Romania and The Republic of Moldova - Between The European Neighbourhood Policy and The Prospect of Eu Enlargement

European Institute of Romania – Pre-accession impact studies III
Study no. 5
ROMANIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF

MOLDOVA -
BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND THE
PROSPECT OF
EU ENLARGEMENT
Authors:
Professor Adrian POP, Ph.D. – coordinator

Reader Gabriela PASCARIU, Ph.D.
University assistant George ANGLI OIU, Ph.D. candidate
Alexandru PURC RU , Ph.D. candidate
1
CONTENTS
Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………….......4
Chapter 1 The “Wider Europe - New Neighbourhood” Project ………………………6
1.1 The Strategy and Methodology of the European Neighbourhood Policy..........…8
1.2 Regions and States included in the European Neighbourhood Policy …………12
1.3 The European Neighbourhood Policy Action Fields ….…………………............15
1.4 Complementarities between the European Neighbourhood Policy and other EU
Policies.................... .........................................................................................................17
1.5 Opportunities and Limitations of the ENP; Romania’s Role as a Future Border
Country.............................................................................................................................19
Chapter 2 Romania – The Future Eastern Border of the European

Union…………….............................................................................................................26
2.1 Premises of Romania’s Alignment to the EU Standards on Borders……............26
2.2 Romania’s Strategy of Integrated Border Management..............…......................30
2.3 The Issue of Securing Transparency in Assigning Acquisitions Contracts in the
Security Field……………………………………………………………………………33
2.4 The Transfrontier Relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova...36
2.5. The Transfrontier Relations between Romania and Ukraine .............................39
Chapter 3 The European Aspiration and Orientation of the Republic of

Moldova............................................................................................................................42
3.1 From Russia’s “Near Abroad” to EU’s New Neighbourhood………...................42
3.1.1 Geopolitical Perspectives…………………………...............................................42
3.1.2 Geo-economic Perspectives...................................................................................45
3.2 Moldovan Perceptions of EU, Romania and European Integration....................46
3.3 The Impact of Domestic Policy Developments in the Republic of Moldova and
Ukraine………………………………………………………………………49
3.3.1 The Impact of Voronin Factor in the Republic of Moldova...............................49
3.3.2 The Impact of Yuschenko Factor in Ukraine......................................................50
3.4 The Role of Regional Cooperation...........................................................................51
3.4.1 The Participation of the Republic of Moldova in the Regional Cooperation
Structures……………………………………………………………………….............51
2
3.4.2 The Role of Euro-regions.......................................................................................57

3.5 The Role of the EU Special Representative for the Republic of
Moldova............................................................................................................................60
3.6 Romania’s Role …………………………………………………………………….61
3.6.1 Political and Diplomatic Aspects………………………………...........................61
3.6.2 Cultural and Spiritual Aspects…..........................................................................63
3.6.3 Economic Aspects....................................................................................................67
Cap. 4. The Transnistrian Conflict from the Perspective of EU

Enlargement……………………………………………………………………….........68
4.1 Transnistria – Geopolitical and Geo-economic Aspects........................................68
4.2 The Conflict Management.......................................................................................71
4.2.1 The Conflict Resolution Efforts...................................................…………........71
4.2.2 Moldovan Perceptions of the Causes of Conflict Resolution’s Failure............76
4.3 Opportunities for Conflict Resolution Presented by the ENP and the ESDP....79
4.4 The Conflict and the Frontier Securitization ......................................................81
4.5 The Impact of the Conflict on the Moldovan Security Sector
Reform................................………………....................................................................82
4.6 Romania’s Role in Conflict Resolution............……………………………..........86
Conclusions and Recommendations.............................................................................89
Annexes...........................................................................................................................92
Bibliography...................................................................................................................106
3
ABBREVIATIONS
AINA – Automatic Identification National Agency (Republic of Moldova)

AP – Action Plans
ADP – Agrarian Democratic Party (The Republic of Moldova)
BSEC – Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSECO – Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization
CBC – Cross-Border Cooperation
CPA – Cooperation and Partnership Agreements
CE – Council of Europe
EU – European Union
CEI – Central European Initiative
CFE – Treaty on European Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
DMR – Dnestr Moldovan Republic
EIB – European Investment Bank
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EUROMESCO – Committee for Euro-Mediterranean Studies
EMFIP – Euro-Mediterranean Facility for Investments and Partnership
EMFESI - Euro-Mediterranean Forum of the Economic Science Institutes
ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy
ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy
EUSR – European Union Special Representative
GD – Government Decision (Romania)
GED – Government Emergency Decision (Romania)
GIRMIFS – Romanian Interdepartmental Group for the State Frontier Integrated
Management
GUUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova Group
GUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova Group
JHA – Justice and Home Affairs
IAP – Individual Action Plan
ISD – “Ovidiu incai” Social-Democratic Institute (Romania)
4
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

RM – Republic of Moldova
RAOG – Russian Army Operative Group
MAI – Ministry of Administration and Interior (Romania)
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Romania)
NNPI – New Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
PCDP – Popular Christian-Democratic Party (the Republic of Moldova)
PSD – Social-Democratic Party (Romania)
SAR – Romanian Academic Society (Romania)
SEA – Single Economic Area
SECI – Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
SISF – Integrated System for the Security of Romania’s State Frontier
SPSEE – Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
SSR – Security Sector Reform
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
TARIC – Common Integrated Tariff
WTO – World Trade Organization
EU - European Union
5
CHAPTER I
THE “WIDER EUROPE – NEW NEIGHBOURHOOD” PROJECT
The most recent European Union enlargement wave, called the «big bang»
enlargement, fundamentally changed the geopolitical context in Europe and created the
conditions for the Union external vocation. Included in the founding projects, but
marginalized by adopting the neo-functionalist integration method, the external
dimension of the integration process had difficulty in being visible and remained in the
field of inter-governmental cooperation. Nowadays the Union is organized enough and
can become strong by strengthening its political dimension, in order to actively contribute
to world peace and prosperity. Consequently, aware of and interested in increasing its
role on the external level, the European Union initiated a more and more coherent process
of regional cooperation and openness within its geographic proximity during the last
decade, defined by three interest areas: Central and Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans
and the Mediterranean Sea. The common elements of the different regional approaches
were the following: peace, stability, promotion of shared values (especially democracy
and fundamental liberties), commercial development and integration.
The most successful component of the foreign policy was clearly the
enlargement process. Yet, the Union enlargement cannot continue forever; at least, not
concerning the option to maintain the present integration structures and the political
unifying perspective. Consequently, forced from the outside to include new members and
from the inside to stabilize its structures and make its action levers more efficient, the
Union developed a new approach in the external relations with its neighbouring
countries, at the border between cooperation and integration.
The Copenhagen European Council of December 2002, stating that “the present
enlargement creates the conditions for a Union with strong perspectives for sustainable
development and for taking over an important role in consolidating stability, peace and
democracy in Europe and abroad”, mentioned that the European Union is interested in
strengthening the regional and cross-border cooperation relations with its neighbouring
countries, “ in order to fully develop the regional potential” […] and to “avoid the risk
of new European division lines”1. The European Council underlined thus the Union’s
intention, shown by the Council for General Affairs and External Relations of November
2002, to develop new relations with its Eastern neighbouring countries, depending on the
level of their economic and political development, in order to work up a “Wider
Europe”.
The solution advanced by the European Commission came in March 2003,
within the Communication „Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”2 – for short, the project
1
The Copenhagen European Council, 12–13 December 2002, The Presidency Conclusions, p. 7,
http://Ue.Eu.Int/Uedocs/Cms_Data/Docs/Pressdata/En/Ec/73842.Pdf.
2
COM(2003)104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003.
6
“Wider Europe – The New Neighbourhood”. In its essence, the Communication

offered new perspectives of political and economic integration for the countries that
cannot be accepted, for the time being, as members of the EU3, in order to create a
security, prosperity, sustainable development and good neighbourhood area, a «ring of
friends» at the Union external frontiers, characterized by close and pacifist relations
based on cooperation”. The new set of foreign policy measures was subsequently
grouped under the name of the „European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP), in the
Commission Communication of June 20044, which is a framework-document of the ENP,
together with the Communication concerning the creation of the New Neighbourhood
Instrument of July 2003. The year 2004 also meant the beginning of implementing the
ENP (The Country Report and Action Plan adoption5), aiming at clarifying and
structuring the EU commitment through the Contribution of the General Affairs and
External Relation Council, of the European Parliament and of the European Council (see
Appendix 1).
By its new policy, the Union commits itself, conditioned by the achievement of
certain criteria, to support the neighbour partner efforts to „diminish poverty and create a
prosperity and common value area, based on high economic integration, more powerful
political and cultural relations, strong cross-border cooperation and common conflict
prevention”6. For the most advanced countries, the Union „advances” even the
perspective to participate in the internal market, as well as the possibility to join
progressively certain community programmes in the cultural, educational,
environmental, technical and scientific fields.7. The European „generosity” can be
explained by the fact that, in the absence of an accession motivation (like in the case of
the enlargement strategy), the offer had to be attractive enough, on the one hand, to limit
the pressure from the EU neighbour countries to accede to it and, on the other hand, to
make them undertake the necessary measures to develop a security and stability area on
the European continent. During the closing session of the ECSA-World Conference on 5–
6 December 2002, Romano Prodi8 made a synthesis, in the most successful way, of the
EU strategy essence towards the new neighbours: ”sharing everything with the Union but
institutions” (see Appendix 2).
Within such an approach of the neighbourhood relations, the ENP can be
considered a compromise between the desire of the new neighbour countries to become
members of the Union and the EU limits to accept new enlargements. Its enforcement
will lead to the outline of a pan-European and Mediterranean region, organized
according to the concentric circle pattern: a hard nucleus made of the European Union
(which is during a high integration stage), operating as a pole of spreading transformative
processes towards its Eastern and Southern neighbourhood in order to develop a large
3
The Mediterranean South (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Libyan, Libya, Morocco, The Palestinian
Authority, Syria, Tunisia), the New Western Independent States (Belarus, the Republic of Moldova,
Ukraine) and Russia. The Commission Communication of 2004 completed the list to include the Southern
Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia).
4
COM(2004)373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004.
5
See 1.1.
6
COM(2003)104 final, p. 9.
7
COM(2004) 373 final, p. 9.
8
President of the European Commission at that time.
7
stability, security and prosperity area; a number of third countries, the most developed,
taking part in the internal market; and, the last group, taking part only in the free
exchange area. The idea, advanced by Jacques Delors within the proposal to create a
nation-state federation, was seen as a solution to the deepening – enlargement dilemma
within the EU integration strategy during the 90’s, and later on as a solution to the
Constitutional Treaty failure.
The concentric circle method corresponding to the different integration degrees
would allow the minimization of the contradiction between enlargement and
reinforcement and can be taken into account in the organization of the neighbourhood
relations. It still includes discrimination by omitting the states belonging to the outer
circle, to participate in policies and actions that are allowed for the states within the
middle circle. A compromise solution would be that of the “variable geometry hard
nucleus”, namely the participation of all the states to a number of common policies and
actions corresponding to the highest level of integration and their differentiation, where
there is no common denominator. The major fields for the variable geometry
implementation could be: internal market, education, R&D, industrial policies, the
environment policy, the social policy, justice and internal affairs, and the external
relations.
§ 1.1 The Strategy and Methodology of the European Neighbourhood Policy

The ENP was conceived as a reference framework for the relations between the
European Union and the member states, on the one hand, and the Eastern and Southern
neighbourhood countries, on the other hand. It doesn’t create new structures and
obligations, but aims at providing more motivation, concentration on priority objectives
and added value for the regional cooperation relations run within the Association
Agreements9 or the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.10
A. The defining elements of the European Neighbourhood Policy are:
a) The Strategy Paper;
b) The Action Plans;
c) The Monitoring Reports;
d) The New Instrument for Neighbourhood and Partnership (NINP).
a) The Commission Communication „The European Neighbourhood Policy –
Orientation Paper” is considered the ENP Strategy Paper. It establishes the objectives,
key elements, method, principles, financial instruments, geographic coverage, action
fields and integration way of the neighbourhood policy within the cross-border and
trans-national regional cooperation relations. According to the Commission
Communication, the ENP strategic objective is ”sharing with the neighbouring countries
the benefits of the EU enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, in order to
strengthen stability, security and welfare for all concerned. The ENP will try to prevent
9
For the countries participating in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
10
For the countries of Eastern Europe.
8
the emergence of new division lines between the Wider Union and its new neighbours and
to give them the possibility to take part in different EU activities through close
cooperation in the political, economic, security and cultural field.”11 The privileged
relations with the neighbours are conditioned by the commitment towards promoting and
respecting the “shared values” (especially in the field of rule of law, good governance,
human rights, including the minority rights, promotion of good neighbourhood relations,
adoption of market economy and sustainable development principles) and undertaking
certain essential objectives of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, especially:
mass destruction and weapon proliferation prevention, terrorism, responsibility in
preventing conflicts and solving crises, observance of the international law provisions.
b) The ENP central element is represented by the Action Plans (AP). They
establish the key priorities, namely: shared values respect; political dialogue; economic
and social development (including the promotion of a favourable environment for
business and foreign investments); trade, internal market and legislative reforms
(promote trade and support the integration of the partner countries in the international
trade system, encourage the adoption of the European legislation and the internal market
standards); cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security (the justice reform
and the migration and border traffic control); integration in the infrastructure networks
(energy, transport and telecommunications, informational society and new technologies);
cooperation for environment protection; social policy and „people–to- people” contacts.
The Action Plans will differ from country to country, in order to reflect the real
situation within the relations with the EU, as well as the partner specific needs and
capacity to undertake different reform measures towards the joint objective achievement.
They will be drawn by the Commission, in cooperation with the partner country, for 3 - 5
years, and will be approved within the Association or Cooperation Council. The AP will
not create structures, but will support the achievement of the existing agreement
objectives. Action Plans for Israel, Jordan, the Republic of Moldova, Morocco,
Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine have been undertaken so far, and another five
will be undertaken by the end of 2005, for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia and
Lebanon. The European Union intends to provide a new partnership framework under the
shape of certain European Neighbourhood Agreements, which will replace the present
generation of bilateral agreements.
c) The Monitoring Reports are analysis papers of the bilateral relations,

political, institutional, economic and social situation of the partner country and of its
progress in the priority domains established through Action Plans.12 The reports are
periodically drawn by the Commission, together with the cooperation structures of the
partner or association agreements, and will be the basis for action plan re-examination
and adaptation.
11
COM(2004)373 final, p. 3.
12
The first Monitoring Reports were drawn in order to undertake the Action Plans.
9
d) The New Instrument for Neighbourhood and Partnership

Taking into account the short-term constraints related to the financial
instrument coordination of cross-border cooperation, the Commission Communication as
of 1 July 2003 – “Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument” proposed the
adoption of the new financial instrument through a phase approach:
• The 2004-2006 phase: The Introduction of the Neighbourhood
Programmes (NP)
The main NP objective is the coordination of different existing financial
instruments, both within the foreign policies and in the internal ones, through the
integration of the current regional and cross-border cooperation instruments:
INTERREG, PHARE - CBC, TACIS – CBC, CARDS and MEDA.13 The main
instruments will be TACIS and MEDA, together with other Union programmes
(especially the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and the Macro-
financial Assistance) and the loans from the European Investment Bank. The first
programmes were already adopted in 2004.
• The post-2006 phase: The New Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument
Beginning with 2007, within the financial perspectives for 2007-2013, the ENP
will benefit from a new instrument, called the European Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument - ENPI14. This will belong to the category of “general
instruments to support directly the European foreign policies”, together with the “Pre-
Accession Instrument” (PAI)15 and the “Development Cooperation and Economic
Cooperation Instrument (DCECI)16.
According to the present point of view, the New Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument (NNPI) will complete the existing instruments (TACIS,
MEDA) and will function based on the neighbourhood programme experience
undertaken for the period between 2004 and 2006. The financing will go towards the
following key objectives: promote the sustainable development in the border regions; the
cooperation in the field of environment, public security, conflict and organised crime
prevention; border management; promotion of cross-border cooperation at the local
level and "people-to-people contacts"17.
13
The INTERREG Community Initiative, as a financial instrument of the regional policy; PHARE, a
financial instrument of the pre-accession strategy, whose PHARE-CBC component supports the cross-
border cooperation programmes between the EU and the candidate countries; TACIS-CBC, as a financial
instrument for Eastern Europe and Central Asia; MEDA, promotes regional cooperation within the Euro-
Med partnership; CARDS, as a main instrument for the Balkans within the Stabilization and Association
Process.
14
The Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, Financial Perspectives
2007 – 2013, COM(2004) 487 final, Brussels, 14 July 2004.
15
PAI will address the candidate countries (Turkey, Croatia) and those which are potential candidates (the
Western Balkans); it will replace the existing elements (PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD, the Regulation for
Turkey’s pre-accession and CARDS).
16
DCECI will be used for supporting the development efforts of the countries uncovered by PAI and NIVP.
17
COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004, p. 29.
10
In this respect, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument will

finance joint projects, proposed by and for the benefit of both the EU member countries
and the neighbouring countries. Its implementation will require mainly the combination
of the ENP objectives within the cross-border and trans-national cooperation programmes
with the economic and social cohesion policy objectives. Moreover, the ENPI resources
will be provided through financial instruments specific for the different community
policies (education, research, environment, etc.) and through EIB and EBRD grants.
B. The ENP method and principles

The strategy of the European Neighbourhood Policy was drawn so as to lead to
the tracing of a „ring of friends” at the EU borders which share the EU objectives and
fundamental values, countries which are under strong cooperation with the member
states, also including a high level of economic and political integration.18 The method
put forward in the strategy paper requires:
- The definition of a shared set of principles and values, as well as joint
commitment to observing them;
- A bilateral framework, integrated in the cooperation regional dimension,
mainly aiming at the stability and security at the EU external borders;
- The definition, by mutual agreement with the partners, of some objectives
and priorities in key domains, depending on each country realities;
- The ENP periodical evaluation and adaptation depending on the
evolutions of the partner country;
- To establish certain reference economic and political criteria, in order to
allow for a clear and transparent evaluation of each country’s progress in meeting the
undertaken requirements derived from the Action Plans;
- The EU progressive engagement, subordinated to meeting the objectives
of the Action Plans; the Union will not provide new advantages if the partner country
lacks progress;
- To ensure coherence between the ENP instruments and the
19
complementary policy instruments ; the ENP will be thus a reference framework;
- The ENP integration into the European security strategy, by the help of its
contribution to strengthening the regional cooperation aspects and the mutual promotion
of the EU objectives in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy;
- To generate added value: clearer emphasis on the regional and bilateral
adapted objectives; new territories; the passage from simple cooperation and trade mutual
liberalization, in the short run, to the integration in the internal market, in the long run;
strengthening political cooperation and even opening progressively certain community
programmes; new financial instruments; new contractual relations by adopting the
European Neighbourhood Agreements.
18
Ibid., p. 5.
19
See 1.3.
11
To sum up, the ENP method consists of developing the cooperation relations
within a new reference framework, defined in relation to key objectives related to
stability, security and sustainable development, based on the three EU current pillars:
internal market, justice and home affairs, foreign and security policy. The following
principles will be adopted so that the method will be in force: cooperation based on
certain shared values; emphasis on priorities; differentiation; positive conditionality
based on certain reference criteria; periodical evaluation; progressiveness by
introducing the distinction short term/long term. Consequently, we may say that the
neighbourhood policy is at the border between the European security strategy and the
enlargement strategy; it combines in fact elements of the two strategies, by adjusting the
instruments used in the enlargement process (priorities, evaluation criteria, country
reports, specific financial instruments) to the regional cooperation relations.
§ 1.2. Regions and Countries included in the European Neighbourhood Policy

The European Neighbourhood Policy currently includes 17 countries which can
be grouped within three geographic areas: the Mediterranean Region (10 countries),
Eastern Europe (4 countries) and Southern Caucasus (3 countries).
The Mediterranean Region includes the countries participating in the “Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership” (Euro-Med), also called “The Barcelona Process”:
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya20, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the
Palestinian Authority.21 The Partnership began in 1995 and goes on, nowadays, based
on the “Common Strategy for the Mediterranean region”,22 the Regional Strategy
Document23 of 2002-2006 and the Regional Indicative Programme of 2005-200624. As a
method, Euro-Med combines the regional and the bilateral approach. At the
multilateral level, the cooperation takes place through regional programmes25, politically
(the high representative reunions, the Ministerial conferences) and officially (Euro-Med
Committee) established bodies, as well as within certain cooperation networks, such as
EUROMESCO (the Euro-Mediterranean Study Committee) or MFESI (the
Mediterranean Forum of the Economic Science Institutes). At the bilateral level, the
partnership exists through the Association Agreements and the National Indicative
Programmes, negotiated each time with each of the partner countries, depending on the
20
Within the Barcelona Process, Libya enjoys just an observer status.
21
Cyprus and Malta, Euro-Med partners, have lately become Union members, while Turkey is included in
the pre-accession strategy.
22
Adopted by the European Council of June 2000 from Santa Maria da Feira, (Common Strategy of the
European Council on the Mediterranean Region), Doc.2000/458/CFSP, published in OJCE L 183 as of 22
July 2000, p. 5.
23
Adopted by the Commission on 18 December 2001, following the favourable notice from the MEDA
Committee as of 5 December 2001.
24
The Regional Indicative Programme of 2005-2006, adopted by the Commission in 2004, following the
MEDA Committee favourable agreement.
25
For example: “Justice and Home Affairs Programme” ( 6 million), “Support to the Water Information
System” ( 2 million), “Training of Public Administrations” ( 6 million), “Euro-Med Heritage III” ( 10
million).
12
specific priorities. The agreements aim at the progressive achievement of a free trade area
for the industrial products, agricultural products and services, political and economic
cooperation, social and migration cooperation, as well as cultural cooperation.
The ENP implementation for the Euro-Med countries meant strengthening
the bilateral approach, by drawing the national reports for Israel, Jordan, Morocco,
Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt and Lebanon, and by adopting the Action Plans
for the most developed countries in meeting the political conditionality (Israel, Jordan,
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority). For the near future, some Action
Plans for Egypt and Lebanon, and accession for Libya to the Barcelona Process are
expected.
• The Eastern Europe Area includes the so-called “New Western
Independent States” – Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus – and Russia.
Contrary to the Mediterranean area, the Eastern Europe does not benefit from a
regional approach.26 The relations are mainly bilateral, through Partnership and
Cooperation Agreements (PCA). The PCA are based on respecting the democratic
principles and the human rights and set the legal frame for the economic, political and
commercial relations between the EU and the partner countries. There are also
cooperation measures in the field of justice and home affairs (especially illegal activity
prevention, combating drug trafficking and money laundering), environment, science and
culture. As a specific element, unlike the contractual relations with other neighbourly
countries, the PCA do not take into account a framework for the preferential commercial
relations with the EU.
The relationship with Russia, the Union’s most important partner in its Eastern
neighbourhood, develops within the strategic partnership27 concerning the creation of
four common areas: an economic area (including special provisions concerning
environment and energy); a common space of liberty, security and justice; a cooperation
area in the security field and an area of research, education and culture. Practically
speaking, Russia takes part in the ENP only through association; the bilateral relations
take place parallel to the neighbourhood policy, but separately and the joining elements
are provided by the objective similarity and the common financing through the NNPI.
The situation is mainly the result of the issues raised by the EU influence in the area,
leading to a dynamics of the EU-Russia relations based on certain procedures and
mechanisms different form those adopted within the relations with other countries of the
ENP.
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus, although negotiated
beginning with 1995, has not come into force yet. The Union will start the ENP
implementation procedures if there are favourable evolutions towards democratization
and commitment to observe the shared values promoted by the EU.
Moldova and Ukraine are already integrated in the ENP and have already
adopted Action Plans. Besides the specific elements, the plans comprise a set of general
26
The only regional framework can be considered the “Northern Dimension”, in which only Russia takes
part.
27
Adopted at the Petersburg Summit of May 2003.
13
priorities in areas covered by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements: strengthen

stability and improve the efficiency of the rule of law and democratic institutions;
guarantee the respect of the media and expression freedom; strengthen cooperation in
the field of regional security and good neighbourhood relations, and find a solution for
the Transnistrian conflict; border management; join the WTO in the case of Ukraine and
fully implement the WTO agreement in the case of the Republic of Moldova (RM);
improve the business climate and attract foreign investments; establish a constructive
dialogue and efficient cooperation concerning migration and visa policy in providing
free circulation between the EU, on the one hand, and the RM and Ukraine, on the other
hand; gradually approach legislation, norms and standards to the community acquis;
strengthen the juridical and administrative capacity.
Nowadays, the main assistance instrument in the Eastern Europe is the TACIS
programme, which includes both national and multilateral programs in the field of
nuclear security, cross-border cooperation and regional cooperation. Moreover, there are
other specific instruments to be taken into consideration: the Macro-Financial Assistance,
ECHO human help, the Food Safety Program.
• The South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). The area hasn’t been
included in the first Commission Communication on the Wider Europe. But the Report of
the European Parliament on the Commission proposal (November 2003) and the Security
Strategy adopted by the European Council of December 2003 set the South Caucasus
area as an EU interest area in preventing regional conflicts, taking into account the fact
that the three countries are members of the Europe Council and the OSCE. The
Parliament Resolution as of 26 February 2004 – “EU policy towards South
Caucasus”28 – played an important part because it recommended that the area get a “final
status within the neighbourhood policy, according to the principle of avoiding new
dividing lines in Europe, both to stimulate the region countries to develop by adopting
the economic and political reforms, and to answer the EU interest to increase its political
role in the region and in solving conflicts”29.
Consequently, in its June 2004 Communication on the European
Neighbourhood Policy, the Commission advanced the proposal to include Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan in the ENP system, depending on each country progress in the
field of democracy, rule of law, human rights observance and market economy
development. The first step towards implementing the ENP in the three countries was
taken in March 2005 by publishing the Country Reports, together with the Commission
advice to draw the Action Plans. The reports describe the current situation in the
important fields of the neighbourhood policy (democracy, rule of law, human rights
observance, justice and home affairs cooperation, economic and social reforms, free
trade, contribution to regional stability) and set the key points for the Action Plans.
In conclusion, the ENP geographic coverage, through the integration and
regional cooperation context, is able to stimulate the beginning of a large area of stability,
peace, prosperity and free movement which could be called, according to the European
Parliament proposal, “the pan-European and Mediterranean region”. Its identity
28
The P5_TA(2004)0122 reference.
29
The European Parliament Resolution no. 2003/2225(INI), p. 5.
14
elements would be the joint action areas– political, economic and security areas, based
on sharing certain values: the rule of law, democracy, the fundamental freedoms and the
human rights.30
§ 1.3. The European Neighbourhood Policy Action Fields

Based on the objectives and priorities included in the Action Plans, three ENP
action fields could be circumscribed, also called “areas” or “dimensions”:
• The political, human and cultural dimension;
• The economic dimension;
• The security dimension.
The political, human and cultural dimension

The ENP will act mainly to promote democracy, rule of law, the fundamental
rights and freedoms in the interest areas, as well as to increase the dialogue and
cultural cooperation between the countries of the member states and the neighbour
countries.
According to the bilateral Action Plans, the Union priorities in all the partner
countries will be: the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law, the observance of
the human rights and the fundamental freedoms (especially the press freedom and the
freedom of expression), the minority and children rights, the equal rights between men
and women, and the civil society development.
In this respect, an important part will be played by the partner country
integration in the European education area, as well as by the promotion of inter-cultural
dialogue, considering that a “Europeanization” sustainable process cannot be conceived
outside a real contact between the peoples of the partner countries as it facilitates mutual
relations and respect, tolerance, solidarity, non-discrimination, development of the civil
society. The neighbourhood policy will consequently promote cooperation in the field of
education, research, culture and human capital development.
The economic dimension

There are three major axes of the neighbourhood policy in the economic field:
a) Trade and internal market;
b) Energy, transport and telecommunication networks;
c) Economic and social development.
30
European Parliament Report on „Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” (COM(2003) 104-203/2018 (INI)), Final A5-0378/2003, 5
November 2003, p. 20.
15
a) The Action Plans will promote and create the conditions for free trade,
according to the provisions of the Association Agreements or the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreements. The result could turn into a large pan-European and
Mediterranean free trade area (pan-European and Mediterranean Free Trade Area).
In the long run, although the official documents do not provide clear statements
and do not establish terms, the ENP provides the opportunity for the partner countries
to join the internal market. In this respect, the Action Plans will support a process of
legislative harmonization by adopting the different acquis components depending on each
country evolution.
b) As the main importer and world second energy consumer, the European
Union is interested in ensuring the energy security. Considering the fact that its western
and southern neighbourhood owns important oil and natural gas reserves, it is very clear
why the strategic energy partnership is a priority axis within the neighbourhood policy.
The Action Plans will aim at developing networks and interconnecting the EU and the
partner countries, forging cooperation in the field of energy, the energy policy
convergence and their correlation with the sustainable development objectives.
The transport and telecommunication networks also play a key role in
promoting the commercial and economic integration at the regional level. The Action
Pans will aim at developing and interconnecting the networks at the pan-European level,
improving the transport system efficacy and safety, as well as the legislative
harmonization.
c) The ENP has high potential concerning the improvement of economic and
social development conditions in the neighbour countries. First of all, the liberalization
of commercial flows will lead to trade effects, scale economies and competition
improvement. Then, the legislative harmonization, the increase of stability and security,
the technical and financial assistance from the EU, the strengthening of the dialogue and
cooperation in the social and environment protection field, the promotion of the
information and communication technologies will improve the business environment,
will attract flows of direct foreign investments and will provide the conditions for
sustainable economic and social development. The benefits are conditioned by the
adoption of the complementary policies necessary to ensure the macro-stability and
operation of the market economy mechanisms, as well as to minimize the short-term
social impact determined by the economic reorganization.
The security dimension

The priority axes of the ENP action plans in the security field are:
a) Justice and home affairs;
b) Foreign and security policy.
a) The main problem concerning justice and home affairs is related to finding
solutions suitable for each region and country in order to meet, on the one hand, the
objective to open borders and, on the other hand, the need for regional security and
stability. Consequently, the border management is seen as a priority in most of the Action
16
Plans. They put forward measures concerning cooperation in the field of migration, visas
and asylum conditions, terrorism, crime and money laundering prevention, drug and
weapon traffic prevention. Moreover, the AP identifies the possibilities to strengthen
cooperation in the field of justice and police, including the cooperation with European
specialized bodies such as EUROPOL and EUROJUST. In this respect, special care will
be paid to the ratification and implementation of certain international key conventions.
b) The ENP, as an element of the European Security Strategy, strengthens the
Union participation in conflict prevention and crisis management. Consequently, the
Action Plans will define both the bilateral dialogue areas and the multilateral cooperation
framework concerning global government and preventing menaces towards world
security and stability. The European Union aims at integrating the partner countries in
certain aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and of the European Security
and Defence Policy and establishing a framework for shared responsibilities in the field
of regional security and stability.
§ 1.4. Complementarities between the European Neighbourhood Policy and other

EU Policies
Considering the information above, we can draw the conclusion that the
European Neighbourhood Policy, by its much extended action areas, is correlated with a
great part of the Union policies. Depending on the progress, which the ENP will favour in
the field of political and economic integration, the partner countries will probably
participate in a system of variable geometry, in the set of community policies and
programmes. On the short and medium term, we can identify five complementarities
with a significant impact on the ENP efficacy and evolution perspectives:
• Regional policy;
• Justice and home affairs;
• Education, culture and research;
• Sustainable, social and environment development policies;
• Foreign and security policy.
Regional policy
The regions at the Union external borders, which bear the borderline effects,
besides those due to former development discrepancies, are “privileged” beneficiaries of
the regional policy. Through the programmes which intensify the development of
endogenous factors and through the connection to the trans-European transport,
communication and energy networks, the regional policy minimizes the borderline
character of these regions, making possible the over border transfer of their economic
stability and prosperity. Moreover, the INTERREG initiative, applied within the regional
policy, supports three programmes (related to cross-border, trans-national and
interregional cooperation, energy network development and region arrangement) which
can be correlated with the objectives put forward through the ENP Action Plans. The
17
regional policy reform of 2004 strengthens complementarity with the ENP by including
the cross-border cooperation within the cohesion objectives for the period 2007-2013.
Justice and home affairs

The EU strategic objective in the field of JHA is to create „ a freedom, security
and justice area within the internal borders”. Justice and home affairs are a prevailing
area of the security field within the European Neighbourhood Policy, leading to
important changes in the community acquis, in order to adapt it to the specificity of the
neighbour countries and the cooperation relations to be developed. In fact, through the
ENP, there will be a transfer of the weight centre concerning the security problems
(asylum, migration, visas, measures to prevent terrorism and organized crime, etc) at the
external “borders” of what is taking shape as a “pan-European region”. The Action Plans
already include major JHA actions (migration, border management, crime prevention,
money laundering prevention and crime prevention in the economic and financial field)
and anticipate the possibility for the neighbour countries to take part in different
European and international programmes. Justice and home affairs have, in the short run,
the highest degree of complementarity with the ENP objectives and provide various
possibilities of political integration.
Education, culture and research

The community programmes in the field of education, culture and research can
be connected, without any difficulty, to the European Neighbourhood Policy, considering
the EU experience in developing international cooperation programmes concerning
professional training, mobility, R&D and the formation of research and expertise
networks, joint acknowledgement of diplomas and qualifications, the use of new
information and communication technologies, as well as the integration of the cultural
and European dimension within the education policies. The intensification of cooperation
and integration of the neighbour countries in the European area of education and research
will create premises both to develop the human resources and to create a stability and
security area, by shaping and strengthening the feeling of belonging to an area of shared
values and interests. The Commission is already developing programmes in the cultural
and education field through TACIS and MEDA within the bilateral agreements while,
through the Action Plans, the Commission wishes for the participation of the partner
countries to the Community R&D Framework Programmes, Culture 2000, Tempus III,
Erasmus Mundus and Youth.
The sustainable development policies

The sustainable development is an objective of the European integration
process, turned into conditionality criteria for adopting and implementing the Union and
the member state policies. The Union is not clear and categorical in relation to using the
sustainability principle in the neighbourhood policy, although the strategy refers to
sustainable development, and many of the Action Plans priorities support such an
approach. Considering this somewhat dramatic situation of the countries integrated in the
18
ENP concerning the environment aspects, the degree of poverty and social exclusion and
the lack of balance on the labour market, the result might be the strengthening of the
social and environment dimensions within the cooperation relations and the programmes
to be developed. Sustainability will surely become a conditionality criterion in
implementing the ENP, while the community legislation towards sustainable
development will also include the pan-European external component.
The foreign and security policy

Although the ENP is an individualized component within the EU external
relations (through objectives, methods, instruments and the geographic covered area), one
of its implicit functions is to attract new privileged partners in promoting the priorities of
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy.
According to the Strategy Paper, the partner countries are called to involve in taking the
responsibility concerning security and stability, not only at the level of the region they
belong to, but also at the international level. Consequently, the cooperation relations will
go beyond the regional framework, and the Action Plans will include objectives of the
two policies in the field of global security. Moreover, the observance of the international
commitments by the partner countries related to security is a conditionality criterion.
1. 5. Opportunities and Limitations of the ENP; Romania’s Role as a Future Border

Country
The analysis of the European Neighbourhood Policy clearly reflects the fact
that it provides important elements of added value from the general perspective of the
European integration process. The ENP opportunities are mainly related to:
- The clearer structuring of the EU policies and actions, by insisting on
priority objectives within a unitary strategy which correlates the foreign policy objectives
with the internal policy objectives;
- Minimizing the borderline effects in the EU border countries and regions,
as well as externalizing the integration benefits upon the new neighbours, by setting the
EU external limits, at least from the current point of view;
- Strengthening the EU position on the international level and increase the
Union potential to contribute to peace and security on the continent and beyond;
- Minimizing the risk for certain dividing lines between the EU and the
neighbour countries, which generates instability and insecurity effects in the area, with a
negative impact on the member states;
- Deepening the economic dimension of the existing agreements by
intensifying the preferential character of the commercial relations, the perspective to join
the internal market, the connection to the trans-European networks, the participation to
different EU actions and programmes;
19
- Improving the technical and financial assistance from the EU, together
with the neighbour country emphasis on priorities through a progressive and
differentiated approach established within bilateral agreements;
- Stimulating the economic and administrative reforms in the neighbour
countries, promoting the European pattern of the social market economy and supporting
the implementation of a sustainable democracy system based on the European shared
values;
- Creating a favourable framework for sustainable development, through
the commercial flow liberalization, investment environment improvement,
macroeconomic stabilization, competitiveness improvement, technology and know-how
transfer;
- Strengthening cooperation in the cultural, education, professional training
and youth mobility fields; in the neighbour countries, the ENP will support the
development of human resources and the Bologna process implementation and will
extend the participation of these countries to the community programmes;
- Promoting solidarity, the feeling of belonging to an area of shared values
and interests, knowledge and mutual respect for the specific systems of values;
- Organizing a political and cooperation framework in the field of justice
and home affairs and foreign policy; even though, for the time being, the ENP does not
provide instruments to develop this dialogue, they will come out of the cooperation
process necessary to implement the Action Plans, providing thus important elements of
added value in relation to the political “integration”;
- Managing more efficiently the common borders (by improving the
cooperation conditions related to migration, asylum, visa policies, border traffic,
terrorism and organised crime prevention) and the association of the partner countries to
certain aspects of the CFSP and ESDP (conflict prevention, crisis management, and so
on);
- Stimulating the ENP countries in adopting the standards of good
government and the European shared values, especially: freedom, democracy, human
rights and fundamental freedoms observance, the rule of law.
Consequently, we may appreciate that the ENP provides a favourable context
for the EU external relations and has potential especially to support the economic
development processes of the neighbour countries as well as the regional stability and
security strengthening through cooperation in the JHA and CFSP fields, to minimize the
discrepancies between the EU and the neighbour countries, to promote the European
values in the region and abroad and increase the Union role as a global actor. At the same
time, the European Neighbourhood Policy has certain limitations whose impact can go
from the “simple” reduction of the EU efficiency of action, to the deep reconsideration of
the whole ENP strategy. One can point out the following aspects as limitations:
- The ENP reflects the European Union prevailing position on the regional
level, without providing the neighbour countries with a political cooperation structure
attractive and powerful enough to make them accelerate the “Europeanization” process;
unlike the enlargement strategy, the ENP does not take into account the
20
institutionalization of the periphery relations, thus lacking the incentive of the political
integration; from this perspective, we will see whether the ENP will develop an efficient
context to achieve the necessary reforms in the partner countries for an efficient
participation in the three pillars of the integration process – the internal market, JHA and
the CFSP – or it will limit itself to deepening the cooperation relations with the neighbour
countries, based on the financial and technical extra support from the EU;
- The beginning of the ENP takes place under the circumstances of a lack of
balance between commitments and conditionality, minimizing the Union chance to act
not only as directional and instrumental leadership, but also as structural leadership31
(by attracting periphery in a cumulative process of development and integration). Even
though the Union financial support increases to 14 million for the 2007-2013 financing
period only through the NNPI, and the conditionality is positive, the ENP offer may be
under the neighbour country expectations, if we consider that: the EMU access is
blocked; the trade freedom is not attractive enough, on the one hand, because, at least for
the time being, it does not extend to services and agriculture – important share fields in
achieving the GDP of the partner countries – and, on the other hand, because, as a WTO
member, the Union must provide any trade preference set through bilateral agreements to
all the WTO countries, according to the „most favoured-nation clause” (the preference
advantages are thus much diminished); the perspective of the internal market is removed
and has little interest for the low competitive countries in the absence of redistributive
processes resulting from certain community policy implementation; the offer to
participate in the Union programmes is vague and barely represented in the Action Plans,
except for the education and research fields. In exchange, throughout the evolution of
their relations to the EU, the neighbour countries are conditioned by the achievement of
an extremely large set of criteria, comparable with those implemented in the enlargement
process;
- Although the political dialogue is meant for the cooperation in the JHA
and CFSP fields, they do not mention clearly the dialogue mechanisms and instruments,
risking to deprive the mutual actions of the efficiency and coherence necessary to achieve
the ENP multiple objectives;
- The difficult coordination of instruments and actions; the multiple
complementarities of the ENP with different Union policies and actions mean the
development of mechanisms to correlate the specific instruments in order to coordinate
over 300 actions mentioned in the action plans; the EU strategy has not developed yet
such mechanisms, except perhaps, for a NNPI, hence the risk of overlapping and
inefficiency in using the resources.
In conclusion, taking into account the potential role played by the European
Neighbourhood Policy in the European integration strategy, as well as its limitations in
the present conception in relation to the Union perspectives, the following conditionality
elements of the ENP objective achievement can be established:
31
Vitaliy Denysyuk, “Politique de voisinage de l’Union Européenne, quelles transformations sur le régime
commercial régional en Europe”, in Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, no. 485, Février
2005, p. 114.
21
- Improve the Union offer, especially by: deepening the political dimension;
improving the Action Plans pragmatism and focusing on a small number of key
objectives; increasing the ENP role in creating conditions so that the free trade and
gradual integration in the internal market do not generate asymmetric shocks and
discrepancies; promoting the freedom of people circulation; defining more clearly the
internal market minimum acquis which must be implemented in the ENP countries;
simplifying the agenda for the implementation of a sustainable democracy system;
- Ensure the ENP action and instrument complementarity with actions and
programmes of the various international and regional cooperation organizations, in
order to get a higher added value and save resources;
- Considering the ENP very wide action area and the high inter-
conditionality with many community policies, the EU strategy success will also depend
on the way in which it will be able to ensure the coherence of the different instruments
and programmes, through an approach of the internal and external objectives of the
integration process;
- Find some complementary financing resources and develop certain
patterns to analyze the impact of the adopted programmes and improve the efficiency of
the financial effort;
- Integrate agriculture and services in the process of free trade, otherwise
the commercial integration will have limited effects upon the restructuring processes;
- The integration of the Lisbon Strategy objectives in the economic
development national strategies; the commitment to the Lisbon objectives and the
European social pattern, channelling the economic development process towards the
sustainable development principles is a catalyst in the Europeanization process and
creates the premises to minimize the discrepancies between the member states and the
EU neighbourhood;
- Strengthen the administrative and legal capacity of the bordering
countries to implement the neighbourhood policy, as well as ensure the coherence of the
adopted actions at the community, national, regional and local level, within a process of
decentralization and promotion of the cross-border cooperation;
- Establish a favourable framework for the development and galvanizing the
Euro-regions;
- Lay greater emphasis upon the human resource development, as a key
element in achieving the ENP objectives;
- The responsible management of the shared neighbourhood so as to avoid
conflicts of interests with the strategic partners and/or the emergence of new dividing
lines in the relations with countries which are not included in the ENP.
On the whole, it comes out that the ENP provides the opportunity of stabilizing
the EU external borders, but it remains to talk about its capacity to promote efficiently a
development and cooperation pattern on the regional level which do away with the
accession temptation and ensures a large pan-European area of prosperity, stability and
security.
22
A solution for the political management of such a large area, working in a

system of variable geometry concentric circles, could be the adoption of the
functionalist method to integrate the neighbour countries: the step by step economy
integration on the common market within a cooperation pattern which allows the
interdependency emphasis and solidarity development, in other words, „surrounding the
political aspect through an economic strategy of functional increase”32 based on an
integration cumulative logic. However, the functionalism’s successful implementation
asks for:
- The adoption of a sustainable development strategy by the partner
countries and the setting of a reform-making calendar towards implementing the market
economy mechanisms, improving competitiveness, adopting a mixture of political
policies to ensure the macroeconomic stabilization and the necessary context to increase
stimulus within an open economy;
- Pattern pliability, by keeping the internal market wholeness; the necessary
pliability must be strictly made in correlation with the neighbour countries evolution
rhythm and requires the clear determination of the fields where the legislative
harmonization must be implemented (including the definition of the minimum acquis
elements that must be adopted), without adapting the internal market legislation to the
neighbour country peculiarities. The ENP shouldn’t contribute to increasing the risks of
the integration process dilution through market fragmentation or legislative constraint
diminution of the common market (policies concerning consumer protection, social and
environment constraints, competition, and so on), attempting to facilitate the neighbour
partner access;
- The careful management of the cost-benefits balance, taking special care
of the economic integration impact upon the life standards of the vulnerable groups (the
social-professional areas affected by the restructuring processes brought about by the
market liberalization and business internationalization);
- Anticipate shocks, especially those related to capital market and labour
market liberalization and the adoption of the necessary policies for their management
under low economic and social costs (the experience of the Central and Eastern European
countries’ accession can be extremely useful in this respect);
- Create the premises to adopt the neo-functionalist method, implemented in
the member country integration process, if the Union evolution imposes the enlargement
towards the ENP countries.
In implementing the ENP, the border countries and regions will play an important
part. As a future border country of the EU, Romania will have both the opportunity and
responsibility of developing strengthened cross-border cooperation relations with the
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, aiming at achieving the priorities set through the
Action Plans. Considering the fact that the ENP strategy provides a new context for the
methodology implemented within the UE enlargement process towards Central and
Eastern Europe, the two future neighbour countries of the EU can use not only Romania’s
32
Octav Bibere, Uniunea European între real i virtual (The European Union between actual and virtual),
All Educational Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, p. 113.
23
status as a EU member in implementing the Action Plans and integrating the European
policies and programs, but also the experience acquired while meeting the accession
criteria and achieving the transformative processes towards Europeanization. In this
respect, we can mention some key strategy elements of the relations between Romania as
a future member country, on the one hand, and the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine as
ENP countries, on the other hand:
1. manage the bilateral and multilateral cooperation relations within the
different regional structures to which the three countries belong towards the
priorities included in the Action Plans; taking into account the cooperation potential
and the involvement requirements as a future border country, as well as the experience
gathered during the pre-accession process to the European Union, Romania (out of the 80
priorities established through the Action Plan for Moldova and 71 for Ukraine) could
have an essential contribution to:
- Institutionalize a sustainable democracy system, by strengthening
democracy and the rule of law, observing the human rights and the fundamental freedoms
(especially press and expression freedom), the administrative and justice reform;
- Develop the civil society and integrate the neighbour countries within the
education and research European area; support the Bologna Process implementation and
the accession of the two countries to the European programs related to culture, education,
professional training where young people could play an important part;
- Implement the economic and administrative reforms, improve the export
potential, implement the European legislation related to tariff union and standards;
prepare to participate in the internal market and adopt the community acquis necessary
to ensure freedom of circulation and administrative cooperation; Romania will be able to
use in this respect both the possibilities to correlate the internal community policy
instruments which are complementary to the ENP and the expertise acquired during the
pre-accession period;
- Strengthen the cooperation and political dialogue in the field of foreign
and security policy, as well as justice and home affairs, especially to implement the
European Security Strategy, prevent terrorism, organised crime, drugs and human beings
trafficking, migration control and frontier management;
- 2. the commercial and economic integration, according to the
functionalist method implementation (in accordance with the above analysis);
- 3. strengthen the cross-border and trans-national regional
cooperation, with structural objectives: promote the sustainable economic and social
development, improve the business environment, promote the public-private partnership,
minimize discrepancies, develop the transport infrastructures, telecommunications,
environment, energy, research-development, develop the informational society,
information, communication, transfer of competences. In this respect too, Romania will
have the opportunity to correlate the programmes and funds of the internal policies with
those of the neighbourhood policy;
24
- 4. create certain structures and mechanisms for communication,

information, advice and institutional dialogue, both at the central level and at the level
of the local and regional communities;
- 5. promote „people-to-people” contacts, especially through cooperation
in the field of education, international mobility, culture and audio-visual;
- 6. Strengthen the Euro-regions’ role; in this respect, it is imperative to
create the conditions for the current implementation, both in Romania and in the Republic
of Moldova and Ukraine, of the Madrid Convention, of the two adjacent Protocols and
the Local Government Charter.
In order that Romania takes advantage most efficiently of the ENP context in its
relations with the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, it would be necessary to elaborate a
strategy to implement the neighbourhood policy oriented towards the ENP fields and the
Action Plans objectives, by taking into account the internal complementary policies and
the European Security Strategy. If it were based on the functionalism method, the ENP
implementation could actively contribute to a much higher degree of integration of the
two countries in the European system; functionalism would not only give the advantage
of flexibility by integrating the interest fields for the involved actors, without significant
constraints, but would also give the opportunity of progressive integration by creating the
training and convergence mechanisms necessary for a possible, even remote prospect of
the accession of the two countries to the European Union.
25
CHAPTER 2
ROMANIA – THE FUTURE EASTERN BORDER OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
The efficient and systematic control and the permanent surveillance of the 3,147
km of borderland, especially of those sectors that are going to be the future external
border of the European Union, totalizing around 2,050 km, represent priorities of
foremost importance for Romania. The future eastern border of EU, on the river Prut, on
the Danube and at the Black Sea, does not have to represent a new curtain – not even one
made of silk. To avoid the transformation of the new enlargement wave in a generator of
new fault lines and to transform this region into a field of cooperation, not confrontation,
represent major challenges in the period of Romania’s pre- and post-accession to the
European Union.
In this context, the Ministry of Administration and Interior (MAI) has established
as a priority objective the integrated management of border security for the future
external border of EU, an objective that includes not just issues regarding border control,
but also aspects related to political asylum, migration and conformation to human rights
in general. For a more efficient border security management, Romania intends to
intensify the cooperation with the EU member states and neighbouring countries, at the
future internal borders (Bulgaria, Hungary) and external borders (Republic of Moldova,
Ukraine) of the Union.
§ 2.1 Premises of Romania’s Alignment to the EU Border Standards

The acquis for Chapter 25 – Customs Union – includes the EU customs code and
its application norms, the common customs tariff, including commercial preferences,
tariff contingents and suspensions, as well as connected legislation, which overshoots the
customs code’s realm, such as the legislation on counterfeit or pirated goods, drugs
trafficking and cultural products. The acquis consists mainly in a set of instruments
ensuring the functioning of the customs union and the effective protection and control of
the external borders of the EU.
Romania, as well as the other candidate states, provided information regarding the
set up of a corresponding operational capacity of their customs administration, in such
matters as: customs services reform and improvement; full and rapid installation and
implementation of IT applications for customs services, in view of an adequate
transposition of the acquis; implementing measures aimed at reducing waiting times at
the border, guaranteeing copyright and industrial property rights, fighting economic and
organised crime, strengthening customs ethics, fighting fraud and corruption, and
continuing developing and implementing efficient training systems; improving internal
coordination within a customs administration and between customs administrations and
other institutions in charge with applying and controlling legislation observation,
including police and judicial authorities; the legal and institutional measures necessary
26
for ensuring collection and control of EU’s future own resources, and for efficiently
managing the common agricultural policy.
Customs administrations must guarantee that the development and application of
a strategy for collecting and managing revenues will allow both internal and community
revenues to be collected, registered, used, reported and audited in an appropriate way,
both at a national level and within the Union. For this reason, candidate states must
develop policies, systems, procedures, technologies and instruments compatible with EU
requirements and standards.33
Customs administrations of the candidate countries should have all the facilities
necessary for the appropriate development of customs control in ports, airports and
terrestrial border points and for ensuring a fluent traffic of persons and goods, the
collection of revenues at a national and community level. This desideratum involves,
among others: the existence of quality control equipment and units, control and
investigation units, radio and telecommunications units, instruments and equipment
allowing for a better control of transport vehicles and their freight, special equipment for
detecting illegal goods and, in some cases, equipment for night time use and heat
detectors; introducing controls after customs clearance procedures; the development of
cooperation between various agencies functioning at border points and inside the country;
promoting international cooperation between customs services; setting up, improving,
using and checking periodically the information systems capable to support control units
located at border points and inside the country; setting up, developing using and checking
periodically the risk profiles, which take into account the economic situation of the region
in question for each place where a customs control is performed.
Moreover, the systems and procedures for legislation analysis and implementation
must be computerised. This process involves the setting up of the following systems: IT
systems capable to create the interface with EU systems (TARIC, NCTS, EU Import
Quota and CIS/SCENT, etc.); adequate information systems able to accept EDI
(Electronic Data Interchange) messages; IT systems capable to use EU’s standards/
CCN/CSI transmission system; a computerised system for customs declarations
processing; a computerised system for revenues collection and registration; a
computerised system for transit control, integrated with the system for customs
declarations processing; one or several computerised information systems; providing
statistic data on foreign trade within preset deadlines.
In the position paper for Chapter 25 of negotiation - Customs Union - Romania
declared that „accepts the acquis communautaire in force as of 31 December 1999, does
not request transition periods or derogations and declares that it will be able to entirely
implement it upon accession”.34
The provisions of the Customs Code (Law No. 141/1997) and of the Rules of
Application of the Customs Code (Government’s Decision No. 626/1997) are to a great
33
See the description of Chapter 25 - Customs Union,
http://www.infoeuropa.ro/ieweb/jsp/print.jsp?cid=194&lid=1&id=199
34
See Romania’s position paper for Chapter 25 – Customs Union,
http://www.mie.ro/Negocieri/Romana/Documente_pozitie/Rom/CAP25-DP.pdf
27
extent harmonised with the community customs legislation, its implementation being
accomplished in a unitary way. There are no differences of enforcement compared to the
community legislation in the use of the tariff nomenclature, binding tariff information,
rules of origin, customs valuation, customs procedures and regimes on import and export,
transit, customs warehouses, single administrative documents, customs duties.
In September 1999, Romania started the drawing up of the national integrated
customs tariff, having the same principles and the same format as the Common Integrated
Tariff (TARIC). At the same time, Romania took several actions meant to prepare,
logistically and technically, its customs services for an effective implementation of its
tasks as a member state of the EU. In this context, a main priority would be the
improvement in the security of its Northern and Eastern borders which will be endowed
with modern detection and control equipment (fixed and mobile X-rays systems for the
carrying out of the non-destructive physical control, administration systems of the black
lists etc.). In order to fulfil these objectives, Romania will provide important domestic
financial resources, as well as resources stemming from EU funds.
Simultaneously with the taking over and the implementation of the community
acquis, Romania aims to fulfil its obligations as a contracting party to several
international multilateral conventions, recommendations of the World Customs
Organisation, as well as the obligations flowing from the bilateral agreements on co-
operation and mutual assistance in customs matters.
The strengthening of the institutional capacity to undertake the community acquis,
as a main concern for the Romanian Customs Administration during the period until the
accession, will be achieved through diversifying the training actions of its own personnel.
Romania will take the necessary measures for the preparation of the Romanian Customs
Administration in order to assume all prerogatives arising from specific community
customs activity (administration of tariff quotas, collection of indirect taxes,
administration of the free zones etc.).
Starting from 30 June 2001, the Romanian state border is administrated in
conformity with a new normative act35 which, taking over the relevant concepts of
management and border control from the acquis communautaire extended the border area
with 30 km inwards from the border line. The premises of separating the flows on the
both crossing ways at the state border crossing points, for Romanian citizens and the
citizens of the countries with which Romania has concluded agreements concerning the
abolishment of visas or of the control at the border crossing, on one hand, and for the
citizens of the others countries, on the other hand, have thus been created. The regime of
the common border crossing points, the alignment with the European standards
established through the FAL Convention regarding the control of crossing the blue border
in maritime and fluvial harbours, and the mechanisms for the protection of personal data
stored by the police have also been settled.
At the same time, it was created the legal framework for the Romanian border
police’s institutional reform through the adoption, at the same date, of the normative act36
regarding the organization and function of the Romanian border police, which introduced
35
GED no. 105/2001.
36
GED no. 104/2001.
28
a set of new conceptual elements, such as the definition of the area of border police
competence and even the border policeman concept itself.
The new structure of the Romanian border police created – after the model of
border police from EU member states – on regional directions at the level of border with
each neighbouring state and at the Black Sea, is functional since 1 June 2001.
At the same time, it was elaborated a career guide for the border policeman and
the relationships between the different categories of personnel and staff tasks were re-
evaluated. On the other hand, new study programmes were adopted in the educational
institutions for officers and non-commissioned officers, with emphasis on the judicial
training of policemen.
For the eastern border, modern equipments were acquired (equipments for night
time use, portable heat detector equipments, automobiles of surveillance and control).
In the area of communications, it was set up from domestic funds a modern
system which allows the voice and data transfer between Bucharest and county towns and
also between county towns and border crossing points. At the same time, it was created
an information system concerning the movement of goods and persons across the border,
similar with the Schengen Information System, which keeps the evidence, processes and
exploits information about cross-border crimes and crimes at the border, about aliens and
goods put under surveillance. The system is accessible for state authorities which have
responsibilities concerning border crossing and for other public interested public
institutions, the border police being just one of its many beneficiaries.
As a consequence of signing an aide-memoire between the commanders of the
Coast Guard of the border police structures of the Black Sea countries, the cooperation
between these structures was improved, regarding especially the development of the co-
operation networks in the field of maritime search and rescue, the combating of the
maritime pollution, illegal trafficking in some goods and smuggling. At the same time, an
operative document has been agreed upon (a form comprising data on suspect ships),
used by all maritime border authorities.
The cooperation with border authorities from EU member states is presently
accomplished, mostly, through liaison officers of these countries in Bucharest. An
important role in the border police’s process of achieving the European standards was
played by the twinning convention with Germany.
During 2001-2005 Romania has accelerated the measures of alignment to the EU
standards in the field, measures that included: the legislative harmonization in conformity
with Schengen space requirements; the establishment of flexible institutional structures,
after EU models, capable to efficiently accomplish the missions instated by law; the
improvement of training and specialization of border policemen, through workshops and
experience exchanges within the framework of twinning conventions; intensification of
national and international cooperation; proper endowment, through PHARE programmes,
governmental assurances and donations; starting up the establishment of unique offices
for the payment of border taxes; the creation of mixed control teams formed by border
policemen and customs employees; the separation of EU and non-EU passenger flows in
the “Henri Coand ” International Airport (Bucure ti-Otopeni); starting up actions for
29
creating the integrated system of border security. These measures were finalized by the
adoption, in June 2005, of an updated Schengen Action Plan, which is being implemented
by and large in accordance with the deadlines, and by the entering into force, in July
2005, of an Agreement on border cooperation between Romania and Bulgaria.37
MAI intention of hiring in 2006 a number of 7,500 policemen, out of which 4,000
border policemen, denotes, through the important budgetary efforts engaged, the
seriousness of Romania’s engagement of transposing in reality an essential ENP
objective – the control of migration and of all forms of illegal traffic.
At present and especially in the post-accession period, a real support in the realm
of border management and the fight against organized crime, that represent objectives of
ENP, could offer the SECI Regional Centre for Combating Cross-border Crime and the
International Centre for Police Cooperation that function at the 10th and the 9th floors of
the Romanian Parliament building. The former gathers the efforts of twelve South East
European countries on fighting organized crime, and the latter, created as general
directorate subordinated to MAI, facilitates the cooperation, in the police area, of all
major structures with responsibilities in the domain, including EUROPOL and
INTERPOL, assuring, on this basis, the premises for the adoption of a common strategy
in the field.
§ 2.2 Romania’s Strategy of Integrated Border Management

The integrated management of state border represents a system of unitary
coordination of actions and procedures developed in the institutions which have the duty
to guarantee the maintenance of a state of normality at the state border, the cooperation
concerning the border regime with other states and similar institutions from neighbouring
countries, as well as supporting the permanent compatibility with the norms and practices
of surveillance and control of state border applied in EU countries.38
With this strategy of integrated management of state border, Romania seeks for
the unitary coordination at central and territorial level, by structures with responsibilities
at the borders, of actions and measures conducted for the security of the state border, the
monitoring and fighting against trans-national crime, and a compatibility with the
community norms and procedures regarding the surveillance and control of the state
border in order to ensure the conditions for Romania’s accession to the EU.39
The necessity of securing Romania’s state borders, especially the northern and
eastern ones, is determined by the growth in dimension and complexity of the cross
border criminality, mostly on the east-west main direction, by the internationalization of
organized crime phenomena, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of
terrorist actions around the world, as well as by generating favourable conditions for such
37
Romania 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, European Commission, SEC (2005) 1354, Brussels,
25 October 2005, COM (2005) 534 final, p. 67, http://delegatie.infoeuropa.ro/ROMR2005.pdf.
38
See GD no. 471/1 April 2004 concerning the National Strategy of Integrated Border Management.
39
Coordonare Strategic , GIRMIFS (Strategic Coordination, GIRMIFS),
http://proiectsisf.mai.gov.ro/index01.htm.
30
phenomena through the persistence of economic crisis, of social, ethnic and religious
conflicts in some states near Romania’s borders.
For guaranteeing at the central level the coordination of national authorities
attributions with responsibilities at Romania’s state border, it was established, on 21 June
2001, by GD no. 943/200140 the Romanian Inter-ministerial Group for the Integrated
Management of State Border (GIRMIFS).
This group is a consultative body without juridical personality, having the role of
making more efficient the communication and cooperation between MAI and the other
central and local public authorities with border responsibilities, as well as contributing to
the elaboration of dispositions or orders regarding the adopted measures and correlated
actions, that are going to be conducted for the security of state border and for an
integrated and functional border management.
GIRMIFS determines the general view and provides the unitary coordination, on
the strength of the Strategy, of the integrated border management, of measures and
actions for the security of state border, conducted by the Romanian authorities with
border responsibilities, centralizes and monitors the results of the cooperation between
them and their external partners with attributions in the field.
GIRMIFS conducts its activity under the authority and direct governance of
Romanian Government’s Prime-Minister, as President, and it is composed of leaders of
ministries and institutions of defence, public order and national security, apt to conduct
activities in the area of state border security.41
In the structure of GIRMIFS, there are inter-ministerial commissions of expertise
in the following areas: external borders, migration, cross border organized crime, police
cooperation, IT cooperation, Schengen acquis implementation.
The main accomplishment of GIRMIFS is represented by the elaboration of the
National Strategy of Integrated State Border Management 2004-2006 that represents a
development of the National Strategy of Integrated State Border Management approved
by GD no. 482/200342. The elaboration of the Strategy was determined both by the
necessity of transposing in practice the observations, recommendations and conclusions
formulated by EU organs, regarding the processes registered in Romania in the area of
justice and internal affairs, as well as by the adaptation to the dynamics of cross border
criminality, in order to increase the degree of national border security and by the
intensification of accession process to the European structures.
The principles that guide the Strategy are the following:
• The principle of legality. All the circumscribed actions of integrated border
management take place with the conformation to the fundamental human rights
and liberties, to the international documents’ prescriptions in which Romania is
part of, to the acquis communautaire, the Schengen acquis and the national
legislation in the area.
40
Published in the Official Monitor no. 618/1October 2001.
41
Coordonare Strategic – Activit i GIRMIFS – 2004 (Strategic Coordination– GIRMIFS Activities–
2004), http://proiectsisf.mai.gov.ro/index02.htm.
42
Published in the Official Monitor no. 309/8 May 2003.
31
• The principle of unitary coordination and cooperation. The state border

management is coordinated in a unitary manner by the Romanian Inter-Ministerial
Group for the Integrated Border Management and has at its basis the cooperation
between national institutions with border prerogatives, the information exchange
between them and the dissemination of good practices in the field.
• The principle of complementarity. Within the integrated border management the
cooperation between institutions with specific prerogatives take place in such a
way as to avoid the competence vacuum, parallelisms and disputes regarding
exertion of responsibilities.
• The principle of autonomous decision-making. The inter-institutional cooperation
in the area of border management takes place with the conformation to the
autonomy of each involved structures.
• The principle of growth in efficiency and effectiveness. In achieving the objectives
of integrated border management one seeks for the increase in efficiency and
effectiveness in the use of institutions’ own resources (human, technical,
technological, informational, financial, logistical, etc.)
• The principle of continuity. The activities performed for the border management
have to take place in a sustained rhythm and to be characterized by coherence.
• The principle of professionalism and personnel motivation. The integrated border
management presupposes the professional training of personnel in conformity
with the new requirements, the design and use of adequate motivational levers, in
order to set up specific activities at the level of European standards.
• The principle of finality. In order to achieve the effectiveness of the assessed
objectives there are used combinations of different resources and actions, without
the generalization of one single alternative.
The main objective of the Strategy is the creation of an integrated system
of management for all Romanian borders, aligned to the European standards, that
would ensure: a high degree of border security that will offer the protection of
Romania’s and EU’s citizens, through the application of adequate measures
concerning border control, the prevention and fight against cross border
criminality and against international terrorism; the modernization of control
procedures for the fluidization of free border circulation of persons and goods;
adequate policies in the area of migration and asylum, aligned to the international
law and acquis communautaire; starting up on schedule the actions meant to
create the necessary framework for Romania to satisfy, as soon as possible after
the accession to EU, the necessary conditions of Schengen acquis application and,
implicitly, the accession to this space.
The Strategy’s implementation instrument is called the Action Plan for the
Implementation of Romania’s National Strategy of Integrated State Border
Management 2004-2006, and it determines the actual actions and responsibilities
that fall upon each ministry/institution with prerogatives in the field.
32
For a unitary coordination of border management and constant monitoring

of the cooperation between the institutions with border prerogatives, it has been
created the Group of Monitoring the Border Security Management.
In October 2005, a Concept for the Implementation of the Integrated
Border Security System was adopted and overall this shows good progress has
been made in developing a clearer strategic vision on the steps to be taken in the
field.
2.3 The Transparency Problem in Assigning Acquisitions Contracts in the Security

Domain
The community directives in the public acquisitions domain43 impose the
following measures in case of a public auction: the intensive advertising of the auction
announcement both locally and internationally; the advertising on the public auctions
website of the EU “Tenders Electronic Daily”; the advertising of all data regarding the
auction, including the financial ones; the publication of the attendance requirements and
of the conditions of contract. In case a state feels injustice in the assignation of a public
auction contract, it can address itself to the qualified forums of the EU.
GIRMIFS has designated the Ministry of Administration and Interior through the
Management Unit of the Project, under the Decision no. 2, to attribute the framework-
contract of implementing the Integrated System for the Security of Romania’s State
Frontier to a general systems integrator, according to the stipulations of the article 9 letter
C, line 2 of the GD no. 60/2001, approved by the Law no. 212/2002 and to coordinate the
implementation of the part financed from community funds, within the projects of
financial assistance non-reimbursable from the EU, as well as budget funds for the co-
financing, which is assured by the Romanian state.
The attribution of the public acquisitions contract has been done by applying the
single source negotiation procedure.44 MAI has offered the integrated management
contract of the state border to a European consortium, EADS, with whom negotiated
directly, refusing to make essential information public, regarding the conditions that were
established when this business was made.
Classified as “working secret” by MAI while during the PSD government, the
contract has been declassified by the new government, which was formed after the
autumn elections of 2004, under no. 956449/16 February 2005.
Invoking the community directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and
European Council as of the 31 May 2004, regarding the coordination of the procedures
for the attribution of a public acquisitions contract in the domains of services, goods or of
the public contracts, where at the column exclusions from commitments states: “contracts
that are declared as “secret” or affect the essential interests of the Member States, can be
43
Particularly 92/50/CE regarding public acquisitions in the services domain, 93/36/CE regarding public
acquisitions in the products domain, 93/37/CE regarding public acquisitions in the engineering domain,
93/38/CE regarding public acquisitions in the special branches domain.
44
Contractul cu EADS - Atribuire contract (The Contract with EADS – Contract attribution),
33
excluded from these commitments”, MAI argued that the way this contract had been
attributed was in accordance with the community acquis45, because it was declared a
“working secret”. But the community directives mentioned above at the transparency
column, demand at least the publication of every auction ad on a national level, which did
not happen in the case of EADS. The disclosure of the details of this auction wouldn’t
have been of such nature as to affect the national security. MAI had the obligation to give
some information to the public regarding the project, because the funds that were used in
the contract were coming in a 15 per cent ratio from community funds and the rest from
the state budget. The community norms in the case of this auction were not observed. In
addition, the contract was concluded in unfavourable conditions for the Romanian state.
Among the clauses of the contract is the subsection 4.1.1 that states the fact that “the
seller will be the only interface for the buyer and will autonomously decide on the
subcontractors” and that “in the event the seller subcontract works... the buyer shall not
have the right to formulate objections regarding the provisions of such contracts”.
Signed on 12 August 2004, the acquisitions contract for the implementation of the
Integrated System for the Security of Romania’s State Frontier (SISF) will keep going
until 2009 and will cost at least 650 million euros (with a subcontracting option of 350
million euros more). In an initial phase of the project, which will go on until 31
December 2006, the efforts for the modernization of the security system of the frontier
will be channelled towards the future external border of the EU.46
Based on the contract the following issues will be provided: the acquisition and
installation of high-tech surveillance systems, the implementation of modern command
and control centres, the outfitting of more than 180 headquarters and training centres of
the Romanian frontier police. Simultaneously, the project will assure the expansion and
development of the IT and communications infrastructure, which is needed for the
cooperation between all the institutions with frontier expertise. The contract covers the
purveyance of surveillance systems, command and control facilities, including all the
necessary hardware and software, an IT and communications infrastructure plus
engineering works, intended to ameliorate the frontier policemen’s work conditions.
EADS acts as a prime contractor and system integrator and coordinates the modernization
process of the helicopters, ships, technical training centres and work gears of the agents
in the Romanian frontier police.
The European Commission has pointed out a succession of overlaps with projects
financed with PHARE programmes and those provided by the contract concluded with
the EADS Corporation. In February 2005, the government has announced that it will
renegotiate the terms of the contract concluded in August 2004, in order to avoid the
overlaps and pay the correct price for this project. In a short time, the Administration and
Interior minister declared, on his turn, that a review of the contract is necessary, because,
on one hand, it contains overlaps with the security programmes of the frontier financed
45
For the EU legislation regarding public acquisitions see Public works contracts, public supply contracts
and public service contracts, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l22009.htm.
46
Obiective prev zute a se realiza în prima faz de derulare a contractului, pentru asigurarea unui înalt
nivel de control i supraveghere la frontier la 31.12.2006 (Objectives to be attained in the first phase of
the contract in order to secure a high level of control and surveillance by 31.12.2006 ),
http//www.mai.gov.ro/Documente/Prima%20Pagina/Obiective.pdf.
34
from European non-reimbursable funds, and on the other hand, it doesn’t cover but 6
districts of plains, instead of 9, from the future external frontier and the seaside of the
Black Sea, while the most important area is not covered, more precisely the north frontier
with Ukraine (the districts of Satu Mare, Maramures, and Suceava).47
On 15 June 2005 the MAI has concurrently published two bulletins: the first one
announced the continuous cooperation with EADS for the execution of the contract
concluded in August 2004,48 and the second one informed the public opinion about the
results of the inspections done in 2005 by the supervisory body of the Administration and
Interior Ministry for establishing the circumstances in which the acquisition contracts
were concluded in relation to the achievement of the SISF - the acquisition contract of the
feasibility study concluded with BEARING POINT firm and the framework-contract for
its implementation concluded with the multinational consortium EADS.
In the first case, the verifications established that after the assignment of the
contract, the BEARING POINT firm has notified the Romanian side, that it cannot
achieve but the feasibility study and cannot do the technical project anymore like it had
been earlier settled and BEARING POINT agreed to pay the German firm the equivalent
of 430,000 euro in Lei, although the negotiation warrant had foreseen the amount of
500,000 euros for the feasibility study and the technical project. Furthermore, the
feasibility study done by the BEARING POINT firm had been in reality a synthesis of
some prior studies with the same object, which had been done by other companies in the
benefit of the Romanian frontier police.
Regarding the contract concluded with the firm EADS, the verifications have
evinced the fact that a steady price has not been negotiated, but a minimal one, and that at
the establishment of the value 650 million euros, not all goods and services to be
purchased, nor their minimum price, had been taken into consideration. The description
of the appending systems and the goods and services to be purchased, had not been
mentioned in the framework-contract. The appendix of the contracts had been negotiated
later on, after the conclusion of the framework-contract, and by means of the first
appendix, signed on 8 October 2004, the nature of the contract was changed, from a
goods acquisition contract into an integrated systems acquisition contract, without
mentioning, who will be the owner of the source codes of the soft, implemented by
EADS. Taking into consideration all these, the verifications have established that the
persons who participated at the negotiations have severely violated the principle of the
efficient use of public funds.49
47
Emil Popescu, „Contractul de securizare a frontierei este la pre ul pie ei, spune EADS” (The Contract of
frontier security is at market price, says EADS), in Ziarul Financiar, 11 March 2005.
48
„MAI i EADS GmbH – Parteneriat pentru securitatea frontierei României” (MAI and EADS GmbH –
Partnership for the security of Romania’s frontier), in Buletin Informativ, 13-19 June 2005,
http://www.mai.gov.ro/Documente/Arhiva%20comunicate/Buletin%20informativ%2013-
19%20iunie%202005.pdf
49
“Ministerul Administra iei i Internelor a sesizat Parchetul în leg tur cu unele aspecte ale încheierii
contractelor cu BEARING POINT i EADS” (The Ministry of Administration and Interior has announced
the Prosecutor’s Office regarding some aspects of the contract conclusions with BEARING POINT and
EADS), in Buletin Informativ, 13-19 June 2005,
19%20iunie%202005.pdf.
35
In its renegotiated version as of 9 November 2005, materialized in the form of an

Addendum50, the contract stipulates a reduction of the price – from 650 million euros to
524.5 million euros – due to the removal of the overlaps with projects financed by the EU
with PHARE Programmes and the Schengen Facility, estimated by the MAI at over 450
million euros. The new provisions of the contract are meant to secure a qualitative and
quantitative improvement of the SISF. It was introduced the EADS’ obligation to achieve
and implement the mobile communications subsystem within the SISF in TETRA
standard technology, utilized in EU Member States and which was already implemented
in the projects of modernization of frontier security funded by PHARE Programmes. The
source code of software, as well as the development license of it shall be handed over to
the MAI, at the end of the warranty period. It was revised also the provision of the
contract regarding the subcontractors in order to observe the principle of securing the
transparency in the acquisitions of goods and services. Last but not least, the provisions
regarding the warranty provided by EADS for its goods and services and the resolution of
any dispute between the parts were modified in Romanian state’s advantage.51
Besides the “lesson” of the EADS case, as was mentioned in the European
Commission’s Romania 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, Romania’s preparation
for implementing the acquis in the fields of Schengen and the EU external border should
be done in a harmonised and more consistent manner. Among other, this will ask for: the
modernization of the equipment and infrastructure along the green and blue borders so
that a uniform high level of control is reached; the acceleration of the preparations for the
future participation in the Schengen Information System (SIS II); the filling of all
remaining vacancies in the border police until the end of 2009; the professional training
of the contractual agents and the new staff to be recruited in the border police, in
accordance with the Police Status Law; the strengthening of the risk analysis capacity of
the border police; and the enhancing of the surveillance capacity along the Black Sea
coast and the Danube, in close cooperation with Bulgaria in the latter case.52
2.4 The Transfrontier Relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova
The debut of the accession negotiations of Romania to the European Union
(February 2000) has compelled Bucharest to devise an implementation strategy of the EU
standards regarding the frontiers with the Republic of Moldova. This has affected the
following domains: the frontier traffic; the granting of the Romanian citizenship; and the
signing of the bilateral treaty.
50
Act adi ional nr. 1 din 09.11.2005 la Contractul nr. S/980352 din 12.08.2004, declasificat sub nr. 95649
din 16.02.2005 (Addendum no.1 as of 09.11.2005 to the Contract no. S/980352 as of 12.08.2004,
declassified under no. 95649 as of16.02.2005),
http//www.mai.gov.ro/Documente/Prima%20Pagina/act_aditional.pdf.
51
„Ministerul Administra iei i Internelor a încheiat, miercuri, negocierea cu concernul EADS pe marginea
contractului privind securizarea frontierelor” (The Ministry of Administration and Interior concluded
Wednesday the negotiation with EADS over the contract for border security), in Buletin Informativ, 11
November 2005, http//www.mai.gov.ro/Documente/Prima%20Pagina/BI_contract_EADS.pdf.
52
Romania 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, European Commission, SEC (2005) 1354, Brussels,
25 October 2005, COM (2005) 534 final, pp. 67-68, http://delegatie.infoeuropa.ro/ROMR2005.pdf.
36
• The frontier traffic

After a round of consultations between the legal departments of the foreign affairs
ministries of the Republic of Moldova and Romania, which took place in Chisinau on
11-12 April 2001, Romania has forwarded to the Republic of Moldova the project of a
bilateral agreement, which proposed the introduction of the obligation of using
passports, as well as a document regarding the settlement of the double citizenship
regime. The agreement project between the Government of Romania and the
Government of the Republic of Moldova regarding mutual travels of the citizens of
both states aimed at the admission, exit, transiting or standing on the territories of the
two states. The Romanian side proposed that the entry procedures of this agreement
should be finalized on 1 July at the latest, according to Romania’s commitments to
the EU. Therewith, Romania has declared the will to conclude as soon as possible
agreements regarding the readmission of the foreigners, the regulation of the small
frontier traffic, the verification at frontier passing and the verification of the travel
documents.
Consequently, starting with 1 July 2001 Romania introduced the requirement of
having passports for the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, who up to then could
enter on Romanian territory only by presenting their ID card.
As far as the visas regime is concerned, although on 1 July 2001 Romania
introduced visas for all ex-Soviet states, for the citizens of the Republic of Moldova it
managed to postpone its introduction and eventually to get a more favourable regime.
In October 2005 there were finalized the provisions of the bilateral agreement
regulating the visas regime. In accordance with them, the Moldovan citizens are
going to get multiple-entry visas for a longer period.53
• The granting of the Romanian citizenship
In 2000, Romania offered the citizens of the Republic of Moldova the possibility
to obtain Romanian citizenship without any residence compulsion. A few thousands
of Moldovan citizens took advantage of that opportunity at the end of 2000 and the
beginning of 2001, that generating the discontentment of the authorities in Chisinau.
In March 2001, during the presidential elections campaign, in order to disconcert
the charge of Romanianness phobia, generated by the announcement of the intention
to put to a referendum after the elections the admission of the Republic of Moldova to
the Russian-Belarus Union and the granting of the second official language status to
the Russian language, Vladimir Voronin declared that he will propose the amendment
of the Constitution, hereby the holding of the double citizenship to become possible.
The initiative would have allowed the citizens of the Republic of Moldova who
desire, to ask for and obtain the Romanian citizenship. According to some unofficial
info, more than 200,000 citizens of the Republic of Moldova hold the citizenship of
Romania and more than 50,000 hold that of Russia. The procedure for the granting of
the citizenship, based on the confirmation of the fact that a successor of the solicitor
was a Romanian citizen, produced a diplomatic scandal between Bucharest and
53
Cosmin Popa „România vrea s resusciteze Organiza ia de Cooperare la Marea Neagr ” (Romania wants
to resuscitate the Black Sea Cooperation Organization), in Adev rul, 29 October 2005,
http://www.adevarulonline.ro/index.jsp?page=articol&article_id=159781.
37
Chisinau. The ambassador of the Republic of Moldova in Bucharest, Emil Ciobu, sent
a letter to a Romanian newspaper, accusing the Romanian government that it wishes
to grant the citizenship to as many citizens of the Republic of Moldova for
discrediting the official institutions of the Republic of Moldova, thus facilitating a
progressive takeover of the Republic.
• The signing of the bilateral treaty
Although Romania was the first country to recognize the Republic of Moldova, at
a few hours after the proclamation of its state independence, on 27 August 1991, the
political treaty between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, whose negotiation started
in February 1992, hasn’t been signed up till now, because of some clauses, that Chisinau
has considered disadvantageous.54 At present, the Republic of Moldova is the only
neighbouring state that Romania hasn’t concluded a bilateral treaty with.55 There are real
prospects, though, for this major deficiency in the bilateral relations to be adjusted soon.
Following the meeting between the Presidents Traian B sescu and Vladimir Voronin in
Iasi on 25 September 2005, President B sescu declared that Romania and the Republic of
Moldova have set up the common goal to finalize the political treaty. From Romania’s
standpoint, the treaty should take the form of a bilateral European partnership agreement,
as a concrete means for assisting Chisinau in its EU accession endeavour.
After President B sescu’s visit in Chisinau, in January 2005, and particularly the
counterpart visit of President Voronin in Ia i, in September 2005, the relations between
Romania and the Republic of Moldova have become more pragmatically-oriented,
substantiated in assistance provided in all international forums to the Republic of
Moldova for its European integration and standpoint in relation to the Transnistrian issue,
the rebuilding of the economic collaboration and the enhancement of the commercial
exchanges between the two countries, and the backing of the Republic of Moldova to
become a member with full rights in the distribution system of electric energy in South-
East Europe.56
Within the scope of its policy to protect the rights of Romanians from abroad, the
Romanian state will continue to support in the relation with the Republic of Moldova, the
promotion of democracy, the market economy, the principles of stability and good
neighbourliness, the rights and fundamental liberties of the citizens, including the ethnic
identity assertion of the Romanians from the Republic of Moldova.
54
Romania after 2000: Threats and Challenges, Annual Early Warning Report Romania 2001, Romanian
Academic Society, Bucharest, 2002, p. 168.
55
Noua frontier Schengen i impactul asupra rela iilor dintre România i Republica Moldova: Implica ii
ale securiz rii frontierei la nivel politic, social, economic i opera ional (The new Schengen frontier and
the impact on the relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova: Implications of frontier
security at political, social, economical and operational level), the Institute for Public Policy and the
International Studies Centre, Bucharest, October 2002, p. 33
56
The Press Communique from 25 September 2005 on Basescu-Voronin meeting in Iasi,
http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=6618&_PRID=ag.
38
2.5 The Transfrontier relations between Romania and Ukraine

Romania was one of the first states that recognized the independence of Ukraine,
eventually having winding bilateral relations, with several syncopes, but also cooperation
moments in the economic and trade, and cultural and scientific domains.
On 2 June 1997, in Constanta, the Treaty regarding the relations of good
neighbourhood and cooperation between Romania and Ukraine was signed, the
document being ratified by the Romanian Parliament by means of the Law 129/16 July
1997.57
Under article 2, line 1, of this Treaty, Romania not only recognizes the present
frontiers with Ukraine, but also gives up any territorial claims in the future: “The
Contracting Parts reaffirm, in correspondence with the principles and international law
norms and with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, that the frontier between them is
inviolable and therefore they will forbear, in present and in the future, from any attempt
against this frontier, as well as from any demand or action oriented to forestall and to
usurp a part or the entire territory of the other Contracting Part”.58
In the treaty with Ukraine the Romanian government has asked for the inclusion
of a reference to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, a demand which has also been reiterated
into the negotiations for the treaty with Russia. This attitude has been perceived in the
respective countries, especially in Ukraine, as a revisionist attitude. The treaty stipulated
the commitment of Bucharest and Kyiv to implement the international norms and
standards regarding the protection of national minorities, including the Recommendation
1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council, and to support, in
accordance with the European Framework-agreement on transfrontier cooperation, the
collaboration between territorial-administrative units from the two states in the current
and the two recently established euro-regions, in the north and south of Bessarabia.
Although supposedly very important, taking into consideration the fact that Ukraine is a
country where there are half a million Romanians living - in the north of Bucovina, south
of Bessarabia, in the district of Herta and the historical Maramures county59 -, these
provisions of the treaty weren’t applied, but to a small extent, by the Ukrainian part.
The PHARE Programme-The Initiative on Transfrontier Cooperation 2003 has
played a certain role in quickening the Romanian-Ukrainian relations. The purpose of the
Programme was the amelioration of the transfrontier cooperation on a local level between
Romania and the neighbour states, which aren’t candidates at the integration into the EU,
with the aim to create the premises for future PHARE Programmes on Transfrontier
Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood (2004-2006). This programme has funded a series
of common projects of small sizes with tranfrontier impact, which encouraged the
establishing of some connections between communities / organizations / institutions on
57
Nicolae Ecobescu (eds.), Tratatele politice de baz (The political base treaties), Romanian Institute of
International Studies “Nicolae Titulescu”, Bucharest, 2003, p. 189.
58
„Tratat cu privire la rela iile de bun vecin tate i cooperare între România i Ucraina” (Treaty regarding
the relations of good neighbourhood and cooperation between Romania and Ukraine), in Politica Extern ,
Vol. II, No. 3-4, Autumn 1997, p. 210.
59
Adrian Severin, Locurile unde se construieste Europa (Places where Europe is being built), Polirom,
Iasi, 2000, p.52.
39
both sides of the frontier; technical support for the multi-annual programming and the
implementation of future projects for transfrontier cooperation with Serbia and
Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova; and the support for the future development of the
frontier regions.
On 17 June 2003 the Treaty regarding the Romanian-Ukrainian state frontier
regime, the collaboration and mutual support in frontier problems was signed in Cernauti
(Chernovtsy) which laid ground the modern type frontier regime between Romania and
Ukraine, according to the European standards and requirements. The treaty offered the
two states the legal framework necessary for eventual corrections of the frontier route,
according to the evolutions in the frontier, fluvial and maritime areas. For this purpose a
joint frontier commission was formed by way of this treaty, having among its attributions
the periodical verification of the fluvial frontier route, in case of natural morphologic
evolutions. At the same time, by means of this treaty, guarantees were offered about the
territorial sea of both states to have permanently a width of 12 marine miles, in
accordance with the international law.
If the negotiations regarding the state frontier regime were successful, those
following in parallel, starting with 1998, regarding the continental plateau and its
demarcation, have stagnated. Ultimately, in September 2004, Romania had to put forth to
the International Court of Justice in The Hague a request for the arbitration of the dispute
regarding the Serpent Island, the determination of the continental plateau and of the
exclusive economic areas of Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea.60
On 11 May 2004 Ukraine has started engineering a large depth Danube-Black See
channel on the Bastroe arm of the Danube Delta, by violating paragraph 6 of art. 12 of
the treaty regarding the frontier regime, which stipulated that the achievement of any
construction engineering, on frontier waters or on its shores, which can induce the
alteration of the riverbeds of these waters or of their flow regime, should be done
according to the bilateral agreements. The Bastroe channel affected the Reservation of
the Biosphere of Danube Delta (included in the world natural patrimony and situated
under the exclusive protection of UNESCO), as well as the navigation regime on the
Lower Danube Delta side, and therefore the state frontier regime of Romania.
Ukraine continued its engineering works on the channel, without taking into
consideration the negative reactions and the suspension appeals, expressed by the
Romanian side, the European states and the European Commission, the international
organizations working in the environment protection domain, and several non-
governmental organizations.
The Romanian diplomacy has undertaken numerous bilateral and multilateral
intercessions, with the purpose to determine an attitude from Ukraine according to
international law. This included the attempt to bring the Bastroe subject in the discussion
of the informal meeting of the North-Atlantic Council at the level of defence ministers in
Poiana Brasov (October 2004). The reaction of the western powers was rather cold,
60
„România a cerut Cur ii de Justi ie de la Haga tran area problemei Insulei erpilor” (Romania has
demanded from the Court of Justice in The Hague a solution to the Serpent Island problem”) in Adev rul,
17 September 2004, http:// www.adevarulonline.ro/arhiva/2004/Septembrie/900/97429/.
40
although at that moment the Ukraine of the Kucima regime was submitted to a
considerable political embargo by the West.
In September 2005, the new administration of Kyiv made a first step towards the
normalization of the transfrontier relations between the two states, by means of the
decision to stop engineering the Bâstroe channel,61 although the final decision is to be
taken after a consultative meeting between the Romanian and Ukrainian ministries of
environment.
On the occasion of its November 2005 visit in Bucharest, the Ukrainian minister
of Foreign Affairs Boris Tarasiuk signed with his counterpart Mihai-R zvan Ungureanu
joint letters addressed to the OSCE High Representative for Minorities and the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe asking the involvement of the two organizations in the
„depoliticized” monitoring of the rights of Romanian minority in Ukraine and the
Ukrainian minority in Romania. On the same occasion, it was announced the intention of
setting up minority languages departments in state universities in Romania and Ukraine,
of a Romanian cultural centre in Kyiv and of a Ukrainian cultural centre in Bucharest, as
well as the intent of simplifying the visas system for the Ukrainian citizens. As far as the
determination of the continental plateau and of the exclusive economic areas of Romania
and Ukraine in the Black See and the problem of the Serpent Island, Boris Tarasiuk
declared that Ukraine could take a decision until May 2006 and most probably it would
put forth a counter-memorandum to the International Court of Justice.62
61
See the MFA communiqué , quoted by Gardianul newspaper, 23 September 2005, “Ukraine, obliged to
take the European pressures into consideration, forsakes Bastroe”,
http://www.gardianul.ro/index.php?a=primapagina2005092305.xml.
62
Magda Cri an, „România i Ucraina continu taton rile” („Romania and Ukraine continue the
probings”), in Adev rul, 11 November 2005, p. 7.
41
CHAPTER 3
THE EUROPEAN ASPIRATION AND ORIENTATION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
§ 3.1 From Russia's “Near Abroad” to EU's “New Neighbourhood”

§ 3.1.1 Geopolitical Perspectives
The Republic of Moldova (RM) was called a “buffer state” between Romania and
Ukraine, but in fact, it is a buffer state between two major geopolitical projects: the Euro-
Atlantic project (under NATO and EU aegis), and the Euro-Asian one (under the aegis of
Russia).
The success of the first project – in 2004, RM became a state neighbouring
NATO and in the near future, it will become a state neighbouring the EU – has greatly
determined the current pro-European orientation of Chisinau.
This is the result of the changes that have been taking place since 2003 in the ex-
Soviet area. The event that shook the communist government in Chisinau was the CIS
summit in Yalta on 18-19 September 2003, during which the presidents of the Russian
Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed an agreement on the establishment
of a Common Economic Space (CES). CES was supposed to become a replica of the EU,
including joint taxes, free circulation of goods, services, capitals and workforce, as well
as the commercial legislation harmonization in order to remove the border barriers.
Chisinau was excluded from this arrangement, which triggered Vladimir Voronin’s
protests who said the RM will subsequently take more decisive actions targeting the
European Union. Another crucial event took place on 24 November 2003, when Chisinau
rejected the Russian plan to solve the Transnistrian conflict. The visit of the Russian
president Vladimir Putin, scheduled on the occasion of signing up the Kozak
Memorandum, was annulled on the last minute, marking the deterioration of the
relationships between the two countries. Voronin’s decision was made under the pressure
of the street protests, as well as following the consultations with the western officials.
The truth of the matter is that the Moldovan communists, rejected by Kremlin, were
forced to reorient towards the West.63
Altogether, the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, at the end of 2003, and the
“Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, at the end of 2004 were real political earthquakes
whose impact was felt as far as Chisinau, which seriously feared that similar processes
might be experienced by the Republic Moldova.64
Within this complicated context, Voronin discovered the European accession as
an “anti-revolutions shield”. As long as it was not an internal choice grounded in the
63
See “Interview given by the President of the Republic of Moldova Vladimir Voronin to the magazine
Trud-Moldova, 30 January 2004”, http://presedinte.md/press.php?p=1&s=1584&lang=rom.
64
Vladimir Voronin himself admitted that the “refreshing waves of the European revolutions, the decisive
revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, are boosting the Moldovan democracy”. See “The appointment speech
of Mr. Vladimir Voronin, President of the Republic of Moldova (Chisinau, 7 April 2005)”,
http://www.prm.md/press.php?p=1&s=2786&lang=rom.
42
evolution of the Moldovan society but an option imposed by foreign events, the current
political development is rather fragile. Moreover, the European accession is viewed only
as a geopolitical priority, which hinders the EU’s acknowledgement and undertaking as a
community of values.65
These recent evolutions are the result of persistent and long-lasting phenomena.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, the US offensive against
terrorism, following the attacks on 11 September 2001, brought about the reconsideration
of some fundamental aspects of world geopolitics. These successive events triggered the
redefinition of the Heartland. Currently, axis mundi is crossing an area made up of
Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan and the enlarged Middle East.66 Zbigniew
Brzezinski calls this area the “Global Balkans”, because of the “explosive potential to
throw the world into chaos”.67
Within this context, the Black Sea region, neighbouring NATO, the EU and the
Middle East altogether, was “rediscovered”68 by Washington as well as by Brussels and
acquired complex geopolitical aspects; it subsequently became a “springboard” for the
export of democracy as well as a centre of operations for the fight against terrorism. The
region therefore encompasses for the western states opportunities as well as risks, such as
frozen conflicts, cross-border criminality and democratic deficits.
Out of the position of a NATO state and future member of the EU, Romania has a
privileged and yet difficult condition of Western border. In turn, the EU increased the
diplomatic activities in the former Soviet area, especially in the states to become or that
that already became neighbours of the Union, subsequent to the enlargement of the
European community at 25 member states, in May 2004. While Moscow is treating the
former Soviet Republics as “near abroad”, the officials in Brussels considers them as
“common neighbours” of Russia and of the EU.
The geopolitical development of the West was accomplished by limiting the
traditional sphere of influence of Moscow. After 1991, Russia saw its influence limited to
its own territory. The shock of the downfall into the “western cul-de-sac” was reinforced
by the entry of the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the
range of action of the West. By the NATO accession of the Baltic States, Poland and
Romania, Russia was isolated in the west by a “sanitary belt” to be totally closed once
Ukraine’s option as far as its accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures is definitive.
Moreover, in Central Asia and Caucasus, the USA tried to take advantage of the
political vacuum created following the USSR dissolution – event that president Putin
65
Nicu Popescu, “The Revolutionary Evolution in Moldova”, in CEPS Neighborhood Watch, Issue 3, April
2005, p. 3.
66
Ionel Nicu Sava, Geopolitical Patterns of Euro-Atlanticism. A Perspective from South Eastern Europe,
Conflict Studies Research Centre, Central & Eastern Europe Series 04/16 June 2004, pp. 9-10. The article
was also published in Euro-Atlantic Studies, no. 8, University of Bucharest, Publishing House of the
Bucharest University, 2005.
67
Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Hegemonic Quicksand”, in The National Interest, Winter 2003/2004, p. 5.
68
Ronald D. Asmus, Bruce P. Jackson, “The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom”, in Policy Review,
June-July 2004, pp. 17-18.
43
deems as being a “geopolitical catastrophe”69 – in order to substitute the Russian

influence with its own influence.
Within the context of the recent evolutions, the region of the Black Sea might
acquire a higher value for Washington and Brussels, taking into consideration the fact
that Moscow has not given up dominating some areas perceived as being in its exclusive
area of influence until not long ago.
Thus, in the context of a decline of the “orange revolutions” that marked the
2003-2004 years, Kremlin looks to articulate coalitions that counterbalance the American
presence in the Central Asia and in the region of the Caspian Sea, and draws up projects
on setting up a Euro-Asian Union made up of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.70 Within
the meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization on 5 July 2005, Moscow managed to
co-interest the other member states (China, Uzbekistan, Kirghiz Republic, Tajikistan and
Kazakhstan) to adopt a common declaration asking Washington to settle precise
deadlines to leave the bases in Kirghiz and Uzbekistan, used for the transit connected to
the military operations in Afghanistan.
Within this global puzzle, the Republic of Moldova starts to be less anonymous,
even if for the West the real stake is Ukraine’s anchoring in the West.71
The Republic of Moldova is relevant for Russia, which explains its constant attitude
towards Tiraspol. On 17 November 1995, the State Duma enacted a decision by means of
which it requested President Boris Yeltsin to acknowledge Transnistria as an area of
strategic interest for Moscow, “taking into account NATO’s enlargement trend to the
East”.72 Nowadays, the importance of Transnistria does not reside in its Russian-speaking
population, but in the fact that with its help, Moscow “can keep the Republic of Moldova
under its tutelage, Ukraine under control and the Balkans under surveillance”.73
Hence, it is likely that Moscow is continuing to play the Transnistrian card, in its
efforts to impede the crisis regulation on a definite period of time, forcing RM to remain
prisoner in a grey area under Russian influence.
69
“Putin: Collapse of USSR Could Have Been Avoided”, message of Agency RIA Novosti on 6 May 2005.
70
“The CIS and Baltic press on Russia”, message of Agency RIA Novosti, 22 July 2005.
71
As for the importance that USA gives Ukraine, see Ukraine’s Future and U.S. Interests. Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, 2004, http://www.house.gov/international—relations. Also,
Testimony of Bruce Pitcairn Jackson Before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
European Affairs “The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Region”, March 8, 2005.
72
“Decision draft of the State Duma of the Russian Federation on some issues of the collaboration between
the Russian Federation and Transnistria”, in Marian Enache, Dorin Cimpoe u, Misiune diplomatic în
Republica Moldova 1993-1997 (Diplomatic mission in the Republic of Moldova, 1993-1997), Polirom,
Iasi, 2000, p. 379.
73
Petre Deic , Rusia imperial . Recidiva sau visul unui geopolitician rus (Imperial Russia. Relapse or the
dream of a Russian politician), at http://www.geopolitica.ro. Also see Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia:
Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization, Moscow, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001,
p. 171.
44
§ 3.1.2 Geo-economic Perspectives

The meaning of the “Global Balkans” does not only reside in their destabilizing
potential for the world, but in their wide energy resources. About 68 per cent of the world
oil reserves and 41 per cent of the gas ones are currently found in this region.74
On its turn, the extended area of the Black Sea is more than the West’s access
gate to the new Heartland;75 it provides a meaningful percentage of the necessary energy
of the EU’s member states, and it is most likely to grow in the following decade.76 The
demand will be partly covered through some pipelines towards the energy sources in the
Caspian Sea and in the Near and Middle East, which would minimize the EU dependency
on Russian supplies.77 Moscow is aware of this fact and president Putin constantly says
the “Black Sea enables Russia the direct access to the most important global transport
routes”.78
The region of the Black Sea always had simultaneous or successive roles of
connection and border.79 The fact it used to be the terminus station of the Silk Route, and
taking into account it is going to be transited by the energy transport corridors to the
Western Europe, will render it more visible, Brussels being directly interested in keeping
the safety and constant supply of this region.
As for Moldova, the situation is much more delicate. The import of energy from
the Russian Federation and Ukraine covers about 97 per cent of the domestic need,
placing Chisinau in a position of economic dependency towards Moscow.80 This is
amplified by the disproportionate orientation of the Moldovan trade towards the Russian
market, which makes that the Republic of Moldova almost totally belongs to the Euro-
Asian area, geo-economically speaking.
Therefore, for Chisinau to efficiently diminish the economic vulnerability is to
gradually but firmly re-orientate towards the EU.
74
Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Hegemonic Quicksand”, p. 6.
75
Testimony of Bruce Pitcairn Jackson Before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
European Affairs “The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Region”, 8 March 2005.
76
According to President Traian B sescu, “the enlarged area of the Black Sea is currently providing 50% of
the necessary energy of the EU and it is aimed that 70 per cent of the necessary energy of the EU’s
countries is provided from this area in the upcoming ten years”. See the transcript of the debate on “New
directions of the Romanian foreign policy” on 14 June 2005, attended by President B sescu,
http://www.ziua.ro/b.html. The figures mentioned by the president are accurate, but they represent the
aggregate imports of energy of the EU coming from the Gulf area, Russia and North Africa. See “European
security strategy”, in Alexandru-Radu Timofte, Marea provocare a începutului de mileniu – securitatea în
societatea globalizat (Big challenge of the millennium-security in the globalized society), Publishing
House of the National Information Academy, 2005, Bucharest, p. 228.
77
Alexandra Sarcinschi, Cristian B hn reanu, Redimension ri i configur ri ale mediului de securitate
regional - zona M rii Negre i Balcani (Changes and configuration of the regional security environment -
the area of the Black Sea and the Balkans), Publishing House of the National Defense University,
Bucharest, 2005, p. 18.
78
CDI Russia Weekly, 18 September 2003.
79
regional - zona M rii Negre i Balcani (Changes and configuration of the regional security environment -
the area of the Black Sea and the Balkans), p. 7.
80
Oleg Serebrian, Politic i geopolitic (Politics and Geopolitics), Cartier, Chisinau, 2004, p. 24.
45
§ 3.2 Moldovan Perceptions of EU, Romania and European Integration

The European accession is an issue that has recently been included on the public
agenda of the RM. Despite of the vague references on the European appurtenance of
Chisinau in the speeches of some officials,81 the option of the accession was nothing but a
hypothesis or “a sort of hobby for some young diplomats”.82
As in geopolitics the perception incorporates the interest,83 in other words the
perception of an actor upon the geographic area and upon its own part in the power
equation is also influenced by its interests, it is obvious the lack of any reference on the
EU is a consequence of Chisinau’s lack of interest in following a European way.
In fact, since acquiring the independence, RM has vacillated between choosing
the CIS or the EU. This fundamental indecision brought about, at the political as well as
the collective representation levels, the contradiction “of the concomitant accession in
CIS and in the EU”. At a declarative level, this ambiguous attitude was explained by the
ex-President Lucinschi, back in 1997: “We are taught in black and white. Or – or. On one
of the two sides. But Moldova will be a part of CIS. It will also be a part of the European
Union. In time, of course”.84
The option is a symptom of the identity crisis faced by the RM. Interesting is the
fact that the split-up between East and West was presented by the political elite in
Chisinau as a means to toughen the state, the simultaneously favouring of the two
irreconcilable options ensuring the country’s independence.85
Thus, according to Vasile Stati, the ideologist and official historian of the
communists in Moldova, Chisinau can both aim to Moscow and Brussels (or Bucharest),
as this policy brings about the freedom of movement of the Republic: “By
acknowledging the double suzerainty – of Poland and Ukraine (sic!) – Moldova just as
now (our emphasis) is under protection of both countries, as the pretences of both
countries, namely of Poland and Hungary, were mutually annulling one another. Thus,
through tefan’s diplomatic skills, in 1475, Moldova was de facto independent, its
«vassalage» being much more decorative”.86
The same idea of “double vassalage” was more metaphorically conveyed by the
president in charge Vladimir Voronin in the thesis “the calf eating from two cows”.87 His
81
In his appointment speech, President Petru Lucinski stated on 15 January 1997, the “Chance of the
Republic of Moldova relies in (sic!) the modernity and the European horizon”. See “The appointment
speech”, in Marian Enache, Dorin Cimpoe u, Misiune diplomatic în Republica Moldova 1993-1997
(Diplomatic mission in the Republic of Moldova, 1993-1997), p. 392.
82
Oleg Serebrian, Politic i geopolitic (Politics and Geopolitics), p. 9.
83
Constantin Hlihor, Istorie i geopolitic în Europa secolului XX. Considera ii teoretice i metodologice
(History and geopolitics in the 20th Europe. Theoretical and methodological aspects), Publishing House of
the Academy of High Military Studies, Bucharest, 1999, p. 174.
84
Iulian Frunta u, O istorie etnopolitic a Basarabiei (1812-2002) (An Ethno-political history of
Bessarabia, 1812-2002), Cartier, Chisinau, 2002, p. 405.
85
Despite of the fact that there is no juridical incompatibility between the appurtenance to CIS and the
accession to the EU, the formula “East and West altogether” is politically bankrupt.
86
Vasile Stati, Istoria Moldovei (History of Moldova), Vivar-Editor, Chisinau, 2002, p. 81.
87
Nestor Rate , “Moldova: communists rule”,
46
opinion overlaps, being almost identical, to that of his predecessor. Thus, in June 2002,
he said that “the European integration is not built on an alternative basis, it is no longer
opposed to the integration of the CIS countries”.88 In May 2005, the President of
Moldova reiterated the same stand,89 which proves that the officials in Chisinau continue
to be the prisoners of duplicity.90
According to suggestive remark of a journalist in Moldova, the policy of the
leaders in Chisinau is very simple: “when they leave to the West, they brag the Republic
of Moldova heads to one direction – to the gates of IMF and of the European Union, but
making a halt at the Kremlin palaces, they claim the locomotive of the Republic of
Moldova train has one terminus station - Russia-Belarus Union”.91
It may seem ironic but president Voronin himself was incriminating this
indecisive attitude, in Washington, in 2002. “But Moldova – he said – was kept aside of
those positive integration processes that took place in Europe. We particularly talk about
the European accession. Years in a row the political class in Moldova has tried to
vacillate between West and East, between Europe and Russia, primitively translating the
global interests of Russia and of the West”.92
This ambivalence was a feature of the leaders in the Republic of Moldova and of
most of the population as well. Even though during 1998-2001, we could witness an
increase of the preferences for the European accession, under the circumstances that the
costs were not fully acknowledged,93 a survey back in 2002 indicated that 38% of the
interviewed persons felt inclined towards the European Union and an identical percentage
towards the CIS.94
http://www.observatorcultural.ro/informatiiarticol.phtml?xid=3490.
88
Anatol Gudîm, Republic Moldova i Uniunea European ca parteneri (Republic of Moldova and the
European Union as partners), Center for Strategic Investigations and Reforms, Chisinau, 2002, p. 21.
89
“Voronin: Relations between Moldova citizens and the Russian entered the genetic code”, message of
news agency Russia nowadays, 15 May 2005.
90
“Despite of the fact that RM boosted the accession process to NATO structures, the foreign policy of
Moldova continues to be vacillating and lacking a well-defined western vector. The participation of
Moldova within CIS is continuing, though lacking a future. The European accession and the
implementation of the bilateral plan of the EU-RM is considered to be the number one priority of the
administration in Chisinau. The continuation of such a vacillating policy will stagnate even more the
solving of the disagreement in Transnistria, the Ukrainian party justifying the illegal and profitable trade
with Transnistria based on the treaties signed within CIS. Out of this point o view, the continuation of the
participation within an organization undermining the economic and political interests of the RM seems
abnormal.” Political & Security Statewatch, Monthly Bulletin on Moldova issued by Idis Viitorul, no. 3,
May-June 2005, p. 5.
91
Nicolae Rusu, “ ara liliecilor” (Bats’ country), in Contrafort, issue 7-8 (81-82), July-August 2001,
http://www.contrafort.md/2001/81-82/169.html.
92
“The Speech of the President of the Republic of Moldova Vladimir Voronin at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, USA”, 18 December 2002,
http://www.prm.md/press.php?p=1&s=797&lang=rom
93
Ala Belostecinic, Analiza Barometrului de Opinie Public (Analysis of the Public Opinion Barometer
1998, 2000, 2001), research drawn up within the Program of the Public Opinion Barometer in Moldova of
the Institute for Public Policy, Chisinau, 2001, p. 16.
94
Barometrul de Opinie Public - noiembrie 2002 (Public Opinion Barometer- November 2002), drawn up
by the Center of Analysis and Sociological, Political and Psychological Investigations CIVIS in Chisinau at
the request of the Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md.
47
We could notice a more definite situation in the last period. According to the
Barometer of Public Opinion during 26 October-10 November 2004, on a sample of
1,446 persons, two thirds of the people in Moldova (66.4 per cent) voted in favour of
RM’s accession to the EU, while only 5.4 per cent were against, and 24 per cent
abstained. About 64.6 per cent of the polled persons said their living standard will
improve with RM’s accession to the EU, while 3.2 per cent believed their living standard
will get worse.95
Surprising are the results of a Gallup poll (2003-2004), according to which half of
the respondents claimed that the EU is partner of Moldova and 77 per cent said their
country should join the EU. Moreover, the EU ranked the top position in a classification
of the trust the citizens of Moldova have in institutions, immediately after the Russian
Orthodox Church and right before the Bessarabian Orthodox Church.96
We must cautiously consider these data, because of the “individuals’
psychological duality”97 on the left bank of Prut. Another poll in 2000 shows that 69 per
cent of the polled persons supported the EU accession, despite of the fact that 55.6 per
cent said they have never felt Europeans.98
As for Romania, a public poll in 2004 accounts that 19 per cent and respectively
24 per cent (in case of the sample for the public local administration in the Republic of
Moldova) of the people polled, believe this is the country which Chisinau should develop
relations with priority, while Russia enjoys 41 per cent and 42 per cent. We must stress
out that USA ranked the third position in their preferences, with 8 per cent, while
countries of the EU such as Germany, Great Britain or France hardly got each 6 per
cent.99
According to the same poll, 24 per cent of the polled people said the main effect
of Romania’s accession to the EU will be, out of their perspective, the settlement of visa
restriction for the free circulation, and only 10 per cent and respectively 20 per cent (in
case of the sample for the public local administration in RM) said that this way, the
Republic of Moldova will subsequently have “a strategic reliable partner among the full-
right members of the EU”.100
We have to see the degree in which the preferences of the population and of the
political elite on the international accession of the Republic of Moldova are firmly and
constantly developing to the European direction or this is only a trend of conjuncture. On
medium and long-term, the perception on the European Union might develop according
to various factors, including the EU success, Romania’s EU accession and Ukraine’s firm
95
Barometrul de Opinie Public – octombrie-noiembrie 2004 (Public Opinion Barometer-October-
November 2004), made by the Institute of Marketing and Surveys IMAS-INC Chisinau, upon the request of
the Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md.
96
Magda Barascu, “26 per cent of the people in Moldova fear Romania”, in Evenimentul Zilei, 21 May
2005.
97
Iulian Frunta u, O istorie etnopolitic a Basarabiei (1812-2002) (An Ethno-political history of
Bessarabia, 1812-2002), p. 404.
98
Ibid., p. 404.
99
Social Monitor, Public opinion survey, Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) Viitorul,
Chisinau, October 2004, p. 81.
100
Ibid., p. 87.
48
option towards the same direction, notwithstanding the transformations underwent by the
society of Moldova or in the CIS space. Also, in time, Romania’s role as main advocate
of Chisinau in relation to the EU is likely to be more intensively acknowledged,
eliminating the impression that “Romania turned its face to the West and its back to
Moldova”.101
§3.3 The Impact of Domestic Policy Developments in the Republic of Moldova and
Ukraine
§ 3.3.1 The Impact of Voronin Factor in the Republic of Moldova
Vladimir Voronin, the re-elected President of the RM, has underwent a
spectacular evolution in the field of foreign policy from the support of the accession to
Russia-Belarus Union to the unconditioned undertaking, rhetorically at least, of the
European integration. As strange as it might seem, this metamorphosis is not the result of
an inconvenience, but the evidence of the availability of the communist leader in
Chisinau to adhere to any cause that guarantees his political survival.
The good faith of his commitment is questioned because of this very reason.
Without eliminating ab initio the possibility of a real change of the former apparatchik
and former general in the Russian militia structures into a convinced democrat and
supporter of the European values,102 the variant of a change based on conjuncture is much
more likely. As Voronin’s “pragmatism” is expressed through the slogan “we must be
where it is convenient for us to be”, his current facelift is questioned.
However, if we ignore the issue of political honesty of the President of Moldova,
we must stress out that in a way, he became the prisoner of his own rhetoric. By waging
on the European accession, out of strictly electoral reasons on the internal plan, or to
avoid the isolation on the external plan, Voronin created into the Moldovan society a
huge horizon of expectation, any major diverging from the current political strategy being
most likely to bring about frustrations that can originate a crisis. Moreover, we must not
overlook that Voronin was designated in the supreme position in the state by the
Parliament in Chisinau following a “Political partnership to reach the goals of European
integration” that included the forces of the opposition, subsequently included in a
Declaration.
Also, as much as he had tried, at a declarative level, to tactfully deal with
Moscow’s susceptibility, Voronin is now in the bad graces of “the big brother from the
East”, which relies now on the “Patria-Rodina” party to promote his interests in
Chisinau.103
101
Iurie Ro ca’s telephonic conversation in Vartan Arachelian’s talk show “Politica” (Politics), Realitatea
TV, 18 January 2003.
102
Lately, Voronin is even speaking about an ideological reorientation of the communist party in Moldova
to the social-democracy. See the interview with Vladimir Voronin made by Eugen Tomiuc for “Radio Free
Europe”, 8 February 2005, http://www.contrafort.md/2005/123-124/795_2.html.
103
Michael Emerson, “The Black Sea as Epicentre of the Aftershocks of the EU’s Earthquake”, Centre for
European Policy Studies, Policy Brief , No. 79/July 2005, p. 2.
49
The political scene left of Prut will most likely be dominated by Voronin and by
the communists who, with 56 mandates, have a parliamentary majority. The Coalition of
the Democratic Moldova Block, which adjudicated 34 positions in the Parliament, has
already entered a process of dissolution, after the elections on 6 March 2005, process that
was boosted by its heterogeneous and incoherent nature; this is implicitly favouring the
stability prospects of the communist governance. The Popular Christian-Democratic
Party has only 11 mandates and holds a negative reduced impact in the electorate, the
more so that its anti-Russian and pro-Western message is monopolized by Voronin.
A formula a political consensus has apparently been reached. The three
parliamentary parties support as main priorities, despite of the ideological differences, the
European accession, the unconditioned pullout of the Russian troops and the resolution of
the Transnistrian crisis.
The importance of the Voronin factor is augmented by the lack of a motivated and
powerful opposition as well as by the absence of an enough dynamic civil society. Hence,
we should not fear a new radical strategy-change of the communist leader in Chisinau
leading to a realignment to the position of the Russian Federation (though this possibility
cannot be totally ruled out), but we should fear that he might be tempted to endorse and
to perpetuate the democratic deficit in the RM behind a sterile pro-European rhetoric.
§ 3.3.2 The Impact of Yuschenko Factor in Ukraine

The success of the “Orange Revolution” in Kyiv was applauded by the West,
which hoped the political change will be an inside catalyst of the democratization
process, ensuring the country’s Euro-Atlantic orientation.
The new President, Viktor Yuschenko, inherited an oligarchic state104 from his
predecessor Leonid Kuchma, that is politically, ethnically and culturally split-up, Dnepr
being the delimitation between a pro-Western and a Russian-speaking Ukraine.105
The people’s confidence in Yuschenko is diminishing, the rhythm of the reform
not matching the population’s expectation, which might turn the initial enthusiasm into
disappointment. Under these circumstances, the artisans of “the orange revolution” might
be defeated in the parliamentary elections scheduled for March 2006, which might have
an even more serious impact as Ukraine is going to turn from a presidential republic into
a semi-parliamentarian one.106
Even if the government in Kyiv receives a new confirmation following the
legislative voting in 2006, subsequent frustrations can be originated by an indefinite
104
About the oligarchic groups in Ukraine, see Hiski Haukkala, Arkady Moshes, Beyond “Big Bang”: The
Challenges of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy in the East, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs,
Report 9/2004, p. 41.
105
See Jean-Pierre Masseret, Rapporteur and Abdülkadir Ate , co-Rapporteur, Report submitted on behalf
of the Political Committee, “Security cooperation between the EU and its eastern neighbors”, Assembly of
Western European Union, The Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, Fifty-First
Session, Document A/1895, 14 June 2005, p.7.
106
James Sherr, Realism About Ukraine, Part I – Internal Conditions, Conflict Studies Research Centre,
UK Defence Academy, 28 June 2005, p. 1.
50
expectation in the anti-chamber of the Euro-Atlantic institutions, which might cause Kyiv
to lean towards Moscow once again.
The accession to NATO is currently hard to achieve. Despite of the new
government seen as a reformist one, Ukraine is qualified for the accession only if the
Euro-Atlantic decision-makers aim at the dissolution of the Alliance. USA and its
European allies need an intensified political and economic partnership with Ukraine, but
the integration of this fragile colossus within the Alliance would bring high risks: the
Russian fleet is still in Sevastopol, and Kyiv has to solve the territorial dispute with
Moscow connected to the Kerch Strait and the juridical regime of the Azov Sea.
Internally, a counterrevolution of pro-Moscow forces might take place, due to the large
Russophile and Russian-speaking community in Donetsk region, for example. We must
also add the incapacity to adopt a like-minded behaviour – emphasized by the unfriendly
attitude toward Romania –, the too-slow and superficial reform of the Ukrainian armed
forces, the recent accession waves that must be suitably integrated and last but not least,
the considerable opposition of Russia. Unable to achieve Ukraine’s short-term107
accession to NATO, and considering that the perspective of EU accession is even more
remote, president Yuschenko could become the victim of powerful popular resentments.
§ 3.4 The Role of Regional Cooperation

During the development of the processes of multilateral cooperation in Europe,
it was noticed that the participation to the projects promoted through various regional
initiatives is a logical prerequisite for the European accession.108 Hence, targeting the
accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures, the overcoming of the marginalization effects
within the context of Romania’s accession to the EU, as well as the propagation in the
region of the effects of stability, security and prosperity from its Western neighbourhood,
RM has politically enforced a strategy to get involved in various initiatives and bodies of
regional cooperation, as well as of development of the Euro-regions, together with
membership in international bodies.
3.4.1 The Participation of the Republic of Moldova in the Regional Cooperation

Structures
The Republic of Moldova is member of the United Nations, of the International
Monetary Fund, of World Bank, of World Trade Organization, of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, of the Council of Europe and of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its accession to the world multilateral cooperation
was completed after 1991 through the more obvious shaping of the regional dimension,
by taking part in: the Central European Initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe, the South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process, the Southeastern European
Cooperative Initiative, the Danubian Cooperation Process, the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation Organization and GUAM/ GUUAM.
107
Namely, during the presumed period of two constitutional mandates.
108
See Europe and the Transition Process in the Republic of Moldova, Südosteuropag Gesellschaf
Conference Report, Berlin, 2-3 July 2004, p. 7.
51
The Central European Initiative (CEI) is a flexible form of regional

cooperation comprising 17 states: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Republic of Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The initiative
was set up in 1989 and aims to promote the political, economic and cultural cooperation
between the member states, in order to support the reforms from the countries in
transition and to contribute to the further cohesion in Europe with a view of setting up a
continent with no delimitation lines resulting out of the differences of economic
development or strategies of European and Euro-Atlantic enlargement.109 CEI aims to
cooperate with organizations and European institutions, especially with the EU, the
Council of Europe, the OSCE, as well as with other cooperation initiatives, in mutual
interest areas. As a member state, Moldova benefits from programmes of know-how
transfer, technology transfer, promotion of investments and scientific research,
development of the transport, energy and telecommunications infrastructure, education
and professional training. An important role is assigned to the cooperation in the field of
control of migration and border security, minorities’ rights, energy and SMEs. Since
2002, CEI has established a specialized working group on the cross-border cooperation –
CEI Working Group on Interregional and Cross-Border Cooperation, aiming to support
projects aiming at good neighbourhood relations, stability, security and prosperity. In
relation to the ENP goals, the CEI actions could focus on the bilateral cooperation EU–
RM on all the three fields: political/human/cultural, economic and security.
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE) is a major attempt of the
international community to implement in South Eastern Europe a long-term conflicts
prevention strategy, stressing upon the economic reconstruction, political development
and social security. SPSEE has gradually become an additional key instrument meant to
enable the accession of South Eastern states to the European Union.110
The Republic of Moldova joined the SPSEE on 6 June 2001, subsequent to an
intense diplomatic offensive supported by Romania. Since then, RM has tried to establish
an efficient national collaboration mechanism with the Stability Pact and to take part in
most of its initiatives. The wide range of fields and of geographical coverage of the Pact
favoured the rapid familiarization with the dynamics and the mechanisms of regional
cooperation and brought RM closer to the Euro-Atlantic structures. The participation to
SPSEE, besides the support to the direction of macro-stability, infrastructure
development, democracy and security consolidation, meant the inclusion of the Republic
of Moldova in the range of interests of the EU and the prospect of Euro-Atlantic
accession. The political incoherence of Chisinau and the modest financial resources
limited the impact of the actions of the Pact upon the economic recovery, internal
democratization and stability and security of RM. Moreover, RM does not take part in the
main mechanism initiated by the EU in collaboration with the Stability Pact – the
Accession and Stabilization Process–, which confers it a rather marginal status.
109
Vasile Popa, Mihai-Stefan Dinu, România i procesul de stabilizare regional (Romania and the process
of regional stabilization), Publishing House of National Defense University, Bucharest, 2004, p. 17.
110
Adrian Pop, Strategii de integrare european (Strategies of European integration), Sylvi Publishing
House, Bucharest, 2003, p. 142.
52
The South Eastern European Cooperation Process is a non- institutionalized

regional cooperation structure established in 1996, grouping 9 states: Albania, Bulgaria,
Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Croatia. Its defining feature is the fact that it represents the sole forum in Europe
exclusively established and managed by the participant states according to the “regional
ownership” principle, meant to encourage the political dialogue and the consultation in
the accession process of the area to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The main
goal is to promote the relations of good neighbourhood, the stability and security in the
region, according to the Charter enacted in Bucharest in February 2000. Moldova enjoys
an observer status and its major goal is the accession to the regional energy market,
which represents one of the two main initiatives of the Process, next to the action plan for
regional economic cooperation.
The Southeastern European Cooperative Initiative is a sub-regional structure
encouraging the cooperation and the facilitation of the accession to the European and
Euro-Atlantic structures. The initiative was launched in December 1996, by the American
ambassador Richard Schifter, after the signing of the Dayton peace agreements, and aims
to develop a viable economic and environment strategy within the area. The initiative
currently comprises 12 states – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and
Serbia and Montenegro – and enjoys the support of Austria, Italy, Switzerland, USA and
the Czech Republic, as well as of a tight cooperation with the EU and OSCE. The
initiative monitors the coordination of the plans of regional development, ensures a better
presence of the private sector within the economic sector of the area, and encourages the
know-how transfer and the carrying out of investments in the private sector.
The Danubian Cooperation Process is a political initiative of Romania and
Austria, joined by the European Commission and the Stability Pact. Launched in Vienna,
on 27 May 2002, the Danubian Cooperation Process is a non-institutionalized structure, a
political framework of cooperation and promotion of the joint preoccupation and interests
of the states in the Danubian region: economic development, navigation and the
sustainable transport, management of the environment and of the fluvial basin, the
tourism, the cultural and sub-regional cooperation. All the Danube riparian states were
invited to joint the Process, targeting the co-involvement of all the states in the region for
developing the cooperation in view of a more efficient management of their own
resources. Currently, besides the European Commission and the Stability Pact, the
activity of the Danubian Cooperation Process involves 13 states: Austria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, the Republic of
Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Beginning
the conference launching the initiative, Romania was hopeful that this initiative would
become a political platform by means of which Romania’s eastern neighbours, namely
Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, could access financing programmes allotted by the
European Bank for Investments for regional projects. The second ministerial conference
of the Process held in Bucharest, on 14 July 2004, took into account the idea that by
giving special attention to the Danubian problems, within the context of launching and
implementing ENP, the EU could contribute at consolidating the connections between all
53
the Danubian countries, bringing closer the member states of the Union to non-member
ones.111
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was launched as a consultation
forum and as a flexible mechanism of political coordination on 25 June 1992, through
signing the Declaration in Istanbul by Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia,
Greece, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine. Serbia
and Montenegro and Macedonia subsequently asked to become members, and Austria,
Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland and Tunisia enjoy observer status.112 On the
occasion of the meeting in Chisinau on Romania’s takeover of the acting presidency of
this organization, from the Republic of Moldova, as of 1 November 2005, the USA and
Belarus were also assigned observer status.113 On its turn, the European Union might also
receive an invitation in that respect.114 Subsequent to the coming into force of the
“Charter for Black Sea Economic Cooperation”,115 on 30 April 1999, BSEC became a
regional organization with international identity – the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Organization (BSECO). The same year, after enacting the Resolution A/54/5, BSECO
acquired the status of an UN observer.
By its large number of member states and the high institutionalization degree,
BSECO is the most important multilateral collaboration framework in the region. The
organization abides by the principles “cooperation, not confrontation” and “involvement,
not alienation” and aims to promote the stability and economic growth in the region.116
BSECO has 15 working groups, the most important being those on cooperation in the
fields of transports, energy and fighting organized crime.117 The financial pillar of the
organization is the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, which financed over 60
projects.
Until not long ago, the EU has been reluctant in taking seriously the organization,
in setting up cooperation relations with it and in efficiently getting involved in its
111
Final Document of the Second Ministerial Conference of the Danube Co-operation Process (Bucharest,
14th of July 2004).
112
Mustafa Aydin, Europe' s Next Shore: the Black Sea Region after EU Enlargement, Occasional Paper,
no, 53, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, June 2004, p. 22.
113
Cosmin Popa, „România vrea s resusciteze Organiza ia de Cooperare la Marea Neagr ” (Romania
wants to resuscitate the Black Sea Cooperation Organization), in Adev rul, 29 October 2005,
http://www.adevarulonline.ro/index.jsp?page=articol&article_id=159781. Also, see Testimony by
Ambassador John F. Tefft Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs "The
Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Area", Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on
European Affairs, 8 March 2005.
114
Mustafa Aydin, Europe' s Next Shore: the Black Sea Region after EU Enlargement, p 17.
115
The Charter was signed during the Yalta meeting, on 5 June 1998.
116
regional-zona M rii Negre i Balcani (Changes and configuration of the regional security environment -
the area of the Black Sea and the Balkans), p. 20.
117
As for the efficiency and results of this organization, different evaluations have been made, sometimes
even antagonistic ones. Thus, according to Bruce Pitcairn Jackson, BSECO is a “dying” forum. For
Aleksandr Iakovenko, deputy of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the organization has a great
potential. See Testimony of Bruce Pitcairn Jackson Before the Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on European Affairs “The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Region”, 8 March 2005
and “Russian policy in the Black Sea region”, message of Agency Ria Novosti, 18 August 2005.
54
projects. In fact, grouping countries coming from 3 geographical areas (Southern Europe,
Eastern Europe and South Caucasus), divided into 4 categories from the viewpoint of the
relations with the EU (member states, associated countries to become member states,
states undergoing the pre-accession period and states covered by the neighbourhood
policy), BSECO is a structure of regional cooperation whose experience can be used to
ensure the coherence and unity of approach within the ENP. The diversity of the
participant countries, the existence of historic conflicts, the low level of the financial
resources and the economic difficulties urged the establishment of the “lowest common
denominator”, and a flexible attitude in enacting the projects of cooperation, strategy
required by the neighbourhood relations of the EU as well. Also, through its projects (in
the field of energy, trade liberalization, development of the networks of transport,
communication and their connection to the trans-European networks, attracting foreign
investments, the development of SMEs), its established mechanisms (the Black Sea
Trade and Development Bank, the Data Bank, the International Centre for Black Sea
Studies), BSECO can support the accomplishment of the goals of the ENP and implicitly
the priorities of the Action Plan for Moldova.
However, BSECO has some limitations mainly connected to the different agendas
of each member state. If the Russian Federation for example, insists upon the economic
aspect, the Republic of Moldova (that fulfilled the presidency of organization during
May-October 2005) would have aimed to settle “new collaboration domains within
BSECO, namely the security and stability in the region”.118 As acting president of
BSECO (November 2005-April 2006), Romania announced to promote projects in the
field of the fight against the organized crime and to propose in that respect the signing of
a collaboration memorandum between BSECO and SECI Regional Center. In fact, the
setting up of a security area has always been a target undertaken by BSECO, but no
concrete and distinct policies have been drafted, at least for now, because of the reticence
of some member states to “mix up” the security field with the economic one. As for the
member states, the regional cooperation can be nothing but useful, provided that BSECO
would not fail in an alternative to the EU and would become an instrument for promoting
the policies of Brussels in the area. In that respect, the document to settle the principles
and the collaboration modalities between BSECO an EU will be extremely important,
whose settlement is a priority for the Romanian presidency of BSECO, next to fields such
as the transport, energy and the domestic affairs.119
Another cooperation group in the enlarged region of the Black Sea is GUAM/
GUUAM (the acronym of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), established back
in 1997. Two years later, Uzbekistan became a member of this structure that aimed to be
an alternative to CIS. In time, Ukraine’s attitude towards this structure has been rather
ambiguous.
Neither the Republic of Moldova has showed a constant enthusiasm towards
GUAM. In 2001, Vladimir Voronin refused to sign, within the meeting in Yalta, the
118
“Pre iden ia Republicii Moldova în cadrul OCEMN” (The Presidency of the Republic of Moldova
within BSECO), http://www.mfa.md/Ro/BSECOhome.html.
119
“România preia Pre edin ia în Exerci iu a Organiza iei Economice a M rii Negre (OCEMN)” (Romania
takes over the Acting Presidency of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization , BSECO),
http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=27435&idlnk=2&cat=4
55
agreement on setting up a free-trade area between the member states or the Charter of this
organization. One year later, he said the perspectives of the activities within GUUAM are
“obscure and illegible”.120
Subsequent to the political changes in 2003-2004, GUAM acquired further
popularity and during the summit in Chisinau in 2005, it was settled the reform of the
group, the intensification of the collaboration – including in the political-military field –
and its transformation into a regional group for the democratization and development of
the member states, Romania being invited to take part with observer status. When
everybody thought that GUAM is revitalizing after a confuse period, following the
summit in Chisinau, Uzbekistan announced its withdrawal, within the context of
changing its geopolitical priorities (the interest for the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization), out of the desire to improve the relations with Russia (from which the
Uzbek president expects support during the 2006 elections) and fearing a possible
domino effect of the political changes underwent in recent years in some of GUAM
countries.
In the field of regional cooperation and of the ENP perspectives, the
participation of the Republic of Moldova to the Community of Independent States
(CIS) will have an important role. RM joined the CIS in 1994, mostly because of
Russia’s pressures, and has only a status of a participant state (it has not ratified the
charter). The regional cooperation has not been a priority of this organization, as RM
refuses to take any action on the political cooperation ground, which would involve
supranational type structures. This explains why in spite of the fact that its economic
interests with the CIS member states are high, Moldova does not take part in the
Common Economic Space.121 The relations are bilateral and they concern mainly the
development of trade and economic relations, due to the high level of foreign dependency
towards Russia and Ukraine rather than an active accession strategy on the part of RM.
However, the participation to CIS can be complementary to ENP for what we call
“shared neighbourhood”, taking into consideration Russia’s major interests in
maintaining the influence in the region. The current crisis underwent by CIS, mirrored by
Ukraine’s willingness to get out the Common Economic Space, the initiative of the
Community of Democratic Choice,122 the higher interest for GUAM’s sub-regional
initiative are the consequences of the fact the current structure of CIS, developed around
Russia as its gravitation centre, does not match the current geopolitical context. Hence,
the role of CIS in the region will depend on the organization’s reform.
Despite of its status as an international organization, the Council of Europe
(CE) has a major impact upon the development of regional cooperation. Set up to
promote the observance of democracy, rule of law, human rights and the European
120
“Moldova considers GUUAM perspectives obscure”, message of the Agency RIA Novosti, 18 July 2002.
121
The participant countries are Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazahstan.
122
The fact that Washington and Brussels sent positive signals towards some initiatives of the new
Ukrainian diplomacy, encouraged Kyiv to aim at the role of regional leader and agent of democratization.
On 12 August 2005, the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and his Georgian counterpart Mikhail
Saakashvili signed in Borjomi a joint declaration legalizing the intention to establish a community of
democracy in the Baltic–Black–Caspian Sea region. Subsequently, the two Presidents, joined by the
Presidents of Poland and Lithuania, had a new meeting during which they decided to set up a Community
of Democratic Choice.
56
identity, after 1989 CE undertook specific goals for Central and East European countries:
support to consolidate reforms, know-how transfer in the fields of democracy, education,
culture and environment, human rights observance, cross-border cooperation promotion.
The most important instruments established to support the Council are the European
Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation (Madrid, 1980), with the two
additional protocols and the Standing Committee of the Local and Regional Authorities
of the Council of Europe (established in 1975 and turned in 1994 into the Congress of the
Local and Regional Authorities in Europe). Moldova became a member of the Council of
Europe on 13 July 1995 and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Liberties in 1997; also, it signed the European Outline Convention on
Transfrontier Cooperation and the two additional protocols on the right of the local and
regional authorities to develop cross-border relations (Additional Protocol No. 1 and No.
2 to European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between territorial
communities and authorities), as well as the European Charter of Local Self Government.
Thus, it benefits from the international legislative framework to promote democracy and
cross-border cooperation, as well as from the Council of Europe programmes on
promoting democracy at local and regional level, media assistance and technical
cooperation, Euro-regions development and the support of the European Commission and
Stability Pact in the legislative and institutions democratization fields. The relationship
between the status of a member state of the Council of Europe and that of an ENP state is
direct and involves a high level of political complementarity and inter-conditionality. On
one hand, the compliance with the commitments undertaken as a member of the Council
of Europe is a prerequisite for the support of the European Union and the progressiveness
in enforcing the neighbourhood policy and, on the other hand, the RM-EU Action Plan
includes priorities supporting RM in enacting the measures and recommendations of the
CE: the democracy and the rule of law, the human rights and fundamental liberties
observance, the political dialogue and the cooperation in the fields of foreign and security
policy and conflict prevention and crisis management. Also, the Council of Europe will
get involved, next to other bodies and regional or universal structures, in defining the
priorities of the Action Plan as well as in the periodical evaluation by the Commission of
the progress achieved by the Republic of Moldova in reaching the goals of the ENP.
§ 3.4.2 The Role of Euro-regions

According to the Council of Europe and to the European Union, a key element
in the economic growth and political stability of South Eastern Europe is the cross-border
cooperation. Hence, many programmes and initiatives were enacted, in order to
encourage and support cross-border cooperation projects, one of the most widely spread
frameworks of cross-border cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe being the Euro-
regions.
The Euro-regions are considered to be frameworks of structured cooperation
between local and regional authorities in neighbouring countries, in order to meet joint
goals and to improve the conditions of development and security in the adjacent regions.
The Euro-regions are materializing specific solidarities, beyond state borders and
strengthen the process of decentralization and integration into the European area. Hence,
the term of Euro-region covers a wide range of cooperation structures, from the simple
57
association without juridical personality up to bodies of private or even public law. In

Central and Eastern Europe, most of the established Euro-regions are non-
institutionalized structures of information and cooperation.
The Republic of Moldova takes part in three cross-border initiatives of Euro-
regions type:
• Lower Danube (1998), made up of Cahul county (Republic of Moldova),
Br ila, Gala i and Tulcea counties (Romania) and Odessa region (Ukraine);
• Upper Prut (2000): B l i and Edine counties (Republic of Moldova),
Boto ani and Suceava counties (Romania) and Cern u i region (Ukraine); and
• Siret-Prut-Nistru (2002): Ungheni, Chisinau, L pu na, Soroca and Orhei
counties (Republic of Moldova) and Ia i, Piatra Neam and Vaslui counties (Romania).
The three countries involved in these Euro-regions concluded many economic
and cooperation agreements, most of which are stimulated by the trilateral -Romania-
Republic of Moldova-Ukraine, established within the context of Romania’s activism in
the field of regional and sub-regional cooperation starting the second half of the ‘90s.123
About 70 per cent of the territory and 80 per cent of the population of RM is
currently taking part in cross-border activities in the framework of Euro-regions.
Beyond elements of specificity, the three Euro-regions settle cooperation
relations in the following fields: environment, agriculture and land planning; sustainable
development and workforce; transport and telecommunications; tourism; civil society;
media; development and implementation of new technologies; education, research and
culture; “people-to-people” contacts; border securitization. There were many
programmes of cross-border cooperation, but their impact was rather low. The most
important factors limiting the efficiency of the Euro-regions are: the lack of an integrated
approach towards the Euro-regions as an instrument of the foreign policies of the three
countries and their strategies of sustainable development; the lack of action plans with
clearly defined goals and priorities; the relatively low economic potential of the involved
regions; the lack of experience and the relatively weak competence of the local and
regional administrative structures; the excessive emphasis on information and
consultation programmes, rather than development programmes; and the limited
financing resources.
However, the Euro-regions promoted relations of good neighbourliness and
favoured the accumulation of experience in the field of cross-border cooperation,
experience that can be an important support in the ENP implementation. In addition, in
view of Romania’s accession to the EU, the instruments of the regional policy could be
123
For details see Adrian Pop, At the Crossroads of Interlocking Subregional Arrangements : Romania’s
Pivotal Role in East Central Europe, NATO Defense College Monograph Series, Fall 1999; idem,
“Subregionalism and Security in Central and South East Europe”, in R zvan Theodorescu and Leland
Conley Barrows (eds.), South East Europe – The Ambiguous Definitions of a Space/L’Europe du Sud-Est –
Les definitions ambiguës d’un espace, UNESCO-CEPES, Enciclopedica Publishing House, Bucharest,
2002, pp. 177-198.
58
used together with the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, to
boost the activities of the three Euro-regions.
In order to turn the Euro-regions in efficient structures to accomplish the goals
of the ENP, Romania and RM should:
- adopt a general legislative framework to promote cross-border
cooperation, according to the principles of the Madrid Convention and its additional
Protocols;
- develop structures of information, consultation and institutional dialogue
supporting the various initiatives of the Euro-regions and ensuring the vertical (between
the national, regional and local levels of decision) and horizontal (between the Euro-
regions) coherence;
- adopt specific measures on the development of cross-border cooperation:
decentralization, territorial planning and favourable administrative organization for
increasing the role of the regional and local regions, budgetary policies supporting the
initiatives of the regional and local communities, more flexible border policies, etc;
- promote a specialized offer on human resources development, according
to the necessary competencies to toughen the capability of the communities and territorial
authorities to develop cross-border cooperation.
As a pragmatic document to direct the measures on promoting the cooperation
within the Euro-regions, it might be used the Recommendation (2005)2 of the Ministerial
Committee of the member states of the Council of Europe, on the good practices and the
diminishing of obstacles in the field of cross-border and inter-territorial cooperation of
communities or territorial authorities.124
To conclude with, RM benefits from a multilateral framework favourable to the
cross-border and transnational cooperation, the implementation of the ENP and the
accomplishment of the priorities of the Action Plan. Although the ENP is bilaterally
focused, the EU aims also to directly develop, through the policy of neighbourhood, the
multilateral approach, due to the internationalization of the security problems as well as
of the sustainable economic and social development. According to the Strategy
Document, the ENP will support the initiatives of regional cooperation in the following
main fields:
- economy, business environment, recruitment and social policy,
infrastructure, sustainable development, the fight against poverty and social exclusion,
transnational networks of energy and transport;
- environment, nuclear security and natural resources;
- justice and home affairs, mainly: border management, control of
migration, the fight against organized crime, money laundering, and the trafficking in
drugs and human beings;
124
Enacted on 19 January 2005.
59
- the development of civil society, the promotion of good governance and

the compliance with the fundamental rights, the promotion of exchanges and cooperation
in the cultural, education and public health fields.
Further on, the toughening of the ENP multilateral dimension will contribute to
the intensification of the bilateral actions and will ensure a favourable context for
diminishing the risk of creating new divisive lines in the region.
Hence, ENP is able to contribute at toughening the existent cooperation
frameworks and at providing an instrument of orientation in the subsequent developments
of various arrangements of regional and sub-regional cooperation. Out of the analysis of
the goals of the structures of multilateral cooperation involving the Republic of Moldova,
we could notice they cover the whole range of action of the neighbourhood policy. For
the various regional initiatives to be effectively correlated with the ENP and to become
instruments of European accession, their targets need more coherence as well as a relative
specialization.
§ 3.5 The Role of the EU Special Representative for the Republic of Moldova
On 16 March 2005, the European Union designated Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged
on the newly created position of EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Republic of
Moldova.
The EU Special Representative is a Brussels diplomat for certain areas or states
affected by conflicts,125 having an important role in drawing up the policies of the EU
towards them.126 He is delegated by the Council of the European Union (the General
Affairs and External Relations Council) and coordinates his actions with the EU High
Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana.
With a budget of EUR 278,000 for 2005,127 Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged’s main
responsibility consists in supporting the efforts the conflict resolution in Transnistria.
Javier Solana said that “designating Ambassador Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged on the
position of European Union special representative in Moldova is a clear sign of the
continuous commitment undertaken by the Union to regulate on long-term the conflict in
Transnistria”.128
125
EU currently has other 7 special representatives: for Bosnia (Lord Ashdown), Macedonia (Michael
Sahlin), South Caucasus (Heikki Talvitie), Afghanistan (Francesc Vendrell), Middle East (Marc Otte), the
region of the Great Lakes in Africa (Aldo Ajello) and for the coordination of the Stability Pact (Erhard
Busek).
126
Nicu Popescu, EU’s Special Representative for Moldova: from opportunity to actions,
http://www.studiidesecuritate.ro.
127
See Jean-Pierre Masseret, Rapporteur and Abdülkadir Ate , co-Rapporteur, Report submitted on behalf
of the Political Committee, “Security cooperation between the EU and its eastern neighbors”, Assembly of
Western European Union, The Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, Fifty-First
Session, Document A/1895, 14 June 2005, p. 16.
128
Diana Lungu, “Reformele interne vor consolida parteneriatul dintre Moldova i Uniunea European ”,
interviu cu Javier Solana, Înaltul Reprezentant al UE pentru PESC (The domestic reforms will consolidate
the partnership between Moldova and the European Union”, interview with Javier Solana, the EU High
Representative for the CFSP), 15 April 2005,
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/OT/sghr_int/84582.pdf
60
Despite of the fact the EUSR is mainly dealing with security problems, Adriaan
Jacobovits de Szeged’s mandate is much more complex, including the contribution for
promoting good relations between the Republic of Moldova and the EU, according to the
Action Plan signed within the ENP, the regional cooperation development, the support
granted to the fight against trafficking in weapons and human beings from and through
Moldova or the contribution at strengthening the democracy, the rule of law and the
compliance with the fundamental rights and liberties for all the citizens of RM.129
Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged was talking about his mission as being “important”,
as it establishes “the connection between the Republic of Moldova and the states of the
European Union, which want tighter relations with this country but do not know much
about it”.130
Despite of the fact that EUSR designation for the Republic of Moldova illustrates
the increasing commitment of the EU, his tasks on strengthening democracy suggest the
support of Brussels is conditioned upon the way Chisinau meets its commitments.
§3.6 Romania’s Role

§3.6.1 Political and Diplomatic Aspects
The relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova are back on track
now, after having undergone a real crisis for a long period. The leaders of Moldova have
finally acknowledged the role that Bucharest can play in getting Chisinau closer to the
European structures. However, Voronin implicitly conditioned the quality of the bilateral
relations with the Bucharest giving up the paradigm of the “two Romanian states”, which,
according to his view, is responsible for creating a tense environment. Even though the
rhetoric claimed by the politicians left of Dnestr was pretence rather than the real cause
of the relations deterioration, Chisinau susceptibilities must be spared in that respect.
In order to support the European aspiration of the Republic of Moldova, Romania
can act on two distinct political levels: at the bilateral level, through providing a direct
and constant aid to Chisinau and at European level, through the measures taken as future
member of the EU.
As for the bilateral relations, no field is mirrored in the EU-RM Action Plan in
which Bucharest cannot give pertinent and useful consultancy to the neighbour state,
considering its experience on European accession.
The identification of the priorities and of the concrete support modalities can be
best achieved within joint session of the Executives in the two countries, according to the
model of the Romanian-Hungarian government session organized in October 2005. The
organization of such an event, besides its symbolic value, might enable the enactment of
129
Javier Solana comments on the appointment of an EU Special Representative for Moldova,
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/declarations/84175.pdf.
130
Oana Popescu, “La negocierile transnistrene, doar prin intermediul UE, interviu cu Adriaan Jacobovits
de Szeged” (At the Transnistrian negotiations, only through the EU, interview with Adriaan Jacobovits de
Szeged), in Cotidianul, 6 June 2005, http://moldovaworld.iatp.md/viewarticle.php?id=569.
61
various joint measures in various chapters such as infrastructure, environmental

protection, education and culture.
In addition, the Parliament of Romania might give the chance to its counterpart
forum in the Republic of Moldova to send to Bucharest a parliamentarian with observer
status in order to monitor the legislative process with impact in the field of European
accession.
Romania might fully influence the ENP only when it becomes a full-fledged EU
member. Finland and Poland are the best examples in that respect as after only their
accession they asked Brussels for a much powerful commitment towards the non-member
neighbourhood states.131 Subsequent to the EU accession, Finland managed to promote a
regional valuable cooperation initiative: the EU’s Northern Dimension.
Finland’s example can be inspiring for Romania on establishing a possible Black
Sea European Dimension, which is currently missing on Brussels’ agenda. Following the
model settled by Helsinki through the Northern Dimension, Romania might have the
initiative of organizing a Forum for Security and Democracy in the Black Sea region,
inviting to take part the member states of BSECO, EU and USA.132 The projects of the
Forum might benefit from financing through the European Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument, which is in the finalization stage. In that respect, Romania might
coordinate the efforts with Bulgaria, Greece (the only member state to the EU present in
BSECO) and Turkey, which started the accession negotiations.
The Republic of Moldova does not currently have any clear prospect for EU
accession. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and
European Neighbourhood Policy stated in May 2005 that the Republic of Moldova must
abstain itself from submitting the application for joining the European Union, in order to
prevent a refusal.133 On medium and long term, if Chisinau is subsequently kept in an
environment of incertitude, the political class and the population might be frustrated. The
EU officials should send clear messages that the EU door remains open for RM. Such a
vision involves support and communication as well as symbolic gestures, meant to
encourage Chisinau that is on the right track. Such a signal might be the re-branding of
the policy towards the states that target the EU accession, and the European Integration
Policy is a name already proposed by some experts, according to whom this is this is the
right way to send a positive signal.134 Such a measure should benefit from the total
support of Bucharest.
It is interesting to note that the public opinion in Romania maintains that the
European track of Chisinau must be encouraged by Bucharest. Thus, according to a poll
131
Marius Vahl, The EU and Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Some Challenges for BSEC, April 2005,
http://www.ceps.be/wp.php?article_id=420
132
The scenario of such an initiative is evoked by Michael Emerson, The Black Sea as Epicentre of the
After-Shocks of the EU’s Earthquake, Paper prepared for symposium of The German Marshall Fund of the
United States, “The United States and the European Union: Shaping a Common Geo-Strategy”,
Washington DC, 29-30 June 2005, pp. 9-10.
133
See “European commissioner - Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia must abstain from submitting the
accession request to the EU, to avoid any subsequent refusal”, message of Agency Novosti Moldova on 3
May 2005.
134
Michael Emerson, op. cit., p. 8.
62
emphasizing the Romanians’ perceptions on Romanian foreign policy, a quarter of the

respondents believe the relations with the Republic of Moldova should be given a special
attention, saying that in the past 15 years, the policy towards the Republic of Moldova
was "not too good" (49 per cent), "bad" (26 per cent) or "very bad" (4 per cent).135
Moreover, most of the Romanians believe the Republic of Moldova should be
helped with student scholarships and supported in its efforts of Euro-Atlantic integration.
Despite of these opinions, 42 per cent of the respondents believe that Romania should
meet the demand of the EU to introduce visas for the Moldovan citizens, and 16 per cent
of them believe this should happen even if the European officials do not request it.136
At the level of the Romanian public perception, we notice a certain "projection"
into the Euro-Atlantic space, as Romanians assign themselves another identity, beyond
that of nationality. Thus, only 16 per cent of the respondents recommend themselves as
"Balkan" or "East European". The majority (51 per cent) of them prefers to consider
themselves as "European" citizens and 23 per cent as "citizens of the world".137
§ 3.6.2 Cultural and Spiritual Aspects

At an official and institutionalized level, the cultural relations between Romania
and the Republic of Moldova are in a bad shape, despite of the numerous possibilities
offered by the common language or by the pantheon hosting the same tutelary figures, on
both sides of Prut.
In order to give one pertinent example, in January 2005, month dedicated to the
celebration of 155 years since Mihai Eminescu’s birth (considered to be a national poet in
Romania and in the Republic of Moldova as well), no single common event was
organized in Chisinau.
The Moldovan officials are not the only ones to be blamed for this situation. At a
time when 146 years since the Union of the Principalities were celebrated, the Romanian
embassy in Chisinau distinguished itself by its absence, developing no cultural event
during that period.138
The website of the institution says “Romania imagines its relation with the
Republic of Moldova on two major coordinates:
- the affirmation of the special character of this relation, conferred by the community of
language, history, culture, traditions – realities that can be neither denied nor ignored;
- the European level of the bilateral cooperation, grounded on the strategic objective of
both states to join the European Union”.139
135
Perception of the public opinion in Romania upon the foreign policy and upon the international
relations, Institute for Public Policies, Bucharest, October 2005, p. 49.
136
Ibid., pp.50-51.
137
Ibid., pp .47-48.
138
Agenda of public diplomacy. Events organized by the diplomatic missions and by the Cultural Institutes
in Romania, January 2005. The source is represented by the documents of the diplomatic missions and of
the Cultural Institutes in Romania during 1 January- 4 February 2005.
139
Embassy of Romania in Chisinau, http://chisinau.mae.ro/index.php?lang=ro&id=654.
63
As long as the “special relations” have not materialized in the best and most
significant moment, it is no wonder that “the European nature of the bilateral
cooperation” was ignored in May, when celebrating the “Europe Day”. The slogan “the
common European way” has not materialized. However, the embassy of Romania
organized a concert for the memory of George Enescu, at the Academy of Music, Theatre
and Plastic Arts in Chisinau.140
Unfortunately, this situation is not fortuitous but persistent. In 2004, after a short
and precise evaluation of the activity of the Romanian diplomats who have been acting
since 1991 in the neighbour state, the well-known critic and essayist in Moldova, Vitalie
Ciobanu, was noticed “the diplomatic mission of Romania in Chisinau proves self-
sufficiency and self-contentment”, “the quality” of the Romanian ambassadors
acknowledging the Bucharest disinterest for the Republic of Moldova.141
In fact, the disinterest is matched by a chronic shortage of experts on the relations
with the Republic of Moldova as well on the entire ex-Soviet area.142
On the same website of the embassy of Romania in Chisinau, the only issue
mentioned in the “Cultural relations” column is the collaboration in the education field. It
is true the education is a relevant field,143 but the issue of granting scholarships for
youngsters in the Republic of Moldova, to study in Romania, cannot cover the complex
nature of some normal cultural relations, not to talk about that of “special” relations.
Moreover, the measures in the field of education are one-way channelled and
Bucharest does nothing to convince the Romanian youngsters to choose university
centres in the Republic of Moldova (the Russian Federation or Ukraine being in the same
situation), which might subsequently provide experts on Eastern Europe policy.
Bucharest failed to build a cultural-informational area, accounted by the lack of
distribution of the Romanian press in the Republic of Moldova where all the publications
(and especially the cultural ones) from Romania are practically inaccessible.144 The
140
Agenda of the public diplomacy. Events organized by the diplomatic missions and by the Cultural
Institutes in Romania, May 2005.
141
Vitalie Ciobanu, Anatomia unui faliment geopolitic: Republica Moldova (The Anatomy of a geopolitical
failure: Republic of Moldova), Polirom, Ia i, 2005, p. 395.
142
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Mândria bine temperat . Are politica extern resurse pentru ambi iile noului
pre edinte?” (Well moderated proud. Has the foreign policy resources for the ambitions of the new
president?), in Dilema, 10-16 June 2005, p. 11.
143
Romania has annually received for studies a substantial number of youngsters from the Republic of
Moldova. By GD 87/2005, the number of positions with total or partial financing from the budget of
Ministry of Education and Research for the Romanians youngsters in the Republic of Moldova,
neighbouring countries and the Diaspora is 1,650 for the academic education (out of which 1,000 are for
the Republic of Moldova) and 600 for the pre-university education (150 for the Republic of Moldova). The
figures for the academic year 2005/2006 are similar to those during the previous year. One should also add
the training of young graduates of juridical higher education institutions from the Republic of Moldova at
the National Magistrature Institute in Bucharest as well as the training of young Moldovan officers at the
National Defence University “Carol I” in Bucharest.
144
failure: Republic of Moldova), p. 71.
64
media is dominated by publications in Russian language, “about 215 pages”145 being

available on a daily basis.
This is a counterpart phenomenon in Bucharest, where the press distribution units
receive no cultural magazine from Chisinau. This proves a quasi-total miscommunication
at the level of the cultural elite in the two countries as well as at the level of the
population. The art and culture in the Republic of Moldova are a mystery for the
Romanian citizens. The only exception worth mentioning is the Cartier Publishing House
that managed to successfully promote the books on the Romanian market.
The television field undergoes the same situation. Despite of the fact the national
TV station TVR1 has a good reception in the urban centres and sometimes even in the
rural areas, it has a reduced impact as it does not broadcast any show meant for the
Romanians abroad. According to Vitalie Ciobanu, “Romania has been disregarding the
force of the audiovisual”,146 and deprived the population in the Republic of Moldova of
all alternative source of information. Unlike Romania, ORT (the state television of the
Russian Federation) has a local studio in Chisinau.
Moreover, the anti-Romania propaganda has been constantly promoted through
TVM, causing the journalists in Moldova to protest.147
Moreover, “TVM is censoring the TV appearance of persons, ideas as well as of
some words, such as ‘Romanian citizen’, ‘of Romania’”; thus, the channel turns into an
instrument of communist propaganda, anti-Romanian and anti-democratic, just like
during the hardest years of Soviet totalitarianism.148
Another problem consists in the way the funds allotted by the Romanian state to
support some cultural activities in the Republic of Moldova were managed. In September
and October 2005, the Romanian press published excerpts from a report considered as
authentic, analyzing the projects developed by the Department for the Romanians from
Everywhere in 2004, in the neighbour state. According to the document, “most of the
145
See the transcript of the debate “New Directions for the Romanian Foreign Policy” on 14 June2005,
with the participation of president B sescu, http://www.ziua.ro/b.html.
146
147
During protests, the employees of the state company Teleradio Moldova requested in February 2002:
“- To be annulled the political censure at the National Broadcast and TV Stations. To meet the freedom of
expression of the journalists and with the right to fair information of the TV spectators and radio-listeners.
The truth should not be mangled with because it does not like the powers-that-be (…)
- To cancel the taboo on the words «Romanian", «Romanian language», «Bessarabia», «History f the
Romanians», « totalitarian regime».
- To lift the interdictions settled by the current government upon the different historic periods of our
people, including on the inter-war and deportation-related ones, hunger caused by the Stalinist occupation
regime, the period of national renaissance in 1989.” “Teleradio Moldova asks for the freedom of the Public
Television and Radio Broadcast Stations in the Republic of Moldova”, Mediafax message on 27 February
2002.
148
Nicolae Negru, Mass-Media in Republica Moldova (Media in the Republic of Moldova), paper
presented at the international conference “Participation to the Stability Pact as booster of the social-
economic reforms in the region”, Chisinau, 7-8 December 2001, p. 4.
65
contractors in the Republic of Moldova proved to be disloyal, dishonest, they

irresponsibly spent public funds, and were, at best, lacking managerial skills”.149
Besides the charges against the partners in the Republic of Moldova, the
document incriminates the very institution that performed the audit. The most important
conclusion of this internal evaluation of the Department for the Romanians from
Everywhere pertains to the lack of competence of this department, whose activity must
promote and support the programmes of the Romanian communities everywhere, to meet
its tasks.
This situation might bring about a very dangerous result. Firstly, it compromises
the activity of our serious partners in the Republic of Moldova, even if they have not
necessarily been accused in the lump, but some punctual references were made to some
cases in which the beneficiaries over the Prut of some funds allotted by the Romanian
state have not met their obligations. Secondly, the Romanian public opinion might be
reluctant to the issue “Republic of Moldova”, as the report suggested that the money
Bucharest sent to Chisinau was used against the Romanian interests.150 Another potential
risk consists in using, in Romania, the issue of the relations with the Republic of
Moldova as a means to settle some internal political conflicts.
Another question mark is connected to the total lack of reaction of the Romanian
officials. Thus, even though the report was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
and the Prime Minister’s Chancellery since April 2005 and subsequently published in the
press, no investigation was launched and no official position was formulated.
This is reinforced by the lack of activity of the Department for the Romanians
from Everywhere in 2005, because its transfer under the subordination of the MFA,
which led to the initiation of “various specific activities connected to the handover and
receipt of the data on the budgetary stipulations, of the afferent patrimony as well as of
the other connected rights and obligations”.151
Instead of a conclusion, we prefer to cite Vitalie Ciobanu, who noticed that “all
the strategies for Bessarabia are the scholarships granted to Moldovan youngsters and the
support given to some magazines by the Romanian Cultural Institute (former Romanian
Cultural Foundation).152
149
“Jaf la Românii de Pretutindeni” (Robbery to the Romanians from Everywhere), in Ziua, 30 September
2005, http://www.ziua.net/display.php?id=185740&data=2005-09-30. The same article was also published
by the Agency Romanian Global News, www.rgnpress.ro.
150
“Banii României în interesul Rusiei. Fondurile Departamentului pentru Românii de Pretutindeni au fost
folosite pentru axa PSD-Chi in u-Moscova” (Romania’s money to the best interest of Russia. The funds of
the Department for the Romanians from Everywhere were used for the axis PSD-Chisinau-Moscow), in
Ziua, 1 October 2005, http://www.ziua.net/display.php?id=185829&data=2005-10-01.
151
This is the explanation for the activity deadlock of the Department provided by the Romanian MFA. See
“R spunsul remis de Ministerul Afacerilor Externe la întrebarea formulat de doamna deputat Leonida Lari
înregistrat la Camera Deputa ilor cu num rul 458A/2005” (Answer given by Ministry of Foreign Affairs
at the question of Mrs. deputy Leonida Lari registered within the Chamber of Deputies with number
458A/2005), www.cdep.ro.
152
66
§ 3.6.3 Economic Aspects

The economic relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova are far
from the potential provided by the two states, the evolution of the trade exchanges having
been influenced in time by the quality of political collaboration (see Annex 3).
Thus, in 2000, before Bucharest had totally resented the shock of the new
communist government in Chisinau, Romania was the main exporter to the Republic of
Moldova, before the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
The political relations’ cooling off was subsequently felt in the field of the
bilateral economic relations as well, even under these circumstances Romania continuing
to be the main trade partner of the Republic of Moldova in Central and Eastern Europe.
The diminishing of the trade exchanges was also generated by the fact that
Bucharest introduced the passports control at the Romanian-Moldova border, which
rendered more difficult the traffic of persons and goods between the two countries.153
In 2003, the representative of Chisinau to the Council of Europe, Alexei Tulbure,
accused Romania that it willingly brings prejudices to the economy of the Republic of
Moldova by banning the import of meat and eggs, considered to be an unfriendly
gesture.154
Subsequent to a period of retrogression, the situation improved during 2004-2005.
In 2004, the total volume of Romania’s trade exchanges with the Republic of Moldova
registered USD 282.3 million,155 and in the first 9 months of 2005, Romania’s exports to
the RM increased with 47 per cent, and those of RM to Romania, with 20 per cent.156
153
Valeriu Prohnitsky, “Moldova-Ukraine-Romania: a regional portrayal of economy and trade”, in South-
East Europe Review, no. 2/2002, p. 41.
154
See “Discursul reprezentantului permanent al Republicii Moldova pe lâng Consiliul Europei Alexei
Tulbure, la edin a Comitetului de Mini tri al CE” (The speech of the standing representative of the
Republic of Moldova to the Council of Europe Alexei Tulbure, at the session of the EC Committee of
Ministers), in Moldova Suveran , 15 October 2003,
http://www.moldova-suverana.md/articol.php?id=1613.
155
Out of the total volume of commercial exchanges, the export was assigned USD205.2 mn, the import
USD77.1 million, the balance being +USD128.1 million. See Annex 3.
156
See the Press Communiqué from 25 September 2005 on the meeting between Presidents Traian B sescu
and Vladimir Voronin in Ia i, http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=6618&_PRID=ag.
67
CHAPTER 4
THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF

EU ENLARGEMENT
§ § 4.1 Transnistria – Geopolitical and Geo-economic Aspects

The process of dismantlement of the USSR (1990-1991) generated the re-ignition
of historical tensions between the ethnic groups concentrated in the former Soviet empire.
The frozen character of the Transnistrian conflict157 fuelled the clash of geopolitical and
geo-economic interests on the left bank of river Dniestr. Unable to reach consensus over
keeping the Transnistrian region inside the newly independent Republic of Moldova, the
belligerent factions -the Moldovan side (of Romanian ancestry) against the Slavic one (of
Russian or Ukrainian origin)-, fought the 1991-1992 war during which the involvement
of the 14th Russian Army under the command of general Aleksandr Lebed granted victory
to the separatist leaders in Tiraspol. A Russian official explanation compliant to the
international law’s regulations of their support for a secessionist entity which Moscow
does not even recognize is still missing. Moreover, despite the commitments taken by
Russian Federation at the OSCE Summits in Istanbul (1999) and Porto (2002) to
withdraw its 14th Army158 from Transnistria, only a scant progress has been achieved
until now.
Letting aside the serious blow inflicted to the relevance of the OSCE mission as a
very ambitious collective security organization, this fact reveals a fundamental objective
of the Russian strategy in Transnistria. It is all about keeping the control (or at least of a
high degree of influence) over the most advanced stronghold to the West, near the
common NATO-UE eastern border of the new comer Romania. Thus, the geopolitical
concept of Near Abroad159 concocted by the Kremlin power brokers in 1992-93160 is still
a favourite tool to try to stop the Western political, economical and military expansion in
the area. The extraterritorial character of this concept based on the preservation of the
rights of Russian citizens living abroad meant that CIS was designed to be a
conglomerate of post-Soviet satellites. These satellites were supposed to stay under
control, by force if necessary, by the help of the Russian military presence and frozen
conflicts like those in Nagorno-Karabach, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjaria.
157
For a comprehensive analysis of the origins and evolution of the Transnistrian conflict througout the
‘90s see Adrian Pop, “The Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova”, in Rebecca
Haynes (ed.), Moldova, Bessarabia, Transnistria, Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies No. 3, School of
Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, 2003, pp. 205-217.
158
The current name of the 14th Army is the Operational Group of the Russian Army (OGRA). See
“Moldova: The problem of small arms” in South Eastern Europe SALW Monitor,
www.seesac.org/target/Country%20Assessment%20Moldova.pdf.
159
The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy, The Library of the Congress,
http://countrystudies.us/russia/77.htm.
160
See Alexei Pushkov, “Russia and the West. An endangered relationship?”, in NATO Review, No.1,
February 1994, Vol. 42, pp. 19-23.
68
The stake has a major geo-economic component as well161 because the self-
proclaimed authorities of the Dnestr Moldovan Republic (DMR), despite the fact that
they are not recognized by any state or international organization, cover under the
obsolete aegis of communism very profitable Mafia-type illicit activities. Meanwhile, the
majority of Transnistrian region’s inhabitants live in worse conditions – statistics that
make the Republic of Moldova the poorest European state.162 The economic interests
overpass the level of Transnistrian leadership, the illegal off-shore named DMR focusing
the attention of influential groups from Russia, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova163 and
even of some Western companies.
There is to be mentioned also the fact that the Mafia-type regime in Tiraspol has
become integral part of a criminal network within CIS164 and a catalyst for secessionist
movements in the former Soviet republics. Even an alliance has been forged in 2004
between DMR, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On 2 June 2004, the Transnistrian leader
Igor Smirnov promised on the basis of the mutual security guarantees of that pact military
support for the South Ossetia separatists in case of an attack by the Georgian troops.165
The basis of Igor Smirnov’s power is the conjunction – under the security
umbrella of the 14th Russian Army – between profits from illegal activities and sistematic
repression against the Romanian-speaking community living on the Eastern bank of river
Dniestr.166
The condition of the agrarian communities from the so-called Security Zone,
imposed by DMR after the war, has worsen, the Smirnov regime breaching the agreement
161
Initially 40 per cent of the Moldovan industrial potential was located in Transnistria but throughout the
the transition years the importance of this geo-economic aspect has decreased due to the deindustrialization
process. The privatization process of industrial facilities in Transnistria has been relaunched in 2003 as a
pressure factor against Chisinau and is been done unilaterally under the umbrella and for the benefit of the
separatist regime.
162
See, for instance, the monthly “Country Report: Moldova” made by The Economist Intelligence Unit,
www.eiu.com.
163
The privatization of the metalurgic factory Rabnita in 1999 would not have been possible without the
approval of some officials in Chisinau, the beneficiary company the Russian Itera beeing expected to make
big investments only with solid guarantees over their property rights. See Oazu Nantoi, The East Zone
Conflict in the Republic of Moldova – A New Approach, Institute for Public Policy, Chisinau, 28 June 2002,
pp. 6-7, www.ipp.md/publications/en.html.
164
The Moscow prostitutes are provided in a 40 per cent ratio via the Transnistrian connection. At the same
time, 90 per cent of tobacco and alcohol as well as 60 per cent of the oil imported in Transnistria represent
a massive tax evasion and a regular breach of the Moldovan customs system. See Ceslav Ciobanu,
NATO/EU Enlargement: Moldova and the “Frozen and Forgotten” Conflicts in Post-Soviet States, United
States Institute of Peace, p. 30, moldova.org/download/eng/67/.
165
See Vladimir Socor, “Trans-Dniester offers military assistance to South Ossetia, Abkhazia”, The
Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 14 June 2004.
166
The school crisis of 2004 is just one of the recent episodes of the sistematic violations by the separatist
regime of the human rights standards. See Severe Violations of Human Rights in the Transdnistrian Region
of Moldova. Statement by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and the Moldovan
Helsinki Committee, Vienna/Chisinau 11 August 2004, www.ihf.org. See also chapter 4 Human rights in
Transnistria from the report made for UNHCR by Argentina Gribincea and Mihai Grecu, “Moldova:
Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment”, Writenet Papers, October 2004, and the US Department of
State's evaluation, Moldova - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004, Released by the Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 28, 2005,
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41697.htm.
69
and introducing de facto border and militia points on the Tiraspol-Rabnita route. Thus,
the farmers from Dorotcaia, Cosnita, Parata, Cocieri, Molovata Noua etc. have been
harassed and forced to pay considerable tax “protection”167 in return for their lawful right
to make use of their land. Consequently, in 2004 and 2005 they lost their crops.168
The Moldovan official authorities are to be blamed, too, for the perpetuation of
the Transnistrian illicit phenomenon because they have offered to the Smirnov regime
during 1996-2001 attributes of state sovereignty in the productive and trade field. Thus,
due to the Decision for the resolution of problems between customs services of the
Republic of Moldova and Transnistria (bilateral document signed by the Moldovan
President Mircea Snegur and Igor Smirnov), the separatists got the right to have and use
their own customs stamp with the inscription “Republic of Moldova. Tiraspol Customs”.
Since 1991, no economic agent from the area under Tiraspol’s control is paying taxes to
the state budget. By signing this document, the Transnistrian illicit traffic was legalised
for the overall economic endurance of the DMR169.
Alongside customs stamp, the Republic of Moldova granted to the Transnistrian
economic agents all the conditions for legal business: Certificates type A (necessary of
exporting textiles to EU), Certificates of Conformity, Standby Letters of Credit and
Guarantees etc. The National Agency for Automatic Identification (EAN) issued linear
codes to the Transnistrian economic agents, without which their exports would not have
been possible.
Only after September 2001 when the strategy of Chisinau towards the Smirnov
regime was changed and a new customs stamp was introduced, the negotiations formula
reversed – first the elaboration of the legal status and only afterwards the issuing of new
customs stamps for export. The separatist leaders170 rejected this and started a
provocative campaign against the communist authorities in Chisinau.
The energy dependence of the Republic of Moldova on the Cuciurgani electric
plant held by the separatists is another critical aspect of the empowering of the Smirnov
regime over the life means of the inhabitants on both banks of the river Dniestr. Also,
independent reports outlined the fact that economic structures controlled by DMR
(Tighina mechanic factory, Rabnita metallurgic factory and “Electromas” factory in
167
More than this, the farmers have been forced in 2005 to sign rent contracts with the separatist authorities
on their own properties.
168
See Ion Manole, Dreptul la proprietate în regiunea de est a Republicii Moldova (The Property Right in
the Eastern Region of the Republic of Moldova), www.politicom.moldova.org/.
169
Only the government of Prime-minister Ion Sturza has managed to introduce in April 1999 tax points
alongside river Dniestr for a better control on exports and imports. But the illegal trafficking was already a
very profitable business so the opponents like Eugen Grosu, the chief of Causeni Customs, had to be
eliminated. He was killed on 2 July 1999 after capturing several illegal transports and refusing cooperation
with some Moldovan corupt officials. Of course, the perpetrators escaped. Moreover, the fall of Sturza
government was soon to happen because of the opposition of power brokers in Chisinau and Tiraspol were
displeased with the new customs policy (November 1999).
170
Head of the Transnistrian Customs Committee was the son of Igor Smirnov, the 14th Army’s arsenal
being an enormous source for illegal and uncontrolled arms exports.
70
Tiraspol) were producing trafficking arms for conflict areas. Three radioactive Alazan
rockets, dating back from the USSR times, were recently available for sale.171
The effective control of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border (especially on its
Transnistrian segment of 452 km) could represent a powerful coercion tool against the
separatist regime. But the prerequisite for this is a change in attitude from the new
Ukrainian administration in the sense of creating common172 border posts on the
Ukrainian soil and militarily monitoring the frontier by an international mission led by
EU because the trafficking poses threats not only to Moldova but to Ukraine, too.
§ 4.2 The Management of the Transnistrian Conflict

§4.2.1 The Conflict Resolution Efforts
The OSCE Plan
The mandate of the OSCE Mission to the Republic of Moldova had (February
1993) and still has as fundamental objective the “consolidation of the independence and
sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova within its current borders and reinforcement of
the territorial integrity of the state along with an understanding about a special status for
the Trans-Dnestr region”.173
But even at this moment, the OSCE mediation results are disappointing. It has
been achieved the reduction of Russian armaments and troops but not their full
withdrawal according to the obligations internationally assumed by Moscow within the
OSCE framework. The Russian obstructions have often managed to hamper the
mediation efforts and have fuelled Tiraspol’s intransigence for accepting nothing less
than federalization as the starting point for negotiations.
In July 2002 during the negotiations in Kyiv between Chisinau and Tiraspol it
was presented the OSCE Plan174 for transformation of the Republic of Moldova in a
federation of “state entities” with their own constitutions and laws. The Plan said nothing
about their number but there were envisaged Transnistria and the so-called Gagauz-Yeri.
The separation of powers would have meant for the federal authorities prerogatives in the
areas of foreign policy, defence and security.
According to the Plan, the Moldovan Army and the Transnistrian military forces
were supposed to be united in future, but without mentioning the time frame and modus
operandi. The two entities had to reduce their troops and armaments, to promote
confidence-building measures, to reciprocally inform on the military exercises and to
delegate liaison officers for it. These provisions would have legalised the military forces
171
See recent investigations made by Brian Johnson Thomas and Mark Franchetti, “Radiation rockets on
sale to ‘terrorists’” in The Sunday Times, May 8, 2005 and also the paper of Alex Kliment, “The
Transnistrian Dilemma”, SAIS Review, Volume 25, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2005, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, pp. 71-73.
172
See EU Border Guards Set to Ensure Moldova' s Economic Reintegration,
http://www.azi.md/news?ID=28594, 8 April 2004.
173
www.osce.org/documents/mm/1993/02/4312_en.pdf.
174
Draft Agreement on the Basis of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria, 2 July
2002, www.adept.md.
71
of the Smirnov regime composed of many generals, officers and even NCOs transferred
directly from the Russian Army.
The OSCE Plan envisaged a new federal parliament with two chambers and 101
seats: the Chamber of Legislators (71 seats in which the federal entities had to be
proportionally represented according to the number of votes) and the Chamber of
Representatives (30 seats on the basis of equal representation regardless of demographic
weight).
The Federation was to have a single currency, the Moldovan leu, and the internal
customs taxes were to be abolished.
On the international level, the Republic of Moldova had to be under the political
and juridical “guarantees” of Russia, Ukraine and OSCE which would have had the
power to monitor the constitutional and legislative matters, the institutions of the new
federal state and to referee the disagreements among federal entities. Their decisions had
the power to overpass those of state authorities.
The OSCE Plan was inapplicable and unacceptable due to several critical aspects.
Firstly, it meant the breaching of the Moldovan Constitution, of the OSCE mandate and
of the ruling party’s programme: the first article of the Constitution said that “The
Republic of Moldova is a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible state”, the
OSCE mandate said nothing about the changing of the political and juridical status of the
Republic of Moldova internally or internationally and the Communist programme
proclaimed the fact that the party was for “a sovereign, independent, unitarian and
indivisible state”. Secondly, amending the constitution of a sovereign state and its
division exclusively on ethnic grounds would have created a dangerous precedent for the
international community in its strive to solve similar conflicts. The consequences would
have been the facilitation of ethnic conflicts and regional instability with clear-cut impact
on growing illicit human, drugs, arms and money trafficking and clandestine immigration
towards Central and Western Europe. Thirdly, the OSCE Plan ignored the choice of
Moldovan citizens who according to polls opposed federalisation.175
The Russian Plan
A strange political phenomenon occurred in the last years on the Moldovan
political stage due once again to the Transnistrian conflict. In 2001, the Communist Party
had won the elections with a pro-Russian and anti-Western campaign having as main
objective the joining by the Republic of Moldova of the Russia-Belarus Union.176 The
next elections were won by the same party but with a reversed electoral platform. What
happened to change so radically the strategic vision of the ruling party was the so-called
Kozak Memorandum177– the Russian plan for Transnistria.
175
The survey conducted by the Institute for Public Policies in Chisinau indicated in December 2003 that
37.8 per cent of Moldovan citizens were against federalization, 21.2 per cent deemed it to be an acceptable
solution, 13.1 per cent thought this topic is not of their concern, 25.5 per cent were undecided, and 2.4 per
cent gave no answer. See www.azi.md/news?ID=27042.
176
http://elections.parlament.md/candidates/parties/pcrm/.
177
Dmitri Kozak, the deputy chief of Russian presidential administration.
72
The Draft Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of a

United State in Moldova (17 November 2003) 178 re-launched the OSCE solution of
federalization of the Republic of Moldova in its 1990 frontiers. The Basic Principles
meant that this document was about the unitary, democratic, demilitarized and neutral
character of the state. The federal state had to have 2 entities, DMR and the Gagauz
autonomy, to which all the structures, prerogatives and official symbols were recognized.
The Moldovan language was to become “state language”, with the Russian getting the
status of “official language”. The two entities would have had the right of secession by
referendum in the case of union between the federal Moldova and another state or if
Moldova would have lost its status as subject of international law.
The main federal institutions were to be the Presidency, the Parliament and the
Constitutional Court. The Parliament would have been a bicameral one: the Senate (26
seats – 9 for DMR, 4 for Gagauzia and 13 coming from the lower house) and the
Chamber of Representatives (71 seats by federal vote). The Senate had extensive powers
with the right to veto any piece of legislation regarding the federation. This was a very
dangerous aspect179 because the federal entities would have had an a priori 50 per cent of
votes. The Constitutional Court preserved too excessive representation rights for the
federal entities due to its misbalanced structure: 11 seats – 4 for DMR, 1 for Gagauzia
and 6 for members coming from the Chamber of Representatives.
During transition, DMR had the right to keep its military forces, the legislation
issued by the separatist regime since secession keeping its de jure status.
The Memorandum had unclear and incomplete security guarantees. A number of
2,000 Russian peacekeeping troops were supposed to watch over the implementation of
the Memorandum but the withdrawal calendar was vague, sometime around the year
2030, following the progress in achieving the complete demilitarization of the federal
territory.180
Initially, the Memorandum was welcomed by the Moldovan President Vladimir
Voronin as “a realistic project, a compromise for overcoming the territorial, political and
economic disunity of our state”; this characterization should be corroborated with the one
made by the leader of the Communist parliamentarian majority Victor Stepaniuc who
considered that “the Russian proposal is a positive step…” because by proposing “an
asymmetric federalization, Moscow has adopted the Chisinau stance”.181
178
http://eurojournal.org/more.php?.
179
Some authors have even characterized the Kozak Memorandum as a tool of “transnistrianization” of the
Republic of Moldova because of the lack of clear-cut delimitation of powers and unfair political
disproportion between de federal political center and the two overrepresented entities. See Dov Lynch,
Moldova and Transnistria, in David Greenwood, Peter Volten (eds.), Security-Sector Reform and
Transparency-Building. Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova, Harmony Papers No. 17, 2004,
pp. 111-122.
180
See the statement of the Russian Defense Minister Serghei Ivanov for Itar-Tass, 21 November 2003,
www.itar-tass.ru/different/hotnews/russian/507600.html.
181
www.e-democracy.md Originalul: /e-journal/20031203/index.shtml.
73
The Moldovan independent press proved to be an important unifying factor for

strong popular opposition182 both by criticizing the Kremlin proposals and by accusing
the Moldovan President of accepting a luxury payoff (a private jet -Yak 40- belonging to
the Russian presidential air fleet) in exchange for Moldova’s federalization. The
negotiations between the Moldovan and Transnistrian experts were facilitated by the
amnesty granted for those people who in 1992 “have committed crimes against the
participants to the fighting for defending the territorial integrity and independence of the
Republic of Moldova or against civil population”. Moreover, they even announced the
reaching of consensus one night prior to the scheduled visit of Russian President
Vladimir Putin (25 November 2003) with the occasion of the agreement’s signing.
Eventually, the Moldovan President chose to reject the Russian Plan against the
background of Moldovan public opinion’s pressure and Western diplomatic messages of
disapproval.183 The Maastricht OSCE Summit in December 2003 also dismissed the
Kremlin initiative due to the joint opposition of US and EU.184
The Ukrainian Plan
The Transnistrian conflict equally depends on the strategy of the second state-
guarantor, Ukraine. The success of the Orange Revolution meant the failure of the
candidate backed-up by Kremlin and the electoral triumph, under street pressure, of the
opposition’s candidate, Viktor Yuschenko. The Western diplomatic milieu welcomed the
political change in Kyiv and sent positive signals towards the new Ukrainian foreign
policy. This occurred in hope that the new Ukrainian leader would differ from his
predecessor Vladimir Kucima not only in terms of domestic democratic reforms, but also
in reorienting his country towards the West, after years of diplomatic isolation and
strategic dependence on Russia.185
During the pentagonal summit in Vinnita, on 16-17 May 2005, the Ukrainian
delegation presented “The Plan for Solving the Transnistrian Problem” (informally called
the Yuschenko Plan) on the basis of the “seven steps” presented by the new Ukrainian
president on 22 April 2005 at the GUUAM Summit in Chisinau.
Without insisting on details186, the main provisions of the Ukrainian document
have to be outlined in order to reveal the fact that this Plan and the Kozak Memorandum
182
See Appeal of the National Assembly of Moldova' s Citizens to the participants in the Meeting of Foreign
Affairs Ministers of member states of the OSCE at Maastricht, Chisinau, 30 November 2003,
www.e-democracy.md.
183
Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for CFSP, recommended to president Voronin in November
2003 not to accept the Russian Plan. See Marius Vahl, “The Europeanisation of the Transnistrian Conflict”,
CEPS Policy Briefs, Centre for European Policy Studies, No. 73, May 2005.
184
For a realist perspective over the Moldovan foreign and security policy during the first term of president
Voronin, see Robert Weiner, “The Foreign Policy of the Voronin Administration”, Demokratizatsiya, Fall
2004, Volume 12, Number 4, pp.541-556.
185
See the favourable comments of the EU Special Representative for Transnistria Adriaan Jacobovits de
Szeged in Trimisul UE despre planul ucrainean pentru Transnistria (The EU Representative on the
Ukrainian Plan for Transnistria), 1 June 2005, http://www.moldova-suverana.md.
186
The Moldovan experts have criticised the hidden agenda and the impracticability of the Ukrainian
proposals. See Oazu Nantoi Planul de reglementare a problemei transnistrene, propus de partea
ucrainian – pro i contra (The Ukrainian Plan for Solving the Transnistrian Problem – Pros and Cons),
Institutul de Politici Publice, Chisinau, 8 June 2005, http://ipp.md/comentarii1.php?l=ro&id=38.
74
are in fact similar. The first critical aspect is the fact that the Transnistrian de facto
authority gets an implicit recognition because is been proclaimed in the preamble as “part
of the negotiation process”, entitled to sign and adopt the agreement. Moreover, the
Yuschenko Plan (chapter II, art. 3) calls for mandatory and urgent elections for the
Supreme Soviet, existing parliamentarian body which would thus receive its legitimacy.
Although the OSCE failed since 1993 to monitor and prevent the deterioration of daily
life in Transnistria, the Ukrainian Plan (cap. IIIc, par. 2) wants to put under its
supervision the elections for the Supreme Soviet. This is hardly to be considered a well-
thought solution, the document saying nothing about the withdrawal of the 14th Russian
Army and its arsenal either as a prerequisite for fair elections or as a consequence of a
possible normalization of the situation in DMR.
The Moldovan authorities and public opinion opposed constantly to the
federalization scenario as envisaged by the OSCE Plan and by the Kozak Memorandum.
The Yuschenko Plan has no reference to this but proposes a status of special territorial-
administrative entity “in the form of a republic within the Republic of Moldova” (cap.
IIIa, art. 2). That should have its own constitution, symbols and official languages
(Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian) and the right to develop foreign relations in the
economic, scientific, technological and humanitarian field, “according to the legislation
of the Republic of Moldova”, which would have to be amended in a federal sense.
The fundamental law for this new legal order would have to be the one of “basic
provisions on the status of Transnistria” which would have to be adopted by the
Moldovan Parliament and include first of all the right of secession (by referendum) if the
Republic of Moldova decides to unite with another state or if it looses its status as subject
of international law (cap. IIIb).
But the biggest problem is the fact that the inefficient and non-representative
triangle Russia-Ukraine-OSCE remains the guarantor for this process in which EU and
US would have only to assist, without participating to the International Agreement of
Guarantees and without having full rights in the Conciliation Committee. The latter is
intended to solve the disputes of interpreting the Law on Transnistria’s status and is
designed to two representatives of the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria and one of
for each member of the triangle. This would favour the blocking of decisions, the
hypothetical score being 3 to 4 (Moldova 2 + OSCE 1 versus Transnistria 2 + Russia 1 +
Ukraine 1). Moreover, Romania is totally put aside in the Yuschenko Plan.
Officially, the Putin regime considers the Kozak Memorandum as the sole
diplomatic solution for the Transnistrian conflict. The Ukrainian Plan is seen as
unacceptable and characterized as a set of “coercive measures”.187 But the Kozak
Memorandum is an obsolete instrument, promoted unilaterally by Russia, while the
187
A comprehensive analysis of the two documents shows their equivalence based on similarity of
perspective and the gradual instruments that should be used. Thus, both documents embrace the perspective
of federalization, with Transnistria receiving a republican status and its own constitution. The Transnistrian
inhabitants get the right to secession by referendum if Moldova joins another state (namely Romania) or
loses its status of international law subject. The Russian troops should not withdraw and the new legal
order should be under the same triangle Russia-Ukraine-OSCE. Of course, one may find discrepancies but
these are rather about text size than different approaches. Their style is similarly laconic, with omissions
and confuse.
75
Yuschenko Plan had a positive reception in the West and is often invoked as a landmark
for conflict resolution.
The Statute Law
The last developments in Moldovan political life generates more confusion over
the capacity of the Voronin regime to solve peacefully the conflict. On 22 July 2005, the
draft made by the Reunification Minister Vasile Sova188, at the request of President
Voronin, was unanimously approved by the Moldovan Parliament. Its provisions are
surprising due to the fact that it practically follows the lines of the Yuschenko Plan,
document rejected by the Moldovan MPs on 10 June 2005 for lacking the so-called 3-D
(demilitarization, decriminalization, democratization).189 It is twice surprising the fact
that the Moldovan Parliament has accepted the federalization (with Transnistria
becoming “territorial administrative unit in form of a republic”) and the fact that the new
regime of guarantees does not include the prerequisite of the Russian 14th Army
withdrawal.
The reactions190 of the mediation triangle were swift. The head of the OSCE
Mission in the Republic of Moldova William Hill saluted the adoption of the law, adding
that the most important thing is the fact that it guarantees a special status for Transnistria
within the Republic of Moldova.
But the Russian diplomacy rejected the Moldovan initiative in a press
communiqué on the grounds that the law breaches the rule of drafting and adopting it
through the consultation of the Transnistrian side.
Ukraine reacted in a more nuanced manner, emphasising the fact that the law
exceeded the limits of the Yuschenko Plan (accepted by the separatist leaders) and lacked
consultation with DMR authorities. As for the Smirnov regime, it rejected categorically
the Moldovan law.
§4.2.2 Moldovan Perceptions of the Causes of Conflict Resolution’s Failure

From the point of view of IR theory, the issue of Moldovan official and NGO
perceptions fit into the classic games of Stag Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma of the larger
category of Security Dilemma.191
A review of the public phenomena related to the Transnistrian conflict for 1991-
2005 reveals the constant balance between the wish for a positive resolution and the
188
“Lege cu privire la prevederile de baz ale statutului juridic special al localit ilor din stînga Nistrului
(regiunii transnistrene a Republicii Moldova)” (Law on the Basic Provisions of the Special Juridical Statute
of the Left Bank of River Dniestr’s Locations (The Transnistria Region of the Republic of Moldova)),
No.173-XVI, 22 July 2005, published in Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, No. 101-103/478, 29
July 2005.
189
See the reactions of the some Moldovan top politicians in Yuschenko' s plan– the second Kozak?, 21
June 2005, www.reporter.md.
190
See “Problema transnistrean ” (The Transnistrian Problem), e-journal, 3rd
year, No. 55, 4-29 July 2005, www.e-democracy.md/e-journal/20050729/index.shtml.
191
See, for instance, Jill Steans & Lloyd Pettiford, International Relations: Perspectives and Themes,
Longman, London, 2001, pp. 34-36.
76
incapacity to choose the right path. We encounter the dichotomy internal problem of the
Republic of Moldova (with no foreign involvement) / strategic incapacity to solve by own
peaceful or military means the secession (thus calling for foreign aid).
The internal problem of the Republic of Moldova option proved undoable even
during the hot phase (1991-92) of the conflict, Russia recognizing de jure the
independence of the Moldovan state, but using de facto the realist principle of divide et
impera for preserving its geo-strategic interests. The uneven structure of the Moldovan
society, the gap between its Romanian-speaking and Slavic components, generated
opposite perceptions over the Russian role in conflict resolution. An important moment
occurred in 2001, when the pro-Russian Communist Party won the elections using an
electoral platform of rejecting Romania’s perceived “big brother” behaviour and
unconditionally joining Kremlin’s vision – the sole effective guarantor for ending the
conflict and reuniting the country.
The Moldovan political elite, as legitimate representative of the “Moldovan
nation”, perceived the strategic incapacity to solve by its own peaceful or military means
the secession, but did not acknowledged the fact that was not even in the position to
formulate and implement the solution. In the anarchic international arena192, the state-
actor who does not have the power to solve its own domestic problems has to accept the
solutions of those state-actors who can.
The fear for federalization193, the solution proposed in 2001 by the Russia-
Ukraine-OSCE triangle, generated panic in the Moldovan society, incapable of “hunting”
by itself the big prize of reunification (the stag) under the sovereign authority of
Chisinau, but reluctant to be satisfied by the small prize (the hare)194 of the others, more
doable, but not so meaty on long term. Thus, the theoretical forecast shows the pre-
eminence of hare’s choice.
At the same time, taking into consideration the impact of the Transnistrian
conflict over domestic political trends, no governing party ever risked the radical solution
of conflict resolution at all costs. Instead, they omitted full and comprehensive dialog
with DMR, by invoking the pretext of avoiding recognizing the Smirnov regime in this
way. Thus, they shut up, in line with the terms of Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The September 2003195-2005 period of time has been characterized by a growing
Europhilia of the Voronin regime and of the Moldovan society with hopes that a
perceived powerful and just actor as EU would grant the big prize to Chisinau.
Consequently, the precedent of the Cypriot conflict aroused, Nicosia joining the EU
being depicted by the official rhetoric196 as the model to follow by Chisinau. Thus, the
192
So less fair and moral per se.
193
See Oleh Protsyk, Federalism and Democracy in Moldova, European Centre for Minority Issues,
www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/FD/DMD20050621_12/dmd20050621_12en.pdf.
194
The small prize could be either the federalization of the Republic of Moldova (with a higher degree of
autonomy for Transnistria and a limited central power) or the Transnistrian self-determination (by
referendum).
195
The year when President Voronin invited the EU to join the group of mediators.
196
See the column of Vitalie Ciobanu, “Cine mai are nevoie de Republica Moldova?” (Who needs the
Republic of Moldova anymore?), in Contrafort, No. 12 (110), December 2003,
www.contrafort.md/2003/110/638.html.
77
myth of salvation started to generate errors, the European integration’s goal being too far
and risking to produce the reverse phenomenon of Europhobia caused by rejection or
long-term postponement of Moldova’s candidacy.197
Ambassador William Hill’s case
The Moldovan perceptions issue could have as key study the activity of
Ambassador William Hill.
In an article for Helsinki Monitor198, an OSCE official publication, Ambassador
Hill declared that “Russia made progress toward building normal relations with this
small neighbouring former republic of the Soviet Union. Local Transdniestrian
authorities demonstrated their willingness, albeit grudging at times, to observe general
European norms and agreements”. Follow-up reactions from the mass-media in Chisinau
led to a conflict between the head of the OSCE Mission and the board managements of
Timpul and Flux journals199, over the pro-Russian and pro-Transnistrian approach of
Ambassador Hill, considered being a close friend of Evgheny Primakov, the mastermind
of the federalization plan for Moldova.
Another episode took place in September 2003, when the acting OSCE chairman,
the current Secretary-General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, in a message to the US
Congress, promoted the necessity of EU participation to an international peacekeeping
operation in Transnistria. In this context, Ambassador Hill was quoted on 5 September
2003 as pro-EU involvement, with the condition that this participation to take place under
OSCE aegis. Later on, on 17 September he was quoted saying that the EU force of 500
troops should replace the Russian peace-keepers which should be “completely and
immediately withdrawn”.200 But the next day, the OSCE official denied such a statement.
During the demonstrations organized by the Moldovan opposition forces against
de intended adoption of the Kozak Memorandum by the Voronin regime, William Hill
was again the focus of protesters’ attention.201
In 2004, Vladimir Socor, senior editor for Wall Street Journal Europe, accused
the OSCE Mission under Ambassador Hill’s leadership to be on the KGB payroll.202
Letting aside the true or false character of this allegation, the fact that William Hill
continues to be the head of the Mission fuels, through his controversial image, the
negative perceptions of the Moldovan society on the OSCE role in the conflict resolution.
197
See Nicu Popescu, Op iunea european a Moldovei nu trebuie s fie o alegere geopolitic , ci o alegere
de politic intern (The European choice of Moldova does not have to be a geopolitical choice but an
option of domestic policy), 4 April 2005, http://politicom.moldova.org/europa/rom/151/2/.
198
William Hill, "Making Istanbul a Reality: Moldova, Russia, and Withdrawal from
Transdniestria”, in Helsinki Monitor, 13 (2), 2002, pp. 129-145.
199
The director of “Timpul”, Constantin T nase, and the editor-in-chief of “Flux”, Igor Burciu, will be
joined by Nicolae Dabija (editor-in-chief, “Literatura i arta”), Val Butnaru (director, “Jurnal de
Chisinau”), Ala Mandacanu (editor-in-chief, “Democratia”) and Vasile Nastase (editor-in-chief, “Glasul
Natiunii”). See Open letter to ambassador William Hill, head of the OSCE Mission in Chisinau, Moldova
published in Romanian and English in "Timpul", "Flux”, "Literatura i arta", "Jurnal de Chisinau",
"Democratia", and "Glasul Natiunii" publications, 8-9 May 2003.
200
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/09/180903.asp.
201
www.lumeam.ro/nr1_2004/actualitate_chisinau.html.
202
http://moldovaworld.iatp.md/stiri.php?p=72,
78
§ 4.3 Opportunities for Conflict Resolution Presented by the ENP and the ESDP
The faulty management by OSCE generated big question marks about its capacity
to play the leading role in solving the Transnistrian conflict.203 Because of OSCE’s lack
of reform, especially in the field of unanimity voting procedure, only small positive steps
are to be expected on short and medium-term.
Therefore, emphasis should go on EU and NATO, very different in scope and
nature than OSCE. Besides their interlocking security nature, EU and NATO do not have
Russia as member-state, so the issue of Kremlin’s veto is eliminated. On the other hand,
the two Western organizations risk to be confronted with Russia’s fierce opposition to a
possible decisive involvement of them in Transnistria.
In the general framework of EU-RM rapprochement, the ENP presents a series of
opportunities for Chisinau worthy to be considered, the Transnistrian conflict included.
The primary goal for ENP is to create a ring of friendly states at the periphery of EU,
countries not included in the EU enlargement but partners in forging a space of peace,
prosperity and stability.204 But Transnistria is a security issue on the ENP map, a
generator and facilitator of asymmetrical risks and threats primarily because of arms,
drugs and human trafficking.
The EU-Moldova Cooperation Council approved on 22 February 2005 the Action
205
Plan which defines the relationship between Brussels and Chisinau on short-term, until
2008. The Transnistrian conflict gets a special attention, EU proclaiming its will to
continue to be involved in the resolution process “respecting the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized
borders, and guaranteeing respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights”
(chapter 2.2). The statement of this principle by the EU diplomacy it is very important
especially when the federalization plans promoted by the official mediators Russia and
OSCE seemed to be questioning the integrity of the Moldovan state. Also, it must be
underlined the EU commitment to continue its efforts towards convincing Russia to
withdraw its 14th Army from Transnistria. Concomitantly, by signing an Action Plan206
with Ukraine, too, the EU puts an emphasis on the improvement of border cooperation
especially on the Transnistrian segment in order to prevent illegal trafficking.
Of course, EU cannot act unilaterally, so consulting and coordinating its actions
with those of OSCE and Council of Europe (on the critical issues of human rights
violations by the separatist regime) is necessary as well as interacting bilaterally with the
state-actors with vested interests in the area, namely Russia, Ukraine and Romania.
203
See the critical perspective on OSCE of the Russian Foreign Minister Serghei Lavrov, “The comparative
advantages of OSCE are being eroded”, in International Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2005, pp. 16-20.
204
See A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability, Speech by Romano Prodi, President of
the European Commission, “Peace, Security And Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU”
Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, SPEECH/02/619,
www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/sp02_619.htm.
205
http://ced.pca.md/menu1_5-1.html.
206
See Chapter 2.1.14 of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/Proposed_Action_Plan_EU-Ukraine.pdf.
79
Taking into account both the Russian predictable opposition against a 100 per cent
Western settling of the Transnistrian conflict and Brussels’ signals not encouraging a
direct involvement of Bucharest in the mediation efforts, the key lies in the addition to
the current group of the strategic triangle EU-NATO-US. The latter has the economic
power, the military strength, the diplomatic assets and experience to implement a viable
solution in Transnistria. The lessons-learned in managing similar crises in the former
Yugoslavia could facilitate a positive result in Transnistria, too207 but only after
complying to several preconditions:
The proclamation of US political will to be decisively involved in the region, but in
such a manner as to accommodate Kremlin’s feelings and not jeopardizing the
American-Russian cooperation on key aspects like counter-terrorism and energy
security.
The common decision of EU, NATO and US to be decisively involved in solving this
security issue in the near vicinity of Euro-Atlantic space because this black hole
called Transnistria could help spread the terrorism.
Bridging the different conceptual perspectives and strategic priorities of EU and
NATO regarding the Black Sea region. Via the Wider Europe-New Neighbourhood
concept, the EU emphasizes the idea of setting up a band of friendly countries at its
periphery, which includes as a distinct component the Black Sea region, whereas
NATO either points to the Caspian Sea-Black Sea energy corridor, via the Wider
Black Sea concept, referring to the Black Sea and Southern Caucasus countries, or
underlines the fact that the Black Sea region is a springboard towards the strategic
and unsettled area of the Middle East, via the Greater Middle East concept.
EU and NATO have to realize that cooperation in this area is not only a feasible, but
desirable, too, considering the fact that the Transatlantic link would benefit due to
such an initiative. A Petersberg mission, under the Berlin+ Agreement208, would give
to the ESDP the opportunity to expand its area of action in the former Soviet space.
Such a mission based on the lessons-learned in the previous Petersberg missions in
the Balkans could start with the management of a single city (Tighina209, for instance
– following the pattern of Mostar’s administration by WEU) and could expand latter
to the whole troubled area. Such a mission should be deployed prior to any form of
political consultation in Transnistria and Russia could participate to it only after
fulfilling the withdrawal of its 14th Army and arsenal. On the other hand, Ukraine
should be encouraged to participate as a sign of acknowledging its strategic option
207
See Simon Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security. From EDC to PESC, Macmillan,
Basingtoke, 2000 or Elfriede Regelsberger, Phillipe de Schoutheete de Tervarent, Wolfgang Wessels
(coord.), Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Boulder, London, 1997.
208
The EU-NATO Agreement concluded in December 2002, which offers to the EU the right to make use
of NATO assets for Petersberg missions.
209
Moldovan city, outside of Transnistria, captured by the separatists in 1992.
80
towards Euro-Atlantic community and its ability to fulfil its international

commitments.210
Because the Republic of Moldova is a neutral state, its Constitution has to be
amended so that an international peace-keeping force to be legal to operate within.211
§ 4.4 The Conflict and the Frontier Securitization

The Moldovan authorities tried to add to their new tax and customs policy an
improvement in border cooperation between Chisinau and Kyiv. In May 2003, under the
mediation of Chris Patten, the EU Commissioner for Foreign Relations, they have
brokered a border cooperation agreement on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan-
Ukrainian frontier. The core provisions regarded the right solution of creating common
customs posts on Ukrainian soil in order to avoid and annul the de facto customs
operations of the separatist regime. But the Kucima regime did not implement the
agreement, despite the fact that an additional document was adopted in January 2004.
This contributed to the failure of the trade blockade on Transnistria ordered by the
Moldovan government in August 2004, as a consequence of the forced closure of
Romanian language schools by the secessionist leaders.
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine has produced until now the same rhetoric of
good will unaccompanied by real steps meant to materialize it, the Yuschenko-Putin
meeting on 19 March 2005 proving to be a catalyst for Ukrainian customs permissiveness
on the Transnistrian segment, with the complicity of co-interested authorities in
Odessa212. All these things took place in the initial context of the new measures taken by
Kyiv to accept on the Ukrainian territory only that merchandise bearing the Moldovan
official customs marks and to fight corruption in the customs apparatus.
The right solution for the Republic of Moldova lies in the two Action Plans
concluded by Brussels with Chisinau and Kyiv, the pressure of EU diplomacy (possibly
reinforced by that of US) being the last resort in persuading the Yuschenko regime to
fulfil its international commitments. An important role could be played by the trilateral
formula of consultation Moldova-EU Commission-Ukraine introduced by the two
documents. The EU Commission has the power to generate provisional general reports on
the status of the two countries’ progress in meeting the priorities.
The answer to the generic question about how constructive the role played by
Ukraine could be is elusive because the diplomatic behaviour of the new regime in Kyiv
reflects merely a focus on replacing Kremlin from its pre-eminent position, excluding
Romania and containing Western involvement in this issue.
210
See the provisions of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan on the basis of which the Yuschenko regime engaged
itself to support actively the CFSP efforts to implement the European Security Strategy, the crisis
management included.
211
The Moldovan Constitution (Article 11.2 ) stipulates the fact that “The Republic of Moldova does not
accept the deployment of foreign troops on its territory”.
212
Iulia Kirnitki, Economic Sanctions and Security of the Border Between Moldova and Ukraine,
www.azi.md/comment?ID=33794, April 12, 2005
81
In this line of arguments, it should be mentioned the negative reality of the

continuation of de facto relations between Kyiv and Tiraspol, following the pattern of the
former Kucima regime of protecting the Transnistrian communist authorities. On 27
February 2003, the EU and the US introduced travel bans for Igor Smirnov and other 16
Transnistrian officials. But these separatist leaders can continue to travel freely in
Ukraine, and the Kyiv administration, despite its pro-European rhetoric, has done nothing
in declaring them persona non grata.
The current joint monitoring of the Transnistrian segment, with OSCE
participation, does not re-establish unconditionally the Moldovan customs sovereign
space and does not remove from power the secessionist regime in Tiraspol. By invoking
the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, the Ukrainian authorities contradict
themselves due to the fact that only the joint Moldovan-Ukrainian customs posts, and not
those illegal between Tiraspol and Odessa, could reinforce the Moldovan customs single
space and stop the illicit trafficking which fuels the Smirnov regime.213
Ukraine allows also Russian military flights which land on the Tiraspol military
airfield, ignoring the fact that these happen without the authorization from Chisinau.
Considering that the Tiraspol military airfield is not under the control of the Moldovan
authorities or of the OSCE Mission, these flights could be used for illicit trafficking. Kyiv
could remedy this by imposing the precondition for these flights to land on the Chisinau
airfield with a joint customs check provided by Moldovan authorities and OSCE
personnel.
Acceding to international and primarily EU financial assistance should be an
urgent priority for the Moldovan government, its capacity to assume and use such funds
representing a relevant criterion for closer ties with the Western partners. The grant
offered by EU and UNDP for the Moldovan frontier securitization project is such a test.
The basic goal of this project is to reduce illegal migration and drug trafficking, to
facilitate counter-terrorism and fight against organized crime. The project (1,942,500
euros) will be implemented for one year. Its main beneficiaries will be the Border Guard
Department, the Customs Department, the Migration Department, the Foreign Affairs
Ministry and the Home Affairs Ministry of the Republic of Moldova. This project is also
intended to insure modern technology and infrastructure for 5 border crossing points:
Criva-Mamaliga, Medveja-Zeliona, Larga-Kelmenti, Briceni-Rososeni i Giurgiulesti-
Reni.214
§ 4.5 The impact of the Transnistrian Conflict on the Moldovan Security Sector
Reform
The security sector reform (SSR) represents a mandatory component of the
democratization process in view of the European and/or Euro-Atlantic integration. Every
former communist state which aimed at joining the Western political and security
community had to give priority to SSR, due to the fact that the like-minded strategic
213
For a positive perspective over the Moldovan-Ukrainian cooperation, see Alexander Rahr, “Moldova
and Ukraine”, in David Greenwood, Peter Volten (eds.), Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-
Building. Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova, pp. 123-130.
214
See e-journal, 3rd year, No. 47, 14 February- 6 March 2005, www.e-democracy.md/e-journal/20050314/
82
principle of NATO could not been applied without the civilian democratic control over
the armed forces.
Defining SSR, it could be said that in the post-Cold War era this concept indicates
both the relationship between the defence structures and the other governmental and
nongovernmental organizations active in the security and defence area and the re-
evaluation of international missions ranging from preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping
or peace-making operations to humanitarian interventions and post-conflict
rehabilitation.215
According to its constitution, the Republic of Moldova is a neutral country and
the presence of foreign troops on its soil is forbidden. But proclaiming such a principle
did not prove to be sufficient for securing Moldovan security. On the contrary, the
Moldovan geopolitical and geostrategic realities are decisively influenced by the
Transnistrian conflict, in such a way that the evolution of SSR in the Republic of
Moldova differs radically from those of the other Eastern European states sharing similar
integration objectives.
The Transnistrian conflict represents both the necessity and the opportunity for a
viable SSR, because the phase of military confrontations (the end of 1991-June 1992, the
battles of Tighina and Dubasari) coincides with the beginning of Moldovan statehood.
The victory of the secessionist forces over the Moldovan army and the agreement
between Chisinau and Kremlin (July 1992) legitimized the continuation of Russian
forces’ presence in Transnistria216 as peace-keepers, a demilitarized Security Zone under
trilateral Russian-Moldovan-Transnistrian supervision being created. The impotence of
Moldovan authorities to count in this power play showed off soon and the Security Zone
was not demilitarized, but transformed in a de facto border full with troops, border guards
units and customs posts of the separatist regime. Moreover, the Chisinau initiatives are
constantly blocked in the Joint Control Commission217 by the Transnistrian veto.218
Letting aside the more or less realistic objective of RM’s European integration,
SSR has become necessary in the frozen phase of the conflict because the separatism is
based on a disproportionate balance of forces. Several databases219 estimates the
Moldovan strength at 6,800 troops and 2,300 civilian personnel organized in 3 infantry
motorized brigades, 1 artillery brigade, 1 anti-missile brigade, special forces and
215
See Adrian Pop, “Romania: Reforming the security sector”, in David Greenwood, Peter Volten (eds.),
Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building. Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova.,
pp. 49-58.
216
In order to see how fair and balanced were the Russian peace-keeping forces, it is relevant to remember
the statements of the 14th Army’s former chief general Aleksandr Lebed (elected MP both in the Russian
Duma and in the DMR Soviet) who used to characterize the Moldovan leaders as “war criminals”, rulers of
“a fascist state” and to threaten Bucharest with invasion in 24 hours. See Graeme P. Herd, Moldova and
the Dnestr Region: Contested past, frozen conflict, speculative futures, Conflict Studies Research Centre,
Central & Eastern Europe Series 05/07, February 2005.
217
The body in charge with the peace-keeping mission.
218
For an analysis of the Security Zone, see Dov Lynch, Moldova and Transnistria, in David Greenwood,
Peter Volten (eds.), Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building. Needs and Options for Ukraine
and Moldova, p. 113.
219
See Michal Fizser, “Loose cannons in Eastern Europe, part 2: Belarus and Moldova”, in Journal of
Electronic Defense, March 2005, p. 18.
83
auxiliaries. The air forces count on 1,050 troops, but the 6 MIG-29 are out of service. The
land forces do not have tanks, but possess 200 Romanian-made armoured transporters
(TAB).
Fewer data are available for the separatist forces, which do not have the obligation
to report to any international agency due to the fact that Smirnov regime is not
recognized. According to the statistics of the Moldovan Defence Ministry, the
Transnistrian army220 has 4 infantry brigades (located strategically in Tiraspol, Tighina,
Rabnita and Dubasari), one tank battalion (with 18 T-64Bs), one anti-tank battalion, one
artillery unit and one engineer unit. The air forces consist of one active squadron in
Tiraspol (6 Mi-8s, 2 Mi-2s and an An-26, for transport). It should be underlined the
importance of the special forces (one “Delta” battalion) and of paramilitary troops (of
Cossack volunteers, for instance) under the command of the State Security Ministry or
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The total sum of Transnistrian troops is around 6,000-8,000-
10,000 in strength221.
But the military effectiveness of the two sides do not pose great risks and threats
to the neighbouring countries due to their obsolete and partially non-operational
capabilities of Russian or Romanian origin. The huge 14th Army’s arsenal is a total
different story, being not only a violation of the international law (the CFE Treaty222, the
obligations took by Russia during the OSCE Istanbul and Porto Summits) but also a
security umbrella for the secessionist regime, protector and beneficiary of the illicit arms
trafficking.
By the end of 2003, the 14th Army strength was reduced to 1,300-1,500 troops,
mostly officers, but the arsenal still counted for 25,000 t out of the initial 42,000 t.223
Once the relations between Chisinau and Kremlin worsen because of Kozak
Memorandum’s rejection, the withdrawal process stopped, the OSCE proving again to be
not capable of solving key-aspects of the conflict.
It is worth mentioning also the fact that Russia managed to block during the
OSCE Ministerial Summit in Sofia in December 2004 a draft resolution224 calling for the
14th Army’s withdrawal, despite the fact that already one year had passed since the last
deadline. Paradoxically, from Kremlin’s tactics benefit Chisinau, due to a clear-cut
reaction from Washington225, State Secretary Colin Powell expressing the US
commitment226 to sign the CFE Treaty but only after the withdrawal of the Russian forces
220
Another source for Transnistrian force assesment is the official press agency Olvia-press. See
www.olvia.idknet.com/ENCYCLOPAEDIC%20INFORMATION.htm.
221
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2003; The Military Balance 2002-2003, IISS, London, 2003.
222
Treaty on European Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990) under OSCE aegis
223
Dov Lynch, Moldova and Transnistria, in David Greenwood, Peter Volten (eds.), Security-Sector
Reform and Transparency-Building. Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova, p. 115.
224
Graeme P. Herd, Moldova and the Dnestr Region: Contested past, frozen conflict, speculative futures,
p. 12.
225
For an analysis of the Moldovan-American relations, see Steven Woehrel, Moldova: Background and
US Policy, CRS Report for Congress, March 8, 2005.
226
The US is a major contributor to Russian withdrawal by granting OSCE approximately 14 million USD
until now.
84
and arsenal from Transnistria. On 10 March 2005, the US Senate passed a resolution
which reiterated the same precondition.227
Coming back to the SSR perspectives in the Republic of Moldova228, it should be
underlined the fact that besides insuring the civilian political control by the
democratically elected authorities, framing the civilian-military cooperation within the
general area of Moldovan democratic reforms, restructuring and modernizing the security
forces and the specific ministries, employing young specialists to provide a fresh impetus
to the strategic thinking in Chisinau, the reality must always prevail. The Republic of
Moldova is not only a small state, but also a very poor one, which cannot compete with
the Swiss pattern of achieving security by perpetual neutrality. The authorities in
Chisinau, regardless of their political orientation, cannot create a super-army able to
regain Transnistria by force. Taking into account the slow progress of the economic
reform, they cannot even create a rapid reaction force, flexible and easy to sustain on the
battlefield on the model of the NATO Response Force.229
“The Military Reform Concept”230 (2002) had a financial prognosis of 0.5 to 2.5
per cent increase in GDP terms for the next 12 years, a level not reached throughout
2003-2005 due to the public deficit. Such a financial handicap raises big question marks
over the capacity of the Republic of Moldova to improve its cooperation and
interoperability with NATO, by going from the PfP phase (1994) to the upper level of the
Individual Action Plan (IPAP), like Ukraine and Georgia have already done.
But the Moldovan authorities could prioritize feasible goals for SSR like
consolidating the border guards or creating small units designed to participate in
international operations,231 thus improving the image of the Moldovan state especially in
Western chancelleries. Alongside achieving military objectives, the overall reform of
Moldovan diplomatic corps should be a priority for RM, the soft arsenal being the only
viable tool for Chisinau in the regional power play. The establishment in September 2005
of an EU Commission Delegation’s office in Chisinau, according to the bilateral Action
Plan, represents a test for the Moldovan authorities whose official representation in the
West is meagre.232
The Republic of Moldova could portray itself both as a promoter of peaceful
solutions and as a security provider for sensitive topics on the Euro-Atlantic security
agenda like frontier securitization and the fight against all forms of illegal trafficking.
227
US Senate resolution on Russian troops in Georgia & Moldova, SRES 69 ATS, 109th CONGRESS,
March 10, 2005, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov.
228
For a comparative analysis see Nicolae Chirtoac , “Moldova: reform requirements” and Vlad Lupan,
“Moldova: implications of NATO/EU enlargement”, in David Greenwood, Peter Volten (eds.), Securtiy-
Sector Reform and Transparency-Building. Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova, pp. 93-110.
229
www.nato.int/issues/nrf/.
230
Concep ia Reformei Militare (The Concept of Military Reform), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii
Moldova No. 117-119, 15 August 2002.
231
During his visit to the Republic of Moldova (June 2004), the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
took the opportunity to thank Chisinau for its support in Irak. But in February 2005, the mine-removal unit
of 12 soldiers was withdrawn, the Moldovan Parliament not approving until now a new mission despite
Washington’s expectations. See Secretary Rumsfeld and Moldovan Minister of Defense Press Availability
2nd Brigade Headquarters Chisinau Moldova, June 26, 2004, www.usembassy.md/en-rumsfeld.htm
232
www.ipp.md.
85
As far as the neutrality issue is concerned, the options imply a new security
dilemma as long as promoting a successful SSR means getting financial assistance,
expertise and training from EU and NATO. But this collides with the Moldovan
constitutional limits.
§ 4.6 Romania’s Role in Conflict Resolution

At the beginning of the ‘90s, Romania was unjustly excluded from the mediation
group. Paradoxically, Bucharest authorities decided to adopt a passive attitude precisely
when it had the power to influence the conflict resolution. In 2001, when Russia was
supposed to withdraw its troops and armaments from Transnistria, in accordance with the
OSCE Istanbul Summit commitments (1999), the acting Romanian presidency of OSCE,
namely its former Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana, decided to transfer the Transnistrian
issue on the agenda of the incoming Portuguese presidency by fear not to jeopardize the
Romanian-Russian treaty negotiations.233
The power shift in Bucharest brought with it a renewed interest for Romania’s
involvement in the Transnistrian conflict resolution.
Romania has the interest and duty to contribute together with and through the EU
to the Transnistrian conflict resolution, in order to ensure its own security and the
security of the future wider Europe. But at the same time, it has to avoid trap choices
which could block its accession to EU like the quid pro quo type of arrangement
proposed by Russia in 2004, through Stanislav Belkovski, director of the Institute for
National Strategy, in order to test Bucharest’s reaction – the unification of Bessarabia
with Romania in exchange for Transnistria’s independence.234
Paradoxically, the scenario proposed by Belkovski echoed in Bucharest, in a
Romanian Academic Society (SAR) policy brief. Using as starting point the case of
Cyprus’ accession to the EU, the paper recommended to Chisinau to abandon the priority
of Transnistrian reintegration and to focus instead on its candidacy to EU “regardless of
what Transnistria does, like the Greek Cyprus has done vis-à-vis the rest of the island
occupied by Turkey”. Meanwhile, Romania should do nothing and wait for its accession
moment in order to be involved in the conflict resolution.235
Another variant of Cyprus’ case was afterwards launched by the “Ovidiu Sincai”
Social-Democratic Institute (ISD) in a report that proposed the provisional separation of
Tranistria from Moldova and the implementation of an international protectorate for a
233
But the same Romanian official stated in November 2003 that Romania does not want to sign a Treaty
with the Republic of Moldova “because the period of time when this were needed in Europe is already
over”. http://www.azi.md/news, 17 November 2003.
234
Stanislav Belkovski, the promoter of this proposal, considered that “sooner or later, this artificial state
will have to give Basarabia to Romania and the rest will join either Russia, or Ukraine, or will keep its
sovereignity”. See „Moscova î i schimb strategia fa de Transnistria” (Moscow changes its strategy for
Transnistria), in Ziua, 21 May 2004. Anneli Ute Gabany, researcher at the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs in Berlin, characterized this proposal as “the way to block Romania’s
accession to EU”.
235
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Ion Naval, Cum putem ajuta Moldova s se ajute pe sine (How can we help
Moldova to help itself), SAR Policy Brief No.16, Bucharest, August 2005.
86
minimum period of time of 5-7 years, following the model of Kosovo. Concomitantly,
the rest of Moldova should advance from the current ENP member status to full EU
membership (on the basis on an accession calendar of a maximum 3-5 years). After the
completion of Transnistria’s demilitarization, decriminalization and democratization, its
final status should be settled either as an integral part of Moldova (already member of
EU) or as an entity like Monaco or Liechtenstein which transfer partially their
institutional management to some neighbouring countries (in this case, Russia and/or
Ukraine).236
Even if, and on the contrary to the SAR scenario, the ISD scenario has the merit
to underline the necessity of Romania’s involvement towards achieving the
internationalization of the Transnistrian issue and setting up, jointly with EU and NATO,
an official plan for Transnistria, it has several implementation flaws.
First, the decision to put Transnistria under a UN protectorate would be most
likely blocked by the Russian veto. Second, the peace-keeping troops should be provided
by EU, Russia, Ukraine and other willing states, the presence of US troops being
expedited by the authors in the “among others” category. But the missions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Kosovo have essentially been based on the US contribution, via NATO.
Meanwhile, the Russian peace-keeping forces have not been capable and interested to
prevent the severe human rights violations in Transnistria. Third, a shift of RM’s Western
side to the Dnestr from ENP to EU enlargement is unrealistic because it cannot be done
unilaterally only for RM, but for all the regions and states covered by the ENP, which is
less likely taking into account the current context of the debut of EU accession
negotiations with Turkey and Croatia. Fourth, is improbable that the Moldovan electorate
would accept the scenario of giving up Transnistria in exchange for a very far away EU
accession perspective of the rest of RM. Last but not least, Romania cannot play for the
Republic of Moldova a similar role as Greece did for the Greek Cyprus considering that it
is still not an EU member (not to talk about an old EU member, like Greece). Moreover,
its entry moment is not yet clear and Chisinau denies constantly the Romanian origin of
most of its citizens.
The replacement of the current pentagonal mediation framework with another in
which EU and US would have full rights is in the best interest of Romania. The recent
revised formula with EU and US as observers237 is not enough taking into consideration
the near vicinity of the frozen conflict area.
As a junior partner of great Western actors, Romania, whose political and security
interest should remain the one of preserving Moldovan sovereignty and independence,
can refrain itself from a direct and on an equal footing participation in the negotiation
framework and to accept to act only through EU bodies.238 But it cannot accept to be
236
Transnistria. Evolu ia unui conflict înghe at i perspective de solu ionare (Transnistria. The evolution of
a frozen conflict and its resolution perspectives), Institutul Social-Democrat “Ovidiu incai”, Bucharest,
September 2005, p. 16.
237
During the Odessa Summit (26-27 September 2005), Tiraspol and Kremlin have accepted EU and US as
observers. http://www.moldpres.md/default.asp?Lang=en&ID=25083
238
See the interview granted by the Romanian Foreign Minister Mihai-R zvan Ungureanu, 11 October
2005, for the Russian radio station Eho Moskvi (“In any way, Romania is under the EU flag…”), at
87
present and to be involved in the conflict resolution process through an EU which has got
only the observer status.
From its present position as NATO member and future EU member, Romania can
act as a facilitator for the Western security vectors by providing a common denominator
- the joint action in Transnistria - on the trans-Atlantic reconciliation agenda. By forging
a consensus between the EU and the US for a decisive involvement in Transnistria
Romania could become more relevant in the regional power play. But at same time, in
order to prevent unwanted risks and adversities, Romanian foreign policy should avoid
statements capable of hurting Russia’s sensitivity.239
Alongside proving support for the Republic of Moldova in the international
bodies and introducing the Transnistrian conflict on its presidency’s agenda of the
Council of Europe’s Ministerial Council,240 Romania could act through EU, too. The
Romanian involvement in the ENP security dimension could be both twinning and
participation to the EU missions that Brussels is starting to deploy in the Republic of
Moldova. On the basis of the trilateral Memorandum signed on 7 October 2005,241
starting 1 December 2005 an EU monitoring mission will be deployed at the Moldovan-
Ukrainian border (especially on its Transnistrian segment). It will consist of 65 persons
(of which 50 are customs agents and border guards) with a renewable two-year mandate
and a budget of 7 million euros. Its primary objective will be to combat cross-border
organized crime and border violations. This mission represents an opportunity for
Romania, but only after EU accession, a participation of its customs agents and border
guards in the second phase of the mission being able to generate a good image for
Bucharest in its efforts to contribute to conflict resolution.
Taking into consideration this window of opportunity, in the context of its future
status as EU border state, Romania should produce as soon as possible a long-term
strategy on Moldova – and implicitly on the Transnistrian conflict resolution – resultant
from a bipartisan consultation and agreement.
http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=27289&idlnk=2&cat=4. His position matches the message of

the EU Special Representative for the Republic of Moldova who declared in June 2005, after a meeting
with the afore-mentioned Romanian official that “I do not see why Romania should be a separate member
in the negociation framework as long other EU member states are not there, too.” See
http://www.9am.ro/revistapresei/International/12708/Provocarile-Romaniei-vin-de-la-Rasarit.
239
According to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, 3 officials can legally
bind a state in the international system, namely the head of state, the prime-minister and the foreign
minister. Statements like those of President Traian B sescu (15 September 2005) – „The Russian
Federation considers the Black Sea as a Russian lake because it does not want the internationalization of
the problems of that area“ or "We do not have to accept anymore the Black Sea to be a Russian lake" – do
not serve to the Romanian-Russian diplomatic rapprochement. See http://www.hotnews.ro/articol_32071-
'Marea-Neagra-nu-e-lac-al-Federatiei-Ruse' .htm.
240
See the Press Comunique after the Basescu-Voronin meeting in Iasi on 25 September 2005
241
Strengthening the partnership between the EU and its neighbours -
Signature of EU-Moldova-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding, Palanca cross border point, 7 October
2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/moldova/intro/sp05_586.htm.
88
Conclusions and Recommendations

The ENP could be considered as a compromise between the desire of the new
neighbour countries to become members of the Union and the EU limits to accept new
enlargements. The ENP implementation will lead to the creation of a pan-European and
Mediterranean region organized on the concentric circles pattern.
The ENP provides a favourable framework for the EU foreign relations and has
the necessary potential to sustain the economic development processes in the
neighbouring countries and the strengthening of stability and security on regional level.
The ENP presents a series of limitations as well whose impact could cause the
reduction of efficiency of the EU action in its direct neighbourhood or even the overall
revision of its strategy.
Due to its multiple dimensions – political, human and cultural, economic and
security – the ENP interrelates with many EU policies (regional policy, justice and home
affairs, education, culture and research, sustainable, social and environment development
policies, foreign affairs and security).
The securitization of the future eastern border of EU on the river Prut, on the
Danube and at the Black Sea, together with the avoidance of the transformation of the
new enlargement wave in a generator of new fault lines, represents one of the major
challenges which Romania has to face in the pre and post-EU accession period.
Several external factors have led to the recent pro-European orientation of the
Republic of Moldova: the vicinity of the Euro-Atlantic limes; its exclusion from the
Single Economic Space; the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine; and the imperative of
diminishing its economic dependency on Russia.
The pro-European orientation of the Republic of Moldova remains still anchored
mostly at the official rhetorical level, the real attitude of the majority of political leaders
and that of Moldovan society at large being characterized by ambivalence and permanent
vacillation between EU and CIS.
The presence in Transnistria of large military and paramilitary forces blocks the
economic and social development and the European aspiration of the Republic of
Moldova. Hampered by the outbreak of the secessionist movement, the security sector
reform has become a precondition of conflict resolution.
The ENP and the ESDP offer new opportunities for the Transnistrian conflict
resolution. The EU monitoring mission will be the first display of the ENP security
dimension in the Black Sea region. The securitization of the most vulnerable segment of
the Moldovan-Ukrainian border might be completed by a future Petersberg mission,
under the Berlin+ Agreement, which would have Transnistria as its first implementation
ground in the former Soviet area.
The past emphasis of Bucharest in promoting “the two Romanian states” theory
proved to be counterproductive for the bilateral relations because it was a barrier of
communication between the citizens of the two neighbouring states and aggravated the
legitimacy complex of the Moldovan political elites, which replicated by promoting a
fake Moldovan identity and adopting an anti-Romanian attitude.
89
Romania does not need a privileged political relationship with the Republic of
Moldova, but normal relations in order to generate deep and viable bonds with the
Romanians from the left bank of river Dnestr.
Taking into consideration its vast working experience in the field of European
integration, Bucharest can offer valuable expertise in any field of the EU-Republic of
Moldova Action Plan.
The know-how transfer in the area of European integration might use both the
governmental level, including the possibility for joint government meetings on the model
of the Romanian-Hungarian government meeting in October 2005, and the
nongovernmental one, by proving support and consultancy to NGOs involved in the
Moldovan democratization.
In the wider framework of Moldovan-Romanian parliamentarian exchanges, the
Romanian Parliament could offer to the Moldovan Parliament the opportunity to send a
MP to Bucharest as observer of the legislative process in the field of European
integration.
The sub-regional cooperation structures and the Euro-regions open a large field of
action to the implementation of the ENP goals in the relationship between Romania, as
future EU eastern border, and the Republic of Moldova which should consequently feel
less marginalized.
Joining the EU in 2007 could represent an important argument for Bucharest in its
relations with Chisinau because it could help sooner from within the Moldovan pro-
European orientation and contribute to the strengthening of the recent rapprochement.
Last but not least, several recommendations should be put forward in order to
provide coherence to Romania’s strategy on the ENP, the Black Sea region and the
Transnistrian conflict:
1. Continue to implement the good neighbourhood policy and the peaceful tools
of conflict resolution.
2. Optimize the management of the future EU eastern border. In the area of
immigration control and fight against all forms of illegal trafficking -one of
the ENP objectives- it is recommended a better use of the logistics and field
experience of the SECI Regional Centre for Combating Cross-border Crime
and of the International Centre for Police Cooperation. The procurement in the
security field should be transparent and EU law compliant.
3. Produce a multidimensional strategy on Romania’s relations with the
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Such a strategy could include the support
for Moldova’s European integration with an emphasis on the economic
dimension; the orientation of bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation in
the regional structures to which all the three countries belong according to the
priorities set forth in the Action Plans – transport, energy, justice and home
affairs; the creation of structures and mechanisms for communication,
information, consultation and institutional dialogue; the galvanization of
cross-border cooperation especially at the level of the trilateral Romania-
90
Republic of Moldova-Ukraine and of the Euro-regions; the diversification of

cultural exchanges; and the development of people-to-people contacts.
4. In the relations with NATO allies and EU partners, to promote Romania as a
stability factor and a security provider in the region. This aspect could include
the know-how transfer from Romania and Bulgaria to the Republic of
Moldova and Ukraine in the areas of democratization and security sector
reform. A 2+2 format (two states of the future NATO-EU eastern border
together with two ENP countries) of know-how transfer might position
Romania as a necessary and efficient partner of the West in the region.
5. Use its dual status as NATO member and future EU member to facilitate the
forging of a consensus on the international strategy for the Black Sea region.
6. Support diplomatically the goal of joining by the EU-US-NATO strategic
triangle of the current pentagonal framework of negotiations on Transnistria.
7. Promote, through EU structures, initiatives for the implementation of a
European pattern of resolution of the conflict in Transnistria, considering that
the reinsertion of Romania in the mediation group is, for the moment at least,
unfeasible. In this respect, Romania should manifest its availability to
participate, after EU accession, to the EU monitoring mission of the
Moldovan-Ukrainian border and also to a possible future EU Petersberg
mission in Transnistria.
8. Pay a special attention to the Romanian citizens living on the both banks of
river Dniestr; their rights and liberties should become a strategic priority for
Bucharest.
9. Revive the Romanian cultural, spiritual and identity involvement in the
Republic of Moldova through measures such as: to create a Romanian
Cultural Institute in Chisinau; to reinstate the Governmental Fund for the
relations with Moldova, which could be used, after consultations and
agreement with Chisinau, to create a Moldovan-Romanian television in order
to rebroadcast TV shows of the two national televisions and to produce shows
on cultural or European integration topics; and to generate in the Republic of
Moldova a robust cultural and informational space in Romanian language.
10. Initiate the organization of a Forum for Security and Democracy in the Black
Sea region to which the BSECO countries, the EU and the US should be
invited to participate. The projects of this Forum could be financed by the
incoming European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.
11. Launch, after the EU accession, an EU Black Sea Dimension following the
model instituted by Finland with its Northern Dimension.
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Annex 1
A Chronology of ENP
• 15 April 2002 : The General Affairs Council (GAC). The Council held an
exchange of views on relations between the future enlarged EU and its eastern
neighbours. It welcomed the intention of the Commission and the High Representative,
Mr Javier Solana, to prepare contributions during the second half of 2002 on the
possibilities for strengthening those relations, taking into account the state of relations
between the EU and the various countries involved, as well as their level of political and
economic development;
• 7 August 2002: Joint letter by EU Commissioner Chris Patten und the EU
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy on Wider
Europe. It proposed the General Framework for the relations with the new neighbours:
the geographical coverage; the method and the principles; the measures (the areas of
action); and the instruments;
• 30 September 2002: The General Affairs and External Relations Council re-
confirmed its conviction that EU enlargement will provide a good opportunity to enhance
relations between the European Union and the countries concerned with the objective of
creating stability and narrowing the prosperity gap at the new borders of the Union. The
Council tasked its relevant bodies to continue work on this issue with a view to the
perspective of the European Council in Copenhagen. It was also underlined that, beyond
the question of Eastern neighbours, the broader question of "wider Europe" deserved
consideration.
• 12-13 December 2002: The Copenhagen European Council declares that “The
enlargement will bring about new dynamics in the European integration. This presents an
important opportunity to take forward relations with neighbouring countries based on
shared political and economic values. The Union remains determined to avoid new
dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the
new borders of the Union;
• 24 February 2003: The General Affairs and External Relations Council
discussed the "Wider Europe - New Neighbourhood" initiative as part of a reflection on
the enlarged Union and its neighbours initiated by the Council in September 2002;
• March 2003: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament “Wider Europe— Neighbourhood: A New Framework for
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”;
• 16 June 2003: The General Affairs and External Relations Council welcomes
the Communication of the Commission .Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a new
framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours as well as
contributions made by the High Representative, and considers that they provide a good
basis for developing a new range of policies towards Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Algeria,
92
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia
and, at the same time reinforcing EU-Russia strategic partnership. At a later stage, the
Council envisages to examine whether the Southern Caucasus countries could also be
covered within these policies.
• 16/17 October 2003: The Brussels European Council welcomes progress made
on the Commission' s Wider Europe–New Neighbourhood Initiative. It urges the Council
and the Commission to take forward work in implementing this initiative with a view to
ensuring a comprehensive, balanced and proportionate approach, including a financial
instrument, responding to the need to promote cross-border and regional/transnational
cooperation on the external borders of the enlarged Union;
• July 2003: European Commission published the Communication “Paving the
Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument”. Proposal to create a single new
Regulation to govern a Neighbourhood Instrument to fund activities both inside and
outside the Union, which are to be based on a single budget line.
• 5 November 2003: The European Parlament Report considers that the Wider
Europe - Neighbourhood Policy and the New Neighbourhood Instrument must be
implemented with all the EU’s neighbours and that the geographical dimension of
'neighbourhood'must take account of all the areas that are essential to ensure real
territorial continuity and political sustainability for the Union'
s strategy, while at the same
time clearly differentiating between the regions and countries covered, in particular on
the basis of the types of challenges involved, their level of respect for democracy, human
rights and individual freedoms, and their interest and capacity to engage in closer
cooperation;
• 12 May 2004: European Commission published the Communication
“European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper” and the European
Neighbourhood Policy Countries’ Reports for Palestinian Authority, Israel, Jordan,
Morocco, Tunisia, Moldova and Ukraine;
• 11 October 2004: European Commission proposed the Regulation laying down
general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument;
• 9 December 2004: Communication from the Commission to the Council On
The Commission Proposals For Action Plans Under The European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) and the proposed plans for the Palestinian Authority, Israel, Jordan, Morocco,
Tunisia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine;
• 2 Mars 2005: Communication from the Commission to the Council
“European Neighbourhood Policy. Recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia and for Egypt and Lebanon” and Action Plans for those five countries;
• 26 April 2005, The General Affairs and External Relations Council “reaffirms
the special role of the European Neighbourhood Policy this policy for the European
Union' s external relations, offering the possibility of increased political, security,
economic and cultural cooperation between the European Union and its neighbours. The
Council confirms its desire for the European Union's commitment in the Mediterranean,
Eastern European and South Caucasus regions to be carried forward. The Council
reaffirms the importance that the European Union attaches to Armenia, Azerbaijan,
93
Egypt, Georgia and Lebanon as neighbours and partners. The EU hopes that these five
countries will maintain close links with the Union, on the basis of common values of
democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, including the
freedom of the media, and common interests, as defined in the framework of the ENP.”
94
Annex 2
Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission
“Peace, Security And Stability – International Dialogue and the Role of EU”
Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 5-6 December
2002
The Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability
Ladies and gentlemen,

Changing times impose greater responsibilities, and the responsibilities of the
European Union at this time could not be weightier. We are striving to keep pace with a
world in flux that is opening up new opportunities but also throwing up new threats.
The political map of Europe will be redrawn in less than two years. Next week,
at Copenhagen, we shall take a historic step and invite ten new members to join our
Union. This decision will give Europe a new dimension and impose on us new
responsibilities.
This sixth World Conference of the European Community Studies Association
has given us an opportunity to discuss in depth peace, security and stability-related
issues. All the participants here are aware of the great responsibility represented by the
half a billion people who will be living in the EU after 2007.
These 500 million people will not settle for less security than the citizens of the
present Community of Fifteen. They want the same protection against organised crime
and international terrorism as present members. And they want the benefits that led them
to choose the EU as their political haven: stability, prosperity, solidarity, democracy and
freedom.
If we are to keep pace with this changing world and shoulder our growing global
responsibilities, we, as the Union, have to take the necessary measures. If we want to
satisfy the rising expectations and hopes of countries abroad and the peoples of Europe,
we have to become a real global player. We are only beginning to act as one.
The Balkans, Afghanistan and the Middle East are only three examples of the
challenges facing the world community. The EU has to play its part in dealing with them.
The EU ' s foreign policy must be brought up to speed. It must be expressed with
one voice and vested with the necessary instruments. How else can we guarantee our
security in the long term?
The Commission has just presented its second communication to the
Convention. We made detailed proposals for reform of EU structures to make sure that
they continue to work properly. And we also pleaded for a strong Commission, which, as
the Commission is the guardian of the community interest, will strengthen the Union.
95
The Community method will be valuable in the field of foreign relations too,
allowing us to broker special arrangements and ad hoc solutions
There is still much to be done by the EU if it wants to make an effective
contribution to international security.
Let me now deal in more detail with the central item on this conference' s
agenda: stability. Lasting and sustainable stability in this region of the world we call
Europe, has been the crowning achievement of the European Union. This is what we do
best:
We are projecting stability even beyond the borders of the current candidate
countries, which are already sharing in our prosperity. We should recognise that this
success creates legitimate expectations in the EU’s future neighbours that they in turn
will reap benefits from the current enlargement.
Is our policy for these neighbouring countries well-defined enough to meet the
challenges thrown up by enlargement? I want to focus on this issue because I think we
have not yet got to grips with the underlying problem. Today I am going to talk about the
need for a new political perspective on relations with our southern and eastern neighbours
with the aim of giving them incentives, injecting a new dynamic in existing processes and
developing an open and evolving partnership. This is what we call our proximity policy, a
policy based on mutual benefits and obligations, which is a substantial contribution by
the EU to global governance.
Let me reiterate. The current enlargement is the greatest contribution to
sustainable stability and security on the European continent that the EU could make. It
is one of the most successful and impressive political transformations of the twentieth
century. And all this has been achieved in a single decade.
This achievement is the fruit of a decision taken by the EU in 1993 and the
courageous efforts of the Union and the candidate countries ever since. The initial
decision gave these countries hope for the future:
By holding up the goal of membership we enabled these governments to
implement the necessary reforms. Only this prospect sustained the reformers in their
efforts to overcome nationalist resistance and fears of change and modernisation.
Hope is a strange thing. It has much in common with a credit rating or the trust
people have in you. It determines how we look at people or events. How does a country
envision its future when it is lacking direction or confidence? Hope gives direction and so
inspires confidence. But the future must be attractive to inspire hope.
The EU looks certain to remain a pole of attraction for its neighbours. For many
of the countries in our future "backyard" the EU is the only prospect. Many of these
countries have already received a formal undertaking from the Union:
The integration of the Balkans into the European Union will complete the
unification of the continent, and we have held out this prospect to them. Although there is
still a long way to go, the Balkans belong to Europe. The process of integrating them will
create a sort of bridge between enlargement and neighbourhood policy.
96
Each enlargement brings us new neighbours. In the past many of these

neighbours ended up becoming candidates for accession themselves.
I do not deny that this process has worked very well. But we cannot go on
forever extending the area of security, stability and prosperity with just the enlargement
instrument. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European
Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale.
We need a debate in Europe to decide where the limits of Europe lie and
prevent these limits being determined elsewhere. We also have to admit that currently we
could not convince our citizens of the need to extend the EU’s borders still further east.
It is a question of responsibility: We have to develop a blueprint for future action
to deal with a problem stemming directly from the success of enlargement.
What have we to offer our new neighbours in the near future? What prospects
can we hold out to them? Where does Europe end? These are the questions we have to
answer. The European public is calling for such a debate. I know: This debate will heat
up after the accession of new members. Therefore it is our duty to start finding some
answers.
I want to be perfectly clear on this point: Article 49 of the Treaty on European
Union stipulates that any European state which respects the fundamental principles of the
Union can apply for membership.
So whatever our proximity policy is or will be, no European state that complies
with the Copenhagen criteria we established in 1993 will be denied this prospect.
But to clear up any doubt, let me also say this. Holding out such a prospect to a
country does not mean promising this country that it will definitely accede.
Accession is not the only game in town. Remember that enlargement does not
benefit only present and future members. Future neighbours will benefit too.
Being a neighbour of the EU means better market opportunities in a more stable
economic and political environment. In many cases, for instance, future trade tariffs will
be lower than the existing ones for the candidate countries.
But enlargement will also create new challenges for our neighbours.
Repositioning existing markets may well pose problems. We need to find solutions that
will allow us to share the advantages of enlargement with our neighbours. This calls for a
comprehensive approach to our neighbours.
The geographical scope of this approach is our neighbourhood in the literal
sense of the word, our backyard. It includes our future eastern neighbours and the whole
Mediterranean area, as I recently explained in Louvain when I spoke on “Europe and the
Mediterranean -- time for action."
I want to see a “ring of friends” surrounding the Union and its closest European
neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea.
This encircling band of friendly countries will be a mixed bag. The quality of
our relations with them will largely depend on their performance and the political will on
either side. Of course, geography will play a role too.
97
It is the Commission’s responsibility to come up with a way of improving

relations with all these countries.
Let me try to explain what model we should follow. I admit that many of the
elements which come to my mind are taken from the enlargement process. What struck
me about that process is that just the prospect of accession has brought benefits to the
central and eastern European countries.
You can improve the climate for direct investment without being a member of
the EU. You can align your legislation on the EU' s without being a member. You can
have limited or even unlimited market access without being a member. You can tighten
budget controls and boost economic growth without being a member.
But -- and this is an important but -- these benefits can only be obtained if and
when the process is well structured, when the goals are well defined and the framework is
legally and politically binding. And only if the two sides are clear about the mutual
advantages and the mutual obligations.
The goal of accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can
think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect? A substantive and
workable concept of proximity would have a positive effect.
The existing and well functioning instruments of the EU’s policy for its
neighbours are the foundations for any new approach. We should be able to combine this
proposal with the variety of existing partnership, cooperation, association and
stabilisation agreements. But we must also better exploit their potential and build on this
basis.
I strongly feel we need a new political impetus to make full use of these
instruments.
Let me concentrate on the question of what political perspective would best
extend the area of stability without immediate enlargement of the Union. This is
something that would benefit our neighbours and the Union itself, whether from the point
of view of stability, security or prosperity.
We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than
membership, without excluding the latter categorically. So what would a proximity
policy do for our old and new neighbours look like?
It must be attractive. It must unlock new prospects and create an open
and dynamic framework. If you embark on fundamental transformations of your
country'
s society and economy, you want to know what the rewards will be.
It must motivate our partners to cooperate more closely with the EU.
The closer this cooperation, the better it will be for the EU and its neighbours in
terms of stability, security and prosperity, and the greater the mutual benefits will
be.
It must be dynamic and process-oriented. It should therefore to be
based on a structured, step-by-step approach. Progress is possible only on the basis
of mutual obligations and the ability of each partner to carry out its commitments.
98
We need to set benchmarks to measure what we expect our neighbours

to do in order to advance from one stage to another. We might even consider some
kind of “Copenhagen proximity criteria”. Progress cannot be made unless the
countries concerned take adequate measures to adopt the relevant acquis. The
benefits would be directly felt. As would absence of any progress.
A proximity policy would not start with the promise of membership
and it would not exclude eventual membership. This would do away with the
problem of having to say “yes” or “no” to a country applying for membership at
too early a stage. Between a “no” today and a “yes” in a fairly distant future there
is great scope for creating a virtuous circle, a win-win scenario.
I can imagine what might be the first question that comes to your mind. What is
attractive about such an offer? Where’s the beef? The answer is simple. But to make it
work will take time and effort.
On other occasions I have already referred to this concept, which I described as
”sharing everything with the Union but institutions”. The aim is to extend to this
neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very
essence of the European Union.
The centrepiece of this proposal is a common market embracing the EU and its
partners: it would offer a single market, free trade, open investment regime,
approximation of legislation, interconnection of networks and the use of the euro as a
reserve and reference currency in our bilateral transactions.
As the Union is more than a common market there are other dimensions to be
included, too:
If we have common goals, we must also be ready to deal with common
threats, such as crime, terrorism, illegal migration and environmental challenges.
We must act together to put an end to the regional conflicts on our
continent.
We have to make sure that our common border is not a barrier to
cultural exchanges or regional cooperation in the period when there cannot be
completely free movement of people and labour.
Let me come back to the question as to whether we need new instruments or
structures to create this new political impetus. I am normally cautious about setting up
new structures if your aims can be achieved with existing ones.
The idea of “sharing everything but institutions” itself applies to existing EU
institutions. But this does not exclude the possibility of developing a new structures with
our neighbours at a later stage, if necessary.
I am thinking of innovative concepts such as institutions co-owned by the
partners: The Euro-Mediterranean Bank and the Foundation for Dialogue between
Cultures and Civilisations might be cited as examples here; both were conceived as tools
to strengthen an existing process, not as an alternative to it.
99
I would also like to see the launching of a new political dialogue on the basis of
“shared principles and values”, making full use of all the potential offered by our
common external policies.
Consider, for instance, policies on the environment, transport, research,
education and culture, to mention but a few. New forms of assistance and cooperation
based on the social cohesion model. Or new joint measures to tackle problems we all
have at our borders.
Let me try to explain how the concept of sharing everything but institutions
should be understood: The example I have in mind is the proposal I made to Russia:
A Common European Economic Space could provide a framework in which
we could ultimately share everything but institutions. Though it will obviously not be
built in a day. Clearly each partner would need to consider whether they are ready and
able to adopt our standards and legislative models. However, this is only a first, tentative
attempt to build something new that we can shared with our neighbours to our mutual
benefit.
A European-Russian High Level Group is exploring the possible building blocks
of such a Common Economic Space: standards, customs, financial services, transport,
industry and telecommunications are just a few.
And we can point to an example of a working economic area which has all this,
and more.
The European Economic Area, based on the EEA Agreement, brings together
the EFTA countries and the European Union under a single roof: We share one single
market, which is governed by the same acquis communautaire. The single market entails
four freedoms: the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. If a country
has reached this level, it has come as close to the EU as it is possible to be without being
a member.
I know this might take decades for many countries. But it would help them to
carry out the necessary reforms and take the right measures because they would have an
objective to aim at. And it would clearly bring mutual benefits, and consequently mutual
incentives, to both the Union and its neighbours.
The EEA model does not presuppose accession as an objective. But, as history
shows, being member of the EEA does not exclude membership of the EU at a later date.
To me this seems very attractive.
Of course, the situation of countries like Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus differs
completely from that of Norway, say. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to offer them
a reasonable degree of proximity that does predetermine the question of future
membership in advance. Indeed, because their situation is very different and because
much more time will be needed to reach a certain stage, it is worth seeing what we could
learn from the way the EEA was set up and then using this experience as a model for
integrated relations with our neighbours.
I feel that we need more time to develop this concept. We identified relations
with our neighbours as a strategic objective of this Commission in February 2000. The
100
job of the Commission is to seize this opportunity to find a comprehensive solution to

the question of the Union’s relations with its neighbours.
The more we share, the less easily we can be divided. This applies to values,
beliefs, ways of life, trade, markets, rules, laws, needs and ideas. Many of these things are
shared only by individuals but many, and many important ones, can be provided by a
Union which is aware of its responsibility for its neighbours.
That is what I meant with the idea of “sharing everything but institutions.” In
this wider Europe we cannot confine our action to ad hoc, bilateral initiatives. We cannot
simply ignore what is happening beyond our borders. But neither can we solve problems
with our new neighbours simply by letting them join the Union.
We are tolerant and open to dialogue, to coexistence and to cooperation. We
have to assume our role as a global player. The development of a substantive proximity
policy should be one of the first steps.
We need to institute a new and inclusive regional approach that would help keep
and promote peace and foster stability and security throughout the continent, ultimately
promoting the emergence of better global governance.
Thank you for your attention.
101
Annex 3
The dynamics of trade exchanges between Romania and the Republic of Moldova
(US $ million)
1995 1996 1997 1998 *1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total 186,4 180,49 191,08 190.40 141,4 183,6 150,2 159,89 220,7 282,3
5
Export 81,92 100,65 128,66 128,60 101,0 142,3 111,5 109,63 136,9 205,2
Import 104,5 79,84 62,42 61,80 40,4 41,3 38,7 50,26 83,8 77,1
3
Sold - +20,81 +66,24 +66,8 +60,6 +101 +72,8 +59,47 +53,1 +128,1
22,61
Source: www.mae.ro
102
Annex 4
The Breakdown of Moldovan Export by Country (US $ million)
Source: Moldova, tendin e în economie (Moldova. Economic tendencies), June 2005,

www.met.dnt.md.
103
104
Annex 5
The Breakdown of Moldovan Import by Country (US $ million)
Source: Moldova, tendin e în economie (Moldova. Economic tendencies), June 2005,

www.met.dnt.md.
105
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125

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European Institute of Romania – Pre-accession impact studies III

ROMANIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF

Professor Adrian POP, Ph.D. – coordinator

Chapter 2 Romania – The Future Eastern Border of the European

Chapter 3 The European Aspiration and Orientation of the Republic of

3.4.2 The Role of Euro-regions.......................................................................................57

Cap. 4. The Transnistrian Conflict from the Perspective of EU

AINA – Automatic Identification National Agency (Republic of Moldova)

OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

THE “WIDER EUROPE – NEW NEIGHBOURHOOD” PROJECT

“Wider Europe – The New Neighbourhood”. In its essence, the Communication

§ 1.1 The Strategy and Methodology of the European Neighbourhood Policy

c) The Monitoring Reports are analysis papers of the bilateral relations,

d) The New Instrument for Neighbourhood and Partnership

In this respect, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument will

B. The ENP method and principles

§ 1.2. Regions and Countries included in the European Neighbourhood Policy

priorities in areas covered by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements: strengthen

§ 1.3. The European Neighbourhood Policy Action Fields

The political, human and cultural dimension

The economic dimension

The security dimension

§ 1.4. Complementarities between the European Neighbourhood Policy and other

Justice and home affairs

Education, culture and research

The sustainable development policies

The foreign and security policy

1. 5. Opportunities and Limitations of the ENP; Romania’s Role as a Future Border

A solution for the political management of such a large area, working in a

- 4. create certain structures and mechanisms for communication,

§ 2.1 Premises of Romania’s Alignment to the EU Border Standards

§ 2.2 Romania’s Strategy of Integrated Border Management

• The principle of unitary coordination and cooperation. The state border

For a unitary coordination of border management and constant monitoring

2.3 The Transparency Problem in Assigning Acquisitions Contracts in the Security

In its renegotiated version as of 9 November 2005, materialized in the form of an

• The frontier traffic

2.5 The Transfrontier relations between Romania and Ukraine

§ 3.1 From Russia's “Near Abroad” to EU's “New Neighbourhood”

deems as being a “geopolitical catastrophe”69 – in order to substitute the Russian

§ 3.1.2 Geo-economic Perspectives

§ 3.2 Moldovan Perceptions of EU, Romania and European Integration

§ 3.3.2 The Impact of Yuschenko Factor in Ukraine

§ 3.4 The Role of Regional Cooperation

3.4.1 The Participation of the Republic of Moldova in the Regional Cooperation

The Central European Initiative (CEI) is a flexible form of regional

The South Eastern European Cooperation Process is a non- institutionalized

§ 3.4.2 The Role of Euro-regions

association without juridical personality up to bodies of private or even public law. In

- the development of civil society, the promotion of good governance and

§3.6 Romania’s Role

various joint measures in various chapters such as infrastructure, environmental

emphasizing the Romanians’ perceptions on Romanian foreign policy, a quarter of the

§ 3.6.2 Cultural and Spiritual Aspects

media is dominated by publications in Russian language, “about 215 pages”145 being

contractors in the Republic of Moldova proved to be disloyal, dishonest, they

§ 3.6.3 Economic Aspects

THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF

§ § 4.1 Transnistria – Geopolitical and Geo-economic Aspects