Eugenio vs. Drilon

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106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Eugenio vs. Drilon


G.R. No. 109404. January 22, 1996. *

FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & S Delta Village,
petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HOUSING
AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) AND PROSPERO PALMIANO,
respondents.
Actions; Appeals; Jurisdiction; Administrative Law; Pleadings and Practice; Under
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, appeals from judgments or final orders of the
Office of the President may be taken to the Court of Appeals.—Under Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, “appeals from judgments or final orders of the x x x Office
of the President x x x may be taken to the Court of Appeals x x x.” However, in order to
hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision one and a half
years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of
speedy justice.
Statutes; P.D. 957; Subdivisions; Contracts; Statutory Construction; P.D. 957 is to be
given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in
1976.—In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary erred
in applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the nondevelopment of the E & S Delta Village
justified private respondent’s non-payment of his amortizations. Petitioner avers that
inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered into in
______________

 THIRD DIVISION.
*

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Eugenio vs. Drilon
1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern the
transaction. We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary did
not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover
even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and
from the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be
enforced.—P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can
be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the law, as culled
from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy,
must be enforced.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Social Justice; P.D. 957 was enacted with no other
end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to
the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers.—It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor
the weak and the disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers and aspiring
homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with no other end in view than to provide a protective
mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of
‘unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers,’ and such intent is nowhere expressed
more clearly than in its preamble.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 23 of P.D. 957 correctly invoked to justify
non-payment of amortizations for failure of the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision
project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the
same.—Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it
follows that Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he
desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner’s failure to develop
the subdivision project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for
complying with the same. (Such incomplete development of the subdivision and
non-performance of specific contractual and statutory obligations on the part of the
subdivision-owner had been established in the findings of the HLURB which in turn were
confirmed by the respondent Executive Secretary in his assailed Decision.)
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108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eugenio vs. Drilon
Pleadings and Practice; The Executive Secretary did not exceed his jurisdiction in
ordering the refund of private respondent’s payments on Lot 12 although only Lot 13 was the
subject of the complaint where the supporting documents submitted substantiating the claim
of non-development justified such order inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for
non-payment of amortizations on Lot 12.—Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner’s
contention that respondent Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the refund of
private respondent’s payments on Lot 12 although (according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was
the subject of the complaint. Respondent Secretary duly noted that the supporting
documents submitted substantiating the claim of non-development justified such order
inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-payment of amortizations on said Lot 12.
Administrative Law; Decisions, resolutions and orders of the Office of the President
shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen
(15) days from receipt of a copy thereof, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed
within such period.—Finally, since petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the (Executive
Secretary’s) Decision dated March 10, 1992 was filed only on the 21st day from receipt
thereof, said decision had become final and executory, pursuant to Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, which provides that
“(d)ecisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of
a copy thereof x x x, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.”

PETITION for review of a decision of the Executive Secretary.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.


     Edwin Y. Chua for petitioner.
RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the
non-payment of amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase
agreements entered into
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Eugenio vs. Drilon
prior to the enactment of P.D. 957, “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’
Protective Decree”? This is the major question raised in the instant Petition seeking
to set aside the Decision of the respondent Executive Secretary dated March 10,
1992 in O.P. Case No. 3761, which affirmed the order of the respondent HLURB
dated September 1, 1987.
On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from
petitioner and his co-owner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta
Village in Quezon City.
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and
2620 filed by the Delta Village Homeowners’ Association, Inc., the National Housing
Authority rendered a resolution on January 17, 1979 inter alia ordering petitioner
to cease and desist from making further sales of lots in said village or in any project
owned by him.
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent
filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589)
against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo alleging that, in view of
the above NHA resolution, he suspended payment of his amortizations, but that
petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses Relevo, in whose favor title
to the said property was registered. Private respondent further alleged that he
suspended his payments because of petitioner’s failure to develop the village.
Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and
for reconveyance of the lot to him.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of
petitioner to cancel the contract with private respondent and dismissed private
respondent’s complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and,
applying P.D. 957, ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision development and
to reinstate private respondent’s purchase contract over one lot, and as to the
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Eugenio vs. Drilon
other, “it appearing that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 269546 has been issued to
x x x spouses Rodolfo and Ad(e)lina Relevo x x x, the management of E & S Delta
Village is hereby ordered to immediately refund to the complainant-appellant
(herein private respondent) all payments made thereon, plus interests computed at
legal rates from date of receipt hereof until fully paid.”
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the
HSRC and denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and
for having been filed out of time. Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review
before the Supreme Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, “appeals from judgments or
final orders of the x x x Office of the President x x x may be taken to the Court of
Appeals x x x.” However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was
deemed submitted for decision one and a half years ago, the Court resolved to make
an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary
erred in applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E & S
Delta Village justified private respondent’s non-payment of his amortizations.
Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered into
in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern the
transaction.
We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary did
not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to
cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be
plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation,
circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a
leading authority on statutory construction stressed:
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Eugenio vs. Drilon
‘The intent of a statute is the law. x x x. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law,
and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The
intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will
not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the
legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. x x x. In
construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the
legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in
the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.’  (italics supplied.)
1

It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor
the weak and the disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers and
aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with no other end in view than to
provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the
manipulations and machinations of ‘unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers,’ and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than in its preamble,
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
“WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent
human settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their
quality of life;
“WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations
to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems,
lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and
safety of home and lot buyers;
“WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of
______________

 Vol. II, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 693-695.


1

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112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eugenio vs. Drilon
the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value” ; (italics supplied.)
2

From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest and unarguable that the
legislative intent must have been to remedy the alarming situation by having P.D.
957 operate retrospectively even upon contracts already in existence at the time of
its enactment. Indeed, a strictly prospective application of the statute will
effectively emasculate it, for then the State will not be able to exercise its regulatory
functions and curb fraudulent schemes and practices perpetrated under or in
connection with those contracts and transactions which happen to have been
entered into prior to P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to the very subdivision lot
buyers sought to be protected by said law. It is hardly conceivable that the
legislative authority intended to permit such a loophole to remain and continue to
be a source of misery for subdivision lot buyers well into the future.
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole are
certain of its provisions, viz., Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very
terms have retroactive effect and will impact upon even those contracts and
transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957’s enactment:
“SEC. 20. Time of Completion.—Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the
facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water
supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision
or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of
advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the
subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the
Authority.
“SEC. 21. Sales Prior to Decree.—In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold
or disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or
developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his
______________

 Preamble, Presidential Decree No. 957.


2

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or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this
Decree unless otherwise extended by the
Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6
hereof.
“Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the
preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of
this Decree.
“SEC. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments.—No installment payment made by a buyer in a
subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited
in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or
developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to
develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within
the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed
the total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests,
with interest thereon at the legal rate.” (italics supplied)
On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive Secretary, the
application of P.D. 957 to the contracts in question will be consistent with
paragraph 4 of the contracts themselves, which expressly provides:
“(4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to subdivide, develop and improve the
entire area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the parcels of lands
subject of this contract is a part in accordance with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance
No. 6561, S-66 and the Party of the First Part further binds himself to comply with and
abide by all laws, rules and regulations respecting the subdivision and development of lots
for residential purposes as may be presently in force or may hereafter be required by laws
passed by the Congress of the Philippines or required by regulations of the Bureau of Lands,
the General Registration Office and other government agencies.” (italics supplied)
Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it
follows that Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent
when he desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner’s
failure to develop the subdivision project according to the
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Eugenio vs. Drilon
approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. (Such
incomplete development of the subdivision and non-performance of specific
contractual and statutory obligations on the part of the subdivision-owner had been
established in the findings of the HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the
respondent Executive Secretary in his assailed Decision.) Furthermore, respondent
Executive Secretary also gave due weight to the following matters: although private
respondent started to default on amortization payments beginning May 1975, so
that by the end of July 1975 he had already incurred three consecutive arrearages
in payments, nevertheless, the petitioner, who had the cancellation option available
to him under the contract, did not exercise or utilize the same in timely fashion but
delayed until May 1979 when he finally made up his mind to cancel the contracts.
But by that time the land purchase agreements had already been overtaken by the
provisions of P.D. 957, promulgated on July 12, 1976. (In any event, as pointed out
by respondent HLURB and seconded by the Solicitor General, the defaults in
amortization payments incurred by private respondent had been effectively
condoned by the petitioner, by reason of the latter’s tolerance of the defaults for a
long period of time.)
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner’s contention that respondent Secretary
exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the refund of private respondent’s payments on
Lot 12 although (according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the
complaint. Respondent Secretary duly noted that the supporting documents
submitted substantiating the claim of nondevelopment justified such order
inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-payment of amortizations on said
Lot 12.
Finally, since petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the (Executive
Secretary’s) Decision dated March 10, 1992 was filed only on the 21st day from
receipt thereof, said decision had become final and executory, pursuant to Section 7
of Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, which provides that
“(d)ecisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of
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Eugenio vs. Drilon
the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final
after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof x x x, unless a
motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.”
WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, the petition
is DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—When an administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all
controversies regarding the subject matter falling within its specialization are
deemed included. (Tejada vs. Homestead Property Corporation, 178 SCRA
164 [1989])
It is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real
estate mortgages executed prior to its enactment. (Philippine National Bank vs.
Office of the President, 252 SCRA 5 [1966])

——o0o——
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