EN BANC

[G.R. No. 137004. July 26, 2000.]

ARNOLD V. GUERRERO, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.

MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 11th
Congress, HON. ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, as the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives, 11th Congress, RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS and
GUILLERMO R. RUIZ, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with prayer for
a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. It assails the Order of the Commission on Elections, Second Division, dated
May 10, 1998, in COMELEC Case No. SPA 98-227, which dismissed the petition filed by
herein respondent Guillermo C. Ruiz to disqualify respondent Rodolfo C. Fariñas as a
candidate for the elective office of Congressman in the first district of Ilocos Norte
during the May 11, 1998 elections. It also assails the Resolution dated May 16, 1998, of
the COMELEC En Banc, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Ruiz
and dismissing the petition-in-intervention filed by herein petitioner Arnold V.
Guerrero. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In the Second Division of the COMELEC, Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify

respondent Fariñas as a candidate for the position of Congressman. 1 Ruiz alleged that
Fariñas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998
polls, despite his failure to file a Certificate of Candidacy for said office. Ruiz averred
that Fariñas’ failure to file said Certificate violated Section 73 of the Omnibus Election
Code 2 in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 2577, dated January 15, 1998. Ruiz
asked the COMELEC to declare Fariñas as a "nuisance candidate" pursuant to Section
69 of the Omnibus Election Code 3 and to disqualify him from running in the May 11,
1998 elections, as well as in all future polls.

On May 8, 1998, Fariñas filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC,
substituting candidate Chevylle V. Fariñas who withdrew on April 3, 1998.

On May 9, 1998, Ruiz filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion To Resolve Petition" with the
COMELEC, attaching thereto a copy of the Certificate of Candidacy of Fariñas.

On May 10, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC decided Case No. SPA 98-227,
disposing as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES to

DISMISS the instant petition for utter lack of merit. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"SO ORDERED." 4

In dismissing Ruiz’s petition, the Second Division of the COMELEC stated," [T]here is
none (sic) in the records to consider respondent an official candidate to speak of
without the filing of said certificate. Hence, there is no certificate of candidacy to be
cancelled, consequently, no candidate to be disqualified." 5

On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled. The post-election tally of
votes in Ilocos Norte showed that Fariñas got a total of 56,369 votes representing the
highest number of votes received in the first district. Fariñas was duly proclaimed
winner.

On May 16, 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Fariñas could
not validly substitute for Chevylle V. Fariñas, since the latter was not the official
candidate of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was an
independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate.
Thus, Fariñas’ certificate of candidacy claiming to be the official candidate of LAMMP in
lieu of Chevylle V. Fariñas was fatally defective, according to Ruiz.

On June 3, 1998, Fariñas took his oath of office as a member of the House of
Representatives.

On June 10, 1998, petitioner herein filed his "Petition-In-Intervention" in COMELEC

Case No. SPA 98-227. Petitioner averred that he was the official candidate of the Liberal
Party (LP) in said elections for Congressman, and stood to be adversely affected by
Case No. SPA 98-227. Guerrero contended that Fariñas, having failed to file his
Certificate of Candidacy on or before the last day therefor, being midnight of March 27,
1998, Fariñas illegally resorted to the remedy of substitution provided for under Section
77 of the Omnibus Election Code 6 and thus, Fariñas’ disqualification was in order.
Guerrero then asked that the position of Representative of the first district of Ilocos
Norte be declared vacant and special elections called for, but disallowing the candidacy
of Fariñas.

On January 6, 1999, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Ruiz’s motion for reconsideration
and Guerrero’s petition-in-intervention in Case No. SPA 98-227. The decretal portion of
its Resolution reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING PREMISES, this Commission (En Banc)

RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to AFFIRM the Order of the Commission (Second
Division) and thereafter, DISMISS this instant motion for reconsideration for lack of
jurisdiction (italics in the original) without prejudice to the filing of a quo warranto case,
if he so desires.

"SO ORDERED." 7
Hence, the instant petition, anchored on the following grounds: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A. THE RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN

EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO RULE ON THE VALIDITY
OR INVALIDITY OF THE CANDIDACY OR PURPORTED CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT FARIÑAS.

B. THE RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN

EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN TOSSING THE DUTY TO RULE ON THE
VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF THE CANDIDACY OR PURPORTED CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT FARIÑAS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) CONSIDERING THAT THE LATTER (HRET) OBVIOUSLY
LACKS JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE ISSUE THEREBY UNDULY CREATING A VACUUM
AND RENDERING PETITIONER WITHOUT A REMEDY.

C. THE RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN

EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT RENDERING A RULING, BASED ON
THE FACTS AS STATED IN ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED JANUARY 6, 1999
(Annex "B" hereof) DISQUALIFYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT FARIÑAS AS A CANDIDATE
FOR CONGRESSMAN OF THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF ILOCOS NORTE DURING
THE MAY 11, 1998 ELECTIONS, PREMISED ON ITS FINDINGS THAT "THERE IS NONE IN
THE RECORDS TO CONSIDER RESPONDENT (FARIÑAS) AN OFFICIAL CANDIDATE TO
SPEAK OF WITHOUT THE FILING OF SAID CERTIFICATE, HENCE, THERE IS NO
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY TO BE CANCELLED, CONSEQUENTLY, NO CANDIDATE TO
BE DISQUALIFIED."  chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

D. THE RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN

EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT CALLING A SPECIAL ELECTION TO
FILL-UP THE VACANT POSITION OF CONGRESSMAN OF THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT OF ILOCOS NORTE DUE TO THE DISQUALIFICATION OF RESPONDENT
FARIÑAS AS A CANDIDATE THERETO AND WHO APPEARS TO HAVE OBTAINED THE
HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES CAST IN THE MAY 11, 1998 ELECTIONS.

We find pertinent for our resolution this issue: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of
the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Fariñas is already within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives?

In its assailed resolution, the COMELEC had noted that respondent Fariñas had taken
his oath and assumed office as a Member of the 11th Congress and by express
mandate of the Constitution, 8 it had lost jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner Guerrero argues that the refusal of the COMELEC to rule on the validity or
invalidity of the certificate of candidacy of Fariñas amounted to grave abuse of
discretion on its part. He claims that COMELEC failed in its Constitutional duty to uphold
and enforce all laws relative to elections. 9 He relies on Gallardo v. Judge Tabamo, Jr.,
218 SCRA 253 (1993), which reiterated the doctrine laid down in Zaldivar v. Estenzo,
23 SCRA 533 (1968), that the COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of an electoral exercise.
A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of when the tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling the proceeding. 10 It is the proper
remedy to question any final order, ruling and decision of the COMELEC rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. 11 But for an action
for certiorari to prosper, there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion. This means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or excess thereof, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by law. 12

In the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC
when it held that its jurisdiction over Case No. SPA 98-277 had ceased with the
assumption of office of respondent Fariñas as Representative for the first district of
Ilocos Norte. While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a
certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation
and assumption of the position by Fariñas is a recognition of the jurisdictional
boundaries separating the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives (HRET). Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has
sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the
House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. 13
Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is
justifiable, in deference to the HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

However, petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article
VI, Section 17 of the Constitution is limited only to the qualifications prescribed under
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. 14 Consequently, he claims that any issue
which does not involve these constitutional qualifications is beyond the realm of the
HRET. The filing of a certificate of candidacy being a statutory qualification under the
Omnibus Election Code is outside the pale of the HRET, according to him.

This contention lacks cogency and is far from persuasive. Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution cannot be circumscribed lexically. The word "qualifications" cannot be read
as qualified by the term "constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos distinguire
debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated. For firstly, the drafters of the fundamental
law, in making no qualification in the use of a general word or expression, must have
intended no distinction at all. Secondly, the courts could only distinguish where there
are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or
qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgiver’s
intent.

Petitioner further argues that the HRET assumes jurisdiction only if there is a valid
proclamation of the winning candidate. He contends that if a candidate fails to satisfy
the statutory requirements to qualify him as a candidate, his subsequent proclamation
is void ab initio. Where the proclamation is null and void, there is no proclamation at all
and the mere assumption of office by the proclaimed candidate does not deprive the
COMELEC at all of its power to declare such nullity, according to petitioner. But as we
already held, in an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning
candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is
raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. 17 The reason for this ruling is self-
evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people’s mandate.

Whether respondent Fariñas validly substituted Chevylle V. Fariñas and whether

respondent became a legitimate candidate, in our view, must likewise be addressed to
the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Only thus can we demonstrate fealty to
the Constitutional provision that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of Congress shall
be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members." 18

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Guerrero vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify respondent Farinas as a

candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte.
Ruiz alleged that Farinas had been campaigning as a candidate for
Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a certificate of
candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998, Farinas filed his certificate of
candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3,
1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz for lack of
merit.

After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Thereafter, Ruiz filed a
motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not validly substitute
for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate of LAMMP,
but was an independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an
independent candidate. Ruiz claimed that Farinas’ certificate of candidacy was
fatally defective. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a member
of the House of Representatives. The COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of

discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the certificate of
candidacy of respondent Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Held: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when

it held that its jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of
office of respondent Farinas as Representative for the first district of Ilocos
Norte. While COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a
certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the
proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a recognition of the
jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET. Under Art. VI,
Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over
the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions.