. And again, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be derived from the penalty next lower in degree,
which is prision correccional. Therefore, the new penalty to be imposed shall be imprisonment of six (6)
years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. The rest of
the penalties, like the imposition on the petitioner of a fine of one hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00) and the order for him to undergo psychological counseling, as upheld by the appellate
court, are hereby affirmed.

Both Criminal Case Nos. 1701 and 1702 involve the same offense as defined in RA 9262 and are
punishable by the same range of penalties as prescribed in the said law. However, due to the greater
ignominy of the acts done by the accused in Criminal Case No. 1702, the minimum and maximum
lengths of the sentence imposed should therefore be greater than in Criminal Case No. 1701.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 187495               April 21, 2014

PONENTE: Reyes

TOPIC: Marital rape

FACTS:

                Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

                On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her
husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their
residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-
appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

                As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really

                One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead,
rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask
angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer
here to our bed.”

                KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and
abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him
and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall
causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her
pillow and transferred to the bed.
                The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his
desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by
warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.

                The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried
to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the
sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

                The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and
rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and
succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued
to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”

                Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated
the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of
their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

                YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over
their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

                The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital
rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their
proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.

                The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between
marital rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in
defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and
property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest
scrutiny.

                The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to
be unconstitutional.
                Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity
from prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to
him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or
abets another person in raping her.

                Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the
rapist’s legal relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

                The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which
was raised by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed
between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

                According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual
violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or
against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party
to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape
under R.A. No. 8353.