Version 7 Revision 3

-i-

IBM System Storage TS1130 Tape Drive –

Machine Type 3592, Model E06

Security Policy

Document Version 7 Revision 3

 ii Version 7 Revision 3

1  Document History .................................................................................................................................................. 1 

2  Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ 2 
2.1  References ............................................................................................................................................... 3 

3  TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive Cryptographic Module Description ..................................................................... 4 

3.1  Overview ................................................................................................................................................. 4 
3.2  Secure Configuration ............................................................................................................................. 5 
3.3  Ports and Interfaces ............................................................................................................................... 8 
3.4  Roles and Services .................................................................................................................................. 9 
3.5  Physical Security .................................................................................................................................. 15 
3.6  Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Management............................................................................ 16 
3.7  Design Assurance ................................................................................................................................. 20 
3.8  Mitigation of other attacks .................................................................................................................. 20 
 Version 7 Revision 3
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1 Document History
Date Author Change
02/25/2009 Christine Knibloe V0.0
Initial Creation
10/05/2009 Said Ahmad V1.0
Updated Figure 1 and Table 3
removing references to misc. port
10/20/2009 Said Ahmad V2.0
Updated cryptographic boundary
from the canister to drive brick
10/21/2009 Said Ahmad V3.0
Updated Figure 1 with duplicate
Ethernet port
10/29/2009 Said Ahmad V4.0
Updates per the Lab Comments
1/28/2009 Said Ahmad V5.0
Updated per the Lab Comments
6/2/2010 Said Ahmad V6.0
Updated per CMVP comments
6/3/2010 Said Ahmad V7.0
Updated per CMVP comments
6/8/2010 Said Ahmad V7.1
Updated per CMVP comments
7/16/2010 Said Ahmad V7.2
Updated per CMVP Comments
 2 Version 7 Revision 3

2 Introduction
This non-proprietary security policy describes the IBM System Storage TS1130 Tape Drive - Machine
Type 3592, Model E06 cryptographic module and the approved mode of operation for FIPS 140-2,
meeting the security level 1 requirements for each section of the requirements. This policy was prepared
as part of FIPS 140-2 validation of the TS1130. The IBM System Storage TS1130 Tape Drive -
Machine Type 3592, Model E06 is referred to in this document as the “TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive,”
the “TS1130,” and the encrypting tapedrive.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2—Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More
information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST web site at:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/
The security policy document is organized in the following sections:

• Introduction

• References

• Document Organization

TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive Cryptographic Module Description

• Cryptographic Module Overview

• Secure Configuration

• Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

• Roles and Services

• Physical Security

• Cryptographic Key Management

• Self-Tests

• Design Assurance

• Mitigation of Other Attacks

 3 Version 7 Revision 3

2.1 References
This document describes only the cryptographic operations and capabilities of the TS1130 Encrypting Tape
Drive. More information is available on the general function of the TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive at the
IBM web site:
http://www.ibm.com/storage/tape/
The tape drive meets the T10 SCSI-3 Stream Commands (SSC) standard for the behavior of sequential
access devices. In addition, the tape drive primary host interfaces are physical fibre channel ports. The
physical and protocol behavior of these ports conforms to Fibre Channel Protocol (FCP) specification.
These specifications are available at the INCITS T10 standards web site:
http://www.T10.org /
A Redbook describing tape encryption and user configuration of the drive in various environments can be
found at:
http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/abstracts/sg247320.html?Open
The TS1130 drive format on the tape media is designed to conform to the IEEE P1619.1 committee draft
proposal for recommendations for protecting data at rest on tape media. Details on P1619.1 may be found
at:
http://ieee-p1619.wetpaint.com/
 4 Version 7 Revision 3

3 TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive Cryptographic Module Description

3.1 Overview
The TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive is a set of hardware, firmware, and interfaces allowing the optional
storage and retrieval of encrypted data to magnetic tape cartridges. The TS1130 tape drive is FIPS
validated as a multi-chip, embedded cryptographic module (Hardware Version: 45E8855 EC Level
L31095 and Firmware Version: 46X1651 EC Level L31096). In customer operation the “brick” unit is
embedded in a canister package for operation in a library. Some components of the TS1130 tape drive,
such as mechanical components used for tape loading/unloading and actuating the tape cartridge, labels,
cables, connectors, terminals and sensor components, do not have an effect on the security of the
cryptographic module.
A block diagram of the TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive is shown below:

Cryptographic Module Block Diagram

Power
(J37)

Message Display
SDRAM SDRAM (U20,U21,U22,
(U52,U54) U34,U49,U51,U67,U58)
Port 0 Port 1 422 232 Panel net
(J4)

FC

FAS600
(U71)
FC
(J12)

Yuri
(U24)

Cartridge Mem
RS- RS- Service Ether-

UPIF Other

(J10)
(internal PPC)
(U23) Card
Functions Deck
(U14,U9,U13,
(J32)

Flash (U17) U8,U46,U48)

SH7780
(U16)
Head
ACF I2C net

Tape
(J6)
SDRAM (U86,U87) SDRAM (U10,U11) Main Card
Ether-
(J42)

Drive

Figure 1: TS1130 Block Diagram

 5 Version 7 Revision 3

The TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive has two major cryptographic functions:

ƒ Data Block Cipher Facility: The tape drive provides functions which provide the ability for
standard tape data blocks as received during SCSI-type write commands to be encrypted
before being recorded to media using AES-GCM block cipher using a provided key, and
decrypted during reads from tape using a provided key.
o Note the AES-GCM block cipher operation is performed after compression of the
host data therefore not impacting capacity and data rate performance of the
compression function
o The TS1130 drive automatically performs a complete and separate decryption and
decompression check of host data blocks after the compression/encryption process
to validate there were no errors in the encoding process

ƒ Secure Key Interface Facility: The tape drive provides functions which allow authentication
of the tape drive to an external IBM key manager, such as the IBM Encryption Key
Manager (EKM) or the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM), and allow transfer of
protected key material between the key manager and the tape drive.

3.2 Secure Configuration

This section describes the approved mode of operation for the TS1130 drive to maintain the FIPS 140-2
validation.

There are two configurations for the TS1130 in the approved mode of operation. They are:
ƒ System-Managed Encryption (SME)
ƒ Library-Managed Encryption (LME)

In order to be in an approved mode of operation, the values of the fields Key Path (manager Type) (from
VPD), In-band Key Path (Manager Type) Override, Indirect Key Mode Default, Key Scope, and
Encryption Method must be set according to the table below. More details can be found in the TS1130
SCSI Reference.

Table 1: Settings for Approved Configurations

Required Fields System-Managed Library-Managed
Encryption (SME) Encryption (LME)
Key Path (Manager Type) (from VPD) X’1’ X’6’
Mode Page X’25’, byte 21, bits 7-5
In-band Key Path (Manager Type) Override X’0’ or X’1’ X’0’
Mode Page X’25’, byte 21, bits 4-2
Indirect Key Mode Default B’0’ B’0’
Mode Page X’25’, byte 22, bit 4
Key Scope X’0’ or X’1’ X’0’ or X’1’
Mode Page X’25’, byte 23, bits 2-0
Encryption Method X’10’ or X’1F’ X’60’
Mode Page X’25’, byte 27

A user can determine if the TS1130 is in the approved mode of operation by issuing a SCSI Mode Sense
command to Mode Page X’25’ and evaluating the values returned.

Certain commands are prohibited while in the approved mode of operation. The commands vary based on
which configuration is used in the approved mode. In the LME configuration, all Mode Select commands
to subpages of Mode Page X’25’ are prohibited. In the SME configuration, Mode Select commands to the
following subpages of Mode Page X’25’ are prohibited.
 6 Version 7 Revision 3

Table 2: Mode Select Eligibility of Mode Page X’25’ Subpages

Mode Page X’25’ Subpages System-Managed Encryption Library-Managed Encryption
(SME) (LME)
X’C0’ – Control/Status Allowed Prohibited
X’D0’ – Generate dAK/dAK’ Pair Prohibited Prohibited
X’D1’ – Query dAK Prohibited Prohibited
X’D2’ – Update dAK/dAK’ Pair Prohibited Prohibited
X’D3’ – Remove dAK/dAK’ Pair Prohibited Prohibited
X’D5’ – Drive Challenge/Response Allowed Prohibited
X’D6’ – Query Drive Certificate Allowed Prohibited
X’D7’ – Query/Setup HMAC Prohibited Prohibited
X’D8’ – Install eAK Prohibited Prohibited
X’D9’ – Query eAK Prohibited Prohibited
X’DA’ – Update eAK Prohibited Prohibited
X’DB’ – Remove eAK Prohibited Prohibited
X’DF’ – Query dSK Allowed Prohibited
X’E0’ – Setup SEDK/EEDK(s) Allowed Prohibited
X’E1’ – Alter EEDK(s) Allowed Prohibited
X’E2’ – Query EEDKs (Active) Allowed Prohibited
X’E3’ – Query EEDKs (Needed) Allowed Prohibited
X’E4’ – Query EEDKs (Entire) Allowed Prohibited
X’E5’ – Query EEDKs (Pending) Allowed Prohibited
X’EE’ – Request EEDKs (Translate) Allowed Prohibited
X’EF’ – Request EEDKs (Generate) Allowed Prohibited
X’FE’ – Drive Error Notify Allowed Prohibited

Loading a FIPS 140-2 validated drive microcode level and configuring the drive for SME or LME
operation initializes the TS1130 into the approved mode of operation. The FIPS 140-2 validated drive
microcode level should be loaded twice to ensure the firmware occupies both the main and reserved
firmware locations.

The TS1130 supports multi-initiator environments, but only one initiator may access cryptographic
functions at any given time. Therefore the TS1130 does not support multiple concurrent operators.

The TS1130 implements a non-modifiable operational environment which consists of a firmware image
stored in FLASH. The firmware image is copied to, and executed from, RAM. The firmware image can
only be updated via FIPS-approved methods that verify the validity of the image.

The TS1130 drive operates as a stand-alone tape drive and has no direct dependency on any specific
operating system or platform for FIPS approved operating mode, but does have requirements for:

• Key Manager/Key Store attachment

• Drive Configuration

The following criteria apply to the usage environment:

ƒ Key Manager and Key Store Attachment
o In both SME and LME modes of operation, an IBM key manager, such as the Encryption
Key Manager (EKM) or the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM), and a supported key
store must be used in a manner which supports secure import and export of keys with the
TS1130 drive :
• Keys must be securely passed into the TS1130 drive. The key manager
must support encryption of the Data Key to form an Session Encrypted
Data Key (SEDK) for transfer to the TS1130 drive using the TS1130
drive public Session Key and a 2048-bit RSA encryption method.
 7 Version 7 Revision 3

• The key manager/key store must be able to use the EEDK it supplies
the drive to determine the Data Key.
ƒ Drive Configuration requirements
o The TS1130 drive must be configured in SME or LME encryption mode.
o The TS1130 drive must have the FIPS 140-2 validated drive firmware level loaded and
operational.
o Drive must be configured in the approved mode of operation.
o In LME mode, the TS1130 drive must be operated in an automation device which
operates to the LDI or ADI interface specifications provided.
 8 Version 7 Revision 3

3.3 Ports and Interfaces

The cryptographic boundary of the TS1130 drive cryptographic module is the drive brick. Tape data
blocks to be encrypted (write operations) or decrypted data blocks to be returned to the host (read
operation) are transferred on the host interface ports using SCSI commands, while protected key material
may be received on the host interface ports or the library port.
The physical ports are separated into FIPS-140-2 logical ports as described below.
Table 3: Ports and Interfaces of the TS1130
TS1130 Drive FIPS-140-2 Crypto Interface Functionality
Physical Ports Logical Interface Services
Fibre Channel Port Data Input Yes ƒ Inputs data
0 Data Output ƒ Crypto: Inputs protected keys from the key
Control Input manager in SME mode.
Fibre Channel Port Status Output ƒ Outputs data
1 ƒ Outputs encrypted key components
ƒ Inputs SSC-3 SCSI protocol commands
ƒ Outputs SSC-3 SCSI protocol status
RS-422 Port Data Input Yes ƒ Crypto: Inputs protected keys from the key
Data Output manager in LME mode.
Control Input ƒ Outputs data
Status Output ƒ Outputs encrypted key components
ƒ Inputs LDI and LMI protocol commands.
ƒ Outputs LDI and LMI protocol status.
RS-232 Port Disabled None ƒ Disabled in the FIPS validated firmware
Ethernet Port Control Input None ƒ Inputs controls and image for firmware load
Status Output ƒ Outputs status
Data Input
ACF Interface Control Input None ƒ Inputs controls from automatic cartridge facility
Status Output ƒ Outputs status
I2C Interface Data Input None ƒ Inputs VPD data
Data Output ƒ Outputs VPD data
Service Panel Control Input Yes ƒ Inputs controls from service panel
Interface Status Output ƒ Crypto: Inputs controls for key zeroization
ƒ Crypto: Inputs controls for VPD configuration
ƒ Outputs status
ƒ Crypto: Outputs indicator for the encrypting state
Front Panel Control Input Yes ƒ Inputs unload button selection
Interface Status Output ƒ Inputs reset button selection
- 8 Character ƒ Outputs status on 8 character display
Display ƒ Crypto: Outputs indicator for the encrypting state
- Unload Button
- Reset Button
Input Power Port Power None ƒ Inputs power to the TS1130 drive
Write Protect Control Input None ƒ Inputs write protect state of the cartridge
Switch
Cartridge Memory Data Input Yes ƒ Inputs parameters.
RFID Port Data Output ƒ Crypto: Inputs external key structures
ƒ Outputs parameters.
ƒ Crypto: Outputs external key structures
Read/Write Head Data Input None ƒ Inputs data from tape cartridges (decrypted reads)
Data Output ƒ Outputs data to tape cartridges (encrypted writes)
Control Input ƒ Inputs command to load firmware from special
FMR cartridges
 9 Version 7 Revision 3

3.4 Roles and Services

The TS1130 drive supports both a Crypto Officer role and a User role, and uses basic cryptographic
functions to provide higher level services. For example, the TS1130 drive uses the cryptographic functions
as part of its data reading and writing operations in order to perform the encryption/decryption of data
stored on a tape.
The Crypto Officer role is implicitly assumed when an operator performs key zeroization. The User role is
implicitly assumed for all other services. Both operators have access to the Power-up Self-Tests service.
The two main services the TS1130 drive provides are:

• Encryption or decryption of tape data blocks using the Data Block Cipher Facility.

• Establishment and use of a secure key channel for key material passing by the Secure Key Interface
Facility.
It is important to note that the Secure Key Interface Facility may be an automatically invoked service when
a user issues Write or Read commands with encryption enabled that require key acquisition by the TS1130
drive. Under these circumstances the TS1130 drive automatically establishes a secure communication
channel with a key manager and performs secure key transfer before the underlying write or read
command may be processed.

3.4.1 User Guidance

The services table describes what services are available to the User and Crypto Officer roles.

ƒ There is no authentication required for accessing the User Role

ƒ There is no authentication required for accessing the Crypto Officer Role
Single Operator requirements:

ƒ The TS1130 drive enforces a requirement that only one host interface initiator may have access to
cryptographic services at any given time.
 10 Version 7 Revision 3

3.4.2 Provided Services

Available services are also documented in the specified references. All of the services summarized here are
allowed in the FIPS mode of operation:
Table 4: Provided Services
Service Interface(s) Description Inputs Outputs Role
General SCSI - Host As documented in the Formatted Formatted User
commands TS1130 SCSI Reference Operational Operational
Codes and Codes and
Messages Messages
General Library - Library As documented in the Formatted Formatted User
Interface commands Drive Library LDI and Operational Operational
LMI Interface Codes and Codes and
Specifications Messages Messages
Service Panel - Service Set selected aspects of Button Service User
Configuration Panel drive configuration selections Panel
manually, per the 3592
E06 Maintenance
Information Manual
Service Panel - Service Invoke diagnostics Button Service User
Diagnostics Panel manually, per the 3592 selections Panel,
E06 Maintenance 8 Character
Information Manual Display
Service Panel Status - Service Displays status, per the From Service User
Display Panel 3592 E06 Maintenance TS1130 Panel
Information Manual drive
operating
system
Front Panel Interface - Front Panel Displays status, per the From 8 Character User
Status Interface 3592 E06 Maintenance TS1130 Display
(8 Information Manual drive
Character operating
Display) system
Front Panel Interface - Front Panel Unload via unload button Button 8 Character User
Unload Interface selection Display
(Unload
Button)
Front Panel Interface - Front Panel Reset via the reset button Button Reboot User
Reset Interface selection occurs
(Reset
Button)
 11 Version 7 Revision 3

Service Interface(s) Description Inputs Outputs Role

Encrypting Write- - Host The Secure Key Interface - Plaintext - Encrypted User
type Command Facility automatically data data on tape
requests a key, provides - SEDK - EEDK on
authentication data, - EEDK tape
securely transfers and
verifies the key material.
The Data Block Cipher
Facility encrypts the data
block with the received
Data Key using AES-
GCM block cipher for
recording to media. A
received EEDK is
automatically written to
media using the
Cartridge memory and
the RW Head Interface.
The decryption-on-the-
fly check performs AES-
GCM decryption of the
encrypted data block and
verifies the correctness of
the encryption process
Decrypting Read- - Host The Secure Key Interface SEDK - Plaintext User
type Command Facility automatically data to host
requests a key, provides
authentication data and
EEDK information if
available, securely
transfers and verifies the
key material.
The received Data Key is
used by the Data Block
Cipher Facility to decrypt
the data block with using
AES-GCM decryption
and returning plaintext
data blocks to the host;
Optionally in Raw mode
the encrypted data block
may be returned to the
host in encrypted form
(not supported in
approved configuration)
Set Encryption - Host Performed via Mode Requested None User
Control Parameters - Library Select to Mode Page Mode Page
(including Bypass x’25’ and Encryption and Subpage
Mode) Subpage X’C0’
Query Encryption - Host Performed via Mode Requested Mode Data User
Control Parameters - Library Sense to Mode Page Mode Page
(including Bypass x’25’ and Encryption and Subpage
Mode) Subpage X’C0’

“Show Status”
 12 Version 7 Revision 3

Service Interface(s) Description Inputs Outputs Role

Drive - Host Allows programming Requested Mode Data User
Challenge/Response - Library challenge data and Mode Page
reading an optionally) and Subpage
encrypted, signed
response; not used in
default configuration.
Performed via mode
select and mode sense to
Mode Page x’25’ and
Encryption Subpage
x’D5’; not used in
default configuration
Query Drive - Host Allows reading of the Requested Mode Data User
Certificate - Library Drive Certificate public Mode Page
key. Performed via and Subpage
mode sense to Mode
Page x’25’ and
Encryption Subpage
x’D6’; the provided
certificate is signed by
the IBM Tape Root CA.
Query dSK - Host Allows reading of the Requested Mode Data User
- Library Drive Session (Public) Mode Page
Key Performed via and Subpage
mode sense to Mode
Page x’25’ and
Encryption Subpage
X’DF’.
Setup an SEDK and - Host This is the means to Requested Mode Data User
EEDK structure (a - Library import an encrypted Mode Page
protected key private key to the and Subpage
structure) TS1130 for use in writing
and encrypted tape or in
order to read a previously
encrypted tape.
Performed via mode
select to Mode Page
x’25’ and Encryption
Subpage x’E0’. In this
service, the module
generates a drive session
key pair. The module
then sends the dSK to the
key manager where it is
used to create an SEDK.
At this time, the key
manager also uses its
own RSA key to generate
the EEDK. Then, the
key manager sends both
the SEDK and the EEDK
back to the module.
 13 Version 7 Revision 3

Service Interface(s) Description Inputs Outputs Role

Query EEDK(s) – - Host Allows the reading from Requested Mode Data User
active, needed, - Library the drive of EEDK Mode Page
pending , entire (all) structures in different and Subpage
categories for the
medium currently
mounted. Performed by
Mode Select commands
to Mode Page x25’ and
various subpages.
Request EEDK(s) - Host This status command is Requested Mode Data User
Translate - Library used when the drive has Mode Page
already notified the Key and Subpage
Manager that it has read
EEDKs from a mounted,
encrypted tape and needs
them translated to an
SEDK and returned for
the drive to read the tape.
The key manager issues
this command to read
EEDK(s) structures
which the drive requires
to be translated by the
Key Manager and
subsequently returned to
the drive as an SEDK
structure to enable
reading of the currently
active encrypted area of
tape. Performed via
mode sense to Mode
Page x’25’ and
Encryption Subpage
x’EE’ .
Request EEDK(s) - Host This status command is Requested Mode Data User
Generate - Library used when the drive has Mode Page
already notified the Key and Subpage
Manager that it requires
new SEDK and EEDK(s)
to process a request to
write an encrypted tape.
This page provides
information about the
type of key the drive is
requesting. Performed
via mode sense to Mode
Page x’25’ and
Encryption Subpage
x’EF’ .
 14 Version 7 Revision 3

Service Interface(s) Description Inputs Outputs Role

Alter EEDK(s) - Host This command is used to Requested Mode Data User
- Library modify the EEDK Mode Page
structures stored to tape and Subpage
and cartridge memory.
The TS1130 will write
the modified structures
out to the tape and
cartridge memory as
directed.
Performed via mode
sense to Mode Page
x’25’ and Encryption
Subpage x’E1’ .
Drive Error Notify - Host These status responses Requested Mode Data User
and Drive Error - Library are the means used by the Mode Page
Notify Query drive to notify the Key and Subpage
Manager that an action is
required, such as a Key
generation or Translate,
to proceed with an
encrypted write or read
operation. These status
responses are read via
Mode Sense commands
to Mode Page x’25’
subpage ‘EF” and ‘FF’.
Power-Up Self-Tests - Power Performs integrity and None Failure User,
- Host cryptographic algorithm required status, if Crypto
- Library self-tests, firmware applicable Officer
image signature
verification
Configure Drive - Host Allows controlling of From Vital User
Vital Product Data - Library default encryption mode TS1130 Product
(VPD) settings and other operating drive Data (VPD)
parameters operating
system
Firmware Load - Host Allows loading of Firmware None Crypto
validated firmware image Officer
images
Key Path Check - Host As documented in the Diagnostic Diagnositc User
diagnostic TS1130 SCSI Reference command command
specifying status
the Key Path
diagnostic
Key Zeroization - Service Zeroes all private Service Diagnositc Crypto
Panel plaintext keys in the panel command Officer
TS1130 drive via the buttons status
Service Panel
 15 Version 7 Revision 3

3.5 Physical Security

The TS1130 drive “brick” unit is embedded in a factory supplied canister assembly. The brick assembly is
the cryptographic boundary of the TS1130. All of the drive’s components are production grade.
Both the drive brick unit and the canister assembly have industrial grade covers. These covers are not
removed in the field in the approved configuration. The TS1130 requires no preventative maintenance, and
field repair is not performed for the unit. All failing units must be sent intact to the factory for repair.

Figure 2 TS1130 Drive Brick

Figure 3 TS1130 Drive Canister

 16 Version 7 Revision 3

3.6 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Management

3.6.1 Cryptographic Algorithms

The TS1130 drive supports the following basic cryptographic functions. These functions are used by the
Secure Key Interface Facility or the Data Block Cipher Facility to provide higher level user services.

Table 5: Basic Cryptographic Functions

Algorithm Type /Usage Specification Approved? Used by Algorithm
Certificate
AES-GCM mode Symmetric Cipher AES: FIPS-197 Yes ASIC #918, #919
encryption / Encrypts data GCM: SP800-38D and #1273
decryption blocks while
(256-bit keys) performing
decrypt-on-the-fly
verification
Decrypts data
blocks
RNG IV generation for FIPS 186-2 using Yes Firmware #711
AES-GCM, Drive SHA-1
Session Key
generation
SHA-1 Hashing FIPS 180-3 Yes Firmware #1173
Algorithm
Multiple uses
SHA-256 Hashing FIPS 180-3 Yes Firmware #1173
Algorithm
Digest verifies
key manager
messages, digest
appended on
messages to key
manager
PKCS #1 :RSA Digital signature FIPS 186-2 and Yes Firmware #611
Sign/Verify generation and PKCS#1
verification to
sign the session
key and to verify
firmware image
signature on
firmware load
PKCS #1 :RSA Key Key Generation - No, but Firmware N/A
Generation (1024 Session key allowed in
and 2048-bit keys) generation FIPS mode1
PKCS #1 RSA Key Unwrapping of - No, but Firmware N/A
Transport (1024 and transported key allowed in
2048-bit keys) material SEDK FIPS mode
TRNG (Custom) Seeding RNG - No2 ASIC N/A

1
Allowed for generation of keys used by the RSA Key Transport mechanism
2
Allowed in FIPS mode for seeding approved RNG
 17 Version 7 Revision 3

3.6.2 Security Parameters

The following table provides a summary of both critical security parameters (CSPs) and non-critical
security parameters used by the TS1130 drive.
Table 6: Security Parameters
Security CSP Key Type Input into Output Generation Storage Storage Form Zeroized
Parameter Module from Method Location
Module
Drive No RSA Yes - Yes N/A Drive Non-volatile N/A
Certificate 2048-bit at time of Vital Plaintext
Public Key PKCS#1 manufacture Product
(dCert) Data
(VPD)
Drive Yes RSA Yes - No N/A Drive Non-volatile Yes
Certificate 2048-bit at time of VPD X.509
Private Key PKCS#1 manufacture certificate
(dCert’) signed with the
IBM Tape root
CA
Drive No RSA No – Yes Non-approved, Drive Ephemeral N/A
Session 2048-bit Generated allowed in RAM Plaintext
Public Key PKCS#1 by module FIPS mode
(dSK)
Drive Yes RSA No – No Non-approved, Drive Ephemeral Yes
Session 2048-bit Generated allowed in RAM Plaintext
Private PKCS#1 by module FIPS mode
Key
(dSK’)
Session No RSA-2048 Yes No N/A Drive Ephemeral Yes
Encrypted encrypted RAM Encrypted
Data Key with the
(SEDK) dSK

Data Key Yes AES Yes – No N/A Before Ephemeral Yes

(DK) 256-bit (Received in Use: Plaintext
symmetric encrypted Drive
key form, RAM
encapsulated
in the When in Ephemeral
SEDK) use: Encrypted
Stored In form as SEDK
ASIC;
(unreadab
le
register)
186-2 RNG Yes Seed No – No TRNG Drive Ephemeral Yes
Seed Key Generated RAM Plaintext
by module
186-2 RNG Yes Seed No – No TRNG Drive Ephemeral Yes
Seed (20 bytes) Generated RAM Plaintext
by module

Additional notes on key management:

• Secret and private keys are never output from the TS1130 drive in plaintext form.

• Secret keys may only be imported to the TS1130 drive in encrypted form.

• Zeroization behavior outlined in Table 7

 18 Version 7 Revision 3

Table 7: CSP Access Table

Drive Certificate Private Key

Drive Certificate Public Key

Session Encrypted Data Key

Drive Session Private Key
Drive Session Public Key

186-2 RNG Seed Key

186-2 RNG Seed

(SEDK)
(dCert’)

Data Key
(dCert)

(dSK’)
(dSK)

(DK)
General SCSI commands
General Library Interface commands R R W
Service Panel Configuration , X X X X
Diagnostic and Status services
Service Panel Configuration
Service Panel Diagnostics X X X X
Service Panel Status Display
Front Panel Interface Status
Front Panel Interface Unload Z Z Z Z
Front Panel Interface Reset Z Z Z Z Z Z
Encrypting Write-type Command X
Decrypting Read-type Command X
Set Encryption Control Parameters
(including Bypass Mode)
Query Encryption Control Parameters
(including Bypass Mode)

“Show Status”
Drive Challenge/Response X X X X
Query Drive Certificate R
Query dSK X R
Setup an SEDK and EEDK structure X W W
(a protected key structure)
Query EEDK(s) – active, needed,
pending , entire (all)
Request EEDK(s) Translate R
Request EEDK(s) Generate W
Alter EEDK(s) X RW
Drive Error Notify and Drive Error
Notify Query
Power-Up Self-Tests X X X X
Configure Drive Vital Product Data W W
(VPD) settings
Firmware Load Test
Key Path Check diagnostic X X RX X R
Key Zeroization Z Z Z Z Z Z
 19 Version 7 Revision 3

3.6.3 Self-Test
The TS1130 drive performs both Power On Self Tests and Conditional Self tests as follows. The operator
shall power cycle the device to invoke the Power On Self tests.

Table 8: Self-Tests
Function Self-Test Type Implementation Failure Behavior
Tested
AES-GCM Power-Up KAT performed for Encrypt and Decrypt (256- FSC3 D12D posted
(256-bit keys) bit)
RNG Power-Up KAT performed FSC D12D posted
SHA-1 Power-Up KAT performed FSC D12D posted
SHA-256 Power-Up KAT performed FSC D12D posted
RSA PKCS #1 Power-Up KAT performed FSC D12D posted
Sign/Verify

Firmware Power-Up RSA PKCS #1 digital signature verification of Drive reboot

Integrity Check application firmware; CRC check of SH vital
product data (VPD); CRC check of FPGA
image.
RNG Conditional: Ensure the newly generated random number FSC D133 posted
When a random number is does not match the previously generated random
generated number. Also ensure the first number generated
after start up is unused and stored for
comparison
TRNG Conditional: Ensure the newly generated random number FSC D133 posted
(Custom) When a random number is does not match the previously generated random
generated number. Also ensure the first number generated
after start up is unused and stored for
comparison
Firmware Load Conditional: RSA PKCS #1 signature verification of new Code load is
Check When new firmware is firmware image before new image may be rejected
loaded loaded
Exclusive Conditional: Ensure correct data output after switching FSC D189 posted
Bypass Test When switching between modes
encryption and bypass Check to ensure the key is properly loaded
modes (Note: The same implementation serves as the
Alternating Bypass Test.)
Alternating Conditional: Ensure correct data output after switching FSC D188 posted
Bypass Test When switching between modes
encryption and bypass Check to ensure the key is properly loaded
modes (Note: The same implementation serves as the
Exclusive Bypass Test.)
Key Path test Conditional: The drive will initiate a key request and key FSC D132 posted
When the Send Diagnostic transfer operation with an attached Key
command specifying this Manager; random protected key material is
diagnostic number is imported into the device and checked for
received from the host validity; status is reported back to the Key
fibre or library port; the Manager and the invoking Host
drive must be unloaded
and idle or the command
is rejected

3
Fault Symptom Code
 20 Version 7 Revision 3

3.6.4 Bypass States

The TS1130 supports the following bypass states:

Table 9: Bypass States

Bypass State To enter the Bypass State To verify the Bypass State

Static Bypass Mode 1: Issue a Mode Select command to

Encryption disabled mode page X’25’ and set the
“Encryption Disabled” bit
Static Bypass Mode 2: Issue a Mode Select command to
Zero key usage for all records mode page X’25’ and set bit 0 of Issue a Mode Sense
Encryption Control 3 to 1 command to verify the
Alternating Bypass Mode 1: Issue a Mode Select command to mode is accurately reflected
Zero Key usage all labels mode page X’25’ and set bit 2 of on mode page X’25’
Encryption Control 3 to 1
Alternating Bypass Mode 2: Issue a Mode Select command to
Zero Key usage on Volume Labels mode page X’25’ and set bit 1 of
Encryption Control 3 to 1

Bypass entry, exit, and status features are provided to meet approved methods for use of bypass states.

3.7 Design Assurance

TS1130 drive release parts are maintained under the IBM Engineering Control (EC) system. All
components are assigned a part number and EC level and may not be changed without re-release of a new
part number or EC level.
The following table shows the validated configuration for each host interfaces of the TS1130 encrypting
tape drive:
Table 10: Validated Configuration
Hardware EC Level 45E8855 EC Level L31095
Firmware EC Level 46X1651 EC Level L31096

3.8 Mitigation of other attacks

The TS1130 drive does not claim to mitigate other attacks.