Petitioners Respondent
Petitioners Respondent
Petitioners Respondent
DECISION
FELICIANO, J : p
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, the petitioners took
this appeal to the Court of Appeals which, as already noted, certified the
case to us as one raising only questions of law.
The issues we must confront in this appeal are:
1. whether or not the Trust Agreement had extinguished, by
novation, the obligation of R & B Surety to the PNB under the Surety Bond
which, in turn, extinguished the obligations of the petitioners under the
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Indemnity Agreements;
2. whether the Trust Agreement extended the term of the Surety
Bond so as to release petitioners from their obligation as indemnitors thereof
as they did not give their consent to the execution of the Trust Agreement;
and
3. whether or not the filing of this complaint was premature since
the PNB had not yet filed a suit against R & B Surety for the forfeiture of its
Surety Bond.
We address these issues seriatim.
1. The Trust Agreement referred to by both petitioners in their
separate briefs, was executed on 28 December 1965 (two years after the
Surety Bond and the Indemnity Agreements were executed) between: (1)
Jose and Susana Cochingyan, Sr., doing business under the name and style
of the Catholic Church Mart, represented by Joseph Cochingyan, Jr., as
Trustor[s]; (2) Tomas Besa, a PNB official, as Trustee ; and (3) the PNB as
beneficiary.
The Trust Agreement provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
'WHEREAS, the TRUSTOR has guaranteed a bond in the amount
of P400,000.00 issued by the R & B Surety and Insurance Co. (R & B) at
the instance of Pacific Agricultural Suppliers, Inc. (PAGRICO) on
December 21, 1963, in favor of the BENEFICIARY in connection with the
application of PAGRICO for an advance line of P400,000.00 to
P800,000.00;
'WHEREAS, the TRUSTOR has also guaranteed a bond issued by
the Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. (CONSOLACION) in the
amount of P900,000.00 in favor of the BENEFICIARY to secure certain
credit facilities extended by the BENEFICIARY to the Pacific Copra
Export Co., Inc. (PACOCO);
There is no question that the Surety Bond has not been cancelled or
fully discharged 2 by payment of the Principal Obligation. Unless, therefore,
the Surety Bond has been extinguished by another means, it must still
subsist. And so must the supporting Indemnity Agreements. 3
We are unable to sustain petitioners' claim that the Surety Bond and
their respective obligations under the Indemnity Agreements were
extinguished by novation brought about by the subsequent execution of the
Trust Agreement.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or
change of the obligation by a subsequent one which terminates it, either by
changing its object or principal conditions, or by substituting a new debtor in
place of the old one, or by subrogating a third person to the rights of the
creditor. 4 Novation through a change of the object or principal conditions of
an existing obligation is referred to as objective (or real) novation. Novation
by the change of either the person of the debtor or of the creditor is
described as subjective (or personal) novation. Novation may also be both
objective and subjective (mixed) at the same time. In both objective and
subjective novation, a dual purpose is achieved — an obligation is
extinguished and a new one is created in lieu thereof. 5
If objective novation is to take place, it is imperative that the new
obligation expressly declare that the old obligation is thereby extinguished,
or that the new obligation be on every point incompatible with the old one. 6
Novation is never presumed: it must be established either by the discharge
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of the old debt by the express terms of the new agreement, or by the acts of
the parties whose intention to dissolve the old obligation as a consideration
of the emergence of the new one must be clearly discernible. 7
Again, if subjective novation by a change in the person of the debtor is
to occur, it is not enough that the juridical relation between the parties to the
original contract is extended to a third person. It is essential that the old
debtor be released from the obligation, and the third person or new debtor
take his place in the new relation. If the old debtor is not released. no
novation occurs and the third person who has assumed the obligation of the
debtor becomes merely a co-debtor or surety or a co-surety. 8
Applying the above principles to the instant case, it is at once evident
that the Trust Agreement does not expressly terminate the obligation of R &
B Surety under the Surety Bond. On the contrary, the Trust Agreement
expressly provides for the continuing subsistence of that obligation by
stipulating that "[the Trust Agreement] shall not in any manner release" R &
B Surety from its obligation under the Surety Bond.
Neither can the petitioners anchor their defense on implied novation.
Absent an unequivocal declaration of extinguishment of a pre-existing
obligation, a showing of complete incompatibility between the old and the
new obligation (and nothing else) would sustain a finding of novation by
implication. 9 But where, as in this case, the parties to the new obligation
expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity of the old one,
where, in other words, the parties expressly negated the lapsing of the old
obligation, there can be no novation. The issue of implied novation is not
reached at all.
What the trust agreement did was, at most, merely to bring in another
person or persons — the Trustor[s] — to assume the same obligation that R
& B Surety was bound to perform under the Surety Bond. It is not unusual in
business for a stranger to a contract to assume obligations thereunder; a
contract of surety ship or guarantee is the classical example. The precise
legal effect is the increase of the number of persons liable to the obligee,
and not the extinguishment of the liability of the first debtor. 10 Thus, in
Magdalena Estates vs. Rodriguez, 11 we held that:
"[t]he mere fact that the creditor receives a guaranty or accepts
payments from a third person who has agreed to assume the
obligation, when there is no agreement that the first debtor shall
be released from responsibility, does not constitute a novation,
and the creditor can still enforce the obligation against the original
debtor."
In the present case, we note that the Trustor under the Trust Agreement, the
CCM, was already previously bound to R & B Surety under its Indemnity
Agreement. Under the Trust Agreement, the Trustor also became directly
liable to the PNB. So far as the PNB was concerned, the effect of the Trust
Agreement was that where there had been only two, there would now be
three obligors directly and solidarily bound in favor of the PNB: PAGRICO, R &
B Surety and the Trustor. And the PNB could proceed against any of the
three, in any order or sequence. Clearly, PNB never intended to release, and
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never did release, R & B Surety. Thus, R & B Surety, which was not a party to
the Trust Agreement, could not have intended to release any of its own
indemnitors simply because one of those indemnitors, the Trustor under the
Trust Agreement, became also directly liable to the PNB.
2. We turn to the contention of petitioner Jose K. Villanueva that his
obligation as indemnitor under the 24 December 1963 Indemnity Agreement
with R & B Surety was extinguished when the PNB agreed in the Trust
Agreement "to hold in abeyance any action to enforce its claims against [R &
B Surety]".
The Indemnity Agreement speaks of the several indemnitors
"apply[ing] jointly and severally (in solidum) to the [R & B Surety] — to
become SURETY upon a SURETY BOND demanded by and in favor of [PNB] in
the sum of [P400,000.00] for the faithful compliance of the terms and
conditions set forth in said SURETY BOND —." This part of the Agreement
suggests that the indemnitors (including the petitioners) would become co-
sureties on the Security Bond in favor of PNB. The record, however, is bereft
of any indication that the petitioners-indemnitors ever in fact became co-
sureties of R & B Surety vis-a-vis the PNB. The petitioners, so far as the
record goes, remained simply indemnitors bound to R & B Surety but not to
PNB, such that PNB could not have directly demanded payment of the
Principal Obligation from the petitioners. Thus, we do not see how Article
2079 of the Civil Code — which provides in part that "[a]n extension granted
to the debtor by the creditor without the consent of the guarantor
extinguishes the guaranty" — could apply in the instant case. The petitioner-
indemnitors are, as it were, second-tier parties so far as the PNB was
concerned and any extension of time granted by PNB to any of the first-tier
obligors (PAGRICO, R & B Surety and the trustor[s]) could not prejudice the
second-tier parties.
There is another reason why petitioner Villanueva's contention must
fail. PNB's undertaking under the Trust Agreement "to hold in abeyance any
action to enforce its claims" against R & B Surety did not extend the
maturity of R & B Surety's obligation under the Surety Bond. The Principal
Obligation had in fact already matured, along with that of R & B Surety, by
the time the Trust Agreement was entered into. Petitioners' obligations
under the Indemnity Agreements had, in turn, already similarly matured, for
those obligations were to mature "as soon as [R & B Surety] became liable to
make payment of any sum under the terms of the [Surety Bond] — whether
the said sum or sums or part thereof have been actually paid or not." Thus,
the situation was that precisely envisaged in Article 2079:
"[t]he mere failure on the part of the creditor to demand
payment after the debt has become due does not of itself constitute
any extension of time referred to herein." (Emphasis supplied).
The theory behind Article 2079 is that an extension of time given to the
principal debtor by the creditor without the surety's consent would deprive
the surety of his right to pay the creditor and to be immediately subrogated
to the creditor's remedies against the principal debtor upon the original
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maturity date. The surety is said to be entitled to protect himself against the
contingency of the principal debtor or the indemnitors becoming insolvent
during the extended period. The underlying rationale is not present in the
instant case. As this Court has held,
"mere delay or negligence in proceeding against the principal will
not discharge a surety unless there is between the creditor and the
principal debtor a valid and binding agreement therefor, one which
tends to prejudice [the surety] or to deprive it of the power of obtaining
indemnity by presenting a legal objection for the time, to the
prosecution of an action on the original security." 12
In the instant case, there was nothing to prevent the petitioners from
tendering payment, if they were so minded, to PNB of the matured obligation
on behalf of R & B Surety and thereupon becoming subrogated to such
remedies as R & B Surety may have against PAGRICO.
3. The last issue can be disposed of quickly, Clauses (b) and (c) of
the Indemnity Agreements (quoted above) allow R & B Surety to recover
from petitioners even before R & B Surety shall have paid the PNB. We have
previously held similar indemnity clauses to be enforceable and not violative
of any public policy. 13
The petitioners lose sight of the fact that the Indemnity Agreements
are contracts of indemnification not only against actual loss but against
liability as well. 14 While in a contract of indemnity against loss an
indemnitor will not be liable until the person to be indemnified makes
payment or sustains loss, in a contract of indemnity against liability, as in
this case, the indemnitor's liability arises as soon as the liability of the
person to be indemnified has arisen without regard to whether or not he has
suffered actual loss. 15 Accordingly, R & B Surety was entitled to proceed
against petitioners not only for the partial payments already made but for
the full amount owed by PAGRICO to the PNB.
Summarizing, we hold that:
(1) The Surety Bond was not novated by the Trust Agreement. Both
agreements can co-exist. The Trust Agreement merely furnished to PNB
another party obligor to the Principal Obligation in addition to PAGRICO and R
& B Surety.
(2) The undertaking of the PNB to "hold in abeyance any action to
enforce its claim" against R & B Surety did not amount to an "extension
granted to the debtor" without petitioners' consent so as to release
petitioners from their undertaking as indemnitors of R & B Surety under the
Indemnity Agreements; and
(3) Petitioners are indemnitors of R & B Surety against both
payments to and liability for payments to the PNB. The present suit is
therefore not premature despite the fact that the PNB has not instituted any
action against R & B Surety for the collection of its matured obligation under
the Surety Bond.
WHEREFORE, the petitioners' appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and
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the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Gancayco and
Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. With then Judge Ricardo C. Puno presiding.
2. R & B Surety had earlier made partial payments thereon to PNB.
3. Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. v. Villarama. 107 Phil. 891, 899 (1960).
4. De Cortes v. Venturanza, 79 SCRA 709, 722-23 (1977).
5. Id. at 723.
6. Zapanta v. Rotaeche, 21 Phil. 154, 159 (1912).
7. E.g., Tui Siuco v. Habana, 45 Phil. 707, 713 (1924); Martinez v. Cavives, 25 Phil.
581 (.1913).
8. Duñgo v. Lopena, 6 SCRA 1007, 1015-16 (1962).