Daf Ditty Yevamot 10: ‫ ֵאין לוֹ מוַֹח ְבׇּקְדֳקדוֹ‬Poor Levi!

Mishnah (MS Add.470.1)

The text of the Mishnah describes the first written account of the early Jewish oral
tradition and the earliest significant work of Rabbinic Judaism. It dates from the
period of the second century BCE at a time when persecution of the Jewish
populations gave rise to the fear that the details of the oral traditions dating from
the first five centuries BCE might be lost. As a written authority it is second only
to the Bible text and can be used as a source of authority for making judgements.
The Mishnah is divided into six orders (Shisha Sedarim) and over the next six
centuries, along with further commentaries, came to form the Talmud. A major
part of the text of the Mishnah is written in Hebrew and reflects the debates which
took place in the first and second centuries CE by a group of Rabbinic thinkers
known as the Tannaim. It teaches by drawing on examples of specific judgements
along with debates by notable Rabbis and discusses problems from all areas of
human existence.

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This is one of only three complete manuscripts of the Mishnah and considered to
be 'an outstanding witness of the western type of Mishnaic Hebrew'. 1

1
Of the manuscript, Schiller-Szinessy (vol. ii p. 9) writes: ‘Although this copy can lay claim neither to a very great age, nor to
absolute correctness, we cannot hesitate to pronounce it to be a MS. beyond all prices.’ Edited by W. H. Lowe, ‘The Mishnah on
which the Palestinian Talmud Rests’ (Cambridge, 1883) – although that title can be considered inaccurate given more recent
research on the manuscript. https://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/view/MS-ADD-00470-00001/1

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§ After discussing different interpretations of the relevant verses, the Gemara addresses the details
of the halakhot of the mishna. It first considers the numbers that comprise the structure of the
mishna as a whole. The Sage Levi said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Why does the tanna specifically
teach the cases of fifteen women? Let him teach the cases of sixteen women, including the case
of a rival wife of a forbidden relation. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Judging by his
question, it seems to me that this Sage has no brain in his head.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi proceeded to explain the question and the answer himself: What is your
thinking? Is it that the tanna should have included the case of his mother who had been raped
by his father? In the opinion of the Rabbis, a woman raped by one’s father is permitted in marriage
to another of his sons. Consequently, it is possible that she might give birth to a son and later marry

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one of the other sons of the rapist. If her husband subsequently died childless, this woman would
come before the brother of the deceased for levirate marriage, who is in this case her son. If so,
there are in fact sixteen women with whom relations are forbidden.

However, continued Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, this is incorrect, as the case of his mother raped by
his father is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. According to Rabbi
Yehuda, a woman raped by one’s father could never come before him for levirate marriage, as it
is prohibited for her to marry his brothers. And the tanna of this mishna does not deal with
disputed cases. The mishna enumerates only those cases that are accepted by all opinions, not
those that are a matter of dispute.

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The Gemara comments: Nevertheless, despite Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s criticism, Levi
established this additional possibility of a woman raped by one’s father in his mishnayot.

As Levi taught in his baraita: With regard to the case of his mother, at times she exempts her
rival wife, and at other times she does not exempt her rival wife. How so? If his mother was
married to his father and after his father’s death she illicitly married her son’s paternal
brother, who then died, this is a case of: His mother who does not exempt her rival wife.

The reason is that her marriage to his brother does not take effect at all, as it was forbidden on pain
of karet. Since this marriage never occurred, only the other wife, the so-called rival wife, is
considered a wife of the brother, and she may enter into levirate marriage.

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If, however, his mother was a woman who was raped by his father and subsequently married
his paternal brother, and the brother died, this is a case of his mother who exempts her rival
wife. According to the opinion of the Rabbis this marriage is permitted, and even according to the
opinion of Rabbi Yehuda the marriage is valid despite the transgression. Consequently, both the
mother and her rival wife come before the son for levirate marriage. Since the mother is a forbidden
relation to him, her rival wife is exempt as well.

And although the Sages taught in the mishna: Fifteen women, we must add a sixteenth case,
for example, the situation described above. Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: According
to the opinion of Levi, who said that the mishna teaches even cases of: What if, which involve a
transgression, let the mishna also teach the case of one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama
and went back and betrothed her, and then died childless.

His betrothal is a transgression, as after ḥalitza the yevama is permanently forbidden to him. As,
in this case, since she is forbidden to all the brothers, due to the ḥalitza performed by the deceased
yavam, her rival wife is also forbidden. This is an additional case of a woman who exempts her
rival wife.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: This example is not cited because the case does not include
the possibility of a rival wife of a rival wife.

All of the other cases listed in the mishna involve both rival wives and rival wives of rival wives.
Here, however, this is impossible, as the same prohibition applies equally to all of the brothers,
and therefore none of them may marry her.

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Summary

After Chalitza2

Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan argue about some specific questions regarding chalitza. In
ordinary circumstances, a man is not allowed to marry his ex-wife's sister - his sister-in-
law. However, under the special circumstances when the woman's husband has died childless, she
is allowed to her brother-in-law in marriage. If that marriage is unwanted, the couple performs the
ritual of chalitza.

What happens when they change their minds? Rabbi Yochanan believes that all brothers are
equally allowed or prohibited from marrying this woman after chalitza. Reish Lakish, however,

2
http://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/10/

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believes that all brothers are subject to karet if they marry their sister-in-law following
chalitza. The yibum, however, is subject to a less serious consequence.

The concept of yibum is difficult, as it challenges the Torah prohibition against marrying one's
close relative. One rabbi believes that yibum erases that prohibition, and the other believes that
yibum is an unusual exception that does not affect the general rule.

Again, the rabbis attempt to find their way through this maze through legal fiction alone. There is
no talk of the emotional or psychological effects of their potential interpretations. I wish I had
something novel to say about this; it continues to concern me as I struggle with the text.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:3

Rav Adda Karchina said in front of Rav Kahana, in the name of Rava: Rebbe in fact agrees with
Rabbi Chiya’s rules, but this is what he answered Levi: Regarding the case where one’s mother
was violated by his father will only be in accordance with one of Rabbi Chiya’s rules, but not both.

The Gemora explains: If the father violated two sisters and had two sons; his two other sons
married the two women who were violated by the father, and subsequently, they died childless and
the two sisters fall for yibum to their sons – the statement of ‘each one of the women is a sister to
a yevamah’ is accurate, but we cannot say that ‘one who is forbidden to one brother will be
permitted to the other brother’ (because they are both prohibited to each of the brothers; one
woman is the mother of the brother and the other woman is his aunt). If the father violated two
women who are unrelated to each other, we can say that ‘one who is forbidden to one brother will
be permitted to the other brother,’ but we cannot say that ‘they are sisters of a yevamah.’

Rav Ashi offers an alternative answer: In truth, Rebbe does not hold of Rabbi Chiya’s rules, and
he maintains that the Mishna does mention cases which are disputed. And what did Rebbe mean
when he said, “It appears to me as if you do not have brains in your head”? This is what he was
saying: Why didn’t you infer from the exact wording of the Mishna that it reflects the opinion of
Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that a man is forbidden from marrying a woman who has been
violated by his father; for the Mishna stated: There are six arayos where a greater stringency applies
than to these (the fifteen arayos mentioned in the first Mishna), because they are married to others
(these arayos cannot be married to the brother either), their co-wives are permitted.

The Mishna lists them: his mother, and his father's wife, and his father's sister, etc. Now, what is
the precise case of the Mishna when it mentions ‘his mother’? It cannot be referring to a case where
she (the mother) was married to his father, for that is the same case as ‘his father’s wife.’ Rather,
it must be referring to the case of a woman who has been violated by his father, and the Mishna
had taught that she does not exempt her co-wife, for they are married to others. The Gemora infers
that they can be married to others, but they are forbidden to the brothers. Who is the Tanna that

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http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Yevamos_10.pdf

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maintains that this logic (that the brothers are prohibited from the woman violated by their father,
even though she is not their mother)?

This is the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who forbids the woman violated by one’s father. Hence,
this case (where one’s mother, a woman violated by his father) is not possible to include in the
Mishna’s listing (of the fifteen women who exempt their co-wives from yibum and chalitzah, for
she cannot be married to any of the brothers, and there will not be a case of a co-wife). Ravina
asked Rav Ashi: Perhaps the Mishna is referring to a case where the brother transgressed and
married the woman who was violated by his father; he then died childless. His widow is then
falling for yibum to her son.

Why didn’t the Mishna include this case? Rav Ashi responded: The Mishna does not want to
discuss a case which can only occur “if” there is an illegal marriage. Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana:
The Mishna can state a case even without the brother marrying his wife illegally. The case is:
Yaakov violated his daughter-in-law, the wife of Reuven and had a son. Reuven dies childless and
his wife falls for yibum to Reuven’s brothers; they cannot perform a yibum with her because she
is their father’s violated woman. And since she is forbidden to him, her co-wife will be forbidden
as well!? Rav Kahana replied: The Mishna does not want to deal with cases that involve a
prohibition.

The Gemora notes: Although Rebbe rebuked Levi’s question, Levi nevertheless included this case
in his collection of braisos, for Levi taught: One's mother sometimes exempts her co-wife and
sometimes she does not exempt her. If his mother, for instance, was lawfully married to his father,
and then she was married to his paternal brother who subsequently died, such a mother does not
exempt her co-wife (for since she was forbidden to him under the penalty of kares, the marriage is
deemed invalid, and she does not fall to yibum at all). If his mother, however, was a woman that
had been violated by his father and was then married to his paternal brother who subsequently
died, such a mother does exempt her co-wife. And though the Sages taught in our Mishna ‘fifteen,’
we must add a case like this as a sixteenth.

Rish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan: According to Levi, who includes in the Mishna cases where
the brother had married his wife illegally, let the Mishna teach the following case: A man
performed a chalitzah with his yevamah and then married her (this is prohibited) and then died
childless. The yevamah will be forbidden to the brothers on account of her being the original
brother’s wife. She is an ervah, subject to the penalty of kares and shall thus exempt her co-wife,
as well.

Rabbi Yochanan answered: This case is not mentioned because this yevamah would not be
included in the case of a co-wife’s co-wife (since she is forbidden to each of the brothers). The
Gemora asks: Why didn’t Rabbi Yochanan answer Rish Lakish the following: The yevamah is
only forbidden to the brothers by a mere negative commandment and thus would be eligible for
chalitzah and yibum?

The Gemora answers: He was answering according to Rish Lakish’s own opinion, and this is what
he was saying to him: According to me, it would be a case of someone forbidden to the brothers
by a mere negative commandment and thus would be eligible for chalitzah and yibum, but

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according to you, who maintains that she is forbidden under penalty of kares, it (the reason the
Mishna doesn’t mention the case0 is because this yevamah would not be included in the case of a
co-wife’s co-wife (since she is forbidden to each of the brothers).

The Gemora presents a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish. It was stated: A man
performed a chalitzah with his yevamah and then married her; Rish Lakish said that he is not liable
for kares for marrying the chalutzah (the one with whom the chalitzah was performed), but the
brothers will be liable to kares for taking her. He (the one who performed the chalitzah) and his
brothers will be liable to kares for taking the co-wife.

Rabbi Yochanan says: Both he and the brothers will not be liable to kares for taking the chalutzah
or her co-wife. What is the reason of Rish Lakish? Scripture stated (regarding someone who
performs chalitzah): That does not build; since he has not built, he must never again build. [This
is a mere negative prohibition, but she is not forbidden to him under the penalty of kares.] He
himself is thus placed under the prohibition of ‘building no more,’ but his brothers remain in the
same position in which they were before (and just as before the chalitzah, she was forbidden to
them under the penalty of kares, on account of being his brother’s wife, that prohibition remains
even after the chalitzah). Furthermore, the prohibition to build no more applies only to herself, her
co-wife, however, remains under the same prohibition as before.

And Rabbi Yochanan? Is it inconceivable that at first chalitzah should be allowed to be performed
by any one of the brothers and with either of the widows of the deceased brother, and that now, he
(the one who performed chalitzah) should be involved in kares (to the other widow, and his
brothers should be subject to kares because they didn’t perform the chalitzah)!?

Rather, he (the one who performed chalitzah) merely acts as agent for the brothers, and she (the
widow who submitted to chalitzah) acts as agent for her co-wife (and both women are forbidden
to all the brothers on account of a mere negative prohibition).

Rabbi Yochanan pointed out to Rish Lakish the following objection: The braisa states: If a yavam
performed chalitzah to his yevamah, and later betrothed her and died, she requires chalitzah from
the surviving brothers. Now, according to me who maintains that the surviving brothers are subject
to the penalty of a mere negative prohibition, one can well understand why she requires chalitzah
from the other brothers. According to you, however, why should she require chalitzah?

Rish lakish responded: Explain then, on the lines of your reasoning, the final clause: If one of the
brothers arose and betrothed her, she does not require anything (and she may marry another man
without even getting a bill of divorce)! Now, if she is forbidden by a mere negative prohibition,
why does she not require anything (the betrothal should be effective, and a bill of divorce should
be required)?

Rav Sheishes replied: The final clause represents the opinion of Rabbi Akiva who holds that a
betrothal with those who are subject thereby to the penalty of a negative prohibition is of no
validity. The Gemora asks: Should it not then have been stated: according to the view of Rabbi
Akiva, she does not require anything? The Gemora notes that this indeed is a difficulty.

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MISSED OPPORTUNITY

The Gemora states: Scripture stated (regarding someone who performs chalitzah): That does not
build; since he has not built, he must never again build. This is, so to speak, ‘a missed opportunity.’

The Chofetz Chaim (quoted in Vertlach) cites the following parable: There was a small city that
was mostly comprised of poor people, but there was one wealthy person who was in the diamond
business. He wouldn’t just go to a wholesaler to buy diamonds; he would travel the world for long
intervals. He knew how to dig, cut, polish, and sell them. He knew it all, everything from A to Z.
On one of his overseas trips home, he put up a letter in the local town square advertising for an
assistant. He needed help with his business and was looking to hire a competent individual. There
were a lot of applicants who wanted the job, the reason being they wanted to be wealthy, like him.
However, none of them liked the travelling schedule. Finally, one man who applied for the job
was accepted.

After a full year on the job watching his superior tend his affairs, this man picked up the business
quite quickly. He could do everything just like the boss. He expanded his boss’s business, opened
new locations, and made the owner even more successful than he already was. He not only became
wealthy himself, but he had also made a name for himself as a diamond expert. He was no longer
an ‘assistant,’ he was now his own established person bringing in plenty of money as well. When
he returned home to the town where he originated from, the other people saw him, and they realized
the missed opportunity they had squandered.

The owner - they weren’t bothered by; he was already established, and he was already a powerful
and wealthy businessman. But the assistant, he was one of them! He was just like them and look
what he became! He himself was successful, wealthy, and well established now. Look at what we
could’ve become! One can grow up with another and have all the same qualities and attributes,
only to later watch him grow and prosper to become something great.

Only then will a person realize and see the opportunity that they too had, to become a great person,
and yet, they wasted it away. Friends and classmates that rise through the ranks, be it in Torah or
in any other matter, when a person looks back and says, “We were equal; he was no better than
me, look what I could have been had I not wasted and passed up the opportunity back then.”

Only then will a person realize what he could have become. Let’s not wait for that to happen; each
of us should open our eyes and look for the opportunities that are knocking at our doors on a daily
basis.

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 THE STATUS OF THE WIVES AFTER ONE OF THEM PERFORMS
CHALITZAH

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:4

The Gemara discusses the status of the surviving brothers and the wives (Tzaros) of the deceased
brother after Chalitzah is performed by one of the brothers with one of the Tzaros. Reish Lakish
maintains that all of the brothers are prohibited to all of the Tzaros with an Isur Kares (the Isur of
"Eshes Ach"), with the exception of the brother and the woman who did Chalitzah, who are
prohibited to each other only with a Lav (the Isur of "Lo Yivneh"). Rebbi Yochanan maintains that
they are all prohibited to each other with only a Lav and not with Kares.

The Gemara explains Rebbi Yochanan's reasoning. It does not make sense that one brother (the
one who did Chalitzah) should be prohibited to the woman with only a Lav while the other brothers
are prohibited to her with an Isur Kares, since they were all equally entitled to do Chalitzah. Rather,
the brother who did Chalitzah acted as a Shali'ach on behalf of all the other brothers, and the
woman who did Chalitzah acted as a Shali'ach on behalf of all the Tzaros.

It is clear that Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the Isur Kares of "Eshes Ach" disappears completely
in a situation of Yibum, when one brother dies, and his wives fall to Yibum (or Chalitzah) to the
other brothers. According to Rebbi Yochanan, at exactly what point does the Isur Kares of "Eshes
Ach" of all the wives disappear? Is it removed as soon as the brother dies or only when a surviving
brother performs Chalitzah? The words of the Gemara provide apparently conflicting implications.

The first part of Rebbi Yochanan's reasoning (that the Isur Kares should be removed from all of
the brothers because initially any one of them could do Chalitzah or Yibum) implies that even
before any brother performs Chalitzah, the Isur Kares is removed. On the other hand, the second
part of his reasoning (that the Yavam and Yevamah who perform Chalitzah (or Yibum) act as
Shelichim for the others) implies that it is the act of Chalitzah which removes the Isur Kares, and
until that act is done the Isur remains in force.

(a) TOSFOS (10b, DH Ihu) implies that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" remains in force until
Chalitzah is performed, at which time the act of Chalitzah removes the prohibition. Rebbi
Yochanan -- who says that when the wife falls to Yibum any brother may perform Chalitzah --
does not mean that there is no prohibition of "Eshes Ach," but rather that it is logical that the Torah
would not give a Mitzvah to the brothers from which they could excuse themselves and pass on to
another brother. Rather, the brothers never actually remove themselves from the obligation.
Whichever brother performs Chalitzah (or Yibum) does so on behalf of all of the other brothers.
This also seems to be the opinion of RASHI (52a, DH Nasan), who calls the Yevamah an "Eshes
Ach" even during the period of Zikah.

4
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/yevamos/insites/ye-dt-010.htm

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Support for this approach may be adduced from the opinion of Aba Shaul (39b). Aba Shaul
disagrees with the Rabanan and maintains that performing Chalitzah is preferable over performing
Yibum, because one who performs Yibum with impure intentions "is considered as though he lives
with an Ervah, and the child is virtually a Mamzer." If the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed
at the time the woman falls to Yibum and before Yibum is done, there should be no prohibition of
Ervah whatsoever and no reason to say that the child is close to being a Mamzer.

(b) However, the RASHBA (41a, end of DH Shomeres Yavam) writes that Rebbi Yochanan's
statement, "If this [brother] wants to do Chalitzah, then he may do it, and if this one wants to do
Chalitzah, then he may do it," implies that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" actually falls away as
soon as the brothers become permitted to perform Yibum.

According to the Rashba, why does Rebbi Yochanan add that the brother acts as a Shali'ach on
behalf of the other brothers? Even if he does not perform Chalitzah or Yibum on their behalf, the
prohibition of "Eshes Ach" has already been removed from them!

Moreover, how does the Rashba understand the opinion of Reish Lakish who says that all of the
other brothers are prohibited to the woman with an Isur Kares when one brother performs Yibum
with her? The Rashba cannot explain that the Isur Kares falls away and then returns to the other
brothers when one brother performs Yibum, because the Rashba himself asserts that once the
prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed it cannot return.

The Acharonim offer two approaches to answer these questions. The simple approach is that the
reason why Rebbi Yochanan says that one brother acts as a Shali'ach for the others is not to explain
why the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed (because it is not removed when the brother
performs Yibum, but earlier, at the time the woman falls to Yibum). Rather, when Rebbi Yochanan
says that one brother acts as a Shali'ach for the others his intent is to explain why the prohibition
of "Lo Yivneh" takes effect for the other brothers.

Although the verse implies that the prohibition of "Lo Yivneh" applies only to the brother who
performed Chalitzah (and prohibits him from attempting to "rebuild" his brother's family), Rebbi
Yochanan says that the prohibition of "Lo Yivneh" applies to all of the brothers (and Tzaros)
because of the Shelichus. (This approach is difficult to read into the words of the Gemara.)

How does the Rashba understand the opinion of Reish Lakish? The Rashba apparently understands
that Reish Lakish indeed maintains that the prohibition of "Eshes Ish" could return even if it was
removed at the time the Yevamah fell to Yibum. Therefore, when one brother performs Chalitzah
or Yibum, the prohibition returns to the other brothers. (This also appears to be the intention of the
Rashba to 44a, DH v'Nachlotz, as printed in the Mosad ha'Rav Kook edition.)

A second approach is suggested by RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN Hy'd in KOVETZ

HE'OROS (4:9 and 1:7). From various sources it seems that when one brother performs Yibum
or Chalitzah, his act determines retroactively that the other brothers were not involved with the
Zikah at all, and Imrei Moshe, end of #5). Perhaps this is Reish Lakish's intention when he says
that the other brothers are prohibited to the Yevamah with an Isur Kares. Once one brother has
performed Yibum, it becomes determined retroactively that he was the only one who was permitted

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to her. To which brother the Heter applies becomes known only after the Heter is actually utilized
by one of the brothers.

Rebbi Yochanan also agrees that, in theory, the Zikah would be retroactively removed from any
brothers and Tzaros not involved in the Chalitzah. However, he maintains that because of the
Shelichus, they are all considered to be involved in the Zikah even retroactively, and thus the
prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed from all of them. (According to the proposal that Rebbi
Yochanan agrees that Zikah can be removed retroactively, it is not clear what he tries to prove
from the words, "If this [brother] wants to do Chalitzah, then he may do it." How does Rebbi
Yochanan prove from those words that the Zikah applies retroactively to all of them? Also, the
Rashba clearly states that even when one brother can no longer do Yibum, the Yevamah is still
permitted to him. This is contrary to the logic which Rav Elchanan applies to Reish Lakish's
opinion.)

Another problem with the opinion of the Rashba is why the Gemara needs a verse to prove that
the brother may remarry the Yevamah (with whom Yibum has been performed) after he divorced
her (8b). His allowance to remarry her should be obvious if the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" can
never return to the Yavam. Perhaps the Rashba maintains that it is only after the above verse is
expounded that the Gemara understands that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed
permanently once the Yevamah falls to Yibum.

Another possible explanation is that the Rashba accedes that after Yibum (or Chalitzah) is
performed, the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" can return. Since the prohibition can return, a verse is
necessary to teach that the Yavam may remarry the Yevamah (with whom Yibum was performed)
after he divorced her. If this indeed is the view of the Rashba, it also explains why Reish Lakish
can posit that the brothers become prohibited to the Yevamah with an Isur Kares, and why Rebbi
Yochanan needs to introduce the concept of Shelichus.

As for how the Rashba adduces support for his opinion from the Gemara, perhaps he merely
intends to show that there is a logical reason to assume that once the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is
removed, it remains permitted as long as possible (until Yibum according to Reish Lakish, and
even after Yibum according to Rebbi Yochanan).

How does the Rashba understand Aba Shaul's statement (that it is better to do Chalitzah than
Yibum because Yibum with impure intentions "is considered as though he lives with an Ervah")?
The Kovetz He'oros explains that either the Rashba discusses only the opinion of the Rabanan, or
he understands that Aba Shaul's statement expresses only a Halachah d'Rabanan and not a
Halachah d'Oraisa.

In conclusion, there is a basic difference in understanding among the Rishonim with regard to
whether the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed at the moment the woman falls to Yibum
(RASHI and TOSFOS) or whether it is removed only at the time of Chalitzah or Yibum
(RASHBA).

This dispute may have other Halachic implications. For example, the Gemara (54a) states that if
the Yavam unknowingly has relations -- before he has performed Yibum -- with his deceased

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brother's wife (for example, he was asleep during the act), no Kinyan takes effect. According to
Rashi and Tosfos, she should become disqualified from eating Terumah since she has had a
forbidden relationship with an Ervah. According to the Rashba, the act was not forbidden at all,
and thus she should remain permitted to eat Terumah and to marry a Kohen.

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:

We have already learned that when a man dies with no children, the Torah commands one of his
surviving brothers to perform yibum (levirate marriage). We also learned that there is an option for
someone who chooses not to perform this mitzvah, as the Torah allows him to
do chalitzah (see Devarim 25:7), a ceremony that releases the woman from her relationship with
this family and allows her to marry anyone that she wants.

What if one of the surviving brothers performs the chalitzah ceremony and then chooses to marry
his late brother’s wife? Does the original prohibition of marrying one’s sister-in-law remain, or
was it removed when the opportunity to marry her through yibum was permissible?

Reish Lakish argues that the punishment of karet – which is the standard punishment for someone
who performs an act of incest or adultery – remains intact for all of the brothers, with the exception
of the one who performed chalitzah. For that brother, only a simple lav remains, for which he
would be liable to receive lashes, but not karet, since the Torah (Devarim 25:9) puts him in the
category of an ish asher lo yivneh et bet achiv – a man who refuses to rebuild his late brother’s
family – and once he has refused, he is forbidden (on the level of a lav) to do so. For the other
brothers the original prohibition – which was much more severe – simply remains.

Rabbi Yochanan rules that the severe punishment of karet no longer exists, neither for the brother
who performed chalitzah, nor any of the others. He argues that the brother who
performed chalitzah did so as the shaliach – acting as an agent – for the other surviving brothers.
Therefore they are all placed in the same situation.

The Rashba explains the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan as being based
on the question of how the mitzvah of yibum is to be perceived. According to Reish Lakish, the
original prohibition of marrying a sister-in-law remains intact, even in a situation of yibum.
Fulfillment of the mitzvah pushes aside the prohibition. Rav Yochanan, on the other hand, views
a yibum situation as one that removes the prohibition entirely.

Even though chalitzah will still be needed to sever the relationship between the widow and the
surviving brothers, there is no longer the potential punishment of karet.

20
The Gemara discusses the dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding a case
where one of the brothers performed chalitza with the yevama, and he then offered her kiddushin.5

Reish Lakish is of the opinion that the brother who gave chalitza is prohibited to marry this woman
due to the rule of ‫ יבנה לא אשר‬- once the opportunity to perform yibum has been dismissed, there
shall no longer be a marriage among the family.

This is only a “regular” ‫ לאו‬, and one who takes her as a wife would be liable for lashes, not kares.
The other brothers, however, are faced with the original restriction not to marry a brother’s wife
when there is no mitzvah to do so, and if they would marry her they would be liable for kares. Reb
Yochanan holds that once chalitza was given and yibum can no longer be done, the prohibition for
any of the brothers to marry the yevama is only based upon the simple ‫ לאו‬of ‫יבנה לא שוב —יבנה לא‬
and no one is liable for kares.

The logic behind the ruling of R’ Yochanan is that we consider the one brother who delivered
chalitza as if he was acting as a representative of the rest of the brothers, and the woman who
accepted the chalitza is seen as acting on the behalf of all the co-wives of the original brother.
Reish Lakish does not agree with our seeing the actions of these two people as representative of
the other family members. Therefore, the punishment of kares remains for them
.

explains that this dispute reveals a fundamental difference

of opinion how to view the process of chalitza and how it functions. Rabbi Yochanan explains that
each brother had a direct responsibility to perform either yibum or chalitza to each of the wives.
When one brother delivers chalitza to one wife, we consider it as if all the brothers gave all the
wives their official release. This is why they all become permitted to marry.

Reish Lakish, however, understands that only the one brother acted on his own and dismissed the
one wife. Why are the co-wives all released to marry? We must say that Reish Lakish holds that
through this act of the one brother, we say ‫ מילתא איגלאי‬that no other brother ever had a
responsibility to fulfill the mitzvah addressed by the one brother, and all remaining co-wives were
never connected with a ‫ זיקה‬.

The mitzvah of the brothers was fulfilled via this one brother and the wife who received chalitza.

5
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Yevamos%20010.pdf

21
It was taught: If one did chalitza to his yevama and then betrothed her, Reish Lakish said that
he is not subject to kares for marrying her, but the brothers are subject to kares etc. And R’
Yochanan said that neither the yavam nor the brothers will be subject to kares for marrying the
chalutza etc.

There was once a woman who lived in a house with her husband and his brother, and a second
brother lived elsewhere.

The married brother died without children and since they lived in an Ashkenazi land (1) one of the
brothers was going to do chalitza. The obvious choice would be for the brother who shares a house
with the widow to do chalitza except that Rema (2) rules that the widow and her husband’s brother
may not live in the same house if they had a relationship (‫ ) בה גס לנו‬because they are considered
like an engaged couple who may not sleep in the same house out of concerns of seclusion. Since
in this case it was not possible for the widow to move to another home the question was which of
the two brothers should do the chalitza.

Rav Yehoshua Heshel of Tornipol (3) suggested that the brother who lived elsewhere should do
the chalitza. One of the reasons he gave for his position is that the prohibition against one of the
brothers cohabiting with the widow is less severe than the prohibition against the one who did the
chalitza cohabiting with the widow. Therefore, if the widow is going to continue to share a house
with one of her husband’s brothers it is preferred that he should not be the one who does the
chalitza.

Teshuvas Bais Ephraim (4) challenges this position from our Gemara. All opinions agree that the
one who did chalitza does not receive kares for cohabiting with the widow and there is a dispute
between Reish Lakish and R’ Yochanan whether the other brothers will receive kares for
cohabiting with the widow. Consequently, it is preferable for the brother who shares a home with
the widow to do the chalitza since it is certain that they will not become subject to kares.

A second reason offered by Teshuvas Bais Ephraim is that it is preferable for the one who may, at
some point in the future, be suspected of wrongdoing to do an act of formally rejecting the widow
rather than another brother.

22
Our daf features the idea that once an opportunity to perform a mitzvah is lost, more often than
not it cannot be made up.

The chasidim of Ger had become accustomed to study intensely and prepare extensively before
davening each day, and the start of the minyanim had slowly shifted later and later. When the Sfas
Emes assumed his role as the Chief Rebbe of Ger, he issued instructions that all prayer services
should commence promptly at the proper halachic times.

One of his chasidim approached the Rebbe, and he appealed to him. "Rebbe!" he cried, "I do not
have the opportunity to inspire and prepare myself for davening anymore, and I no longer feel the
sweetness of the words as I pronounce them. What should I do?"

The Rebbe poignantly answered his well-meaning follower by quoting the Yerushalmi (Yoma
4:5): "Furthermore taught Bar Kappara: If they had added the smallest amount of honey [to the
incense], no one would have been able to withstand its beautiful fragrance." If so, why didn't they,
in fact, add honey to it? It is because the Torah says (Vayikra) "Any meal-offering that you offer
to 2:11 Hashem shall not be prepared leavened, for you shall not cause to go up in smoke from
any leavening or any honey as a fire offering to Hashem."

This teaches us, he explained, that although the outcome may seem desirable, we are never to act
contrary to the halacha. "It is because the Torah says..." When the chasid left, the Rebbe turned to
his attendant and commented. "This man is worried about the lost opportunity to prepare for his
prayers, and he notices the difference. I am sure that he will soon find an answer to his quest.

Unfortunately, there are others who do not even detect that anything has changed, and they do not
feel any loss at all to the quality of their davening."

Rabbi Elliot Goldberg writes:6

Our daf cites a mishnah which we will soon encounter on Yevamot 13:

Six women with whom relations are forbidden are more severe than these enumerated in the
previous mishnah, because they may marry only others and can never be married to any of the
brothers, and therefore their co-wives are permitted.

Unlike the opening mishnah, which lists the 15 categories of women who exempt their co-wives
(and the co-wives of their co-wives) from the obligation to perform yibbum or halitzah, this

6
Myjewishlearning.com

23
mishnah enumerates six categories of women with whom one cannot fulfill these mitzvot, but they
do not exempt their co-wives from the obligation.

One of the six categories included in the second mishnah is a mother. This refers to a case where
a man’s father dies and his mother then marries his paternal half-brother (basically, her step-son).
If the half-brother then dies childless, the woman would naturally fall to the surviving brother for
yibbum. But that’s not possible because the woman is his mother.

The second mishnah comes to teach us that even as the surviving brother is prohibited from
performing yibbum with his own mother, his mother does not exempt her co-wives from the
obligation — he still can and should marry one of them.

As we learned yesterday, the sage Levi does not fully agree with the mishnah:

With regard to the case of his mother, at times she exempts her co-wife, and at other times she
does not exempt her co-wife.

In other words, according to Levi, when a person’s mother falls to him as a potential for levirate
marriage there are times when she exempts her co-wives and times when she does not. As a result,
Levi includes the category of mother not only in the second list, but in the first list as well.

In exploring Levi’s position, the Gemara shares a number of cases in which this might be true,
several of which have disturbing details. For example, the Gemara relates a situation where a man
rapes his daughter-in-law and fathers a son with her. If the daughter-in-law’s husband — and the
rapists’ son — then dies childless, then her own child would be in line for yibbum, since both he
and the deceased are brothers (they have the same father). In such a case, Levi argues that not only
is the woman exempt from yibbum, since she cannot marry her own son, but her co-wives would
be exempt as well.

As a result of all of this, Levi thinks that “mother” should be included as a category not only in the
second mishnah (because there are times when she does not exempt her co-wives, like the case
first case described above), but in the first mishnah as well (because of the second case above,
where she does).

On yesterday’s daf, we saw that Levi’s challenge to the mishnah led to the suggestion that he had
a hole in his head. And although the Gemara does not ultimately adopt his view, today’s
conversation shows that he might, in fact, have a leg to stand on.

24
Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:

Yesterday’s daf (Yevamot 9a) contained an insult said by Rebbi about his student Levi – ‫כמדומה‬
‫לי שאין לו מוח בקדקדו‬, ‘it seems that he has no brain in his head’ – because Rebbi felt that Levi
should have invested more effort in his Talmudic reasoning, and in today’s daf (Yevamot 10a) we
find that the Gemara invests effort to try and understand what, precisely, was Rebbi’s gripe against
his student.

Yet while we can debate the appropriateness and efficacy of such words being said by a teacher to
their student, the reason I wish to mention this insult is to highlight how it has been inverted in the
writings of those like the Ba’al HaTanya (R’ Shnuer Zalman of Liadi, 1745-1812) who explains
in Chapter 17 of the Tanya that love of God, though it often ‘does not glow openly like flaming
coals’, is something felt by all those ‫ – שיש לו מוח בקדקדו‬with a brain in their head.

What this means is that rather than using these words as an insult, he took them, inverted them,
and used them as a complement. He harnessed words that were used to highlight what someone
lacked and used them to highlight what others have. He turned a negative and flipped it to be used
as a positive.

Today is Purim whose theme is ‫ הוּא‬Š‫( ְוַנֲהפוֹ‬Esther 9:1), ie. the turning of the negative into the
positive. And as we know, there are unfortunately times when people say things that are negative
either about Jews in general, or about us as individuals. But the message we can learn from this
interpretation of today’s daf is that we can flip the negative into the positive, we can receive an
insult and turn it into a blessing, we can take a threat and turn it into a victory, and we can be
threatened with danger and turn it into a triumph.

Ephraim Moses Lilian, The Talmud Students (1915)

25
MOSHE KLINE WRITES:7
I am a graduate of St. John's College in Annapolis Md. and Yeshiva University. I studied under
Jacob Klein at St. John's as was influenced by Leo Strauss. Later I studied with Rabbi Leon
Ashkenazi ("Manitou") and received an oral tradition from him. In recent years I have been
mentored by Jacob Milgrom and Mary Douglas.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STRUCTURED MISHNAH8

I want to thank Professor Roth for the opportunity of speaking today. My subject is a new edition
of the Mishnah which I have edited, The Structured Mishnah, or in Hebrew, ‫המשנה כדרכה‬. I will
begin with a disclaimer. This edition is not based on critical analysis of manuscripts. It uses the
Kaufman text as found in Albeck’s edition. It does not utilize parallels from the Tosefta or any
other literature. It does not take a stand on any historical or developmental issues relevant to the
Mishnah. In short, it does not speak to most of the issues that generally concern the scholarly
community. Nevertheless, I have come here to speak with you because I am convinced that The
Structured Mishnah should become a standard edition, accessible to all students and scholars. The
reason why it should become an accepted standard is that it presents the text of the Mishnah as it
was composed.
The Structured Mishnah reflects a new approach to reading the Mishnah. It presents each chapter
of the Mishnah as a tightly woven composition, rather than an agglomeration of laws. This
presentation is based on the discovery of the rules according to which the chapters of Mishnah
were constructed. Identifying the rules made it possible to recreate the literary formats of the
chapters, and consequently, to read the chapters as coherent compositions.
The format in which the Mishnah text is presented in The Structured Mishnah enables the reader
to grasp each chapter as a conceptual unit. The whole chapter appears printed on a single page,
formatted in a manner that emphasizes both its division into components, and the relationships
between its components.
The Structured Mishnah is based on a simple observation which led to a significant discovery
when systematically applied to all the chapters of the Mishnah. The initial observation was that
there often appears to be hierarchical organization within the chapter. Small units of text, similar
in size to mishnayot, are regularly grouped according to key words. These key words often
comprise an opening or closing phrase.
The existence of such groups of linguistically related segments would seem to indicate that the
chapters were divided on more than one level. If so, it might be possible to identify the structures

7
https://chaver.com/Mishnah-
New/Hebrew/Text/Seder%20Nashim/Masechet%20Yevamot/Masechet%20Yevamot%20Perek%201.htm
8
AN ADDRESS TO THE TALMUD FACULTY OF THE JEWISH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF AMERICA MARCH 21,
2005

26
of chapters, and consequently, the rules according to which the chapters were constructed.
Ultimately, it might be possible interpret a chapter as a unit by analyzing its formal structure. A
form of this hypothesis was first tested, to the best of my knowledge, by the Maharal of Prague in
Derech Chaim, his ground-breaking commentary on masechet avot.
The Maharal’s successful experiment was limited to part of a single chapter, the “pairs” section of
the first chapter of avot. The clarity of his findings was an inspiration to try similar experiments
analyzing the Mishnah. Preliminary findings, also in avot, were presented to Professor David
Weiss-Halivni in the early 1980’s. He indicated that while the findings were interesting, they
would be significant only if they applied to the whole of the Mishnah. This challenge inspired the
research that resulted in The Structured Mishnah.
According to Halivni’s challenge, each and every chapter of the Mishnah had to be analyzed in
order to determine whether its internal divisions could be identified. It would then be necessary to
systematize the findings. Certain facts became apparent after analyzing only a few select chapters.
All of the chapters contained at least two levels of internal division. A method was then devised
to layout the chapter in a manner that would indicate these two levels of division according to a
convenient visual key. The chapters were laid out as tables with the major divisions occupying the
rows of the tables and the minor divisions segments of the rows.

The Art of Writing the Oral Tradition

This is an expansion of the Maharal's approach to the pairs structure in the first chapter of Masechet
Avot. It demonstrates how the non-linear structure of the Mishnah contains within it additional
layers of meaning. Below is our first perek of Yevamot using this structured format:

27
28
 9

Patriarch; redactor of the Mishnah; born about 135; died about 220. He was the first of Hillel's
successors to whose name the title of hereditary dignity, "ha-Nasi" (= "the prince"), was added as
a permanent epithet; and accordingly in traditional literature he is usually called "Rabbi Judah ha-
Nasi." In a large portion of such literature, however, and always in the Mishnah, he is simply called
"Rabbi," the master par excellence.

He is occasionally called "Rabbenu" (= "our master"; see Yeb. 45a; Men. 32b; comp. Abbahu's
sentence, Yer. Sanh. 30a). The epithet "ha-Ḳadosh" (= "the holy") was occasionally added to
"Rabbenu." Two of Judah's prominent pupils, Rab and Levi, in speaking of him (Pes. 37b; Shab.
156a), add to the term "Rabbi" the explanatory sentence, "Who is this?" "Rabbenu ha-Ḳadosh"
(Frankel, "Darke ha-Mishnah," p. 191, erroneously considers this as a later gloss). The epithet
"holy" is justified by Judah's singularly moral life (Shab. 118b; Yer. Meg. 74a; Sanh. 29c). It may
have been borrowed from the terminology which was used by the inhabitants of the city of
Sepphoris; for Jose b. Ḥalafta also praises his colleague Meïr as a holy and moral man (Yer. Ber.
5, below; comp. Gen. R. c., where the second term is missing). The epithet "holy" is by no means
analogous to the epithet "divus," used to designate the Roman emperors ("He-Ḥaluẓ," ii. 93). It is
likewise incorrect to interpret (as Levy, "Neuhebr. Wörterb." iv. 255) the sentence of Ḥiyya, a
pupil of the patriarch, in Ket. 103b to mean that the title "holy" was not used after Rabbi's death,
for Ḥiyya intends what is repeated elsewhere in different words (Soṭah, end), namely: "At Rabbi's
death 'humility and the fear of sin' ceased." The three virtues holiness, humility, and the fear of sin
occur in this sequence in the series of virtues enumerated by Phinehas b. Jair (Soṭah ix., end, and
parallel passages).

Birth and Education

According to a statement handed down in Palestine (by Abba b. Kahana, Gen. R. lviii.; Eccl. R. i.
10) and in Babylonia (Ḳid. 72b), Judah I. was born on the same day on which Akiba died a martyr's
death. The place of his birth is not known; nor is it recorded where his father, Simon b. Gamaliel
II., sought refuge with his family during the persecutions under Hadrian. On the restoration of
order in Palestine, Usha became the seat of the academy and of its director; and here Judah spent
his youth. It may be assumed that his father gave him about the same education that he himself

9
https://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/8963-judah-i

29
had received, and that his studies included Greek (Soṭah 49b; comp. Bacher, "Ag. Tan." ii. 325);
indeed, his knowledge of Greek fitted him for intercourse with the Roman authorities. He had a
predilection for this language, saying that the Jews of Palestine who did not speak Hebrew should
consider Greek as the language of the country, while Syriac (Aramaic) had no claim to that
distinction (Soṭah ib.). In Judah's house pure Hebrew seems to have been spoken; and the choice
speech of the "maids of the house of Rabbi" became famous (Meg. 18a; R. H. 26b; Naz. 3a; 'Er.
53a).
Judah devoted himself chiefly to the study of the traditional and of the written law. In his youth he
had close relations with most of the great pupils of Akiba; and as their pupil and in converse with
other prominent men who gathered about his father at Usha and later at Shefar'am, he laid the
foundations of that wide scholarship which enabled him to undertake his life-work, the redaction
of the Mishnah. His teacher at Usha was Judah b. 'Ilai, who was officially employed in the house
of the patriarch as judge in religious and legal questions (Men. 104a; Sheb. 13a). In later years
Judah was wont to tell how when a mere boy he read the roll of Esther at Usha in the presence of
Judah b. 'Ilai (Meg. 20a; Tosef., Meg. ii. 8).

His Teachers

Judah felt especial reverence for Jose b. Ḥalafta, that one of Akiba's pupils who had the most
confidential relations with Simon b. Gamaliel. When, in later years, Judah raised objections to
Jose's opinions, he would say: "We poor ones undertake to attack Jose, though our time compares
with his as the profane with the holy!" (Yer. Giṭ. 48b). Judah hands down a halakah by Jose in Men.
14a. At Meron, in Galilee (called also "Teḳoa'"; see Bacher, l.c. ii. 76), Judah was a pupil of
Simeon b. Yoḥai ("when we studied the Torah with Simeon b. Yoḥai at Teḳoa'"; Tosef., 'Er. viii.
6; Shab. 147b; comp. Yer. Shab. 12c). Judah also speaks of the time when he studied the Torah
with Eleazar b. Shammua' ('Er. 53a; Yeb. 84a; comp. Men. 18a). Judah did not study with Meïr,
evidently in consequence of the conflicts which had separated this famous pupil of Akiba from the
house of the patriarch. He regarded it as great good fortune, however, to have beheld even Meïr's
back, though he was not allowed to look him in the face, as one should regard one's teacher
according to Isa. xxx. 20 ('Er. 13b; Yer. Beẓah 63a, where an anachronistic anecdote is connected
with this saying of Judah's). Nathan the Babylonian, who also took a part in the conflict between
Meïr and the patriarch, was another of Judah's teachers; and Judah confessed that once, in a fit of
youthful ardor, he had failed to treat Nathan with due reverence (B. B. 131a; in different version
Yer. Ket. 29a; B. B. 16a).
In halakic as well as in haggadic tradition Judah's opinion is often opposed to Nathan's. In the
tradition of the Palestinian schools (Yer. Shab. 12c; Yer. Pes. 37b) Judah b. Ḳorshai, the halakic
specialist mentioned as assistant to Simon b. Gamaliel (Hor. 13b), is designated as Judah's real
teacher. Jacob b. Ḥanina is also mentioned as one of Judah's teachers and is said to have asked him
to repeat halakic sentences (Sifre, Deut. 306).
The R. Jacob whose patronymic is not given and in whose name Judah quotes halakic sentences is
identical with one of these two tannaim (Giṭ. 14b; comp. Tosef., 'Ab. Zarah, v. 4). In an
enumeration of Judah's teachers his father, Simon b. Gamaliel, must not be omitted (B. M. 85b).
In the halakic tradition the view of the son is often opposed to that of the father, the latter generally
advocating the less rigorous application (see Frankel, l.c. p. 184). Judah himself says ('Er. 32a):

30
"My opinion seems to me more correct than that of my father"; and he then proceeds to give his
reasons.
Humility was a virtue ascribed to Judah, and he admired it greatly in his father, who openly
recognized Simeon b. Yoḥai's superiority, thus displaying the same modesty as the Bene Bathyra
when they gave way to Hillel, and as Jonathan when he voluntarily gave precedence to his friend
David (B. M. 84b, 85a).

His Academy at Bet She'arim

Nothing is known regarding the time when Judah succeeded his father as leader of the Palestinian
Jews. According to a tradition (Mishnah Soṭah, end), the country at the time of Simon b. Gamaliel's
death not only was devastated by a plague of locusts but suffered many other hardships. It was for
this reason, it may be assumed, that Judah, on beginning his public activity, transferred the seat of
the patriarchate and of the academy to another place in Galilee, namely, Bet She'arim. Here he
officiated for a long time.
During the last seventeen years of his life he lived at Sepphoris, which place ill health had induced
him to select on account of its high altitude and pure air (Yer. Kil. 32b; Gen. R. xcvi.; Ket. 103b).
But it is with Bet She'arim that the memory of his activity as director of the academy and chief
judge is principally associated: "To Bet She'arim must one go in order to obtain Rabbi's decision
in legal matters," says a tradition concerning the various seats of the directors of the
academies (Sanh. 32b).
The chronology of Judah's activity is based entirely on assumption. The year of his death is
deduced from the statement that his pupil Rab left Palestine for good not long before Judah's death,
in 530 of the Seleucidan era (hence 219; see "R. E. J." xliv. 45-61). He assumed the office of
patriarch during the reign of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus (c. 165). Hence Judah, having
been born about 135, became patriarch at the age of thirty, and died at the age of about eighty-five.

31
His Patriarchate

It is difficult to harmonize the many anecdotes, found in Talmudic and midrashic literature,
relatingto Judah's intercourse with an emperor named Antoninus (see Jew. Encyc. i. 656) with the
accounts of the various bearers of that name; and they therefore cannot be used in a historic account
of Judah's life and activity.

However, as Marcus Aurelius visited Palestine in 175, and Septimius Severus in 200, there is a
historical basis for the statement that Judah came into personal relations with some one of the
Antonines; the statement being supported by the anecdotes, although they may report more fiction
than truth. In many of these narratives references to the emperor apply really to the imperial
representatives in Palestine.
The assumption that not Judah I., but his grandson, Judah II., is the patriarch of the Antonine
anecdotes (so Graetz) seems untenable in view of the general impression made by the personality
of the patriarch; the tradition doubtless refers to Judah I.
The splendor surrounding Judah's position, a splendor such as no other incumbent of the same
office enjoyed, was evidently due to the favor of the Roman rulers. Although the Palestinian Jews
had to contend with serious difficulties, and were persecuted during the patriarch's tenure of office,
covering more than fifty years, yet it was on the whole a period of peace and one favorable to the
activity of the academy. Judah I., who united in himself all the qualifications for internal and
external authority, was naturally the chief personage of this period, which was destined, in virtue
of its importance, to close the epoch of the Tannaim, and to inaugurate definitely with Judah I.'s
life-work the epoch of the Amoraim. Judah's importance, which gave its distinctive impress to this
period, was characterized at an early date by the saying that since the time of Moses the Torah and
greatness, i.e., knowledge and rank, were united in no one to the same extent as in Judah I. (Giṭ.
59a; Sanh. 36a).

32
It is a curious fact, explainable by the nature of the sources, that only scattered data concerning
Judah's official activity are to be found. These data refer to: the ordination of his pupils (Sanh. 5a,
b); the recommendation of pupils for communal offices (Yeb. 105a; Yer. Yeb. 13a); orders relating
to the announcement of the new moon (Yer. R. H. 58a, above); amelioration of the law relating to
the Sabbatical year (Sheb. vi. 4; Yer. Sheb. 37a; comp. Ḥul. 7a, b), and to decrees relating to tithes
in the pagan frontier districts of Palestine (Yer. Dem. 22c; Ḥul. 6b). The last-named he was obliged
to defend against the opposition of the members of the patriarchal family (Ḥul. l.c.). The
ameliorations he intended for the fast of the Ninth of Ab were prevented by the college (Meg. 5b;
Yer. Meg. 70c). Many religious and legal decisions are recorded as having been rendered by Judah
together with his court, the college of scholars (Giṭ. v. 6; Oh. xviii. 9; Tosef., Shab. iv. 16; see
also Yeb. 79b, above; Ḳid. 71a).
The authority of Judah's office was enhanced by his wealth, which is referred to in various
traditions. In Babylon the hyperbolical statement was subsequently made that Rabbi's equerry was
wealthier than King Sapor. The patriarch's house-hold was compared to that of the emperor (Ber.
43a, 57b).
In connection with a sentence by Simeon b. Yoḥai, Simeon b. Menasya praised Judah I. by saying
that he and Lis’ sons united in themselves beauty, power, wealth, wisdom, age, honor, and the
blessings of children (Tosef., Sanh. xi. 8; Baraita Ab. vi. 8). During a famine Judah opened his
granaries and distributed corn among the needy (B. B. 8a). But he denied himself the pleasures
procurable by wealth, saying: "Whoever chooses the delights of this world will be deprived of the
delights of the next world; whoever renounces the former will receive the latter" (Ab. R. N. xxviii.).

His Redaction of the Mishnah

No definite statements regarding the redaction of the Mishnah, in virtue of which Judah became
one of the most important personages of Jewish history, are to be found either in the Mishnah itself

33
or in the remaining voluminous traditional literature. The Mishnah contains many of Judah's own
sentences, which are introduced by the words, "Rabbi says." The work was completed, however,
only after Judah's death, sentences by his son and successor, Gamaliel III., being included also
(Ab. ii. 2-4). But no proofs are required to show that the Mishnah, aside from this final revision,
is Judah's work. Both the Talmuds assume as a matter of course that Judah is the originator of the
Mishnah—"our, Mishnah," as it was called in Babylon—and the author of the explanations and
discussions relating to its sentences. However, the Mishnah, like all the other literary documents
of Jewish tradition, cannot be ascribed to any one author in the general acceptance of that term;
hence Judah is correctly called its redactor, and not its author.
The Halakah, the most important branch of ancient Jewish traditional science, found its
authoritative conclusion in Judah's Mishnah, which is based on the systematic division of the
halakic material as formulated by Akiba; Judah following in his work the arrangement of the
halakot as taught by Meïr, Akiba's foremost pupil (Sanh. 86a). Judah's work in the Mishnah
appears both in what he included and in what he rejected. The mass of tannaitic Halakah sentences
still found in the Tosefta and in the baraitot of both Talmudim shows that Judah had no small task
in selecting the material that he included in his work. Also the formulating of halakic maxims on
controverted points required both his unusual technical knowledge and his undisputed authority;
and the fact that he did not invariably lay down the rule, but always admitted divergent opinions
and traditions both of the pre-Hadrianic time and, more especially, of Akiba's eminent pupils,
evidences his circumspection and his consciousness of the limits imposed upon his authority by
tradition and by its recognized representatives.

Contemporaries and Pupils.

Among Judah's contemporaries in the early years of his activity were Eleazar b. Simeon, Ishmael
b. Jose, Jose b. Judah, and Simeon b. Eleazar, the sons respectively of Simeon b. Yoḥai, Jose b.
Ḥalafta, Judah b. 'Ilai, and Eleazar b. Shammua'; their relations to Judah are discussed in the
articles under their respective names. The followingamong his better-known contemporaries and
pupils may be mentioned: Simon b. Manasseh, Phinehas b. Jair, Eleazar ha-Ḳappara and his son
Bar Ḳappara, the Babylonian Ḥiyya, Simon b. Ḥalafta, and Levi b. Sissi. Among his pupils who
taught as the first generation of Amoraim after his death are: Ḥanina b. Ḥama and Hoshaiah in
Palestine, Rab, and Samuel in Babylon.
Judah's motto (Ab. ii. 1) is divided into three parts. In the first he answers the question, what course
a man should follow in life, with the words: "Let him so act that his deeds will be for his own glory
[i.e., approved by his conscience] and praised by men" (another answer by Judah to the same
question is recorded in Baraita Tamid 28a). In the second part he remarks that the least
commandment should be as rigorously observed as the greatest. In the third he says that the most
effective preventive of sin is the consciousness "that there is above us an eye that sees, an ear that
hears, and a book in which all the deeds of men are recorded." His deep religious feeling appears
in his explanation of certain passages of Scripture-I Sam. xxviii. 15; Amos iv. 13, v. 15; Zeph. ii.
3; Lam. iii. 29; Eccl. xii. 14-which reminded him of the divine judgment and of the uncertainty of
acquittal and made him weep (Yer. Ḥag. 77a; Lev. R. xxvi.; Midr. Shemuel xxiv.).

34
His Character

Judah was, indeed, easily moved to tears. He exclaimed, sobbing, in reference to three different
stories of martyrs whose deaths made them worthy of future life: "One man earns his world in an
hour, while another requires many years" ('Ab. Zarah 10b, 17a, 18a; for a sentence by Judah on
the ranking of the pious in the future world see Sifre, Deut. 47). He began to weep when Elisha b.
Abuya's (Aḥer's) daughters, who were soliciting alms, reminded him of their father's learning (Yer.
Ḥag. 77c; comp. Ḥag. 15b).
And in a legend relating to his meeting with Phinehas b. Jair (Ḥul. 7b) he is represented as tearfully
admiring the pious Phinehas' unswerving steadfastness, protected by a higher power. He was
frequently interrupted by tears when explaining Lam. ii. 2 and illustrating the passage by stories
of the destruction of Jerusalem and of the Temple (Lam. R. ii. 2; comp Yer. Ta'an. 68d). Ḥiyya
found him weeping during his last illness because death was about to deprive him of the
opportunity of studying the Torah and of fulfilling the commandments (Ket. 103b).
The following story shows his delicacy of feeling. He said to a calf, which, while being led to the
slaughtering-block, looked at him with tearful eyes, as if seeking protection: "Go; for thou hast
been created for this purpose!" To this unkind attitude toward the suffering animal he ascribed his
years of illness, which he bore with great resignation.
Once, when his daughter was about to kill a small animal which was in her way, he said to her:
"Let it live, child; for it is written (Ps. cxlv. 9): 'His [the Lord's] tender mercies are over all'" (B.
M. 85a; Gen. R. xxxiii.). His appreciation of animal life appears also in the prayer which he said
when eating meat or eggs (Yer. Ber. 10b): "Blessed be the Lord who has created many souls, in
order to support by them the soul of every living being." When wine seventy years old cured him
of a protracted illness, he prayed: "Blessed be the Lord, who has given His world into the hands
of guardians" ('Ab. Zarah 40b). He privately recited daily the following supplication on finishing
the obligatory prayers (Ber. 6b; comp. Shab. 30b): "May it be Thy will, my God and the God of
my fathers, to protect me against the impudent and against impudence, from bad men and bad
companions, from severe sentences and severe plaintiffs, whether a son of the covenant or not."
In regard to the inclination to sin ("yeẓer ha-ra'") he said: "It is like a person facing punishment on
account of robbery who accuses his traveling companion as an accomplice, since he himself can
no longer escape. This bad inclination reasons in the same way: 'Since I am destined to destruction
in the future world, I will cause man to be destroyed also'" (Ab. R. N. xvi.).
It is not unlikely that Judah was the author of the parable of the blind and the lame with which he
is said to have illustrated in a conversation with Antoninus the judgment of the body and the soul
after death (Mek., Beshallaḥ, Shirah, 2; Sanh. 91a, b; see a similar parable by him in Eccl. R. v.
10). The impulse to sin is the topic of another conversation between Judah and Antoninus (Gen.
R. xxxiv.; Sanh. 91b).
Judah's sentence, "Let thy secret be known only to thyself; and do not tell thy neighbor anything
which thou perceivest may not fitly be listened to" (Ab. R. N. xxviii.), exhorts to self-knowledge
and circumspection. On one occasion, when at a meal his pupils expressed their preference for soft
tongue, he made this an opportunity to say, "May your tongues be soft in your mutual intercourse"
(i.e., "Speak gently without disputing"; Lev. R. xxxiii., beginning). The following sentence shows

35
a deep insight into the social order: "The world needs both the perfumer and the tanner: but happy
he who engages in the fragrant trade; and wo to him who engages in the vile-smelling trade! The
world needs both the male and the female: but happy he who has male children; and wo to him
who has female children "(Pes. 65a; Ḳid. 82b; comp. Gen. R. xxvi.). He praises the value of work
by saying that it protects both from gossip and from need (Ab. R. N., Recension B, xxi.). The
administration of justice has taken its place beside the Decalogue (Ex. xx., xxi.); the order of the
world depends on justice (A. V. "judgment," Prov. xxix. 4); Zion is delivered by justice (Isa. i. 27);
the pious are praised for their justice (Ps. cvi. 3).

Sayings on Study

Judah sums up the experiences of a long life spent in learning and in teaching in the confession,
which also throws light upon his character, "I have learned much from my masters, more from my
colleagues than from my masters, and more from my pupils than from all the others" (Mak. 10a;
Tan., Ta'an. 7a). Judah indicates that one can also learn from a young teacher: "Do not look to the
jug, but to its contents: many a new jug is full of old wine; and many an old jug does not even
contain new wine" (Ab. iv. 20).
He forbade his pupils to study on the public highway (probably in order to put a stop to abuses),
basing his prohibition on his interpretation of Cant. vii. 2(M. Ḳ. 16a, b); and he deduced from
Prov. i. 20 the doctrine, "Whoever studies the Torah in secret will find public renown through his
scholarship" (ib.). He connected with Deut. xi. 12 the question: "Why is it written, 'for whom the
Eternal, thy God, cares'? Does not God care for all countries? The answer is: 'Scripture means to
say that although God seems to care only for the land of Israel, yet for its sake He also cares for
all other countries. God is similarly called the protector of Israel (Ps. cxxi. 6), although He protects
all men (according to Job xii. 10), but only for the sake of Israel'" (Sifre, Deut. 38). According to
Joshua b. Levi, Judah interpreted Jer. xlix. 20 to mean that the Romans, the destroyers of the
Temple, will in time be destroyed by the Persians (Yoma 10a).
In Judah's Bible exegesis those portions may be noted in which he undertakes to harmonize
conflicting Biblical statements. Thus he harmonizes (Mek., Bo, 14) the contradictions between
Gen. xv. 13 ("400 years") and verse 16 of the same chapter ("the fourth generation"); Ex. xx. 16
and Deut. v. 18 (ib. Yitro, Baḥodesh, 8); Num. ix. 23, x. 35 and ib. (Sifre, Num. 84); Deut. xiv. 13
and Lev. xi. 14 (Ḥul. 63b). The contradiction between Gen. i. 25 and verse 24 of that chapter, in
the latter of which passages among the creatures created on the sixth day is included as a fourth
category the "living souls"—a category not included in verse 25—Judah explains by saying that
this expression designates the demons, for whom God did not create bodies because the Sabbath
had come (Gen. R. vii., end).
Noteworthy among the other numerous Scriptural interpretations which have been handed down
in Judah's name are those in which he cleverly introduces etymological explanations, as of the
following: Ex. xix. 8-9 (Shab. 87a); Lev. xxiii. 40 (Suk. 35a); Num. xv. 38 (Sifre, Num. 115); II
Sam. xvii. 27 (Midr. Teh. to Ps. iii. 1); Joel i. 17 (Yer. Peah 20b); Ps. lxviii. 7 (Mek., Bo, 16).

His Death

Judah's death is recorded in a touching account (Yer. Kil. 32b; Ket. 104a; Yer. Ket. 35a; Eccl. R.
vii. 11, ix. 10). No one had the heart to announce the patriarch's demise to the anxious people of

36
Sepphoris, until the clever Bar Ḳappara broke the news in a parable, saying: "The heavenly host
and earth-born men held the tables of the covenant; then the heavenly host was victorious and
seized the tables." Judah's testamentary wishes, which referred to his successor and to his family
as well as to his interment, have likewise been handed down (ib.). In accordance with his express
desire he was buried at Bet She'arim, where he had lived at one time and where he had long since
prepared his tomb (Ket. 103b, below); but, according to the work "Gelilot Ereẓ Yisrael," his tomb
was shown at Sepphoris.

Bibliography:
• Hamburger, R. B. T. ii. 440-450;
• Bacher, Ag. Tan. ii. 454-486;
• Büchler, R. Jehuda, I. und die Städte Palästina's, in J. Q. R. xiii. 683-740;
• Moses Kunitz, Bet Rabbi, Vienna, 1805; and the bibliography to the article Antoninus.

When the Mishnayos were compiled, were they compiled into the
perakim we have today, or were they just compiled into masechtos?
Many times throughout Shas, it seems as if the Perakim are sliced in completely
arbitrary places. To name a few examples:10
In Maseches Shabbos, the halachos of Tzad, trapping, are discussed in 13:5-14:1. It seems odd that
the last Mishnah regarding trapping is attached to the following chapter rather than having all of
the halachos of trapping in the same chapter.
Further on, Muktzeh is discussed in 17:1-18:2. Why not attach those two Mishnayos to chapter
17? The third and final Mishnah in chapter 18 discusses helping animals and women give birth on
Shabbos, and what one may do with the baby afterwards. These prohibitions and permissions,
according to Rashi to Shabbos 128b, relate to the prohibition against doing extra work on Shabbos
and the permission to do whatever is necessary to save a person’s life. These have nothing to do
with Muktzeh, but this Mishnah is the springboard with which the Mishnah justifies the following
chapter being about what acts of Bris Milah may be done on Shabbos. Based on that, it would

10
https://judaism.codidact.com/posts/277640/277641

37
make more sense that it starts chapter 19, rather than conclude chapter 18, which it doesn’t have
anything to do with.
Another example from an entirely different masechta: Rosh HaShanah 1:3-3:1 discusses the
witnesses’ testimony for Rosh Chodesh, and the procedure done once their testimony was
accepted. 3:2 picks up with the halachos of Shofaros, discussed through the end of the masechta.
Why is 3:1 not the end of chapter 2?
For one final example: Bava Metzi’a 7:1-8 talks about someone hired to watch produce. In the
middle of Mishnah 8, the Mishnah switches to talk about general halachos of Shomrim, which it
continues through Mishnah 10 (with a slight tangent in Mishnah 11). In chapter 8, the Mishnayos
continue with halachos of shomrim. Why is the end of chapter 7 not prepended to chapter 8?
There are many more examples I could bring of these types of scenarios. While the order of
Mishnayos within a masechta are in order (Avodah Zarah 7a), can one deduce from such scenarios
as the ones above that the perakim were a later, perhaps arbitrary decision? Especially in light of
the example in Bava Metzi’a, perhaps one could extend this argument to where the Mishnayos
begin and end.
I am not asking for an explanation for these particular cases. I am asking if anyone says explicitly
that the perakim in Mishnayos were a later addition or not. If the answer turns out to be negative,
perhaps I’ll ask that separately.
The 1906 Jewish Encyclopedia answers that the division of the several treatises into chapters as
well as the sequence of these chapters was the work of Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi] himself although
some changes were made over time. See there for full references.
The division of the several treatises into chapters as well as the sequence of these chapters was
the work of Rabbi himself
Letter of Sherira Gaon, l.c. p. 13
The portion discussed each day constituted an independent pereḳ; and this term was, therefore,
applied elsewhere to a single discourse also. Generally speaking, the original division and
sequence of the chapters have been preserved, as appears from various passages of the Talmud
(R. H. 31b; Suk. 22b; Yeb. 9a; Ket. 15a; Niddah 68b; Zeb. 15a).
The names of the chapters taken from the initial letters are likewise old, and some of them are
mentioned even in the Talmud (B. M. 35a; Niddah 48a). In the course of time, however, various
changes were made in the division, sequence, and names of the chapters; thus, for example,
the division of Tamid into seven chapters is not the original one. On other variations in sequence
see Frankel, l.c. pp. 264-265, and on the changes in the names see Berliner in "Ha-Misderonah,"
i. 40b.
See also the Rambam's introduction to the Mishna 15:15 where he writes:

38
 Page from Iggeret Rav Sherira Gaon

Rav Sherira Gaon: The Jews of Babylon

Henry Abramson writes:11

Who, exactly, wrote down the foundational texts of the Oral Torah? Who is responsible for the
compiling of the Talmud? These were some of the questions addressed to Sherira Gaon, the Rosh
Yeshiva of the great city of Pumbedita in Babylon in 987 by a young Rabbi in Tunisia. His famous
response, preserved for over a thousand years, is an impressive survey of the Jewish intellectual
tradition, leading up to the establishment of the greatest Talmudic centers in Jewish history.

11
https://henryabramson.com/2013/10/27/rav-sherira-gaon-the-jews-of-babylon-next-week-saadia-gaon/

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 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v6TYR9fzmr4

Iggeret of Rabbi Sherira Gaon (Hebrew: ‫)אגרת רב שרירא גאון‬, also known as the Letter of Rav
Sherira Gaon, and the Epistle of Rav Sherira Gaon, is a responsum penned in the late 10th
century (987 CE) in the Pumbedita Academy by Sherira Gaon, the Chief Rabbi and scholar of
Babylonian Jewry, to Rabbi Jacob ben Nissim of Kairouan, in which he methodologically details
the development of rabbinic literature, bringing down a chronological list of the Sages of Israel
from the time of the compilation of the Mishnah, to the subsequent rabbinic works
(Tosefta, Sifra, Sifrei, etc.), spanning the period of the Tannaim, Amoraim, Savoraim,
and Geonim under the Babylonian Exilarchs (Resh Galutha), concluding with his own time.
Therein, Sherira Gaon outlines the development of the Talmud, how it was used,
its hermeneutic principles, and how its lessons are to be applied in daily life whenever one rabbinic
source contradicts another rabbinic source. It is considered one of the classics in Jewish
historiography.

Sherira's letter (henceforth: Iggeret), in its length, takes the form of a short book. In it, Sherrira
endeavored to answer an inquiry from Kairouan about the authorship and composition of
the Mishnah and Talmud, and in particular why earlier authorities are seldom cited by name and
the authorities that are so cited do not seem to be chronologically continuous. Sherira is one of the
first to present a detailed discussion on the Savoraim, including their activity in revising and
finishing the Talmud. The letter he wrote is the chief source for the history of the Talmudic, post-
Talmudic, and geonic periods. Jacob ben Nissim of Kairouan addressed, in the name of his
community, a number of questions of historical interest to Sherira, inquiring especially into the
origin of the Mishnah and the sequence of the redactions, the origin of the Tosefta, and the

40
sequence of the Talmudic, post-Talmudic, and geonic authorities. The reply seeks to clarify the
basic principles upon which the chain of transmission of the Oral Law is founded.
Sherira clearly and lucidly answers all these questions, throwing light upon many obscure passages
of Jewish history. This historical responsum, which is composed half in Aramaic and half in
Hebrew, reveals Sherira as a true chronicler, with all the dryness and accuracy of such a writer,
though his opinions on the princes of the Exile belonging to the branch of Bostanai, as well as on
some of his contemporaries, are not entirely unprejudiced.
As narrator of the history of Halakhah in the course of the first millennium. The literary topoi of
his historical account have some parallels to the Islamic historical genre – the ṭabaqāt. As a
chronicler, he exposes monumental documented information about the rabbis and the Babylonian
communities, especially the Jewish seats of learning (academies) at Sura and Pumpeditha. Sherira
also relates to the persecution under Yazdegerd II. Apparently, he also refers to some mythical
imagery while reconstructing the chronology of the Halakhah as a profound historical picture.
This letter is included in the Ahimaaz Chronicle, but it has also been edited from manuscripts by
B. Goldberg and under the title "Iggeret Rab Sherira Gaon"; also by J. Wallerstein, under the title
"Sherirae Epistola." The best edition of this letter prior to 1900 is that by Adolf Neubauer. The
best modern source for the letter is the edition of B.M. Lewin, in which the French and Spanish
recensions are printed side by side. Most later editions are based on one or other of these.
All dates appended in Sherira's work are according to the Seleucid era counting. Modern
translations of the Iggeret have converted these dates into their corresponding Gregorian
calendar date for easy comprehension.
Another letter by Sherira, also addressed to Jacob ben Nissim of Kairouan, deals with the various
titles given to the Talmudic sages, as "Rabban," "Rabbi," "Rab," and "Mar," and explains why
some sages are simply mentioned by their names, without the addition of any titles.

41
 A street in Kairwan, Tunisia 1899

The Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon: A Point of Departure for the Academic Study

of the Mishnah

The most important early source for the history of the development of rabbinic

literature is the Epistle (Iggeret) of R. Sherira Gaon. What prompted him to

write this history? What periods does it cover, and what were his sources? Was

he really the “father of the modern critical historical” study of rabbinic

literature as many claim, or was he a creative traditionalist narrator defending

the authority of the rabbinic tradition?

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Prof. Rabbi Michael Chernick writes:12

1 The Critical-Historical Study of the Mishnah

The bedrock of rabbinic law is the Mishnah, which was produced in the Galilee around the year
200 CE. It later spawned two Talmuds, the Yerushalmi and Bavli. This corpus established rabbinic
Judaism, which informs all denominations of Judaism. Thus, enlisting academic methods for
understanding the Mishnah is a crucial task that helps us understand how we got to where we are
today.

Currently, the dominant academic mode of Mishnah study could be described as Critical-
Historical. When we speak of the critical-historical examination of Jewish texts, including the
Mishnah, we usually do so in order to differentiate it from more traditional forms of study. Yet,
the term “critical” need not imply a disparaging and fault-finding attitude towards the text. Instead,
“critical” means the consciously analytical study of the text often undertaken from some distance,
as in the phrase “critical thinking.” “Historical” in this context refers to the attempt to reconstruct
the history of how the Mishnah came into being, which forces brought it into being, and what all
this means for understanding the Mishnah’s structure, halakhot, and purpose.

Precedents for the Historical-Critical study of the Mishnah

One may have assumed that such historical-critical approaches to the Mishnah were solely the
domain of modern academicians and not our earlier sages. However, this assumption would not
be entirely correct. Already the amoraim (sages of the second talmudic period, from approximately
220 – 500 CE) were interested in the formation of the Mishnah and the identity of its tannaitic
(sages of the first talmudic period, spanning the first two centuries of the Common Era) author or
authors.[1] Nevertheless, the amoraim did not treat these subjects in a comprehensive and
organized fashion.

The agenda for the historical-critical study of the Mishnah became more established in the post-
Talmudic period of the geonim, who were the heads of the academies in Sura and Pumbeditha
from the very end of 6th century/beginning of 7th century through the early 11th century.

The Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon

In 986/7 CE R. Sherira Gaon (b. circa 906 CE-d.1006 CE) wrote the work that presaged the
historical-critical study of early rabbinic literature, the Epistle (Letter) of R. Sherira Gaon. This
letter was written in response to a request of the Rabbanite community of Kairwan, Tunisia.

The primary objective of the Epistle was to provide a response to challenges in Kairwan from a
group of Jews known as the Karaites, who rejected rabbinic authority. The Epistle’s secondary
objective was to establish the authority of the Babylonian academies as the inheritors of the most

12
https://thegemara.com/article/the-epistle-of-sherira-gaon-a-point-of-departure-for-the-academic-study-of-the-mishnah/

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authentic rabbinic traditions. Communities like Kairwan had developed their own centers of
rabbinic learning and were less dependent on the Babylonian academies for legal decisions and
functionaries, causing them to reduce their financial support of the Babylonian academies
accordingly. R. Sherira sought to convince these communities to rethink their position.

These two objectives find expression in the Epistle’s two major sections. The first section that
deals with the antiquity and authenticity of the rabbinic literary tradition provides Kairwan
Rabbanites with a response to Karaite claims against the authority of practices based on the literary
sources of rabbinic Judaism—the Mishna and the Talmuds. The section that provides a chronology
of the Sages attempts to show how Babylonian Jewish Sages were central to the development of
the traditions followed by rabbinic Jews from antiquity until R. Sherira’a day.

The Kairwan Community’s Questions about the Mishnah

The Epistle’ starting point was a response to the following questions on Mishnah that concerned
the Kairwan community:

• Was the Mishnah an oral or written composition?

• Was it composed at a single time or in stages?

• Did it originate with the Men of the Great Assembly[2] or only with the later tannaim, the
Sages whose names are mentioned most in the Mishnah?
The community also sought information about:

• Why were there disputes in the Mishnah?

• What were the forces that led to the creation of the Mishnah?

• What is the logic of the orders of the mishnaic tractates?

• What is the essential purpose of the Mishnah?

Sherira Gaon’s Reponses

According to the version of the Epistle that is considered most authoritative,[3] R. Sherira told the
Kairwan community that Rabbi Judah the Prince organized the Mishna as an oral composition. He
also wrote that the Mishnah was not put together at one moment in time. Rather, the traditions –
some as old as the earliest period of the Second Temple (sixth century BCE) – were passed down
anonymously from generation to generation. Therefore, there was no need to record the names of
the Sages in connection with these traditions since they were, with notable exceptions, undisputed.

44
Disputes developed only at moments of destruction and upheaval during the period of the Second
Commonwealth, the worst being the Destruction of the Temple (70 CE), followed by the Bar
Kokhba debacle (132-135 CE). At a moment of peace between the Romans and the Jews, R. Judah
the Prince compiled the Mishnah in order to prevent the early traditions from being lost.

Regarding the composition of the mishnaic tractates, R. Sherira states that some of the mishnaic
tractates existed prior to the Mishnah. However, R. Judah added material to these tractates and
ultimately formulated the majority of the tractates with their chapters and individual mishnah units.
R. Judah, however, did not arrange the tractates in any particular order. Rather each teacher of the
Mishnah chose the tractate he wished to teach first and which he wished to teach later.[4]

Finally, R. Sherira posits that the Mishnah’s primary function is to serve as a code of Jewish law
presenting normative halakhah.

2 Sherira Gaon’s Historical Method

In order to form a picture of how the Mishnah came into existence, R. Sherira collected statements
scattered throughout the Talmud, reconstructed a history of the Mishnah, and identified the
primary contributors to its development.

R. Sherira’s historical writing, however, is not “history for history’s sake.” Rather, it is directed
against the Karaites’ claim that the rabbinic tradition, especially the Mishnah, was a recent human
creation without the weight of history or divine authority behind it.

The Antiquity of Rabbinic Tradition

To answer the Karaites’ challenge against the authenticity and antiquity of the rabbinic tradition,
R. Sherira cited the following Talmudic passage:

45
Sherira derives from this source that at the time of Hillel, before the destruction of the Temple, the
rabbinic world already possessed the Written Torah (Scriptures), an existent Mishnah, Talmud,
collections of decided law and non-halakhic teachings, and a host of other rabbinic traditions
including what would later be called the “questions and answers of Abaye and Rava,” who were
fourth generation amoraim. In short, the entire rabbinic tradition existed from ancient times, as
proved by the content of R. Yohanan ben Zakkai’s (first century CE) repertoire.

The Evidence that there were no Disputes

Further, R. Sherira claims that there were no halakhic disputes in the original rabbinic tradition. R.
Sherira documented this by citing the following passage in Mishnah Hagigah 2:2, which describes
a dispute concerning whether the rite of laying one’s hands on the festival offering should take
place on the festival itself:

46
This list of disputants starts with Jose ben Yoezer, whom rabbinic tradition places during the
Maccabean period, marking his death around 160 BCE. According to R. Sherira this indicates that
there were no earlier disputed laws in rabbinic tradition, and only at the time of Jose ben Yoezer
did a dispute develop about this one issue.

Sherira notes that even during the time of Hillel and Shammai only three halakhic matters were
subject to debate, as R. Huna taught, “Shammai and Hillel debated three issues” (Babylonian
Talmud, Shabbat 14b-15a).

Why Are there Disputes in the Mishnah?

According to the Karaites, the presence of disputes in the Mishnah is a clear sign that this work
does not represent the Divine Will. If it did, how could there be debates and contradictions about
what God wanted of His people? R. Sherira’s response again took the form of citing a Talmudic
passage that on its face was a straightforward historical statement:

47
According to R. Sherira, the source of halakhic dispute was the failure of the students of Shammai
and Hillel to learn their masters inherited and undisputed teachings. In addition, the result of the
events of the destruction of the Temple created an environment in which the natural and
uninterrupted transmission of traditional learning could no longer take place. This is not stated
explicitly in the Talmud’s text, rather it is R. Sherira’s reconstruction of the situation based on his
understanding of the chronology of the generations of the Sages.

Sherira’s interpretation of this Talmudic statement made it clear that the Oral Tradition that the
Karaites attacked was not originally filled with disputes and contradictions. Only new situations
to which the principles of the Oral Tradition were applied were subject to debate, and even those
debates were settled by the Supreme Court.

3 Modern Historical Methods in Comparison with R. Sherira Gaon’s

Approach
Today, historians test the historical reliability of their data in two ways: by external and internal
criticism. External criticism requires historians to determine whether the data they are using to
reconstruct history is authentic by comparison to other documents from the same time period. If
the data is a document, historians would initially consider it authentic if its language and writing
style conforms to the language and writing style of the particular period under study. If, however,
the document reports events its hypothetical author could not have known about, the historian
would invalidate the document for the reconstruction of history.

Similarly, if the document’s author fails to report a major event about which he should have known,
the historian becomes suspicious about the document’s worth as historical evidence. Finally, if the
document is contradicted by other contemporaneous documents, the historian must decide which
document is most accurate. And historians are often skeptical of sources that cannot be verified
by any outside source.

Further, contemporary historians want to know if a document was an original or a copy of a

document reporting an event. If it was a copy, its historical value would decrease if one could
detect changes in the copy that was not in the original. If a document is undated and does not
include the name of its author, the historian would have to make a judgment about whether hints
in the document about its origins are sufficient to grant the document historical value. All this
constitutes external criticism.

Internal criticism takes place once a historian considers a source authentic. The fact that data may
be authentic does not automatically make it useful for the reconstruction of history. Historians
would want to know if the report the data provides is accurate. After all, even an eyewitness can
incorrectly interpret an event he has seen. Modern historians would also ask, “Was the person
reporting the event competent, honest, and unbiased?”; “How long after an event happened was it
recorded?”; and “If there were multiple witnesses to the event, does the witness we are relying on
agree with them?”[5]

48
Relying on the Face Value of the Sages’ Statements
Sherira assumes that the Talmud and other rabbinic literatures contain only authentic data, for if
the Sages reported an event, they would have done so accurately. Further, who would suspect the
Sages of dishonesty, incompetence, or bias? Even if an event was reported years after it occurred,
the principle of the reliability of tradition was sufficient for R. Sherira to consider the report
accurate.

The problem with R. Sherira’s approach is that many of his sources were not meant to be historical
data but rather hagiographical praise of a Sage’s knowledge or character. It is true that R. Sherira
used sources that report historical events. R. Sherira however did not subject these sources to any
form of verification. Perhaps he had no further witnesses to the history of the events or rabbinic
literature he writes about.[6] This would have left him unable to verify the accuracy of the reports
he used. Perhaps, however, he considered the Sages the most reliable witnesses to the history of
their own traditions, making any form of verification of their historical statements superfluous.
Nevertheless, without outside witnesses to the accuracy of the Talmud’s historical assertions, we
cannot be sure whether they present facts or idealized reconstructions of the past.

Internal Criticism: The Description of the Judicial System in Temple Times

One of the best examples of the problems generated by not verifying data using all available
sources is R. Jose’s report about how the Jewish judicial system operated in Temple times. R.
Sherira cites the Babylonian Talmud, but certainty about the historical usefulness of this report is
reduced when we see the Tosefta describe the same court system somewhat differently.

49
External Criticism: The Description of the Sanhedrin
Josephus’ historical works and the Gospels present further problems relating to the historicity of
this rabbinic data concerning the Sanhedrin or synedrion (the Greek word meaning “a council,” “a
meeting”). These sources, which unlike rabbinic literature, are contemporaneous with the events
they describe, depict the Sanhedrin and Jewish judiciary in terms completely different from those
of R. Jose. Either we have a contradiction of how the Sanhedrin operated, or perhaps the Sanhedrin
and synedrion may not even be the same institution.

Where does all this conflicting data leave us? Were there several sanhedrins with different
functions, or was the rabbinic description of the Sanhedrin and the judicial system surrounding it
an idealized reconstruction of the past? Or does each of these texts have an agenda, and they are
all untrustworthy? In short, what history can be done with any certainty when this data?

This example highlights some of the problems with R. Sherira’s historiography when evaluated
according to contemporary academic norms. But perhaps a better question is to ask where R.
Sherira Gaon’s methodology and writing met the best criteria of historiography in his time?” To
that question we may answer “Yes”—his methods are typical of pre-modern historical
writing. Thus, we must not use modern criteria to criticize his historiography, nor should we
accept his historical reconstruction as accurately describing the formation of the Mishna.

R. Sherira: A Starting Point for Exploring a Historical Hypotheses

Though R. Sherira may not qualify as a modern historian, the queries raised by the Kairwan
community remain questions that modern studies of the Mishnah, Talmud, and other early rabbinic
literature still try to answer. Though R. Sherira’s answers may not qualify as acceptable
historiography according to today’s standards, it nevertheless remained the starting point for many
subsequent scholarly studies of rabbinic literature.

Even into the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, well-known scholars of rabbinic
literature like B. M. Lewin, J. N. Epstein, Abraham Weiss, and David Weiss-Halivni considered
the Epistle a useful starting point for their historical hypotheses about the formation and history of
rabbinic texts. In this respect, he is an early and important pioneer and seminal figure in the field
of what was to become the modern critical-historical study of the Mishnah and Talmud.

Addendum
Seder Tannaim v’Amoraim
The Epistle of R. Sherira is not the only Gaonmic work that describes the development of early
rabbinic literature. Seder Tannaim v’Amoraim has some overlapping interests. It is divided into
two sections: a chronology of the tannaim, amoraim, and post-amoraic sages called saboraim,
including occasional snippets of biographical and other historical information, and a list of rules
for determining normative halakhah in cases of dispute. Nothing is known of the work’s author,

50
though Simchah Assaf, a 20th century expert on the gaonic era and its literature, dates it to 884-
886 CE on the basis of internal evidence.[7]

Given its contents, Seder Tannaim v’Amoraim appears to be an early example of “Introduction to
the Talmud” literature, especially in the section that provides the rules for deciding normative
halahkah. Unlike R. Sherira’s Epistle it does not use the Talmud to document the chronology of
the Sages it speaks of, but rather it asserts its historical facts, which do not always agree with those
of other chronologies. It is likely that like R. Sherira the author of Seder Tannaim v’Amoraim had
oral and written chronological sources at his disposal.

Seder Tannaim v’Amoraim does not have the same obvious polemical agendas as R. Sherira’s
Epistle. On the surface this should make it a better historical source for the periods of the Mishnah
and Talmud, yet the work is barely consulted. This is because it does not really provide history
beyond a list of death dates and “reigns” of the Talmudic sages and little information about the
development of early rabbinic literature. Therefore, the Epistle emerged as the most important
gaonic source for the history of rabbinic literature because R. Sherira created such a a rich narrative
of how the Mishnah and Talmud came into existence and based his reconstruction on selections
from the Talmud.

Footnotes

1. For one of many examples, see Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 86a: “Any anonymous mishnah (was formulated by) R.

Meir; any anonymous tosefta (was formulated by) R. Nehemiah; any anonymous Sifra passage (was formulated) by R.

Judah; any anonymous Sifre passage (was formulated by) R. Shimeon, and all of these were based on the opinion of R.

Akiba."

2. The Men of the Great Assembly are mentioned in m. Avot 1:1 as a link in the chain of tradition. Traditional scholars

have defended its existence mostly on the basis of m. Avot 1:1-2. Since the nineteenth century scholars specializing in

Second Temple period have raised doubts as to whether such an institution existed at all. Those who grant that there must

have been some governing body during the early Second Temple period believe it may have been popular council quite

different from what the Rabbis describe.

3. There are two recensions of the Epistle, one called the “French” version, the other called the “Spanish” version. The

French version is actually a Damascan manuscript located in France. The “Spanish” version claims that R. Sherira’s view

is the Mishnah was written. The “French” version claims that R. Sherira held the Mishnah to be an oral composition.

Today the “French” version is considered the more authentic statement of R. Sherira’s views.

51
4. R. Sherira acknowledges that the Talmud knows of a specific order of mishnaic tractates but does not offer information

about when this order came into existence.

5. Del Siegle, Educational Research Basics (University of Connecticut, 2015), chapter 22, pp. 549-550.

6. It appears that R. Sherira had sources for the Epistle’s chronology of the amoraic Sages through the period of the geonim.

See Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, Lewin edition, pp 84 and 86, where R. Sherira writes about oral chronological traditions

and on pp. 96 and 98 where he writes of written gaonic chronologies. This is accepted by scholars as early as Abraham

Weiss in his Babylonian Talmud as a Literary Unit (Heb.) (New York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1943),

246-247 and as recent as Robert Brody in his The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish Culture (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp 22-23, and Isaiah Gafni, “On the Talmudic Historiography in the Epistle of R.

Sherira Gaon: Between Tradition and Historiography” (Heb.) Zion 73 (2009), p 272, n 7. It is necessary, as Gafni notes,

to separate R. Sherira’s narrative about how the Mishnah and Talmud came into existence, which is reconstructed based

on Talmudic sources of his own choosing, and the chronological section dealing with the period closer to his life, that

appears to have a firmer historical foundation.

7. Seder Tannaim v’Amoraim, ed. Kahana (Frankfort-am-Main, Hermon, 1935), p 8 discusses a date in the main body of

the text that would equal 884. Another date appears in the critical apparatus that would bring the date to 886/887.

52
 The Geonim of Bablyonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish
Culture by Robert Brody Review

Gidon Rothstein writes:13

13
Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought , Summer 2000, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 90-94

53
54
55
56
57
The use of the term ‫ ֵאין לוֹ מוַֹח ְבׇּק ְדֳקדוֹ‬is used by the Alter rebbe in Tanya below as
an expression that any sentient person realizes the obvious:

Tanya Chapter 17

by Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi

Rabbi Gedalia Potash and William Schecter, MD write:14

14
https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/302170.1?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en

58
And from this it will be understood what is written “the thing (the Torah) is very close to you
in your mouth (speech) and in your heart (the intellect and the emotional attributes), to observe
it (the Laws of the Torah) (actions) (Deuteronomy 30:14).

Apparently, the Teachings of the Torah “in your heart” (contemplation) are in opposition to
our senses (our animal inclinations and urges)

On first glance, it appears that the Torah is not very close so as to divert the heart from the
passions of this world toward the true love of G-d. The Talmud asks: Is fear of G-d a small
matter? And what about love of G-d (because it easier to acquire fear than love).

The Rabbis of the Talmud also said that Tsadikim (Righteous People) have control over the
emotions in their heart. But in terms of action (performance of Mitzvot) only love (of G-d)
leads to the performance of Mitzvot referring to the hidden love contained in the recesses of
the heart (of the Beinoni) that has not been revealed like the flames of a fire.

This thing (love), says the Elter Rebbe, is very close and makes it easy for every person with a
brain in his head (to perform Mitzvot), because his intellect is under his control. He is able to
contemplate all that he desires. And when he contemplates the Greatness of G-d, the
contemplation will seamlessly give birth to the love of G-d leading one to cleave to Him
through the performance of Mitzvot and Torah study. Each person should “observe the
commandments today (now)” (Deuteronomy 7:11) Today refers to the World of Action and
Tomorrow (the World to Come) …. As will be explained elsewhere.

The Intellect controls the Nature with which man is born. These animal emotions and desires
are located in the left side of the heart (contemplation), in his mouth (speech) and in the
organs of the body—the tools necessary for action.

This is true except for the truly wicked person. The Rabbis of the Talmud stated that the
wicked person is governed by the animal soul in the left side of his heart, and he has no
control over his heart (animal emotions). And this is the punishment for the greatness of their
transgressions. The Torah did not speak about these dead people (the wicked) who are called
dead even when they are alive. For truly, it is impossible for Evil people to begin to serve G-
d without having done Tshuvah (Repentance) for their past actions to shatter the Klipot (the
impure layers surrounding their Soul) which act as a separating screen (separating the Divine
from the Profane) and a metal partition separating sons from their Father in Heaven. This
process of Tshuvah requires breaking the heart and embittering the Soul of the Evil Person
through contemplation of his past sins.

Following up on this concept the Elter Rebbe quotes the Zohar: “the Sacrifice (offering) to the
Lord is a broken Soul and a broken heart….” For by way of the broken heart and the broken

59
Soul (spirit), the impurities of the Sitra Achra (literally the other side—referring to the Animal
Soul) acquires the attribute of lower repentance.

At this point we must take a moment to review the Hebrew spelling of Tshuvah (repentance) in
order to understand the point that the Elter Rebbe is making. The word Tshuvah— ‫ תשובה‬means
both repentance and return. If we separate the last Hebrew letter from the word Tshuvah we get:
‫תשוב ה‬. The first word, Tashuv also means return. The letter ‫ ה‬is one way of referring to G-d’s
name without actually uttering it or writing the Tetragram.

Now we can return to the Elter Rebbe’s argument. He says that repentance requires raising the
‫( ה‬a code letter indicating G-d) which has fallen from its position at the end of the word
Tshuvah.

In other words, that true Tshuvah means a return to G-d. This is the secret of the Exile of
the Shekinah (the G-dly Spirit) as the Rabbis of the Talmud said: “They were exiled to Rome
(the height of indulgence in superficial animal lusts in the eyes of the Rabbis of the Talmud). The
Shekinah is with them”.

Meaning if a person does an “action of Rome” (a sin), he lowers not only himself but the
Divine Spark that gives life to his Soul investing him with his Animal Soul from the layer
(klipah containing the Animal Soul) in the left side of his heart guiding him as long as he is Evil
and governing his body and Soul which are conquered and in exile within him. When his
heart and Soul are broken, the impurity and Animal Soul separate from him, and his G-dly
Soul arises from Its fall and stands erect as will be explained elsewhere.

60
61
Rabbi Yosef Wineberg writes:15

With this explanation—that even a fear and love of G-d which remain concealed in one’s mind
and heart suffice to infuse one’s fulfillment of the commandments with vitality, thereby
perfecting and elevating them—we will understand the verse:

:‫וָּבֶזה יוַּבן ַמה ֶשָּׁכּתוּב‬

“For this thing is very near to you, in your mouth and in your heart, that you may do
it.”1

."‫ ְבִּפי{ וִּבְלָבְב{ ַלֲﬠשׂוֹתוֹ‬,‫"ִכּי ָקרוֹב ֵאֶלי{ ַהָדָּבר ְמֹאד‬

The verse states that it is easy for one to fulfill Torah and mitzvot with all three “garments” of the
soul—thought, speech, and action. The words “with your mouth” refer to speech, “with your
heart”—to thought, and “that you may do it” refers to action. In a deeper sense, however, “your
heart” refers not only to the power of thought but also to the heart as the seat of the emotions—
love, fear, and so on. The verse is telling us, then, that it is within easy reach of every Jew to fulfill
the mitzvot with a feeling of awe and love of G-d. Concerning this, the Alter Rebbe poses the
question:

At first glance, [the statement that “this thing is very near to you]…in your heart” seems
contrary to our experience—in our experience, we find that it is no simple feat to acquire
a spirit of love and fear of G-d.

‫ הוּא – "ִבְּלָבְב{" – ֶנֶגד ַהחוּשׁ ֶשָׁלּנוּ‬,‫ְדִּלְכאוֹ ָרה‬

(2Yet the Torah is eternal),3 hence, it could not refer only to Moses’ generation—“a
generation of understanding”—but must hold true for our own age as well.

,[‫] ְוַהתּוֹ ָרה ִהיא ִנְצִחית‬

15
https://www.chabad.org/library/tanya/tanya_cdo/aid/7896/jewish/Chapter-17.htm Kehot Publication Society

62
In our experience, we see that it is not a “very near thing” to change one’s heart from
worldly desires to a sincere love of G-d, for by nature one is inclined toward the former.

,‫ֶשֵׁאין ָקרוֹב ְמֹאד ַהָדָּבר ְלַהֵפּ“ ִלבּוֹ ִמַתֲּאווֹת עוָֹלם ַהֶזּה ְלַאֲהַבת ה' ֶבֱּאֶמת‬

And as is written in The Duties of the Heart,4 “Desires for worldly pleasures are unable to dwell
in the heart together with a love of G-d.” In order to attain a love of G-d, therefore, it is necessary
for one to change his nature from one extreme to the other—by no means an easy matter!

Indeed, commenting on Moses’ statement: “What does G-d ask of you but to fear
Him?” the Talmud queries: “Is fear of heaven a small matter?”5

?"‫ "ָאטוּ ִי ְרָאה ִמיְלָּתא זוַּט ְרִתּי ִהיא‬:‫שָׁכּתוּב ַבְּגָּמ ָרא‬

ֶ ‫וְּכמוֹ‬

This indicates, as the Rebbe points out, that even in Moses’ generation (and surely in subsequent
generations), it was no simple matter to acquire a fear of G-d.

And if this is true of fear of G-d, then how much more so a love of G-d, for fear of G-d is
generally more easily attainable than love of G-d.

.‫ְוָכל ֶשֵׁכּן ַאֲהָבה‬

Moreover, our Sages also said6 that only tzaddikim have control over their hearts—to
arouse a love and fear of G-d whenever they so desire.

."‫ְוַגם ָאְמרוּ ַרבּוֵֹתינוּ־ִזְכרוָֹנם־ִלְב ָרָכה ְדּ"ַצִדּיִקים – ַדּ ְוָקא – ִלָבּם ִבּ ְרשׁוָּתם‬

This latter quotation intensifies the question, as the Rebbe points out. Not only is it not “very near”
to us to achieve a love of G-d, but on the contrary, it is possible only for tzaddikim, who are a
minority. Surely the Torah does not address only tzaddikim; how, then, can it state that a love of
G-d is very near to us, indicating that our heart is in our control, that we can divert it from mundane
desires to a love of G-d?

But the words “that you may do it” refer to a love which merely leads to the fulfillment of
the commandments, although, strictly speaking, it is not an actual love.

63
 ,‫ ָהַאֲהָבה ַהְמִּביָאה ִליֵדי ֲﬠִשַׂיּית ַהִמְּצוֹת ִבְּלָבד‬,‫ ְדּ"ַלֲﬠשׂוֹתוֹ" – רוֶֹצה לוַֹמר‬,‫ֶאָלּא‬

The author thus interprets the words “that you may do it” as a qualification of the earlier phrase
“for this thing is near to you…with your heart.” What is “near to you with your heart” (i.e., what
sort of love is easily attainable)? That love which pertains to action (“that you may do it”).

Thereby, we may also understand the order of the words in the verse. The words “in your mouth
and in your heart, that you may do it” refer to the three “soul-garments” of thought, speech, and
action, as we have observed earlier. However, the order in which they are listed in the verse is
difficult to understand, for it seems to be neither an ascending order (action, speech, thought) nor
a descending order (thought, speech, action). Why is the middle faculty, speech, put first, followed
by thought (“in your heart”), and then action (“that you may do it”)? However, according to the
interpretation of the words “that you may do it” given here, this is readily understood. These words
follow immediately after the words “in your heart,” for they serve to explain and to qualify them:
the love of which the verse speaks here (“in your heart”) is that which leads to action (“that you
may do it”).

This means the hidden desire of the heart; even if it does not burn openly like a flaming
fire, it can still lead one to fulfill the commandments.

,‫ ַגּם ִכּי ֵאיָנהּ ְבִּהְתַגּלּוּת ִלבּוֹ ְכּ ִרְשֵׁפּי ֵאשׁ‬,‫ֶשִׁהיא " ְרעוָּתא ְדִלָבּא" ֶשְׁבַּתֲﬠלוּמוֹת ֵלב‬

This matter of arousing a love which remains hidden in the heart is very easy and very near
to every man who has a brain in his head,

,‫ְוָדָבר ֶזה "ָקרוֹב ְמֹאד" ְוָנֵקל ְלָכל ָאָדם ֲאֶשׁר ֵישׁ לוֹ מוַֹח ְבָּקְדֳקדוֹ‬

for his mind is under his control even if his heart is not, and with it, he can meditate as he
pleases on any subject.

,‫שׁר ַיְחפּוֹץ‬
ֶ ‫ִכּי מוֹחוֹ ִבּ ְרשׁוּתוֹ ְוָיכוֹל ְלִהְתבּוֵֹנן בּוֹ ְכָּכל ֲא‬

If then, he will contemplate with it on the greatness of the Almighty, he will inevitably
generate—in his mind, at least—a love of G-d to cleave to Him through the performance
of His commandments and the study of His Torah.

64
 ‫ ְבּמוֹחוֹ ַﬠל ָכּל ָפּ ִנים – ָהַאֲהָבה ַלה' ְלָדְבָקה בוֹ ְבִּקיּוּם‬,‫ ִמֵמּיָלא יוִֹליד‬,‫ּוְכֶשׁ ִיְּתבּוֵֹנן בּוֹ ִבְּגדוַּלּת ֵאין־סוֹף ָבּרוּ“־הוּא‬

.‫ִמְצוָֹתיו ְותוֹ ָרתוֹ‬

This Torah study and fulfilling the mitzvot constitutes “the whole purpose of man,”7 for it
is written: “I command you these mitzvot, that you do them this day”8—“this day”
referring specifically to this world of physical action.

‫שׂה ַדּ ְוָקא‬
ֶ ‫שׁ"ַהיּוֹם" הוּא עוַֹלם ַהַמֲּﬠ‬
ֶ ,‫ ִכּי – "ַהיּוֹם ַלֲﬠשׂוָֹתם" ְכִּתיב‬,"‫ְו"ֶזה ָכּל ָהָאָדם‬

The Alter Rebbe’s point is that the main objective in the commandment to love G-d lies not in the
love itself but in the practical and wholehearted fulfillment of the commandments that is motivated
by this love, for the main thing in this world is action.

Only “tomorrow” i.e., in the afterlife is the time of reward,9 as is explained elsewhere.

.‫שׁ ִנְּתָבֵּאר ְבָּמקוֹם ַאֵחר‬

ֶ ‫ ְכּמוֹ‬,"'‫"וְּלָמָחר כוּ‬

Hence, the true love of G-d, which is in itself a partial reward for one’s serving Him, is not as
important in this life as the actual performance of the mitzvot, which can be generated even by a
love which remains hidden in the mind and heart. This, then, is the love referred to in the verse,
“For this thing is very near to you, in your mouth and in your heart, that you may do it”—a love
which, though it may not find overt expression in the heart, is yet sufficient to motivate the
performance of the mitzvot and within reach of every Jew.

How does this love motivate one to perform the commandments? This the Alter Rebbe now goes
on to explain:

The mind, by virtue of its inherent nature, is master over the left part of the heart, the seat
of the animal soul, whence come one’s mundane desires and evil thoughts, and over the mouth
and the other bodily organs, which are the instruments of action.

.‫ ְוַﬠל ָכּל ָהֵאָב ִרים ֶשֵׁהם ְכֵּלי ַהַמֲּﬠֶשׂה‬,‫ ְוַﬠל ִפּיו‬,‫ְוַהמּוַֹח – ַשִׁלּיט ְבִּטְבעוֹ ְותוַֹלְדתּוֹ ַﬠל ָחָלל ַהְשָּׂמאִלי ֶשַׁבֵּלּב‬

Hence, by having—in his mind, at least—a love of G-d and a desire to fulfill the mitzvot, one can
utilize the natural mastery of the mind to overcome the desires of his heart and to motivate his

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mouth and other bodily organs to study Torah and fulfill its commandments. We thus see that this
can be done even by one whose heart is not under his control, as is a tzaddik’s.

This is true of everyone except he who is truly wicked—that is, not the beinoni who is
considered “like a rasha” but one who is truly a rasha; in his case, it cannot be said that his mind
is master over his heart.

,‫ִאם ל ֹא ִמי ֶשׁהוּא ָרָשׁע ֶבֱּאֶמת‬

On the contrary, our Sages state6 that the wicked are under the control of their heart, but
their heart is not under their control at all—they are unable to master the desires of their
heart, for their mind has no active control over it.

,‫ ְוֵאין ִלָבּם ִבּ ְרשׁוָּתם ְכָּלל‬,"‫שִׁﬠים ֵהם ִבּ ְרשׁוּת ִלָבּם‬

ָ ‫שׁ"ָה ְר‬
ֶ ‫ְכַּמֲאַמר ַרבּוֵֹתינוּ־ִזְכרוָֹנם־ִלְב ָרָכה‬

This also resolves an apparent contradiction. The statement “tzaddikim have control over their
heart” indicates that anyone of a lesser rank, including a beinoni, is not in control of his heart,
while the statement that only the wicked are “under the control of their heart” implies that anyone
outside the category of rasha—even a beinoni—is in control of his heart. Where, then, does
the beinoni actually stand? The previous discussion of the mastery of mind over heart explains this
point. There are actually not two alternatives—of either being in control of one’s heart or
controlled by it—but three. The tzaddik controls his heart. He can arouse a love of G-d in his
heart, directly, without resorting to his mind as a medium of influence. The rasha, on the other
hand, not only does not control his heart but is controlled by it. The beinoni, although not in control
of his heart, as is a tzaddik, rules his heart by way of his mind, which is under his control. To a
certain extent, then, i.e., as regards the practical effect of his heart on his thought, speech, and
action, the beinoni does in fact control his heart. Therefore, the Alter Rebbe says of the rasha, “his
heart is not under his control at all,” emphasizing that he is unable to influence his heart even by
means of his mind.

The author previously stated that the ability of the mind to master the heart is natural and inherent
in the mind. Why, then, do the wicked (resha’im) lack this capacity? He answers:

This is a punishment for the enormity and potency of their sinfulness.

.‫ְוֶזה עוֶֹנשׁ ַﬠל גּוֶֹדל ְועוֶֹצם ֲﬠוָֹנם‬

66
However, this raises another question: If they have in fact lost the ability to master their heart, how
can it be “very near” to them to observe the mitzvot “with their heart”? In answer, the author states:

The Torah does not speak of the dead, that is, those wicked ones who are considered
dead10 even during their lifetime.11

.‫ ֶשְׁבַּחֵיּיֶהם ְקרוּ ִים ֵמִתים‬,‫ְול ֹא ִדְבּ ָרה תוֹ ָרה ְבֵּמִתים ֵאלּוּ‬

Indeed, it is impossible for the wicked to begin to serve G-d, that is, to observe
the mitzvot out of a feeling of love and fear of G-d, without first repenting for their past

– ‫ ִאי ֶאְפָשׁר ָל ְרָשִׁﬠים ְלַהְתִחיל ַלֲﬠבוֹד ה' ְבִּלי ֶשַׁיֲּﬠשׂוּ ְתּשׁוָּבה ַﬠל ֶהָﬠָבר ְתִּחָלּה‬,‫כִּי ֶבֱּאֶמת‬

in order to shatter the kelipot that were created by their sins, which form a sundering curtain
and an “iron wall” that interposes between them and their Father in Heaven.12

,‫ְלַשֵׁבּר ַהְקִּליפּוֹת ֶשֵׁהם ָמָס“ ַמְבִדּיל וְּמִחיָצה ֶשׁל ַבּ ְרֶזל ַהַמְּפֶסֶקת ֵבּיָנם ַלֲאִביֶהם ֶשַׁבָּשַּׁמ ִים‬

How are these kelipot shattered?—By means of contriteness of heart and bitterness of soul
over one’s sins.

,‫ַﬠל ְיֵדי ְשִׁבי ַרת ִלבּוֹ וְּמ ִרי ַרת ַנְפשׁוֹ ַﬠל ֲחָטָאיו‬

As the Zohar interprets the verse “The sacrifices to the Almighty (Elokim) are a broken
spirit, a broken and contrite heart…”13 to mean that through one’s breaking his heart,
the unclean spirit of the sitra achara (the kelipot) is broken, and this is the sacrifice that we
offer to the Divine Name, Elokim.

‫שַׁﬠל ְיֵדי ֵלב ִנְשָׁבּר – ִנְשָׁבּ ָרה רוַּח‬

ֶ ,"'‫ ֵלב ִנְשָׁבּר ְוגוֹ‬,‫ "ִזְבֵחי ֱא¬ִהים רוַּח ִנְשָׁבּ ָרה‬:‫שָׁכּתוּב ַבֹּזַּהר ַﬠל ָפּסוּק‬
ֶ ‫ְכּמוֹ‬

‫ַהטּוְּמָאה ְדִסְט ָרא ָאֳח ָרא‬

When speaking of the sacrifices and the laws pertaining to them, the Torah mentions only the
Divine Name Havayah (as in the oft-repeated phrase describing the sacrifices: “an appealing

67
fragrance to G-d (Havayah)”). No mention is made of a sacrifice to the Divine Name, Elokim.
What, asks the Zohar, does constitute a sacrifice to that Name? The Zohar interprets the previously
quoted verse as answering this question. “The sacrifice to Elokim is a broken spirit” (i.e., breaking
the spirit of the sitra achara, and this is accomplished by means of) “a broken and contrite heart.”

(14See Zohar on Parashat Pinchas, p. 240, and on Parashat Vayikra, p. 8 and p. 5a, and the
commentary of Rabbi Moshe Zacuto thereon.)

.[‫]ַﬠֵיּין ָשׁם ָפּ ָרַשׁת ִפּי ְנָחס ַדּף ר"מ וָּפ ָרַשׁת ַו ִיְּק ָרא ַדּף ח' ְוַדף ה' ַﬠמּוּד א' וְּבֵפירוּשׁ ָה ַרב ֹמֶשׁה ַזכּוּת ָשׁם‬

Returning now to his original point, that the wicked cannot begin serving G-d with love and fear
before repenting their sins, the Alter Rebbe says:

This is the lower category of repentance, whereby the lower letter hey is raised up from its
fall into the forces of evil, the kelipot.

,‫שָׁנְפָלה ֶאל ַהִחיצוֹ ִנים‬

ֶ ‫ ַלֲהִקיָמהּ ִמ ְנִּפיָלָתהּ‬,‫ ְלַהֲﬠלוֹת ֵה"א ַתָּתָּאה‬,‫ְוִהיא ְבִּחיַנת ְתּשׁוָּבה ַתָּתָּאה‬

Teshuvah (repentance), spelled ‫ְתּשׁוָּבה‬, forms the words “returning the hey”; this implies that
repentance “returns” the hey of the Divine Name, Havayah (yud-hey-vav-hey), to its proper place.
The higher category of teshuvah returns the “higher” (the first) hey to the yud preceding it, while
the lower form of teshuvah returns the “lower” hey to the vav preceding it.
The teshuvah mentioned earlier as a prerequisite for a love and fear of G-d is of the lower category.

This fall of the lower hey of the Divine Name into the kelipot is the mystery of
the Shechinah (the Divine Presence) in exile, as our Sages have said: “When the Jews were
exiled to Edom, the Shechinah went into exile with them.”15

,"‫ "ָגּלוּ ֶלֱאדוֹם – ְשִׁכיָנה ִﬠָמֶּהם‬:‫ ְכַּמֲאַמר ַרבּוֵֹתינוּ־ִזְכרוָֹנם־ִלְב ָרָכה‬,‫ֶשׁהוּא סוֹד ָגּלוּת ַהְשִּׁכיָנה‬

In a spiritual sense, in terms of one’s service to G-d, this statement means that when one acts
like “Edom,” the embodiment of evil, when he sins, he degrades and draws down
to Edom, to the kelipot, the Divine spark which vitalizes his nefesh, ruach,
and neshamah with G-dly, holy life. In this way, the Shechinah within him is drawn into exile.

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 ‫שָׁמה‬
ָ ‫שׁם ְבִּחיַנת ְו ִניצוֹץ ֱא¬הוּת ַהְמַחֶיּה ֶאת ֶנֶפשׁ־רוַּח־ ְנ‬
ָ ‫שׂה ַמֲﬠֵשׂה ֱאדוֹם מוֹ ִריד וַּמְמִשׁי“ ְל‬
ֶ ‫ ְכֶּשָׁאָדם עוֹ‬,‫ְדַּה ְיינוּ‬

,‫ֶשׁלּוֹ‬

What constitutes “exile” in this case is the fact that the Divine spark gives life to his G-dly
soul, which is clothed in the animal soul of kelipah situated in the left part of his heart, and
as long as he remains wicked, the animal soul reigns over him, dominating his “small city,”
his body. Thus, the Divine spark within his G-dly soul is in exile in the kelipah of his animal
soul.

‫ ַהמּוֶֹלֶכת בּוֹ ְבּעוֹדוֹ ָרָשׁע וּמוֶֹשֶׁלת ָבִּﬠיר ְקַטָנּה‬,‫ ֶשְׁבִּלבּוֹ ֶשֶׁבָּחָלל ַהְשָּׂמאִלי‬,‫ַהְמלוָּבִּשׁים בּוֹ ַבֶּנֶּפשׁ ַהַבֲּהִמית ֵמַהְקִּליָפּה‬

,‫ֶשׁלּוֹ‬

The nefesh, ruach, and neshamah are thus held captive in exile under it.

.‫ְוֶנֶפשׁ־רוַּח־ ְנָשָׁמה ְכּבוִּשׁים ַבּגּוָֹלה ֶאְצָלהּ‬

A captive not only lacks the freedom to act as he wishes but is also forced to carry out the wishes
of his captor. The Divine spark within the soul, however, although in exile, is still not in captivity.
It has merely lost its ability to affect the person with its G-dly vitality.

When the heart of the rasha is broken within him and thereby, the spirit of uncleanliness
and of the sitra achara are broken and the forces of evil are dispersed,

– '‫ ְו ִיְתָפּ ְרדוּ כוּ‬,‫ ְו ִנְשְׁבּ ָרה רוַּח ַהטּוְּמָאה ְוִסְט ָרא ָאֳח ָרא‬,‫שׁ ִנְּשָׁבּר ִלבּוֹ ְבִּק ְרבּוֹ‬
ֶ ‫וְּכ‬

then the lower hey of the Divine Name—the Shechinah—rises from its fall and stands
firm, as discussed elsewhere.

:‫שׁ ִנְּתָבֵּאר ְבָּמקוֹם ַאֵחר‬

ֶ ‫ ְכּמוֹ‬,‫ִהיא ָקָמה ִמ ְנִּפיָלָתהּ ְוַגם ִנָצָּבה‬

Only when he repents and thereby frees the Shechinah from exile, allowing the Divine spark
within him to affect his soul and body, may he begin to serve G-d with love and fear.

69
In summary: It is indeed “very near” to us to love and fear G-d, for we are able to create at least
an “intellectual emotion” by means of our mind, which is under our control, even if our heart is
not. However, this does not apply to the rasha, who is a slave to the desires of his animal soul and
must repent before beginning to serve G-d with love and fear.

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