Pp v Barte

FACTS:
‣ This case sprang from the buy-bust operation conducted by several police officers against the Barte
based on the tip from a caller whose identification was only through the alias of Ogis.
‣ The information received is that Barte was engaged in the sale of shabu.
‣ Surveillance for three nights was made following such tip by which they had confirmed that he was
really selling shabu.
‣ The results of their surveillance also confirmed that the subject of their surveillance was the same
person referred to by their informant.
‣ Buy-bust operation was conducted in Consuelo Village by P02 Cabatingan as the poseur-buyer and
his backup officers were PO2 Baylosis and PO3 Ompad.
‣ P02 Cabatingan met with Barte, and informed the latter that he wanted to buy shabu worth “a
peso.
‣ When the buy-bust money was handed to Barte and in exchange a small sachet with white colored
content was given, P02 Cabatingan gave his signal to P02 Baylosis and PO3 Ompad by touching his
head.
‣ They rushed forward to Barte and identify themselves as policemen. They frisked Barte and brought
him to the police station.
‣ PO2 Cabatingan
1. identified the sachet marked “EBM,” which contained the white substance.
2. requested for laboratory examination.
3. delivered the confiscated substance, along with the request, to the crime laboratory, which
later on found the substance to be positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
4. Identified the buy bust money used

‣ The RTC found Barte guilty of selling shabu. According to the Court, that the testimony of P02
Cabatingan established that Barte had sold shabu to him.
‣ That the non-observance of the procedure sets under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 (as to the procedure after the accused has been arrested) does not overcome the
presumption of regularity of performance of police duties where the testimonies of the policemen
concerned have been found to be credible.
‣ The CA affirmed the decision of RTC and note that the arresting officers acted within the bounds of
law and jurisprudence in the conduct of the buy-bust operation.

ISSUE: WON the procedure sets forth under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act after the accused has
been arrested may be set aside.

HELD: NO. It is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust operations are “susceptible to police abuse, the
most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion.” The high possibility of abuse was precisely the
reason why the procedural safeguards embodied in Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
have been put up as a means to minimize, if not eradicate such abuse.

The procedural safeguards not only protect the innocent from abuse and violation of their rights but also
guide the law enforcers on ensuring the integrity of the evidence to be presented in court.

The very corpus delicti of the offense is the dangerous drug. Its identity and integrity must definitely be
shown to have been preserved. The prosecutor must account for each link in the chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs. The chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the
identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed.
In this case, the noncompliance with the procedural safeguards under Section 21 cast doubt on the
integrity of the evidence presented in court and directly affected the validity of the buy-bust operation.

It gives the Court the questions whether the sachet of shabu had really come from Barte, and whether the
sachet of shabu presented in court was the same sachet of shabu obtained from Barte at the time of the
arrest.

Neither the testimonies nor the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty may overcome
the safeguards instituted by our law. However, if there is a justifiable ground for the noncompliance and
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved, then the non-compliance is
justified which is not present in this case.

Hence, the failure to prove the chain of custody should mean that the Prosecution did not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the sachet of shabu presented during the trial was the very same one
delivered by Barte to the poseur-buyer. Thus, Barte was acquitted.

Catalan v Catalan

FACTS:
- Merope Enriquez vda De Catalan and Louella Catalan-Lee each respectively filed their petitions for the
issuance of letters administration and appointment as adminstratrix of the estate of Orlando Catalan, which
were consolidated
- Merope was claimed not to be an interested person as her marriage with Orlando was bigamous (RTC
acquitted her because Orlando was divorced and divorce not being recognized in our jurisdiction, their
marriage was not valid)
- The RTC ruled in favor of Louella (one of the children of Orlando), holding that Merope’s earlier marriage was
valid when she married Orlando and thus, she was not an interested party qualified to file the petition
- The CA affirmed, citing that her failure to dispute the facts established in the bigamy case does not inspire a
reversal

Issue: Is the divorce decree of Orlando with his first wife a matter of judicial notice?

Held: No. The fact of divorce must still first be proven.

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.

Our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either:
1) an official publication or
2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be
a. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
b. authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to
be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
Noveras v Noveras
FACTS:
‣ David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married in Quezon City, Philippines.
‣ They resided in California, United States of America (US) where they eventually acquired American
citizenship.
‣ When David left the USA, Leticia learned that David had an extra-marital affair with another woman
and lived with her.
‣ So Leticia she filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court in California, USA.
‣ The California court granted the divorce and grant to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well
as all the couple’s properties in the USA
‣ Then, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler,
Aurora.
‣ The RTC recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personal status are those of the USA.
‣ Based on their divorce decree in California, the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved so the
court consider the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation.
‣ The court also apply the doctrine of processual presumption that Philippine law should apply
because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any
proof of their national law.
‣ The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
‣ In his appeal, David insists that the court should have recognized the California Judgment which
awarded the PH properties to him because said judgment was part of the pleading presented and
offered in evidence before the trial court.

ISSE: WON the Philippine Court may recognize California divorce law.

HELD:
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the court ruled that :
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. The foreign judgement and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rule on evidence.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of marriage, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact.

In this case, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity as well as the law on California on divorce decree were not presented. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.

Dimaguila vs Monteiro
FACTS:
- Sps Monteiro purchased a property in Liliw from the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila and sought to partition
the same
 - The Dimaguilas countered that no coownership exists as the property has long been partitioned
between Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, dividing the property into the northern and southern halves
- The complaint was amended, converting it to an action for the recovery of possession, admitting that
the property had already been partitioned and such partition had been observed by the heirs, entitling
them to 1/3 of the southern half which belonged to Pedro, the son of Perfecto.
- In their amended answer, the Dimaguilas claimed that the admission of partition into the northern and
southern halves in the original answer was an oversight on the part of their counsel and that it was merely
divided into “two and share and share alike”
- Among the witnesses presented were employees from the Assessor’s office and the DENR, who testified
on cadastral maps
- The RTC ruled in favor of the Monteiros, appreciating evidence aliunde showing that the division into
north and south halves have been observed.
- The Dimaguilas were held estopped in recanting their admission of partition in their original answer

Issue: Is the renunciation of the Dimaguilas original position re: the partition proper?

Held: No. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake.

The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so amended their original complaint for
partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now
estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property.

Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would actually be sufficient
to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the respondent spouses.

Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when
the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody or the record.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records
are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of
requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty.
The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

Pp v Janjalani
FACTS:
- Members of the Abu Sayyaf group were charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder in
relation to the Valentine’s Day bus bombing in Makati.
- The 3 also entered pleas of guilty to multiple murder
- Media statements were released by 3 of the 4 accused admitting their roles in the bombing
- During pre-trial, they admitted to causing the bomb explosion inside the bus and to their media admissions
- Not guilty pleas were initially entered in the second case, but were subsequently withdrawn after
consultation with their counsel brought about by the PJ bringing up the “inconsistency” in their pleas
- Baharan and Trinidad question the lack of a searching inquiry after their change of plea
Issue: WON the testimony of a co-conspirator made during a televised interview and repeated during trial may be
admissible as evidence against a co-conspirator

Held: Yes. Accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge – multiple murder – based on the
same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge.

Prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt – one
through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial),
and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation).

While it is true that under Sec 30 Rule 130, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are
admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy, if the declarant repeats the statement in court,
his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.
Sec 30 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial
where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross examine the declarant.

In thiscase, Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in
evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the
testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.

In this case, he guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by the testimonies of the
witnesses, coupled with their respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions
(exclusive television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of
the Valentine’s Day bombing.

ISSE: Is the conviction proper?

HELD: