Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security

Arts. 267-292

1. People vs. Edilberto Norada, GR 218958, December 13, 2017 (No detention;
homicide)

--- Si foreigner dapat yung ki kidnaping kaso hindi sya sumama kaya si victim (school
principal) ang sumama. He was not deprived of his liberty. Nag inom lang sila then
nung nakatulog na sya tinalian sya then when he resisted, hinataw sya ng kahoy sa
ulo hanggang he lost consciousness. Sabi ng SC hindi pasok ng kidnapping yun kasi
the essence of kidnapping is to deprive someone of his or her liberty in this case
walang nangyari na ganun kasi si victim he was not deprived of his liberty, nag inom
lang sila sa motel. Homicide ang kaso dapat hindi kidnapping with murder kasi wala
naming treachery. There was no showing that the accused planned their attack in a
way to deprive the victim to defend himself.

Facts:

Rosalina Pacil (Rosalina), mother of the victim, testified that the latter received a
monthly salary of P12,837.00 as school principal. Rosalina further testified that
appellant was a friend of her son. Appellant frequently visited their house since the
victim finances the former's fruit buying and selling business. On February 11, 2004,
appellant was in their house waiting for the arrival of the victim. The victim arrived early
in the evening with a Canadian friend, Ray Truck (Truck). Not long enough, the victim
and appellant left, leaving behind Truck. That was the last time Rosalina saw her son
alive.
In his Post Mortem Autopsy findings, Dr. Eli Cong (Dr. Cong), the medico-legal officer
of the Bacolod City Health Office, found lacerated wound and contusion hematoma on
the body of the victim and gave the cause of death as "Uncal Erniation, secondary to
contusion hemorrhage brain parietal area, a secondary. Fracture with laceration of the
skull parietal area, head, secondary to trauma by blunt instrument head, contusion
hemorrhage, multiple"3 which could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a piece
of wood.
ESTABLISHED FACTS: Accused Edilberto Norada declared that he and Agustin Seva
for sometime, have been hatching to organize a kidnap for ransom group in Bacolod
City. This plan did not materialize as they have no money to fund the operation. Later,
in 2003, he met Eugene Villanueva, security guard of the Riverside Hospital. Eugene
Villanueva revealed that he is a close friend of Reggie Pacil, a schoolteacher at the town
of Valladolid. Reggie Pacil has a friend, a Canadian national named Ray Truck. This Ray
Truck has plenty of money x x x. The three (3) of them, namely, himself, Agustin Seva
and Eugene Villanueva, made a plan to kidnap Ray Truck.
To carry out their plan, accused Norada revealed that they rented the car of Cecile
Pioquinto, who was the girlfriend of the accused Seva. They also rented a room at the
Taculing Court Apartelle. The accused Villanueva would bring both Reggie Pacil and the
Canadian Ray Truck at the Apartelle on the evening of February 11, 2004 and they will
then execute their kidnap plan.
On the appointed day, Accused Villanueva fetched Reggie Pacil and Ray Truck in the
house of Pacil in Valladolid but only Reggie Pacil came. Ray Truck remained in the
house of Reggie Pacil in Valladolid. The non-appearance of Ray Truck made them
change their plan. They decided to just kidnap Reggie Pacil as they were convinced that
Rey Truck will pay ransom for his release. They decided that the kidnapping will take
place as soon as Reggie Pacil falls asleep.
Inside their rented room in the Taculing Court Apartelle, Seva, Villanueva and Pacil
[drank] liquor. Norada x x x slept [in] the car in the garage of the Apartelle.
In the early morning of the following day Norada said that Villanueva woke him up and
told him that Pacil was already asleep. They began tying up Pacil but somehow he woke
up and resisted. Norada said that he hit Pacil [on] the head with a piece of wood. Pacil
was rendered unconscious only briefly and he again struggled. Norada hit him again and
this time Pacil stayed motionless but snoring. Then Seva taped the mouth of Pacil while
he and Villanueva tied x x x his hands and feet. They wrapped Pacil [in] a blanket, and
loaded him into the car. Then they dumped his body at Villa Angela subdivision.
Thereafter, they parted ways. x x x.5
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC gave probative value to the narration of Norada respecting the conspiracy to
kidnap the victim and how he was killed. The RTC further ruled that the killing was
attended by treachery and abuse of superior strength. The court a quo ratiocinated that:
In the present case, the crime of Kidnapping was only in its Attempted Stage as the
offenders only commenced the execution of the felony directly by overt acts but they
failed to perform all the acts of execution x x x by reason of the resistance of Reggie
Pacil. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal detention as a single felony such that all other offenses committed by
reason of or on occasion of it are absorbed by it by express mandate of the law. But the
absorption rule will not apply when the Kidnapping is only Attempted or Frustrated, as
Article 267 does not so provide. [W]hen Kidnapping is attempted or Frustrated and
another crime is committed arising out of the same act of attempted or frustrated
kidnapping, the provision of the ordinary complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code shall apply. An ordinary complex crime under Article 48 is committed when
a single act results to two or more grave or less grave felonies. The act which constituted
as an attempt to kidnap was also the same act that caused the death of Reggie Pacil. x x x
It should be stressed that the Information against the accused fully and completely
alleges the commission of the crime of Murder, with the killing of the victim qualified by
treachery and abuse of superior strength.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when a single act produces two (2) or
more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the graver offense shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. The maximum penalty for Murder is death
but since the penalty of death had already been abolished, the penalty is Reclusion
Perpetua.6
Thus, on July 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which
stated:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds all the three
(3) accused, namely, Eugene Villanueva Y Canales, Edilberto
Norada Y Harder and Agustin Seva Y Lacbanes, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Attempted
Kidnapping with Murder,

ISSUE: WON the crime of kidnapping was satisfactorily established

RULING:

Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659.
The crime has the following elements:

(1) the accused is a private

individual;

(2) the accused kidnaps or detains

another or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty

(3) the act of detention or kidnapping

is illegal; and

(4) in the commission of the offense,

any of the following
circumstances is present:

(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts tor

more than three days;

(b) it is committed by simulating public

authority:
 (c) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are
made or;

(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a

minor, female or a public official.9

"The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty
coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment
of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever
length of time."10
The totality of the prosecution's evidence failed to sufficiently establish the offense of
kidnapping in this case. There was no concrete evidence whatsoever to establish or from
which it can be inferred that appellant and his cohorts intended to actually deprive the
victim of his liberty for some time and for some purpose. Hence since the offense of
kidnapping was not sufficiently established, the trial court erred in holding appellant
liable for attempted kidnapping.
Treachery did not attend the killing
"Treachery cannot be presumed [for] the circumstances surrounding the [killing] must
he proved as indubitably as the crime itself." 15 Treachery is present ''when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." 16 "To
constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means,
methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender's safety from any
defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) the offender's
deliberate or conscious choice of the means, method or manner of execution." 17
Indeed, the victim was struck on the head by Norada with a piece of wood which
resulted to his death. However, the records is bereft of any evidence that appellant and
his co-accused made some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure
the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the victim to defend
himself.
The crime committed was homicide.
Considering that none of the circumstances alleged in the information, i.e., treachery
and abuse of superior strength was proven during the trial, the same cannot be
appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. Appellant can only be held liable for
homicide.
Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty prescribed for the crime of homicide is
reclusion temporal.
People vs. Felipe Mirandilla, GR 186417, July 27, 2011 (Kidnapping with rape)
FACTS
AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla.
2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the
plaza, AAA was dancing with her elder sister, BBB.
AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her
way back through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders,
with a knife’s point thrust at her right side. She will come to know the man’s name at the
police station, after her escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr.4 He told her not to move or
ask for help. Another man joined and went beside her, while two others stayed at her
back, one of whom had a gun. They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked
farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds.
After a four-hour walk through the grassy fields, they reached the Mayon International
Hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon passing the Albay Cathedral, the
others alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a
companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the darkness. Minutes later, they
reached the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis.5
Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete house. At
gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants. 6 When she defied him, he slapped her and
hit her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching
her vagina, slipped his three fingers and rotated them inside. The pain weakened her.
He forcibly pulled her pants down and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis
inside.7 "Sayang ka," she heard him whisper at her, 8 as she succumbed to pain and
exhaustion.
When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help,
shouting until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came.
At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA,
he ordered her to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her
mouth, pulling through her hair with his left hand and slapping her with his right. After
satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the
road’s side, Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth,
punched her arm, thigh, and lap, and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was
gone. Then she felt Mirandilla’s penis inside her vagina. A little while, a companion
warned Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away.9
They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered with
cloth. Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed her shirt, forced her legs
open, and again inserted his penis into her vagina.
The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she
suffered the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and
forth from one place to another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to
Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on
the grassy field right outside her cell, then to Camalig, where they caged her in a small
house in the middle of a rice field. She was allegedly raped 27 times.
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing
that Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and
ran, crossed a river, got drenched, and continued running. She rested for awhile, hiding
behind a rock; she walked through the fields and stayed out of people’s sight for two
nights. Finally, she found a road and followed its path, leading her to the house of
Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA was
in foul smell, starving and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police
gave her food. When the police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she
recognized the man’s face – she was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr.,
the police told her.12
The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to Dr. Sarah
Vasquez, Legazpi City’s Health Officer for medical examination. The doctor discovered
hymenal lacerations in different positions of her hymen, indicative of sexual
intercourse.13 Foul smelling pus also oozed from her vagina - AAA had contracted
gonorrhoea.14 AAA WAS 18, MIRANDILLA SA 33
Mirandilla denied the charges against him. This is his version.
Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped into each
other at the Albay Park where AAA, wearing a school uniform, approached him. They
had a short chat. They were neighbors in Barangay San Francisco until Mirandilla left
his wife and daughter there for good.15
Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends’ houses and in cheap
motels. On 24 October 2000, after Mirandilla went to his mother’s house in Kilikao,
they met again at the park, at their usual meeting place, in front of the park’s comfort
room, near Arlene Moret, a cigarette vendor who also served as the CR’s guard. 17 They
decided to elope and live as a couple. They found an abandoned house in Rawis, at the
back of Gallera de Legazpi. Emilio Mendoza who owned the house, rented it to them for
₱1,500.00.18 They lived there from 28 October until 11 December 2000. 19 From 12
December 2000 until 11 January 2001, 20 Mirandilla and AAA stayed in Rogelio
Marcellana’s house, at the resettlement Site in Banquerohan, Legazpi City.
Mirandilla and AAA’s nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only during
AAA’s menstrual periods, the last of which she had on 7 December 2000. 21 In late
December, however, Mirandilla, who just arrived home after visiting his mother in
Kilikao, saw AAA soaked in blood, moaning in excruciating stomach pain. 22 AAA had
abortion – an inference he drew upon seeing the cover of pills lying beside AAA.
Mirandilla claimed that AAA bled for days until she left him in January 2001 after
quarrelling for days.23
Mirandilla, however, had a second version of this crucial event. He claimed that AAA
missed her menstruation in December 2000 24 and that he would not have known she
had an abortion had she not confessed it to him.25
THE RTC RULING
The RTC convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four counts of rape, and one count of rape
through sexual assault.
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING
found him guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape (instead of
kidnapping as the RTC ruled), four counts of rape, and one count of rape by sexual
assault.
ISSUE: WON MIRANDILLA IS GUILTY OF special complex crime of kidnapping with
rape
RULING:
Mirandilla is guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with
rape.
Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA, which
happened almost nightly during their cohabitation. He contended that they were live-in
partners, entangled in a whirlwind romance, which intimacy they expressed in countless
passionate sex, which headed ironically to separation mainly because of AAA’s
intentional abortion of their first child to be – a betrayal in its gravest form which he
found hard to forgive.
In stark contrast to Mirandilla’s tale of a love affair, is AAA’s claim of her horrific ordeal
and her flight to freedom after 39 days in captivity during which Mirandilla raped her 27
times.
Second, the trial court found AAA’s testimony to be credible in itself. AAA’s ordeal was
entered into the police blotter immediately after her escape, 35 negating opportunity for
concoction.36 While in Mirandilla’s company, none of her parents, brothers, sisters,
relatives, classmates, or anyone who knew her, visited, saw, or talked to her. None of
them knew her whereabouts.37 AAA’s testimony was corroborated by Dr. Sarah Vasquez,
Legazpi City’s Health Officer, who discovered the presence not only of hymenal
lacerations but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted disease.
More importantly, AAA remained consistent in the midst of gruelling cross examination.
The defense lawyer tried to impeach her testimony, but failed to do so.
The Court of Appeals confirmed AAA’s credibility in affirming the RTC decision.
We emphasize that a trial court’s assessment of a witness’ credibility, when affirmed by
the CA, is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight or influence. 38 This is so because of the judicial
experience that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility,
having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment
and manner of testifying under gruelling examination. 39 Thus, in Estioca v. People,40 we
held:
Second Issue
"Sweetheart Theory" not Proven
Accused’s bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it
must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. 42 Usually, these
are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the
lovers.43
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the
first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force
or intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust. 44
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only
an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; 45 after the prosecution has
successfully established a prima facie case, 46 the burden of evidence is shifted to the
accused,47 who has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual. 48
A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced
evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in
litigation.49
Burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time
during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favour or to overthrow one when
created against him."50(Emphasis supplied)
Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above attempted to meet the
prosecution’s prima facie case. To corroborate it, he presented his mother, Alicia
Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and, his friend
Arlene Moret.
Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CR’s guard, testified that on
30 October 2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at the park. 51 They approached
her and chatted with her. On cross examination, she claimed otherwise: Mirandilla
arrived alone two hours earlier, chatting with her first, before AAA finally came. 52 She
also claimed meeting the couple for the first time on 30 October 2000, only to
contradict herself on cross examination with the version that she met them previously,
three times at least, in the previous month.53 On the other hand, Mirandilla claimed first
meeting AAA on 3 October 2000 at the park.54
The accused’s mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once, and living
in Kilikao only after his imprisonment. 55 This contradicted Mirandilla’s claim that he
visited his mother several times in Kilikao, from October 2000 until January 2001. 56
Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in blood,
agonizing in pain, with the abortifacient pills’ cover lying nearby, cannot be reconciled
with his other claim that he came to know AAA’s abortion only through the latter’s
admission.57
Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses’ testimonies contradicted each
other and flip-flopped on materials facts, constraining this Court to infer that they
concocted stories in a desperate attempt to exonerate the accused.
As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of witnesses should be
reconciled,58 it being true that such is possible since a witness is not expected to give
error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory.59 But, this principle, learned from lessons of human experience, applies only to
minor or trivial matters – innocent lapses that do not affect witness’ credibility. 60 They
do not apply to self-contradictions on material facts. 61 Where these contradictions
cannot be reconciled, the Court has to reject the testimonies, 62 and apply the maxim,
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. Thus,
To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness based on the maxim falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus, testimony must have been false as to a material point, and the
witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify a material point. In
other words, its requirements, which must concur, are the following: (1) that the false
testimony is as to one or more material points; and (2) that there should be a conscious
and deliberate intention to falsity.63
Crimes and Punishment
An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including
one not raised by the parties. 64 This was our pronouncement in the 1902 landmark case
of U.S. v. Abijan,65 which is now embodied in Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:
SEC 11. Scope of Judgment. – The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the
judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case
to the Regional Trial Court for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case. (Emphasis
supplied)
The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the
trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws
the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to
render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
appellant.66
To reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274-
75-76-77), and one count of rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9278 alleged that
Mirandilla kidnapped AAA and seriously and illegally detained her for more than three
days during which time he had carnal knowledge of her, against her will. 67
The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It was the RTC,
no less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in detention for 39 days
and carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife.68
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or
anal orifice of another person.
AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of her; (2) through
force, threat, or intimidation. She was also able to prove each element of rape by sexual
assault under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his
penis into her mouth; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx
Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 7659,70 states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. This provision gives rise to a special complex crime. As the
Court explained in People v. Larrañaga, 71 this arises where the law provides a single
penalty for two or more component offenses.72
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with
rape.73 This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense
as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A.
7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim
was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed – the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not
have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, 74 we explained that if the taking was by
forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was
only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct
and separate count of rape.75
It having been established that Mirandilla’s act was kidnapping and serious illegal
detention (not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several
times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape, warranting the penalty of
death. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines,76 the penalty of death is hereby reduced to reclusion
perpetua,77 without eligibility for parole.78

Joseph Anthony Alejandro, et.al., vs. Atty. Jose Bernas

PADLOCKING THE CONDO
GR 179243, September 7, 2011 (Grave Coercion) PERALTA, J.:
Petitioners, are occupying a condo, nasira yung aircon nila so they reported
the matter to the OPI or condo aministration. Habang hindi pa nagagawa
yung aircon, hindi nagbabayad ng rents si petitioners. Ngayon, nag file ng
ejectment case si Condo Admin against petitioners. During that ejectment
case, the condo unit was padlocked, twice. The MeTC, in the ejectment case
ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the ruling of the MeTC was
overturned by the RTC and CA. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a complaint
for grave coercion against the respondents before the OCP. The OCP
charged the respondents with unjust vexation and not grave coercion.
FACTS:
Alejandro is the lessee-purchaser of condominium unit, Discovery Center Condominium
(DCC) in Pasig City under the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase 3 with the
lessor-seller Oakridge Properties, Inc. (OPI).
Alejandro sub-leased the Unit to the other petitioners Firdausi I.Y. Abbas (Firdausi),
Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas (Carmina) and Ma. Elena Go Francisco (Ma. Elena) to be
used as a law office.4 However, a defect in the air-conditioning unit prompted
petitioners to suspend payments until the problem is fixed by the management. 5 
Instead of addressing the defect, OPI instituted an action for against Alejandro for the
latter’s failure to pay rentals.
During the pendency of the ejectment case, OPI, allegedly through respondent Atty.
Bernas, ordered that the Unit be padlocked. In an Order the MeTC directed OPI to
remove the padlock of the Unit and discontinue the inventory of the properties.
However, OPI, allegedly through respondent Atty. Jose Bernas, again padlocked the
Unit. The padlocking was allegedly executed by Amor, as Property Manager and
respondent Eduardo Aguilar (Aguilar) as head of the security unit. Respondents,
likewise, cut off the electricity, water and telephone facilities.
The MeTC rendered a Decision10 in the ejectment case in favor of Alejandro and against
OPI. However, the RTC and CA reversed the MeTC.
Petitioners filed a criminal complaint13 for grave coercion against respondents Bernas,
Sia-Bernas, Amor, Aguilar et al. Petitioners claimed that the padlocking of the Unit was
illegal, felonious and unlawful which prevented them from entering the
premises.15 Petitioners also alleged that said padlocking and the cutting off of facilities
had unduly prejudiced them and thus constituted grave coercion. 16
Amor and Aguilar maintained that petitioners did not allege that the former actually
prevented the latter to enter the Unit. They added that petitioners in fact gained access
to the Unit by forcibly destroying the padlock.18
The OCP charged respondents Fernando Amor and Eduardo Aguilar with unjust
vexation.
The OCP held that respondents could not be charged with grave coercion as no violence
was employed by the latter. In padlocking the leased premises and cutting off of
facilities, respondents Amor and Aguilar were found to be probably guilty of the crime of
unjust vexation.21
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) but
the appeal was dismissed22 for their failure to comply with Section 12, paragraph (b) of
Department Circular No. 70. The DOJ Secretary, acting through Undersecretary Ernesto
L. Pineda, explained that petitioners failed to submit a legible true copy of the joint
counter-affidavit of some of the respondents. Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration23 was likewise denied in a Resolution 24 dated April 3, 2006. He denied
the motion after a careful re-evaluation of the record of the case vis-à-vis the issues and
arguments raised by petitioners.
Undaunted, petitioners elevated the matter to the CA that rendered the assailed
decision25 on May 23, 2007. The appellate court recognized the DOJ’s authority to
dismiss the petition on technicality pursuant to its rules of procedure. The CA explained
that while the DOJ dismissed the petition on mere technicality, it re-evaluated the
merits of the case when petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration. On whether or
not there was probable cause for the crime of grave coercion, the CA answered in the
negative. It held that the mere presence of the security guards was insufficient to cause
intimidation.26 The CA likewise denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on
August 8, 2007.27
ISSUE: WON the respondents are guilty of grave coercion.
RULING: YES
[Probable cause] is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause"; nor does
it import absolute certainty. It is merely based in opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. 42
For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:
1. that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law,
or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2. that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or
intimidation; and
3. that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so,
or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or
in the exercise of any lawful right.43
Admittedly, respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the electricity, water and
telephone facilities. Petitioners were thus prevented from occupying the Unit and using
it for the purpose for which it was intended, that is, to be used as a law office. At the
time of the padlocking and cutting off of facilities, there was already a case for the
determination of the rights and obligations of both Alejandro, as lessee and OPI as
lessor, pending before the MeTC. There was in fact an order for the respondents to
remove the padlock. Thus, in performing the acts complained of, Amor and Aguilar had
no right to do so.
The problem, however, lies on the second element. It was never alleged that the act of
padlocking was effected by violence, threat or intimidation. The mere presence of the
security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the
person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his
consent. 44 Material violence is dispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear
produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is
sufficient.45
In the crime of grave coercion, violence through material force or such a display of it as
would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended
party is an essential ingredient.49
In this case, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to intimidate
petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and
that they produced fear on the part of petitioners. To determine the degree of the
intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. 46 Here, the
petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who
presumably know their rights.

People vs. Pedro Consulta NANGHABLOT NG NECKLACE

GR 179462, February 12, 2009
(Robbery vs. grave Coercion)
FACTS:
private complainant Nelia R. Silvestre (Nelia), together with Maria) and Veronica,
boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching Ambel Street,
appellant pedro and his brother Edwin blocked the tricycle and under their threats, the
driver alighted and left.
Pedro and Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying "Putang ina mong
matanda ka, walanghiya ka, kapal ng mukha mo, papatayin ka namin." Pedro added
"Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala, sinabihan na kita na kahit
saan kita matiempuhan, papatayin kita."
Pedro thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold necklace with a crucifix pendant which was
worth ₱3,500, kicked the tricycle and left saying "Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo
mga nurses lang, anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, mga nurses lang kayo. Kami, marami
kaming mga abogado. Hindi niyo kami maipapakulong kahit kailan!"
Denying the charge, appellant branded it as fabricated to spite him and his family in
light of the following antecedent facts:
He and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelia’s house in Pateros. Nelia is his
godmother. The adjacent house was occupied by Nelia’s parents with whom she often
quarreled as to whom the rental payments should be remitted.
Appellant went on to claim that despite frequent transfers of residence to avoid Nelia,
she would track his whereabouts and cause scandal.
RTC: PEDRO C. CONSULTA guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the felony
of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons defined and penalized under Article 294,
paragraph No. 5, in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code 
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant has committed the crime of which he was charged
RULING:
293 of the Revised Penal Code under which appellant was charged provides:
Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. – Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take
any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilt of robbery.
(Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)
Article 294, paragraph 5, under which appellant was penalized provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
The elements of robbery are thus:
1) there is a taking of personal property;
2) the personal property belongs to another;
3) the taking is with animus lucrandi / intent to gain; and
4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon
things.
Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through
the overt acts of the offender. It may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on
the part of the perpetrator.5
In this case, the taking of Nelia’s necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain on
appellant’s part. That intent to gain on appellant’s part is difficult to appreciate gains
light given his undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-feelings,
manifested by, among other things, the filing of complaints 6 against him by Nelia and
her family which were subsequently dismissed or ended in his acquittal. 7
Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant, robbery does not lie against him. He is not
necessarily scot-free, however.
From the pre-existing sour relations between Nelia and her family on one hand, and
appellant and family on the other, and under the circumstances related above attendant
to the incidental encounter of the parties, appellant’s taking of Nelia’s necklace could
not have been animated with animus lucrandi.
Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for one of its elements. Thus Article 286 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
"Art. 286. Grave coercions. – The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not
exceeding six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without authority
of law,
shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another from doing somethi
ng not prohibited by law or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be
right or wrong.
The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the
act. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion:
"The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and the
other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was the purpose with
intent to gain to take the property of another by use of force or intimidation? Then,
conviction for robbery.
Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the
creditor, to compel another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then,
conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused
are the prime criterion. And there was no common robber in the present case, but a man
who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own hands
and attempting to collect what he thought was due him. Animus furandi was lacking."10 
By appellant’s employment of threats, intimidation and violence consisting of, inter alia,
uttering of invectives, driving away of the tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle,
Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her destination.
Appellant is thus guilty of grave coercion.

Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA No. 4200)

REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER
RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That
the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or
cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who
violates the provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder, or
aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender
be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an
alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or
punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to
execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases
involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war,
piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition,
kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act
No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security: 
Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the
offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be
granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be,
have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to
the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no
other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose
communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard,
intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications,
the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of
the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications,
conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or
sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall
be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days
from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon
being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the
expiration of the period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed
envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer
granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times
covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the
deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have
been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or
package deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be
opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed,
except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due
notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or
communications have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First
Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for
are to be executed. RTC LANG
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of
this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
accordingly amended.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Data Privacy Act of  2012 (RA 10173)

Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Data Privacy Act of 2012″.
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to protect the
fundamental human right of privacy, of communication while ensuring free flow of
information to promote innovation and growth. The State recognizes the vital role of
information and communications technology in nation-building and its inherent
obligation to ensure that personal information in information and communications
systems in the government and in the private sector are secured and protected.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. – Whenever used in this Act, the following terms shall
have the respective meanings hereafter set forth:
(a) Commission shall refer to the National Privacy Commission created by virtue
of this Act.
(b) Consent of the data subject refers to any freely given, specific, informed
indication of will, whereby the data subject agrees to the collection and
processing of personal information about and/or relating to him or her. Consent
shall be evidenced by written, electronic or recorded means. It may also be given
on behalf of the data subject by an agent specifically authorized by the data
subject to do so.
(c) Data subject refers to an individual whose personal information is processed.
(d) Direct marketing refers to communication by whatever means of any
advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals.
(e) Filing system refers to any act of information relating to natural or juridical
persons to the extent that, although the information is not processed by
equipment operating automatically in response to instructions given for that
purpose, the set is structured, either by reference to individuals or by reference to
criteria relating to individuals, in such a way that specific information relating to
a particular person is readily accessible.
(f) Information and Communications System refers to a system for generating,
sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic data messages or
electronic documents and includes the computer system or other similar device
by or which data is recorded, transmitted or stored and any procedure related to
the recording, transmission or storage of electronic data, electronic message, or
electronic document.
(g) Personal information refers to any information whether recorded in a
material form or not, from which the identity of an individual is apparent or can
be reasonably and directly ascertained by the entity holding the information, or
when put together with other information would directly and certainly identify an
individual.
(h) Personal information controller refers to a person or organization who
controls the collection, holding, processing or use of personal information,
including a person or organization who instructs another person or organization
to collect, hold, process, use, transfer or disclose personal information on his or
her behalf. The term excludes:
(1) A person or organization who performs such functions as instructed by
another person or organization; and
(2) An individual who collects, holds, processes or uses personal
information in connection with the individual’s personal, family or
household affairs.
(i) Personal information processor refers to any natural or juridical person
qualified to act as such under this Act to whom a personal information controller
may outsource the processing of personal data pertaining to a data subject.
(j) Processing refers to any operation or any set of operations performed upon
personal information including, but not limited to, the collection, recording,
organization, storage, updating or modification, retrieval, consultation, use,
consolidation, blocking, erasure or destruction of data.
(k) Privileged information refers to any and all forms of data which under the
Rides of Court and other pertinent laws constitute privileged communication.
(l) Sensitive personal information refers to personal information:
(1) About an individual’s race, ethnic origin, marital status, age, color, and
religious, philosophical or political affiliations;
(2) About an individual’s health, education, genetic or sexual life of a
person, or to any proceeding for any offense committed or alleged to have
been committed by such person, the disposal of such proceedings, or the
sentence of any court in such proceedings;
 (3) Issued by government agencies peculiar to an individual which
includes, but not limited to, social security numbers, previous or cm-rent
health records, licenses or its denials, suspension or revocation, and tax
returns; and
(4) Specifically established by an executive order or an act of Congress to
be kept classified.
Section 4. Scope. – This Act applies to the processing of all types of personal
information and to any natural and juridical person involved in personal information
processing including those personal information controllers and processors who,
although not found or established in the Philippines, use equipment that are located in
the Philippines, or those who maintain an office, branch or agency in the Philippines
subject to the immediately succeeding paragraph: Provided, That the requirements of
Section 5 are complied with.
This Act does not apply to the following:
(a) Information about any individual who is or was an officer or employee of a
government institution that relates to the position or functions of the individual,
including:
(1) The fact that the individual is or was an officer or employee of the
government institution;
(2) The title, business address and office telephone number of the
individual;
(3) The classification, salary range and responsibilities of the position held
by the individual; and
(4) The name of the individual on a document prepared by the individual
in the course of employment with the government;
(b) Information about an individual who is or was performing service under
contract for a government institution that relates to the services performed,
including the terms of the contract, and the name of the individual given in the
course of the performance of those services;
(c) Information relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial nature such as
the granting of a license or permit given by the government to an individual,
including the name of the individual and the exact nature of the benefit;
(d) Personal information processed for journalistic, artistic, literary or research
purposes;
(e) Information necessary in order to carry out the functions of public authority
which includes the processing of personal data for the performance by the
independent, central monetary authority and law enforcement and regulatory
 agencies of their constitutionally and statutorily mandated functions. Nothing in
this Act shall be construed as to have amended or repealed Republic Act No.
1405, otherwise known as the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act; Republic Act No.
6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act; and Republic Act
No. 9510, otherwise known as the Credit Information System Act (CISA);
(f) Information necessary for banks and other financial institutions under the
jurisdiction of the independent, central monetary authority or Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas to comply with Republic Act No. 9510, and Republic Act No. 9160, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other
applicable laws; and
(g) Personal information originally collected from residents of foreign
jurisdictions in accordance with the laws of those foreign jurisdictions, including
any applicable data privacy laws, which is being processed in the Philippines.
Section 5. Protection Afforded to Journalists and Their Sources. – Nothing in this Act
shall be construed as to have amended or repealed the provisions of Republic Act No.
53, which affords the publishers, editors or duly accredited reporters of any newspaper,
magazine or periodical of general circulation protection from being compelled to reveal
the source of any news report or information appearing in said publication which was
related in any confidence to such publisher, editor, or reporter.
Section 6. Extraterritorial Application. – This Act applies to an act done or practice
engaged in and outside of the Philippines by an entity if:
(a) The act, practice or processing relates to personal information about a
Philippine citizen or a resident;
(b) The entity has a link with the Philippines, and the entity is processing
personal information in the Philippines or even if the processing is outside the
Philippines as long as it is about Philippine citizens or residents such as, but not
limited to, the following:
(1) A contract is entered in the Philippines;
(2) A juridical entity unincorporated in the Philippines but has central
management and control in the country; and
(3) An entity that has a branch, agency, office or subsidiary in the
Philippines and the parent or affiliate of the Philippine entity has access to
personal information; and
(c) The entity has other links in the Philippines such as, but not limited to:
(1) The entity carries on business in the Philippines; and
(2) The personal information was collected or held by an entity in the
Philippines.
CHAPTER II
THE NATIONAL PRIVACY COMMISSION
Section 7. Functions of the National Privacy Commission. – To administer and
implement the provisions of this Act, and to monitor and ensure compliance of the
country with international standards set for data protection, there is hereby created an
independent body to be known as the National Privacy Commission, winch shall have
the following functions:
(a) Ensure compliance of personal information controllers with the provisions of
this Act;
(b) Receive complaints, institute investigations, facilitate or enable settlement of
complaints through the use of alternative dispute resolution processes,
adjudicate, award indemnity on matters affecting any personal information,
prepare reports on disposition of complaints and resolution of any investigation
it initiates, and, in cases it deems appropriate, publicize any such
report: Provided, That in resolving any complaint or investigation (except where
amicable settlement is reached by the parties), the Commission shall act as a
collegial body. For this purpose, the Commission may be given access to personal
information that is subject of any complaint and to collect the information
necessary to perform its functions under this Act;
(c) Issue cease and desist orders, impose a temporary or permanent ban on the
processing of personal information, upon finding that the processing will be
detrimental to national security and public interest;
(d) Compel or petition any entity, government agency or instrumentality to abide
by its orders or take action on a matter affecting data privacy;
(e) Monitor the compliance of other government agencies or instrumentalities on
their security and technical measures and recommend the necessary action in
order to meet minimum standards for protection of personal information
pursuant to this Act;
(f) Coordinate with other government agencies and the private sector on efforts
to formulate and implement plans and policies to strengthen the protection of
personal information in the country;
(g) Publish on a regular basis a guide to all laws relating to data protection;
(h) Publish a compilation of agency system of records and notices, including
index and other finding aids;
(i) Recommend to the Department of Justice (DOJ) the prosecution and
imposition of penalties specified in Sections 25 to 29 of this Act;
(j) Review, approve, reject or require modification of privacy codes voluntarily
adhered to by personal information controllers: Provided, That the privacy codes
 shall adhere to the underlying data privacy principles embodied in this
Act: Provided, further, That such privacy codes may include private dispute
resolution mechanisms for complaints against any participating personal
information controller. For this purpose, the Commission shall consult with
relevant regulatory agencies in the formulation and administration of privacy
codes applying the standards set out in this Act, with respect to the persons,
entities, business activities and business sectors that said regulatory bodies are
authorized to principally regulate pursuant to the law: Provided, finally. That the
Commission may review such privacy codes and require changes thereto for
purposes of complying with this Act;
(k) Provide assistance on matters relating to privacy or data protection at the
request of a national or local agency, a private entity or any person;
(l) Comment on the implication on data privacy of proposed national or local
statutes, regulations or procedures, issue advisory opinions and interpret the
provisions of this Act and other data privacy laws;
(m) Propose legislation, amendments or modifications to Philippine laws on
privacy or data protection as may be necessary;
(n) Ensure proper and effective coordination with data privacy regulators in other
countries and private accountability agents, participate in international and
regional initiatives for data privacy protection;
(o) Negotiate and contract with other data privacy authorities of other countries
for cross-border application and implementation of respective privacy laws;
(p) Assist Philippine companies doing business abroad to respond to foreign
privacy or data protection laws and regulations; and
(q) Generally perform such acts as may be necessary to facilitate cross-border
enforcement of data privacy protection.
Section 8. Confidentiality. – The Commission shall ensure at all times the
confidentiality of any personal information that comes to its knowledge and possession.
Section 9. Organizational Structure of the Commission. – The Commission shall be
attached to the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT)
and shall be headed by a Privacy Commissioner, who shall also act as Chairman of the
Commission. The Privacy Commissioner shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Privacy
Commissioners, one to be responsible for Data Processing Systems and one to be
responsible for Policies and Planning. The Privacy Commissioner and the two (2)
Deputy Privacy Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines
for a term of three (3) years, and may be reappointed for another term of three (3) years.
Vacancies in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner in which the original
appointment was made.
The Privacy Commissioner must be at least thirty-five (35) years of age and of good
moral character, unquestionable integrity and known probity, and a recognized expert
in the field of information technology and data privacy. The Privacy Commissioner shall
enjoy the benefits, privileges and emoluments equivalent to the rank of Secretary.
The Deputy Privacy Commissioners must be recognized experts in the field of
information and communications technology and data privacy. They shall enjoy the
benefits, privileges and emoluments equivalent to the rank of Undersecretary.
The Privacy Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioners, or any person acting on their
behalf or under their direction, shall not be civilly liable for acts done in good faith in the
performance of their duties. However, he or she shall be liable for willful or negligent
acts done by him or her which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good
customs even if he or she acted under orders or instructions of
superiors: Provided, That in case a lawsuit is filed against such official on the subject of
the performance of his or her duties, where such performance is lawful, he or she shall
be reimbursed by the Commission for reasonable costs of litigation.
Section 10. The Secretariat. – The Commission is hereby authorized to establish a
Secretariat. Majority of the members of the Secretariat must have served for at least five
(5) years in any agency of the government that is involved in the processing of personal
information including, but not limited to, the following offices: Social Security System
(SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Land Transportation Office
(LTO), Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PhilHealth), Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Philippine Postal Corporation (Philpost).
CHAPTER III
PROCESSING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
Section 11. General Data Privacy Principles. – The processing of personal information
shall be allowed, subject to compliance with the requirements of this Act and other laws
allowing disclosure of information to the public and adherence to the principles of
transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality.
Personal information must, be:
(a) Collected for specified and legitimate purposes determined and declared
before, or as soon as reasonably practicable after collection, and later processed
in a way compatible with such declared, specified and legitimate purposes only;
(b) Processed fairly and lawfully;
(c) Accurate, relevant and, where necessary for purposes for which it is to be used
the processing of personal information, kept up to date; inaccurate or incomplete
data must be rectified, supplemented, destroyed or their further processing
restricted;
 (d) Adequate and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
collected and processed;
(e) Retained only for as long as necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes for
which the data was obtained or for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal
claims, or for legitimate business purposes, or as provided by law; and
(f) Kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than
is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected and
processed: Provided, That personal information collected for other purposes may
lie processed for historical, statistical or scientific purposes, and in cases laid
down in law may be stored for longer periods: Provided, further, That adequate
safeguards are guaranteed by said laws authorizing their processing.
The personal information controller must ensure implementation of personal
information processing principles set out herein.
Section 12. Criteria for Lawful Processing of Personal Information. – The processing
of personal information shall be permitted only if not otherwise prohibited by law, and
when at least one of the following conditions exists:
(a) The data subject has given his or her consent;
(b) The processing of personal information is necessary and is related to the
fulfillment of a contract with the data subject or in order to take steps at the
request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;
(c) The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which
the personal information controller is subject;
(d) The processing is necessary to protect vitally important interests of the data
subject, including life and health;
(e) The processing is necessary in order to respond to national emergency, to
comply with the requirements of public order and safety, or to fulfill functions of
public authority which necessarily includes the processing of personal data for
the fulfillment of its mandate; or
(f) The processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests
pursued by the personal information controller or by a third party or parties to
whom the data is disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection
under the Philippine Constitution.
Section 13. Sensitive Personal Information and Privileged Information. – The
processing of sensitive personal information and privileged information shall be
prohibited, except in the following cases:
 (a) The data subject has given his or her consent, specific to the purpose prior to
the processing, or in the case of privileged information, all parties to the
exchange have given their consent prior to processing;
(b) The processing of the same is provided for by existing laws and
regulations: Provided, That such regulatory enactments guarantee the protection
of the sensitive personal information and the privileged information: Provided,
further, That the consent of the data subjects are not required by law or
regulation permitting the processing of the sensitive personal information or the
privileged information;
(c) The processing is necessary to protect the life and health of the data subject or
another person, and the data subject is not legally or physically able to express
his or her consent prior to the processing;
(d) The processing is necessary to achieve the lawful and noncommercial
objectives of public organizations and their associations: Provided, That such
processing is only confined and related to the bona fide members of these
organizations or their associations: Provided, further, That the sensitive personal
information are not transferred to third parties: Provided, finally, That consent
of the data subject was obtained prior to processing;
(e) The processing is necessary for purposes of medical treatment, is carried out
by a medical practitioner or a medical treatment institution, and an adequate
level of protection of personal information is ensured; or
(f) The processing concerns such personal information as is necessary for the
protection of lawful rights and interests of natural or legal persons in court
proceedings, or the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims, or when
provided to government or public authority.
Section 14. Subcontract of Personal Information. – A personal information controller
may subcontract the processing of personal information: Provided, That the personal
information controller shall be responsible for ensuring that proper safeguards are in
place to ensure the confidentiality of the personal information processed, prevent its use
for unauthorized purposes, and generally, comply with the requirements of this Act and
other laws for processing of personal information. The personal information processor
shall comply with all the requirements of this Act and other applicable laws.
Section 15. Extension of Privileged Communication. – Personal information
controllers may invoke the principle of privileged communication over privileged
information that they lawfully control or process. Subject to existing laws and
regulations, any evidence gathered on privileged information is inadmissible.
CHAPTER IV
RIGHTS OF THE DATA SUBJECT
Section 16. Rights of the Data Subject. – The data subject is entitled to:
(a) Be informed whether personal information pertaining to him or her shall be,
are being or have been processed;
(b) Be furnished the information indicated hereunder before the entry of his or
her personal information into the processing system of the personal information
controller, or at the next practical opportunity:
(1) Description of the personal information to be entered into the system;
(2) Purposes for which they are being or are to be processed;
(3) Scope and method of the personal information processing;
(4) The recipients or classes of recipients to whom they are or may be
disclosed;
(5) Methods utilized for automated access, if the same is allowed by the
data subject, and the extent to which such access is authorized;
(6) The identity and contact details of the personal information controller
or its representative;
(7) The period for which the information will be stored; and
(8) The existence of their rights, i.e., to access, correction, as well as the
right to lodge a complaint before the Commission.
Any information supplied or declaration made to the data subject on these
matters shall not be amended without prior notification of data
subject: Provided, That the notification under subsection (b) shall not apply
should the personal information be needed pursuant to a subpoena or when the
collection and processing are for obvious purposes, including when it is necessary
for the performance of or in relation to a contract or service or when necessary or
desirable in the context of an employer-employee relationship, between the
collector and the data subject, or when the information is being collected and
processed as a result of legal obligation;
(c) Reasonable access to, upon demand, the following:
(1) Contents of his or her personal information that were processed;
(2) Sources from which personal information were obtained;
(3) Names and addresses of recipients of the personal information;
(4) Manner by which such data were processed;
(5) Reasons for the disclosure of the personal information to recipients;
 (6) Information on automated processes where the data will or likely to be
made as the sole basis for any decision significantly affecting or will affect
the data subject;
(7) Date when his or her personal information concerning the data subject
were last accessed and modified; and
(8) The designation, or name or identity and address of the personal
information controller;
(d) Dispute the inaccuracy or error in the personal information and have the
personal information controller correct it immediately and accordingly, unless
the request is vexatious or otherwise unreasonable. If the personal information
have been corrected, the personal information controller shall ensure the
accessibility of both the new and the retracted information and the simultaneous
receipt of the new and the retracted information by recipients
thereof: Provided, That the third parties who have previously received such
processed personal information shall he informed of its inaccuracy and its
rectification upon reasonable request of the data subject;
(e) Suspend, withdraw or order the blocking, removal or destruction of his or her
personal information from the personal information controller’s filing system
upon discovery and substantial proof that the personal information are
incomplete, outdated, false, unlawfully obtained, used for unauthorized purposes
or are no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were collected. In this
case, the personal information controller may notify third parties who have
previously received such processed personal information; and
(f) Be indemnified for any damages sustained due to such inaccurate, incomplete,
outdated, false, unlawfully obtained or unauthorized use of personal information.
Section 17. Transmissibility of Rights of the Data Subject. – The lawful heirs and
assigns of the data subject may invoke the rights of the data subject for, which he or she
is an heir or assignee at any time after the death of the data subject or when the data
subject is incapacitated or incapable of exercising the rights as enumerated in the
immediately preceding section.
Section 18. Right to Data Portability. – The data subject shall have the right, where
personal information is processed by electronic means and in a structured and
commonly used format, to obtain from the personal information controller a copy of
data undergoing processing in an electronic or structured format, which is commonly
used and allows for further use by the data subject. The Commission may specify the
electronic format referred to above, as well as the technical standards, modalities and
procedures for their transfer.
Section 19. Non-Applicability. – The immediately preceding sections are not
applicable if the processed personal information are used only for the needs of scientific
and statistical research and, on the basis of such, no activities are carried out and no
decisions are taken regarding the data subject: Provided, That the personal information
shall be held under strict confidentiality and shall be used only for the declared purpose.
Likewise, the immediately preceding sections are not applicable to processing of
personal information gathered for the purpose of investigations in relation to any
criminal, administrative or tax liabilities of a data subject.
CHAPTER V
SECURITY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
Section 20. Security of Personal Information. – (a) The personal information
controller must implement reasonable and appropriate organizational, physical and
technical measures intended for the protection of personal information against any
accidental or unlawful destruction, alteration and disclosure, as well as against any
other unlawful processing.
(b) The personal information controller shall implement reasonable and appropriate
measures to protect personal information against natural dangers such as accidental
loss or destruction, and human dangers such as unlawful access, fraudulent misuse,
unlawful destruction, alteration and contamination.
(c) The determination of the appropriate level of security under this section must take
into account the nature of the personal information to be protected, the risks
represented by the processing, the size of the organization and complexity of its
operations, current data privacy best practices and the cost of security implementation.
Subject to guidelines as the Commission may issue from time to time, the measures
implemented must include:
(1) Safeguards to protect its computer network against accidental, unlawful or
unauthorized usage or interference with or hindering of their functioning or
availability;
(2) A security policy with respect to the processing of personal information;
(3) A process for identifying and accessing reasonably foreseeable vulnerabilities
in its computer networks, and for taking preventive, corrective and mitigating
action against security incidents that can lead to a security breach; and
(4) Regular monitoring for security breaches and a process for taking preventive,
corrective and mitigating action against security incidents that can lead to a
security breach.
(d) The personal information controller must further ensure that third parties
processing personal information on its behalf shall implement the security measures
required by this provision.
(e) The employees, agents or representatives of a personal information controller who
are involved in the processing of personal information shall operate and hold personal
information under strict confidentiality if the personal information are not intended for
public disclosure. This obligation shall continue even after leaving the public service,
transfer to another position or upon termination of employment or contractual
relations.
(f) The personal information controller shall promptly notify the Commission and
affected data subjects when sensitive personal information or other information that
may, under the circumstances, be used to enable identity fraud are reasonably believed
to have been acquired by an unauthorized person, and the personal information
controller or the Commission believes (bat such unauthorized acquisition is likely to
give rise to a real risk of serious harm to any affected data subject. The notification shall
at least describe the nature of the breach, the sensitive personal information possibly
involved, and the measures taken by the entity to address the breach. Notification may
be delayed only to the extent necessary to determine the scope of the breach, to prevent
further disclosures, or to restore reasonable integrity to the information and
communications system.
(1) In evaluating if notification is unwarranted, the Commission may take into
account compliance by the personal information controller with this section and
existence of good faith in the acquisition of personal information.
(2) The Commission may exempt a personal information controller from
notification where, in its reasonable judgment, such notification would not be in
the public interest or in the interests of the affected data subjects.
(3) The Commission may authorize postponement of notification where it may
hinder the progress of a criminal investigation related to a serious breach.
CHAPTER VI
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TRANSFER OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
Section 21. Principle of Accountability. – Each personal information controller is
responsible for personal information under its control or custody, including information
that have been transferred to a third party for processing, whether domestically or
internationally, subject to cross-border arrangement and cooperation.
(a) The personal information controller is accountable for complying with the
requirements of this Act and shall use contractual or other reasonable means to
provide a comparable level of protection while the information are being
processed by a third party.
(b) The personal information controller shall designate an individual or
individuals who are accountable for the organization’s compliance with this Act.
The identity of the individual(s) so designated shall be made known to any data
subject upon request.
CHAPTER VII
SECURITY OF SENSITIVE PERSONAL
INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT
Section 22. Responsibility of Heads of Agencies. – All sensitive personal information
maintained by the government, its agencies and instrumentalities shall be secured, as
far as practicable, with the use of the most appropriate standard recognized by the
information and communications technology industry, and as recommended by the
Commission. The head of each government agency or instrumentality shall be
responsible for complying with the security requirements mentioned herein while the
Commission shall monitor the compliance and may recommend the necessary action in
order to satisfy the minimum standards.
Section 23. Requirements Relating to Access by Agency Personnel to Sensitive
Personal Information. – (a) On-site and Online Access – Except as may be allowed
through guidelines to be issued by the Commission, no employee of the government
shall have access to sensitive personal information on government property or through
online facilities unless the employee has received a security clearance from the head of
the source agency.
(b) Off-site Access – Unless otherwise provided in guidelines to be issued by the
Commission, sensitive personal information maintained by an agency may not be
transported or accessed from a location off government property unless a request for
such transportation or access is submitted and approved by the head of the agency in
accordance with the following guidelines:
(1) Deadline for Approval or Disapproval – In the case of any request submitted
to the head of an agency, such head of the agency shall approve or disapprove the
request within two (2) business days after the date of submission of the request.
In case there is no action by the head of the agency, then such request is
considered disapproved;
(2) Limitation to One thousand (1,000) Records – If a request is approved, the
head of the agency shall limit the access to not more than one thousand (1,000)
records at a time; and
(3) Encryption – Any technology used to store, transport or access sensitive
personal information for purposes of off-site access approved under this
subsection shall be secured by the use of the most secure encryption standard
recognized by the Commission.
The requirements of this subsection shall be implemented not later than six (6) months
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 24. Applicability to Government Contractors. – In entering into any contract
that may involve accessing or requiring sensitive personal information from one
thousand (1,000) or more individuals, an agency shall require a contractor and its
employees to register their personal information processing system with the
Commission in accordance with this Act and to comply with the other provisions of this
Act including the immediately preceding section, in the same manner as agencies and
government employees comply with such requirements.
CHAPTER VIII
PENALTIES
Section 25. Unauthorized Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal
Information. – (a) The unauthorized processing of personal information shall be
penalized by imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not
less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two
million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who process personal
information without the consent of the data subject, or without being authorized under
this Act or any existing law.
(b) The unauthorized processing of personal sensitive information shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Four million pesos
(Php4,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who process personal information
without the consent of the data subject, or without being authorized under this Act or
any existing law.
Section 26. Accessing Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information Due
to Negligence. – (a) Accessing personal information due to negligence shall be penalized
by imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who, due to negligence, provided
access to personal information without being authorized under this Act or any existing
law.
(b) Accessing sensitive personal information due to negligence shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Four million pesos
(Php4,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who, due to negligence, provided
access to personal information without being authorized under this Act or any existing
law.
Section 27. Improper Disposal of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal
Information. – (a) The improper disposal of personal information shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months to two (2) years and a fine of not less than
One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who knowingly or
negligently dispose, discard or abandon the personal information of an individual in an
area accessible to the public or has otherwise placed the personal information of an
individual in its container for trash collection.
b) The improper disposal of sensitive personal information shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than
One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who knowingly or negligently dispose,
discard or abandon the personal information of an individual in an area accessible to the
public or has otherwise placed the personal information of an individual in its container
for trash collection.
Section 28. Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information
for Unauthorized Purposes. – The processing of personal information for unauthorized
purposes shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and six (6)
months to five (5) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be
imposed on persons processing personal information for purposes not authorized by the
data subject, or otherwise authorized under this Act or under existing laws.
The processing of sensitive personal information for unauthorized purposes shall be
penalized by imprisonment ranging from two (2) years to seven (7) years and a fine of
not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two
million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons processing sensitive
personal information for purposes not authorized by the data subject, or otherwise
authorized under this Act or under existing laws.
Section 29. Unauthorized Access or Intentional Breach. – The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who knowingly and unlawfully, or
violating data confidentiality and security data systems, breaks in any way into any
system where personal and sensitive personal information is stored.
Section 30. Concealment of Security Breaches Involving Sensitive Personal
Information. – The penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year and six (6) months to five
(5) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but
not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who,
after having knowledge of a security breach and of the obligation to notify the
Commission pursuant to Section 20(f), intentionally or by omission conceals the fact of
such security breach.
Section 31. Malicious Disclosure. – Any personal information controller or personal
information processor or any of its officials, employees or agents, who, with malice or in
bad faith, discloses unwarranted or false information relative to any personal
information or personal sensitive information obtained by him or her, shall be subject to
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5) years and a fine
of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One
million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
Section 32. Unauthorized Disclosure. – (a) Any personal information controller or
personal information processor or any of its officials, employees or agents, who discloses
to a third party personal information not covered by the immediately preceding section
without the consent of the data subject, shall he subject to imprisonment ranging from
one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
(b) Any personal information controller or personal information processor or any of its
officials, employees or agents, who discloses to a third party sensitive personal
information not covered by the immediately preceding section without the consent of
the data subject, shall be subject to imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to five
(5) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but
not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00).
Section 33. Combination or Series of Acts. – Any combination or series of acts as
defined in Sections 25 to 32 shall make the person subject to imprisonment ranging
from three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine of not less than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00).
Section 34. Extent of Liability. – If the offender is a corporation, partnership or any
juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the responsible officers, as the case
may be, who participated in, or by their gross negligence, allowed the commission of the
crime. If the offender is a juridical person, the court may suspend or revoke any of its
rights under this Act. If the offender is an alien, he or she shall, in addition to the
penalties herein prescribed, be deported without further proceedings after serving the
penalties prescribed. If the offender is a public official or employee and lie or she is
found guilty of acts penalized under Sections 27 and 28 of this Act, he or she shall, in
addition to the penalties prescribed herein, suffer perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification from office, as the case may be.
Section 35. Large-Scale. – The maximum penalty in the scale of penalties respectively
provided for the preceding offenses shall be imposed when the personal information of
at least one hundred (100) persons is harmed, affected or involved as the result of the
above mentioned actions.
Section 36. Offense Committed by Public Officer. – When the offender or the person
responsible for the offense is a public officer as defined in the Administrative Code of
the Philippines in the exercise of his or her duties, an accessory penalty consisting in the
disqualification to occupy public office for a term double the term of criminal penalty
imposed shall he applied.
Section 37. Restitution. – Restitution for any aggrieved party shall be governed by the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
CHAPTER IX
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section 38. Interpretation. – Any doubt in the interpretation of any provision of this
Act shall be liberally interpreted in a manner mindful of the rights and interests of the
individual about whom personal information is processed.
Section 39. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). – Within ninety (90) days
from the effectivity of this Act, the Commission shall promulgate the rules and
regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act.
Section 40. Reports and Information. – The Commission shall annually report to the
President and Congress on its activities in carrying out the provisions of this Act. The
Commission shall undertake whatever efforts it may determine to be necessary or
appropriate to inform and educate the public of data privacy, data protection and fair
information rights and responsibilities.
Section 41. Appropriations Clause. – The Commission shall be provided with an
initial appropriation of Twenty million pesos (Php20,000,000.00) to be drawn from the
national government. Appropriations for the succeeding years shall be included in the
General Appropriations Act. It shall likewise receive Ten million pesos
(Php10,000,000.00) per year for five (5) years upon implementation of this Act drawn
from the national government.
Section 42. Transitory Provision. – Existing industries, businesses and offices
affected by the implementation of this Act shall be given one (1) year transitory period
from the effectivity of the IRR or such other period as may be determined by the
Commission, to comply with the requirements of this Act.
In case that the DICT has not yet been created by the time the law takes full force and
effect, the National Privacy Commission shall be attached to the Office of the President.
Section 43. Separability Clause. – If any provision or part hereof is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected shall
remain valid and subsisting.
Section 44. Repealing Clause. – The provision of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9372,
otherwise known as the "Human Security Act of 2007″, is hereby amended. Except as
otherwise expressly provided in this Act, all other laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 45. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

 Sections 25-37