Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues

Debating 21st Century

Nuclear Issues

price and Mackby

Center for Strategic and International Studies

owen c.w. price and jenifer mackby
1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 editors
Tel: (202)887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199
Web: www.csis.org c e n t e r f o r s t r at e g i c a n d i n t e r n at i o n a l s t u d i e s
Debating 21 Century st

Nuclear Issues
owen c.w. price and jenifer mackby
editors

c e n t e r f o r s t r at e g i c a n d i n t e r n at i o n a l s t u d i e s
Wa s h i n g to n , D. C .
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) seeks to advance global
security and prosperity in an era of economic and political transformation by
providing strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmakers. CSIS
serves as a strategic planning partner for the government by conducting research
and analysis and developing policy initiatives that look into the future and antici-
pate change. Our more than 25 programs are organized around three themes:
  Defense and Security Policy—With one of the most comprehensive programs
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fense organization, defense policy, and the defense industrial and technology base.
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  Global Challenges—With programs on demographics and population, energy
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CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein
should be understood to be solely those of the authors.

© 2007 by Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

All rights reserved

ISBN 978-0-89206-499-1

Center for Strategic and International Studies

1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006
Tel: (202) 887-0200  Fax: (202) 775-3199  Web: www.csis.org
Information on the Project on Nuclear Issues may be found at www.csis.org/isp/
poni
 Contents

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms   v

Acknowledgments   ix

Foreword   xi
Ambassador Linton Brooks and Dr. Michael Wheeler

Preface   xiv
Clark Murdock
Introduction   xix

1/ NEW AND EMERGING CHALLENGES TO U.S. SECURITY

POLICY   1
1. Regional Nuclear Powers and U.S. Policy:
A Study in Asymmetries   3
Michael Tkacik
2. Towards a Policy of Nuclear Dissuasion: How Can
Dissuasion Improve U.S. National Security?   29
Jonathan Hagood
3. North Korea and Implications for U.S. National
Security Policy   45
Dennis Shorts
4. Dealing with the Damage: How to Manage
a Nuclear Iran   59
David D. Palkki and Lawrence Rubin
2/ THE STRATEGIES OF OTHER NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES
IN A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT   75
5. Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   77
Richard Weitz
iii
 6. Paper Tiger or Waking Dragon?
Considering Nuclear Change in China   102
Dakota S. Rudesill
7. Nuclear Deterrence: The French Perspective   117
Bruno Tertrais
8. Renewing Trident: Britain’s Nuclear Politics   139
Nick Ritchie and Michael Sulmeyer
9. U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation and
Nuclear Deterrence   157
Eric A. Miller
3/ ISSUES IN OPERATIONALIZING NUCLEAR STRATEGIES   177
10. Strategic Conventional Trident Modification:
Sizing and Structuring the U.S. Stockpile for a
“Minimum Counterforce” Capability   179
Owen C.W. Price
11. Nuclear Deterrence and the American Way of War:
A New Look for the Post-9/11 Era?   203
Lt. Col. (select) George R. Nagy, USAF
12. Nuclear Command and Control in the Twenty-first Century:
Trends, Disparities, and the Impact on Stability   226
Jerome M. Conley
13. Transformation of the Nuclear Weapons Complex: Overcoming
the Legacy of a Sprawling Enterprise   251
Lani Miyoshi Sanders
14. The Nuclear Weapons Production Complex and the Reliable
Replacement Warhead   266
Francis Slakey and Benn Tannenbaum
4/ Nonproliferation in a Nuclear Age   277
15. Beyond the NPT: The Emerging Nonproliferation
Environment   279
Whitney Raas
16. The India Deal and its Implications   298
Mary Beth Nikitin
About the Editors and Authors   311

iv
 abbreviations and acronyms

AAAS American Association for the Advancement

of Science
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile [Treaty]
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AEC Atomic Energy Commission
AF&F Arming, Fusing and Firing System
AP Additional Protocol
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASMP Air-Sol Moyenne Portée—a French air-
breathing missile
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
BWC Biological Weapons Convention
C2 Command and Control
C³I Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CD Conference on Disarmament
CMC Central Military Committee
COAs Courses of Action
CONOPS Concept of Operations
CONUS Continental United States

CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
CTM Conventional Trident Modification —a conventional
warhead for Trident ballistic missiles
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EADS European Aeronautic Defence and Space Co.
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
EU European Union
FMCT Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICI Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Force
IRCG Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp
JDEC Joint Data Exchange Center
JSTPS Joint Strategic Planning Staff
KPA Korean People’s Army
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory
LEP Life Extension Program
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LMJ Laser Mégajoule
LOW Launch on Warning
MAD Mutually Assured Destruction
MD Missile Defense
MDA U.S. Missile Defense Agency
MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
MOD Ministry of Defence
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA Nuclear Command Authority

vi
NDS National Defense Strategy
NFU No First Use
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
NPR Nuclear Posture Review
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG Nuclear Supplier’s Group
NSS National Security Strategy
NWS Nuclear Weapon State
OPLANs Operations Plans
PAL Permissive Action Link
PGS Prompt Global Strike
PRPs Personnel Reliability Programs
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RNEP Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)
RRW Reliable Replacement Warhead
RVSN Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces (Raketniye voiska
strategicheskogo naznacheniya)
SAC Strategic Air Command
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation
SDR Strategic Defence Review
SFIs Significant Findings
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SMF Strategic Missile Forces
SNM Special Nuclear Material
SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty)
SRF Strategic Rocket Forces
SSBN Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSP Stockpile Stewardship Program
TA-55 Technical Area 55 —a plutonium facility at Los Alamos
National Laboratory
TMD Theater Missile defense
TMD AHWG Theater Missile Defense Ad-Hoc Working Group

vii
TNA Tête Nucléaire Aéroportée—a French air-launched
nuclear warhead
TNO Tête nucléaire océanique - a new-generation French
nuclear warhead
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USN United States Navy
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

viii
 Acknowledgments

In Memoriam
Leon Sloss (1926–2006)

The late Leon Sloss, friend and mentor to PONI since its inception,
acted as a senior editor for this book until his death on November
1, 2006. His parting is keenly felt by those whose lives he touched.

T
he editors and authors sincerely thank Dr. Michael Wheeler
and Ambassador Linton Brooks for suggesting and encouraging
the production of this text within the auspices of the Project on
Nuclear Issues (PONI). Strong support was provided by Elaine Bunn,
Frank Miller, Frank Moore, Tom Neary, George Quester, Brad Roberts,
Paul Taylor, Victor Utgoff, and Christopher Williams, who helped shape
the objectives of the book, mentored the authors, and reviewed their
work. Roberta Howard, Divina Jocson, and Camille Sawak are thanked
for shepherding the text through the publishing process, and Dr. Clark
Murdock (director of PONI) is especially commended for giving the edi-
tors and authors both the freedom and support necessary for success.

ix
 foreword

Linton Brooks and Michael Wheeler

I
n the half century between the end of the Second World War and
the collapse of the Soviet empire, nuclear weapons dominated Ameri-
can national security thinking. The prospect of a nuclear confronta-
tion with the Soviet Union influenced American attitudes and actions
throughout the globe. Starting with the early work of Bernard Brodie
and with Albert Wohlstetter’s seminal article “The Delicate Balance of
Terror,” American defense intellectuals developed a complex theory of
nuclear deterrence. American officials spent time wrestling with such
concepts as counterforce and counter value targeting, the importance
of throw-weight, crisis stability, arms race stability, escalation control,
extended deterrence, and, above all, with the difficult question, “how
much is enough?” We argued over differences between deterrence and
warfighting. We worried about maintaining a secure reserve to prevent
global dominance by the Soviet Union after a nuclear exchange. We built
NATO, the most successful peacetime alliance in history, around shared
risks and responsibilities for nuclear operations. To help manage the
nuclear confrontation, we led the way in developing bilateral and mul-
tilateral nuclear arms control regimes. So pervasive was the influence
of nuclear weapons that, for many, the very word “strategic” lost its rich
historic meaning and became simply a synonym for “nuclear.”

Ambassador Linton Brooks was Administrator of the National Nuclear Securi-

ty Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, from 2002 to 2007. Dr. Michael
Wheeler is Director of the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency.
xi
xii   FOREWORD

In hindsight, our theories were somewhat limited. Despite occasional

entreaties to consider the impact of nuclear proliferation on stability,
we largely failed to think strategically about nuclear weapons possessed
by third countries, assuming they would somehow be subsumed in the
US-Soviet confrontation. We paid no meaningful attention to nuclear
terrorism. Although we studied the role of limited nuclear exchanges
within a broad conflict with the Soviet Union, we acted as though nucle-
ar weapons, once used in any fashion, would inevitably lead to a massive
exchange.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, this intellectual legacy quickly
came to be seen as largely irrelevant. Nuclear weapons became, for many,
a thing of the past, like the horse cavalry or the coast artillery—capa-
bilities that once were important but that could now be safely ignored.
Some ignored nuclear policy because they could not see any relevance
for nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. Others saw the de-
mise of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to reduce reliance on weap-
ons they had always considered immoral. But most people didn’t think
about nuclear weapons at all, despite the wake-up call that international
inspectors provided when they revealed the depth of the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program after the First Gulf War. Throughout the 1990s, deci-
sion-makers and defense intellectuals turned their attention elsewhere.
A decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union the nuclear tests by
India and Pakistan in 1998, growing concern about the future direc-
tion of China and the Russian Federation, the recognition that states like
North Korea and Iran were seeking to develop nuclear weapons, and the
threat of nuclear terror in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, com-
bined to make it clear that, no matter what some individuals wished,
nuclear weapons remained very much an important part of the post-
Cold War world. Gradually, beginning with the 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review, the policy community began to re-engage on the subject of nu-
clear weapons. Then came Iraq, which increasingly dominated national
security thinking both inside and outside of government, driving out all
other considerations. As a result, the stark reality is that while the world
has changed dramatically since Christmas 1991 when General Secretary
Gorbachev announced the end of the Soviet Union, nuclear thinking has
not advanced to match those changes. Despite sporadic calls by lonely
voices, there has been no national discussion or debate on this impor-
tant topic outside the very small community of nuclear specialists.
 FOREWORD   xiii

In 2002, when it was still possible to believe that a national dialogue

on the future of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons policy was possi-
ble, a group of Cold War-era nuclear experts met at a dinner sponsored
by Dr. John Hamre, President of the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies. The two of us were present. We had both spent the 1980s
deeply enmeshed in nuclear issues from the different perspectives of
the Navy and the Air Force and of the Joint Staff and the White House.
Like virtually everyone at that dinner, we shared the view that renewed
thinking on nuclear issues was crucial.
As the discussion proceeded, all of us recognized the complete ab-
sence of new participants in the debate. There were infrequent meet-
ings and seminars to discuss nuclear issues, but the participants were,
almost to a person, the same people we would have encountered at simi-
lar gatherings in the mid-1980s. This is a concern for two reasons, one
obvious and one slightly less so. The obvious concern is that the indi-
viduals with experience in developing and articulating nuclear policy
will inevitably be passing from the scene over the coming years and will
need to be replaced. Indeed, one of our good friends present at that first
dinner, Leon Sloss, has since departed. His wisdom and experience was
a national treasure we no longer can reach out to. The less obvious—but
more pressing—concern is that those of us with long experience during
the Cold War were accustomed to thinking of nuclear issues only in
the context of large-scale exchanges with a single superpower adversary.
No matter how flexible and agile we think our minds are, a lifetime of
dealing with one particular view of the nuclear problem may not be the
best preparation for the challenges posed by nuclear weapons in the 21st
century.
The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) grew out of these twin insights.
It was designed to encourage younger scholars, practitioners and sci-
entists to think deeply and carefully about the challenges of what Keith
Payne has called “the second nuclear age.” This book is the result of
some of their thinking. The essays it contains are important for at least
three reasons. First, they are important in themselves. Each deals with a
significant issue where clear thinking backed by sound analysis is cru-
cial. Second, they are important because they illustrate that diversity of
issues with which the United States must grapple in the coming years.
Finally, they are important as an opportunity for new voices to enter the
discussion of nuclear issues. These new voices, like those of the authors
in this volume, will come from national laboratories, think tanks, the
xiv   FOREWORD

academic community, the military, and elsewhere. Unburdened with

the intellectual legacy of the Cold War, they will have a better chance of
gaining the fresh insights we so desperately need.
The United States will face many challenges with regard to nuclear
weapons in the coming decades. It will need to decide whether and how
to modernize our aging nuclear weapons infrastructure. It will need to
decide whether to embrace the opportunities posed by the Reliable Re-
placement Warhead. It will need to decide on what additional reduc-
tions in the stockpile are appropriate and how those reductions relate
to the growing capability of a responsive infrastructure. It will need to
decide the appropriate relationship between offense and defense and be-
tween nuclear and non-nuclear or non-kinetic capabilities. It will need
to improve the linkage between our nuclear weapons policy and our
nonproliferation policy. It will need to face the continuing challenge of
preventing nuclear terrorism. It will need to address deterrence in a 21st
century context.
All of these issues are important. Arguably, however, the most impor-
tant question facing us is gaining and articulating a clearer understand-
ing of the fundamental purpose or purposes of nuclear weapons in the
21st century. The essays in this volume, by helping to illuminate various
aspects of the nuclear challenges we face, will help the United States as it
gropes toward a consensus on these fundamental issues.
War and conflict have been with us as long as the human race has
existed. Plato said that only the dead have seen the end of war. Similarly,
however much we may wish it were otherwise, nuclear weapons and the
challenges they pose will be with us for the foreseeable future. Failing
to meet these challenges could have devastating consequences for the
United States. Sound and diverse thinking on these issues will be cru-
cial. This book is a good step in that direction.
 Preface

Clark Murdock

T
here is little margin for error in nuclear deterrence in times of
crisis. This is no less true for the United States today, with its
asymmetric adversarial relationships with regional states hav-
ing “rogue” regimes than during the Soviet era. Although the U.S.-So-
viet ideological struggle included infamous episodes such as the Cuban
Missile Crisis—where the world held its breath for thirteen days on the
brink of nuclear annihilation—there was a maturity in the relationship,
along with the cold comfort of mutually assured destruction. There is
no such mutual understanding in the relations between the U.S., West-
ern countries and regional actors that have ambitions to acquire WMD.
Potentially ambiguous threats of the use of nuclear weapons have been
reported prior to Operation Desert Storm and through the ongoing
tensions with Iran and North Korea. However, the credibility of such
threats has eroded over time.
Former adversaries retain large nuclear stockpiles. Strategies to deter
the use of WMD and dissuade the modernization or acquisition of these
terrible weapons must now be carefully crafted for the new security en-
vironment. Compounding the problem, transformation of the large
stockpiles of nuclear weapons will take a long time. The U.S. stockpile
continues to reduce its warhead numbers to meet treaty obligations, but
the infrastructure is barely capable of sustaining even a modest stockpile

Clark Murdock is a Senior Adviser at CSIS and Director of the Project on Nuclear
Issues (PONI). Information on PONI may be found at www.csis.org/isp/poni.

xv
xvi   PREFACE

of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads and a reserve stockpile

without modernization and improved efficiencies.
Of more concern is that successive administrations have not been
able to build political consensus or develop a compelling public narra-
tive in order to support a coherent, overarching strategy necessary to
support new deterrence policies, doctrine, required force structures,
weapons, operational plans, the underpinning technologies and mili-
tary industrial complex. Much of this can be attributed to a desire to
reduce the relevance of nuclear weapons in national security strategy
and the resultant lack of attention to them.
In 2002 Donald Winter, then a senior vice president at Northrop
Grumman, and now Secretary of the Navy, Dr. Hamre, former Deputy
Secretary of Defence and now President of CSIS, and, and Amb. Linton
Brooks, then Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Adminis-
tration, concluded that investment in human capital was the most press-
ing issue facing the U.S. nuclear weapons’ community. Further, it is the
nuclear weapons’ policy community that seems to have suffered most
by the benign neglect of the preceding decade. It was seen that many
with an interest in and experience with nuclear matters were retired or
soon retiring and the next generation was absent, whereas the military,
national laboratories, and industry had continued to maintain a level of
recruitment and programmatic effort to provide a foundation of intel-
lectual capability. However, all will face the effects of the retirement of
the baby boom generation over the next few years. Having made this
stark observation, they established the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues
(PONI).
The goals of the project are twofold. First, PONI aims to build and
sustain a networked community of young nuclear experts from the
military, the national laboratories, industry, academia, and the policy
community. Secondly, PONI works to contribute to the debate and lead-
ership on nuclear issues by generating new ideas and discussions among
both its members and the public at large.
From the first conference at USSTRATCOM in November 2003,
PONI members have been considering nuclear weapons-related matters
and presenting their thinking to senior policy makers in the U.S. gov-
ernment. In recognition of the value provided by PONI, sponsors have
institutionalized their support and are committed to continuous fund-
ing. At the third annual PONI conference, held at U.S. Strategic Com-
 PREFACE   xvii

mand (USSTRATCOM), Dr. Mike Wheeler and Ambassador Linton

Brooks challenged the PONI membership to write a “seminal work”—
an edited volume on contemporary nuclear issues. The 16 papers in this
book are the result, having been selected from more than double the
number of prospective authors. They have very much been written from
the fresh perspective that the young PONI membership has brought to
this critical area of policy analysis. True to the PONI model, the authors
have enjoyed unique access to seasoned practitioners in the field from
the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency. This group of senior scholars and former govern-
ment officials has been invaluable in the process of shaping the guiding
themes: U.S. nuclear weapons policy, the drivers, their contribution to
deterrence and the challenges of ownership. They have offered priceless
assistance to the authors through coaching and peer review.
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains one of the most
serious threats to the peace and security of the United States, its allies
and the international community. Nuclear weapons offered a founda-
tion to the relative peace of the Cold War. Since that era the U.S. nuclear
deterrence policy has evolved to meet the new and less certain threats
as part of national security and foreign policy. In addition to the shift
of emphasis from a bipolar world of superpowers to a unipolar world,
where regional tensions dominate the headlines and attention of the
White House, this environment has been confused by the war on ter-
ror and the threat of WMD terrorism. Debating 21st Century Nuclear
Issues deliberately excludes terrorism from its contents, although there
was much interest from PONI members—prospective authors—on the
basis that there is little role for nuclear weapons in deterring WMD ter-
rorism. The one possible exception is state-sponsored WMD terrorism.
Deterrence of such potential state adversaries requires robust attribu-
tion methods and intelligence—which are beyond the scope of this vol-
ume—and a coherent nuclear deterrence policy, posture, force structure,
and infrastructure, which are very much the focus of this book.
In four sections, Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues examines the
threats (states with nuclear weapons and those with clear nuclear ambi-
tions), considers recent developments and perspectives of the other nu-
clear weapon states, analyses U.S. policy and strategies for putting into
operation its nuclear deterrent and looks at the interplay between U.S.
nuclear weapons and broader nuclear policies: civil energy cooperation
and non-proliferation.
xviii   PREFACE

These topics are critical, but sometimes overlooked, aspects of U.S.

security policy. It is clear that the U.S. Congress and administration will
continue to develop and execute strategies to maximize the effectiveness
of the nation’s nuclear forces as part of what the 2006 Quadrennial De-
fense Review Report calls “tailored deterrence.” That document, among
other things, reinforced a policy of de-emphasis of nuclear weapons
within the national security strategy, but this message is not the one
taken by others. The George W. Bush administration has struggled to
articulate an overall strategy that chimes with both the security needs of
the nation and the concerns of Congress. Critics of the current execution
of U.S. nuclear policy have highlighted perceptions of near-peer com-
petitors. Accusations of strategies that seek nuclear, first strike, primacy
over Russia—based on a mischaracterization of intent and incomplete
analysis of the technical capabilities of the U.S. military and its develop-
ment plans—have damaged the already fragile stockpile transformation
plans that seek to move America away from a Cold War nuclear posture.
A decade of relative neglect by successive administrations on nuclear
weapons policy matters has no doubt contributed to this, at precisely
the time when the changes in the international security environment
demand attention to nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence and non-pro-
liferation policy. Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues offers insights into
many of the issues for policy makers, analysts and scholars.
 Introduction

T
hough the threat of international terrorism has become the top
priority of most policy makers, the legacy of the nuclear arms race
leaves many important challenges unresolved. Nuclear stockpile
matters receive little attention from senior members of the U.S. admin-
istration or the U.S. Congress when compared with their centrality in
the second half of the 20th century. Neither stockpile issues nor nuclear
power are likely to be key to political campaigns, however, future ad-
ministrations will continue to grapple with the implications of possess-
ing a nuclear force and the ever changing security environment with
inexorable possibilities of nuclear proliferation.
The authors of Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues are members of
the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) who are in their early to mid-ca-
reer years and who have debated some of the ideas that are presented in
this volume. Interest was solicited from PONI members on topics such
as the security environment, the role of U.S. nuclear weapons, devel-
opments in the other nuclear-weapon states, how the United States is
developing and executing nuclear force policies and how these relate to
nonproliferation. In approaching this generation, it is hoped that a fresh
perspective will be valued by policy makers, and that writing the book
will contribute to the aim of PONI, i.e. the creation of an informed cadre
of young nuclear thinkers from which policy makers of the future can
be drawn.
In part one, Michael Tkacik introduces one of the most vexing chal-
lenges faced by nuclear policy makers and planners: how the asymmet-

xix
xx    INTRODUCTION

rical characteristics of potential regional nuclear adversaries complicate

deterrence of such actors. He addresses the challenges through, among
other things, improved understanding of other cultures. Jonathan Ha-
good, noting the emerging salience and emphasis of nuclear dissuasion
in U.S. security policy, suggests three models that relate dissuasion to
deterrence. In doing so, he offers tools that can aid policy makers and
planners in both the development of security strategies and the com-
munication of policy to the American public and U.S. allies. Written at
a time of daily developments in the Six Party Talks and a tense U.S. re-
lationship with Pyongyang, Dennis Shorts examines the North Korean
example of how possession of nuclear capabilities, by an otherwise weak
state, can limit U.S. options. This is a case study of coercion and nuclear
blackmail by a “maddeningly resilient ‘failed state’ with weapons of mass
destruction” for which he proposes remedies. In contrast to focusing
on rollback strategies, David Palkki and Larry Rubin consider how to
react to a future nuclear Iran. In doing so, they address the possibil-
ity that regional powers may well gain and deploy nuclear arsenals—as
India, Pakistan and Israel have done before—despite coherent and pro-
longed international pressure to exercise restraint and to abandon pro-
grams. Drawing on regional field work, they appraise three multilateral
approaches—regional collective security organizations, missile defense
systems, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)—to determine
how best to mitigate the effects of Iranian nuclear acquisition with the
aim of avoiding secondary proliferation in the region. As a whole, the
authors in part one illustrate the key nuclear deterrence challenges that
the United States faces in the “second nuclear age.”
In part two, Richard Weitz assesses the role, status, and planned de-
velopments of Russian strategic nuclear forces. In doing so, we are re-
minded that although President Bush declared that Russia is no longer
America’s enemy, it remains a significant nuclear power whose relation-
ship with the United States has worsened in the early years of the 21st
century. Against a backdrop of increasing Chinese defense budgets,
Dakota Rudesill looks at China’s nuclear posture and considers the im-
plications of its nuclear modernization. Bruno Tertrais describes the
recent modernization of French nuclear forces and the associated de-
terrence doctrine. He compares and contrasts the French posture with
that of the United States and Britain, seeing some convergence. In their
chapter, Michael Sulmeyer and Nick Ritchie analyze the British deci-
 INTRODUCTION    xxi

sion to replace its first generation Trident submarines and the debate
surrounding this decision. Eric Miller catalogues the fortunes of U.S.-
Russian missile defense cooperation, again recalling how good inten-
tions—born after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
and in the immediate aftermath of 9-11—can be hampered by differing
objectives, cultures and an absence of political support on both sides of
a deteriorating relationship. Together these chapters draw our attention
to the stark reality that the other nuclear weapon states are undertaking
significant and costly modernization of their nuclear forces. In contrast,
the United States has no comparable program and barely possesses the
ability to manufacture nuclear warheads.
The chapters in part three examine the execution of current policy,
the attendant climate, various administration proposals extant at the
time of writing, and new ideas to foster debate. Owen Price suggests
how non-nuclear warhead technology previously developed for the
Prompt Global Strike mission could be integrated with a much reduced
nuclear stockpile, while maintaining deterrence and military effects,
augmenting force and infrastructure modernization centered on the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). George Nagy considers how
the U.S. military views nuclear weapons and how U.S. military culture
has influenced nuclear planning. Jerome Conley describes contempo-
rary nuclear command and control challenges and their implications
for crisis stability and U.S. foreign policy. Lani Miyoshi Sanders sets
out the challenges facing the Unites States in modernizing or otherwise
recapitalizing its nuclear complex. Her chapter highlights the tensions
between programmatic drivers, national policy, and domestic politics
that have colored much of the limited congressional debate over recent
years. Finally, Francis Slakey and Benn Tannenbaum share their analysis
of two potential approaches to maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal for
the long term--the RRW program and Life Extension Programs--and
their effects on the nuclear production complex.
In part four, Whitney Raas reminds us that the U.S. leadership in co-
operative nonproliferation efforts complements U.S. security programs
in general and nuclear deterrence in particular to advance security ob-
jectives and assuage the censure of international critics for any proposed
U.S. modernization, respectively. Her chapter is a timely reminder of the
importance of this issue after many years of relative neglect for things
multilateral. Mary Beth Nikitin contemplates the potential implications
xxii    INTRODUCTION

of the 2006 U.S. “nuclear deal.” with India. Her chapter examines how
the real-politick of the deal clashes with the idealism of the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty stalwarts and its likely effect on proliferation.
This collection of work represents a fresh perspective on some of the
principal issues facing today’s nuclear policy makers.
 Part ONE

new and emerging challenges

to u.S. security policy


 Chapter one

REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY:

A STUDY IN ASYMMETRIES
Michael Tkacik

T
his chapter examines how possession of nuclear weapons by a
regional adversary might affect U.S. deterrence options.1 It first
notes that although many believe U.S. nuclear forces are sufficient
to deter any regional actor, this confidence relies on questionable as-
sumptions. Next, it examines the characteristics of regional challenges.
Having established likely regional contexts, the chapter investigates the
likely objectives of regional adversaries during a crisis. The chapter then
reviews ways to enhance the United States’ ability to face a challenge
by a nuclear-armed regional foe. Finally, it focuses on the difficulties of
communicating with a culturally dissimilar regional adversary, to the
detriment of deterrence, hinting at U.S. policy and strategy options for
the future.

General Problems for Deterrence Theory

in the Twenty-first Century Regional Context
The extent to which nuclear deterrence theory is fungible across time
and situation is not clear. Though many believe nuclear weapons have
been de-emphasized, in fact the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
has seen both its nuclear and conventional missions expand. STRAT-
COM is expected, inter alia, to deter both conventional and nuclear ag-
gression worldwide; to respond to asymmetric threats; to support other
theaters of operation; and to assure friends while dissuading, deter-
ring and, if necessary, defeating enemies.2 Notwithstanding these new


   CHAPTER ONE

missions, many outside of STRATCOM view nuclear weapons as either

deemphasized or their capabilities as easily fungible—that deterrence is
“one-size-fits-all.” Many seem to assume that because deterrence at large
force levels worked against the Soviets, so too should it work against any
future opponent.3
It is not clear that the assumptions of the Cold War remain fully ap-
plicable today for many reasons, two of which stand out.4 First, the as-
sumption of rationality may sometimes be misplaced.5 What is rational
in one culture at one point in time under one set of circumstances may
appear less so in another time and place.
[D]eterrence theory posits a rational, reasonable, and to a large extent
predictable opponent. History demonstrates, however, that oppo-
nents often do not understand one another well and therefore behave
in ways that appear ‘senseless’—even when each party involved be-
lieves, by its own light, that it is calculating rationally and behaving
reasonably. This can lead to costly misjudgments.6
And such misjudgments in the regional context may be complicated
by problems of communications and false assumptions about one and
other. Thus it is inappropriate to assume a regional opponent will act as
the Soviet Union did.
Second, it should be noted that the intelligence gathering capabilities
of the regional adversary are likely to suffer in comparison with Cold
War capabilities. Intelligence is never perfect, but it may be even more
flawed than in the past because regional adversaries simply lack the as-
sets that were available to the superpowers. In some cases, such as North
Korea, the United States is also operating from a severe intelligence defi-
cit. This makes understanding and predicting an adversary’s behavior
more challenging and miscalculation more likely.
So then, a real challenge for the West in deterring regional adversaries
is our inability to understand them and vice versa. Almost “all empirical
assessments” of deterrence conclude “understanding the opponent, its
values, motivation, and determination is critical to the success or failure
of deterrence policies.”7 Although today we have more information than
ever about other cultures, and we are able to communicate more quickly
than in the past, our understanding of other cultures does not seem to
have kept pace with security challenges. One need only take note of the
seemingly intractable differences between Islamic and Western cultures
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY  

to realize we still do not understand one another very well. It seems

scholars and politicians who assure us that deterrence will work today
as it worked in the past have not thought as deeply about the problem
as they might.8 Though many claim to know how deterrence works and
how to make it keep working, in fact deterrence may be quite situation
specific.9 It is dangerous to speak blithely of America’s ability to deter all
comers, no matter what the situation. While deterrence may continue to
function effectively in the 21st century regional context, that function is
likely to be far more complex than in the past. In order to avoid these
problems, analysis must begin with context. As Sun Tzu lectured 2,500
years ago, “Know your enemy.”

Characteristics of Regional Challenges

Asymmetry of Interests
As noted above, regional nuclear challenges may look very different from
Cold War challenges. One key difference in a conflict between a regional
power and the United States is the asymmetry of interests involved. “To
the extent a challenger perceives the defender’s interests in a conflict to
be low, the challenger will likely draw the conclusion that the defender’s
resolve to defend these interests will also be low… The regional crises
with the greatest chance for misperceptions of U.S. resolve will be the
ones in which the U.S. interests are ambiguous.”10
In a regional conflict, anything over which the regional power is will-
ing to challenge the United States is likely to be exceptionally important
to the regional power. For example, when North Vietnam was willing to
challenge the United States during the Cold War, it perceived the very
independence of its nation at stake. In the twenty-first century, it is un-
likely that a regional challenger to the United States will have super-
power support, thus we can surmise that the adversary will perceive its
interests as exceptionally important. Owing to such an asymmetry of
interest, it is likely “that regional adversaries will have an advantage over
the United States in a game of brinkmanship…”11 Therefore, we might
expect the regional adversary to be more willing to take risks and the
United States to be more risk averse.12 Even if U.S. interests are more
than “peripheral,” they are still not likely to rise to the level of the re-
gional adversary.
   CHAPTER ONE

Power Projection
WMD in the hands of a regional adversary is likely to make U.S. power
projection much more difficult. And given the perception among cer-
tain adversaries that the United States can be driven off by an initial
bloodletting, some could view a nuclear strike on U.S. power projection
capabilities as sufficient to drive the United States away. Attempting to
deter a regional power from using nuclear weapons while at the same
time projecting U.S. power into that regional adversary’s home area
is therefore likely to be difficult. American strategy “will need some-
how to free U.S. leaders from a challenger’s threats of WMD escalation.
Our policies will have to enable U.S. leaders to do what we assumed
Soviet Cold War leaders would not: project overwhelming force into
an opponent’s territory without being deterred by the possibility of the
opponent’s escalation to WMD.”13
This is all the more challenging when one realizes the opponent may
not even have to target U.S. power projection forces directly. For in-
stance, it may suffice to target a local port. Ports are especially vulnerable
to WMD missile strikes and could make power projection at acceptable
cost levels nearly impossible for the United States.

Authoritarian Challengers
It is likely that the regional adversary facing the United States in
some future conflict will be authoritarian in nature. As such, threats
that would deter a democratic form of government may not deter an
authoritarian leadership, although personal safety and survival may act
as credible motivators for regime leaders. In cases such as North Korea,
the “threat of even massive societal change may not be an effective ba-
sis for deterrence of such leadership.”14 Authoritarian leaders therefore
must be deterred by holding their vital interests at risk, not their people.
Hence U.S. nuclear weapons are only a potential component of a U.S.
response—an ultimate response (though with its own gradations and
flexibility perhaps)—but not necessarily the first response, unlike the
more certain escalation of the Cold War.

[Il]logic of Actors
Some argue the actors the United States is likely to face in the twenty-
first century will be less logical than in the past. They point in particular
to non-state actors, as well as to “rogue states.” There are two potential
problems when dealing with “illogical actors.” First, they may simply
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY  

not respond to cost/benefit analysis. Second, they may be unpredictable

in their actions, even if they do engage in such analysis. This illogic is
not necessarily posited to arise from some inherent pathology. Rather,
it is that regional conflicts may be about issues that are so unfamiliar
to the United States as to appear illogical. For example, myths about
conflicts sometimes mean that the parties are fighting about things that
never even happened. Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia follow this pat-
tern, as arguably does the Arab/Israeli conflict.15 The primary issues of
dispute are often below the surface of logic, focusing on “fundamental
values such as religion, often involving a matter of blood and flesh. In
such a situation, [the] logic of mutual deterrence could be easily dis-
torted and replaced by human factors such as distrust, wish of revenge,
pride, miscalculation and misperception.”16 That is to say, psychological
factors are likely to be even more relevant than in the Cold War, includ-
ing psychological dysfunction and other realities that do not fit easily
into the rational calculus of deterrence. Rationality is thus likely to suf-
fer in regional conflict.

Asymmetric Taboos17
Given that nuclear weapons have not been used in anger since 1945,
many assert that a taboo has grown up against their use. To the extent
that such a taboo exists, it would appear more powerful in the West-
ern democracies than elsewhere. This contention is supported by the
fact that other WMD use such as chemical and biological warfare has
occurred in non-Western authoritarian states including Iraq, Vietnam,
and Afghanistan. Yet the United States has threatened nuclear use in the
past and may have to again in order to deter first use by a regional pow-
er. Hence, friction exists “between the long-standing taboo against re-
gional nuclear use and the possible U.S. need for credible nuclear threats
in support of regional deterrence policies.”18 The plausible existence of
a taboo is problematic enough, but U.S. actions have complicated the
problem. Senior officials from the first Bush administration admitted
in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War that, while they had strongly im-
plied a nuclear response to Iraqi WMD use, in fact they never intended
to carry out nuclear retaliation, even had the Iraqis used WMD.19 So
for observing regional adversaries, more credence is lent to the notion
that the United States operates under a nuclear taboo and may not use
nuclear weapons. U.S. threats therefore may lack credibility in a future
regional contingency. But for the regional adversary, given the increased
   CHAPTER ONE

pertinence of psychological factors and given the perceived geographic

confinement of the conflict, there may be fewer barriers to the use of
nuclear weapons.20
Ultimately then, the question is whether local powers can deter U.S.
entry into a regional conflict, or whether once involved in military ac-
tion, the United States can deter nuclear use by the regional actor (so
called intra-war deterrence). U.S. leaders must initially decide whether
they think the regional adversary will use one or more nuclear weap-
ons. If the United States believes the regional adversary will use nuclear
weapons, the United States may choose not to intervene except in all but
the most extreme cases. Therefore, the ability of the United States to use
force is limited, often in the places it is most needed. It should be noted
that this ignores security assurances given to U.S. regional allies.
The regional context may thus be unfavorable to the United States.
In this environment, a regional adversary is likely to seek “(1) to deter
U.S. intervention within the region, (2) to intimidate U.S. allies within
the region, and (3) to ensure the survival of the state or regime from
external threats, specifically to prevent the United States from seeking
unconditional surrender or the ouster of leadership as the condition for
an armistice.”21 Each of these objectives deserves further examination.

Regional Adversary Objectives

Preventing U.S. Intervention
The first goal of any regional adversary would be to prevent U.S. in-
tervention in the region, thereby guaranteeing freedom to operate. The
methods for preventing U.S. intervention are diverse. Yet, no matter
what choice the regional actor makes, it must ultimately be willing to
use nuclear weapons first against the United States. This point is para-
mount. No matter what threat is made, if the United States does not back
down, the regional adversary must be willing to launch a nuclear weap-
on against the United States or its allies. The United States, conversely,
has only to deter such first use by a far weaker regional adversary. The
regional adversary is likely to have a very small arsenal, implying excep-
tionally “precious assets.”22 The United States, on the other hand, even
after the Moscow Treaty, will have thousands of strategic nuclear weap-
ons available, not to mention tactical weapons. Here, the asymmetries
clearly favor the United States. Though this chapter has noted variables
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY  

that favor the challenger, in this case, barring an extremely irrational foe
and assuming the United States is willing to force the issue, it would be
surprising to see the regional adversary launch a nuclear attack in the
face of overwhelming U.S. response. A “U.S. deterrent strategy based
on escalation dominance should” therefore be credible.23 Moreover, if
the United States has supplemented its strike capabilities with defenses,
the United States might be able to significantly blunt or even eliminate
the incoming attack. Consequently, putting the regional adversary in
a position where it has to use nuclear weapons first is about as domi-
nant a posture as the United States could hope for. A regional adversary
threatening first use should not deter U.S. leaders. But for this approach
to work, U.S. leadership must trust deterrence. If U.S. leaders fear first
use by a regional adversary more than they trust deterrence, the United
States may choose not to intervene.24
U.S. policy in the near term should thus seek to enhance its strike
capabilities (both conventional and nuclear), to think more deeply
about escalation dominance in the regional context, to improve its the-
ater and national missile defenses, and to “enlighten” political leaders
as to the sorts of threats they might face and the need to stand up to
such threats.25 Given all this, it is less likely that the opponent will risk
nuclear attack against U.S. power projection forces. Instead, the regional
adversary is likely to threaten U.S. allies.

Intimidating Allies
One of the most effective strategies a regional adversary could adopt
in order to deter the United States would be to threaten U.S. allies in
the region with nuclear attack.26 U.S. allies are likely to be critical for
basing purposes, over-flight rights, protecting sea-lanes of communica-
tion, providing logistical support, and providing other key benefits. In
addition, U.S. assurances to such allies probably reduce incentives to
proliferate.
It is, of course, ultimately in the interests of the ally to assist U.S. in-
tervention. If the ally is no longer committed to protecting its interests,
it is unlikely that the U.S. public or U.S. leadership will risk U.S. forces.
The threat by the regional adversary against U.S. allies need not be
exceptionally imaginative. By threatening a nuclear attack on a key al-
lied city, or even by simply being ambiguous in doctrine or targeting, the
regional adversary will hope to deter the United States or coerce allies
into denying support to the U.S. military.27 Foiling such a threat will be
10   CHAPTER ONE

more complicated than preventing first use against American targets,

but the United States will still have key advantages, which often seem
under-appreciated. U.S. responses should include a combination of the
threat of retaliation (extended deterrence) and defenses. Of course, the
United States’ ability to offer such a response will be dependent in part
on the allies’ acceptance of certain risks.
The most basic threat a regional adversary could make would be to
attack targets in allied states.28 Here, the United can threaten retaliation
with the assurance of clear escalation dominance.29 Consequently, a re-
gional adversary’s attack would be suicidal, though to be sure the United
States must communicate this in a culturally acceptable way such that
the adversary understands the illogic of its nuclear preemption.
The problem with extended deterrence, of course, is making it cred-
ible. But assuming the regional adversary does not have the ability to
threaten the U.S. homeland in a timely manner, one of the key difficul-
ties of extended deterrence (“trading New York for Paris”) is removed.
Beyond this, however, the regional adversary must still be made to be-
lieve that the United States cares enough to retaliate against the regional
adversary for any attack on a particular U.S. ally. This can be difficult if
there is no history of U.S. commitment. But such a commitment can be
built, if not historically, then empirically. “A U.S. strategy of extended
deterrence should be credible if the U.S. commitment to the threatened
ally is strong and clearly communicated. U.S. troops on allied soil are a
classic way to communicate this commitment.”30 The presence of U.S.
troops and other linking factors should be backed by declaratory state-
ments that the United States will respond to the use of WMD against its
ally in devastating fashion.
The common bond between the United States and its local ally can
be strengthened if the United States can offer the ally defensive protec-
tion. If the ally has some reasonable assurance that its homeland will
be defended, as well as the presence of U.S. troops in the homeland, it
will be less likely to withdraw from its coalition commitments.31 Theater
defenses thus help not only to hold coalitions together, they can actually
help to build coalitions and prevent proliferation. While reassuring al-
lies in the face of regional nuclear threats is challenging, an adversary’s
actions when facing a threat to its own survival is probably the most dif-
ficult challenge facing the United States in the regional context.
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY   11

Regime Survival
Regime survival is a shorthand reference to the difficulties of deter-
ring a regional adversary while the adversary’s regime perceives itself
simultaneously to be under threat of destruction.32 “U.S. protestations
that its intentions are benign may fall on deaf ears.”33 The ability of the
United States to influence this perception will be even more difficult in
the face of cultural and other communication difficulties. “Under these
circumstances, a regional adversary’s threat to use nuclear weapons first
is highly credible.34
Deterrence is so difficult in this situation because the regional adver-
sary, especially if authoritarian, has little left to lose (except perhaps the
lives of the its decision makers, which will be difficult to guarantee in the
twenty-first century war environment).35 As a result, adversary leader-
ship may have little disincentive to withhold its nuclear use. Under such
circumstances, “the United States essentially has two choices: Avoid
placing regional opponents in this position or abandon deterrence in
favor of strategies that emphasize damage limitation.”36
The former strategy relinquishes any hope of regime change by force;
it is a “limited-aims” strategy. Even if it chooses to follow that policy,
however, the United States still must find a way to convince the regional
adversary that the United States does not seek regime change or destruc-
tion. This would be difficult in any crisis, but even more so during war
and more so yet in the face of cultural dissimilarity. Still, the alternative
of an undeterrable nuclear strike against the United States or an ally is
unacceptable.37 Some claim, “a serious drawback, apart from the ques-
tion of whether the adversary actually believes U.S. war aims are lim-
ited, is that this approach creates a strong incentive for regional states to
acquire nuclear weapons.”38 This concern seems misplaced. Any other
strategy by the United States will likely mitigate in favor of greater weap-
on development, not less development. In other words, the lesson from
the strategy advocated below may be that the regime in question simply
had too few nuclear weapons (or insufficient means to deliver them).
The alternative to a limited-aims strategy is to begin a conventional
counterforce campaign against enemy WMD assets so that the enemy
cannot launch an attack or the attack can be defended against if it is
launched, i.e., a strategy of deterrence by denial, leaving U.S. nuclear
counterforce strikes to provide some measure of intra-war deterrence
12   CHAPTER ONE

and escalation dominance. The conventional nature of such a counter-

force campaign, especially if begun well before the regime is actually
under direct military threat, may reduce the justification for nuclear first
use, no matter what the regional adversary’s declaratory policy is.39 But
the sort of intelligence necessary to support conventional strikes with
sufficient confidence would not appear to exist today. Furthermore, it is
just as likely as not that a conventional counterforce campaign would,
at some point, put the adversary regime in a “use them or lose them”
position (intra-war deterrence thus becomes important). Under this
strategy, it is hoped that nuclear retaliatory threats would deter the re-
gional adversary from launching a nuclear attack while the conventional
counterforce campaign is under way. If this strategy is to work then, any
ground counteroffensive against the regional adversary’s regime must
wait until after the conventional counterforce campaign is successfully
completed. And at that point U.S. battle damage assessment must be able
to accurately conclude that all or most enemy WMD are eliminated. It
would be imprudent to assume that intelligence could be this accurate.
While U.S. political leadership may not demand 100 percent confidence
that all enemy nuclear weapons have been destroyed, decision makers
are likely to require very high levels of confidence. Regional adversaries
may also have other options for inflicting costs on the United States or
its allies (e.g., terrorism and the transfer of WMD materials or technol-
ogy to terrorists or other states). Damage limitation risks nuclear use by
the adversary, makes holding coalitions together more difficult in the
face of this possibility, and may encourage proliferation among friendly
states to offset any regional foe’s nuclear weapons. However, such a con-
ventional counterforce strategy could be most valuable as a U.S. tool of
deterrence and dissuasion. Damage limitation approaches may be dif-
ficult to sell when a limited-aims strategy is offered as an alternative, but
the deterrent value of the assets and accompanying declarations should
not be ignored.

ComplEmenting Nuclear and Non-nuclear

Deterrence
Nuclear deterrence can be complemented by preparing other options for
a regional contingency. Multiple options provide the U.S. flexibility and
allow it to take advantage of asymmetries. Moreover, additional options
allow the United States to avoid being forced into nuclear use.40 The ca-
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY   13

pabilities most needed include robust, quickly deployable conventional

forces (themselves a potential component of conventional deterrence
and “tailored” deterrence strategies), as well as improved intelligence
capabilities.
More broadly speaking, an understanding about the regional culture
will be indispensable in any future conflict. The need for greater un-
derstanding of local cultures is especially true for Americans, who are
renowned for their parochialism.
Absent an adequate appreciation of the specific opponent’s values,
goals, determination, perceptions, risk propensities, and so forth, and
absent the capacity to make the U.S. threat credible in the eyes of the
opponent based on that knowledge, prediction of that challenger’s
likely response to U.S. threats under varying conditions will involve a
considerable amount of speculation and guesswork.41
Continued investment in this sort of regional intelligence is therefore
appropriate.
Understanding a regional adversary’s culture and political system, as
well as other traits of its leadership helps to improve the bargaining po-
sition of the United States in a crisis. Intangibles will also be important.
The “challenger’s actions can be shaped by pursuit of intangibles: ‘great
prestige, respect, and deference, in short, honor.”42 While the list is not
complete, “adversary decision making in the face of U.S. deterrent ac-
tions is also influenced by their strategic culture, idiosyncrasies of deci-
sion mechanisms and the leader’s decision style, and leadership risk of
tolerance.”43 These differences “must limit the reliability of any generic
formula for deterrence.”44 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to pro-
vide a detailed recommendation on how to obtain and make use of such
information. But clearly,
a multidisciplinary approach to such [regional] profiles would be
necessary; included should be psychologists, cultural anthropolo-
gists, historians, political scientists, economists, regional specialists,
and military specialists. The more comprehensive and accurate the
characterization of the challenger, the better prepared should U.S.
policymakers be to tailor deterrence to the opponent and context.45
One way to further enhance American understanding of a region-
al adversary’s particular culture and values is to have allies in the re-
gion.46
14   CHAPTER ONE

It seems clear that the United States can and should do a better job of
understanding the cultures of potential regional adversaries. Assuming
that it understands the asymmetric advantages that inure it to regional
foes, that it appreciates its own force structure advantages, that it moves
to enhance certain capabilities including missile defense, conventional
counterforce capabilities, and battlefield intelligence, and that it invests
in better understanding potential regional foes, one key regional pitfall
remains unexplored: communication. None of the understanding of the
complexities of regional deterrence in the post-Cold War world matters
if we cannot communicate effectively with regional opponents.

Communications in the Regional Context

The noticeable differences in culture between the United States and re-
gional opponents can complicate deterrence. One especially significant
complication may arise in communicating with a regional adversary.
This is important because, for deterrence to work, threats must be effec-
tively communicated.47 Communication, however, may come under in-
tense pressure in the regional context. For example, some contrast “Cold
War strategies based on years of close interaction between the U.S. and
Soviet leaders with multiple regional conflicts involving unfamiliar ac-
tors.”48
How messages are presented, when, and by whom can shape the
opponent’s response. For example, in some political cultures, greater
significance would likely be placed on a message delivered by a close
relative of the U.S. president then if it were delivered by a local U.S.
official or even a senior official from Washington. And, as Alexander
George has noted, in some cultures leaders respond ‘very negatively
indeed’ to direct threats.49
Moreover, recipients of communications in any culture may misin-
terpret those messages. “Not only does selective attention distort a mes-
sage, but selective interpretation further confuses the meaning.”50 So
on top of not paying attention, sometimes recipients purposely ignore
or reinterpret messages.51 These problems of distortion may be height-
ened in the inter-cultural context. There will also be great asymmetries
in intelligence capabilities that could otherwise be used to help interpret
communications and U.S. intent, or, in the case of the DPRK, the reverse
due to the dearth of U.S. human intelligence assets.
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY   15

Communication is complicated when the parties have opposing in-

terests. When these parties are also from different cultures, the dif-
ficulty of communication is further heightened. “As language and
culture are inextricably bound, cross-cultural communication is
complex and potentially problematic. Even speaking the same lan-
guage does not guarantee effective intercultural communication.”52 In a
regional crisis, opposing interests are likely to be extremely high value
interests. The cultural differences will almost certainly be significant in
the early twenty-first century when we are likely to see clashes between
“the West and the rest.” Communicators should “consistently bear in
mind that the more substantial the differences in cultural background
between the sender and receiver involved in the communicative pro-
cess, the more substantial the differences in the meaning attached to
the message and social behavior will be.”53 Beyond this contextual or
background fog, conflict (and especially violent conflict) makes com-
munication more difficult. “Different cultural assumptions toward con-
flict are one factor contributing to intercultural miscommunication and
conflict.”54
Although scholars of intercultural communication have identified
numerous potential communication pitfalls, this chapter focuses on a
few that seem especially relevant. These issue sets include whether a
culture values individualism or collectivism, has independent or inter-
dependent self-views, is low context or high context, and/or follows a
monochronic or polychronic time schedule.

Individualism v. Collectivism
A key cultural difference that manifests itself in communications is
whether individualism or collectivism is valued. Some cultures value
independent identity, individual rights, and individual obligations. Oth-
ers value collective identity (group identity, obligations, and concerns).
Individualism and collectivism also manifest themselves in cultural
views on conflict. Individual approaches toward conflict focus on per-
sonal accountability and allow for expressions of emotion (and these
approaches, of course, color communication). Collective approaches
put collective opinions forward, restrain emotions, and seek group ac-
countability. The individual approach is found most often in the West,
while the collective approach is more prevalent in Asia and the Middle
East.55 The sectarian killings tearing Iraq apart today may be viewed on
one level as a manifestation of demands for collective revenge. “Indi-
16   CHAPTER ONE

vidualists tend to hold the person accountable for the conflict; collectiv-
ists tend to emphasize the context that contributes to the conflict.”56 It
is therefore apparent that in the context of a regional conflict between
states of different cultures, there will be ample room for misunderstand-
ing about the causes of the conflict and that communication between
the parties will reflect different assumptions. Not only will it be difficult
to resolve the conflict as a consequence, but deterrent threats are likely
to be misinterpreted by the collectivist and viewed as more aggressive
than they are in fact meant to be. Rather than be seen as an attempt to
prevent some activity, they may be viewed as an attempt to intimidate
and place collective blame, which in turn may lead to intransigence or
even additional aggression on the part of the culturally dissimilar re-
gional adversary.57
Another potential problem between an individualist actor (e.g., the
United States) and a collectivist regional adversary is that the acceptable
solutions to conflict may be very different. The collectivist may seek to
resolve the situation by minimizing dangers to whatever status quo has
developed. And in attempting to minimize dangers, the regional adver-
sary may have very different methods of communication. The United
States is likely to attempt to place blame and seek direct redress of griev-
ances and to do so through direct, perhaps blunt, communication. The
regional adversary may instead seek to play down differences. For the
collectivist, the “underlying assumption is that the function of language
as a means of social communication is not to state facts and opinions,
but to maintain the feeling of harmonious relationships.”58 These vary-
ing assumptions and forms of communication may lead to misunder-
standing. In the context of nuclear deterrence, such misunderstanding
can have disastrous results.

Independent v. Interdependent Self-Views

Another key communicative factor is whether a culture emphasizes in-
dependent or interdependent self-views. “Independent-self individuals
tend to worry about whether they present their individualistic self cred-
ibly and completely in front of others. Interdependent-self individuals
tend to be more reflective of what others think of their projected face
image in the context of in-group/out-group relations.”59 Once again,
there is ample room for misunderstanding because of differences in un-
derlying understandings about the very purpose of communication. The
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY   17

independent-self individual will tend to be as clear as possible in com-

munication. The interdependent-self individual though, will be more
concerned with how his communication reflects back on his own image
and role within his “in-group” This individual may perceive slights to
his “face” that are especially disturbing to him because he feels he has
been humiliated before his own group (perhaps by a threat). But for the
independent-self individual, such threats are part and parcel of the larg-
er ongoing conflict and are seen as valuable in making clear the action
he seeks to deter. In attempting to make clear his threats, the Westerner
may in fact humiliate and antagonize his culturally dissimilar regional
adversary.
The communication problems of the independent and interdepen-
dent self-views extend to the way in which they communicate. So “while
independent-self individuals tend to practice direct verbal communica-
tions, expressing their own thoughts and feelings, interdependent-self
individuals tend to practice responsive communication, anticipating
the thoughts and feelings of the other person.”60 Again, there is room
for misunderstanding here. The Westerner will communicate a threat
directly and expect it to be taken as such. But the interdependent-self
individual will search for deeper meaning, possibly misunderstanding
the communication. This misunderstanding may be complicated by
frustration on the part of the Westerner, who cannot understand why
his clear signals are not responded to, and who may begin to suspect
deceit on the part of the interdependent-self individual. In the end, the
independent-self view tends to dovetail with individualism, while the
interdependent-self view tends to dovetail with collectivism. Indepen-
dent-view people see themselves as autonomous, rational, and unen-
cumbered agents of change. Interdependent-view people see themselves
as group-bound, role-based, and harmony-seeking individuals. This ap-
proach may bring into question some of the fundamental assumptions
about communications on which deterrence relies, such as rational ac-
tors seeking to achieve clear goals. It would be too strong to say these
cultures are irrational, but it would not be too strong to note that there
exists room for misunderstanding. Nuclear deterrence in the regional
context may be more difficult than first thought. Not only are asym-
metric interests problematic, but communication is beginning to appear
problematic as well.
18   CHAPTER ONE

Low-Context v. High-Context Communication

Low-context and high-context forms of expression complicate the prob-
lems of communication discussed above. “Low-context communication
emphasizes expressing intention or meaning through explicit verbal
messages. High-context communication emphasizes conveying inten-
tion or meaning through the context (for example, social roles, posi-
tions) and the nonverbal channels (for example, pauses, silence, tone of
voice) of the verbal message.”61
Certainly the low-context communicator (the Westerner) views
communication more simply than his high-context counterpart. The
low-context communicator misses much both in context itself and also
in nonverbal clues.62 The misunderstanding of context means the West-
erner will fail to notice subtleties such as importance attached to the
person selected to negotiate by the high-context culture. It may be that
this person is not important enough to make decisions or that this per-
son, though lacking rank, is very close to the adversary’s leadership and
thus more important than the Westerner realizes. The impact of non-
verbal clues is unclear. On the one hand, communications during crisis
may not take place in person, making nonverbal context less important.
On the other hand, nonverbal clues will be important during face-to-
face communication, and could retain importance in the way public
statements are issued and perceived. The nonverbal clues may take on
importance during signaling as well and signaling might reinforce (or
detract from) written and verbal communication. Nonverbal signaling
that might be clear to another culture could be unclear, ignored, or even
completely missed by the West.63
The expectations for communicators also differ in low context and
high context situations.
In low-context communication, the speaker is expected to construct
a clear persuasive message that the listener can decode easily. In con-
trast, high-context communication refers to communication patterns
of indirect verbal mode, ambiguous talk, nonverbal subtleties, and
interpreter-sensitive value… In high-context communication, the lis-
tener or interpreter of the message is expected to read ‘between the
lines,’ to infer accurately the implicit intent of the nonverbal message,
and to observe the nonverbal nuances and subtleties that accompany
the verbal message.64
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY   19

These differing expectations complicate a bargaining game already

characterized (on the Western side) as one in which it is acceptable to
make “threats that leave something to chance,” where appearing insane
(or at least unpredictable) is sometimes valued, and where ultimately
one is threatening to use the most powerful weapons known to human-
kind.65 There may be ample opportunity for a high-context listener to
see something between the lines that the low-context speaker did not
intend, or for the low-context listener to miss completely something the
high-context speaker intended to carry great import. The appreciation
of “background” issues is far greater in high-context communication
than low-context communication, making Westerners (and probably
Americans even more so) especially vulnerable to missing important
clues. The complexity of high-context communication is completely for-
eign to most Americans who, of course, prize directness. “High-context
communication emphasizes the importance of multilayered contexts
(for example, historical context, social norms, roles, situational and re-
lational contexts) that frame the interaction.”66 Multilayered contexts
are alien concepts to the untrained American.
The difficulties between low-context and high-context communi-
cation are familiar to those who have had dealings with the Japanese.
For example, there is “the Japanese culture of sasshi (conjecture or tacit
understanding). Japanese people generally believe that it is pointless to
speak precisely and explicitly with one another because we are expected
to read between the lines.”67 So not only is communication pursuant to
the Western model difficult to establish, in fact it is “pointless.”

Monochronic v. Polychronic Time

Monochronic (Western) and polychromatic time refer to the differ-
ent ways that cultures understand and use time. “Some cultures follow
monochronic time schedules and use time in linear ways, whereas peo-
ple in polychronic cultures tend to engage in multiple activities simul-
taneously.”68 This is problematic insofar as the United States is likely
to approach the crisis on one timetable, while a polychronic culture
may approach the crisis on another schedule. This may cause the Unit-
ed States to believe the adversary does not view the crisis as seriously
as it might, thereby possibly leading to miscalculation. Alternatively,
the United States might see the adversary as inattentive thus provok-
ing action by the United States to “get the adversary’s attention.” Or the
20   CHAPTER ONE

adversary might see the United States as pushing too hard and react
unnecessarily out of fear. In all of these cases the different views of time
could negatively affect managing a crisis in the regional context.
Another way of thinking about these differences in approaches to
time is to think in terms of “conflict rhythms.”
People move in different rhythms in conflict negotiations. Intercul-
tural communication between individualists and collectivists is mag-
nified when the implicit rhythm of time plays a decisive role in the
encounter. M-time [monochronic] individuals want to move faster to
address substantive problems and resolve the conflict. P-time [poly-
chronic] individuals prefer to deal with relational and context issues
before concrete, substantive negotiation.69
So then, when time plays a key role, as it must in any regional crisis,
other culturally defined communication differences, such as the differ-
ence between individualists and collectivists, take on greater import.
When the United States differs markedly from a potential regional foe
on almost all indices of culturally relevant communication variables, we
are likely to see a negative synergistic effect where miscommunication
and misunderstanding lurk around every corner.70 And given that de-
terrence is really just a method of bargaining during crisis, we may see
the United States attempting to resolve issues before other cultures are
ready to discuss them, further antagonizing each side.
There are other opportunities for frustration when M-time and P-
time individuals conflict.
For M-time individuals, conflict management time should be filled
with problem-solving or decision-making activities. For P-time in-
dividuals, time is a ‘being’ idea governed by the smooth implicit
rhythms in the interactions between people. When two P-time in-
dividuals come into conflict, they are more concerned with restor-
ing disjunctive rhythms in the interaction than with dealing head-on
with substantive issues.71
So again, P-time individuals, who presumably spend more time in
contact with other P-time individuals, have certain assumptions about
the resolution of conflict. Those assumptions are not likely to apply when
in conflict with the United States. And the United States is sure to be-
come frustrated with an adversary who appears to be delaying, ignoring
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY   21

deadlines, and avoiding resolution of key issues. The behavior is likely

to be perceived as evidence of an underlying agenda characterized by
dishonesty. This is a recipe for the United States to move more aggres-
sively, pushing the regional adversary into a corner, and adding fuel to
whatever fire sparked the conflict. At the very least, the parties have dif-
ferent understandings about what the appropriate timeline for conflict
resolution is, as well as what the resolution itself looks like. Frustration
on both sides may be added into an already difficult conflict.

Other Difficulties in Cross-Cultural Communications

Beyond these cultural values and assumptions, cultures tend to ap-
proach nonverbal communication very differently. Note that these dif-
ferences do not just exist between the West and the rest, but also among
the “rest” as well (e.g., Pakistan and India also have different values and
assumptions).
Although discussed in various places above, emotions and nonver-
bal communications are handled differently by different cultures. For
example, “for collectivists, the masking of negative emotions is critical
to maintaining a harmonious front during conflict. When collectivists
feel embarrassed or perceive face threat in conflict, they may sometimes
smile to cover up their embarrassment or shame.”72 Yet in Western cul-
ture, smiling in time of crisis can sometimes indicate a cavalier attitude
or possibly even a challenge. Again, the opportunity for misreading
communications is clear.
Silence also has different meanings in different cultures. In particu-
lar, individualist and collectivist cultures differ on the meaning of si-
lence. “Silence is a critical strategy in dealing with both in-group and
out-group conflicts in collectivist cultures. Silence may signal approval
or disapproval in collectivist conflict interaction.”73 It is initially note-
worthy then that the United States will need a level of sophistication not
just to recognize that silence has meaning, but also to identify whether
silence is positive or negative. “In silence, the conflict parties incur no
obligations. Silence may also be interpreted as an ambiguous ‘yes’ or ‘no’
response. On the other hand, silence may be viewed as an admission of
guilt or incompetence in an individualistic culture.”74 And of course,
failure to correctly interpret the meaning of silence may lead to more
than a failure to fully understand an adversary; it may lead to exactly the
opposite conclusion from what it was intended to convey.
22   CHAPTER ONE

When one aggregates the problems discussed above, the great diffi-
culty in managing a regional crisis with a culturally dissimilar adversary
becomes clear. “The lack of specific information about each other’s con-
flict assumptions or styles often creates negative interaction spirals that
deepen the cultural schism. The lack of communication skills to handle
such problematic intercultural episodes appropriately and effectively
also compounds the miscommunication chasm.”75 The already present
mistrust is intensified. When one combines a number of Western cul-
tural communication features on one side of a conflict, and sets them
against a combined number of non-Western features on the other side,
one might refer to these differing types of conflict and communications
approaches as the outcome oriented-model (Western) and the process-
oriented model (non-Western). 76
An outcome-oriented model emphasizes the importance of assert-
ing individual interests in the conflict situation and moving rapidly
toward the phase of reaching tangible outcomes or goals. A process-
oriented model emphasizes the importance of managing mutual or
group face interests in the conflict process before discussing tangible
outcomes or goals. ‘Face,’ in this context refers to upholding a claimed
sense of positive public image in any social interaction…77
Here, one can imagine the complications that might arise in a re-
gional crisis where the United States makes threats that are viewed as
damaging to face by the leader or negotiator of the regional adversary.
One area where these interactions might combine is on the Korean pen-
insula. Though a detailed discussion of a Korean scenario is beyond the
scope of this chapter (see chapter 3 by Dennis Shorts), it is appropriate
to briefly examine communication peculiarities of Koreans.
Although Koreans are not necessarily the most dissimilar of cultures,
their culture clearly combines many attributes that stand in juxtaposi-
tion to American culture and communication patterns.
Korean perception of communication is anchored in Buddhist phi-
losophy, which is characterized by the inarticulate or prelinguistic
process of the mind… Truth must be gained without trying and in
every spoken truth the unspoken has the last word; words are ap-
proximations, sometimes helpful, sometimes misleading… In West-
ern culture, however, people believe that words do, in fact, mean
what they say. Aristotle insisted that clarity is the first virtue of good
style.78
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY   23

Many of the previously discussed concepts are clearly reflected in

this description of the Korean approach to language. Koreans have an
interdependent self-view and focus on high-context communications.
Reading between the lines is as important if not more important than
what is actually said. This approach is to be contrasted with an Amer-
ican view that stresses clarity and especially in the context of a crisis
typically seeks to avoid multiple meanings to the same message. Facial
expressions, hand and arm gestures, eye behavior, and clothing all send
different messages in American and Korean cultures, thus opening the
way for misinterpretation. For example, “Koreans who are angry try not
to express their anger outwardly… Adults, especially men are not ex-
pected to smile frequently; it is a sign of weakness.”79 Thus an American
who smiles may have that smile misinterpreted, and at the same time
may not be able to spot anger on behalf of a Korean.
To complicate things further, even among cultures that are collec-
tivist, specifics often differ. So Arabs touch while Asians do not. Arabs
focus eyes on the speaker while Asians look indirectly at the speaker.80
While there is room for miscommunication for an American in either
context, that miscommunication may have different causes in each re-
gion. Of course, a nuclear crisis could occur in either region. Moreover,
the way one interprets messages occurs in a pre-existing worldview.81
Thus, decision-makers in an authoritarian, closed regime may distort
communications in ways outsiders cannot predict. This is especially so
for almost pathological regimes such as the DPRK.

Conclusion
Communication problems, along with the potential asymmetry of in-
terests, are among the greatest challenges faced by the United States in
a regional crisis when reliant on deterrence. This chapter argues that
deterrence (especially nuclear deterrence) is likely to be more difficult
to achieve in the regional context when confronting a nuclear-armed
adversary than in the Cold War context, but that regional adversaries
can be deterred in most instances if care is taken to acknowledge the
uniqueness of each regional situation. The chapter initially critically ex-
amined the view that regional deterrence differs little from Cold War
deterrence. The chapter then examined important differences that are
likely to exist in the regional context. The chapter next discussed pos-
24   CHAPTER ONE

sible regional adversary objectives and some U.S. capabilities that might
be enhanced pre-crisis in order to strengthen its position. Finally, the
chapter analyzed difficulties in communications that might arise in the
regional context, and how these difficulties might complicate deter-
rence.

Notes
The author would like to thank Frank Miller, Frank Moore, and Owen
Price for their insightful comments on this chapter. The author remains
solely responsible for any inaccuracies contained herein.
1. Deterrence is used in this chapter in a broader sense than strategic nuclear
deterrence during the Cold War. Rather, deterrence here reflects the Deterrence
Operations Joint Operating Concept 2.0 (August 2006). Deterrence is tailored,
adversary specific, includes both nuclear options and conventional options,
and otherwise integrates “all elements of national power.” Deterrence Opera-
tions Joint Operating Concept 2.0 (August 2006), 7–8.
2. See generally, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept 2.0. See also,
Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense,
2001).
3. Even here, some argue that we have overestimated how similar the Soviets
were to the West. See, John A. Battilega, Soviet Views of Nuclear Warfare: The
post Cold War Interviews (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004).
4. Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, (Lexington, KY: The
University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 92.
5. Many have noted the problem of imperfect information for rational actor
models. See for example, Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). See also, Charles Lindblom,
“Still Muddling, Not Yet Through,” Public Administration Review 39 (Novem-
ber–December, 1979).
6. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, 56. See also, Owen Price,
“Preparing for the Inevitable: Nuclear Signaling for Regional Crises,” in this
volume.
7. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, 117.
8. Ibid., 46.
9. Ibid., 45–6.
10. Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional
Context (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 15.
11. Ibid., 11.
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY   25

12. Ibid., ix.

13. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, 34.
14. Ibid., 131. However, the dominance of the military in such societies could
be a useful lever point. Military planners of a threshold state might spend more
time thinking about nuclear deterrence than previously. Targeting of military
assets and personnel—as in the Cold War—may well be effective countervalue
targeting as well as deterrence by denial of military capability. I am indebted to
Owen Price for this point.
15. Masako Ikegami, Missile Defense and Nuclear Deterrence in post–Cold
War Regional Conflicts (paper presented at the 24th ISODARCO Summer
Course on Nuclear Weapons in the New International Context, 16–26 June
2003) 1, http://www.isodarco.it/courses/candriai03/candrai03-papers.html.
16. Ibid.
17. See also, Thomas Schelling, An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of
Hiroshima (lecture presented on receiving the 2005 Nobel Prize in Econom-
ics, 8 December 2005), http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laure-
ates/2005/schelling-lecture.pdf.
18. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, 140.
19. See, for example, Colin Powell, A Soldier’s Way (London: Hutchinson,
1995), 324.
20. Masako Ikegami, Missile Defense and Nuclear Deterrence, 1.
21. Wilkening and Watman, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context, 32.
22. Ibid., xi.
23. Ibid., 53.
24. The decision on whether to intervene in the face of regional nuclear
threats is more complex and depends on the nature of the regional crisis. For
example, the U.S. might need to honor its positive security assurances and en-
sure that its nuclear umbrella remains a credible escalation option. My point
here is that U.S. leadership must be willing to engage in brinkmanship and trust
that U.S. forces will deter an adversary’s first use.
25. On the value of defenses, see Wilkening and Watman, Nuclear Deter-
rence in a Regional Context, 55–6.
26. See generally, Robert Critchlow, “Whom the Gods Would Destroy,” Na-
val War College Review (Summer 2000) vol. LIII, no. 3.
27. Wilkening and Watman, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context, 34.
28. Ibid., 56.
29. Though of course such dominance can still risk unacceptable losses for
26   CHAPTER ONE

allied and adversary populations.

30. Wilkening and Watman, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context, 56–
7.
31. Ibid., 58.
32. I have often wondered if Saddam did not use WMD (and released his
Western hostages) during the first Gulf War because his personal safety and
that of his regime were guaranteed. It may be that even regime change can oc-
cur and regional nuclear use can be deterred if the U.S. guarantees the safety of
the pertinent dictator. Of course, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent
execution of Saddam Hussein may call U.S. credibility on such guarantees into
question.
33. Wilkening and Watman, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context, 35.
The DPRK is an example of a regime that seems convinced the U.S. seeks its
destruction. Such a perception would be heightened during major hostilities,
no matter what the U.S. claimed.
34. Wilkening and Watman, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context, xiii.
35. Again, it may be possible to “make a deal with the devil” by guarantee-
ing the well-being of regime leadership (including exile with a generous living
stipend to a third country). But there may be significant difficulty in reaching
such an agreement during ongoing hostilities. And opposition leadership will
have little incentive to reach such an agreement until the military situation has
turned sufficiently sour. Finding the “sweet spot” whereby regional leadership
realizes it must negotiate for personal survival, yet they are not so distressed
that they order the use of nuclear weapons, would be challenging. Furthermore,
it is unclear whether adversary commanders in authority might take matters
into their own hands. Owen Price has suggested that there may be other “public
disgraces” that could be used to deter regional leadership.
36. Wilkening and Watman, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context, 60.
37. It is noteworthy that reassuring allies becomes more difficult if the Unit-
ed States adopts a policy of regime change.
38. Wilkening and Watman, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context, 60.
39. Ibid., 60.
40. Robert L. Brown, “21st Century Deterrence: Punishment versus Denial
and the Demand for U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” in The Future Security Environ-
ment and the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 34.
41. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, 75.
42. Ibid., 111 (quoting Donald Kagan).
 REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND U.S. POLICY   27

43. Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Joint Publication 3–12 (15 March
2005) (Department of Defense), viii.
44. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, 127.
45. Ibid., 128.
46. Robert Oakley, “Deterrence: Clash and Utilization of Value Systems,”
Appendix I to Post–Cold War Conflict Deterrence, http://fermat.nap.edu/html/
pcw/Dt-i.htm.
47. On miscommunication, especially in the nuclear context, see Robert Jer-
vis, Perception and Misperception in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976).
48. Jonathan Hagood, “Dissuading Nuclear Adversaries: The Strategic
Concept of Dissuasion and the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal,” in The Future Security
Environment and the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005),
24–26.
49. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, 124 (footnote omitted).
50. Brett Seabury, “Communication Problems in Social Work Practice,” So-
cial Work (January 1980), 41.
51. On “bounded rationality,” see Herbert Simon, Models of Bounded Ratio-
nality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
52. Johann Le Roux, “Effective Educators are Culturally Competent Com-
municators,” Intercultural Communication 13, no. 2 (March 2002): 41–42.
53. Ibid., 38.
54. Stella Ting-Toomey, “Intercultural Conflict Competence,” in eds. Judith
Martin, et al., Readings in Cultural Contexts (Mountain, View, CA: Mayfield
Publishing Company, 1998), 404.
55. On individualism and collectivism in communication, conflict, and cul-
ture, see Ting-Toomey, “Intercultural Conflict Competence,” 403.
56. See Ibid., 409.
57. Professional Notes, World Englishes (Aug 2005), vol. 24, Issue 3, 405.
58. World Englishes, 405.
59. Ting-Toomey, “Intercultural Conflict Competence,” 403.
60. Ibid., 403–404.
61. Ibid., 404.
62. For more on the importance of nonverbal clues, see Peter Andersen and
Hua Wang, “Unraveling Cultural Cues: Dimensions of Nonverbal Communi-
cation Across Cultures,” in Intercultural Communication: A Reader, eds., Larry
28   CHAPTER ONE

Samovar et al., (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006) (11th ed.), espe-
cially 254–5.
63. See, for example, Owen Price, “Preparing for the Inevitable: Nuclear Sig-
naling for Regional Crises,” Comparative Strategy 26: 2, 103–115.
64. Ting-Toomey, “Intercultural Conflict Competence,” 404.
65. On “threats that leave something to chance,” see Thomas C. Schelling,
The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
66. Ting-Toomey, “Intercultural Conflict Competence,” 404.
67. “Professional Notes,” 405.
68. Andersen and Wang, “Unraveling Cultural Clues,” 252. It is conceivable
that increased “multi-tasking” on the part of Americans is moving us, if only
slightly, toward a more polychronic understanding of time. But even if this is
the case, the underlying philosophy toward problem solving in American re-
mains distinctly monochronic.
69. Ting-Toomey, “Intercultural Conflict Competence,” 406.
70. As Donald Rumsfield might say, the “unknown unknowns” become
more troublesome.
71. Ting-Toomey, “Intercultural Conflict Competence,” 406.
72. Ibid., 407.
73. Ibid., 408.
74. Ibid., 409.
75. Ibid., 409.
76. Ibid., 405 (citation omitted).
77. Ibid., 405 (citation omitted).
78. Min-Sun Kim, “A Comparative Analysis of Nonverbal Expressions as
Portrayed by Korean and American Print-Media Advertising,” in eds., Judith
Martin, et al., Readings in Cultural Contexts (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield
Publishing Company, 1998), 207–8 (citations omitted).
79. Kim, “A Comparative Analysis,” 208.
80. Ibid., 209.
81. Seabury, “Communications Problems,” 41.
 Chapter Two

Towards a Policy of Nuclear Dissuasion

How can Dissuasion Improve U.S. National Security?
Jonathan Hagood

S
ince the formal introduction of the term dissuasion by the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), its practical mean-
ing has remained in doubt—especially as deterrence evolves into
a post-Cold War, post-9/11, “tailored” security strategy.1 Although de-
fense strategists have invested a significant amount of effort in recent
years into understanding the relevance of deterrence to contemporary
and future security environments, dissuasion remains a poorly under-
stood and little researched strategy. Nevertheless, official defense policy
continues to highlight both dissuasion and deterrence as methods by
which the United States can accomplish its security objectives.2 How
dissuasion helps the United States meet these goals and improve its na-
tional security is left unexplored. The dearth of interest in dissuasion
implies either its lack of practical utility or the belief that the United
States can effectively “dissuade future military competition” by continu-
ing to focus on its ability to deter and defeat adversaries.
Both of these beliefs sidestep an important opportunity to craft a
comprehensive strategy of dissuasion that incorporates elements of
deterrence and its traditional counterpart, compellence. This is clear-
est when examining strategies of nuclear dissuasion, the subject of this
chapter. A successful strategy of nuclear dissuasion convinces a state to
refrain from acquiring or expanding nuclear weapons capabilities. The
United States has a long history of successes and failures in the area
of nuclear dissuasion, and the salient feature of this history is that ele-
ments of deterrence and compellence in the guise of promises of punish-
ment and reward featured prominently in these situations. In the end,

29
30   CHAPTER TWO

successful strategies of nuclear dissuasion influenced the decision cal-

culus of states by making one choice (nuclear rollback) more attractive
than another (nuclear proliferation). That is, the United States success-
fully compelled states to undertake one set of actions that improved the
national security of the United States while deterring other acts that po-
tentially harmed U.S. national security.
Today, with the risk of proliferation to non-, sub-, or “rogue” state
actors for whom strategies of deterrence may not be effective at the fore-
front of military and security planning, the United States is transforming
its nuclear strategy but imprecisely reforming its doctrine and mission.
In particular, while most policymakers and the general public agree that
nuclear deterrence remains a critical bulwark of national security, its
applicability to specific cases is murky; and the 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) even downplays the relative importance of nuclear weap-
ons themselves.3 Indeed, it’s not uncommon to hear the phrase: “Where
deterrence works you don’t need it, and where you need deterrence it
doesn’t work.” The need to dissuade nuclear competition further con-
fuses the issue because the efficacy of deterrence and its relationship to
dissuasion are in doubt and their portfolios appear to overlap.
In this context, the easiest way to deter a nuclear adversary would ap-
pear to be dissuading the acquisition of such weapons in the first place.
However, such a crude formula obscures the need for research into the
nature of dissuasion and deterrence—both conventional and nuclear—
and the ways in which these strategies complement and interact with
one another. Although such a task has yet to be undertaken in any sys-
tematic fashion, this chapter begins the process by identifying clear dif-
ferences between dissuasion and deterrence, drawing understandable
distinctions between the two, and modeling their relationship. While
a clarification of differences and distinctions suggests the need to apply
either dissuasion or deterrence to a given adversary, this chapter em-
ploys models to demonstrate how both dissuasion and deterrence may
apply to questions of nuclear strategy. Indeed, we have an opportunity
today to craft a policy of nuclear dissuasion that leverages the tools and
strengths of nuclear deterrence inherited from the Cold War. A focus on
countering and preventing nuclear proliferation means that the strategic
goals of the United States are best met by strategies of nuclear dissuasion
rather than those purely focused on deterrence. To be sure, deterrence is
not an outdated concept from a bygone age. Quite the contrary, nuclear
deterrence was, is, and will continue to be a critical component of a
 Towards a Policy of Nuclear Dissuasion   31

policy of nuclear dissuasion. Yet the added dimension of U.S. conven-

tional superiority over potential adversaries (or competitors) such as
relatively weak states or “rogue” regimes with nuclear capability must be
considered when evaluating dissuasion and deterrence strategies.

A Brief History of Dissuasion

Thomas Schelling credits J. David Singer with proposing the term dis-
suasion in an article published in 1963. Singer created a model to dem-
onstrate the possible combinations of influence situations in a bilateral
system. The model labeled situations in which “A prefers that B do a
certain act (X)” as cases of persuasion while situations in which “A pre-
fers that B not do a particular act, but do almost anything else (non-X
or O) instead” were cases of dissuasion.4 In Arms and Influence (1966),
Schelling built upon this idea by distinguishing between “a threat in-
tended to keep from starting something” (dissuasion) and “a threat in-
tended to make an adversary do something” (persuasion).5 Schelling
preferred “deterrence”—a term already in common use despite Singer’s
interpretation of it as a subset of dissuasion—and “compellence,” which,
as Schelling noted, was the best term available to him.6
The French use of dissuasion nucléaire notwithstanding, the term de-
terrence maintained its hegemonic status as the term applied to strate-
gies designed to prevent particular acts of aggression. The concept of
dissuasion first re-appeared in a meaningful way in the 1998 study en-
titled “U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National
Strategy and Requirements.”7 Its use foreshadowed the term’s inclusion
in the defense and security strategies of the Bush Administration, which
began with the 2001 QDR. However, dissuasion as introduced in “A
Fresh Look” is a confusing concept. It is at times: (a) a component of de-
terrence—“the three traditional elements of deterrence [are] retaliation,
denial, and dissuasion”; (b) a product of deterrence—“dissuasion is…
the impact of the total U.S. deterrent posture, including infrastructure,
in shaping the security environment, and specifically in shaping the cal-
culations of potential adversaries”; and (c) a way through which deter-
rence can be achieved—“the United States can place greater emphasis
on… deterrence through dissuasion.”8
As a next step, the 2001 QDR significantly clarified the relationship
between dissuasion and deterrence. The report identified four primary
32   CHAPTER TWO

defense goals for the United States: “assuring allies and friends; dis-
suading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion
against U.S. interests; and, if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any
adversary.”9 These four concepts infused the defense and security policy
documents of the Bush administration. For example, the 2002 National
Security Strategy (NSS) restated verbatim the defense goals from the
2001 QDR and specifically argued that the United States could “dissuade
those who seek to acquire [WMD] by persuading enemies that they can-
not attain their desired ends.”10
By 2005, the goals of assurance, military-centric dissuasion, deter-
rence, and defeat completed a rhetorical shift toward being understood
as means to an end. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) placed them
in the category of “How We Accomplish Our Objectives,” which the NDS
identified as the need to “secure the United States from direct attack, se-
cure strategic access and retain global freedom of action, strengthen al-
liances and partnerships, and establish favorable security conditions.”11
The NDS also noted that the United States “will place greater emphasis
on those capabilities that enable us to dissuade others from acquiring
catastrophic capabilities (WMD) [and] to deter their use.”12 The 2006
QDR highlighted dissuasion-in-action, stating, “forward-deployed forc-
es and flexible deterrent options have successfully dissuaded potential
enemies and assured allies and partners.”13 More importantly, the 2006
QDR introduced the priority of “Shaping the Choices of Countries at
Strategic Crossroads” as a way to operationalize the NDS. This goal was
closely linked to strategies designed to dissuade “a major or emerging
power [from choosing] a hostile path in the future,” while also persuad-
ing allies and partners to make choices that “foster cooperation and mu-
tual security interests.”14
The NSS, the NDS, and the 2006 QDR embrace dissuasion and deter-
rence as concepts critical to the nation’s defense and security. However,
these documents transformed both dissuasion and deterrence from the
strategic goals of the 2001 QDR to the means to achieve those goals.
This is an important shift because it explains dissuasion and deterrence
as tools of strategy rather than objectives themselves. From this, I argue
that nuclear weapons policy should not focus on the question: How do
we achieve dissuasion and deterrence? Instead, policy formation should
begin by asking: How can dissuasion and deterrence improve U.S. na-
tional security?15
 Towards a Policy of Nuclear Dissuasion   33

Modeling Dissuasion and Deterrence

Despite the Bush Administration’s relatively consistent use of the terms
dissuasion and deterrence, doubt and disagreement as to how the two
concepts relate to one another remain.16 In what follows, I propose three
dissuasion-deterrence models, which I label the Nonproliferation Mod-
el, the Continuum Model, and the Comprehensive Dissuasion Model. I
use the term “model” in a modest sense: more than a conceptual frame-
work but less than a theory. These models are not consistently empiri-
cal generalizations with descriptive, predictive, and explanatory power.
Instead, they are analytical exercises within the context of the “doubt
and disagreement” surrounding the relative meanings of deterrence and
dissuasion. However, these models do carry normative and prescriptive
implications, and I propose them as methods for communicating policy
intentions and as potential aids to the development of “tailored” strate-
gies of deterrence and dissuasion.
A second caveat is that these models do not result from any system-
atic historical investigation. Such an analysis would be valuable but is
beyond the task I have set myself here. Furthermore, such empirical and
historical investigations are best not undertaken until we have a clearer
understanding of the conceptual differences between deterrence and dis-
suasion. Historical analysis might produce some interesting anecdotes
and valuable insights, but it would not lead to logically consistent and
reliable propositions, in large part because the practical meanings and
uses of deterrence and dissuasion have changed so much over time.17
Nevertheless, historical examples are necessary when illustrating argu-
ments and conclusions about strategy, and I do make use of historical
cases when discussing the models that follow.
The Nonproliferation Model is the least complicated dissuasion-deter-
rence model to understand and apply. It is based upon the idea that de-
terrence prevents the use of nuclear weapons while dissuasion inhibits
the acquisition, expansion, improvement or proliferation of nuclear arse-
nals. Under this model, the actions being proscribed drive the choice of
an appropriate strategy (see Table 1).
For example, a policy designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons
by North Korea (DPRK) would rely upon deterrence, while policies de-
signed to prevent an increase in the size of the DPRK’s arsenal and/or
the export of nuclear weapons technology by the regime would include
strategies of dissuasion. The response to a strategy of nuclear blackmail
34   CHAPTER TWO

Table 2.1: The Nonproliferation Model

Examples of Proscribe Actions

(achieved through assurance, com-
Nuclear Strategy pellece, persuasion, threats)

Dissuasion Export of Nuclear Weapons

Technology and/or Materials
Acquisition of Nuclear Arsenal
Increase in Arsenal Size
Additional Arsenal Capabilities
Deterence Use of Nuclear Weapons

by North Korea would be one of deterrence if the DPRK is threaten-

ing a nuclear strike and dissuasive if proliferation to terrorist groups
is threatened. As a result, the Nonproliferation Model implicitly allows
both dissuasion and deterrence to operate at the same time against the
same adversary if, for example, the United States wanted to prevent both
the use of a North Korean nuclear weapon and the spread of nuclear
technology from the DPRK at the same time. In addition, while both
strategies make use of incentives or disincentives, a precise interpreta-
tion of the Nonproliferation Model means that the nuclear strategy in
question depends upon the proscribed action and not the policy tools
involved in implementation.
The increased complexity of the Continuum Model derives from un-
derstanding that practical strategies can make use of multiple approach-
es that include both deterrence and dissuasion. As Figure 2 illustrates,
the model places the 2001 QDR’s original defense goals of assurance,
dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat on a continuum that spans allies, po-
tential competitors, and enemies. A key feature of this model is the clear
relationship between dissuasion and assurance through the promise of
diplomatic and economic solutions to the problems that the potential
adversary believes proliferation will resolve. As Alexander Montgomery
notes after reviewing the history of U.S. nonproliferation efforts, “offer-
ing benefits that closely mirror some of the core motivations of these
states to proliferate has met with some success.” 18 For example, the ex-
tension of U.S. nuclear deterrence resolved the need by East Asian allies
to deter effectively nuclear aggression. In addition, the creation of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group provided a marketplace for nuclear technology
 Towards a Policy of Nuclear Dissuasion   35

industries for nations without complete nuclear capabilities.19 Finally,

isolation from the international system has also been “identified as a
possible correlate of nuclear weapons programs,” and the United States
should not overlook the value of helping to normalize a state’s interna-
tional status.20 Although, Libya would seem to be the most recent and
clearest example of this policy at work, there are mixed results from the
ongoing DPRK example.

Figure 2.1: The Continuum Model

A second feature of the Continuum Model is the clear relationship

between dissuasion and deterrence through the promise of credible
military action (e.g. nuclear and non-nuclear strikes). While assurance
increases the benefits of choosing not to proliferate, credible military
threats decrease the possible benefits of proliferation (dissuasion by
denial). However, the issue is one of credibility; and deterrence com-
plements dissuasion to the degree that adversaries do not perceive the
United States as self-deterred. For example, the United States could
develop a nuclear weapon tailored to destroy effectively underground
biological and chemical weapons bunkers. This is a credible deterrent
that aids WMD dissuasion only if potential proliferators believe that the
United States favors the benefits of a nuclear strike over the costs of col-
lateral damage and international opprobrium.
A final and critical component of the Continuum Model is the iden-
tification of the object of nuclear strategy as an ally, potential competi-
36   CHAPTER TWO

tor, or enemy. Policymakers who see the world through this model first
ask about the relationship between the two states of interest. On the
one hand this makes sense, the Pentagon does not need to waste time
developing plans to defeat or deter the nuclear forces of allies like the
United Kingdom or France, although it does wish to dissuade prolif-
eration by allies such as Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc., owing to the
potential destabilizing effects and the consequent threats to the inter-
ests of the United States and its allies. Any shift in relations between
the United States and its allies will be a slow process. However, at the
other extreme, a focus on defeating potential enemies runs the risk of
neglecting strategies of assurance and dissuasion for states that current-
ly threaten national security. It is also true that the Continuum Model
ignores the potential need to dissuade allies from acquiring, expand-
ing, or enhancing their nuclear arsenals. Using the Continuum Model to
make a cost-benefit calculus on proliferation, we have an intuitive sense
of how to track states that gradually move from friendly regional rivals
to potential enemies. However, it is less clear how the model illuminates
U.S. policy towards existing extended deterrence clients that face new
regional nuclear powers and the question of developing their own indig-
enous nuclear programs.21
The Comprehensive Dissuasion Model makes explicit the relation-
ship between dissuasion, deterrence, and assurance implied by the Con-
tinuum Model by proposing a comprehensive view of dissuasion that
contains elements of deterrence and compellence. Consequently, com-
prehensive dissuasion does not lie on a continuum at the same level as
deterrence and assurance but exists in a hierarchical relationship with
these strategies.
This third model begins with the idea that dissuasion is fundamen-
tally a strategy intended to influence the choices of an adversary. Unlike
a strict interpretation of deterrence as a strategy calculated to convince
an adversary to do anything other than the proscribed action, compre-
hensive dissuasion is a strategy designed to channel adversary choices
toward actions that improve U.S. national security. Successful deter-
rence of a potential security threat maintains the status quo, which has
a neutral effect on national security (granted that maintaining the sta-
bility of national security is itself a positive development). Successful
dissuasion goes a step further than deterrence by also compelling an
adversary to select from its range of policy choices an action that im-
proves U.S. national security. Figure 2 graphically portrays the manner
 Towards a Policy of Nuclear Dissuasion   37

in which dissuasion through deterrence and compellence acts upon the

decision calculus of an adversary contemplating a range of choices that
can be placed on a sliding scale indexed to the effects of these choices on
U.S. national security.

Figure 2.2: The Comprehensive Dissuasion Model

Channeling an adversary towards a particular area of its range of

choices accounts for the underlying reasons why an adversary would
contemplate acquiring, expanding, or improving its nuclear arsenal.
Historically, we know that choices about nuclear proliferation are not
made in a vacuum, and the United States has a long history of influ-
encing how other nations interpreted the range of choices available to
them. In the past, the United States has repeatedly been willing to offer
diplomatic and economic incentives to compel states to roll back their
nuclear programs and not simply freeze them, and these incentives of-
ten engaged the reasons that underlay the state’s initial interest in pro-
liferation.22
A comprehensive strategy of nuclear dissuasion would build upon in-
formal yet successful strategies that combined elements of compellence
and deterrence in a new and interesting way. In a recent essay on the
historical differences between the two terms in the academic literature,
Maria Sperandei highlights deterrence and compellence as “distinctive-
and-linked strategies” and argues that:
An actor who engages in a deterrent policy should already have an
idea of his possible compellent replies in case the opponent refuses
to behave as the deterrer desires. The deterrer’s idea will obviously
change across time… The smoother the linkage and the less abrupt
38   CHAPTER TWO

the passage from a compellent to a deterrent policy, the better for the
side planning and executing them.23
Sperandei’s conception of deterrence and compellence as “sequential
policies” is an important step towards unifying them in policy and in
practice, but I argue that doing so stops short of seizing the opportu-
nity—perhaps limited to nuclear strategy—to combine deterrence and
compellence in a synchronous and comprehensive strategy.24 That is,
there is no theoretical or practical reason why the United States can-
not pursue strategies of deterrence and compellence at the same time in
order to influence the decision calculus of a current or potential nuclear
adversary (or competitor). Labeling such comprehensive strategy “dis-
suasion” leverages contemporary interest in the term, allows deterrence
to maintain its traditional role of directly preventing military action
against the United States, and emphasizes that a policy based on nuclear
dissuasion ultimately prevents actions that would threaten U.S. national
security.25

Toward a Comprehensive Policy of

Nuclear Dissuasion
Each of these three models of dissuasion and deterrence could be used
to develop nuclear policy. Use of the Nonproliferation Model – the most
basic of the three—would be restrictive because of its either/or approach
to strategies of dissuasion and deterrence. The second model, that of the
Continuum, could aid in the development of strategies that are at least
aware of the linkages between dissuasion, deterrence, and assurance; but
I argue that simple awareness of the ability to construct an overall policy
that includes each of these strategies and calculates their relative weight
in a given scenario is not enough. Instead, a comprehensive nuclear pol-
icy that emerges from the Comprehensive Dissuasion Model promises
to incorporate pro-actively strategies of deterrence and compellence as
critical and equally important parts of a policy of nuclear dissuasion,
while at the same time allowing for its tailored application.
There are different kinds of nuclear relationships for which deter-
rence must be individually tailored, and it follows that the same must
be true for dissuasion. It is one thing to dissuade a threshold state and
another to dissuade a nuclear near-peer. Clearly, the stability of deter-
rence depends upon many factors, and therefore dissuasion necessarily
 Towards a Policy of Nuclear Dissuasion   39

engages each potential adversary or competitor differently. For example,

the United States may dissuade a threshold state by resolving regional
security tensions diplomatically, providing economic outlets for do-
mestic nuclear technology industries, and incorporating the state into
regional and international institutions. When trying to dissuade an
existing nuclear power, similar tactics may not work because the state
already enjoys some deterrent benefit from its nuclear arsenal, might
already be engaged in regional and international organizations, and may
seek to expand its self-perception as a regional hegemon. In this case,
the nuclear near-peer competitor may be dissuaded by downplaying the
possible benefits of nuclear expansion in light of the current benefits the
state enjoys.
As a result of the tailored nature of nuclear dissuasion, any general
policy should allow for the flexibility to accommodate different and
changing regional (and sometimes domestic) security and political en-
vironments. However, I propose that a comprehensive strategy of nucle-
ar dissuasion can be framed in general terms as follows:

Compellence
■ General Assurance: e.g., the United States assures states of existing
diplomatic and economic solutions to perceived security problems.
These solutions raise the benefits of choosing not to proliferate. For
example, this can be achieved by the appropriate selections of tar-
gets and careful communication with the adversary.
■ Tailored Compellence: e.g., the United States identifies within the
entire range of choices available to an adversary a small number
that will improve U.S. national security. The U.S. tailors a pack-
age of incentives and solutions that compel an adversary to choose
from these alternatives.

Deterrence
■ Affirming the Credibility of the U.S. Deterrent: e.g., the United States
promises that any nuclear or WMD strike against the U.S., its allies,
or its military forces will result in a response, which may include,
but not be limited to, the use of nuclear capabilities. Furthermore,
this general deterrence is tailored to the type of state and the actions
being deterred.26
■ Negating the Credibility of the Adversary’s Deterrent: e.g., the United
40   CHAPTER TWO

States clearly states that nuclear or WMD threats by an adversary

against the U.S., its allies, or its military forces will be met by over-
whelming U.S. response that includes nuclear and conventional ca-
pabilities to preserve the security interests of the United States.
■ Deterrence by Denial: e.g., the United States promises the following
actions against states that threaten the security of the U.S., its allies,
or its military forces (with conventional escalation and U.S. nuclear
forces providing the intrawar deterrence against nuclear or WMD
use):
● Threshold states that choose to proliferate will provoke a preven-
tive military strike designed to cripple permanently the nuclear
or WMD program before it can reach fruition.27
● The United States will interdict illegal nuclear technology transfer
involving threshold or “rogue” states. This involves the movement
of people, knowledge, materials, or equipment to or from states of
security concern.
● When possible, a preemptive U.S. military strike designed to neu-
tralize permanently WMD capabilities before they can be used
or proliferated will be directed at nuclear “rogues” that choose to
make such capabilities operational.28
This would or could be adopted as a policy of comprehensive nuclear
dissuasion: channeling the decision calculus of a state contemplating the
range of choices surrounding the acquisition, expansion, or improve-
ment of nuclear capabilities. If successfully applied, a policy of nuclear
dissuasion provides a beneficial alternative to proliferation that im-
proves the national security of the United States, underscores the self-
evident costs of nuclear use, lowers the likelihood of successful nuclear
or WMD development, and clearly removes any potential deterrent ef-
fects of nuclear capabilities.
How would such a policy of nuclear dissuasion be put into operation?
Apart from clearly announcing this policy in general terms, it should be
articulated in detail and periodically updated for specific potential adver-
saries. However, the policy would also need to be sufficiently ambiguous
on specifics of response or the conditions that would trigger a nuclear
response (i.e., tailored) to avoid unnecessary commitment traps. Dur-
ing this process, economic and diplomatic benefits tied to compelling
a particular choice by an adversary would need to be clearly expressed,
 Towards a Policy of Nuclear Dissuasion   41

negotiated in good faith, and delivered after agreements were secured.

In terms of the nation’s nuclear posture, the “old triad” makes capabili-
ties clear, reliable, and survivable; demonstrably effective defenses raise
the likelihood that a limited nuclear strike would not succeed or at least
would limit the consequences of a nuclear salvo; and the responsive in-
frastructure establishes the ability to anticipate and react to changes in
the security environment.
Furthermore, the United States military contributes to a policy of dis-
suasion by establishing its ability to carry out preventive and preemp-
tive strikes as well as operate effectively on a nuclear battlefield (another
form of deterrence by denial). Although there are no near-term needs
for new nuclear or conventional weapons to successfully intervene and
neutralize nuclear or WMD programs, future events and developments
may change military needs and popular perception of new weapons.
Making the entire range of military capabilities—not just new nuclear
weapons systems—available to counter proliferation will offset anything
a potential adversary may do.

Conclusions
The central tenet of a policy of comprehensive nuclear dissuasion would
be to manipulate the costs and benefits of the entire range of choices
available to an adversary—not just the course of action the United States
seeks to deter. That is, borrowing from the 2006 QDR, comprehensive
nuclear dissuasion can effectively “shape the choices of countries at stra-
tegic crossroads” precisely because it accounts for and engages all of the
choices available to the country in question. A decision by an adver-
sary that would improve U.S. national security—rather than maintain
the status quo—is possible when the comprehensive goal of dissuasion
through deterrence and compellence is taken into account. In addition
to deterring action, the United States needs to compel favorable choices
by adversaries, competitors, friends and allies that will improve U.S. na-
tional security.
The way in which dissuasion can improve the national security of
the United States is clear. Comprehensive dissuasion strategies seek to
reduce the likelihood that adversaries will obtain nuclear or WMD ar-
senals and may well slow any progress of those determined to acquire
them. In addition, effective dissuasion also increases the likelihood that
42   CHAPTER TWO

potential adversaries will choose to reduce their dependence on military

solutions to their security and economic problems. Finally, comprehen-
sive nuclear dissuasion is a strategy designed to channel the energy and
resources of adversaries into policies that improve U.S. national securi-
ty—both in direct relation to the adversary in question and on a regional
or global scale. The United States can indeed—through comprehensive
dissuasion—shape the choices of countries to the benefit of the United
States. and its allies. There is an opportunity in today’s strategic environ-
ment to emphasize such a comprehensive policy for combating prolifer-
ation, one that does not rely solely upon military efforts or new nuclear
weapons. I argue that comprehensive nuclear dissuasion is that policy.

Notes
1. “Quadrennial Defense Review Report” (2001 QDR), September 2001,
www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.
2. See “The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America” (NDS),
March 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf,
iv.
3. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review
Report: Foreword,” January 9, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/
d20020109npr.pdf; J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internation-
al Security Policy, “Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,” January 9,
2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html;
and “Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review,” January 9, 2002, http://www.
defenselink.mil/DODCMSShare/briefingslide/ 120/020109-D-6570C-001.pdf.
4. J. David Singer, “Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model,” The American
Political Science Review, Vol. 57, No. 2 (June 1963), 424.
5. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966), 69.
6. Ibid., 71.
7. “U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National Strategy
and Requirements,” July 1998, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2001/
US%20Nuclear%20Policy%20-%20Nov%2001/USNPAF.pdf.
8. Ibid., 1.5.
9. 2001 QDR, 11.
10. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (2002
NSS), September 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, p. 14.
11. NDS, iv.
 Towards a Policy of Nuclear Dissuasion   43

12. NDS, 3.
13. “Quadrennial Defense Review Report” (2006 QDR), February 2006,
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf, p. 14. In this in-
stance, dissuasion helped maintain favorable security conditions while also
retaining global freedom of action. We could also add other tools commonly
portrayed by their proponents as aids to nuclear dissuasion such as the Prolifer-
ation Security Initiative (PSI), the Megaport Initiative, and continued work on
National Missile Defense (NMD). See Andrew C. Winner, “The Proliferation
Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction,” The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 28, No. 2 (Spring 2005), 129-143; Steven Aoki, Deputy Undersecretary of
Energy for Counterterrorism, “Testimony on ‘Detecting Smuggled Nuclear
Weapons’ before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee,” July 27, 2006, http://
www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/congressional/2006/2006-07-27_SJC_Nuclear_De-
tection_Hearing_(Aoki).pdf; and Robert Powell, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory,
Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense,” International Security,
Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), 86-118.
14. 2006 QDR, 27-28.
15. The 2001 QDR’s definition of dissuasion as an objective, dissuading com-
petition with the United States left the means by which the U.S. could achieve
this goal unclear. Rethinking dissuasion as a policy tool further broadens its
meaning. Nuclear dissuasion encompasses tools that seek to prevent horizon-
tal and vertical proliferation, sponsorship of nuclear terrorism, deterrence of
nuclear threats, and potentially even competition by offering positive security
assurances to U.S. adversaries or allies.
16. The Administration itself has added to the confusion. For example,
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September 2006, available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/index.html) states that one of
the major objectives of the strategy is to “deter terrorists and supporters from
contemplating a WMD attack and, failing that, to dissuade them from actu-
ally conducting an attack” (p. 14). In this instance, the administration reverses
deterrence and dissuasion from the otherwise consistent usage seen in earlier
documents.
17. Singer makes a similar argument about his persuasion-dissuasion model
in “Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model,” although he also suggests that
much could be learned from the literature of psychology, sociology, or anthro-
pology.
18. Alexander H. Montgomery, “Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle
an Atomic Bomb Network,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2006),
179.
19. This is true for both buyers and sellers. Because of entities like the NSG
44   CHAPTER TWO

and the Zanger Committee, a nation need not have a complete nuclear fuel
cycle in order to participate as a supplier on the world market. Similarly, a na-
tion may exercise its right to nuclear technology under the NPT without main-
taining all (or even any) parts of the fuel cycle.
20. Montgomery, 180.
21. See David Yost, “Dissuasion and Allies,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, No. 2
(February 2005), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/feb/yostfeb05.pdf.
22. See Ariel E. Levite’s discussion of “the threat (or promise) of denying (or
providing) economic and technological assistance [as] another tool commonly
(and successfully) used by the United States to encourage nuclear nonprolif-
eration,” in “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International
Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), 78-79.
23. Maria Sperandei, “Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: An Alterna-
tive Approach to the Study of Coercive Diplomacy,” International Studies Re-
view, Vol. 8 (2006), 277.
24. Ibid., 279.
25. One could conceivably take the perspective of a comprehensive strategy
of “persuasion” that combines compellence and dissuasion and would empha-
size compellence. I argue for dissuasion in large part because of the large body
of military and academic literature that explores how to use military force and
technology to prevent adversary actions that threaten the national security of
the United States.
26. USSTRATCOM’s current Joint Operating Concept on Deterrence Op-
erations (DO JOC) already incorporates many elements of a policy of compre-
hensive nuclear dissuasion (See the “Deterrence Operations Joint Operating
Concept: Version 2.0,” August 2006. http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/
concepts/do_joc_v20.doc).
27. The U.S. strike on a pharmaceuticals factory in Sudan on August 20,
1998, although in large part retaliation for bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania, was nevertheless a military strike designed to prevent the pro-
duction of chemical weapons that could be used against the United States.
28. It may seem that imperfect intelligence and U.S. risk intolerance would
reduce the credibility of such an option, especially as part of a declaratory poli-
cy. However, while missile defense may be a more credible policy of denial from
a declaration perspective, the point here is to declare the intention of the United
States to deny actively the ownership of WMD.
 Chapter Three

North Korea and Implications for

U.S. National Security Policy
Dennis Shorts

A
merica faces few national security challenges as enduring or as
difficult to resolve as the Democratic Peoples Republic of Ko-
rea (DPRK), or North Korea. Pyongyang’s October 2006 under-
ground nuclear test was the most dramatic event in a saga marked by
mutual distrust and frightening brinkmanship. With a standing army
of more than one million—70 percent of which is deployed near the
demilitarized zone (DMZ)—DPRK is a brutal police state perpetually
on a war footing. The government’s songun (military first) ethos charac-
terizes an isolated totalitarian regime where the oppression of millions
is fashioned through propaganda as a glorious military struggle against
Western “imperialists.”
In contrast to its espoused national ideology of juche, or extreme self-
reliance, the regime has depended upon the aid and largesse of other
nations to meet the basic needs of its citizens. With a population of just
over 23 million and an economy smaller than New Hampshire’s,1 North
Korea’s modest experiments with market reform and limited economic
cooperation (mainly with Chinese and South Korean partners) have
done little to alleviate the profound suffering of its citizens. In the end,
the scant resources available are channeled to military endeavors as well
as to luxury items for the power elite.
What continues to astonish the international community is the abil-
ity of this “failed state” to muddle on with a “cult of personality” leader
at its helm. Although he is portrayed as being a madman, Kim Jong-il’s
actions over the course of his leadership have been largely calculating,

45
46   CHAPTER THREE

albeit eccentric. Despite ruling a backward economy with few national

assets, the so-called “Dear Leader” has leveraged threats and managed
crises remarkably well over the years. However, the 2006 nuclear test
marked a new era in North Korean brinkmanship politics, and seriously
undermines global nuclear nonproliferation efforts.2
This chapter will begin by exploring possible drivers for North Ko-
rea’s pursuit of nuclear arms—namely, developing a credible deterrent,
raising the value of its bargaining chips, managing internal political
exigencies, and generating hard currency through illicit weapons sales
(including ballistic missile technologies as well as potential nuclear ma-
terials). The discussion will then move to an analysis of U.S. national
security priorities in light of these drivers. How can the United States
convincingly draw red lines while seeking to negotiate toward peace?

Strategic Intentions
Validating the capability assessments of U.S. intelligence agencies over
the previous several years, North Korea’s underground nuclear test on
October 9, 2006 removed any lingering doubt that fashioning and deto-
nating a crude nuclear device lay within the ambit of North Korea’s tech-
nical expertise.3 (More worrying, its burgeoning stockpile of plutonium
grants it continued resources to refine its bomb-making, and its ballistic
missile technology would give it the ability to strike Seoul or Tokyo,
and could pose a future threat to the continental United States as well.)
With this development, it is crucial to consider what North Korea’s in-
tentions are in terms of its nuclear program. Given the opaqueness of
the regime and the difficulty of obtaining intelligence (especially human
intelligence), this question is nearly impossible to answer with full con-
fidence.4 There are several possible ways to interpret the motivations be-
hind Pyongyang’s actions to date. It is important to note, however, that
these possibilities are in no way discrete—these factors, along with oth-
ers, interact in a complex calculus that one could only know were one
to be privy to Kim Jong-il’s thoughts. What can be known is that power
elite decision-making is driven by pressing imperatives for regime sur-
vival: North Korea and Mr. Kim want a guaranteed future.

Creating a Credible Deterrent

Since the Korean War (1950-1953), North Korea has consistently point-
ed to a security threat emanating from the United States as the central
 North Korea and Implications for U.S. National Security Policy   47

rationale for developing its military arsenal. Although the state is in-
credibly militarized, much of its forces are antiquated and poorly main-
tained, and there is little doubt that North Korea recognizes the steadily
declining nature of its conventional capabilities. The DPRK is far out-
stripped by the combination of U.S. and South Korean forces faced off
against it across the DMZ (however, its artillery batteries aimed at Seoul
remain a powerful deterrent to the United States and its allies). Accord-
ingly, Pyongyang has focused on weapons such as ballistic missiles and
artillery aimed at civilian targets and has allegedly pursued chemical
and biological arms.5
The July 4th 2006 launch of a long-range Taepo-dong 2 missile, cou-
pled with the 2006 nuclear test, shows the DPRK actively seeking to
develop a credible deterrent to ward off what it calls “the U.S. imperial-
ists’ aggression and war moves.”6 In addition, it can certainly be argued
that the war in Iraq reinforced the calculation among U.S. adversaries
that nuclear weapons are needed for deterrence.7 Nuclear armed states
do not get invaded.
However, a sub-kiloton explosion does not constitute automatic nu-
clear deterrence. There are several components to presenting a credible
deterrent. As Siegfried Hecker, the former head of Los Alamos Nation-
al Laboratory and one of the few American nuclear physicists to visit
North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor complex explained to his DPRK hosts,
a true deterrent has three parts: the ability to make plutonium metal, the
ability to design and build a nuclear device, and the ability to integrate
the device into a delivery system.8
By most accounts, Pyongyang’s 2006 test signaled the near accom-
plishment of the first two. This is a qualified statement given the explo-
sion’s low yield.9 However, this low yield did not necessarily constitute a
failure, but can be more accurately characterized as a lack of success.10
Most judge that North Korean scientists will have gleaned much from
the test and will most likely “test again to assert the credibility of its
nuclear arsenal.”11 Indeed, we might also expect a missile test in con-
junction with another nuclear detonation to demonstrate that the na-
tion might one day be capable of marrying a nuclear warhead onto a
ballistic missile (although warhead miniaturization seems still to pres-
ent a daunting hurdle). To this end, Pyongyang’s actions may be seen as
a quest to satisfy all three conditions for achieving true nuclear deter-
rence in the foreseeable future.
48   CHAPTER THREE

The Ultimate Bargaining Chip

With a decrepit national economy based on illicit arms sales and state
sponsorship of criminality (counterfeiting and drug smuggling, among
other activities), nuclear crises might be used as a tool to periodically
extract aid from the international community. Through this brinkman-
ship, Kim Jong-il might have tested in order to increase the value of the
benefits package to be offered for freezing and forgoing nuclear weapons
development. North Korea’s typical negotiating strategy has sought to
ratchet up crises, regularly going into modes that step to and back away
from drastic actions. As it has done so, the United States (and indeed
the international community as a whole) has looked upon the antics
of North Korea with concern, tempered in some cases with a certain
crisis fatigue. Pyongyang can be counted on to provoke a perennial cri-
sis when doing so serves its needs and wins it benefits. This is an in-
trinsically dangerous strategy and, as many experts argue, increasingly
limits North Korea’s range of choices as the talks carry on. In this re-
gard, maintaining leverage in negotiations entails “show[ing] that not all
threats are bluffs.”12 To this end, given its vitriolic statements, the DPRK
might have tested a nuclear weapon in order to save “face” and maintain
credibility.
It might seem counterintuitive for Pyongyang to risk broad-ranging
UN sanctions in order to seek more economic benefits from the inter-
national community. However, the North has done just this over the
years and, up until the 2006 nuclear test, Beijing and Seoul have ac-
commodated an intransigent DPRK by providing money and aid while
six-party talks floundered. Ostensibly this was done largely out of fear of
risking total economic (and regime) collapse in the North, which would
inevitably lead to floods of refugees over the Chinese and South Korean
borders.
The October 9, 2006 test might also be a response to the compre-
hensive financial sanctions executed by the U.S. Treasury Department
on Banco Delta Asia, a Macao-based bank with extensive North Ko-
rean dealings in counterfeit U.S. currency. In the crackdown, the DPRK
claimed that $24 million in assets were unjustly frozen.13 For the cash-
strapped North, this action certainly hurt their vulnerable coffers, and
may have played a part in North Korea’s return to the six-party talks in
November 2006.
There is great debate over whether North Korea would actually bar-
 North Korea and Implications for U.S. National Security Policy   49

gain away something as precious as their nuclear program, an endeavor

in which they have invested much of their scarce resources over the past
several decades. However, some point to North Korea’s statement that it
would still seek a nuclear-free Korean peninsula as a future goal as evi-
dence of Pyonyang’s willingness to negotiate a dismantlement.14 There
is no way of knowing now if this will take place; and the historical record
for countries voluntarily relinquishing nuclear arms is not encourag-
ing.15

Internal Political Intrigue

Internal political intrigue having to do with challenges to the legitimacy
of Kim Jong-il’s leadership, as well as uncertainty surrounding the im-
plementation of a succession plan, might drive the North’s leader to par-
ry threats from within through the credibility that nuclear arms might
offer (especially from the perspective of the hard-line military cadre).
While there is no question that Kim wields absolute power within his
regime, what is less clear is the extent to which his power remains unas-
sailable as he seeks to pass leadership of the country to a member of his
family (possibly one of his sons).16
The late Kim Il-sung, the founding father of North Korea (enshrined
as the leader of the nation in perpetuity), spent decades preparing the
way for his son, the “Dear Leader.” And, though largely seen during the
early years of his ascent as a playboy cinephile with a penchant for co-
gnac, Kim Jong-il has succeeded in consolidating power and co-opting
the power elite in government—mainly by shifting political influence
from the Korean Workers’ Party to the National Defense Commission
(of which he is chairman) and, by extension, the Korean Peoples’ Army
(KPA).17 Unlike his father, who was considered a war hero for having
fought the Japanese in Manchuria, the younger Kim has no military ex-
perience. Accordingly, some posit that he has compensated for this by
instituting songun policies. Although there is debate as to the ultimate
influence the military elite have in Pyongyang, there is no question that
they “on many issues have what amounts to veto authority.”18
As in most totalitarian countries, the North’s nuclear program is
largely managed by the military. Because of the KPA’s influence in deci-
sion making, it is a safe assumption that military advisers to Kim Jong-il
saw a detonation as an opportunity to demonstrate the military’s and
scientific communities’ accomplishments. This is clear in the Korean
50   CHAPTER THREE

Central News Agency statement following the test: “Both to the people
and military, who have always yearned for the strength to defend the
nation, this day brings joy and encouragement.”19

Policy Implications and Red Lines

At the time of writing, more than a year after substantive meetings in
six-party talks, there is little doubt that the North’s 2006 test killed most
hopes that this format would yield results in the next round of talks
(and this has been borne out by the conclusion of talks that began on
December 18, 2006).20 However, not all is lost. The six-party structure
has allowed the United States to coordinate policies with China, Japan,
South Korea, and Russia—countries with much at stake for maintaining
stability in Northeast Asia. This six-party framework also goes some way
toward building a nascent security structure that could be expanded in
future years to address a host of issues that are important for preserving
peace in the region.21

The End of Ambiguity

North Korea’s 2006 test is a clear departure from its previous tactic of
maintaining ambiguity over its nuclear capabilities. Before the test, this
ambiguity allowed South Korea and China to play down estimates of the
scope and pace of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. China could
dodge international (namely U.S.) pressure to punish North Korea for
its intransigence. Uncertainty over North Korea’s programs allowed a
continued South Korean diminution in threat perception precipitated by
years of the “Sunshine Policy” and its follow-on versions carried out by
the liberal President Roh Moo-Hyun. South Korea’s economic ventures
such as the Kaesong Industrial Zone as well as joint tourism ventures
to Mt. Kumkang continued apace. Why would North Korea jeopardize
substantial material support from Seoul and Beijing by proceeding with
the nuclear test? More important, why would North Korea risk offend-
ing its sympathetic neighbors, making them lose face by ignoring their
entreaties not to test missiles or a nuclear device?
The answer might lie in the simple explanation that acquisition of a
nuclear bomb is its overriding objective. Beijing and Seoul’s distaste for
interdiction of North Korean vessels and their softer interpretations of
UN Security Council Resolution 1718 suggest difficulty in creating a
 North Korea and Implications for U.S. National Security Policy   51

true “coalition for punishment.” Pyongyang might have made the gam-
ble that, though sanctions would follow, South Korea and China would
never risk precipitating the North’s collapse. The humanitarian emer-
gency that would ensue, along with the enormous economic burden that
would be required to bring the backward North into the modern era,
certainly give the two bordering nations pause.22 Indeed, South Korea
announced that economic ventures with the North will continue in the
wake of their nuclear test.23 Moreover, in terms of Chinese calculations,
a united Korea presents problems of its own. There is no question that
a unified and nationalistic Korea would complicate China’s rise as a
major power in the region. One attendant problem is the issue of his-
tory and geography. The Koguryo dispute in 2002 exposed China’s fear
of future territorial disputes and showed Beijing’s attempts to preempt
them.24
A second nuclear test would be a true gamble for the Northern re-
gime. If this were to take place, the coalition built around U.S. and Japa-
nese efforts would coalesce further and more closely coordinate a tough
response. And, here, South Korea would have little choice but to suspend
economic cooperation at the risk of tearing asunder an already wobbly
U.S.-ROK alliance.25 Although North Korean nuclear arms “would pre-
sumably invalidate the ROK’s belief that the DPRK weapon’s potential
should not preclude the steady progression of inter-Korean relations,”
the converse currently seems to be true.26
Most important to the allies in the region in the wake of the test was
the U.S. reassurance that the U.S. security umbrella is robust, and that
Washington is committed to maintaining its alliance obligations in the
region. Although some have posited that a nuclear breakout by North
Korea would set off an arms race in the region, with Seoul and Tokyo
seeking capabilities of their own, most experts (as well as those coun-
tries’ leaders) have dismissed such thoughts.27

Red Lines
In the course of attempting to achieve its nuclear ambitions, North Ko-
rea has taken every opportunity to cross “red lines” that have been
drawn. In the spring of 1994, North Korea crossed a red line by
unloading the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. Conflict was avoided by
the high-level trip of former President Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang. In
subsequent years, withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), eviction of International Atomic Energy (IAEA) inspectors from
52   CHAPTER THREE

Yongbyon, removal of the 8,000 spent fuel rods, and stated reprocessing
of those rods show a North Korean pattern of behavior that seeks op-
portunities to cross red lines.28 Doing so ratchets up crises in the hopes
of winning larger “carrots,” and reinforces Kim Jong-il’s domestic image
as a strong leader able to flout the constraints of the international com-
munity.
In one such instance, just days after Assistant Secretary Christopher
Hill made the statement, “The United States will not live with a nuclear
North Korea,” Pyongyang detonated its first nuclear device. This was
an embarrassment for Washington, but more significantly, North Ko-
rea had “publicly and very clearly thumbed its nose at China, which is
no small feat, and it has significant implications for Chinese power and
wherewithal.”29
The most pressing threat in the current situation is not that North
Korea will commit a suicidal act by launching a nuclear-tipped ballistic
missile (a capability some years away) at the United States, but that the
accumulation of fissile material the country is stockpiling is transferred
or sold to a state or entity bent on violence. 30 By all accounts, this is the
one red line that, if crossed, would lead to a firm U.S. response.31 Most
worrying, North Korea has hinted in the past that it would transfer fis-
sile material if “the United States drives [it] into a corner.”32

The Way Forward

What might the future hold? Even with subsequent rounds of six-party
talks, there is a real possibility that North Korea will proceed with the
development of its nuclear and missile programs in order establish a
credible nuclear deterrent. Kim Jong-il might find it possible to suf-
fer through sanctions (even if they are tightened), knowing that China
and South Korea will not want his regime to collapse. Having “given up
on the Bush administration as a negotiating partner,” a demonstrated
nuclear deterrent might give the North a more powerful negotiating po-
sition as the regime “waits for another American administration two
years down the pike.”33
In many ways, the timing of events during the period of October 9
encompasses the stark contrasts of the two Koreas. While North Korea
detonated a nuclear bomb and hunkers down for another winter of fam-
ine and “struggle,” South Korea’s foreign minister was confirmed as the
next UN Secretary General. “The appointment is seen as the supreme
 North Korea and Implications for U.S. National Security Policy   53

embarrassment for North Korea.”34 North Korea’s burgeoning nucle-

ar program is, in some ways, an attempt to hold on to the notion that
North Korea is the real “Korea,” the guardian of what truly comprises
valid Korean culture and pride.35
As discussed in Michael Tkacik’s chapter, Korea experts who have
worked in Republican and Democratic administrations see the utility
of appointing a high-level envoy to tackle the North Korean challenge.
To this end, in consultation with six-party partners, the United States
should appoint a presidential envoy to go to Pyongyang with real power
to negotiate a settlement.36 Other members of the six-party talks have
advocated this. The appointment of Ban Ki-moon as UN Secretary Gen-
eral presents an opportunity to bring the resources of the UN more fully
into the equation on this issue as well.
However, it is important to disavow regime change as an intention of
Washington as it carries out further negotiations. In recent years, U.S.
officials have done this by recognizing the sovereignty of the North.
Whether Pyongyang accepts these statements as sincere is debatable.
It is obvious that Kim Jong-il presides over a reprehensible regime and,
understandably, many world leaders (President Bush chief among them)
express a visceral hatred of the way things are run in Pyongyang. But,
“we must deal with North Korea as it is, not as we want it to be.”37
In many ways, the United States has tried to fit North Korea into the
Libyan model of nuclear disarmament. During his trip to Pyongyang in
January 2005, Representative Curt Weldon impressed upon the North
Korean leadership the example of Libya.38 He detailed how Libya, after
relinquishing its nuclear ambitions, received comprehensive aid and an
opening of ties with the West. He emphatically pointed out that North
Korea could make the same decision and see the same benefits. In re-
sponse, the North Korean officials stated, “We are not Libya. Don’t com-
pare us to Libya. We’re a nuclear-capable country ready for war.”39
Working toward resolving the North Korean nuclear problem should
be the first step in addressing more fundamental issues in the regime at
a later point. Trying to tackle all of Pyongyang’s transgressions—from
drug trafficking and missile sales to human rights abuses and abduc-
tions—is tantamount to seeking regime change. It is counterproduc-
tive and does nothing to diminish the threat of North Korea’s nuclear
weapons. The bottom line is that “you cannot have regime change and
a deal.”40
54   CHAPTER THREE

While North Korea increases the robustness of its current nuclear

program, and suffers more isolation and suffering, the average North
Korean citizen, especially those outside of Pyongyang, is in danger of
starvation. Yet the destitute populace adheres to government exhorta-
tions urging: “Let’s Eat Two Meals per Day, Not Three!”41 Indeed, they
have little other choice save for making the treacherous trip out of the
country.42
Some argue that sending a presidential envoy to Pyongyang rewards
North Korea and grants it a legitimacy that it does not deserve. Although
there is a danger that Iran and other potential proliferators could see a
precedent in this, it is the president’s responsibility to deal with pressing
national security concerns by seeking to solve them with all the tools
available.43
It is important to note that concessions North Korea might make in
its nuclear weapons program could be part of a strategy to stall before
engaging in another cycle of belligerence and obstinacy. However, close
coordination in the six-party format gives Pyongyang much less room in
which to do this. In addition, reputational costs for North Korea would
eventually become too high, especially in terms of Beijing’s tolerance.
North Korea, a maddeningly resilient “failed state” with weapons
of mass destruction, poses one of the most enduring and problematic
international security threats to the United States. Concerted, focused
attention, along with close coordination with regional allies, holds the
best chance for solving the problem.

Notes
1. CIA World Fact Book: North Korea, December 19, 2006 and Victor Cha
and David Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) p. 43.
2. North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) came into effect on April 10, 2003. For more information on its with-
drawal from the NPT, see Paul Kerr, “North Korea Quits NPT, Says Will Restart
Nuclear Facilities,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2003.
3. Larry K. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Congressio-
nal Research Service Report for Congress, October 5, 2006, pp. 10-15.
4. Ambassador Donald Gregg, a former CIA station chief in Seoul, has called
North Korea “the longest-running intelligence failure in the history of U.S. espi-
onage.” See “Kim’s Nuclear Gamble,” Frontline, February 20, 2003. http://www.
pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/gregg.html
 North Korea and Implications for U.S. National Security Policy   55

5. Jonathan Pollack, “The Strategic Futures and Military Capabilities of the

Two Koreas,” Strategic Asia 2006-06: Military Uncertainty in an Era of Uncer-
tainty, National Bureau of Asian Research (Seattle Washington: 2005), p. 137.
6. “Concession and Submission to Imperialism Mean Death,” Korean Cen-
tral News Agency, October 23, 2006.
7. “The Future Nuclear Landscape: New Realities, New Responses,” Center
for the Study of WMD 2006 Symposium Summary, National Defense University,
May 2006. Available at http://www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/docUploaded//Sym-
posium%202006%20-%20Key%20Themes.pdf.
8. See “Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North
Korea,” Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21,
2004, p.5. http://www.lanl.gov/orgs/pa/newsbulletin/2004/01/22/Hecker_Tes-
timony_012104.pdf. Although Dr. Hecker’s opinion of deterrence is valid, it is
also important to note that classical definitions of minimal deterrence would
set the bar much lower.
9. There have been several interesting propositions as to why North Korea’s
test had such a low yield: 1) A “fizzle” due to a design flaw in the implosion
device; 2) A “test of principle design” that uses minimal fissile material in an
effort to conserve a limited stockpile; 3) Test of material that is short of weap-
ons grade; 4) Test of a core assembly for a boosted weapon (too advanced, very
unlikely). These explanations come from Anthony Cordesman, “The Meaning
of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Test,” CSIS Commentary, October 9,
2006.
10. Ambassador Charles “Jack” Pritchard remarks, Sigur Center for Asian
Studies, George Washington University, October 17, 2006 and Owen Price,
“Kim’s Intentions Unclear in Return to Six-Party Talks,” World Politics Watch,
November 1, 2006, http://www.worldpoliticswatch.com/article.aspx?id=305#
11. Jungmin Kang and Peter Hayes, “Technical Analysis of the DPRK Nu-
clear Test,” Nautilus Institute Special Report, October 20, 2006. Ambassador
Charles “Jack” Pritchard remarks at George Washington University, October
17, 2006, echoed this sentiment.
12. Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behav-
ior, (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999) p. 81.
13. “After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Dead?” Asia
Briefing Number 52, International Crisis Group, August 9, 2006, p. 3.
14. “North Korea’s Nuclear Gamble,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, October 13,
2006.
15. Jon Wolfstahl remarks, CSIS Press Briefing: North Korea’s Nuclear Test,
October 11, 2006.
56   CHAPTER THREE

16. “The lack of a known succession plan speaks to some uncertainty regard-
ing leadership transition in the North.” Remarks by Bruce Kligner, at “North
Korea: 2007 and Beyond,” Brookings-Center for Northeast Asian Policy Stud-
ies and Stanford-Asia Pacific Research Center Joint Conference, Washington,
D.C., September 13, 2006.
17. For an interesting look into possible bureaucratic rivalry within North
Korea, see Robert Carlin, “Wabbit in Freefall,” Policy Forum Online, The Nauti-
lus Institute, Sept. 21, 2006
18. Ken Gause, “North Korean Civil-Military Trends: Military Politics to a
Point,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2006, p.
VI. Mr. Gause goes on to point out that Kim Jong-il has promoted a large num-
ber of military loyalists to the rank of general officer over the years in order to
secure and consolidate his power.
19. “North Korea Conducts Nuclear Test,” Chosun Ilbo, October 9, 2006.
20. Because the bulk of this paper was written before the breakthrough agree-
ment reached on February 13, 2007, it does not adequately address early 2007
Six Party Talks and DPRK-U.S. developments. Suffice it to say that the tentative
agreement—encompassing working groups to address issues that should even-
tually bring North Korea into the international community—is an extremely
positive development and a cause for real hope.
21. For an in-depth look at the prospects for transforming the six-party pro-
cess into an enduring security structure in the region, see, “Building Multi-
Party Capacity for a WMD-Free Korea,” Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Workshop, Shanghai, China, March 16-17, 2005.
22. Russia also shares a five-mile border with North Korea, but it is heav-
ily guarded; thus, Moscow would not be significantly affected by refugee out-
flows.
23. Thomas Shanker, “South Says it will Continue Projects in the North,”
New York Times, October 19, 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/19/
world/asia/19cnd-korea.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
24. The Koguryo dynasty was an ancient kingdom of Korea that extended
from present-day North Korea across the Tumen and Yalu rivers into China.
Unbiased scholarly research confirms that the dynasty once ruled on Chinese
land. China, however, began a campaign to discredit this notion and designate
Koguryo as an ancient Chinese Kingdom—angering Koreans on both sides of
the DMZ. See Park Sang-wu, “China Stirs History Furor,” The Korea Times, Sep-
tember 12, 2006.
25. Where the United States sees Kim Jong-Il’s regime as an international
security concern and global threat to nonproliferation, South Koreans see the
DRPK in peninsular terms. This is further exacerbated by South Korea’s par-
 North Korea and Implications for U.S. National Security Policy   57

ticipation in the global war on terror, which seems to be predicated on ROK

pursuit of its own national interests rather than sentiments of alliance obliga-
tion. Indeed, by its non-participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative,
there are signs that it is wavering between cooperating with the United States,
seeking to accommodate China and not angering North Korea. See Victor Cha
in Ellings and Friedberg ed., Strategic Asia 2004-2005 (Seattle, Washington: The
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004).
26. Jonathan Pollack, “The Strategic Futures and Military Capabilities of the
Two Koreas,” Strategic Asia 2006-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Un-
certainty, The National Bureau of Asian Research (Seattle Washington: 2005),
p.163.
27. Although there have been some Japanese statements by members of the
Diet to express such a reevaluation of Japan’s non-nuclear stance, these seem to
be more for domestic consumption that serious policy proposals.
28. For more information on this series of events, see Joel Wit et al., Going
Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press), 2004.
29. Kurt Campbell remarks, CSIS Press Briefing: North Korea’s Nuclear Test,
October 11, 2006.
30. Ambassador Robert Gallucci remarks, Center for Peace and Security
Studies Lecture, Washington, DC, July 25, 2006.
31. Dr.park Hyeon-jung has suggested that over the course of the current
crisis the United States has had no real red lines. North Korea has consistently
stepped over any limitation the United States (or international community)
has set. Author interview with Dr.park Hyeong-jung, Senior Fellow, Korean
Institute for National Unification, and Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution,
October 23, 2006.
32. DPRK’s Vice Foreign Minister, Kim Gye Gwan, as quoted by Selig Harri-
son upon their meeting on April 9, 2005. For more, see Paul Kerr, “U.S. Pushes
to Restart North Korea Talks,” Arms Control Today, May 2005. http://www.arm-
scontrol.org/act/2005_05/NK_Talks.asp.
33. Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, Testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, July 20, 2006.
34. Author interview with Dr.park Hyeong-jung, Senior Fellow, Korean
Institute for National Unification, and Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution,
October 23, 2006.
35. Speaking about North Korea’s possible reaction to Foreign Minister Ban
Ki-moon’s appointment as UNSG: “No, he’s not the legitimate leader of Korean
pride. He shouldn’t be the repository of our nationalism. It should be us. We’re
58   CHAPTER THREE

the ones with nuclear weapons.” Derek Mitchell remarks, CSIS Press Briefing:
North Korea’s Nuclear Test, October 11, 2006.
36. “We need someone of President Carter’s stature (someone like Jim Bak-
er). Give this person the challenge of talking as a presidential envoy to Kim
Jong-il.” Ambassador Charles “Jack” Pritchard, Sigur Center for Asian Studies,
George Washington University, October 17, 2006. Also: “The North Koreans
fear us. The North Koreans don’t trust us. The North Koreans are offended by
our rhetoric, and they have no stake in their relationship with the Bush ad-
ministration. That could be changed, however, if a high-level emissary were
sent to North Korea with a presidential letter indicating our interest in work-
ing towards a better relationship...” Ambassador Donald Gregg, “Kim’s Nuclear
Gamble,” Frontline, February 20, 2003.
37. Ambassador Charles “Jack” Pritchard remarks, Sigur Center for Asian
Studies, George Washington University, October 17, 2006.
38. Rep. Weldon met with DPRK’s Vice Foreign Minister, Kim Gye-gwan,
and Li Gun, Deputy Director for American Affairs at the Foreign Ministry. Rep.
Weldon spent a total of 10 hours with these two officials. On the final day of his
trip, he spent 90 minutes with Kim Jong-il himself.
39. Representative Curt Weldon’s remarks, World Affairs Council of DC
event, Cosmos Club, April 5, 2005.
40. Ambassador Robert Gallucci remarks, Center for Peace and Security
Studies Lecture, Washington, DC, July 25, 2006.
41. Orville Schell, “In the Land of the Dear Leader,” Harper’s, July 1996.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/them/schell.html.
42. For a detailed look into the struggles of North Korean refugees, see “Per-
ilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond,” Asia Report
No. 122, International Crisis Group, October 26, 2006.
43. “...diplomacy is really designed for dealing with bad people on issues that
you care about...I think value-neutral diplomacy is something we should seek
to restore.” Kurt Campbell remarks, CSIS Press Briefing: North Korea’s Nuclear
Test, October 11, 2006.
 Chapter Four

Dealing with the Damage

how to manage a nuclear Iran
David Palkki and Lawrence Rubin

I
ran is determined to acquire an independent nuclear fuel cycle, ap-
parently paving the way for acquisition of nuclear weapons. Barring
U.S. or Israeli military action or a surprising change of heart in Teh-
ran, Iran could acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons with-
in a matter of years.1 A nuclear Iran would profoundly alter the military
balance in the region and might cause states such as Egypt, Saudi Ara-
bia, Turkey, and Iraq to pursue nuclear weapon programs of their own.
Many of these countries have considered developing nuclear weapons in
the past, and some have significant financial means or scientific infra-
structure to acquire nuclear weapons.2 The risks are serious.
Most analysis of the Iranian nuclear threat focuses on how to prevent
Iranian acquisition, primarily with sanctions or air strikes. By contrast,
strategists have devoted considerably less attention to what the United
States should do to prepare to live in a world with a nuclear Iran. Many
Arab states have announced their desire to either restart or establish
nuclear energy programs, which raises considerable fear that these pro-
grams could be used one day for military purposes.3 How could the
United States best pursue its goals of fostering stability in the region,
preventing further proliferation from occurring, and ensuring that Ira-
nian possession of nuclear weapons will not lead to increases in Iranian
sponsored terrorism or successful coercive threats against the U.S. or its
allies?
This chapter describes the likely costs and benefits of three different
U.S.-led, multilateral responses to Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapon

59
60   CHAPTER FOUR

capabilities; we urge policymakers to quietly devote more attention to

how to live with a nuclear Iran by making U.S. participation in the Pro-
liferation Security Initiative (PSI) a top priority.4 The first option we
consider is to create a U.S.-led regional security organization, similar
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Second, the United States could
continue to develop and deploy missile defense (MD) systems in an at-
tempt to strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and cur-
rent U.S. alliances in the region. Third, we argue that the United States
should expand Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) efforts in the re-
gion because, of these options, PSI offers the greatest benefits at the low-
est costs.

Regional Security Regime

The first option is to pursue a regional security regime. Since the 1990s,
individuals have exerted considerable effort in non-official foreign pol-
icy circles (Track 2) to establish a regional security regime.5 More re-
cently, there has been increasing discussion about extending NATO to
protect key U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Both of
these multilateral options suffer from some of the same costs and are
motivated by similar benefits. This section will review and assess key
arguments for and against these two variations of a regional security
system.
To begin, we must define the term “regional security regime.” A re-
gional security regime is a type of cooperative security architecture
around which states agree to defend member states against external
threats. The logic behind this security system is that long-term peace is
better ensured within a comprehensive multilateral framework.6
There are a number of strong arguments supporting this type of se-
curity architecture. In balance of power terms, large defensive forces
against impending threats lower the chance of an outbreak of hostili-
ties. At the domestic level, a regional security regime in the Middle East
may reduce internal pressure on regimes whose foreign policy interests
are allied with the United States. Currently, bilateral relations with the
United States dominate the Persian Gulf ’s security architecture. Despite
deterring regional aggressors, however, security cooperation with the
United States has fueled internal threats. The most notable example of
 Dealing with the Damage   61

such internal pressure is the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia
in 2003. Thus, to mitigate internal pressures on Gulf States, a regional
security regime would replace non-Arab, non-Muslim, western forces
with Arab and Muslim troops. This defense arrangement should appeal
to local pan-Arab and pan-Islamic sympathies.
A third benefit for the United States is that a regional security system
could have an effect on partner states’ military doctrines, weapons pro-
grams, and military training,7 each of which are areas where the United
States has tried to push reform among its Arab allies.8 The current sys-
tem creates dependence on a great power, such as the United States, and
removes the incentives for local actors to deal with external security
threats themselves. Changing this bilateral framework to a multilateral
one may reduce this dependency.
A fourth benefit is that a regional security system would help prevent
a “cascade of proliferation” in the Middle East. Including powerful states
such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia in a security regime would remove some
of the incentives for these countries to develop their own nuclear weap-
ons programs. Although a number of Middle Eastern countries have
announced their intentions to develop or restart such programs, it is not
predetermined that these countries will use the programs for military
purposes.9 Creating a regional security organization in an attempt to
assuage states’ feelings of vulnerability might help.
Despite the perceived benefits of such an arrangement, a regional se-
curity regime would have to overcome the enormous problem of decid-
ing whom to include and exclude. Including Israel would carry with it a
host of problems. Not including Iran would create problems with those
states that favor a more cooperative arrangement with Iran, yet are key
allies of the United States.
The first problem related to membership is how to deal with Israel. If
the regional security regime were just limited to the Gulf, the Israel is-
sue would be less important. However, Gulf security is inherently linked
to broader Arab security, especially Egypt’s security.10 Since many Arab
states lack diplomatic relations with Israel, proposing that they join a
security regime with Israel before official diplomatic recognition is
granted is far from realistic. Furthermore, even states that have diplo-
matic relations with Israel would not want to join a security regime with
Israel due to domestic pressures. Open military cooperation with Israel
would be unacceptable domestically to a population that still debates
“normalization” and harbors strong dislike of Israel. While some elite
62   CHAPTER FOUR

decision-makers in Egypt and Jordan may be amenable to more quiet

strategic cooperation, these regimes know the domestic realities and
risks of aligning with Israel publicly.
Arab states would also find Israel’s participation extremely prob-
lematic because of its unacknowledged possession of nuclear weap-
ons. These states, led by Egypt, have maintained that they will pursue
a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, even at the expense of
potential progress on related issues.11 Institutionally based security co-
operation would contribute to the de facto acceptance of Israel’s nuclear
weapons and severely reduce the ability of Arab states to pressure Israel
to give up its weapons in the future.
Finally, inter-Arab security cooperation has failed in the past and the
presence of the United States would do little to mitigate some of the
suspicions and hostilities between Arab states. The military component
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), originally created in response
to security threats from the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war,
has been largely ineffective due to concerns about military interoper-
ability, considerable political disagreements and historic grievances, and
a general preference for American military effectiveness. The Gulf War
showed that GCC states were incapable of achieving regional security
by themselves.12 Attempts at intra-Arab regional security after the Gulf
War failed as well, even as the United States recommended a GCC + 2
security arrangement known as the Damascus Declaration.13 This idea
proposed that GCC states with Egyptian and Syrian troops serve as an
Arab deterrent against external threats. But this proposal never devel-
oped, due to the objections of Saudis and Kuwaitis, who feared Arab
armies on their soil getting involved with internal politics.14 The politi-
cal problems within and outside the Persian Gulf show no sign of abat-
ing during the current crisis with Iran, suggesting that these intra-Arab
disputes would create grave difficulties for a regional security regime.
On a related note, resistance in the United States and among regional
allies might arise in response to movement from a bilateral to a multilat-
eral framework. First, U.S. partners will likely oppose yielding the spe-
cial status they have with the United States and will consider joining a
regime in which they do not deal directly with the United States for their
security as more of a loss than a gain. The United States, on the other
hand, may not want to remove the leverage it possesses with respect to
its bilateral partners.
 Dealing with the Damage   63

A second option within the context of a security regime, which has

received serious attention recently, is expanding NATO into the Mid-
dle East, specifically the Gulf.15 Following the Mediterranean Dialogue
(1994), the first important step to bring NATO to the Middle East oc-
curred at the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) in 2004. The ICI
launched serious discussions about NATO’s role in the Middle East.
Since then, NATO has focused on Gulf relations, considering a formal
relationship where none had existed. Thus far, NATO has cautiously ap-
proached its future involvement in the Middle East and has emphasized
that it also has components that focus on reform and development in
addition to the security dimension. In the security realm, the ICI out-
lines cooperation with Middle East states on such issues as prolifera-
tion, counterterrorism, financing, interoperability, and border security.
At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO leaders inaugurated a
Training Cooperation Initiative whereby NATO would offer training
and education to participants of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the
Istanbul Conference Initiative.
Expanding NATO into the Middle East has a number of the same
pitfalls and benefits as creating a regional security organization. At the
international level, NATO involvement might eventually mean that
NATO’s nuclear umbrella would openly protect Middle Eastern states.
This would decrease the demand of member states to pursue nuclear
weapons programs of their own as well as deter potential aggressors such
as Iran. Yet, NATO’s increasing role in the Gulf might be interpreted as a
“surrogate operation” of the United States.16 According to some scholars
from the region, the public perceives NATO negatively because of its
association with the United States and its foreign policy.17 In addition,
states with regional leadership roles at stake, such as Egypt, might see
NATO’s increased involvement as diminishing their influence in institu-
tions such as the Arab League. This might help explain some of Egypt’s
perceived reluctance to engage in the Mediterranean Dialogue.18
Only Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar have joined the ICI. Saudi Arabia,
the Gulf ’s most influential and important state, has serious reservations
about joining the ICI. Saudi skepticism possibly stems from concerns
over access to U.S. weaponry due to the close bilateral relationship, the
fact that elite decision-makers prefer the military efficiency of the Unit-
ed States, and the ICI’s requirements dealing with transparency of for-
eign military sales and reforming military doctrine. Furthermore, Saudi
64   CHAPTER FOUR

Arabia will almost surely not join an organization in which it cannot

maintain a powerful, if not hegemonic role, as it does in the GCC. Sau-
dis might see the ICI as leading toward a diminution of their power.
The problems over which countries an expanded NATO would in-
clude and exclude are similar to those found in the proposed regional
security regime mentioned above. The possibility of Israeli inclusion19
would dissuade some states from participating in such a NATO-led se-
curity arrangement.20 Another problem is how such an arrangement
might interfere with bilateral ties with the United States. Finally, NATO
also has its own internal problems, which might encumber operations
in the region. In particular, NATO members disagree as to what the
alliance’s role should be. NATO, involved in its second mission outside
its traditional area of operations, is currently at a crossroads. Its success
or failure in Afghanistan will have a large effect on its future relationship
with the Middle East. NATO’s expansion into the Middle East could
risk seriously increasing tensions within an organization that is already
struggling to define its proper geo-political role
What are the prospects for the future? Will potential member states
abandon bilateral relations with the United States to join a U.S.-led
regional security regime? This scenario is unlikely, given the current
benefits the partner states already receive from bilateral relations with
the United States. Creation of a new regional security regime is, there-
fore, a highly unlikely solution to ensure the security of Gulf States. The
NATO option is much more promising but it is still too early to tell if
this framework will be successful. While there does not seem to be an
immediate institutional solution to ensure the security and stability of
the Gulf States, this analysis has suggested that multilateral frameworks
have a number of advantages over bilateral ones. With the threat of a
number of Middle East states developing nuclear weapons programs,
it is important for policymakers to consider how to encourage states to
join a multilateral framework while guaranteeing that the United States
will not lose leverage over security arrangements.

Missile Defense (MD)

The second option is to continue to develop and deploy missile defense
systems in an effort to defend against missile-delivered WMD. U.S. in-
telligence analysts believe that Iran is attempting to build a compact
 Dealing with the Damage   65

nuclear warhead that it could deliver on Shahab-3 missiles.21 Iran has

announced that it has successfully extended the range of the Shahab-3 to
1,200 miles, which would enable it to hit much of Southeastern Europe,
including U.S. bases in Turkey.22 Israel’s chief of military intelligence
has claimed that Iran received North Korean BM-25 missiles capable of
flying 1,550 miles and delivering nuclear warheads,23 and Vice Admiral
Lowell Jacoby, a former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has
testified that Iran could acquire ICBMs by 2015.24
The United States is currently researching, developing, and even de-
ploying a number of different types of MD, including ground-based ter-
minal phase interceptors in Alaska and California and theater missile
defenses (TMD), in response to the Iranian and North Korean threats.
The following discussion focuses only on TMD systems, since they are
the most technologically feasible near-term options. Moreover, TMD
systems are the most multilateral in the sense that the United States can
most easily place them under the operational control of allies.
TMD systems provide a number of benefits for the United States. As
with other forms of MD, TMD enables the United States to intervene in
regional conflicts at a lower risk of having WMD used against U.S. mili-
tary personnel or allies.25 TMD strengthens U.S. extended deterrence,
lessens security-based pressures on other states in the region to acquire
WMD, bolsters U.S. allies’ resolve and vitiates incentives for them to
bandwagon with Iran. Deploying MD to GCC states constitutes deter-
rence by denial in that it raises Iran’s costs of attacking Gulf states while
lessening the likelihood that the attacks will be successful. TMD also
protects U.S. allies and troops in the region from the types of missile
launches that are most difficult to deter, such as irrational or accidental
launches.
One form of TMD is the sea-based Aegis MD system, which the U.S.
Navy certified for combat in September 2006. This system’s SM-3 mis-
siles are capable of intercepting rockets launched from up to 800 miles
away, and the United States and Japan are developing an improved inter-
ceptor to hit ICBMs up to 6,200 miles away. SM-3s target incoming bal-
listic missiles in their mid-course in the upper atmosphere. If the SM-3s
miss, land-based Patriots (PAC-2 and PAC-3) can attack the incoming
missiles in their terminal phase.26
Whereas tests of other forms of MD have encountered considerable
testing difficulties, Patriot TMD batteries have proven to be quite effec-
tive. Critics argue that in the Gulf War the Patriot batteries succeeded
66   CHAPTER FOUR

in shooting down Iraqi rockets only between 40 and 70 percent of the

time, yet the roughly $3 billion spent on Patriots’ tracking and missile
improvements helped them to perform spectacularly during the 2003
invasion of Iraq.27 U.S. Patriot missiles (a combination of PAC-2s and
PAC-3s) shot down all Iraqi missiles that they targeted. U.S. forces took
down six Iraqi missiles, and Kuwaiti-manned batteries an additional
three. Between six and nine Iraqi missiles were not targeted, since they
were heading harmlessly for the desert or sea.28
While the performance of Patriot batteries during Operation Iraqi
Freedom was spectacular, it was actually a bit too good. Patriots also shot
down two friendly fighter jets, one British and one U.S., probably due to
electromagnetic interference caused by overlapping Patriot radars. The
British plane’s transponder that identified the aircraft as friendly was
also damaged, though, and the plane flew outside of its designated travel
route for friendly aircraft.29
Additionally, though patriots can strike down short-range ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and unmanned vehicles,30 they have
had problems with cruise missiles. Cruise missiles fly more erratically
and lower to the ground than ballistic missiles, thus making them more
difficult to track. In the 2003 war with Iraq, U.S. patriot systems suc-
cessfully destroyed Iraqi ballistic missiles, but failed to detect a CSSC-3
Seersucker cruise missile that skimmed across the water from the Faw
Peninsula on its way to a seawall in Kuwait City.31
Another potential problem with MD systems is that while they will
help dissuade additional countries in the region from developing WMD,
they could lead countries that already have WMD to expand their arse-
nals. If states such as Israel or Iran fear that potential opponents could
deploy effective missile defense systems, they will likely feel the need to
enlarge their nuclear arsenals and employ other countermeasures ac-
cordingly.
Investments in MD will increase U.S. bargaining leverage vis-à-vis
Iran, yet for a variety of reasons such leverage will be minimal. First and
foremost, as critics of MD rightly remind, MD cannot protect against
WMD that are smuggled and released in the vicinity of the target. If
the United States and our allies cannot keep drugs out of our countries,
the argument goes, what makes us think we could detect and deny en-
trance of WMD?32 Clearly, MD is unlikely to be effective in isolation;
improved intelligence, detection devices, and border control will also be
necessary.
 Dealing with the Damage   67

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

PSI activities provide a third multilateral means available to the United
States to stem the proliferation of WMD in the Middle East following
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. First announced in 2003, PSI is
an international counterproliferation effort. PSI lacks a central organi-
zation or staff and member states only participate in activities of their
choosing. In other words, membership generates no automatic commit-
ments. States that accept the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles
agree to cooperate in interdicting suspected WMD-carrying ships in
one’s territorial waters and refusing overflights or grounding aircraft in
one’s airspace. Over 80 countries now participate in PSI, according to
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. This participation has led to 11 in-
stances of halted WMD-transfers since 2004.33 In 2005-2006, PSI has
reportedly led to the interdiction of roughly 24 vessels, some of which
were carrying nuclear and missile related materials to Iran.34
The U.S. goals for PSI are three-fold: a) lengthen the time for pro-
liferators to acquire new nuclear capabilities, b) increase the political
and economic costs to the state seeking these capabilities, and c) dem-
onstrate U.S. resolve to combat proliferation.”35 Interdictions, and the
threat thereof, make it more difficult for Iran and other states to tran-
sit illicit weapons parts and materials. PSI activities also signal to other
states that potential costs, including confiscated goods and reputational
costs, accompany nuclear dealings with Tehran. The activities may also
encourage a cascade of cooperation. As The Economist opines, the “PSI
will work best by persuading more countries that don’t have them to
pass and enforce proper export-control laws.”36
Such ‘coalitions of the willing’ allow for multilateral action without
some of the constraints and problems that accompany more formal in-
stitutions. These ad hoc coalitions are attractive to states, such as the
United States, that are hesitant to enter into formal agreements. In PSI
activities, the mission determines the participants and no state has a
veto over the action of another in an activity in which it is uninvolved.
The Wall Street Journal has embraced PSI because it “doesn’t give the
feckless or evil a veto over what it does” as do other international agree-
ments.37
Another benefit of such ad hoc coalitions is found in the area of in-
telligence sharing. By limiting intelligence sharing to participants of
specific interdiction activities rather than a larger group of states, the
68   CHAPTER FOUR

United States can share sensitive intelligence at a significantly lower risk

of compromising sources and methods. This provides a great advantage
over intelligence-sharing procedures in such institutions as the U.N.
Security Council and NATO, where members have reportedly shared
sensitive U.S. information with America’s adversaries.38
Patrolling and interdicting ships in the Gulf with the help of regional
partners and other PSI allies will also enable the United States to provide
prolonged naval patrols in the Gulf at much lower costs than would be
the case under a more unilateral approach. Multilateral naval groups,
such as NATO’s Task Force 150 and 151, have already greatly lessened
the load for the United States in the Gulf.39 GCC states’ naval modern-
ization programs over the past decade prepare them to take much of the
load in patrolling and conducting interdictions in the Gulf. Each has
developed either maritime patrol aircraft or naval helicopters, and most
have invested in either upgraded or new fast patrol boats.40 Joint PSI
exercises could also foster more institutionalized security arrangements
with Gulf States and expand the areas of military cooperation.
While PSI assistance from allies will lessen U.S. burdens, the Gulf
States have generally been reluctant to engage in behavior considered
antagonistic toward Iran. When a January 2004 PSI exercise tracked a
shipment from the Northern Gulf through the Straits of Hormuz to the
North Arabian Sea, GCC states and Iraq refused to participate, even as
observers.41
This reluctance appears to be waning, however. In the fall of 2006,
GCC states exhibited much more support when roughly 25 states prac-
ticed intercepting ships with nuclear materials as part of PSI naval ex-
ercises in the Gulf near major Iranian shipping lanes. Bahrain hosted
the exercise and contributed three ships, thus becoming the first Arab
state to participate in PSI training. Observers included Kuwait, Qatar,
and the United Arab Emirates. Press reports indicate that the purpose
of the Gulf exercise was to practice interdicting North Korean nuclear
materials en route to Iran.42 A few months earlier, Turkey, which is a PSI
member and potential proliferator, sent ships to participate in similar
PSI exercises in the Mediterranean.43
Indian participation in PSI could also prove valuable in patrolling and
interdicting ships heading to and from Iran in the Arabian Sea, though it
might be difficult to persuade India to participate in such actions given
amicable Indian-Iranian relations.44 Moreover, such participation could
be very destabilizing. If India were to interdict ships containing WMD
 Dealing with the Damage   69

material involving Iran, it might be tempted to do so with Pakistan also,

thus raising tensions between the two states. Indian policymakers are
currently debating whether to participate in PSI-related activities. The
navy has pushed strongly for such activities, and Naval Chief Admiral
Arun Prakash has stated that “from if, it has become a question of when”
for India to take a leading role.45
Questions about the legality of PSI activities could hinder states from
cooperating with U.S. interdiction efforts. China, Russia, and a number
of other states have expressed deep concerns about the legality of PSI
activities. The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) states that
“no state may validly purport or subject any part of the high seas to
its sovereignty,” thus restricting interdictions in international waters. It
makes exceptions, though, for ships suspected of slave trade, piracy, il-
legal broadcasting, or refusing to show their flags.46
In recent years, a variety of changes has occurred to increase the le-
gality of PSI activities. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, passed in
2004, obligates states to counter non-state actors in all aspects of WMD
proliferation. It also requires states to monitor and control sensitive ma-
terials, technologies, and equipment that originate from, are in, or are
passing through their territories.47 In 2005, the Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation was
amended to prohibit involvement of civilian vessels from transporting
illicit WMDs.48 And finally, as states’ interdiction behavior changes, so
too will customary international law.
One danger of PSI is that enthusiasts will believe that interdiction
activities can replace the traditional nonproliferation regime. Detect-
ing concealed, softball-sized highly enriched uranium or plutonium on
board planes or ships is (in technical terms) extremely difficult.49 Much
could slip through. PSI success will depend to a large degree on extraor-
dinarily good intelligence. It appears that the interdiction of the BBC
China did not reveal the extent of A.Q. Kahn’s ties to Libya, as is widely
asserted; rather such ties, and the role of the BBC China, came to light as
a result of a successful CIA operation to turn in a key member of Kahn’s
group.50 It seems very uncertain whether the United States will receive
such high quality intelligence regarding Iranian transfers, though, par-
ticularly if James Risen’s sources in the U.S. intelligence community are
correct that Iran rolled up all U.S. agents in Iran in 2004.51
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with conducting interdictions of Irani-
an ships in the Gulf will be dealing with Iran’s response. U.S. MD efforts
70   CHAPTER FOUR

may help reassure wavering allies against the threat of Iranian rockets,
yet Iran’s growing asymmetric warfare capabilities52 and history of ter-
rorism suggest that Iranian sponsored subversion and terrorist actions
will pose a more difficult challenge.

Conclusions
As Iran gets closer to acquiring an independent nuclear fuel cycle, the
United States must prepare for the eventuality that Iran will have a nu-
clear weapons program that can threaten U.S. foreign policy interests in
the region. In addition, the United States must decide how best to allay
allies’ fears to make sure they do not develop nuclear weapons programs
of their own. The United States should begin now to think about the best
ways to manage its relationships with regional partners and to protect
its interests.
This chapter has taken a different approach than previous studies
about Iranian nuclear proliferation. Instead of focusing on how to pre-
vent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, this article deals with the
eventuality that Iran will acquire an independent fuel cycle and nuclear
weapons. It urges policymakers to quietly devote more attention to how
to live with a nuclear Iran and explores the costs and benefits of several
multilateral approaches.
Our analysis suggests that despite considerable shortcomings, of the
three options we assess the PSI offers the greatest benefits at the lowest
costs. The other two options, however, also offer benefits that should and
could be incorporated. First, the benefits of a regional security regime
highlight the importance of multilateral cooperation. The advantages of
this type of proposal are different from the other options because it cre-
ates more pressure on regional states to work together. Second, one of
the most important benefits of MD is the enhanced ability of the United
States to credibly threaten regional aggressors if U.S. regional allies are
threatened. If TMD is effectively deployed, it could enable the United
States to worry less about a regional launch against its forces or region-
al allies. MD would also reduce the desire of regional states to acquire
WMD to defend themselves. While the U.S. should continue to consider
ways to embrace the benefits of these options, the optimal approach is
for the United States to bolster the PSI and make it a top priority to deal
with a nuclear Iran.
 Dealing with the Damage   71

Notes
1. For a persuasive argument that U.S. military strikes are unlikely, see Peter
Beinart, “Deterrent Defect,” The New Republic, May 8, 2006. For assessments on
how long it might take Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, see Graham T. Allison,
“How Good is American Intelligence on Iran’s Bomb?,” Yale Global, June 13,
2006; Thomas Omestad, “How Close is Iran to the Bomb?,” U.S. News & World
Report, January 23, 2006.
2. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The
Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2004).
3. “Egypt and Nuclear Power: Nuclear Succession”, Economist, September
28, 2006.
4.Analysis in this chapter is limited to U.S. policy options once Iran has ac-
quired nuclear weapons. We do not take a position in this essay on whether the
United States should abandon or pursue counter-proliferation efforts.
5. See Michael D. Yaffe, “The Gulf and a New Middle East Security Sys-
tem,” Middle East Policy Vol. XI, No. 3, Fall 2004, Michael Kraig, “Assessing
Alternative Security Frameworks for the Persian Gulf,” Middle East Policy, Vol.
XI, No. 3, Fall 2004, Bruce Jentleson and Dalia Dassa Kaye, “Security Status:
Explaining Regional Security Cooperation and its Limits in the Middle East,”
Security Studies Vol. 8, No.1, (Fall 1998), Steven L. Spiegel, “Regional Security
and the Levels of Analysis Problem,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3
(September 2003).
6. Michael Kraig, “Assessing Alternative Security Frameworks,” 145.
7. Ibid, 150.
8. Interviews with U.S. State Department and Department of Defense of-
ficials, August 2006, Washington D.C.
9. Hassan M. Fattah, “Arab Nations Plan to Start Joint Nuclear Energy Pro-
gram,” The New York Times, December 11, 2006.
10. Interviews with senior Egyptian foreign ministry officials, November
2005, March 2006, and November 2006, Cairo, Egypt.
11. The issue of Israel’s nuclear weapons has had other negative effects on
arms control initiatives. For instance, the Egyptians move to place the nuclear
issue on the agenda halted the Arms Control Regional Security Talks (ACRS)
in 1995.
12. Joseph Kechechian, Security Efforts in the Arab World: A brief examina-
tion of Four Regional Organizations, RAND, N-3570-USDP (1994), v.
13. Ibid, 18.
14. Interviews with Saudi official, Washington D.C., August 2006.
72   CHAPTER FOUR

15. There has been increasing discussion of NATO’s future role in the Mid-
dle East since its involvement in Afghanistan. In particular, the possibility of
NATO involvement in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon has been discussed
as an option.
16. Riad Kahwaji, “NATO’s Evolving Role in the Middle East: The Gulf
Dimension,” June 3, 2005, www.stimson.org/swa/pdf/NATOTranscriptPan-
el1Edited.pdf, 9, Accessed November 20, 2006.
17. “NATO needs to correct its distorted image in the GULF region”, Kuwait
News Agency, Sept 13, 2006, www.gulfinthemedia.com/index.php?m+global_s
earch&id=243360&PHPSESSID=062
18. Interviews with U.S. Department of Defense officials, August 2006,
Washington, D.C.
19. At the NATO public diplomacy conference held in Israel, Oct 23, 2006,
Deputy Secretary General of NATO H.E. Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Riz-
zo said, “When I look more closely at the Mediterranean Dialogue and focus
on the specifics of NATO-Israel cooperation, I am struck by how much we have
achieved and how quickly things are now moving forward.” http://www.nato.
int/docu/update/2006/10-october/e1023a.htm
20. Series of interviews with Egyptian governmental and non-government
officials (Cairo. October, November 2006)
21. William Broad and David Sanger, “Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to
Prove Iran’s Nuclear Aims,” The New York Times, November 13, 2005.
22. Kenneth Katzman, et al. Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, CRS
Report for Congress, Updated October 4, 2006, 20.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid, 13.
25. Lawrence F. Kaplan, “Offensive Line: Why the Best Offense is a Good
Missile Defense,” New Republic, March 12, 2001; Robert Powell, “Nuclear De-
terrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense,” Interna-
tional Security 27:4 (Spring 2003), 86–118.
26. David Wood, “N. Korea Adds Fuel to Asian Arms Race,” Baltimore Sun,
October 11, 2006; Nick Brown, “US Test Intercepts Ballistic Missile in Descent
Phase,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 31, 2006; Peter Alford, “Japan to Speed up
Missile Defence,” The Australian, August 3, 2005; “New Missile Interceptors
Slated for ’07 Defenses Seen in Response to N. Korea Risk,” The Daily Yomiuri,
June 22, 2003; Nick Brown, “US Certifies First Active BMD Outfit,” Jane’s De-
fense Weekly, September 20, 2006.
27. Bradley Graham, “Radar Probed in Patriot Incidents: False Signals May
have led to Downings,” Washington Post, May 8, 2003; Ross Kerber, “War in
 Dealing with the Damage   73

Iraq/Defense System/Patriot Missiles: Friendly-Fire Cases Draw New Scrutiny

to System,” The Boston Globe, April 16, 2003. The comparison in effectiveness
is imperfect, though, since in the Gulf War Iraq launched longer-range Scuds
while in 2003 it fired primarily shorter-range Al Samoud-2s and Ababil-100s.
See Bradley Graham, “Radar Probed in Patriot Incidents: False Signals May
have led to Downings,” Washington Post, May 8, 2003.
28. Ross Kerber, “War in Iraq/Defense System/Patriot Missiles: Friendly-Fire
Cases Draw New Scrutiny to System,” Boston Globe, April 16, 2003; Tom Walsh,
“Patriot Missile Facing Crucial Combat Test,” Boston Herald, April 8, 2003.
29. Anne Marie Squeo, “Too Much Radar Bugs Patriots: Missile Battery Site
Overlap is Studied,” The San Diego Union-Tribune, May 24, 2003.
30. Michael Richardson, “US Missile Shield: Work in Progress,” The Straits
Times (Singapore), July 6, 2006.
31. Bradley Graham, “Radar Probed in Patriot Incidents: False Signals May
Have Led to Downings,” Washington Post, May 8, 2003.
32. Spencer S. Hsu, “GAO Calls Radiation Monitors Unreliable,” Washington
Post, October 18, 2006.
33. Thomas Orszg-Land, “Special Report: Free-for-all on the high seas,”
Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, November 1, 2003; Sharon Squassoni,
“Proliferation Security Initiative,” CRS Report for Congress, June 7, 2005; Jon
Fox, “U.S. Seeks to Stop North Korean Nuclear Shipments” Global Security
Newswire, October 26, 2006. Accessed November 1, 2006 at www.nti.org; Jofi
Joseph, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Prolifera-
tion,” Arms Control Today, June 2004.
34. “Proliferation Security Initiative,” Updated August 2006. Accessed on
November 1, 2006 at www.nti.org.
35. Erin E. Harbaugh, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Counterprolif-
eration at the Crossroads,” Strategic Insights 3:7 (July 2004), 1.
36. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Services: The Dangers of Flat-Pack Proliferation,” The
Economist, February 7, 2004.
37. “Hot Topic: The Arms-Control Illusion,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern
edition), October 14, 2006.
38. According to one of Saddam’s key bomb makers, after Saddam had an
Iraqi national placed at the IAEA, “classified information began to flow from
our spy inside the IAEA.” Evidence also suggests that Greece passed classified
plans for NATO airstrikes to the Bosnian Serbs, and that Russia shared de-
tails of Contact Group meetings directly with Serbia during the war in Bos-
nia. See Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam’s Bombmaker: The Terrifying
Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York:
74   CHAPTER FOUR

Scribner, 2000), 77; Takis Michas, Unholy Alliance: Greece and Serbia in the
Nineties (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 38–39;
Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1999), 84.
39. Michael Knights, “Maritime Interdiction in the Gulf: Developing a Cul-
ture of Focused Interdiction Using Existing International Conventions,” Non-
proliferation Policy Education Center, p10–11. February 7, 2006. Accessed at
www.npec-web.org1.
40. Ibid, 12.
41. Ibid, 8, 13.
42. Sue Pleming, “Anti-nuclear Naval exercise due in Gulf on Monday,” Re-
uters, October 28, 2006; “PSI Exercise Under Way in Persian Gulf,” Accessed on
November 1, 2006 at www.nti.org.
43. Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Nilsu Goren, “U.S.-Turkey Agreement Stirs De-
bate in Turkey, Sets Benchmarks for Anticipated U.S.-India Nuclear Accord,”
WMD Insights. Accessed on November 10, 2006, at www.wmdinsights.com/
I10/I10_ME5_USTurkeyNuclear.htm
44. For a brief overview of Indian-Iranian relations, see Kronstadt, K. Alan
and Kenneth Katzman. India-Iran Relations with U.S. Interests. CRS Order Code
RS22486. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 2, 2006.
45. V. Jayanth, “Maritime Security: Preparing for the Unexpected,” The Hin-
du, September 20, 2005.
46. Erin E. Harbaugh, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Counterprolif-
eration at the Crossroads,” Strategic Insights 3:7 (July 2004), 3.
47. Andrew Semmel, “U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540: The U.S. Per-
spective,” Remarks at Conference on Global Nonproliferation and Counterter-
rorism: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. Chatham House,
London, October 12, 2004. Accessed on November 15, 2006 at http://usinfo.
state.gov/is/Archive/2004/Oct/21-694223.html.
48. Thomas Land, “Kremlin Counters WMD Threat on the Seas,” Gale Group
Inc, February 1, 2006.
49. Spencer S. Hsu, “GAO Calls Radiation Monitors Unreliable,” Washington
Post, October 18, 2006.
50. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of
its Enemies since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
51. James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush
Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006), 193.
52. Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, National Security in Saudi Arabia:
Threats, Responses, and Challenges (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies and Westport: Praeger Security International, 2005), 14.
 Part TWO

The strategies OF other

nuclear-weapon states in a changing
security environment

75
 Chapter Five

Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems

Richard Weitz

T
he Russian government has declared maintaining a robust nuclear
force a national priority. In a January 12, 2006, article entitled,
“Military Doctrine: Russia Must Be Strong” published in the Rus-
sian Vedomosti newspaper, then Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said
Russia’s primary defense task for the 2006-2010 period is “to sustain and
develop strategic deterrent forces at the minimum level needed to guar-
antee that present and future military threats are deterred.”1 Russian
President Vladimir Putin reportedly told Ivanov that Russia’s nuclear
forces account for 90% of the country’s security.2
Russia possesses sizeable forces in all categories of the traditional
offensive nuclear triad. In the most recent data exchange conducted
through the START process, whose treaty-governed counting rules as-
sume that each platform carries the maximum number of warheads
tested with that system, the Russia Federation declared that it had 4,162
“warheads attributed to deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and
deployed heavy bombers” as of January 1, 2007. Of these, the Russian
Air Force had 14 Blackjack and 64 Bear heavy bombers equipped with
nuclear-armed long-range cruise missiles (ALCMs). The Russian Navy’s
fleet included a dozen nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile sub-
marines (SSBNs) carrying 272 SLBMs with at most 1,392 warheads on
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Russia’s
Strategic Missile Forces (Raketniye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya
or RVSN), which have always constituted the strongest leg of Russia’s stra-
tegic nuclear triad, had 530 land-based ICBMs—243 SS-25, 136 SS-19,
77
78   CHAPTER FIVE

104 SS-18 ICBMs and 47 new SS-27Ms—equipped with at most 2,146

nuclear warheads.3 Scholars at the National Resources Defense Council
estimated the actual number of Russia’s operational nuclear warheads in
the active stockpile at 3,340 in the strategic forces (ICBMs, SLBMs, and
strategic bombers) and 2,330 “nonstrategic” warheads on naval plat-
forms, land-based aircraft, and air and missile defense systems.4 What-
ever the precise quantity, the Russian government has initiated several
major programs aimed at improving the quality of its nuclear forces.
This chapter begins by analyzing Russian nuclear doctrine and policy.
After a vigorous debate in the 1990s, Russian military planners reaf-
firmed the importance of retaining a robust offensive nuclear strike
force to execute a range of important missions that they feared the
country’s weakened conventional forces might prove unable to imple-
ment. The most important of these included deterring a large-scale U.S.
attack against Russian territory, averting a Russian defeat in a conven-
tional military conflict, and limiting the undesirable escalation of an in-
cipient nuclear conflict. The following section analyzes each of the main
components of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. The chapter then ex-
amines the challenges Russia faces in sustaining these forces given sub-
stantial budgetary pressures, limitations on nuclear testing, and other
general difficulties that also confront other nuclear weapons states. The
concluding section discusses the possible evolution of Russia’s nuclear
forces and policies.

DOCTRINE AND POLICY

Nuclear vs. Conventional
During the 1990s, Russian strategists vigorously debated the importance
of maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent.5 A minority argued that,
in the post-Cold War world, nuclear weapons had lost much of their
military utility and hence Russia should concentrate on developing its
conventional forces. The majority, however, continued to view Russia’s
nuclear arsenal as an essential instrument for preserving its status as a
great power. Such considerations still weigh heavily on Russian strategic
thinking. When asked why Russia deserved to be in the G-8, Russian
President Vladimir Putin told a January 31, 2006, press conference that,
“the G-8 is a club which addresses global problems and, first and fore-
most, security problems. Can someone in this hall imagine resolving,
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   79

shall we say, problems concerning global nuclear security without the

participation of the largest nuclear power in the world, the Russian Fed-
eration? Of course not.” 6
Besides these considerations of prestige and status, many Russians
argued that the unprecedented effectiveness of U.S. conventional pre-
cision strikes in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq demon-
strated Russia’s need to retain a strong nuclear arsenal to balance its
conventional weaknesses. Moreover, they observed that upgrading Rus-
sia’s conventional forces to American standards would entail consider-
ably greater expenditures than maintaining even a large nuclear force. In
April 2006 General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, head of the Russian General Staff
and First Deputy Defense Minister, told a press conference: “We are not
going to tighten our belts or take off our last pair of trousers to achieve
parity in the number of aircraft and missiles with the United States or
all of NATO. . . . [Russia] has and will have nuclear deterrent forces suf-
ficient to bring to reason anyone who could try to test the strength of
our borders or tap our natural resources.”7

Russian Declaratory Doctrine

The most important Russian doctrinal statements explicitly recognize
the necessity of employing nuclear weapons under certain conditions.
For example, Russia’s January 2000 National Security Concept empha-
sizes that, “The Russian Federation should possess nuclear forces that
are capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired extent of dam-
age against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions
and circumstances.” The document adds that Russia should prepare to
employ “all available forces and assets, including nuclear, in the event of
need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the
crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective.”8
Similarly, Russia’s April 2000 Military Doctrine maintains that, “The
Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response
to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction
against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggres-
sion utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national
security of the Russian Federation.” The document also declares that
Russian military forces “should be prepared to repulse aggression, ef-
fectively engage any aggressor, and conduct active operations (both de-
fensive and offensive) under any scenario for the unleashing and waging
80   CHAPTER FIVE

of wars and armed conflicts, under conditions of the massive use by the
enemy of modern and advanced combat weapons, including weapons of
mass destruction of all types.”9
These declaratory statements still appear operationally relevant since
Russian military forces continue to conduct large-scale exercises with
scenarios involving possible nuclear use.10 In February 2004, for exam-
ple, the Russian government conducted “Bezopasnost 2004” (“Security
2004”), the largest strategic military exercise in the history of the Rus-
sian Federation. It involved all elements of Russia’s strategic forces.11
More recently, in September 2006, the Russian Air Force simulated a
massive cruise missile strike involving 70 strategic bombers against po-
tential targets in the vicinity of Japan and Alaska. At the same time, the
RSVN conducted a major command post exercise that practiced mobi-
lizing forces from a peacetime to a wartime posture.12

Deterring a Direct Attack

At a minimum, Russian nuclear forces and strategy aim to prevent the
United States or any other country from launching a major attack against
Russian territory. In late 2006, Putin told Russian military leaders that
the country’s “deterrent forces should be able to guarantee the neutral-
ization of any potential aggressor, no matter what modern weapons sys-
tems he possesses.”13 Russian nuclear planners most likely concentrate
their planning and resources on surviving a war with the United States,
since such a capability should provide the assets that Russia would need
to defeat weaker nuclear adversaries (e.g., Britain, China, or France).
The worst-case scenario for Russian strategists would be an American
attempt to decapitate the Russian leadership through a surprise attack
involving U.S. nuclear and conventional attacks against Russian nuclear
forces at their peacetime alert status. According to this logic, American
leaders might anticipate crippling the Russian military response by in-
capacitating Russia’s political and military decision makers before they
could organize a coherent retaliatory strike. Such a hypothetical attack
could employ SLBMs with depressed trajectories from U.S. SSBNs on
patrol near Russia, or stealthy conventional weapons that would exploit
weaknesses in Russia’s early warning systems. U.S. ballistic missile and
air defense systems would then attempt to intercept any Russian nuclear
delivery platform that had survived an American first strike and been
launched in reprisal.14
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   81

Russian military commanders are taking several steps to guard

against a potential U.S. disarming attack. First, they continue to invest
in mobile platforms such as nuclear submarines and special off-road
vehicles capable of launching ICBMs. A moveable target is much more
difficult to destroy than a stationary object, given the need to estimate
its position at the time when the attacking warhead will arrive at its lo-
cation. Second, the Russian government has retained a sizeable arsenal
of nuclear warheads to increase the likelihood that a force of sufficient
strength for retaliation would survive an American attack. Third, Rus-
sian officials continue to improve Russia’s early warning systems and, to
a much lesser degree, the country’s ballistic missile defenses (BMD).

“De-Escalating” a Conventional Conflict.

Russian strategists have also indicated they might detonate a limited
number of nuclear weapons—perhaps just one—to induce another
country to end (“de-escalate” in Russian terminology) a conventional
military conflict with Russia.15 The selective strike would seek to ex-
ploit the inevitable “shock and awe” effect associated with nuclear use to
cause the targeted decision makers to weigh the risks of nuclear devasta-
tion more heavily. This strategy exploits the fear that, after one nuclear
explosion, the prospects of further detonations increase substantially.
Initiating nuclear use would underscore the seriousness with which
the Russian government viewed the situation and might encourage the
other side to de-escalate the conflict and pressure its allies into making
concessions.
The most commonly discussed contingency for a “de-escalation”
mission is a NATO decision to intervene against a Russian military ally
(e.g., Belarus) or on behalf of a non-member country (e.g., Georgia) in
a conflict with Russia. The Russian military rehearsed such a scenario in
their June 1999 “Zapad-99” (“West-99”) exercises. After Russian con-
ventional forces proved unable to repulse an attack on Russia and Belar-
us, Russian nuclear forces conducted limited strikes against the posited
enemy.16 During a subsequent command post exercise in October 2002,
the military simulated launching nuclear strikes from strategic bombers
and missiles.17
In 1993, the Russian government abandoned its declared pledge not
to employ nuclear weapons first in a conflict, effectively establishing a
justification in Russian doctrine for initiating nuclear use. The state-
82   CHAPTER FIVE

ment brought the declared strategic posture of Russia into line with that
of the United States, Britain, and France (but not China). These NATO
countries have never renounced the right to resort to nuclear weapons
first in an emergency.
Actually exploding a nuclear device in a conflict would prove prob-
lematic. On the one hand, it could terminate the conflict in Russia’s fa-
vor. On the other, it could lead to potentially, even large-scale, nuclear
use if the other side considered the detonation a prelude to additional
nuclear strikes and decided to escalate first. Russian officials would
probably attempt to underscore the strike’s limited nature to minimize
the risks of further escalation. In conducting a nuclear strike for a “de-
escalation” mission, for instance, Russian commanders could seek to
minimize its opponent’s civilian and perhaps even military casualties
to discourage further nuclear use. For example, they could employ a
low-yield tactical nuclear warhead against an adversary’s military base,
warship, or armored formation operating in a scarcely populated area.
Alternately, Russian forces could detonate a high-altitude burst near an
adversary’s warships with the expectation that the explosion would not
produce casualties or nuclear fallout, but would still devastate the fleet’s
sensors and communications due to its electro-magnetic pulse (EMP)
and other effects.

Escalation Control
Russian strategists have long considered using limited nuclear strikes to
alter the course of a conventional conflict that Russia risked losing. The
January 2000 National Security Concept, for example, implied that Rus-
sia could use non-strategic nuclear forces to resist a conventional attack
without engendering a full-scale nuclear exchange. A related function of
Russian nuclear forces would be to prevent other countries from esca-
lating a conventional conflict to a nuclear war. In such a scenario, Rus-
sia could threaten to retaliate disproportionately should an adversary
employ nuclear weapons to try to alter a conventional battle in its favor.
Even after one party has initiated a limited nuclear exchange, Russian
commanders might attempt to control further escalation by issuing nu-
clear threats, showing restraint, or pursuing other “nuclear signaling.”
The problem with attempting to exercise escalation control under
combat conditions is that such tactics risk uncontrolled nuclear war. In
theory, other possible firebreaks between non-nuclear operations and
uncontrolled nuclear escalation might also exist. These could include
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   83

attempts to enforce distinctions between strikes against either side’s na-

tional homelands as opposed to less critical third areas, between stra-
tegic and tactical nuclear weapons, or even between nuclear strikes
against military and civilian targets (i.e., “counterforce” vs. “counter-
value” strikes). The most plausible line for limiting escalation, however,
remains that between using and not using nuclear weapons at all.

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES

Like other nuclear weapons states, Russia has encountered challenges
in maintaining robust nuclear forces in a post-Cold War environment
characterized predominately by conventional and sub-conventional
military threats. The Russian government currently pursues a multi-
pronged approach toward sustaining its nuclear forces. It has been retir-
ing older systems, extending the service life of existing systems, actively
test launching delivery platforms in current operational status, and de-
veloping new nuclear weapons systems with advanced technologies.
Under the 2007-2015 State Armaments Program, the Russian gov-
ernment will provide the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with almost 5,000
billion rubles ($189 billion). According to Viktor Zavarzin, chair of the
Duma’s defense committee, the MOD has earmarked approximately
one-fifth of this total for its strategic forces.18 In assessing the viability
of this plan, Ivanov correctly defined the supply side of the procure-
ment equation as the main uncertainty: “The question now is whether
the industries are capable of producing what the military needs.”19 De-
spite some progress, thus far the Russian military industrial complex has
proven inadequate for this task.

Warhead Stockpiles
The Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom) develops
and manufactures Russia’s nuclear weapons. Russia has adhered to the
global moratorium against nuclear weapons testing since 1990, but has
conducted about a half dozen sub-critical explosions annually at the
military’s Central Testing Ground at the Novaya Zemlya range.20 In July
2006, Ivanov visited the site and stressed that Russia kept it in a state of
“permanent readiness for nuclear tests.”21 Besides the tests at Novaya
Zemlya, the Ministry of Defense uses advanced computational tech-
niques to simulate nuclear explosions.22 In public, Russian officials ex-
84   CHAPTER FIVE

press confidence in the capacity of the country’s nuclear establishment

to provide high-quality warheads.23
There are signs, however, that some Russian experts worry about
their ability to certify warhead reliability without full-scale nuclear det-
onations. At the end of March 2006, Putin chaired a special meeting
of about a dozen senior officials in charge of Russia’s nuclear weapons
infrastructure to assess how to sustain its health without weapons test-
ing as Russia transforms its civilian nuclear energy industry. For the first
time in Russian/Soviet history, Moscow has begun separating the civil-
ian and military components of its nuclear complex.24 Russian nuclear
weapons designers also face successor-generation problems resulting
from inadequate funding, attractive job opportunities in commercial
high-technology industries, and other difficulties that have discouraged
Russia’s elite scientists and technicians from pursuing employment in
the nuclear weapons sector.
Rosatom has sought to compensate for these problems by continuing
to use warhead designs and materials certified by pre-moratorium test-
ing. Since the mid-1980s, Russia has reduced its stock of intact warheads
from approximately 35,000 to some 15,000 (of which some 9,300 are in
reserve or awaiting dismantlement).25 Nevertheless, the much shorter
life of Russian warheads (estimated at 10-20 years, considerably less than
U.S. warheads) means Russia remanufactures hundreds of warheads an-
nually. Decommissioned warheads are shipped under guard to one of
the two remaining large warhead assembly and disassembly facilities.
Technicians there take them apart and replace components with limited
service lives (e.g., plutonium pits). Surplus fissile material is stored for
recycling or elimination.26 Russian experts indicate that this frequent
dismantling and remanufacturing process allows them to detect war-
head problems without having to operate a U.S.-style scientific-based
stockpile stewardship program—a system they could not afford in any
case.27
To further ensure warhead sustainability, Ivanov announced in late
April 2006 that all land and sea-based ballistic missiles entering ser-
vice from the end of 2006 would be equipped with the same type of
new warhead. Each missile will have either a single warhead or a MIRV
cluster.28 Russian designers hope to complete testing of such a com-
mon warhead in 2008. The Russian military intends to deploy these
warheads, which supposedly have enhanced BMD penetrability, aboard
both the new Topol-M ICBM (RT-2UTTH; designated by NATO as the
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   85

SS-27) and the Bulava SLBM (R-30 SS-NX-30), currently undergoing

operational testing.29

Ground-Based Strategic Forces

While meeting with senior military officers in November 2006, Putin
insisted that, “We must meet schedules to create new strategic weapons
to secure a balance of forces in the world.”30 Arms control expert Alex-
ei Arbatov calculates that Russia needs to produce approximately 30
ICBMs annually to maintain a strategic nuclear balance with the United
States.31 Until now, Russian defense firms have only built an average
of half a dozen new ICBMs each year. This low production level, com-
bined with the recent withdrawal from service of all rail-mobile SS-24
(RT-23UTTH; designated as the RS-22 under START I) missiles and the
ongoing retirement of the road-mobile SS-25 (RT-2PM Topol RS-12M)
ICBMs, has resulted in a gradual decline in the number of operational
Russian ICBMs.
This decrease will become much more precipitous during the next
few years since the RVSN will soon need to decommission almost all So-
viet-built ICBMs, including the large liquid-fueled strategic missiles that
carry most Russian strategic warheads. In January 2007, Lt. Gen Nikolai
Solovtsev, RVSN commander, told the media that the RVSN would have
to retire over two-thirds of Russia’s fleet of 542 land-based ICBMs by
2015. He estimated that the RVSN would acquire only 62 new ground-
launched strategic missiles by then. Solovtsev argued, however, that the
superior quality of the new missiles, combined with Russia’s strategic
bombers and submarine-launched missiles, would still ensure that the
country retained an adequate nuclear deterrent.32 Some Russian experts
estimate that the entire Russian strategic arsenal will soon possess only
several hundred warheads on operational delivery systems.33 Others
worry that this preoccupation with strategic platforms is resulting in
inadequate spending on supporting infrastructure for the ICBM fleet.
One missile designer, for example, has argued that Russia has made in-
sufficient progress in developing advanced command and communica-
tion networks for the new Topol-Ms.34
The mobile Topol-Ms represents the cornerstone of Russia’s planned
future ICBM arsenal. In early December 2006, the first three mobile
Topol-Ms entered into operational deployment with the 54th RSVN
missile division based in the town of Teikovo, about 250 km north-
east of Moscow. On December 14, 2006, Putin called their newly op-
86   CHAPTER FIVE

erational status “a significant step forward in improving our defense

capabilities.”35 Compared with the silo-based version of the Topol-M,
which has been in service with the RSVN since late 1997, the mobile
version is better protected against a potential adversary first strike since
its location at any one time is less predictable. According to Russian
sources, the Topol-M supposedly also has advanced technologies that
enhance its ability to overcome hostile BMD systems.36 In May 2007,
Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, the RVSN commander, stated that Russia
would stop deploying new silo-based Topol-Ms by 2010.37 Neverthe-
less, Solomonov previously said that the Topol-M would remain Russia’s
main ICBM until 2045.38
Although both the silo- and the mobile-versions of the Topol-M
presently carry only one warhead, many of Russia’s other ICBMs have
multiple warheads. After the United States withdrew from the Anti-Bal-
listic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002, the Russian government de-
clared itself no longer bound by the second Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START II), which prohibited MIRV-ed ICBMs. (The limitations
embodied in START I will remain in effect until the accord expires in
December 2009.) Russia’s ability to retain its MIRV-ed missiles, which
would have had to be discarded by 2007 if START II had come into
effect, effectively solved the problem of how to sustain an extensive nu-
clear force, with thousands rather than hundreds of warheads, within
the tight fiscal limits of the early years of the Putin administration. Had
the START II prohibition come into force, Russia would have had to
reconstruct its entire strategic arsenal to compensate for the lost MIRV-
ed ICBMs. The demise of START II, combined with the equal and more
permissive provisions of the 2002 Moscow Treaty (which does not pro-
hibit MIRV-ed ICBMs) has allowed Moscow to maintain rough nuclear
parity with Washington despite spending much less on its nuclear arse-
nal than the United States.39
The Russian military periodically test launches ballistic missiles to
assess their operational viability. Russian policy makers assume that ac-
tual experience provides a more reliable measure of the missile’s per-
formance than the original “best-guess” estimates of their guaranteed
service lives, which reflected the Soviet practice of developing a new
generation of ICBMs every decade.40 At present, Russia has extended
the service lives of approximately 80% of the RVSN’s ICBMs.41 This fig-
ure is somewhat misleading since the Russian government, like that of
the United States, is constantly upgrading these missiles’ auxiliary sys-
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   87

tems, electronics, and computer programs.42 Despite these extension

programs, Solovtsov acknowledged in December 2006 that the RVSN
expected to retire about 90% of its current ICBMs by 2016. In confor-
mity with Russia’s new emphasis on quality rather than quantity, he said
that the Strategic Missile Forces plans to replace these missiles with a
combination of silo- and mobile-based Topol-Ms.43

Sea-Based Nuclear Forces

If current trends continue, especially the ongoing retirement of Russia’s
oldest ICBMs, Russian Naval platforms will provide an increasing share
of Russia’s strategic nuclear warheads during the next decade. Russian
SSBNs presently serve with both the Northern Fleet, based at the Kola
Peninsula, and the Pacific Fleet, based in the Russian Far East. Navy
commanders plan to continue this two-ocean deployment for their
SSBNs, which have become the Navy’s funding priority.44 In February
2007, Admiral Vladimir Masorin, the Navy’s commander in chief, stated
that his service allocates approximately half its budget toward develop-
ing its strategic nuclear components.45
Despite this extensive funding, the Navy’s ability to fulfill its in-
creasingly important role in Russia’s nuclear strategy remains in doubt.
The most serious uncertainties relate to Russia’s new “Bulava” missile
(“Mace” in English). Three consecutive failed test launches—in Septem-
ber, October, and December 2006—have deepened concerns about this
SLBM, which supposedly has advanced BMD-penetration capabilities.46
In April 2007, Solomonov downplayed the problems with the Bulava,
claiming they were expected and would soon be overcome.47 That same
month, Deputy Defense Minister Aleksei Moskovsky said that Russia
would resume test launches of the Bukava by July 2007.48
The Bulava’s problems call into question the military’s plans to equip
Russia’s next (fourth) generation Project Mk 955 Borey-class nuclear-
power submarines with a dozen of these missiles. In April 2007, the Rus-
sian Navy launched the first Borey-class submarine the Yury Dolgorukiy,
by moving it to a dock at the Severodvinsk submarine base. The Navy
plans to commission the ship next year after it completes construction
and sea trials.49 Putin himself observed that these submarines will rep-
resent Russia’s first new SSBNs since the Soviet era.50 The Navy plans to
commission seven additional Borey-class submarines by 2017.51 Rus-
sian military leaders eagerly await their entry into the Russian fleet since
88   CHAPTER FIVE

the existing 12 operational SSBNs, built before 1990, are becoming ob-
solete. Only one of Russia’s Typhoon-class submarines, the recently re-
fitted and renamed Dmitriy Donskoy, remains serviceable—currently as
a test platform for launching the Bulava. The six Delta III-class (Project
667BDR) SSBNs will reach the end of their service lives within the next
few years, along with their SS-N-18 (RSM-50) Stingray SLBMs. The six
newer Delta-IV-class (Project 667BDRM Delfin) submarines assigned
to the Northern Fleet are undergoing life-extension programs and up-
grades to enable their continued service for at least another decade.
They carry the liquid-fueled SS-N-23 (RM-54) SLBM. The latest version
of the SS-N-23, the Sineva, can carry warheads that supposedly have
enhanced BMD penetration capability.52 The Russian defense industry,
however, can currently produce at best a dozen of these SLBMs annu-
ally. In any case, the Sineva represents an insufficient substitute for the
solid-fueled, longer-range, but troubled Bulava.53
The submarine leg of Russia’s strategic triad suffers from other prob-
lems besides those plaguing the Bulava. In February 2004, the Navy ex-
perienced two other embarrassing failures, in Putin’s presence, during
tests of its older SLBMs. One missile failed to launch; a second exploded
shortly after take-off. Furthermore, budgetary constraints and other
complications have resulted in Russian military submarines conducting
only a few patrols annually in recent years.54 In 2002, it appears that the
SSBN fleet did not perform even a single patrol.55 In comparison, the
Navy managed to conduct 30 patrols in 1991, and still about 10 annu-
ally by 1998.56 This paucity of sea patrols has deprived Russian strategic
submarine crews of opportunities to hone their operational and support
skills. A September 2006 fire aboard the Daniil Moskovskiy, a Russian
attack submarine, exposed serious maintenance problems.57 Moreover,
this lack of training may impede the SSBNs recent efforts to master new
launch trajectories that could make their SLBMs less vulnerable to U.S.
ballistic missile defenses.58 Crews also lack opportunities to practice the
skills they need to evade U.S. “hunter-killer” attack submarines. Finally,
keeping submarines in port renders them more vulnerable since they
become more detectable targets while immobile.

Strategic Bomber Fleet

Russia’s strategic bomber fleet consists almost exclusively of Soviet-
manufactured platforms capable of launching long-range air-launched
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   89

cruise missiles (ALCMs) armed with nuclear warheads. Although Putin

said in May 2006 that, “over the next five years we will have to signifi-
cantly increase the number of modern long range aircraft, submarines
and launch systems in our strategic nuclear forces,” the Russian govern-
ment has not yet committed to upgrading its strategic bomber fleet with
a new generation of planes or cruise missiles.59 During the Soviet peri-
od, the strategic bomber force constituted the weakest leg of the USSR’s
offensive nuclear triad. Since then, the Russian Federation has stopped
building turboprop Tu-95MS (NATO-designated Bear) heavy bombers
and only resumed production of the Soviet-designed supersonic Tu-160
(Blackjack) bomber in the last few years.
In January 2007, Vladimir Mikhailov, the commander-in-chief of
the Russian Air Force, said Russia would commission approximately
two new or modernized Tu-160 strategic bombers every three years. He
added, however, that Russia would continue to upgrade the avionics and
other components of the existing fleet as well as its support infrastruc-
ture.60 For example, the Russian Air Force has begun upgrading the
Tu-160s, which have a range of over 10,000 kilometers, to deliver con-
ventionally armed missiles (typically 12 cruise missiles) or up to 40 tons
of high-explosive gravity bombs.61 Making them capable of employing
conventional as well as nuclear weapons should help the planes to re-
ceive sufficient funding to keep them in a high state of readiness. In early
December 2006, the Kazan aircraft production association completed
upgrading the first Tu-160.62 Lt. Gen. Igor Khvorov, the commander-
in-chief of Strategic Bomber Aviation, insisted that modernized Tu-160s
could remain the mainstay of Russia’s strategic bomber force for decades:
“Heavy aircraft are designed for the long term, so this aircraft will meet
all the necessary requirements for at least another 30 years.”63
In February 2007, Ivanov said that Russia’s strategic bomber fleet
would consist of at least 50 Tu-95 and Tu-160s through 2015.64 The abil-
ity of Russia’s strategic bombers to overcome adversarial air defenses is
questionable, however, since they reportedly conduct infrequent train-
ing flights (though they do participate in major military exercises). The
planes are also vulnerable to a first strike from fast-flying strategic mis-
siles because they are normally stationed at only a small number of air
bases in peacetime.65 Plans to develop a new long-range cruise missile
to replace the Kh-55, which could allow Russian planes to attack a target
from safer distances, remain at an early stage.
90   CHAPTER FIVE

Strategic Defenses
The Russian government is also upgrading the one strategic BMD com-
plex currently operating around Moscow. Depending on how one char-
acterizes the status of current U.S. BMD programs, this A-135 “Galosh”
complex may represent the world’s only operational national missile
defense system.66 On April 5, 2006, the government approved a plan
to provide the A-135 with improved early-warning, reconnaissance,
and telecommunications systems as well as advanced missile intercep-
tors.67 On February 27, 2007, Ivanov said that Russia should develop
fifth-generation air defense, missile defense, and space defense systems
by 2015.68
Besides restructuring its active defenses, the Russian government has
begun to revitalize the country’s early warning systems to thwart pos-
sible surprise missile attacks. The Russian Space Forces currently have
two main ballistic missile detection systems. The first consists of a con-
stellation of satellites with infrared sensors that can detect a missile’s
heat plume shortly after launch. The second element is a network of
ground-based early-warning radars that can track incoming warheads.
Having two means of detection, employing different physical principles,
helps reduce the chances of error.
The Russian government has committed to supply Russia’s Space
Forces with a new, more advanced radar complex that aims to provide
comprehensive coverage of all types of missile launches, including stra-
tegic and tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.69 The first new
“Voronezh-M” radar station became operational in late December 2006
in the Leningrad Region, near St. Petersburg. It will close the gap in cov-
erage of northwest Russia that arose in 1999 when Moscow abandoned
its obsolete Dnestr-M Skrunde radar station in Latvia.70 Col.-Gen. Vlad-
imir Popovkin, the commander of Russia’s Space Forces, announced in
February 2007 that the government expects to complete construction
of another Voronezh-type radar in southwest Russia in 2007.71 Then
Defense Minister Ivanov also indicated that Russia plans to build addi-
tional radar stations in order to end dependence on the stations located
in the other former Soviet republics.72
The Russian government will soon take complementary steps to re-
store the country’s debilitated constellation of early warning satellites.
The Space Forces operate a first-generation network of Oko/US-KS sat-
ellites in highly elliptical Molniya-type orbits that constantly monitor
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   91

the continental United States for possible launches of ICBMs. Russian

authorities had planned to deploy a second generation of more advanced
US-KMO satellites, some in geostationary orbits, to detect launches from
foreign SSBNs deployed anywhere at sea, but this network for expanded
coverage has yet to enter into service.73 In February 2007, Ivanov said
Russia would launch four more military satellites in 2007.74
Until these measures lead to a substantial improvement in the ca-
pacity of Russia’s ground-based and space-based early-warning systems,
Russian national security policy makers, like their Soviet predecessors,
will probably continue to discount the credibility of any warnings these
networks generate. Instead, they will likely still depend on broad stra-
tegic warning indicators (e.g., the overall state of Russian-American
relations) in assessing the potential risks of an attack on Russia. They
will also continue to rely primarily on the threat of military retaliation,
especially with the country’s offensive nuclear forces, to deter foreign
aggression.75

FUTURE PROSPECTS
The Numbers Problem
Although Russia has more than enough nuclear weapons and con-
stituent components, it has encountered problems deploying adequate
numbers of strategic delivery platforms. Since the USSR’s dissolution,
Russian defense enterprises have manufactured far fewer new strategic
ballistic missiles than required to replace the country’s aging land- and
sea-based strategic deterrents. As a result, the looming mass decom-
missioning of Soviet-era ICBMs (with as many as ten warheads each)
will result in a precipitous decline in the relative contribution of Russia’s
land-based missiles to the offensive strategic triad. As Russia transitions
from MIRV-ed ICBMs to single-warhead Topol-Ms, the number of nu-
clear warheads in its ICBM fleet is projected is forecast to decline from
some 1,843 nuclear warheads today to 665 warheads by 2012. In con-
trast, the number of nuclear warheads deployed on SLBMs will decrease
only slightly—from 624 warheads in 2007 to an estimated 600 warheads
in 2012. The number of warheads aboard bombers could also decline
somewhat from 872 warheads in 2007 versus a projected 788 warheads
in 2015.76
For political and military leaders who have traditionally relied on
land-based ICBMs for approximately 60-70% of their country’s strategic
92   CHAPTER FIVE

nuclear warheads, Russia’s growing dependence on its more vulnerable

submarines and bombers must arouse a certain degree of anxiety among
its strategists. In response, Russian designers might either develop a new
MIRV-ed ICBM or, after the START I prohibitions against increasing
the number of warheads attributed to an existing type of ICBM expire
in December 2009, modify the Topol-Ms to carry multiple warheads. In
May 2007, Solovtsov said that Russia would begin to equip the Topol-M
mobile missile system with multiple re-entry vehicles in 2-3 years.77

Wildcards
Numerous external factors could affect the evolution of Russia’s nuclear
forces, especially their nuclear modernization plans. Despite many im-
provements, the nuclear weapons complex remains vulnerable to both
safety concerns (e.g., accidents from aging equipment) and security
breaches (e.g., terrorism or unauthorized thefts and diversions).78 Rus-
sian nuclear plant managers also have inherited a host of expensive en-
vironmental problems from their Soviet predecessors. Cleaning up this
mess could drain resources from military modernization.
Second, the Russian decision to reduce the variety of nuclear delivery
platforms in service has already created crises whenever one type has
experienced production (e.g., the Topol-M) or development (e.g., the
Bulava) problems. The concomitant reduction in the types of nuclear
warheads creates comparable risks from a failure of a particular war-
head design. In particular, proposals to use a single warhead type on all
future Russian ground-launched and submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles could prove disastrous should that design experience an irreparable
technical fault—a development that could call into question the viability
of Russia’s entire strategic deterrent, given the weakness of the country’s
strategic bomber fleet.
Third, the Russian government might decide to allocate a greater
share of defense spending to its conventional forces. Most military re-
form proposals envisage increasing the number of better-compensated
professionals serving in the Russian armed forces, which remains largely
an army of low-paid conscripts. The planned increase in the use of con-
tract soldiers and other non-conscripts could entail substantially higher
spending on human resources since attracting and keeping more volun-
teers will require providing them with better pay, housing, and food. In
addition, Russian military commanders want to purchase many more
advanced conventional weapons, such as expensive precision-guided
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   93

munitions. Any fall in the government’s energy exports, in combination

with the competing demands of Russia’s conventional forces, could fur-
ther curtail spending on the country’s nuclear forces.
Finally, Russia’s future arms control environment remains extremely
hard to predict. The process of implementing the May 2002 Russian-
American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) already entails
uncertainties regarding the sustainability of the Russian nuclear arse-
nal. The treaty designates December 31, 2012, as the date by which the
United States and the Russian Federation must reduce their offensive
arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 “operationally deployed strategic
warheads.” Observers note that the absence of interim deadlines for re-
ductions means that the SORT limits will both take effect and expire on
the same day. Questions also exist about the treaty’s lack of detailed veri-
fication procedures, the absence of a timetable and rules for warhead re-
ductions, its 90-day withdrawal clause, and other issues associated with
the three-page document.79
Thus far, both governments have affirmed their intention to cut their
forces unilaterally to promised levels and have, accordingly, been re-
moving them from operational deployment.80 Between November 2000
and January 2005, Russia eliminated 1,740 nuclear warheads and 357
strategic delivery platforms.81 The United States has also been reducing
its forces in line with the SORT requirements.82 In the absence of a new
bilateral strategic arms control agreement, both governments might
simply extend the SORT force-level limitations beyond 2012. Moscow
and Washington could, however, negotiate a new strategic arms control
agreement that would require changes in the number or deployment
of Russian nuclear forces. Decrying what he termed the “stagnation”
in Russian-American arms control, Putin in late June 2006 called for
renewed bilateral dialogue with priority given to replacing the 1991
Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) before it expires at the end
of 2009.83 Although neither government offered new proposals at the
July G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, their foreign and defense ministries
agreed to begin formally studying possible future strategic arms control
measures. The first session of these talks occurred on March 29 in Ber-
lin. Nevertheless, Russian and U.S. officials have not reached a consensus
beyond a mutual agreement against simply extending the 1991 START
accord beyond its scheduled expiration on December 5, 2009.84
Conversely, a prolonged downturn in U.S.-Russian relations could
result in either government exercising SORT’s permissive withdrawal
94   CHAPTER FIVE

clause. Although Putin and other current Russian officials have re-
nounced a need to match the U.S. military buildup missile-for-missile,
expressing confidence that less costly asymmetric responses would prove
adequate for maintaining the credibility of Russia’s nuclear deterrent,
their successors might be more concerned about retaining quantitative
strategic parity with the United States. An unexpectedly rapid strength-
ening of China’s strategic nuclear arsenal—which could also trigger a
compensatory U.S. military buildup—might lead Russia to alter its own
nuclear force structure. Concerns about a potential long-term Chinese
challenge to Russian interests have already reinforced Moscow’s interest
in retaining a credible nuclear arsenal.85
These uncertainties continue to induce caution in Washington, and
militate against major unilateral reductions in the size of America’s own
nuclear arsenal. Until a change of government occurs in both countries
in 2008, the prospects for additional bilateral agreements to reduce stra-
tegic nuclear weapons, limit destabilizing military operations, jointly
develop ballistic missile defenses, and enhance transparency regarding
tactical nuclear weapons are low. Fortunately, considerable opportuni-
ties exist for profitable near-term collaboration in cooperative threat re-
duction and curbing third-party nonproliferation.86

Notes
1. See also his rankings of the MOD’s “priority tasks” in his responses during
interviews published in Izvestia on February 21, 2006 and March 28, 2006.
2. Viktor Myasnikov, “Starie osnovi novoy doktriny,” Nezavisimaya gazeta,
December 19, 2006.
3. U.S. Department of State, “START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms,” April 1, 2007, http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/83132.htm. For
additional information on the numbers of Russia’s major nuclear systems see
“Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,” http://Russianforces.org/current.
4. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Russia Nuclear Forces, 2007,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 63 (March/April 2007), 61, 63.
5. This debate is reviewed in Nikolai Sokov, “Modernization of Strategic
Nuclear Weapons in Russia: The Emerging New Posture” (May 1998), http://
www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/modern.htm; and Frank Umbach, Future Mili-
tary Reform: Russia’s Nuclear & Conventional Forces (Camberley: Conflict Stud-
ies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, August 2002),
11-14.
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   95

6. “Transcript of the Press Conference for the Russian and Foreign Media,”
January 31, 2001, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/01/31/0953_ty-
pe82915type82917_100901.shtml.
In an interview with NBC News, Putin likewise observed: “How can we talk
about ensuring global security and address the issues of non-proliferation and
disarmament if we do not include Russia, which is one of the biggest nuclear
powers?” July 12, 2006, http://kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/07/12/1443_
type82916_108525.shtml.
7. Nabi Abdullaev, “Russia Won’t Seek Nuclear Parity with West,” Defense
News (April 10, 2006), 12.
8. An English version of the Russian National Security Doctrine is reprinted
in the January/ February 2000 issue of Arms Control Today, http://www.arm-
scontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/docjf00.asp.
9. An English version of the Russian Military Doctrine is reprinted in the
May 2000 issue of Arms Control Today, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_
05/dc3ma00.asp.
10. Mark Schneider, The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Fed-
eration (Washington, DC: United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, 2006), 8-9,
http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/Russian%20nuclear%20doctrine%20--%20NSF%
20for%20print.pdf.
11. For a description of the units involved, see “Russian Defense Ministry
to Conduct First Big Military Exercise in 25 years,” February 4, 2004, http://
english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/351/11962_military.html. See also “Russia Cites
U.S. Action for War Exercises,” International Herald Tribune, February 11, 2004.
On the continued preoccupation of Russian military planners with a potential
war with the West see Victor Myasnikov, “The Red Army: Still the Scariest of
them All,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 27, 2006.
12. “Russian Strategic Bombers Penetrate Buffer Zone near Alaska Coast,”
September 30, 2006, http://www.tldm.org/News9/RussianBombersBuzzAlas-
ka.htm.
13. Cited in RIA Novosti, “Russia to Buy 17 ICBMs in 2007—Minister,”
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061116/55705839.html.
14. For a probably exaggerated assessment of the U.S. capacity to launch
an effective first strike against Russia and China see Kier A. Leiber and Daryl
G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March-
April 2006), 42-54; and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD?
The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, vol. 30, no.
4 (Spring 2006), pp. 7-44. Russian responses to their assessment are surveyed
in Arthur Blinov and Igor Plugatarev, “Guaranteed Unilateral Destruction,” Ne-
zavisimaya Gazeta, March 23, 2006; and Pavel K. Baev, “Moscow Puts PR Spin
96   CHAPTER FIVE

on its Shrinking Nuclear Arsenal,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 17, 2006. Other
critiques appeared in the September-October 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs.
15. According to one authoritative source, “De-escalation of aggression” is
defined as “forcing the enemy to halt military action by threat to deliver or by
actual delivery of strikes of varying intensity with reliance on conventional and
(or) nuclear weapons” (Sergey Ivanov, Priority Tasks of the Development of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Moscow: Russian Ministry of Defense,
October 2, 2003, 70, http://www.pircenter.org/index.php?id=184).
16. Nikolai Sokov, “The ‘Tactical Nuclear Weapons Scare’ of 2001,” Monterey
Institute of International Studies CNS Reports, January 3, 2001, http://cns.miis.
edu/pubs/reports/tnw.htm. The exercise began with a simulated NATO attack
on Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast following a conflict between Russia and a Baltic
country. It ended with Russian nuclear strikes against U.S. territory.
17. Alexander Golts, “Military Reform in Russia and the Global War against
Terrorism,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 2004), 39.
18. Roger McDermott, “Russian Military ‘Modernizing’,” Not Reform-
ing—Ivanov,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 4, no. 32 (February 14, 2007),
http://jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=420&issue_
id=4003&article_id=2371909. For a list of the new strategic systems see Al-
exander Bogatyryov, “Russia Should Renew its Nuclear Arsenal,” February 9,
2007, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070209/60485906.html.
19. Cited in Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press, “Weapons Plan Strives
to Beat Soviet Readiness,” Washington Times, February 8, 2007.
20. For a description of these tests, see Dmitriy Litovkin, “Arkhipelag gotov
k yadernym ispytaniyam,” Izvestia, July 20, 2006; and Viktor Litovkin, “Sergey
Ivanov Visits Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Testing Site,” July 26, 2006, http://en.rian.
ru/analysis/20060726/51869240.html.
21. Interfax, “Russian Nuclear Testing Ground Remains Ready—Ivanov,”
July 19, 2006, http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/28.html?id=11556790.
22. Andrei Frolov, “Putin Meets with Nuclear Industry Chiefs,” Moscow De-
fense Brief, no. 2 (2006), 12.
23. See for example the interview with Sergey Kirienko, the head of Russia’s
Federal Atomic Energy Agency, in Aleksandr Emel’yanenkov, “Sergey Kirienko
o tom, kak budet razvivat’sya yadernaya energetika Rossii,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta,
July 1, 2006.
24. Nikolai Sokov, “Moscow Rejects U.S. Authors’ Claims of U.S. First-Strike
Capability, as Putin Protects Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure,” WMD Insights,
no. 5 (May 2006), 19-20.
25. Norris and Kristensen, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2007,” 61.
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   97

26. John B. Wolfsthal and Tom Z. Collina, “Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead
Control in Russia,” Survival, vol. 44, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 74.
27. The structure and standard procedures of Russia’s nuclear weapons com-
plex are described in Oleg Bukharin, “Downsizing Russia’s Nuclear Warhead
Production Infrastructure,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring
2001), 116-130.
28. RIA Novosti, “Russian Ballistic Missiles to be Equipped with New War-
head,” April 24, 2006, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060424/46839202.html.
29. Ivan Safronov, “Rossiya skreshchivaet boegolovki,” Kommersant, April
24, 2006.
30. Cited in RIA Novosti, “Wrap: Russia Prioritizes Strategic Forces on Secu-
rity Agenda,” November 16, 2006, http://en.rian.ru.russia/20061116/55710444.
html.
31. RIA Novosti, “Russia Should Make 20-30 Ballistic Missiles a Year—Ex-
pert,” April 11, 2006, at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060411/45553177.html. See
also Fred Wer, “In Moscow, Buzz Over Arms Race II,” Christian Science Moni-
tor, April 24, 2006.
32. Pavel Felgenhauer, “A Potemkin Democracy, A Potemkin Free Mar-
ket, and a Potemkin Arms Race,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 4, no. 12
(February 14, 2007), at http://jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_
id=420&&issue_id=4003.
33. Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia Prepares for ‘Wars of the Future,” ISN Secu-
rity Watch (February 12, 2007).
34. Vladimir Bukhshtab, “Garantiinye Sroki Istekli” [“Warranty Periods
Have Expired”], Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, September 15, 2006.
35. Cited in RIA Novosti, “Topol-M Mobile ICBMs Crucial for Na-
tional Security—Putin,” December 14, 2006, at http://en.rian.ru/rus-
sia/20061214/56931286.html.
36. Viktor Myasnikov, “Nepredskazuemoe oruzhie generala balyevskogo,”
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 18, 2007.
37. RIA Novosti, “Russia to deploy fixed-site Topol-M ICBMs by 2010--SMF
cmdr,” May 8, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070508/65086382.html.
38. Roman Fomishenko and Vitali Denisov, “PROryv Rossii v Novyi Vek”
[“Russia’s Breakthrough into the New Century”], Krasnaya Zvezda, December
15, 2006.
39. Rose Gottemoeller, “Nuclear Weapons in Current Russian Policy,” in The
Russian Military: Power and Policy, ed by Steven E. Miller and Dmitri V. Trenin
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004), 191, 193, 195.
98   CHAPTER FIVE

40. Pavel Podvig, “Speaking of Nuclear Primacy,” March 10, 2006, at http://
russianforces.org/blog/2006/03/speaking_of_nuclear_primacy.shtml.
41. Interfax-AVN, December 5, 2005, cited in “Russia Extends Service Life
of ICBMs,” Global Security Newswire, December 6, 2005, at http://www.nti.
org/d_newswire/issues. See also “Kura vstretilas’ s ‘Topolem’,” Krasnaya Zvez-
da, November 30, 2005; and the interview with RVSN commander Nikolai
Solovtsov in Aleksandr Volk and Aleksandr Dolinin, “’Topolya’ zhivut dolgo,”
Krasnaya Zvezda, December 2, 2005.
42. Vladimir Bukhshtab, “Garantiynye sroki istekli,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe
Obozrenie, September 15, 2006.
43. Vadim Koval’, “Epokha ‘Topoley’: Prolog” [interview with RVSN Com-
mander Solovtsov], Krasnaya Zvezda, December 15, 2006.
44. Yuri Selznyov, “Russia Builds New Nuclear Sub Equipped With Bulava-
M Quasi-Ballistic Missiles,” Pravda.ru, http://english.pravda.ru/russia/eco-
nomics/90091-0/.
45. Roger McDermott, “Russian Military ‘Modernizing’,” Not Reform-
ing—Ivanov,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 4, no. 32 (February 14, 2007), at
http://jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=420&issue_
id=4003&article_id=2371909.
46. Yuri Seleznyov, “Strategic Submarine of New Generation to be Finished
Soon in Russia,” Pravda, March 27, 2007.
47. See the interview with Solomonov by Igor Korotchenko in Voenno-
Promishlenniy Kur’er (April 4-10, 2007).
48. RIA Novosti, “Tests of Russia’s Newest Ballistic Missile to Continue in
Summer,” April 15, 2007, at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070415/63665096.html.
49. RIA Novosti, “Russia Launches New Nuclear Submarine,” April 15, 2007,
at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070415/63665437.html
50. Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the
Russian Federation,” May 10, 2006, at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speech-
es/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml.
51. Nabi Abdullaev, “Russia Launches First of 8 New Nuclear Subs,” Defense
News (April 23, 2007), 6.
52. Nikolai Sokov, “New Details on Russian Strategic Subs Emerge, as Keel
for Third Borey Class Boat is Laid,” WMD Insights, no. 4 (April 2006), 28.
53. Viktor Myasnikov, “The Bulava Has Been Quietly Sunk: Defense Min-
istry Conceals an Unsuccessful ICBM Test,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December
27, 2006.
54. Nikolai Sokov, “New Details on Russian Strategic Subs Emerge, as Keel
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   99

for Third Borey Class Boat is Laid,” WMD Insights, no. 4 (April 2006), 27.
55. Podvig, Russian Nuclear Arsenal, 12.
56. “Russian Nuclear Submarine Patrols,” Nuclear Brief, February 24, 2006,
at http://www.nukestrat.com/russia/subpatrols.htm.
57. Pavel K. Baev, “Putin’s Ambitions and Russia’s Military Feebleness,” Eur-
asia Daily Monitor, September 11, 2006.
58. These efforts are discussed in Nikolai Sokov, “Russia’s Newest Subma-
rine-Launched Missile Fails in Tests, but Tests of other Systems Succeed: De-
fense Minister Ivanov Raises Questions on Status of Russian Sea-Based Tactical
Nuclear Weapons,” WMD Insights, no. 10 (November 2006), 30-31.
59. Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the
Russian Federation,” May 10, 2006, at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speech-
es/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml.
60. RIA Novosti, “Russian Air Force to Get Two Strategic Bombers Every
Three Years,” January 18, 2007, at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070118/59299841.
html.
61. Dmitriy Litovkin, “VVS poluchili bombardirovshchik dlya bor’by s ter-
roristami,” Izvestia, July 6, 2006.
62. “Russia Completes Upgrade to Strategic Bomber,” Global Security News-
wire, December 8, 2006, at http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2006_12_
8.html#04F3246A.
63. RIA Novosti, “T-160 Bomber to Remain Core of Russian Long-Range
Aviation,” December 12, 2006, at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061212/56823656.
html.
64. Simon Saradzhyan, “Military to Get $189Bln Overhaul,” Moscow Times,
February 8, 2007.
65. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Di-
mension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, vol. 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006),
15, 16.
66. The Moscow BMD system is described in Robert S. Norris and Hans
M. Kristensen, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2004,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scien-
tists, vol. 60, no. 4, (July/August 2004), 74; Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strate-
gic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 413-418; and Vladimir
Trendafilovski, “Russian Anti-Ballistic Guided Missile Systems,” at http://www.
wonderland.org.nz/rusabgm.htm.
67. Alexander Bogatyryov, “Russia to Get New Mobile ICBMs,” December
12, 2006, at http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20061215/57001891.html.
68. Interfax, “Ivanov Calls for 5th Generation ABM System,” February 27,
100   CHAPTER FIVE

2007, at http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue=11684868.
69. Cited in Olga Bozhyeva and Andrey Yashlavsky, “Dobroe Utro, Tovarish-
chi Kommandos,” Moskovsky Komsomolets, December 16, 2005. See also An-
drey Korbut, “Pyatiletka kosmicheskikh voysk,” Voenno-Promishlenniy Kur’er,
February 8, 2006.
70. Vladimir Popovkin, “Russia’s Space Defenses Stage a Revival,” October 4,
2006, at http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20061004/54509604.html.
71. RIA Novosti, “Russia to Put New Radar Station on Combat Duty in 2007—
Commander,” January 22, 2007, at http://en.rian.ru/Russia/20070122/59488562.
html.
72. Cited in Interfax, “Russia to Continue Building New Radar Stations—
Ivanov,” February 7, 2007, at http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/28.html?id_is-
sue=11673037.
73. Podvig, Russian Nuclear Arsenal, 14.
74. Simon Saradzhyan, “Military to Get $189Bln Overhaul,” Moscow Times,
February 8, 2007:
75. Pavel Podvig, “Reducing the Risk of Accidental Launch: Time for a New
Approach?” PONARS Policy Memo 328 (November 2004), at.http://www.csis.
org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0328.pdf
76. Norris and Kristensen, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2007,” 61. See also Yuriy
Grigor’ev, “Ot gonki vooruzheniy XX veka k rotere yadernogo pariteta v XXI,”
Nezavisimaya Gazea, April 7, 2006.
77. Aleksey Nikol’skiy, “Mutatsiya Topolya,” Vedomosti, May 8, 2007.
78. These continuing problems are assessed in Matthew Bunn and Anthony
Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge: John F.
Kennedy School of Government, May 2005).
79. See for example Alexei Arbatov, “Superseding U.S-Russian Nuclear
Deterrence,” Arms Control Today 35, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 14; and
George Perkovich, “Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonpro-
liferation,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 8.
80. As of July 2004, the Russian government claimed it had a total of 4,959
deployed strategic warheads according to START counting rules; altogether,
observers estimate Russia now possesses some 19,500 nuclear warheads, most
of which are in storage or awaiting dismantlement; see the figures compiled
from various sources in Wade Boese, “Russia on Key Nuclear Issues,” Arms
Control Today 35, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 13.
81. Andrey Loshschilin, RIA Novosti, May 3, 2005, reprinted in Yaderniy
 Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Their Problems   101

Kontrol’: Informatsiya, April 29–May 5, 2005, at http://www.pircenter/org/data/

publications/yki9-2005.html.
82. Defense Science Board Task Force on. Nuclear Capabilities, December
2006, “Report Summary,” 17.
83. Vladimir Putin, “Speech at Meeting with the Ambassadors and Per-
manent Representatives of the Russian Federation,” June 27, at http://www.
kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/06/27/2040_type82912type82913type82914_
107818.shtml.
84. Wade Boese, “U.S., Russia Exploring Post-START Options,” Arms Con-
trol Today, vol. 37, no. 4 (May 2007), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_05/
PostSTART.asp.
85. For a discussion of Russian strategists’ diverging assessment of a poten-
tial future Chinese threat to Russia see Yury E. Fedorov, ‘Boffins’ and ‘Buffoons’:
Different Strains of Thought in Russia’s Strategic Thinking (London: Royal Insti-
tute of International Affairs, March 2006), at http://www.chathamhouse.org.
uk/pdf/research/rep/BP0306russia.pdf; and Dmitri Trenin, Russia’s Nuclear
Policy in the 21st Century Environment (Paris: IFRI Security Studies Depart-
ment, Autumn 2005), 11-12.
86. For possible bilateral and multilateral initiatives in this area see Richard
Weitz, Revitalising US–Russian Security Cooperation: Practical Measures (Lon-
don: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005); and
Russian-American Security Cooperation after St. Petersburg: Challenges and Op-
portunities (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War Col-
lege, 2007).
 CHAPTER SIX

Paper Tiger or Waking Dragon?

Considering Nuclear Change in China
Dakota S. Rudesill

I
n moments stolen from the all-consuming question of how to pre-
vent Iraq’s collapse, the U.S. foreign policy community is trying to
come to terms with the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The profound changes underway in the world’s most populous nation
have put the China question on the front pages of magazines1 and best
seller lists,2 generated dozens of congressional hearings and expert re-
ports,3 and resulted in a controversial annual Pentagon report on Chi-
nese military power,4 all fueling an intense debate.5 Adding to the sense
of alarm in some quarters have been headline-grabbing military moves,
including China’s successful test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile in
January of this year,6 approach by a People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Navy submarine to the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk battle group in October of last
year,7 and substantial military budget growth in recent years, including
an announced hike of nearly 18 percent for 2007 alone.8
The Pentagon’s new Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
2007 report suggests that China will shortly field an improved nuclear
force, in both qualitative and quantitative terms.9 Yet the report informs
rather than resolves debate about the nuclear China question, one com-
plicated by the fact that China has the least transparent program of the
“P-5,” the five nations with permanent UN Security Council Seats and
legal nuclear arsenals under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Great
uncertainty is, however, more than a function of the emphasis on secre-
cy and deception in Chinese strategy noted by the Pentagon.10 Thanks
to galloping economic growth and apparent maturation of the DF-31

102
 Paper Tiger or Waking Dragon   103

missile11 and its variants, the range of possible PRC nuclear futures is
also expanding dramatically. The PRC leadership itself may well regard
the question as still pending.
Accordingly, this chapter will avoid prognostication in favor of identi-
fying key trends and questions at the intersection of Chinese capabilities
and intentions and changes to U.S. strategic posture. Parts I–III provide
a snapshot of PRC nuclear forces and modernization today, identify fac-
tors driving and auguring against dramatic change, and posit and briefly
evaluate several alternate Chinese nuclear futures. To facilitate analysis
of PRC nuclear moves, Part IV suggests a six-point “index of leading
Chinese nuclear indicators.” The chapter concludes by endorsing efforts
to engage Chinese officials on nuclear issues and careful evaluation of
potential changes to U.S. strategic capabilities and doctrine—prudent
responses to persistent uncertainty amid great change and high stakes.

China’s Posture
Against the backdrop of growing concern about Chinese military pow-
er, what is most remarkable about China’s strategic nuclear forces to date
is the PRC’s relative restraint and divergence from the approach of the
other P-5 powers.
The United States and Russia each have several thousand operation-
ally deployed strategic nuclear warheads on a triad of land, sea, and air
platforms of intercontinental range. In contrast, open sources suggest
China today has 74 to 112 warheads operationally deployed with land-
based missiles,12 only 18-20 of which—mounted on the liquid-fueled
DF-5 ICBM—bring the continental United States (CONUS) within
range.13 Since the late 1960s China has fielded bombers able to reach
targets in Russia and since the early 1980s has had a single SSBN, the
Type 092 submarine Xia. However, China’s nuclear bomber capabilities
remain relatively limited14 and in 25-plus years the evidently problem-
plagued Xia has reportedly gone to sea once and conducted zero deter-
rent patrols.15 Therefore, in deployed arsenal size and platform diversity
the small, largely “uniad” PRC strategic force has less in common with
the two top-tier nuclear powers than it does with second-tier powers
France and the United Kingdom, which have small arsenals (of roughly
350 and less than 200 active warheads, respectively) designed around
SSBNs (France also has warheads deliverable by air-to-surface missiles
104   CHAPTER six

carried on fighter aircraft).16 Although China is thought to have a num-

ber of tactical nuclear warheads (in which it has not shown sustained
interest),17 the PRC claimed in 2004 to have “the smallest nuclear arse-
nal.”18
China is the only P-5 nation presently without patrolling SSBNs or
deployed missiles with multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs). But China’s
divergence from its P-5 brethren is deeper. Chinese ICBMs and IRBMs
are believed to carry multi-megaton warheads19 suited for counter-
value retaliation against population centers, while the other P-5 pow-
ers deploy sub-megaton weapons on their ICBMs and SLBMs and have
counter-force capabilities. Furthermore, while the United States and
Russia maintain ICBMs on alert, and the United States, Russia, United
Kingdom, and France deploy SSBNs at sea (and Russia alternately pier-
side) in responsive postures, none of the nuclear missiles of the Second
Artillery—the PRC’s rocket corps—are thought to be on alert. China’s
ICBMs and associated warheads have been stored separately.20
China’s non-doctrinaire nuclear force has reflected a traditionally
limited view of the utility of nuclear weapons. China went nuclear in
1964 to prevent nuclear intimidation and soon thereafter adopted a
relatively simplistic, inflexible retaliatory posture.21 This decision was
reportedly based on the Chinese leadership’s conclusion in the wake of
the threat of U.S. nuclear use in the Korean War that deterrence from
the threat of a counter-value second strike is the bomb’s only real util-
ity.22 Otherwise, Mao warned, the “atom bomb is a paper tiger.”23 PRC
nuclear writings depict counter-strikes as coming after a first strike has
been absorbed.24
Today, the PRC retains a no first use (NFU) declaratory policy, a
“minimum credible deterrent” force regarding the United States and
Russia (and, arguably, also potential theater adversaries, such as India
and Japan),25 and a “counterattack” doctrine focused on inflicting “a
heavy psychological shock” on the enemy to induce war termination.26
Although Evan Medeiros’s review of PRC writings shows a stated desire
for “assured retaliation,”27 the PRC’s limited, fixed, vulnerable missile
deployments to date suggest that the Beijing leadership has for most of
its nuclear history believed that assured doubt in Washington or Mos-
cow of a first strike completely eliminating the Second Artillery’s retalia-
tory capability is sufficient.
As RAND’s Medeiros writes, PRC leaders “continue to view nucle-
ar weapons as primarily political tools to maintain China’s freedom of
 Paper Tiger or Waking Dragon   105

action while minimizing its vulnerability to coercion by other nuclear-

armed states.”28 The current nuclear modernization effort, however,
has the PRC’s forces on course to look more like those of the other P-5
states. Although retirement of older systems is probable and could offset
numerically any new deployments,29 the U.S. intelligence community
believes that China’s operational warhead total may rise30 as the PRC
fields three solid-fueled DF-31 variants: the road-mobile DF-31 ICBM
(which the Pentagon judges “achieved initial threat availability in 2006”
and may be operational “in the near future” if not already), the longer-
range silo-based DF-31A ICBM (“expected to reach initial operating
capability (IOC) in 2007”) and the JL-2 SLBM (“IOC 2007-2010”) for
new Type 094 Jin SSBNs, the operational date of which is not clear.31
The PRC may deploy MRVs on its missiles (including the DF-5), us-
ing a new, smaller, more accurate, sub-megaton warhead that may be
deployed with penetration aids intended to foil U.S. ballistic missile de-
fenses (BMD).32 Cruise missiles that could have nuclear capability are
also reportedly in development.33
In short, China appears to be seeking a deterrent improved in size,
survivability, accuracy, and penetrability. Operational deployment on
road- and sea-mobile platforms, with warheads continually mated to
missiles, may suggest impending, significant changes to posture and
doctrine.

Modernization
Several PRC motives for modernization are relatively obvious. Along
with deterring nuclear attacks and preventing nuclear coercion, signal-
ing great power standing is enumerated as one of the arsenal’s stated
missions;34 in this sense, modern nuclear forces function as a P-5 sta-
tus symbol. The rising economic tide that has made the PRC a great
power is also lifting all military boats. In turn, more and better nuclear
hardware (including from Russia) makes overwhelming and penetrat-
ing U.S. BMD easier.
This four-part atomic harmony of prestige, money, technology, and
counter-BMD is discernable in discussions of PRC modernization on
both sides of the Pacific. It does not, however, fully account for the
mounting pressure for change and growth in nuclear capabilities and
doctrine. A fuller explanation begins with but goes beyond the most
explosive issue in Sino-American relations, Taiwan.
106   CHAPTER six

The “comprehensive transformation” of the PLA is focused on en-

abling the PRC to prevail in a “local war[] under conditions of informa-
tionalization”—a brief, intense, high-technology war to capture Taiwan
or at least prevent its independence.35 While Americans tend to view this
capability (years away, according to the Pentagon36) in terms of some-
thing the PRC seeks to acquire, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
leadership appears to view it in connection with preventing catastrophic
loss. Due in great part to the popular nationalism the CCP has stoked in
the place of communist ideology, it is common perception in China that
“if the Communist regime allows Taiwan to declare formal indepen-
dence without putting up a fight, the outraged public will bring down
the regime.”37 The CCP might contemplate or threaten nuclear escala-
tion to avoid having to back down, and in any event could be expected
to hope that the risk of a Taiwan crisis becoming a nuclear crisis will in-
ject caution into U.S. decision-making.38 As it seeks to deter the United
States from conventionally resisting a PRC conventional attack beyond
its current frontier, however, China finds itself with legacy nuclear forces
designed primarily for a very different Cold War scenario: deterring the
Soviet Union from a nuclear attack on (or a massive ground invasion of)
PRC territory.39 The limited capabilities and simple, NFU-based retalia-
tory doctrine assumed to work in the latter case likely look to some PRC
strategists like small, vulnerable, blunt instruments in the former.
Concern about the vulnerability of China’s deterrent, and concomi-
tant pressure for its modernization, appear to have been stoked by the
2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). As part of a “New Triad,” the
NPR endorsed BMDs that represent an implicit challenge to China’s
second strike capability, and doctrinally added conventional weapons
to U.S. strategic offensive forces.40 From the U.S. standpoint, proposed
conventional ballistic missile (CBM) systems such as the Conventional
Trident Modification (CTM)—rejected to date by Congress but request-
ed again this year by the Pentagon41—hold out the promise of “prompt
global strike” against terrorists and rogue states. Such systems might
also meet strategic targeting requirements with fewer nuclear warheads,
or suggest the surgical removal of peer or near-peer nuclear forces dur-
ing a crisis without crossing the nuclear threshold.42 But from China’s
standpoint, that is just the problem: some PRC strategists fear that in a
Taiwan crisis the United States might attempt a disarming non-nuclear
first strike, believing that BMD or the PRC’s own NFU pledge would
protect against Chinese nuclear retaliation. IDA’s Brad Roberts observes
 Paper Tiger or Waking Dragon   107

that in this scenario China either backs down or else “China is the first
user of nuclear weapons, possibly the second user, but also the loser.”43
Strong gravitational forces are pulling the PRC toward significant nu-
clear change but it would be wrong to conclude that they are unopposed.
The CCP keeps a firm grip on nuclear forces, to the point of rejecting
“the Pentagon’s offer to set up a military hotline between the high-level
armed forces of the two countries because [the CCP] was reluctant to
delegate that much authority to the senior commanders.”44 This consid-
eration can be expected to exert a restraining effect on the numbers and
operational posture of road-mobile missiles and SSBNs.
A stronger, multifaceted drag is fiscal. The PRC economy and mili-
tary budget can support a vastly larger nuclear force but resource
competition among domestic and defense priorities remains intense.
Furthermore, a nuclear arms race with the United States would not
only be against explicit PRC policy (one reflecting concern about being
militarily competed into bankruptcy like the USSR,45 and reiterated in
the PRC’s 2006 Defense White Paper46), but the Sino-American Cold
War it would reasonably risk would threaten the PLA’s funding source:
the Chinese economic expansion fueled in great part by trade with the
United States and its allies.

The Future
The true relative weights of the variables auguring for and against dra-
matic nuclear change in China in 2007 are, of course, as unknowable to
us as the composition of China’s forces in 2017. More analytically help-
ful is positing a range of what Roberts terms “alternative futures” for
China’s strategic forces. Drawing on the work of several analysts, at least
five can be identified.
■ 1. “The Minimum Means of Reprisal”—In a new book, Harvard’s
Jeffrey Lewis presents cautionary evidence: in the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s, U.S. “intelligence community projections…overesti-
mated both the scope and pace of Chinese ballistic missile deploy-
ments.”47 “Chinese internal politics” are more likely to drive policy
than “changes in the objective balance of capabilities” internation-
ally, and therefore the PRC will retain a “minimum” deterrent not
much larger than 80 operational warheads.48
108   CHAPTER six

Although plausible, this path would assume transformational change

in virtually every major Chinese institution except its nuclear force.
“[T]he evidence is more mixed than Lewis depicts it.”49
■ 2. Baseline Trajectory—Although Roberts warns that “the evi-
dence…is not strong enough to lead to confident predictions,”50
he argues that the PRC will modernize as systems age. Together
with increased survivability and penetrability, and development of
ASATs and other asymmetric capabilities, a “middle way” scenario
sees modest “expansion of the intercontinental component of the
missile force” to match and therefore overcome (but not exceed)
BMD deployments.51 Medeiros takes a somewhat more certain
view, arguing that when completed the PRC’s modernization pro-
gram “will have revolutionized its nuclear capability, providing it
with a highly credible nuclear deterrent against major nuclear pow-
ers for the first time since 1964.”52
Roberts sees two primary alternatives to such a baseline trajectory,
involving competition with the United States and Russia, respectively.
Both are expensive and risk driving other regional players into Ameri-
can arms.
■ 3. Race the New Triad—“Chinese planners might conclude that
they need to race for some fixed period of time…to press [PRC] ad-
vantages over Taiwan” before the BMDs and CBMs of the New Tri-
ad, and the U.S. conventional “transformation” force, are realized.53
This might involve responses that are asymmetrical (capabilities to
track and strike U.S. forces at sea, ASATs) and symmetrical (a Chi-
nese BMD system, together with some increase in offensive nuclear
capability).54
■ 4. Race Russia—In the late 1990s some PRC political figures sug-
gested China surge ahead to become the top nuclear power in Eur-
asia, number two overall.55
This expensive latter option gets more remote, however, as Russia ac-
celerates its SSBN and ICBM force modernization56 and harder to justi-
fy as China’s economic and political clout in Eurasia grows and relations
with Russia improve.57
■ 5. Sprint to Peerhood—These concerns, and the collapse of Soviet
communism during nuclear competition with the United States,
 Paper Tiger or Waking Dragon   109

caution the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) against driving for

U.S. peer or near-peer status. The CCP would, therefore, require
a highly compelling reason to pay peerhood’s steep fiscal and po-
litical costs. In congressional testimony in 2002, however, then-
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld outlined a scenario that would match
a plausible rationale with various estimates that by 2015 the PRC
may field upwards of 100 to 1,000 warheads.58 U.S. cuts below the
Moscow Treaty’s 1,700 to 2,200 deployed strategic warhead level,
he suggested, could lead the PRC to decide that peer or near-peer
status is but a “sprint up” away.59
There are other sprint scenarios. For example, large-scale substitution
of CTM for U.S. nuclear SLBMs (such as suggested by Owen Price in
this volume) might present China an opportunity to sprint to numerical
nuclear near-parity if not in counter-force capability.
Alternatively, significant cuts to or elimination of the U.S. ICBM
force could suggest to China a short dash to a small but viable strate-
gic nuclear counter-force capability, even with BMD in place. America’s
three nuclear bomber bases, two SSBN bases, and three primary nu-
clear command and control centers (Washington, D.C., the U.S. Stra-
tegic Command, and NORAD) total just eight CONUS counter-force
targets—down from a practically insurmountable 458 with the nuclear
ICBM force.60 Such a small CONUS counter-force set might make a
damage limitation first strike begin to look conceivable (or at least a
possible threat) to the PRC in a crisis, or provide a rationale for force
increases and C4ISR improvements in peacetime. If, additionally, the
Trident force had become mostly conventional, and/or China possessed
a robust ASAT capability vis-à-vis U.S. nuclear C4ISR assets, the odds of
dramatically degrading U.S. nuclear capabilities—a very serious “shock”
indeed—might begin to look even better.
From the outside, it is difficult to know whether the PRC leadership
would think along such uncertain and dangerous lines during a nucle-
ar crisis, much less anticipate such brinksmanship and on that basis
change the PRC’s nuclear doctrine and modernization trajectory. But
we can recognize that American strategic doctrine and capabilities have
the potential to influence China’s nuclear calculus, and that change in
China’s capabilities and stated intentions is the best means of charting
its nuclear future.
110   CHAPTER six

The Indicators
In Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006, the Pentagon
identified six “primary indicators” of whether the PRC would adopt a
“sea control” strategy.61 Similarly, we can identify a six-point (but hardly
exhaustive)62 “index of leading Chinese nuclear indicators” that should
aid in gauging nuclear change.
■ 1. Missile Production—The Defense Department estimates that
all three DF-31 missile variants could achieve IOC this year. Rapid
economic and military budget growth and the 100-plus SRBMs
China produces each year63 suggest how rapidly the PRC could
grow its strategic missile forces. Accordingly, actual production will
be a bellwether for PRC pursuit of options 2-5 above.
■ 2. SSBN Production—The first of several Type 094 SSBNs was re-
ported to have been launched in 2004, but work on it apparently
continues.64 Successful operationalization of even four SSBNs
would in terms of SSBN quantity (but not quality or capability)
match France and the United Kingdom, while eight boats would
equal the U.S. and exceed the current Russian Pacific fleets (of eight
and five active boomers, respectively).65
■ 3. Force Posture—One analyst has suggested that when and if the
Type 094s and JL-2s become operational China must choose be-
tween the blue-water deployment approach of the United States (and
United Kingdom and France and Soviet Union) and the defended
coastal “bastion” strategy of the USSR in the 1980s.66 Omitted are
at least two other alternatives: the Russian pierside alert posture
(which, ironically, would put Russia in range of the JL-2, but not
the CONUS), and generally staying in port off alert but rehears-
ing for other SSBN operations modes to provide crisis contingency
options. Deploying Type 094s within JL-2 range of the CONUS (a
departure from the PRC’s current practice of rarely sending sub-
marines on patrol),67 plus frequent patrols by road-mobile DF-31s,
could suggest realization of a standing survivable second-strike ca-
pability against the CONUS.68 To narrow the gap with the top-tier
powers in responsiveness, the PRC could also place its silo-based
ICBMs on alert and improve nuclear C4ISR.
■ 4. MRVs and Testing—The PRC may place MRVs on the legacy
DF-5. Some analysts believe the PRC can now MRV the DF-31
 Paper Tiger or Waking Dragon   111

and JL-2, but that view is not universally shared; a senior U.S. in-
telligence official testified in 2002 that to certify a warhead small
enough to mount in multiples on the DF-31 family, it “would prob-
ably require nuclear testing.”69 This politically costly move would
strongly signal prioritization of nuclear capabilities.
■ 5. Declaratory Doctrine: No First Use (NFU)—In recent PRC Mil-
itary Power reports the Pentagon has highlighted PRC debate about
whether to change its NFU policy (and, additionally, preemption of
stronger opponents).70 A key question is whether the PRC should
regard a conventional strike on its nuclear deterrent as tantamount
to nuclear first use. “It remains unclear what military actions con-
stitute ‘first use’ for Chinese leaders, and thus what would trigger
nuclear retaliation.”71
■ 6. Asymmetries—Deploying a robust ASAT capability could sug-
gest PRC interest in racing the New Triad or in parity. Other asym-
metric options include use of EMP and emphasis on cruise missiles
or theater nuclear forces to counter U.S. strategic superiority.

The Way Ahead

Chinese military strategy emphasizes asymmetries and “disruptive tech-
nologies” as a weaker power’s key to defeating a stronger one.72 This ap-
proach stands in contrast to the highly symmetrical U.S.-Soviet nuclear
competition. A deeper asymmetry, however, is that the United States
and China are bound together economically to an extent the United
States and USSR never were. Any serious Sino-American confrontation
is likely to threaten economic damage the parties may find unwilling
to accept, long before unacceptable losses from use of nuclear weapons
become a clear and present factor in decision-making.
Nevertheless, military power and nuclear weapons remain founda-
tional and potentially explosive elements of the evolving relationship,
particularly in the Taiwan context. China is on course to making sig-
nificant qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear forces,
pulled toward modernization by forces ranging from great power pres-
tige to concern about conventional U.S. strikes on the PRC’s nuclear de-
terrent. Although what we do not know about China’s nuclear program
vastly exceeds what we do, the PRC likely has a broad range of alternative
nuclear directions from which to choose. Because their implications for
112   CHAPTER six

crisis stability are uncertain and potentially serious—particularly when

viewed together with possible U.S. force alternatives—the United States
ought to pay particular attention to several key indicators of China’s
nuclear trajectory. Crisis stability concerns, and in particular avoiding
miscalculations, also argue for continued American civilian and mili-
tary efforts to engage their Chinese counterparts on nuclear issues, and
carefully evaluating the potential implications of significant changes in
U.S. strategic forces and doctrine.

Notes
1. See, e.g., The Economist, May 19, 2007 (cover story: “America’s Fear of
China”).
2. See, e.g., Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (2007); Bates Gill, Ris-
ing Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (2007).
3. See, e.g., Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Independent Task Force,
Carla A. Hills & Dennis C. Blair, Chairs, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative
Agenda, a Responsible Course (New York: CFR, 2007) [hereinafter Hills & Blair];
Anthony H. Cordesman & Martin Kleiber, Chinese Military Modernization and
Force Development (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2006).
4. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Re-
public of China 2007 [hereinafter PRC Military Power 2007].
5. See, e.g., Hills & Blair, 7, 54 (“Taking stock of U.S.-China relations, the
Task Force finds that China’s overall trajectory over the past thirty-five years of
engagement with the United States is positive” and there is “no evidence” that
China will become “a peer military competitor” by 2030); Bill Gertz, “The Chi-
na Threat is Real, the Solution is Democracy,” ABCNews.com, May 14, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=3157634&page=1 (“The China
threat…is real and growing stronger”).
6. PRC Military Power 2007, 1.
7. Ibid., 2.
8. Alexa Olesen, “China: U.S. Exaggerating Military Threat,” Associated
Press, May 27, 2007.
9. PRC Military Power 2007, 18-19.
10. PRC Military Power 2007, 14.
11. The DF-31 is also known as the CSS-9. I use DF designations for consis-
tency and simplicity.
12. For low estimate of 74-85 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, see Jef-
frey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the
 Paper Tiger or Waking Dragon   113

Nuclear Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), 30. Another estimate based on DoD
numbers is 93 warheads, in Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, & Matthew
G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washing-
ton, D.C.: FAS/NRDC, 2006), 46 [hereinafter FAS/NRDC]. Assuming that only
one warhead is operationally deployed for each deployed missile, DoD data
suggest up to 112 operationally deployed strategic warheads with land-based
missiles. PRC Military Power 2007, 42. See ibid., page 19, for missile ranges.
13. DoD puts the number of deployed DF-5s at “approximately 20” (see PRC
Military Power 2007, 18) but the public discussion includes references to 18
(see, e.g., Lewis, 31). The DF-5 is alternatively known as the CSS-4 and is being
upgraded to the DF-5A
14. Cordesman & Kleiber, 85.
15. For General Habiger’s reference to a single Xia “cruise” and Navy data
indicting zero SSBN patrols, see respectively Lewis, 35, and Robert S. Norris &
Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2006,” Bul-
letin of the Atomic Scientists (May/June 2006): 61.
16. FAS/NRDC, 37; http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/france/
bomber.htm.
17. See Brad Roberts, “The Nuclear Dimension: How Likely? How Stable?”
in Evan Medeiros, Michael D. Swaine, & Andrew Young (eds.), Assessing the
Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan Security (forthcoming) (“Whatever
prior interest China might have had in tactical nuclear weapons seems not to
have survived that earlier era” in which they were developed and at least one
exercise was held), but see also Lewis, 1 (apparently inferring from lack of avail-
able evidence of operational tactical warheads with ground, air, and naval units
that the “PRC does not maintain tactical nuclear forces of any kind”).
18. See FAS/NRDC, 38. The PRC may have 200 to 350 total warheads. See
Norris & Kristensen,: 60; Cordesman & Kleiber, 94.
19. See, e.g., FAS/NRDC, 59.
20. See, e.g., Lewis, 1-2. The Second Artillery also operates the conven-
tional SRBMs deployed opposite Taiwan. For discussion, see Evan S. Medeiros,
“Minding the Gap: Assessing the Trajectory of the PLA’s Second Artillery,”
paper presented at U.S. Army War College Conference “Exploring the “Right
Size” for China’s Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organization,” Octo-
ber 2006, pp. 12-21.
21. Ibid., 2-3.
22. Lewis, 12-14.
23. Quoted in Lewis, 61.
24. Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine,
114   CHAPTER six

Command, Control, and Campaign Planning (U.S. Army Strategic Studies Insti-
tute, 2007), 16; Medeiros, 9.
25. Brad Roberts writes that there is disagreement on whether the PRC has
the same view of theater nuclear forces as it does its strategic forces. See Rob-
erts, “Assessing the Threat,” footnote 10.
26. Medeiros, 7.
27. Ibid., 5, 8.
28. Ibid., 5.
29. For this view see FAS/NRDC, 42-44 (also arguing that total deployed
megatonnage will decline as smaller yield warheads enter the force).
30. See ibid., 42.
31. PRC Military Power 2007, 3; for discussion of the Type 094, see http://
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/type_94.htm.
32. See Cordesman & Kleiber, 95; FAS/NRDC, 43-44; Lewis, 32, 48-49.
33. PRC Military Power 2007, 19.
34. Medeiros, 5.
35. PRC Military Power 2007, I.
36. Ibid., 33.
37. See Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford, 2007), 2-3.
38. For discussion of how PRC nuclear capabilities might play in a Taiwan
confrontation that starts with conventional forces, see, e.g., Richard C. Bush &
Michael E. O’Hanlon, A War Like No Other: the Truth About China’s Challenge
to America (Hoboken: Wiley & Sons, 2007), 153-159.
39. Medeiros, 8.
40. Ibid.; see also http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/
npr.htm. Note that the PRC may one day face a CBM threat from Russia, as
well. See Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Russian
Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March / April 2007):
63.
41. For the fiscal year 2008 request for R&D funds, see http://www.finance.
hq.navy.mil/fmb/08pres/rdten/RDTEN_BA4_book.pdf.
42. There is a potential legal argument for CBMs. Employing conventional
rather than nuclear warheads would better meet obligations under the law of
armed conflict to adhere to the requirement of proportionality: avoiding in-
cidental harm to protected persons and property that exceeds the anticipated
military benefit, and in any case minimizing such harm to protected persons
and property. See Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(ii) of Protocol I Additional
 Paper Tiger or Waking Dragon   115

to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection

of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. A
policy argument against CTM is that until impact a CTM would look the same
as a nuclear SLBM and therefore could trigger impulsive, mistaken nuclear
retaliation. Overflight route and patrol area adjustments, plus launch notifica-
tion, have been suggested as remedial measures.
43. Brad Roberts, “Alternative Futures,” in Paul Bolt & Al Wilner (eds.), Chi-
na’s Nuclear Future (2006), 180.
44. Shirk, 71.
45. For discussion, see Medeiros, 6.
46. PRC Military Power 2007, 19.
47. Lewis, 50-51.
48. Ibid., 1-2.
49. Brad Roberts, “Book Review: Nuclear Minimalism” (reviewing Jeffrey
Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal), Arms Control Today (May 2007): 41.
50. Ibid.
51. Roberts, “Alternative Futures,” 176.
52. Medeiros, 10-11.
53. Roberts, “Alternative Futures,” 181.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., 182.
56. See, e.g., Jim Heintz, “Russia Test-Launches New ICBM,” Associated
Press, May 29, 2007.
57. See PRC Military Power 2007, 1.
58. See National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015 (1998), 5, and House
Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Con-
cerns with the People’s Republic of China, declassified report issued May 25,
1999, cited in Roberts, “Alternative Futures,” footnotes 1-2.
59. Rumsfeld was before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; see Lewis,
144-45.
60. The U.S. Air Force plans to retire 50 of the current 500 Minuteman III
ICBMs, for a planned force of 450.
61. PRC Military Power 2006, 31.
62. For example, one additional issue meriting attention is the “risk of acci-
dental nuclear conflict” that could result from the Second Artillery loading the
same classes of ballistic missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads and
116   CHAPTER six

co-locating them—particularly if U.S. C4ISR assets are attacked by PRC ASATs

or other asymmetric capabilities. See Wortzel, ix.
63. PRC Military Power 2006, 3.
64. Cordesman & Kleiber, 67; PRC Military Power 2007, 3 (stating the Jin
SSBN is “in development”).
65. See Norris & Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: French Nuclear Forces,
2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 2005): 73; Robert S. Nor-
ris & Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: British Nuclear Forces, 2007,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November / December 2005): 77-78; Robert
S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces,
2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March / April 2007): 63 (all Delta III
SSBNs are thought deployed in the Pacific); and http://www.navy.mil/navyda-
ta/fact_display.asp?cid=4100&tid=200&ct=4.
66. Richard Fisher, Jr., “Developing U.S.-Chinese Nuclear Naval Competi-
tion in Asia,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, January 16, 2005,
http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.60/pub_detail.asp#.
67. Strategic Security Blog, “China’s Submarine Fleet Continues Low Patrol
Rate” (“China’s entire submarine fleet conducted only two patrols in 2006” ac-
cording to declassified U.S. Navy data).
68. Depending on deployment location, eastern Russia is already in range of
the solid-fuel, road-mobile DF-21 (also known as the CSS-5). See PRC Military
Power 2007, 19; Cordesman & Kleiber, 96. DF-21s, however, may spend most
of their days in garrison. See Lewis, 34.
69. Cordesman & Kleiber, 95; FAS/NRDC, 55.
70. PRC Military Power 2006, 28, 13-14; PRC Military Power 2007, 12, 20.
71. Medeiros, 9; see also Wortzel, 14.
72. PRC Military Power 2007, 13.
 Chapter Seven

Nuclear Deterrence
The French Perspective
Bruno Tertrais

Current Nuclear Policy: Principles and Scenarios

T
raditionally, France has had a fairly conservative approach to de-
terrence—to the point that a senior defense policy official could
claim in early 2001 that France was “the last outpost of nuclear
fundamentalism in the West.”1 The words “nuclear” and “deterrence”
are still very much associated in the nation’s strategic culture. The 1994
White Paper expressed considerable reservations about the relevance of
“conventional deterrence” as a possible substitute for nuclear weapons.2
And there is a traditional defiance vis-à-vis missile defense, for strategic
and budgetary reasons.
There has been, however, a significant evolution since the end of the
Cold War. In particular, Chirac’s landmark speeches on nuclear deter-
rence issued on June 10, 2001 and January 19, 2006 introduced signifi-
cant new inflexions.
The French defense model, designed in 1996, revolves around four
“operational functions:” Deterrence, Prevention, Projection, and Pro-
tection. However, in his January 2006 speech, Chirac has reshuffled the
cards. He has sought to place nuclear deterrence less as a separate com-
ponent than as the very foundation of French defense policy. He pre-
sented it as the “ultimate expression” of the prevention function and the
backup for its conventional military intervention capabilities.3 He also
made it clear that nuclear weapons protected France’s ability to project
its forces abroad.

117
118   CHAPTER SEVEN

The French nuclear deterrence covers “vital interests.” Since the end
of the Cold War, this notion has been given a broad meaning. The 1994
White Paper defined it as follows: “the integrity of the national terri-
tory, including the mainland as well as the overseas departments and
territories, the free exercise of our sovereignty and the protection of the
population constitute the core [of our vital interests] today.”4
The limits of vital interests remain vague, to avoid an adversary being
able to calculate the risks inherent in his aggression, because the scope
of such interests evolves and can change over time, and because it would
be up to the President to decide whether or not these interests are at
stake. But occasionally, French Presidents drop hints.
In his January 2006 speech, Chirac stated that “the defense of allied
countries” could be part of vital interests.5 The mere mention of “allies”
was not new. But it was generally associated in French public discourse
with the words “Europe” or “Atlantic Alliance.” The use of the word “al-
lies” without any elaboration left open the possibility that non-NATO
French defense partners, for instance in the Persian Gulf, could be pro-
tected.
Chirac also stated that the “safeguard of strategic supplies” could not
be excluded from the scope of vital interests. While this scenario ap-
pears farfetched to some, it is not entirely incredible: a hypothetical al-
liance between Russia and several Middle East oil and gas producers
deciding to cut off exports to the European Union would bring Europe
to its knees, given its increasing dependency on external imports.6
According to French doctrine, an attack on vital interests would bring
on a nuclear response in the form of “unacceptable damage” regardless
of the nature of the threat, the identity of the State concerned, or the
means employed. A noted part of Chirac’s January 2006 speech was the
strong part that explicitly included the threat of State-sponsored terror-
ism: “Leaders of States resorting to terrorist means against us, as those
who might consider, one way or the other, weapons of mass destruction,
must understand that they risk a firm and adapted response from us.
And this response can be of a conventional nature. It can also be of an-
other nature.”7 Through this statement, France made it clear that it con-
siders that the use of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
would not necessarily represent a threat to the country’s vital interests,
but at the same time sought to reaffirm that it would not hesitate to use
nuclear means should the threshold of vital interests be crossed in the
French President’s view.
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE   119

France’s nuclear deterrent is for States only. Chirac reaffirmed this a

few weeks after the September 11 attacks.8 Nevertheless, as explained
above, he was also keen to emphasize in his January 2006 speech that
a State using terrorist means against vital interests would be subject to
nuclear reprisals. The country’s counter-terrorism policy has been made
coherent with this statement. In March 2006, the French government
published a White Paper outlining why France has become a target
for terrorist attacks and specifying various attack scenarios, including
WMD use. In such circumstances, the White Paper states, France must
not “exclude any response.” It recalls President Chirac’s January 2006
speech and takes note of France’s right to self-defense under Article 51
of the United Nations (UN) Charter.9
Two major rationales are put forward by French leaders to retain and
continue to modernize the country’s nuclear force.
One is the “life insurance” function. French leaders realize that the
world can change rapidly. They believe that it is impossible to exclude
the emergence of a new major threat to Europe at the horizon of 15-30
years, and deem it prudent to maintain a national nuclear deterrent. Did
we not have no less than two major strategic surprises in little more than
a decade, the fall of the Wall and the fall of the Towers? Chirac implic-
itly referred to potential major power threats by observing that France
is “not shielded from an unforeseen reversal of the international sys-
tem, nor from a strategic surprise.”10 The dismantlement in 1996 of the
land-based missiles allowed France to declare in September 1997 that
no French nuclear asset was targeted anymore. French nuclear strategy
has become again tous azimuts, to borrow an expression from the de
Gaulle years. The then-Prime Minister indicated in 1999 that French
deterrence should be able to counter any threat, “even a distant one.”11
This was interpreted as signifying that the build-up of nuclear arsenals
in Asia was deemed a matter of concern for Europe. The rise of China is
considered by some analysts as deserving attention. Some in France do
believe that the capability to deter China might be needed in the future.
Beijing could try to prevent European support for the United States in
the course of a crisis in Asia, or European participation in a Western
intervention in a region of strategic interest. More broadly, in his Janu-
ary 2006 speech, Chirac emphasized that the rise of nationalism and
the competition between poles of power could give rise to new major
threats.
120   CHAPTER SEVEN

A second rationale is to guarantee that no regional power will be in a

position to blackmail or pressure France with WMD (for instance at the
occasion of a military intervention in the Middle East or in Asia). In this
regard, the prevailing opinion in Paris has traditionally been that nuclear
deterrence is a better and safer choice than missile defense. Starting with
the 1994 White Paper, Paris acknowledged that its vital interests could
be threatened by regional powers. France had to “take into account the
potential threats to our vital interests from the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction.”12 This evolution was confirmed when Chirac
came to power in 1995.13 The kind of scenario that has French officials
worried is one where, for instance, a country tries to block military in-
tervention by threatening to strike the national territory. This concept
could be called “counter-deterrence” or “counter-blackmail.” No specific
countries of concern are identified in French discourse. However, ac-
cording to Defense Minister Alliot-Marie, examples include North Ko-
rea, Iran, and Pakistan.14

Current Nuclear Policy: Weapons and Planning

France has reduced its nuclear arsenal since the end of the Cold War
and dismantled several key nuclear installations, including its nuclear
testing site and fissile material production facilities. It maintains its force
at a level of “sufficiency” (a French expression equivalent to “minimum
deterrent”). It considers that its nuclear policy is consistent with its in-
ternational legal obligations, including Article VI of the nuclear Non
Proliferation Treaty.
The current format of French nuclear forces has been fixed in 1996. It
was decided to retain only a “dyad” made of two complementary com-
ponents, each with its own characteristics. This variety is designed to
provide flexibility in planning as well as an insurance against any adverse
technical development that could weaken the capabilities of either.15
France now has four SSBNs (in 2006, one Le Redoutable-M4 class and
three new-generation Le Triomphant-M45 class). Three of them are in
the operational cycle, making it possible to maintain continued at-sea
deterrence with at least one vessel on patrol at all times, and even two
at all times if the President so decides. If the SSBN force were fully gen-
erated, with three boats at sea, a total of 48 missiles and 288 warheads
would be available assuming that each missile carries six warheads. The
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE   121

M45 missile has a range of at least 4,000 kilometers and carries six TN75
warheads, each in the 100-150 kiloton range. The fourth and final new-
generation SSBN will enter service in 2010. (The first one is scheduled
to go into retirement around 2030.)
A new, longer-range SLBM, the M51, will be introduced in 2010, al-
lowing the French deterrent to “go global.” Initially, it will be equipped
with the same warhead as the M45 (TN75). This M51.1 version will be
later supplemented by a M51.2 version, with a new generation warhead
(Tête nucléaire océanique, TNO). The range of the M51 with a full pay-
load of warheads and penetration aids is said to be about 6,000 kilome-
ters. (Its range with a single warhead may be much greater.16) Officials
have suggested that the M51 will have in-flight trajectory correction
abilities and that the M51.2 version will have a greater range than the
M51.1 version. The M51 missile could last until 2040.
France also has three squadrons of Mirage 2000Ns and a small car-
rier-based fleet of Super-Etendard—a feature that distinguishes the
French posture from those of its NATO allies.17 These aircraft carry the
ASMP (Air-Sol Moyenne Portée) air-breathing missile. The ASMP, whose
range is about 300 kilometers, was designed to carry a 300 kiloton TN81
warhead, but it is possible that adaptations to the system were made
since it entered service in 1986. The successor to the ASMP will be the
“improved” ASMP (ASMP-A for ASMP Amélioré), equipped with TNA
(Tête Nucléaire Aéroportée) warheads with better performance. The Ra-
fale will replace both the Mirage 2000N and Super-Etendard after 2008.
The range of the ASMP-A is reported to be 300 to 400 kilometers, and its
precision less than 10 meters. It will include an in-flight trajectory cor-
rection mechanism. The air component is considered particularly well
suited for the exercise of deterrence vis-à-vis a regional power.
The current total numbers of nuclear weapons is not known. Most
public estimates put it around 350. Charts given in official documents
suggested that, in 2000, France possessed 48 SLBMs and about 60
nuclear-capable aircraft.18 The TNA and TNO are not more sophisti-
cated weapons but so-called “robust” warheads: they are less sensitive
to variations in parameters resulting, for example, from the ageing of
components. The concept for the TNA and TNO was tested during the
1995-1996 final testing campaign. The lumping together of all French
nuclear weapons in a single category of “strategic” systems provides for
an increased flexibility in nuclear planning and operations. Depending
on circumstances, airborne weapons could supplement SSBNs for ex-
122   CHAPTER SEVEN

erting “unacceptable damage,” or perhaps a single SLBM shot could be

used as a “final warning.” News reports have indicated that re-targeting
at sea will be an option. French officials insist that both components are
able to participate in all nuclear missions.
French nuclear planning and targeting would be adjusted to the
threat. To deter a major power, France would rely on the threat of “un-
acceptable damage of all kinds.”19 Chirac’s use of this phrase deliberately
left the threat vague, and this was consistent with the abandonment,
since the 1994 White Paper, of France’s previous “anti-cities” threats in
its declaratory policy.
To deter a regional power, France would rely on the threat of destroy-
ing “centers of power.” This was announced by Chirac in his June 2001
speech: “the damage to which a possible aggressor would be exposed
would be directed above all against his political, economic, and mili-
tary power centers.”20 Chirac repeated these ideas in his January 2006
speech, and added that France’s instrument of deterrence is its increas-
ingly precise and controllable ability to strike the adversary state’s “pow-
er centers, its capacity to act,” with nuclear weapons.21 In her January
2006 testimony about the President’s speech, Minister of Defense Al-
liot-Marie said,
In fact, a potential adversary might think that, given its principles
and its known respect for human rights, France would hesitate to
use the entire yield of its nuclear arsenal against civil populations.
The President of the Republic has underlined that our country has
made its capabilities for action more flexible and henceforth has the
possibility of targeting the decision centers of a potential aggressor,
thereby avoiding the excessive general effects capable of making us
hesitate.22
An original French concept is the “final warning” (ultime avertisse-
ment), the idea to threaten an adversary who would have misjudged
French resolve with a single limited strike on military targets. As devised
in the 1970s, the final warning was a compromise between the need to
avoid the “all or nothing” dilemma and the equally pressing need, in
French minds, to avoid adopting a flexible response-type concept—both
options judged not credible. It is also the necessary counterpart to the
deliberate uncertainty that exists regarding the scope of vital interests
and its evolving limits. The final warning cannot be repeated, and would
be followed by an “unacceptable damage” strike if the adversary persisted.
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE   123

This concept has been judged still valid, and perhaps even more so in
the new context, given that a regional or distant adversary might be
more prone to misjudge French determination to safeguard its vital in-
terests and would not necessarily understand the exact limits of the vital
interests. Chirac reintroduced the expression in the public discourse by
stating: “we still maintain, of course, the right to employ a final warning
to signify our determination to protect our vital interests.”23 Nonethe-
less, since 1996 any nuclear planning is considered of a strategic nature.
The idea is that any nuclear weapons use would be a sea change in the
nature of the conflict.
In his January 2006 speech, Chirac mentioned the ability to hold an
adversary’s “capacity to act” at risk. In a subsequent briefing, the French
government explained how an enemy State’s capacity to act could be
distinct from its “power centers.” It was said that France could explode
a nuclear weapon at high altitude and thereby create an electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) that could cripple non-hardened computers and commu-
nications systems.24 An EMP attack might be particularly well suited to
transmit a devastating but theoretically non-lethal final warning mes-
sage.
Also in 2006, Chirac announced that some French submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could carry a smaller number of
warheads than others. This confirmed that France might undertake a
“split launch,” allowing for greater flexibility in planning and targeting.
While specific weapon adaptations have not been made public, it is
widely believed that the French have diversified their yield options in
recent years. The option of exploding only the first-stage “primary” may
have been exploited, since it is known to be an easy adaptation from a
technical point of view.
France has consistently rejected the adoption of a “no first-use” pos-
ture. This has been manifested by reservations attached to the Negative
Security Assurances conferred in 1995 by France. Paris sees nuclear re-
taliation as being consistent with the right to self-defense recognized
by Article 51 of the UN Charter, thus prevailing in case of aggression
over commitments of non-use made in peacetime. France asserts that
countries that do not respect their own non-proliferation commitments
should not expect that the NSA would apply to them, thus implicitly
subscribing to the norms of “belligerent reprisals” that also underpin
U.S. and UK doctrines. These reservations to the NSAs were reaffirmed
124   CHAPTER SEVEN

in 2003.25 Chirac insisted, however, that these changes did not represent
“any lowering of the nuclear threshold.”26
France is traditionally cautious about territorial missile defense, for
both conceptual and budgetary reasons. However, it has shown an in-
creasing pragmatism in this domain. In June 2001, Chirac confirmed
that the country’s forces abroad should be protected against the threat of
tactical missiles. To that effect, the Aster family of weapons systems de-
veloped in cooperation with Italy will provide the basis for short-range
ballistic and cruise missile defense.27 In addition, at the NATO Summit
of November 2002, Paris confirmed its participation in feasibility stud-
ies for missile defense in Europe to protect “Alliance territory, forces,
and population centers against the full range of missile threats.”28 Fi-
nally, in 2006 Chirac stated that missile defense could be a “complement”
to nuclear deterrence “by diminishing our vulnerabilities.”29 This paved
the way for French participation in a future NATO missile defense sys-
tem. In light of France’s long-standing reservations about strategic mis-
sile defenses, this new tone constitutes a quasi-breakthrough on the
conceptual level.

Future Prospects
It is unlikely that France will take major crucial decisions regarding
its nuclear deterrence force in the coming decade. The consensus on
the continued relevance of possessing nuclear weapons remains fairly
strong among politicians and public opinion, and France remains shel-
tered from the dramatic political debates that affect the United Kingdom
about the renewal of its own deterrent. All the more since no decision
regarding the future of the French deterrent will be needed before 2020,
when the question of replacing the new-generation SSBNs will begin to
be raised.
Nevertheless, in the coming years, the French nuclear deterrent will
face two broad challenges, one internal and one external.
The first challenge is of a domestic nature. It will be to maintain the
nuclear consensus and the budgetary expense needed to maintain the
long-term credibility of the French deterrent.
By U.S. standards, the French political lifespan is extremely long.
Until 2007 there were still major politicians on the French scene such
as former Presidents Jacques Chirac and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, or
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE   125

former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur who had begun their careers
during the Kennedy/Johnson era. However, today a new generation of
political leaders is emerging. Nicolas Sarkozy, the new French President
elected in May 2007, is the first true “post-Gaullist” generation. Since it
is prudent to assume that defense budgets in Europe are now structur-
ally constrained due to high social demands, maintaining the French
nuclear consensus will require political leadership as well as good com-
munication skills to explain why the choice that was made in the late
1950s is still valid today. Today nuclear programs make up for about
20 percent of the defense equipment budget. On average, the nuclear
budget for the period 2003-2008, as voted by the Parliament in 2002, is
€2.82 billion per year. The French nuclear budget has never been so low,
in terms of both proportion of the defense expenditure (less than 10 per
cent) and share of the national budget and GDP. Still, many in the armed
forces and in Parliament criticize the heavy burden of nuclear expenses
in the defense budget.
France faces the same problem as other mature nuclear-weapon States
in retaining adequate scientific, technical, and operational knowledge in
the post-Cold War context. The ability to maintain and adapt France’s
deterrent is weakening. The Commissariat à l’énergie atomique and the
Marine Nationale have more difficulties than in the past to attract the
best scientists, engineers and officers. Around 2012-2013, the CEA will
have completed the transition between the “Cold War” generation that
conducted nuclear testing and a new generation. France’s missile exper-
tise is now in the hands of a private multinational company (European
Aeronautic Defense and Space Co., EADS), for whom nuclear deter-
rence is more a business than a mission.
The second challenge is of an international nature. France will have
to take into account the progress made in European integration, as well
as the probable deployment of missile defense systems by the Atlantic
Alliance.
France’s independent nuclear stance will be harder and harder to rec-
oncile with its drive for a more integrated EU. This challenge has been
recognized since the early 1990s by successive French governments, and
the issue has been a recurring theme in French strategic thinking since
former President Mitterrand first raised the question in 1992, at the time
the EU was created. However, so far none of them has been able to give
a satisfying answer to the tension between nuclear independence on the
one hand, and political and defense integration on the other.
126   CHAPTER SEVEN

French leaders have suggested that the country’s nuclear deterrent

already plays an implicit role in the protection of Europe. In June 2001,
Chirac stated that any decision by France to use nuclear weapons “would
naturally take into account the growing solidarity of European Union
countries.”30 And in January 2006, he stated that “the development of
the European Security and Defense Policy, the growing intermeshing of
the interests of European Union countries, the solidarity that now exists
between them, make the French nuclear deterrent, by its mere existence,
an unavoidable element of the security of the European continent.”31
But France has fallen short of declaring that its nuclear deterrence
explicitly covers its Union partners.32 If the “mutual security guarantee”
that was to be included in the failed EU Constitution is adopted one way
or the other in the coming years, France will have to give its interpreta-
tion as to what that means for its nuclear policy.
There is the possibility that future British and French leaders deem it
useful to reinforce their cooperation. Since the early 1990s, bilateral dia-
logue and cooperation mechanisms exist between the two countries in
the nuclear field. In 1995, through the so-called Chequers Declaration
(1995), where John Major and Jacques Chirac stated that they “could not
imagine a situation in which the vital interests of either of our two na-
tions, France and the United Kingdom, could be threatened without the
vital interests of the other also being threatened.”33 The UK December
2006 decision to renew its nuclear deterrent was seen favorably by Paris.
In the short run, nothing would preclude a solemn and explicit affirma-
tion by London and Paris that their two nuclear forces protect the EU
countries. However, it is unlikely that things could go very much further
in the current strategic context.
France will also have to take into account the coming of missile de-
fense in Europe. The country is a party to the debate on missile defense
architectures in NATO; and its geographical location make it impossible
to stay entirely out of any future system of defense against long-range
ballistic missiles. (A first site is to be set up in Europe in 2011.) French
political leaders will face a few problems. The first will be conceptual:
the deployment of missile defense in Europe will force the French into
rethinking the relative role of nuclear deterrence on the one hand, and
of missile defense on the other. Would the threat of a conventional bal-
listic strike on French territory be covered by nuclear deterrence? Or
would France expect a NATO missile defense to cover this risk—and
in that case, does Paris have the will and the means to be a significant
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE   127

partner in such a system? The second will be political: what will be the
place of Paris in NATO missile defense arrangements? It is dubious that
France will not be at least party to the allied early warning system that
will be set up. The third problem will be of a budgetary nature; assum-
ing that the defense budget is not increased, any significant “entry cost”
into a NATO missile defense architecture will imply savings on other
programs.
In fact, both challenges are closely intertwined. Domestic political
evolutions and budgetary constraints may lead the French towards re-
vising their concept of independence in the nuclear field.
France’s concept of “nuclear independence” is today fairly restrictive.
Paris has sought to build and maintain autonomously all the necessary
components of its nuclear arsenal. But future French political leaders
will perhaps be tempted to ponder options for increased cooperation
with London and/or Washington as a possible way to save money.
One possible avenue of cooperation may be the costly French “simu-
lation” program, aimed at maintaining an enduring stockpile without
live nuclear testing. The program includes a high-power laser (Laser
Mégajoule, LMJ), a dual-axis radiography machine (AIRIX34), and a
massively parallel computer architecture (Tera project).35 The simula-
tion program does not allow for the formation of new designs or de-
velopment of entirely new types of warheads. In addition, France is not
able to independently test nuclear weapons any more even if it wanted
to, because it dismantled its facilities in 1997. The only realistic option
would be to use another country’s test facilities.
Another would be the “pooling” of French and British forces, which
would require overcoming two major obstacles. Both countries would
have to recognize that their “vital” interests are completely identical, to
the point that either of the two could theoretically exercise deterrence
in the name of the other. A second potential obstacle would be the exis-
tence of U.S./UK agreements that may preclude an increase of technical
and/or operational cooperation.

Comparison between U.S., UK, and French Policies

French doctrine is much closer to U.S. and UK doctrines than generally
thought. London, Paris, and Washington share a common view about
the fundamentally political role of nuclear weapons, which are sup-
128   CHAPTER SEVEN

posed to be an instrument of deterrence rather than a war-fighting tool.

Nuclear deterrence is relevant whatever the means employed by the ad-
versary in circumstances where essential security interests are at stake.
In the current environment, none of them foresees a conventional threat
that might warrant exercising nuclear deterrence the same way it was
practiced during the Cold War.36 Nevertheless, all three capitals oppose
a “no-first-use doctrine:” they believe it would weaken deterrence by al-
lowing an adversary to calculate the risks inherent in his aggression, and
signal that the use of chemical or biological weapons could be consid-
ered without a risk of nuclear retaliation. This transatlantic consensus
was made clear in the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept.37
London, Paris and Washington exercise nuclear deterrence primar-
ily through the threat of inflicting “unacceptable damage” upon an ad-
versary. Targeting would focus on assets held dear by an adversary. All
three countries insist that they should have limited nuclear options in
addition to massive strike options. They have adapted their respective
nuclear arsenals in order to be able to make them relevant to a world of
multiple and diverse nuclear deterrence scenarios and thus ensure that
deterrence remains credible in the eyes of an adversary in foreseeable
scenarios. None of them mentions “counter-city” targeting anymore, at
least in public language. All three countries seem to implicitly consider
that Russia and China should be treated as potential major threats, and
continued at-sea deterrence is seen as an integral part of deterrence,
with at least one SSBN on patrol at all times. Nevertheless, all three have
“de-targeted” their nuclear forces along with the other two official nu-
clear weapon States.38
Such convergences should not be surprising. The French nuclear my-
thology does not do justice to the importance of UK and U.S. inputs
to the origins of French strategy. The UK government’s adoption of a
massive retaliation strategy attracted attention in the early years of the
French program. In his main book, Stratégie de l’âge nucléaire, published
in 1960, General Pierre Gallois describes at length the British deterrent
and implicitly tells his French readers that Paris could adopt the same
posture. Initial French thinking about nuclear strategy also came from
NATO. The main French military thinkers such as generals André Beau-
fre and Pierre Gallois learned about nuclear strategy in an allied context.
They also both had numerous interactions with the RAND Corpora-
tion, then the intellectual breeding ground of U.S. nuclear strategy.
Some specific French expressions come from allied doctrines, such as
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE   129

“unbearable” or “unacceptable” damage. The former expression originat-

ed in the UK White Paper of 1962, and the latter was introduced by the
United States Government in the early 1960s.39 It appeared in France in
the early 1970s. Another borrowed expression was “sufficiency,” which
had been introduced by the Nixon administration in 1969.
There are, however, differences. Today, three particular features of
French nuclear doctrine differentiate it from the American and British.
France’s concept of a “final warning” is different from the U.S./UK
concept of “sub-strategic” or “non-strategic” planning and use. As men-
tioned before, the final warning is the idea to threaten an adversary who
might have underestimated French resolve to defend its vital interests,
or misjudged the exact limits of these interests, with a single limited
strike on military targets. The final warning could not be repeated, and
would be followed by a massive strike if the adversary persisted.
A second difference is manifested in the way the legal grounds for nu-
clear deterrence are expressed in declaratory policies. Washington and
London express their willingness to consider the use of nuclear weapons
vis-à-vis a regional WMD threat through the threat of unspecified retali-
ation. (A classic example is the expression “overwhelming and devastat-
ing response.”) France chooses to center its declaratory policy vis-à-vis
such threats by promising a nuclear response to any aggression against
its vital interests, whatever the means employed.40 This reflects a dif-
ferent concept of deterrence and, in particular, of the balance between
certainty and uncertainty: Washington and London are clear about the
circumstances that would constitute a particular threshold (WMD use),
but unclear about the response; Paris is vague about the exact threshold
(vital interests), but clear about the response.41 This also reflects a dif-
ferent legal culture. Both the United States and the United Kingdom
are traditionally keen to ensure the compatibility of their doctrines with
international law, in particular the compatibility of negative security as-
surances with their stated nuclear doctrines. France traditionally has a
more lenient view of the impact of international legal norms on its pol-
icy.42 It insists on the importance of the right to self-defense enshrined
in Article 51 of the UN Charter as a legal basis for nuclear deterrence.43
But it has never been inclined to emphasize the need for a “proportion-
ate” response as its U.S. and UK allies do.44 France has been much more
vocal than its allies in stating publicly and explicitly the usefulness of
nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis regional and WMD threats—including for
States sponsoring such attacks. Here the difference may be due to differ-
130   CHAPTER SEVEN

ent factors at play in Washington and London: since 1997, the delicate
ideological balance within the Labour Party has made British leaders
more prudent than previous (Conservative) governments in their sup-
port for the relevance of nuclear weapons.
A third area of differentiation is extended deterrence. While Paris has
never seen its nuclear arsenal as solely protecting its national territory,
and has stated on several occasions since the end of the Cold War that
its deterrent also protects common European vital interests, France has
never explicitly expressed a concept of “extended deterrence”.
Some differences exist between U.S. nuclear policy and those of its
two European nuclear allies. Both France and the UK have emphasized
the importance of strengthening international legal norms of non-pro-
liferation: they both have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT) and are keen to see a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT). A major traditional difference is that neither London nor Paris
is known to consider “counter-force” nuclear options. Both countries
have stated “minimum deterrence” posture (the French concept is called
“sufficiency”), which implicitly exclude such options. This is clearly an
effect of the limited availability of technical and financial resources, since
counterforce is the most demanding of all nuclear missions. Largely for
the same reasons, there is no evidence that either France or the United
Kingdom has ever considered multiple strategic strikes: “unacceptable
damage” would be a single strike option.
The UK December 2006 White Paper has brought British doctrine
closer to the French one in at least two regards. France and the United
Kingdom both consider that any nuclear use could only be of a “strate-
gic” nature. And both countries refer to “vital interests” as the threshold
for nuclear use.
Another difference concerns the place of nuclear deterrence in na-
tional security policies. Since the 1960s, the United States has sought to
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its defense strategy. Recent prog-
ress in conventional precision munitions and missile defense has made
it possible to further downgrade the role of nuclear deterrence. The 2001
Nuclear Posture Review was a milestone in this regard: the new U.S.
“Triad” considerably reduces the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S.
defense policy. France acknowledged in 2003 that “the improvement
of [conventional] capabilities for long-range strikes should constitute
a deterrent threat for our potential aggressors.”45 And Paris and Lon-
don have sought to take advantage of new technologies to develop more
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE   131

efficient long-range precision strike capabilities. But neither France nor

the United Kingdom has been willing to recognize a major strategic role
for conventional deterrence to the point of making it an equivalent of
nuclear deterrence. Likewise, they have never emphasized the notion of
“deterrence by denial.”
At the same time, U.S. nuclear weapons have two roles that have no
real equivalent in French and British official thinking. One of them is
what the 2001 NPR calls “Reassurance”: U.S. nuclear protection helps
avoid nuclear proliferation for those countries that are explicitly pro-
tected by such weapons. The other is what the NPR called “Dissuasion,”
a concept that primarily applies to missile defense, but also to nuclear
weapons to some extent: U.S. nuclear weapons are seen as having a role
as a disincentive for those countries that could be tempted to match the
United States from a military standpoint.
Finally, there are a few areas of convergence between the United
States and France that leave the United Kingdom isolated. Paris in re-
cent years has proven much more “conservative” than London in the
area of nuclear disarmament, allowing for a French-U.S. convergence at
the 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences. France’s interpretation of
Article VI of the NPT and of the commitments made in 2005 (the “13
Steps”) is much closer to that of the Bush administration than of that of
the UK government. It intends to retain nuclear weapons as long as it
judges it necessary for its security. Also, France maintains a wider range
of nuclear options than the United Kingdom through the continued ex-
istence of an airborne component, which can be launched from land or
from the sea.
The three allied nuclear powers do not have identical conceptions on
the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, and there are some
significant differences in their declaratory policies. Those divergences
stem from both different strategic cultures and the availability of techni-
cal and budgetary resources.
There are, however, enough similarities between the three countries
about nuclear weapons, and their concepts of when and how to exercise
nuclear deterrence, that there is an “imperfect consensus” among them
on nuclear policy. The evolution of French nuclear policy since 2001
tends to make the differences less salient than the points of convergence.
Three points deserve being noted: an increasing willingness by France to
recognize the usefulness of conventional weapons for deterrence and of
missile defense; a clear readiness to affirm the role of nuclear weapons
132   CHAPTER SEVEN

to deter the use of WMD by regional actors, including State sponsors of

terrorism; and emerging deterrence statements (“firm and appropriate
response”) that relate more to U.S. (and British) thinking than to the
traditional French approach.
French thinking may be influenced by the strategic debates that take
place in the United States. However, it would not be appropriate to call
these recent evolutions an “Americanization” of French nuclear policy.
As David Yost rightly points out, “What some observers have called
“Americanization” would therefore be more accurately termed a de facto
convergence of some key features of independently developed U.S. and
French policies.”46

Why French Nuclear Policy Matters to the

United States
There are five distinct reasons why French nuclear policies and debates
matter to the United States.
First, the French intention to maintain an independent nuclear stance
for the foreseeable future implies that Paris will continue to be able to
challenge U.S. policies when and where it deems appropriate. It is not
certain that France would have actively opposed U.S.-UK intervention
in Iraq had it not been endowed with nuclear weapons.
A second reason is that French attitudes on nuclear policy issues mat-
ter for consensus and political coalition-building in international fo-
rums and negotiations. This includes the Conference on Disarmament
(CD), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences, and
UN Security Council and General Assembly debates on nuclear issues,
as well as NATO.
Third, changes in French nuclear posture might affect technical co-
operation between Washington and its allies. There is the possibility that
Paris and London may be tempted to deepen their bilateral cooperation,
with in turn would have a potential effect on U.S./UK cooperation. But
there also exists a significant and less known French-American techni-
cal cooperation. The two capitals have generally been discreet about it.
Former President Giscard d’Estaing confirmed in his recent memoirs
that there was in the 1970s indirect American help for the miniatur-
ization of French nuclear warheads.47 Later, in the mid-1990s, as both
countries respected a moratorium on nuclear testing, Paris made public
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE   133

that there was an increased cooperation on security and safety issues.48

In particular, French and U.S. experts cooperate on high-powered la-
sers.49 Any termination or significant change in French programs would
have an impact on such cooperation. Finally, the French 10-year expe-
rience in designing so-called “robust” warheads may be of interest to
the United States as it implements its “Reliable Replacement Warhead”
(RRW) program.
A fourth reason is the fact that France’s nuclear weapons contributed
to Western nuclear deterrence and the defense of common interests.
This contribution was recognized by NATO in 1974 despite France’s
withdrawal from the integrated military structure in 1967. Today,
France openly considers that its nuclear force contributes to the protec-
tion of its allies, European and non-European. There is thus a potential
interdependence relationship between the U.S. umbrella to Europe and
the French nuclear deterrent. Any significant evolution of the NATO
defense strategy may have an impact on French defense policy; and evo-
lutions of French policy may have an impact on European security. The
withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces stationed on the continent may lead
the French to a more explicit nuclear protection of European Union
members. Conversely, a French decision to adopt an explicit “extended
deterrence” posture vis-à-vis its EU allies might lead European nations
hosting U.S. nuclear weapons to question the relevance of their contin-
ued permanent stationing. Also, the deployment of territorial missile
defense may lead Paris towards a greater coordination of its deterrence
with that of its allies. Finally, a hypothetical future French-British desire
to “pool” their respective national nuclear forces might lead to a reex-
amination of existing U.S.-UK nuclear agreements.
A fifth and final reason is that it is possible to imagine circumstances
where Paris and Washington (as well as London) may have to consult
and possibly coordinate deterrence statements, and possibly nuclear
planning. French abstention from the 2003 Iraq war was an exception
rather than a general rule. In many instances, French and U.S. forces
fight side by side. Since the end of the Cold War, this has been the case
at least in four significant occasions: in Iraq (1991), in Bosnia (1995),
in Kosovo (1999), and in Afghanistan (since 2001). It can be assumed
that there may be scenarios in which the two countries will face an ad-
versary threatening to use weapons of mass destruction, for instance
in the Middle East. Also, one can imagine scenarios where France and
other European allies bring support to a U.S. intervention in Asia and a
134   CHAPTER SEVEN

nuclear-armed adversary seeks to dissuade them by reminding them of

its nuclear status.
In such scenarios, the question of whether deterrence statements
should be coordinated will be raised; and in extreme circumstances
common nuclear planning may even be discussed. As stated above,
there are some differences in the way the three countries attempt to de-
ter an adversary from using chemical or biological weapons. Depending
on the circumstances, such differences in declaratory policies could be
either a liability or an asset. They might make it more complex to dem-
onstrate common resolve in the form of a joint statement; but they could
also complicate an adversary’s calculations, as was the case during the
Cold War. The same could be said about nuclear options and planning.
The French consider that their “final warning” could not be repeated,
whereas the Americans and the British are more flexible. But would this
really matter in crisis time? There are good grounds to believe that in the
real world there are very few foreseeable circumstances where the U.S.
and the UK would consider it relevant to embark on a prolonged nucle-
ar escalation. It is reasonable to assume that any U.S., British or French
leader willing to consider the use of nuclear weapons would want even
an initial, selective use to be the last. Old NATO concepts of “repeating”
limited nuclear strikes are hardly relevant to the current strategic con-
text. Any Western leader, if and when contemplating the use of nuclear
weapons, would want it to be decisive.

Notes
1. Personal communication.
2. “It is illusory and dangerous to claim that they [advanced conventional
military technologies] could prevent war like nuclear weapons. All the lessons
of history plead to the contrary. These conceptions enhance the significance
of conventional force balances, which are by nature unstable and founded on
strategies of use, of the preparation and conduct of war. They suggest the pos-
sibility of resolving international problems through the use of force and lead
to arms races. They are not compatible with our strategy. Far from substituting
for nuclear deterrence, a so-called conventional deterrent would only add to it.”
“Livre Blanc sur la Défense,” 1994 (Paris: Editions 10/18, 1994), 99.
3. “In the face of the crises that shake the world, in the face of new threats,
France has always first chosen the road of prevention. It remains, in all its forms,
the very basis of our defense policy (..). Such a defense policy relies on the cer-
tainty that, whatever happens, our vital interests will be protected. That is the
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE   135

role assigned to nuclear deterrence, which is directly in keeping with the con-
tinuity of our strategy of prevention.” Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, Président
de la République, lors de sa visite aux forces aérienne et océanique stratégiques,
Landivisiau—l’Île Longue (Brest), January 19, 2006.
4. «Livre blanc sur la Défense,» 1994, 4.
5. Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, January 19, 2006.
6. The main external providers of oil and gas to EU countries are the follow-
ing: for oil, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Algeria; for gas, Russia and Algeria.
By 2025, Middle East countries will provide about 50% of EU oil needs, while
gas imports will come mainly from Russia (60%). Nicole Gnesotto & Giovanni
Grevi, “The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?” (Paris: EU
Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 64.
7. Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, January 19, 2006.
8. “Of course, these [September 11] attacks do not affect at all the credibility
of nuclear deterrence. [Such deterrence] was never aimed at countering indi-
viduals or terrorist groups. It concerns States.” Speech of M. Jacques Chirac,
Président de la République, lors de sa visite de la marine (Toulon), November
8, 2001.
9. Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, “La France face au terroris-
me: Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme”
(Paris: La Documentation Française, 2006).
10. Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, January 19, 2006.
11. Speech of M. Lionel Jospin, Premier Ministre, devant l’Institut des Hau-
tes Etudes de Défense Nationale, Paris, 22 October 1999.
12. “Livre blanc sur la Défense,” 1994, 97.
13. “Being responsible to the nation for the future and safety of the country,
it is my duty to remind French men and women that only its deterrence force
shields France from the possible use of weapons of mass destruction of what-
ever type.” Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, à l’occasion
de la réunion des ambassadeurs, Paris, August 31, 1995.
14. “At the time when we see countries with non-democratic and sometimes
uncontrollable governments—one could mention North Korea, Iran, Paki-
stan—at the time when we see a whole bunch of countries acquiring nuclear
weapons, should we let our guard down?”(France-Inter Radio, November 2,
2003).
15. For sources on data on nuclear forces see Bruno Tertrais, “Nuclear Poli-
cy: France Stands Alone”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July-August 2004.
16. Jacques Isnard, “La France s’arme face aux puissances régionales ‘prolifé-
rantes’”, Le Monde [Internet version], November 7, 2003.
136   CHAPTER SEVEN

17. U.S. surface ships do not carry nuclear weapons anymore. France has
currently only one aircraft carrier, thus this nuclear capability will not be per-
manent until a second carrier enters service, early in the next decade.
18. See “Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: French Policy”
(Paris: La Documentation Française, 2000), 39.
19. Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, January 19, 2006.
20. Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, devant l’Insti-
tut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, Paris, June 8, 2001.
21. Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, January 19, 2006.
22. Michèle Alliot-Marie, Audition devant la Commission de la Défense Na-
tionale et des Forces Armées, Assemblée Nationale, January 25, 2006.
23. Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, January 19, 2006.
24. Jean Guisnel, “Innovation française,” Le Point, February 9, 2006. See also
Laurent Zecchini, “La guerre nucléaire ‘propre’?” Le Monde, March 3, 2006.
25. See “Rapport de la France sur l’application de l’article VI et de l’alinéa C)
du paragraphe 4 de la décision de 1995 sur les principes et objectifs de la non-
prolifération et du désarmement nucléaires,” Deuxième session du comité pré-
paratoire de la conférence d’examen du TNP de 2005, Geneva, April 30, 2003.
26. Chirac quoted in Laurent Zecchini, “Chirac et le nucléaire: l’Europe si-
lencieuse, l’Iran critique,” Le Monde, January 26, 2006.
27. An initial capability against missiles of up to 600 km range will be de-
ployed in 2012. It will be based on the SAMP-T Block 1 interceptor (using the
Aster 30 missile) and M3R radars.
28. Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Govern-
ment participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on
November 21, 2002, para. 4.
29. Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, January 19, 2006.
30. Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, June 8, 2001.
31. Speech of M. Jacques Chirac, January 19, 2006.
32. Defense Minister Alliot-Marie declared that “our deterrent protects us
and protects a large part of Europe” (Interview on France-Inter Radio, Novem-
ber 2, 2003).
33. Agence France-Presse, “Texte de la déclaration commune franco-britan-
nique sur le nucléaire,” October 30, 1995.
34. Accélérateur par induction de radiographie par imagerie X.
35. Both the LMJ and AIRIX machine will be fully operational in 2012.
36. India and Israel would probably share that view.
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE   137

37. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, April
23-24, 1999, para. 62.
38. A P-5 statement was made to that effect in 2000.
39. For instance, “maintaining a clear and convincing capability to inflict
unacceptable damage on an attacker,” in Senate Armed Services Committee,
Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscal Year 1966, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1965, p. 43. MacNamara also referred from 1962
onwards to “intolerable punishment”; see for instance Statement of Secretary
of Defense Robert S. MacNamara before the House Armed Services Commit-
tee on the Fiscal Year 1966-1970 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget,
February 18, 1965, 39.
40. Another difference is that contrary to what the United States and the
United Kingdom have done in recent years, France has not sought to deter
the use of WMD through the threat of making “personally accountable” those
responsible for such use.
41. A noteworthy exception is Chirac’s January 2006 speech: “Leaders of
States resorting to terrorist means against us, as those who might consider, one
way or the other, weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they risk
a firm and adapted response from us. And this response can be of a conven-
tional nature. It can also be of another nature.” (Speech of M. Jacques Chirac,
January 19, 2006).
42. This difference in legal cultures was made clear during the presentation
of national arguments to the International Court of Justice in 1995-1996, fol-
lowing the UN General Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion on the le-
gality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
43. Indian thinking is close to French thinking in this regard. See “Draft
Report of National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) on Indian Nuclear Doc-
trine,” August 17, 1999.
44. The right to self-defense is based on criteria of necessity and proportion-
ality.
45. Loi no. 2003-73 du 27 janvier 2003 relative à la programmation militaire
pour les années 2003 à 2008, section 2.3.1., “Les fonctions stratégiques”.
46. David S. Yost, “France’s new nuclear doctrine”, International Affairs, Vol.
82, no. 4, (2006), 718.
47. See Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, “Le Pouvoir et la Vie,” Volume III: Choisir
(Paris: Compagnie 12, 2006), pp. 503-504. This U.S. contribution in the form of
“negative guidance” had previously been revealed in Richard H. Ullman, “The
Covert French Connection,” Foreign Policy 75 (Summer 1989): 3–33.
138   CHAPTER SEVEN

48. Reuters, “France Confirms U.S. Nuclear Data Sharing Pact”, June 17,
1996.
49. A MoU on cooperation in megajoule-class solid-state laser technology
was signed by DOE and the CEA on November 19, 1994. Ignition for the NIF is
currently scheduled for 2010. (LMJ ignition is scheduled for 2012.)
 Chapter Eight

Renewing Trident
Britain’s Nuclear Politics
Nick Ritchie and Michael Sulmeyer

B
ritain’s nuclear forces have been gradually reduced since the end
of the Cold War and its status as a nuclear weapon power rarely
features in domestic or international political debate. However, a
2003 Ministry of Defence (MOD) strategy document brought these is-
sues to the fore by announcing that crucial decisions would be needed
in the current parliament (2005-2010) on whether or how to retain its
nuclear weapons capability.
This chapter frames the key issues that are likely to mark the public
debate following the release of the British government’s December 2006
White Paper The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent. What
factors will decisively affect the policymaking process? What are the via-
ble options available to Her Majesty’s Government to maintain a nuclear
deterrent beyond the 2020s? What are the potential implications, both
at home and abroad, of a decision to retain a nuclear deterrent? An-
swering these questions will not only bring greater clarity to the debate
over procuring new submarines, but is likely to inform an upcoming
debate over whether Britain should develop a next-generation nuclear
warhead. We begin with a brief review of Britain’s current force posture
and the current security environment.

* This chapter was written before Parliament voted on Trident in March

2007.

139
140   CHAPTER EIGHT

Prelude to the Debate

Although the full four-boat Trident deterrent has been active for only
seven years, the British government will soon make preliminary deci-
sions about the future of the British nuclear deterrent. Specifically, the
first of Britain’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will near the end
of its projected 25-year life span in the early 2020s.1 According to the
government’s 17-year procurement schedule, decisions are needed in
2007 to maintain a minimum deterrent nuclear force when the current
SSBNs retire.2
Indeed, the government’s 2003 Defence White Paper provided ad-
vance notice that preliminary decisions would likely need to be made
during the current government.3 Though no plans for a successor to the
Vanguard-class submarines were on hand when the Strategic Defence
Review (SDR) was published in 1998, the government asserted the need
to maintain potential design capabilities at the Atomic Weapons Estab-
lishment, Britain’s nuclear warhead design and production facility.4
The post-September 11 follow-on chapter to the SDR affirmed that
nuclear weapons “have a continuing role in guaranteeing the ultimate
security of the UK.”5 The government argued in 2003 that the UK would
need to maintain its minimum nuclear deterrent due to concerns over
increased nuclear proliferation and the near-certainty that other states
will continue to possess large stocks of nuclear weapons.6 These argu-
ments were presented again in the December 2006 White Paper. Prime
Minister Blair has promised the fullest debate on post-Trident plans,
though both he and his likely successor, Gordon Brown, have already
voiced support for a replacement system.7

Understanding Trident
The British nuclear deterrent, commonly referred to simply as “Trident,”
is comprised of three components: the platform, the delivery system,
and the warhead. The platform for Trident is the Vanguard-class SSBN
submarine, built by Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited
(now owned by BAE Systems) in the United Kingdom. Beginning in
1993, four Vanguard-class boats were commissioned: the Vanguard, the
Victorious, the Vigilant, and the Vengeance. Each of these nuclear-pow-
ered submarines has a crew of approximately 140 and is based at Her
Majesty’s Navy Base Clyde in Scotland.
 RENEWING TRIDENT   141

Each submarine’s loading of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic

missiles (SLBMs) serves as the strategic delivery system.8 Designed in
the United States by Lockheed Martin, these three-stage solid-fuel mis-
siles have a range of approximately 7,400 kilometers and are accurate to
within 90 meters. Under terms of the Polaris Sales Agreement9 (updated
for Trident in 1980 and 1982), the UK owns a pool of 58 missiles from
a larger U.S. stock at King’s Bay, Georgia—home to many of America’s
Ohio­ class SSBN submarines that employ Trident missiles as well.10 The
United States has initiated a life extension program to increase the ser-
vice life of the missiles from 30 to 45 years.11 Britain has declared its
intent to participate in this life extension program as well.12
Each Trident missile can deliver 12 independently targeted warheads,
giving each Vanguard-class submarine the capability to deploy 192 war-
heads.13 These warheads are manufactured and designed in the UK by
the Atomic Weapons Establishment and are believed to be closely based
on the 100 kiloton American W76 warhead design.14
The current posture of Britain’s nuclear deterrent reflects the gov-
ernment’s commitment to maintaining a minimum level of deterrence.
The UK is the only recognized nuclear state under the NPT to reduce
its nuclear arsenal to a single weapon system, as land, air and surface
maritime platforms have been withdrawn.15 The 1998 SDR capped the
number of warheads onboard each submarine at 48, or 25% of capac-
ity.16 Only one submarine is at sea at any given time to fulfill the govern-
ment’s minimum deterrence posture of continuous-at-sea-deterrence.
The government also recently committed to restricting its operationally
available warhead stockpile to less than 160.17 Furthermore, the alert
status of all Trident missiles has been lowered from minutes to days.18

Trident’s Utility
Trident provides Britain a strategic nuclear deterrent. During the Cold
War, the objective was to deter Soviet aggression by being able to inflict
considerable damage on Soviet assets, including the capability to pen-
etrate the Soviet missile defense system around Moscow.19 Then and
now, submarines offer an invulnerable and reliable second-strike capa-
bility.20
With the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of other nuclear
platforms and delivery systems from the British arsenal, Trident assumed
142   CHAPTER EIGHT

an additional sub-strategic or tactical capability. In an operational set-

ting, this would imply equipping a Trident missile with only a single,
lower yield warhead as opposed to the multiple higher yield warheads
that would be used in a strategic context. Allowing for lower yield deto-
nations, a sub-strategic Trident weapon could be employed to signal the
resolve to use nuclear weapons in a conflict without escalating to major
exchanges.
Today, however, the role of Trident in the context of Britain’s security
is contested. Critics of the government’s position focus on the absence of
any current strategic military threat, and are confident that none are likely
to emerge in the foreseeable future that will require a British nuclear retal-
iatory threat. Such assertions are indeed supported by the government’s
own 1998 Strategic Defence Review.21 Others argue that Trident enables
the UK to project power abroad with greater confidence than if the UK
lacked nuclear weapons or was merely under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
This is considered by advocates of the government’s position to be a cru-
cial capability since confronting regional instability, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and transnational terrorism will likely re-
main key priorities in the absence of major power conflict.

The Nature of the Debate

In December 2006, the government decided to pursue a new subma-
rine platform to replace the Vanguard-class submarines. The rationale
for this decision was detailed in the December 2006 White Paper, The
Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent. The government’s pri-
mary argument for retaining nuclear weapons is that they continue to
provide an unparalleled deterrent against strategic nuclear threats to
Britain’s interests.22 It is an argument primarily of prudence, accepting
that the future is hard to predict and that continued proliferation makes
today a sub-optimal occasion to abandon nuclear weapons. The govern-
ment also argues through a comparative analysis that factors such as
cost, vulnerability, and capability suggest that submarines remain the
best platform for the future.

Sources of Contention
There has been discussion of delaying a decision on replacing the Van-
guard submarines by initiating a life-extension program for the current
 RENEWING TRIDENT   143

fleet. The government has challenged this suggestion, noting that replac-
ing major components of the submarines, such as the steam generators,
is not cost-effective, nor was the capability for such an overhaul intended
in the original design.23 The number of additional years of service might
be marginally increased, but operational availability of each submarine
would only decrease with age, while support costs would grow.
Some analysts have suggested other platforms to host Britain’s deter-
rent. Alternatives include modifying the new Astute-class nuclear attack
submarine to accommodate the Trident missile24 or procuring a new
multipurpose attack submarine capable of launching Trident ballistic
and conventional cruise missiles along with the capability to deploy
Special Forces.25 The government dismissed these proposals as either
too expensive or vulnerable to attack, opting to continue with an SSBN
platform for the Trident missile.26
The largest point of contention with the government’s proposals
challenges the necessity of maintaining any nuclear weapons whatso-
ever and the impact of retention on efforts to stem the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, for ex-
ample, argues that purchasing the next generation of Trident subma-
rines violates Britain’s international treaty commitments, specifically
Article VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.27 Many church or-
ganizations have also spoken out, including the Right Reverend Alan
McDonald who asked, “How can it be right to spend ₤25bn on a weapon
of unimaginable destruction and horror when so many of the 6 billion
inhabitants of the earth still exist on less than a dollar a day?”28 The
necessity and utility of the British government’s possession of nuclear
weapons has emerged as the central topic of debate.
How is the debate likely to be framed, conducted, and decided? A
host of strategic, normative, domestic political and economic factors is
likely to influence the outcome.

Deterrence
The purpose of Britain’s nuclear weapons remains unchanged since their
introduction in 1956: to protect Britain’s (and NATO’s) vital interests,
particularly from the threat of nuclear attack. Given the abatement of the
Soviet threat and the end of the Cold War, however, the rationale for
possessing nuclear weapons has been widely debated. Some argue that
Britain has no need for nuclear weapons because there are no longer
144   CHAPTER EIGHT

strategic threats to deter and Britain is unlikely to face such threats in the
future.29 Others maintain that the security environment could evolve to
feature a state whose ambitions might be best checked by deterrence
with nuclear weapons.
It is prudent to assume that the international strategic environment
will change over the next 30-50 years. As such, this ‘uncertainty argu-
ment’ is powerful because it cannot be refuted. Indeed, it is the central
plank of the British government’s rationale for retaining nuclear weap-
ons. It is important to be clear, however, that uncertainty in this con-
text refers to the risk of the re-emergence of a strategic nuclear threat
to the UK and Western Europe for which British nuclear weapons are
considered an appropriate response, rather than just the emergence of
general security challenges (in which nuclear weapons may play little or
no role). The government argues in its 2006 White Paper that the poten-
tial for such threats to emerge is sufficient to merit retention of Britain’s
existing nuclear weapons.
Despite the absence of current or foreseeable strategic military threats
to the UK, the belief in the enduring importance of a nuclear deterrent
‘just in case’ is strong. Given the cases of proliferation in recent years, it
is argued that it would be foolish to unilaterally surrender a nuclear ar-
senal, particularly since such a move would effectively be permanent.30
That the other declared nuclear powers are not actively pursuing aboli-
tion is an argument used by the government to cast additional doubt
that the time is right for Britain to abolish its nuclear deterrent.31 Reten-
tion of nuclear weapons therefore appears all but inevitable.32
Whilst the “deterrence as a hedge against uncertainty” argument will
continue to figure prominently in the public debate surrounding the fu-
ture of Britain’s nuclear weapons, for many thoughtful critics it does not
by itself constitute a comprehensive rationale for retention. For them,
three additional issues are also at hand.

The Special Relationship with the United States

The Labour government and the wider British political establishment
argue that the UK should play a major role in global affairs and that
this is important for global stability.33 In keeping with post-war British
tradition, Prime Minister Tony Blair is an ardent Atlanticist and firmly
believes that Britain’s fortunes on the world stage, particularly its secu-
rity, necessitate a close relationship with Washington.34
 RENEWING TRIDENT   145

Of utmost centrality to the British government’s security policies is

the relationship with the United States. Britain’s defense doctrine is pri-
marily, although not exclusively, designed to support and influence U.S.
national security policy as the best means of ensuring British security.
From the government’s perspective, Britain’s military capabilities, their
interoperability with U.S. forces, and an enduring political commitment
to U.S. national security objectives allow it to maintain its own security,
have a degree of influence in Washington, and remain a significant force
in shaping international security.35 The importance of political and mili-
tary credibility in Washington through interoperability with U.S. armed
forces is clear.36
Britain views its nuclear capability as an important power projec-
tion, deterrent, and potential war-fighting tool that demonstrates and
validates Britain’s role as a powerful and credible political and military
ally.37 Britain’s nuclear-weapons relationship with Washington is there-
fore considered an important function of the closeness of the broad-
er military and political relationship.38 In particular, Britain’s nuclear
weapons arguably facilitate its willingness to support the United States
militarily in interventionist activity that Britain believes will enhance
international, and therefore British, security. They provide a reassurance
that, in the process of interventionist engagement, regional powers will
not transgress major UK interests.39 By facilitating that support, Britain’s
nuclear weapons serve an indirect role in allowing Britain to remain the
United States’ primary military ally, thus ensuring Britain’s security.
There is an important military and political constituency in Whitehall
that sees significant risk to Britain’s military credibility in Washington in
not replacing Trident.40 Actions that could conceivably have a negative
affect on the relationship with the United States and thereby undermine
Britain’s security will be studiously avoided. The British military may
have a more ambivalent view of the value of retaining nuclear weapons,
but these will be political rather than military decisions.
Being viewed as a major and responsible world power and the closest
ally of the United States is intrinsic to the defense and wider political
establishment’s enduring identity. Challenges to that identity are likely
to be vigorously resisted. Nuclear decisions can serve important sym-
bolic functions that both reflect and inform a state’s identity.41 This can
be discerned in the current debate in Britain.
146   CHAPTER EIGHT

Economics
Economic factors will have an important impact on if and how the
Vanguard system is replaced. To ensure the retention of nuclear sub-
marine desig­n and construction skills and capabilities—­­a­ stated MOD
objective42—Britain’s nuclear submarine industry will need to design
and build a post-Vanguard submarine by the mid-2010s.43 The industry
has therefore been urging the government to replace the Vanguard fleet
with new submarines.
The primary economic issue at stake is the potential impact of the
new submarines’ approximately £25bn price tag on broader defense
spending. An argument against procuring a new fleet of submarines is
that such funds could better be spent on other, non-nuclear defense ac-
tivities. However, the opportunity cost of procuring the new submarines
is unlikely to be so clear-cut. Although MOD is likely to argue that since
the nuclear force is a national asset, these weapons should not be paid
out of the MOD budget, it is unclear that the funds allocated for new
submarines—which may indeed involve increased funding—would re-
main available to fund new conventional capabilities in the absence of
Trident’s renewal.

Domestic Politics
A final element in the upcoming debate stems from the Labour Party’s
traumatic history of nuclear weapons decisions. Such decisions during
the Polaris and Trident debates in the 1960s and 1980s threatened to
tear the Party apart. Labour is therefore likely to guard against repeat-
ing this history by asserting a strong posture. Party leaders will see little
domestic or international political payoff in being the government that
perhaps irreversibly renounces British possession of nuclear weapons.
Tony Blair’s personal commitment to a strong defense, his considerable
sensitivity to defense issues after they became an electoral liability for
Labour in the 1980s, and the widespread assumption that he has already
made up his mind in favor of retention, make it extremely unlikely that
non-replacement will be a serious option.44
There is unlikely to be widespread public or parliamentary opposi-
tion to retaining nuclear weapons post-Vanguard. It is estimated that
there are only 30 anti-nuclear MPs in the Parliamentary Labour Party.
This, together with Labour’s commitment to retaining a minimum nu-
clear deterrent, enables Tony Blair or the next Labour leader to carry the
 RENEWING TRIDENT   147

majority of the party if they decide to retain nuclear weapons.45 This

will be abetted by Conservative Party commitment to retaining nuclear
weapons46 and the probable absence of a groundswell of public support
in favor of relinquishing nuclear weapons.47

Summary
Taken together, these factors practically ensure that Britain will retain a
submarine-based nuclear weapons capability beyond Vanguard, as pro-
posed in the December 2006 White Paper. Yet it is unlikely that these
factors will be debated at length by the British parliament. Despite pres-
sure to debate the issues in full from critics on the Labour back benches,
small minority parties, and outside parliament, the government is likely
to present a strategic military rationale that asserts the continuing rele-
vance of nuclear deterrence in British defense policy in the context of an
uncertain future where the UK might face a nuclear-armed aggressor.
Perhaps the absence of strategic military clarity makes the current
debate over Trident more of a political decision than the decisions of
the late 1970s. As such, factors such as the character of the special rela-
tionship and domestic political and economic considerations will have
more weight vis-à-vis the strategic military uncertainty factor than they
otherwise would in an environment dominated by an obvious strate-
gic threat. Nonetheless, the uncertainty that inspires prudence will be
amongst the most compelling arguments within government.

Charting the Way Ahead

Historically, the executive has tightly controlled the formulation of nu-
clear weapons decisions. In keeping with that tradition, the decisions
taken in No. 10 will govern the post-Vanguard policy-making pro-
cess.48 The historical record suggests that the Prime Minister, advised
by a select group of ministers and advisers, will play the dominant role
regarding decisions about the future of Britain’s nuclear arsenal. Issues
of national security policy have generally been developed informally
based on meetings and discussions between Blair’s senior advisers and
defense and foreign affairs officials and ministers. The decision-making
processes have been, for the most part, secretive and conducted behind
the closed doors of ad hoc Cabinet committees convened by the Prime
Minister, with the full Cabinet playing no major role.49
148   CHAPTER EIGHT

The policymaking process on post-Vanguard decisions began in 2002

when study groups were formed in MOD to review the options. The
groups studied life extension options, initiated discussions with the de-
fense industry, explored options for new submarine nuclear reactors,
and began talks with the United States.50 The December 2006 White
Paper signaled the end of the initial review process. One option has now
emerged from the process that would appear to have the full support of
the Prime Minster, Chancellor, and defense minister.
A parliamentary vote in 2007 will be followed by a formal decision
to proceed with the government’s preferred option. This will accom-
modate the required 17-year procurement window. During the first 5-6
years, there will be little financial outlay, perhaps several million pounds
on detailed studies, followed by a period of perhaps two years where a
political shift may be possible and alternative decisions made. After this
period, billions will have been committed to building the new system,
making change or cancellation extremely unlikely.51
The British government’s decision-making is likely to reflect a strong
desire to minimize risk. At a strategic level of analysis, retaining Tri-
dent ensures Britain maintains her ultimate guarantor of security. Brit-
ish leaders are also unlikely to risk potentially rocking the boat of the
special relationship with the United States. Not renewing Trident also
risks upsetting the broad consensus between both the Labour and Con-
servative parties on the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent. Within the
civil service, it is likely that the parameters of the internal debate have
excluded the full exploration of non-nuclear or non-deployed nuclear
options as politically untenable for the current Labour leadership and
therefore politically risky for those seeking to advocate them within the
policymaking bureaucracy.52 Within MOD, the path of minimum or-
ganizational risk entails planning to retain a comparable nuclear force
after Vanguard, given the challenge a non-nuclear option presents to the
British defense establishment’s political-military identity and the bu-
reaucratic caution and pragmatism exhibited by most large institutions
such as MOD. The political incentives for change, then, seem minimal,
and the decision to maintain the British submarine nuclear deterrent all
but inevitable.
Though the outcome of the debate may be somewhat over-deter-
mined, the timescale for the post-Vanguard policy-making process is
long. Blair’s predilection for replacement may be formalized in a po-
litical decision supported by his likely successor, Chancellor Gordon
 RENEWING TRIDENT   149

Brown, before he leaves office, but policy is seldom set in stone. As

options, issues, bureaucratic conflicts, and political differences evolve,
there will be a number of opportunities for change.53 For example, how
funding for the submarines impacts the overall budgets of the armed
services may be subject to revision over time. A crucial variable in this
timeframe is when and if Chancellor Gordon Brown takes over from
Tony Blair as leader of the Labour Party, and how the debate on Trident
is shaped during and after the transition to a Brown premiership.
Where Downing Street’s standard operating practice on nuclear
weapons issues is secrecy, a number of parliamentarians have sought
to expose the debate to greater scrutiny and accountability, including
the House of Commons Defence Committee. Advocacy organizations
therefore have an important role to play in supporting active parlia-
mentarians, constructively engaging policymakers, keeping the press
and interested public informed and, perhaps most crucially, widening
the debate beyond purely anti-nuclear parameters and into the realm of
Britain’s role in enhancing international security.

Conclusion
In its December 2006 White Paper, the British government elected to re-
tain a strategic nuclear weapons capability for the foreseeable future. The
government’s primary rationale is that the future international security
environment is uncertain and, so long as nuclear weapons proliferate
and other major powers retain nuclear arsenals, it would be imprudent
for Britain to divest itself of its nuclear arsenal. Critics have responded
that the government has not articulated a convincing argument as to
why these factors compel the UK to retain nuclear weapons in the ab-
sence of a current or specific potential strategic nuclear threat. This has
led to a growing debate on the necessity of renewing Trident, how, or
indeed whether, nuclear weapons and deterrence contribute to Britain’s
security, and the impact of the British decision on the nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty. This chapter has explored a number of facets of the
debate, including several key factors beyond the strategic ‘uncertainty
argument’ that will affect the policymaking process.
Whilst the renewal of Trident seems inevitable, debate about its ne-
cessity and utility are likely to continue in the years ahead. There are no
correct or final answers to the questions raised by the British govern-
150   CHAPTER EIGHT

ment’s decision; rather there are arguments based on strategic and polit-
ical judgement. An alternative method of examining these issues would
be to place the Trident decision in the context of a full review of Britain’s
strategic security policy. This would build on the 1998 Strategic Defence
Review and the subsequent new chapter on the war on terrorism. Such a
review would frame decisions regarding the future of the British nuclear
arsenal in the context of the broader aims of British foreign and de-
fense policy. This context could include: the long-term strategic threats
to Britain; the impact of the relationship with the United States to Brit-
ish security; and the role of nuclear weapons in British defense policy.
Such a review would go far beyond the December 2006 White Paper and
should include a detailed response to the recommendations put forward
by the House of Commons Defence Committee’s reports on the future
of the UK strategic nuclear deterrent.
Finally, one cannot dismiss the importance of the United States on the
future of Britain’s nuclear arsenal. The UK is likely to look to the United
States for political and technical support for its SSBN replacement pro-
gram.54 If, or when, the British government builds a new fleet of subma-
rines to take the Trident D5 missile, it will need that missile to endure
until at least 2050. Although the United States only plans to keep the
missile in service until 2042, it has assured the British government that
the UK will be able to participate in any future American program to re-
place the Trident D5 missile, and that any such next-generation missile
will be compatible with the launch system in Britain’s new SSBNs.55 The
long-term viability of Britain’s nuclear arsenal therefore remains firmly
wedded to enduring U.S. political and technical cooperation for at least
the next 30-40 years.

Notes
1. See “Appendix B: The Expected Life the Trident System” in Memorandum
submitted by the Ministry of Defence, House of Commons Defence Commit-
tee Hearing on the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent (London: House of Com-
mons, March 14, 2006). The Memorandum puts the service life of the SSBNs at
25 years. The SDR said that the Trident system had an expected service life of 30
years—but a definition of system was not made. Strategic Defence Review (Lon-
don: Ministry of Defence, 1998), 17. A 2005 RAND study for MOD (John F.
Schank, et al The United Kingdom’s Nuclear Submarine Industrial Base, Volume
1: Sustaining Design and Production Resources (Arlington: RAND Corporation,
2005) says that “originally the Vanguard-class submarines were to have a life of
 RENEWING TRIDENT   151

25 years, and that plan has not yet officially been changed, but the new reactor
cores should permit operation until age 40.”
2. “Appendix B: The Expected Life the Trident System” in Memorandum
submitted by the Ministry of Defence: “it would be imprudent to assume that
any successor to the Vanguard-class could be designed procured and deployed
within 14 years.” The 2006 White Paper gives a figure of 17 years “from the
initiation of detailed concept work to achieve the first operational patrol.” The
Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent (London: The Cabinet Office,
December 2006), 10.
3. Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper, (London:
Ministry of Defence, 2003), 9.
4. Strategic Defence Review, 117-118.
5. The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, (London: Ministry of De-
fence, 2002), 12.
6. Delivering Security in a Changing World, 9. For more on how the current
“minimum” posture was arrived at, see Strategic Defence Review, 112.
7. Gordon Brown, Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Rt Hon
Gordon Brown MP at the Mansion House, London (London: H. M. Treasury, 21
June 2006).
8. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists states that “the load-out of an SSBN on
patrol with strategic and substrategic missions would likely be either 10, 12, or
14 SLBMs loaded with multiple warheads.” Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kris-
tensen, “British Nuclear Forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61, no. 6
(November/December 2005), 77-79.
9. For more on the acquisition of Polaris, see Richard E. Neustadt, Report to
JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
10. Michael Quinlan clarifies this point, noting, “Missiles are periodically
serviced at King’s Bay on the US Atlantic coast as part of a common U.S./UK
stock, but the UK share is fully owned, not leased.” See Michael Quinlan, “The
Future of United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons: Shaping the Debate” Internation-
al Affairs 82, no. 4 (2006), 628.
11. Ibid., 630.
12. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, 26.
13. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2006
(London: Routledge, 2006), 107.
14. Michael Clarke, “Does My Bomb Look Big In This? Britain’s Nuclear
Choices After Trident,” International Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004), 50-51.
15. See Strategic Defence Review, 112; and Clarke, 51.
152   CHAPTER EIGHT

16. Strategic Defence Review, 25-26.

17. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, 13
18. Clarke, 52.
19. Indeed, this particular capability was the purpose for the Chevaline up-
grade to the original Polaris system. See Lawrence Freedman, “Britain an Ex-
Nuclear Power?” International Security 6, no. 2, (Autumn 1981), 82. See, also,
The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context: Gov-
ernment Response to the Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2005–06 (House
of Commons Defence Committee, London, July 24, 2006), 4. For another use-
ful review, see Walter C. Ladwig III, “The Future of the British Nuclear Deter-
rent: An Assessment of Decision Factors,” Strategic Insights VI, no. 1 (January
2007).
20. See Graham Spinardi, “Trident: Tracing the Course of Nuclear Weapons
Technology” Social Studies of Science 17, no. 2. (May 1987), 371.
21. Strategic Defence Review, 8, notes “there is today no direct military threat
to the United Kingdom or Western Europe. Nor do we foresee the re-emer-
gence of such a threat.”
22. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, 7.
23. Ibid., 10-11.
24. It was reported in April 2006 that MOD was conducting feasibility stud-
ies to determine whether the Astute-class SSNs could be re-engineered to ac-
commodate the Trident missile. Tony Skinner, “Nuclear Debate,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, April 12, 2006.
25. A number of commentators have since suggested that the Maritime Un-
derwater Future Capability (MUFC) submarine program could fulfill this role.
This program was originally called the Future Attack Submarine (FASM) and
was established to replace the fleet of aging Trafalgar class SSNs. Lee Willett of
the Royal United Services Institute argues that following the Astute building
program, “they [UK Ministry of Defence] will look to have a single generic
platform able to conduct land attack, nuclear deterrence and deploy special
forces,” “UK debates Trident sub replacement,” Defense News, May 31, 2004.
26. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, 34-39.
27. Kate Hudson, “We’re Not Simpletons. Trident will Breach the Nuclear
Treaty,” The Guardian, November 29, 2006.
28. “Nuclear Fissions Over Trident,” The Guardian, November 27, 2006.
29. See, for example, evidence by Professor William Walker, The Future of
the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context (House of Commons
Defence Committee: London, June 2006), Ev 132.
 RENEWING TRIDENT   153

30. Quinlan, 634. See also Admiral Sir Raymond Lygo, “Are there realistic
security and military rationales for the UK retaining its nuclear weapons?” in
Frank Barnaby and Ken Booth, eds., The Future of Britain’s Nuclear Weapons
(Oxford Research Group: Oxford, 2006), 28.
31. Clarke, 61. Britain has formally committed itself to working towards
nuclear disarmament under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
but as part of a global nuclear disarmament process involving the other Nuclear
Weapon States. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office website states that
“we remain committed to securing a world free from nuclear weapons. We value
all reductions in nuclear weapons levels whether achieved through unilateral,
bilateral, or multilateral means and continue to support multilateral negotia-
tions towards mutual, balanced, and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons
worldwide. When we are satisfied that sufficient progress has been made to
allow us to include British nuclear weapons in any negotiations, without en-
dangering our security interests, we shall do so.” Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xceler-
ate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1087554441356, accessed (November 12, 2006).
32. On Tony Blair see Tim Ripley, “Secret Plans for Trident Replacement,”
The Scotsman, June 9, 2004, and Colin Brown, “Revealed: Blair to upgrade
Britain’s nuclear weapons,” The Independent, May 2, 2005. On Gordon Brown
see Stephen Fidler, “Brown Fires Only First Shot in Missile Debate,” Financial
Times, June 23, 2006, and Gordon Brown, Speech by the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer. On Defence Secretary Des Browne, see Richard Norton-Taylor and
Patrick Wintour, “Defence Minister Backs Nuclear Arms,” The Guardian, July
8, 2006, 18.
33. See Lawrence Freedman, Defence, in Seldon, A., ed., The Blair Effect:
The Blair Government 1997-2001 (Little Brown and Company: London, 2001),
295; Geoff Hoon, “Intervening in the new security environment,” Speech to the
Foreign Policy Centre, November 12, 2002.
34. See Tony Blair, “Britain’s Place in the World,” Prime Minister’s speech at
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Leadership Conference, January 7, 2003.
http://www.pmo.gov.uk/output/Page1765.asp, accessed (March 16, 2006).
35. See UK International Priorities, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
December 2003. Cited in “UK White Papers on defence and Foreign Policy,”
Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 75 (January/February 2004); Delivering Security
in a Changing World, 8. Jeremy Stocker argues that an important function of
British nuclear weapons has always been to influence the United States as “the
ultimate guarantor of Britain’s political independence and physical survival.”
The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context, Ev
101.
154   CHAPTER EIGHT

36. See Delivering Security in a Changing World, 8; and Paul Rogers, “Big
Boats and Bigger Skimmers: Determining Britain’s Role in the Long War,” In-
ternational Affairs 82. No. 4 (2006), 651.
37. Lawrence Freedman, The Politics of British Defence, 1979-98 (Macmillan:
Basingstoke, UK, 1999), 98.
38. See remarks by British Army Major General Charles Vyvyan, then De-
fence Attaché at the British Embassy in Washington, in Charles Heyman, “The
Jane’s Interview,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 2, 1997, 32.
39. See Brad Roberts, Multipolarity and Stability (Institute for Defense
Analysis, November 2000). Roberts states, “A good argument can be made that
the primary function of nuclear weapons here is not deterrence, but self-assur-
ance,” 13.
40. Arguments about the influence that being a nuclear weapon state confers
Britain in its international relations are ambiguous and open to challenge. Sir
Michael Quinlan, Former Permanent Under Secretary at MOD, stated that he
did not find the “seat at the top table” argument persuasive or attractive. See The
Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context, 16.
41. Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” International Se-
curity 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97), 73. He goes on to state that “State behavior is
determined not by leaders’ cold calculations about the national security inter-
ests or their parochial bureaucratic interests, but by deeper norms and shared
beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international rela-
tions.”
42. Keith Hartley, “The UK Submarine Industrial Base: An Economic Per-
spective” Centre for Defence Economics, University of York, unpublished, May
1999.
43. Peter Whitehouse, transcript of oral evidence before the House of
Commons Defence Committee hearing on the UK’s strategic nuclear deter-
rent, March 28, 2006. On April 4, 2006 the Financial Times reported that Peter
Whitehouse of DML, the company that owns the Devonport nuclear subma-
rine yard in Plymouth, stated “If we are not to see a very big gap in throughput,
Barrow needs to be getting on with the design and build of the submarines
[post-Vanguard SSBNs].”
44. See Ripley, “Secret Plans”; Freedman, Defence, 289; and Philip Stephens,
“Politics Calls the Nuclear Missile Shot,” Financial Times, June 27, 2006.
45. John Keegan, “Britain needs a nuclear deterrent more than ever,” Sunday
Telegraph, 25 June 2006.
46. For example, see House of Commons Early Day Motion No. 149 of Oc-
tober 12, 2005 led by Michael Ancram MP, then Shadow Secretary of State for
 RENEWING TRIDENT   155

Defence and Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party, which said “this House
believes that the United Kingdom should continue to possess a strategic nucle-
ar deterrent as long as other countries have nuclear weapons; and accordingly
endorses the principle of preparing to replace the Trident system with a succes-
sor generation of the nuclear deterrent.”
47. The degree of public support for retaining nuclear weapons is mixed.
For example, a survey conducted for the Ministry of Defence in 1998, where
the question was “Should Britain keep its nuclear weapons?” found 35 per cent
said they should be kept in all circumstances, and a further 35 per cent that they
should be kept in some circumstances. Strategic Defence Review, Omnibus
Survey Report, prepared by BMRB International Limited, BMRB/JT/SK/1153-
344, July 1998, cited in Tom Milne, et al, An End to UK Nuclear Weapons (Brit-
ish Pugwash Group: London, 2002), 36.
48. Freedman, British Defence, 134.
49. See Nick Ritchie, Replacing Trident: How will the decision be made and
who will make it? Working Paper (Oxford Research Group: Oxford, November
2004); William Hopkinson, The Making of British Defence Policy (London: The
Stationery Office Books, 2000), 24.
50. See Geoff Hoon MP, Hansard, House of Commons, June 30, 2004, Col-
umn 356W and John Reid MP, Hansard, House of Commons, April 19, 2006,
Column 672W on service life extension; R Scott, “UK Funds Nuclear Propul-
sion Studies,” Janes Defence Weekly, September 21, 2005, 13 on nuclear reactors;
James Boxell, “MoD Tests Water on Trident Replacement,” The Financial Times,
April 4, 2006 on industry talks; and David Cracknell, “Talks Start With U.S. on
Trident’s 15bn Successor,” The Sunday Times, July 17, 2005 and talks with the
U.S.
51. Personal communication; and Tim Hare, transcript of oral evidence be-
fore the House of Commons Defence Committee hearing on the UK’s strategic
nuclear deterrent, March 28, 2006.
52. See David Weir and Stuart Beetham, Political Power and Democratic
Control in Britain (Routledge: London, 1999), 171 on the pre-structuring of op-
tions and outcomes civil servants and its near monopoly of ministerial advice
and information.
53. William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain (The Royal Insti-
tute of International Affairs: London, 1975), 6.
54. It was reported in July 2005 that Defence Secretary John Reid had autho-
rized officials to begin negotiations with Washington on the nature of Britain’s
post-Vanguard nuclear force. David Cracknell, “Talks start with U.S. on Tri-
dent’s 15bn successor,” The Sunday Times, July 17, 2005.
156   CHAPTER EIGHT

55. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, 31. See letters
exchanged by Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. President George W. Bush
dated December 7, 2006. http://www.number10.gov.uk/files/pdf/letter_Bush.
pdf, and http://www.number10.gov.uk/files/pdf/letter_Blair.pdf.
 Chapter Nine

U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation

and Nuclear Deterrence
Eric A. Miller

O
n May 24, 2002, Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin
signed the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relation-
ship and agreed that “the era in which the United States and
Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended.” The
two presidents agreed to cooperate “to advance stability, security, and
… to jointly counter global challenges.”1 For the Bush administration,
one of the most pressing challenges was confronting the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems.2 The
nation’s vulnerability, especially to long-range missile attack, prompted
a drive to develop and deploy a layered ballistic missile defense system
of various ground-, sea-, and air-based missile defense capabilities.3 In
this new era, it seemed, the development of missile defenses would nei-
ther destabilize international security nor jeopardize the rapprochement
between the United States and Russia.
The Bush Administration idea was for missile defense to become a
cooperative endeavor. After the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty, the presidents agreed to strengthen confidence
and increase transparency in the area of missile defense, examine pos-
sibilities for missile defense cooperation, and explore opportunities for
practical cooperation on missile defense within the North Atlantic Treaty

The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or
the U.S. government.

157
158   CHAPTER NINE

Organization (NATO)-Russia Council.4 The presidents reaffirmed this

intention in a joint statement on June 1, 2003, declaring their “intention
to advance concrete joint projects in the area of missile defense which
will deepen relations between the United States and Russia.”5 After a
September 2003 summit at Camp David, they agreed to intensify the
dialogue on missile defense cooperation.6 The next month at a NATO
Informal Meeting of Defense Ministers, U.S. and Russian defense lead-
ers started “immediate practical pragmatic work” to identify concrete
measures to achieve near-term missile defense cooperation.7 Given this
high level interest and direction, several compelling questions remain.
In what ways has missile defense cooperation been successful between
Russia and the United States? How concerned is Moscow about the U.S.
missile defense system? How would U.S. missile defenses affect Russian
deterrence and nuclear weapons policy?
This chapter examines these questions in three parts. First, it chroni-
cles how Washington and Moscow have pursued cooperation on missile
defense issues bilaterally as well as within the NATO-Russia framework.
The second section discusses Russian perceptions of U.S. missile defense,
especially with the potential for missile defense capabilities in Europe.
Finally, it examines the ways in which U.S. missile defense progress is
influencing Russian nuclear deterrence and strategy. Russian military
thinkers are concerned about the combination of more sophisticated
missile defenses and conventional U.S. precision-guided weapons,
which they believe could threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability
in the future. From this perspective, missile defense cooperation could
prove detrimental to Russian security in the long run, although in the
short term they feel confident in their strategic deterrent. As this chapter
concludes, missile defense cooperation is more about rhetoric than the
reality underlying the competitive nature of the strategic relationship.

To Cooperate or nOt to Cooperate?

The George W. Bush administration’s missile defense plans have prompt-
ed attention of late, but U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation is not
a new concept. In 1991, President George H. W. Bush proposed a new
missile defense system, nicknamed Global Protection against Limited
Strikes (GPALS) to refocus President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) program. Bush (41) sought a more modest missile de-
 U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation and Nuclear Deterrence   159

fense system to provide protection against accidental, unauthorized, or

limited ballistic missile strikes against U.S. deployed forces, U.S. friends
and allies, and the United States itself. Understanding the importance of
superpower cooperation, in his September 27, 1991 address Bush called
upon the Soviet Union to “join [the United States] in taking concrete
steps to permit limited deployment of non-nuclear limited defenses.”8
For their part, Russian leaders reciprocated this cooperative initiative.
In an October 1991 address, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev stated
that the Soviet Union was ready to “discuss the U.S. proposal on non-
nuclear ABM systems,” further suggesting “the possibility of developing
joint early warning systems with land- and space-based components.”9
This marked the first time ever a Soviet leader agreed to discuss a system
that would violate the ABM Treaty. Similarly, in January 1992 Russian
President Boris Yeltsin stated, “[Russia is] ready to develop, then create
and jointly operate a global defense system, instead of the SDI system…
for the protection of the world community.”10 GPALS met an early end,
however, when the incoming Clinton administration adhered strictly to
the ABM Treaty and focused program activities on the development of
theater missile defense.
Shortly thereafter, the Russian-American Observation Satellite (RA-
MOS) program was conceived to build trust between the two nations.
RAMOS would have consisted of two co-orbital satellites for imagery
of missile launches using Russian satellites with U.S. and Russian pay-
loads. Cost overruns, a failure to conclude a government-to-government
agreement, and the perception the program did not enhance U.S. mis-
sile defense capabilities consistently plagued the initiative.11 The United
States spent more than $140 million on RAMOS between fiscal years
1992-2004; and at the time of cancellation in February 2004, total costs
tripled from the original estimate of $236 million. As Lieutenant Gen-
eral Ronald Kadish, then Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency
(MDA), stated, “we couldn’t, at the government-to-government level,
make the agreements allowing us to proceed without worrying about
barriers that have to be overcome.” As a result, he proposed a less am-
bitious approach, “If we can be successful in the short run on modest
goals, then we will be able to move forward quicker on more ambitious
activities.”12
Other bilateral cooperative initiatives were examined in the U.S.-
Russian Missile Defense Working Group, which was the primary policy
160   CHAPTER NINE

forum for U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation and transparency

issues. It was created under the auspices of the U.S.-Russian Consulta-
tive Group for Strategic Security in 2002, and met seven times before its
eventual dissolution in 2005.13 According to Lieutenant General Trey
Obering, MDA’s current Director, cooperation with Russia on targets
for missile defense testing and radar cooperation for early warning
could prove fruitful.14
Russian ballistic missiles as targets were desirable for several reasons.
Many of the ballistic missiles found throughout the world, especially
in countries perceived to be near-term threats, are based on Russian
missile technology. Moreover, Russia has converted many of these mis-
sile systems to commercial space launch vehicles, such as the Cyclone-3
rocket, which could be used for testing the U.S. missile defense system.
This three-stage liquid fuel vehicle resembles other intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (ICBM), affording opportunities to test against targets
more representative of real world threats. As a result, this level of real-
ism cannot be replicated using existing or aging U.S. ballistic missiles
traditionally used for testing. Furthermore, the ability to test the sys-
tem using more realistic threat trajectories is critical.15 For example, test
launches from the Russian-leased Baikonur space facility in Kazakhstan
would be highly useful for missile defense testing and enable the system
to practice against relevant threat trajectories.
Again, the inability to conclude a government-to-government agree-
ment hindered cooperation, much as it did for RAMOS. For instance,
with respect to possible radar cooperation, the Joint Data Exchange Cen-
ter (JDEC), originally announced by Clinton and Putin in June 2000,
was to be completed in 2001 to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war
by sharing early warning information on missile launches.16 However,
failure to resolve issues over taxes and liability stopped the center in its
tracks.17 Despite continued U.S. efforts to find agreement on these is-
sues, Moscow’s reluctance to come to an agreement is one indicator of
Russian passivity towards missile defense cooperation with the United
States. Beyond the legal dimension, the fact that Russian radars are still
integrated into the operational ballistic missile early warning system
could be problematic to Russia.18
At a multilateral level, Russia and NATO have also begun discussions
on theater missile defense. In June 2002, the NATO-Russia Council es-
tablished the Theater Missile Defense Ad-Hoc Working Group (TMD
AHWG).19 The group is examining whether Russian and NATO missile
 U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation and Nuclear Deterrence   161

defense forces are interoperable and the benefits of interoperability to

include how these forces and systems should interoperate to maximize
the benefit. A multi-phased approach has been adopted to look at these
issues. The TMD AHWG initially created a common glossary of ter-
minology, and then developed an experimental concept of operations
(CONOPS), studied the feasibility and desirability of interoperability,
and conducted three command post exercises in 2004, 2005, and 2006 to
test elements of the CONOPS. In the future, possibly sometime in 2007,
it could begin to focus on the design and development of a prototype
TMD system. Finally, if the political decision were to move forward, the
group could begin to field, train, and exercise the proposed system.20
The Russian rationale for cooperation is straightforward. First, Russia
hopes NATO countries will purchase Russian missile defense technolo-
gies and weapon systems. Russian leaders have offered to contribute the
S-300 and forthcoming S-400 air defense systems to a future European
missile defense system, including one directed against cruise missiles.21
Second, Moscow is undoubtedly interested in information about bud-
ding NATO missile defense plans. In mid-2005, the alliance established
its Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program office,
which will be responsible for ensuring connectivity and interoperability
for NATO missile defense forces to protect deployed forces in theater.
Then in July, the NATO Missile Defense Feasibility Study was conclud-
ed; it took a broader strategic approach to missile defense and examined
options for protecting alliance territory, population centers, and forces
against the full range of missile threats. By continuing discussions with
NATO, Russia likely hopes to gain additional insight into NATO missile
defense planning. Lastly, despite the noteworthy accomplishments of
the first two phases, the difficult political decision as to whether NATO
and Russia should actually develop an interoperable force has yet to be
taken.22 This decision will likely be delayed since neither NATO nor
Russia would want at this time to be seen as the party that walked away
from the program. To date the program has not been particularly costly,
as costs have been shared by NATO allies, and it has not forced any
major policy decisions. Rather, it has facilitated the exchange of ideas
between technical and operational experts.
Ultimately, bilateral missile defense cooperation has failed to produce
concrete results despite presidential guidance to do so. Cooperative dis-
cussions continue in the NATO-Russia framework, but slowly and with
few major inroads. A central factor is that missile defense is increasingly
162   CHAPTER NINE

seen as a zero-sum game in Moscow. Russia is likely concerned that the

United States could gain insight into Russia military capabilities. As we
will see below, concerns that this may assist the United States in its mis-
sile defense program, possibly to the detriment of Russian security, fuel
Moscow’s reluctance. As Chief of the Russian General Staff Yuri Bal-
uyevskiy has pointed out, the key is to find cooperative efforts that ben-
efit both sides equally, “We need to shift from declarative transparency
to actual mutually advantageous cooperation. Cooperation in the mis-
sile defense sphere should not be a separate problem, but must…ensure
strategic stability and security.”23 From the U.S. perspective, coopera-
tion for the sake of cooperation is of little value.24 And while MDA is
still interested in cooperation, the failure to resolve long-standing legal
issues over taxes and liability undermines this effort.

Russian Concerns with U.S. Missile Defense

Missile defense cooperation with Russia has sputtered for myriad rea-
sons. Many Russian leaders believe the United States is pursuing a policy
of military supremacy and question U.S. intentions for missile defense
deployments to Europe.
In a broader sense, Russia is convinced that the United States is ac-
tively seeking military and space dominance, and perhaps more discon-
certing, that it is technologically capable of achieving this.25 Russian
officials often point to U.S. space policy as direct evidence. According
to the new national space policy of August 31, 2006, one of the main
goals is to “develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain U.S. ad-
vantage…to ensure freedom of action in space, and if directed, deny
such freedom of action to adversaries.”26 More directly, General Lance
Lord, then head of U.S. Space Command, stated, “Space superiority is
not our birthright, but it is our destiny. Space superiority is our day-
to-day mission. Space supremacy is our vision for the future.”27 From a
Russian perspective the message is clear.
The primary concern for Russia, though, is not that the United States
might pursue programs to dominate space, but that Russia cannot match
U.S. efforts. According to scientists from one of the leading Russian de-
fense firms, space threats to Russian security “will qualitatively expand
by 2015-2020,” adding that the United States is accomplishing the “great-
est” amount of research and development in hypersonic technologies. In
 U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation and Nuclear Deterrence   163

other leading space industries, the United States is “intensely mastering

these technologies,” which poses a “growing threat for Russia.”28 More-
over, the type of spiral development the MDA is pursuing allows for the
deployment of technologies as they become proven. As with any research
and development program, technological breakthroughs occur and can
lead to further innovations. In the process, the technological gaps that
exist today, especially in the field of space and missile defense, may grow
even wider. According to one leading scholar at the Russian Academy of
Military Sciences, “we should constantly expect new U.S. breakthroughs
in the operational/strategic and (or) military technical spheres, which
will ensure the United States military strategic superiority by developing
and deploying new strategic weapon systems as it sees fit.”29
Adding to the situation, U.S. precision-guided weapons have funda-
mentally altered today’s battlefield. Indeed, the evolution of U.S. pre-
cision bombing since the first Gulf War, through Kosovo, and now in
Afghanistan and Iraq have had a profound impact on how Russian
military thinkers view future war fighting. This approach was further
solidified when the 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review shifted from the
Old Triad of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and
bombers to the New Triad, which emphasized nuclear and non-nuclear
strike capabilities along with missile defenses and a responsive infra-
structure.
Russian strategists acknowledge that the initial phase of a conflict is
likely to be the most crucial to victory.30 And in this regard, the United
States has demonstrated since the first Gulf War that it will begin con-
flicts with precision strikes aimed at crippling an adversary militarily
and decapitating command and control centers necessary to conduct
military operations. Translating this into a worse case scenario, Russian
defense planners undoubtedly believe that any conflict with the United
States would begin with precision strikes that could neutralize or at least
mitigate Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capability. “The United States,” in
the estimate of one senior Russian scholar, “will be able to ensure the
delivery of a disarming strike by precision guided weapons armed with
conventional warheads against an adversary’s strategic nuclear forces
and a reduction in the deterrence capability of strategic nuclear weap-
ons.”31 Missile defenses only strengthen this equation, which some Rus-
sian commentators believe “ensure[s] the United States absolute strategic
domination.”32
164   CHAPTER NINE

U.S. plans to arm Trident SLBMs conventionally, as stated in the 2006

Quadrennial Defense Review, are a case in point.33 The intellectual
argument can be made to Russian leaders that a prompt non-nuclear
global conventional strike asset is necessary in the war on terrorism.
But Russians view the problem differently.34 They argue that while the
technological challenges can be overcome, conventional ballistic mis-
siles can only be assigned a very small set of missions and thus such a
capability is not cost effective.35 To smooth the way, Washington tried to
gain Russian support for the idea. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld stated after meeting Russian Defense Minister Sergey
Ivanov in August 2006, we “would like Russia to do the same,” adding, “I
hope that when my friend Sergey returns to Russia, he will call me and
say: Good idea.” But as Ivanov replied, these plans “evoke certain ques-
tions in Russia.”36 The question is simple: why does the United States,
with its proven conventional precision weapons, need such a capability?
In Russian defense circles, the long-term answer is discomforting, since
such a weapon would be an ideal first strike weapon in the initial phase
of a war or potential nuclear exchange.37
Similarly, the potential deployment of missile defense capabilities in
Central Europe is a stated concern.38 In July 2006, Chief of the Russian
General Staff Baluyevskiy stated that potential deployment of missile
defense interceptors to Central Europe caused “special alarm,” arguing
that such silos could easily be “reconfigured to accommodate ballistic
missiles, which are capable of reaching the most remote targets in Rus-
sia.”39 He added more recently that Russia “cannot sit back passively”
and watch activities that could “threaten strategic stability and securi-
ty.”40 For Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, Commander of Russia’s
Strategic Missile Forces (SMF), missile defense interceptors “could upset
strategic stability,” and the “fear that [they] could have a negative effect
on the parameters of Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential is quite justi-
fied.”41 For his part, Ivanov has suggested that any such plans should
be developed “with maximum transparency, in order not to provoke a
desire to hastily create means of overcoming these missile defense sys-
tems.”42
But the primary concern for Russia apparently is not that it believes
the United States intends to deploy offensive ballistic missiles to Europe
or that a handful of interceptors could threaten Russia’s vast nuclear ar-
senal, a consideration addressed in the next section. Rather it is a psy-
chological question about the potential military buildup near Russian
 U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation and Nuclear Deterrence   165

borders. For example, Polish defense officials stated that the installation
of Patriot missiles would be necessary to defend any prospective inter-
ceptor sites.43 Envisioning such a build-up, Lieutenant General Yev-
geniy Buzhinskiy, Russia’s military lead for missile defense issues, stated
that Russia had no illusions the activities would be limited to the initial
facilities and that Europe would “become overgrown” with new instal-
lations.44 The Russian Foreign Ministry added that the deployments
“cannot be seen as anything but a fundamental reconfiguration of the
American military presence in Europe.”45 From Moscow’s perspective,
this entails yet another strengthening of the NATO alliance, militarily,
politically, and psychologically. The deployments, thus, are seen as a
harbinger of more things to come. In the end, these developments, along
with improvements in U.S. space and missile defense capabilities and
conventional precision-guided weapons, are of considerable concern to
Russian defense thinkers, especially given Moscow’s paranoia over cur-
rent and future U.S. military superiority. The next questions, though, are
how this has influenced Russia’s view of nuclear deterrence and how this
may affect U.S. policy.

On the Other Side of Missile Defense

U.S. missile defense efforts have heightened Moscow’s rhetoric, but
has this fundamentally altered how Russia views its nuclear weap-
ons policy and deterrence strategy? The answer to this question is
mixed. Russian attitudes toward nuclear weapons have changed
little of late, and Moscow continues to focus on nuclear weapon mod-
ernization and development as a counter to U.S. missile defenses. Rus-
sian leaders believe that missile defenses will enhance U.S. capabilities,
but under the current architecture, they will not be capable of defeating
a large-scale attack from Russia. Regardless, this has prompted debate
within Russian defense circles about how much threatened/achievable
damage is enough to deter the United States. In light of new missile sys-
tems and advanced countermeasures, Russian leaders appear confident
in their ability to deliver a sufficiently powerful nuclear strike to deter
the United States.
Nuclear weapons remain essential to Russian defense policy.46 “The
prospects for the future,” Putin noted, “oblige Russia to view its nuclear
deterrent as a fundamental element guaranteeing its security, which…
remains one of the top priorities of Russian Federation policy.”47
166   CHAPTER NINE

Ivanov concurred, “We understand very well that the state of our nucle-
ar arsenal will remain the key factor determining the country’s defense
capability for a long time to come.”48 This enduring reliance on nuclear
weapons is rooted in several realities. First, nuclear weapons provide
a sense of superpower status that cannot be afforded to Russia for any
other military reason.49 The overall weakness of Russia’s conventional
military forces also necessitates a strong nuclear deterrent, since Russia
has fallen far behind the United States and NATO in terms of high tech-
nology weaponry. In this context, Moscow has even spoken about the
possible first use of nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict when fac-
ing large-scale conventional attack because of their likely inability to do
so successfully with conventional forces.50 In addition to the shortcom-
ings of Russian conventional forces, much of this rationale rests with
lingering Cold War thinking within Russian defense circles. Despite any
noticeable tensions or indicators, Russia remains concerned with the
threat from the United States and NATO, rumored to be part of a new
Military Doctrine, as it faces few other near-term challenges (short of
terrorism in the North Caucasus).51
While Moscow’s reliance on nuclear weapons remains constant, U.S.
missile defenses have stimulated discussion as to how robust a Russian
nuclear response must be to deter an aggressor.52 In this regard, Rus-
sia counterforce strategies, targeting an adversary’s military-industrial
infrastructure, may be giving way to more counter value strategies, in
which population centers are held at risk. Writing in the Russian Min-
istry of Defense’s journal, Military Thought, one senior Russian military
thinker writes, “If the combat capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces
ensure the delivery to an adversary’s territory under attack of at least 10
percent of the maximum level of 400 to 500 warheads, the possible ad-
versary will hardly dare to carry out a preemptive strike against the Rus-
sian Federation even if it has a missile defense system.”53 Thus, from the
author’s perspective, even if only 40 to 50 warheads were detonated over
U.S. cities, an adversary (like the United States) would be sufficiently
deterred from preemptively striking Russia. Missile defenses may defeat
some incoming warheads, but they could not intercept them all, signifi-
cantly raising the stakes of a preemptive strike. In other Russian model-
ing, scholars have drawn similar conclusions, notably that deterrence
will still work if Russia can successfully deliver even a limited number
of nuclear warheads.54
 U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation and Nuclear Deterrence   167

Moreover, only a significantly more robust system than the one be-
ing developed by the United States today could threaten this deterrent,
“To destroy the basic nuclear deterrence mechanism, the U.S. missile
defense system would have to acquire capability to effectively neutralize
retaliatory action by the Russian Federation Strategic Nuclear Forces.
But that would provoke the danger of U.S. preemptive strike in crisis
situations.”55 Thus, while Russians understand the utility of U.S. missile
defenses, they believe their strategic deterrent is still effective because
it could inflict sufficient damage on the United States, even if this only
involved a handful of nuclear detonations in major cities. In this regard,
U.S. missile defense efforts have not fundamentally altered Russian nu-
clear deterrence.
Technological advances in Russia’s nuclear arsenal are another fac-
tor that Russians believe ensures their strategic deterrent. Chief among
these are newer ICBMs, like the SS-27 (Topol-M), and advanced coun-
termeasures, such as a new hypersonic glide vehicle. As Putin suggested
recently, “ABM systems are simply helpless” to these new asymmetric
responses, adding that Russia is “not confining [itself] just to these” and
“will have a new generation of systems on which ABM systems will have
absolutely no impact.”56 Ivanov offered a similar assessment, stating that
Russia is “calm” concerning plans to deploy missile defenses to Europe
because the Topol-M “can overcome any ABM defenses.”57 These tech-
nological measures “were not needed earlier,” noted Russian Deputy
Defense Minister Alexei Moskovsky, “but their time has come.”58 Citing
these improvements, SMF Commander Colonel General Solovtsov stat-
ed, “The global missile defense system, which is to be created by Wash-
ington before 2020, will have restricted capabilities for intercepting the
warheads of [Russian] strategic missiles. It will be unable to seriously
weaken the efficiency of Russians strategic nuclear forces during this
period of time.”59 Thus, despite the at times alarmist statements of Rus-
sian officials, other senior leaders are confident in Russia’s current and
future strategic capabilities.
While not strictly related to Russian deterrence thinking, missile de-
fense interceptor deployments to Central Europe could prompt Russia
to withdraw from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty,
which bans land-based ballistic and cruise missile between 500 and
5,000 km. Russia may want shorter-range missile systems that could ef-
fectively counter any missile defense deployments in a crisis situation
168   CHAPTER NINE

for which their longer-range strategic weapons are not suited. While
Ivanov has stated that Russia is not considering withdrawal from the
INF Treaty, he acknowledged that the treaty “is a Cold War relic.”60 Oth-
er Russian commentators highlight the additional financial costs associ-
ated with new missile production as well as the political ramifications
from concerned European governments, as was seen in the 1980s, sug-
gesting the measure would be counterproductive.61 As the interceptor
deployments to Europe unfold, INF challenges could emerge, whether
for rhetorical purposes to pressure the United States or for the actual
development of missiles that could preemptively strike European mis-
sile defense sites.

The Future of Missile Defense Cooperation

and Nuclear Deterrence
U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation, much like the larger U.S.-Rus-
sian strategic relationship, has been fraught with irony over the past few
years. As Ivanov stated in October 2003, while the United States is not
an enemy, they “are not allies either, that is for sure.”62 This attitude has
been an undercurrent as Moscow and Washington have discussed pos-
sibilities for missile defense cooperation, and ultimately this sentiment
thwarted cooperation. As one Russian observer noted concerning mis-
sile defense cooperation, “The brief political rapprochement brought
about by President Putin’s solidarity stance after September 11 was not
sustainable against the deep-running attitudes of distrust within the mil-
itary and political elites of the two countries.”63 As a result, the technical
discussions that some DOD officials eagerly pursued never got beyond
higher-level policy and legal considerations. The future of NATO-Rus-
sia cooperation is similarly unclear. As the United States continues to
enhance its missile defense capabilities into the future, the likelihood
for real cooperation with Russia will diminish even further. Russian per-
ceived security interests have forestalled any real achievements.
Ultimately, the Bush administration witnessed the birth and death
of post-ABM Treaty missile defense cooperation with Russia. In 2002,
when discussions about missile defense cooperation began, the United
States was still in the testing, development, and planning phase of its
missile defense system. This cooperative impulse was also fueled by post
September 11 security cooperation between Washington and Moscow
and a feeling of true mutual partnership. But only a few years later that
 U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation and Nuclear Deterrence   169

intent was successfully translated into actual deployment of some initial

missile defense assets. Moreover, as the U.S. system evolved, the pros-
pects for additional deployment and assets abroad grew as well, with
Central Europe possibly the next site for placement of interceptors
and sensors. Moscow is a spectator for many of these decisions, and it
will likely move forward as long as Washington and its allies (and their
publics) agree. Left with few political, military, and diplomatic options,
Moscow’s increased rhetoric about the destabilizing effect of such de-
ployments is not surprising.
In retrospect, the past few years have been a transition period for
larger strategic questions. The cooperative impulse of 2002, and the sub-
sequent realities that followed, have changed the discourse between Rus-
sian and U.S. policy makers – a cooperative discourse unlikely to return
in the near future. During this transition, U.S. missile defense efforts
have not significantly altered Russian deterrence and nuclear weapons
policy, despite some political rhetoric to the contrary, which the United
States cannot ignore. Russian leaders and strategists continue to grapple
with the numerous military challenges and competing priorities facing
the country, and countering U.S. missile defenses is one of many with
which to contend. However, as many Russian leaders have pointed out,
the strategic weapons’ modernization already under way is essential to
ensuring Russia’s nuclear deterrent in the future and simultaneously will
ensure that U.S. missile defenses will not pose a threat to Russia’s nucle-
ar deterrent. Whether that dynamic changes in the future depends on:
how relations between Washington and Moscow unfold, how effective
Russia’s nuclear weapon modernization and development turn out to be,
and how the U.S. missile defense program progresses. Only time (and
technology) will tell.

Notes
1. “Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship,” May 24, 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-2.html.
2. The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion, December 2002, 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/
WMDStrategy.pdf; The White House, The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America, September 2002, 16 http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
nss.pdf; and J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Secu-
rity Policy, “Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,” January 9, 2002,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html.
170   CHAPTER NINE

3. As Bush stated in December 2001: “We know that the terrorists, and some
of those who support them, seek the ability to deliver death and destruction to
our doorstep via missile. And we must have the freedom and the flexibility to
develop effective defenses against those attacks.” See “President Discusses Na-
tional Missile Defense,” December 13, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/12/20011213-4.html. The mission of the Missile Defense Agency
is “to develop an integrated, layered Ballistic Missile Defense System to defend
the United States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends from ballistic missiles
of all ranges and in all phase of flight.” For an overview of the U.S. planned
missile defense system, see “A Day in the Life of the BMDS,” http://www.mda.
mil/mdalink/pdf/bmdsbook.pdf. See also Peppi Debiaso, “Proliferation, Mis-
sile Defense, and the Conduct of Modern War,” Comparative Strategy 25, no. 3
(2006): 157-72.
4. “Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship.”
5. “Joint Declaration by President Bush and President Putin,” June 1, 2003,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030601-1.html.
6. “President Bush Meets with Russian President Putin at Camp David,” Sep-
tember 27, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030927-
2.html.
7. “Press Briefing by Sergei Ivanov,” October 9, 2003, http://www.nato.int/
docu/speech/2003/s031009c.htm.
8. Pavel Podvig, “A History of the ABM Treaty in Russia,” Project on New
Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) Policy Memo No. 109 (February
2000). For an overview of Bush’s views on superpower cooperation see, Eric A.
Miller and Steve A. Yetiv, “The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The
Bush Administration’s Worldview in Transition,” Presidential Studies Quarterly
31, no.1 (2001): 56-68.
9. Podvig, “A History of the ABM Treaty.”
10. Ibid.
11. Andrey Lebedev, “We are Building a BMD System for Every Contingen-
cy,” Izvestiya, November 20, 2003, translated in Open Source Center (OSC), for-
merly Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Doc ID: CEP20031231000142.
12. Michael Sirak, “New Approach Urged on Shared BMD Strategy by Rus-
sia and US,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 14, 2004, 7.
13. “Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship.”
14. See Public Statement of Lieutenant General Trey Obering, “Missile De-
fense Program and FY2006 Budget,” spring 2005, 20, http://www.mda.mil/
mdalink/pdf/spring05.pdf; Jeremy Singer, “MDA Proposals Include Russian-
Based Early Warning Radar,” Space News, June 21, 2004, 8; and Jeremy Singer,
 U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation and Nuclear Deterrence   171

“Weldon Presses Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia,” Space News, March
7, 2005, 6. At a much lower cooperative level, the Theater Missile Defense Ex-
ercise (TMDEX) is an unclassified, computer-based exercise program managed
by the Joint Staff. The program began in 1994, and five U.S.-Russian exercises
have been conducted. Within the TMDEX framework, the United States and
Russia have also conducted technical discussions on developing an unclassified
missile defense modeling and simulation capability.
15. MDA has increasingly been trying to conduct more realistic testing to
enhance the system’s capability. On March 15, 2005, Lieutenant General Ober-
ing commented before the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcom-
mittee that he will add “new test objectives and [use] more complex scenarios.”
Before the Senate Armed Forces Strategic Forces Subcommittee on April 7,
2005, David Duma, Department of Defense (DOD) acting director for opera-
tional test and evaluation, emphasized the need for more “operational realism”
in missile defense testing.
16. Eric Rosenberg, “U.S.-Russian War Center Still Stalled,” Arizona Re-
public, April 9, 2006. See also Pavel Podvig, “Reducing the Risk of Accidental
Launch: Time for New Approach?” PONARS Policy Memo No. 328 (November
2004).
17. For an overview of the original JDEC mission intent and negotiations
see, Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Trans-
forming the U.S.-Russian Equation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2006), 143-48.
18. This has not stopped Russian officials from stating that their early warn-
ing radars could be useful in the development of a European missile defense
system. During a recent interview about possibilities for Russian-European
missile defense cooperation, General Vladimir Mikhailov, Commander of the
Russian Air Force, stated that “our radar systems for early warning about a mis-
sile attack, differing from the American systems, cover the missile-dangerous
sectors for the majority of the countries of Europe.” See Viktor Ruchkin, “An
Anti-Ballistic Missile System for Europe,” Krasnaya Zvezda, December 1, 2006,
translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20061201330001. Russia may be concerned
that U.S. technical experts could identify shortcomings in the early warning
system – a factor they are already sensitive to today. For instance, Russia mili-
tary and political leaders have reacted strongly to articles by Keir Lieber and
Daryl Press, which pointed to the ineffectiveness of the Russian early warn-
ing system. See “Replying to Foreign Affairs Article, Expert Mulls Nuclear
Arms Programs,” Krasnaya Zvezda, April 12, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID:
CEP20060411330004; and “Russian Media See Article on U.S. Nuclear Primacy
as Provocation,” OSC Analysis, April 3, 2006, in Doc ID: CEF20060403324001.
The original articles can be found in Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The
172   CHAPTER NINE

Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 42-54; and idem,
“The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Se-
curity 30, no. 4 (2006): 7-44.
19. Statement of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Defense Ministers,
June 6, 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p020606e.htm.
20. For an overview of this cooperation see, “A NATO-Russia Exercise to
Take Place in Moscow,” NATO Press Release, no. 121, October 12, 2006, http://
www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-121e.htm; “NATO and Russia to Conduct
Joint Theater Missile Defense Exercise,” NATO Press Release, no. 034, March 9,
2005, http://152.152.96.1/docu/pr/2005/p05-034e.htm; and Robert Bell, Chair-
man of the NATO-Russia Council Ad-Hoc Working Group on Theater Mis-
sile Defense, “Ballistic Missile Threats: A NATO-Russia Strategic Challenge,”
Krasnaya Zvezda, February 27, 2003, http:///www.nato.int/docu/articles/2003/
a030227a.htm.
21. “Russia Proposes Missile Defense Cooperation with Europe,” Moscow
Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, December 5, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID:
CEP20061205950236; Ruchkin, “An Anti-Ballistic Missile System for Europe”;
and Richard Weitz, Revitalizing US-Russian Security Cooperation: Practice Mea-
sures (London: Routledge, 2005), 70.
22. For an earlier look at this cooperation see, Alla Kassyanova, “Russian-
European Cooperation on TMD: Russian Hopes and European Transatlantic
Experience,” The Nonproliferation Review (Fall-Winter 2003): 1-13.
23. Yuriy Baluyevskiy, “About the United States: What’s Next? Who Needs a
Missile Defense Umbrella and Why?” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, July 26,
2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20060725436001.
24. As Lieutenant General Kadish stated, “We don’t want to invest in it just to
do international cooperation. We want to invest in it so that we get the benefit to
our allies as well as us.” Marc Selinger, “MDA: International Cooperation Must
have Tangible Benefits,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, June 25, 2004.
25. Aleksandr Gorshkov, “Exploration of a New Theater of War,” Neza-
visimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, July 28, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID:
CEP20060728436004.
26. Office of Science and Technology Policy, “U.S. National Space Policy,”
August 31, 2006, http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Pol
icy.pdf.
27. Tim Weiner, “Air Force Seeks Bush’s Approval for Space Weapons Pro-
grams,” The New York Times, May 18, 2005.
28. V. Fateyev, S. Sukhanov, V. Omelchuk, “The Threats to Russia’s Security
are Growing,” Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona, translated in OSC, Doc ID:
CEP20060822330001.
 U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation and Nuclear Deterrence   173

29. V. V. Korobushin, “Russia’s Strategic Deterrence: Security Functions and

Development Prospects,” Military Thought 14, no. 3 (2005): 10.
30. S. A. Bogdanov, “Military Art: Features of the Initial Period of Past and
Future Wars,” Voyennaya Mysl, March 1, 2003, translated in OSC, Doc ID:
CEP20030609000350; and A. N. Zakharov, “Desert Fox Operations: Develop-
ment of Strategy and Operational Art,” Military Thought, September 1, 1999.
Some Russian observers have argued that precision-guided weapons are inher-
ently offensive weapons designed to be used, as their deterrent capability has
yet to be proven. See, for example, Vladimir Belous, “High-Precision Weapons:
Deterrence or War?” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, March 18, 2005,
translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20050318000308.
31. Korobushin, “Russia’s Strategic Deterrence,” 15.
32. V.V. Sukhorutchenko and S.V. Kreydin, “Topical Aspects of Nuclear De-
terrence and Strategic Nuclear Sufficiency,” Military Thought 13, no. 3 (2004):
17.
33. U.S. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, 6,
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf. For an overview of
Russian concerns with conventional Trident SLBMs see, Pavel Podvig, “Russia
and the Prompt Global Strike Plan,” PONARS Policy Memo No.417 (December
2006).
34. Putin in his May 2006 State of the Union Address emphasized the de-
stabilizing effect of non-nuclear ballistic missiles, noting “the launch of such
a missile could provoke an inappropriate response from one of the nuclear
powers, [and] could provoke a full-scale counterattack using strategic nuclear
forces.” See his “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federa-
tion,” May 10, 2006, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_ty-
pe70029type82912_105566.shtml.
35. See, for example, Artur Blinov and Vladimir Mukhin, “Missile Haggling
in Alaska,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 29, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID:
CEP20060829379001; and Vladimir Belous, “They are Not Suitable for Com-
bating Terrorism,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, July 28, 2006, trans-
lated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20060728436002.
36. Dmitriy Litovkin, “Rumsfeld Received Our Full Nuclear Response to the
Proposal to Deliver Ballistic Missile Strikes Against Terrorists,” Izvestiya, Au-
gust 29, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20060829380003.
37. Despite Putin’s statements, many Russians downplay the destabilizing
effect of such weapons, since as one observer noted, “attacking Russian terri-
tory with one missile is senseless.” In the words of Vladimir Dvorkin, a former
head of the Fourth Central Scientific Research Institute, “there will be no ‘in-
adequate’ reaction to a single missile launch.” See Ibid; and Kseniya Fokina,
174   CHAPTER NINE

“Friendship between Warheads,” Gazeta, August 29, 2006, translated in OSC,

Doc ID: CEP20060829380002.
38. Similar concerns were voiced when the United States and Denmark
agreed to upgrade the Thule early warning radar in Greenland. See Alla Kassya-
nova, “Russia: In Search of Strategy, in Search of Self,” Contemporary Security
Policy 26, no. 3 (2005): 666.
39. Baluyevskiy, “About the United States”; and “Russian Minister Warns
of Need to Focus on U.S. Defense Motives,” Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh No-
vostey, June 7, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20060607950095.
40. “U.S. Base in Czech Republic ‘May Threaten’ Russia’s Strategic Stability,”
Prague Pravo, January 23, 2007, translated in OSC, Doc ID: EUP200701244035002;
and “U.S. Plan to Build Missile Defense in Europe A Mistake,” Interfax, Decem-
ber 13, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20061213950299.
41. “Russian Missile Commander: U.S. Missile Defense Threatens Russia’s Securi-
ty,” Interfax, April 22, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20060422029045.
42. Aleksandr Sadchikov, “Poetry and Missile: U.S. and Russian Defense
Ministers Find Topics in Common,” Izvestiya, August 29, 2005, translated in
OSC, Doc ID: CEP20060829035002.
43. Jacek Przybylski, “Poland Needs Patriots,” Rzeczpospolita, September 5,
2005, translated in OSC, Doc ID: EUP20060905095005. For an overview of
Polish thinking on missile defense issues see, Rafal Domisiewicz and Slawomir
Kaminski, “Poland: Waiting for Washington,” Contemporary Security Policy 26,
no. 3 (2005): 571-87.
44. “Russia Promises to Adequately Respond to U.S. Missile Defense Efforts
in Europe,” Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, January 16, 2007, trans-
lated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20070116950078; and “Deployment of U.S. Missile
Defense System in Europe Seen as a Threat,” Izvestiya, October 17, 2006, trans-
lated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20061017021009.
45. “U.S. Antimissile Base Will Affect Russian Military Planning,” ITAR-
TASS, January 26, 2007, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20070126950164.
46. According to Russia’s April 2000 Military Doctrine, “The Russian Feder-
ation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear
and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies,
as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons
in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” The
2000 Russian Military Doctrine was reprinted in Arms Control Today 30, no.
4 (2000).
47. “Russian Nuclear Deterrent a Key Element in Security Policy,” Interfax,
March 29, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20060330950105.
 U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation and Nuclear Deterrence   175

48. “Russia Developing Unbeatable Strategic Weapons,” ITAR-TASS, June

20, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20060620950399.
49. Aleksandr Makayev, “Russia: Debate on Superiority of Liquid-Fuel
Strategic Nuclear Ballistic Missiles Continued,” Krasnaya Zvezda, Febru-
ary 5, 2005, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20050204000315; Oleg Falichev,
“Russia: Editorial Remarks for Reprinted Interview with RVSN Commander
Solovtsov,” Krasnaya Zvezda, January 12, 2005, translated in OSC, Doc ID:
CEP20050111000292; David Holley, “Russia Seeks Safety in Nuclear Arms,”
Los Angeles Times, December 6, 2004, 1; and Andrey Piontovskiy, “Russian ‘Im-
passe’ on NMD Blamed on Putin’s Anti-U.S. Policy,” Segodnya, February 14,
2001, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20010214000117.
50. For an overview see, Mark Schneider, The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of
the Russian Federation (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2006), 19-22.
51. See Aleksey Demyanov, “More Than a Doctrine,” Moscow Lenta.ru, Sep-
tember 19, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: 20060920330001. Similarly, after
the publication of “Urgent Tasks of the Development of the Russian Federation
Armed Forces” in October 2003, the first doctrinal publication of the Putin
government, Duma Deputy Committee Chairman Aleksei Arbatov noted that
“although the main enemy is not named, it is clear from everything said that
the main enemy is considered to be the United States and NATO as before. The
wars predicted are global and nuclear, and wide-scale combat operations are
foreseen.” In February 2004, Baluyevksiy also stated clearly that “if one reads
between the lines, it says the principal enemy is America and the entire NATO.”
Cited in Schneider, The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 7.
52. For discussions of possible nuclear reductions and their impact on deter-
rence see, Stephen J. Cimbala, “Russia and Missile Defenses,” Journal of Slavic
Military Studies 19, no.1 (2006): 1-24; and idem, “Strategic Reassurance in a
Proliferation Permissive World: American and Russian Options,” Defense and
Security Analysis 22, no. 3 (2006): 221-40.
53. According to experts at the Russian Federation Academy of Military Sci-
ences, the critical level of damage that is necessary for deterring an adversary
can be assumed at up to 30 to 35 percent of its production capacities and up
to 20 to 25 percent of its population. This hypothetical level of damage can be
inflicted on the adversary should 400 to 500 standard (equivalent) warheads be
delivered to its territory. Korobushin, “Russia’s Strategic Deterrence,” 12-13.
54. See, for example, Sukhorutchenko and Kreydin, “Topical As-
pects of Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Nuclear Sufficiency,” 17-19; and
G.N. Okhotnikov, “The Normative Approach in Current Deterrence The-
ory,” Voyennaya Mysl, December 1, 2005, translated in OSC, Doc ID:
CEP20060403330001.
176   CHAPTER NINE

55. Sukhorutchenko and Kreydin, “Topical Aspects of Nuclear Deterrence

and Strategic Nuclear Sufficiency,” 17.
56. “Putin’s News Conference: Response to U.S. Missile Defense,” Moscow
Vesti TV, February 1, 2007, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20070201950290.
57. “U.S. Planned ABM Defense in Europe Not a Threat to Russia,” Interfax,
December 22, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20061222950169.
58. “Russia Preparing ‘Asymmetric Response’ to U.S. Missile Defense,” Inter-
fax, November 3, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEO20061103950097.
59. “Russia Will Respond to Deployment of U.S. NMD in East Europe,” Mos-
cow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, January 10, 2007, translated in OSC, Doc
ID: CEP20070110950015.
60. “Russian Minister Sees INF Treaty as ‘Cold War Relic’ but Withdrawal Not
on Cards,” RIA-Novosti, April 24, 2006, translated in OSC, CEP20060424950170.
One Russian defense official stated that Moscow could unilaterally leave the INF
Treaty, citing the U.S. precedent of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. “Defense
Ministry Official Not Ruling Out Russian Withdrawal from INF Treaty,” ITAR-
TASS, August 25, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20060825950140.
61. Vladimir Belous, “Donald Rumsfeld’s Strange Proposals,” Nezavisi-
moye Voyennoye Obozreniye, September 15, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID:
CEP20060915436004.
62. Yuliya Kalinina, “National Security Agent: Sergey Ivanov,” Mos-
kovskiy Komsomolets, October 27, 2003, translated in OSC, Doc ID:
CEP20031027000215.
63. Kassyanova, “Russia: In Search of Strategy, in Search of Self,” 669.
 Part Three

issues in operationalizing
nuclear strategies

177
 Chapter ten

Strategic Conventional Trident

Modification
sizing and structuring the U.S. stockpile for a
“minimum counterforce” capability
Owen C.W. Price

T
here is little consensus on the purpose or required character,
composition, and size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. This chapter
considers potential road maps for the future of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent and in particular examines how it could be shaped around
a “minimum counterforce” stockpile by the introduction of “Strategic
Conventional Trident Modification.”
President George W. Bush articulated the U.S. vision for a “credible
nuclear deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons,
consistent with [U.S.] national security needs” in 2001.1 Subsequently,
the administration has reexamined the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.
security strategy and set out its strategy to meet this vision.2 The Bush
team sought to deemphasize the overall role of nuclear weapons.3 The
policy was driven by the need to prepare for emerging security threats
and attendant inherent uncertainties. Owing to congressional skepti-
cism of the underlying objectives, fear of unintended consequences, and
the more immediate pressure of the post-9/11 conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq, there has been only sporadic progress toward realization of the
vision within the context of the “New Triad.”4
Moreover, it is clear that the U.S. president’s vision for the nuclear
element of the strategy, which also stated that “we can and will change
the size, composition, and character of our nuclear forces…,” has yet
to be accomplished. Some progress has been made. Specifically, the

179
180   CHAPTER TEN

de-emphasis of nuclear weapons, together with a focus on regional

states with “rogue” regimes and WMD ambitions, has been underscored
by significant stockpile size reduction of the number of operationally
deployed warheads. This has achieved rhetorical and political progress.
But this has been matched neither by transformation of the character
and composition of U.S. nuclear forces nor by the realization of a respon-
sive infrastructure.5 A lack of national consensus on the purpose of
nuclear weapons is partly to blame. 6
Focusing on warheads, owing to the infrastructure bottleneck of U.S.
plutonium pit production, this chapter examines the potential evolu-
tion of the nuclear stockpile and posture.7 It examines how Bush’s vision
for the smallest nuclear stockpile consistent with U.S. security needs
could be realized.8 Identifying the significant decisions that are likely
to be made in the near future, the chapter first identifies potential road
maps for various options for force and infrastructure transformation.
One of these options is then developed in more detail to examine how
a reduced stockpile could contribute to a “grand bargain” that could
be struck to allow the modernization of the U.S. stockpile and nuclear
complex.9 Such a bargain could link deep stockpile size reductions, the
modernization of the stockpile—introducing the Reliable Replacement
Warhead and Conventional Trident Modification—and modernization
of the nuclear infrastructure.10

Road Maps
Although the principal barriers to modernization progress are politi-
cal, there are practical issues—chiefly limited discretionary U.S. govern-
ment budgets—that constrain the options for the future of an enduring
U.S. nuclear stockpile. Therefore, any strategy developed to meet policy
goals is likely to embody a degree of incremental transformation that
may be regarded as the summation of several key near-term decisions
that employ readily available assets and technology.
The decision includes whether to maintain the nuclear triad,11
whether to field the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) designs,
Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) warheads and conventional
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and how large to size new
plutonium pit production facilities.12 Also, there are many choices that
can theoretically be made in constructing a nuclear deterrence posture.
 Strategic Conventional Trident Modification   181

One example is the potential to place greater emphasis on counter-value

(“city-busting”) targeting in planning guidance and deterrence doc-
trine.13 In turn, some of these decisions would allow other choices to be
made, such as whether to retain, reduce, or eliminate the reserve stock-
pile and how large to size the operationally deployed stockpile. Owing
to the nature of interrelationships between these decisions, tradeoffs
may be made among them. Also, tradeoffs may be made between the
decisions and the overall enterprise characteristics, such as the time to
respond to strategic surprise (e.g. a future arms race). Some example
roadmaps—combinations of choices—are illustrated in Figure 10.1.

Figure 10.1 U.S. Deterrent Roadmaps Options

Item Options
Force Structure Triad Dyad (SLBM / Dyad (SLBM / Dyad (ICBM / Monad (SLBM)
ICBM) Bomber) Bomber) Monad (ICBM)
Monad (Bomber)

Doctrine Counterforce Countervalue

CTM and / or No Yes

Conventional ICBM

Reserve Stockpile Yes No

Pit Production No Yes

RRW No Yes

Baseline Minimum Counterforce Minimum Assured Destruction

Figure 10.1 shows that combinations of near-term decisions, taken

together with some strategic decisions about the nuclear force struc-
ture and targeting policy, can be viewed as three distinct classes of op-
tions, here named “Baseline” (maintaining the status quo for as long as
warheads in the stockpile remain certifiable), “Minimum Counterforce”
(reduction of the ‘strategic’ nuclear stockpile to the minimum size to
meet the current targeting requirements and guidance), and “Minimum
Assured Destruction” (a small stockpile that would rely on “city-busting”).14
Choices about one element of the nuclear enterprise affect the re-
quirements of other elements. For example, the large size and diversity
of the reserve stockpile allows a smaller pit production facility (obviat-
ing the need for a large “surge” capacity),15 and hedges against future
uncertainty of warheads’ reliability and ageing effects, respectively. The
182   CHAPTER TEN

reserve stockpile maintains the ability to respond to strategic surprise

by allowing the rapid increase in the size of the operationally deployed
stockpile by the upload of warheads onto exiting delivery systems. Al-
ternatively, elimination of the reserve stockpile—facilitated by the in-
troduction of RRW to improve the long-term confidence in stockpile
reliability—could have political benefits, but would likely necessitate a
larger pit production facility than presently exists in order to provide a
sufficiently responsive surge capacity to respond to strategic surprise.16
Although this chapter goes on to discuss the roadmap for “Mini-
mum Counterforce” in a little more detail by introducing the concept
of “Strategic CTM”, it is important to note that, although the current
administration has a strategy for only some of the component parts of
the nuclear element of the New Triad, an overall plan has yet to be fully
agreed with Congress. There is some doubt whether this can realistically
be achieved, if the current incremental decision-making process contin-
ues.17 Hence the need for a “grand bargain”, where the elected represen-
tatives of the American people can see an overall strategy that not only
meets the technical needs of the stockpile and the New Triad, but the
other dimensions of the nation’s nuclear (“strategic”) deterrent.18
Before detailing the “minimum counterforce” approach to the real-
ization of the U.S. policy vision, the stockpile characteristics—purpose,
character, composition, and size—are briefly reviewed. Although the
size of the stockpile is not necessarily the best way of characterizing de-
terrence and nonproliferation effects, it remains an emotive symbol of
the U.S. posture and has great bearing on infrastructure modernization.
It is therefore the central topic for this chapter.
The introduction of Strategic CTM would help realize two policy ob-
jectives which might otherwise be characterized as being in conflict with
each other. First, it will appeal to those who believe that fewer nuclear
weapons in the world cannot be a bad thing and value overt commit-
ments to article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and thus its
contribution to the current U.S. policy of “the lowest possible number of
nuclear weapons…” is attractive. Second, the stockpile reductions could
contribute to a political “grand bargain” to allow the necessary modern-
ization of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and infrastructure and reinvigora-
tion of its human capital. Therefore the proposal should also appeal to
those who value a strong strategic deterrent.19
 Strategic Conventional Trident Modification   183

Stockpile Characteristics
Purpose and Character
Regardless of any academic debate, it would seem that the purpose of
the stockpile will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. Although
the U.S. stockpile has lost its stark Cold War mission, the U.S. national
interest and those of its friends and allies demand a minimum-sized,
safe, and secure U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent.20
To meet the needs articulated in The National Security Strategy21—
assure, deter, dissuade, defeat—nuclear forces will not act in isolation
of other efforts. However, in determining the force size, character and
composition, it is necessary to build consensus on the role of nuclear
weapons within this national security construct.
Such an enduring role encompasses: large-scale war prevention;
existential deterrence (the deterrence of a range of nuclear weapons
and WMD threats against the United States and its allies and an un-
certain future);22 assurance of allies against such threats, encouraging
restraint from U.S. allies with so called “latent” nuclear weapons capa-
bility, through extended deterrence; provision of escalation dominance
and control that allows conventional power projection and conventional
preemptive strike options while maintaining intrawar deterrence; and
deterrence of nuclear (or WMD) coercion–counter-coercion.
Given that nuclear weapons cannot be un-invented, and given that
at least some of the facets of their U.S. security role will continue to be
seen as legitimate by the majority of the U.S. electorate, it seems reason-
able to assume that the United States will continue to maintain a nuclear
stockpile for the foreseeable future.
Nuclear deterrence, whether achieved by threat of response with over-
whelming force or by denial, require—to a greater or lesser extent—the
following: an underpinning political resolve and appropriate communi-
cations with adversaries and allies;23 and the ability—the credibility—to
hold certain targets at risk, as part of particular “tailored” deterrence
and dissuasion strategies.24
Although nuances of the role of U.S. nuclear weapons may change,
the underlying purpose and character appear set to be constant for the
foreseeable future. The character will remain principally political, but
will include the technical credibility to fight a nuclear war if necessary.
184   CHAPTER TEN

Composition
The strategic nuclear stockpile is currently composed of Cold War era
designs. Owing to the test moratorium and the current approach to
ongoing stockpile certification—through the science-based Stockpile
Stewardship Program—the current mixture of high yield designs that
makes up most of the stockpile requires a reserve stockpile as a hedge
against the uncertainly of warhead aging and strategic surprise.25 Fran-
cis Slakey and Benn Tannenbuam describe in Chapter 14 of this volume
the evolving debate about whether Life Extension Programs (LEPs) or
the RRW program best addresses the challenges facing the U.S. nuclear
stockpile and complex.
Although previous proposals for new nuclear weapon effects (e.g.
RNEP and the Advanced Concept Initiative) and for improvements in
ballistic missile accuracy have now been defeated in Congress, critics
of any nuclear modernization proposals (e.g. RRW) cloud the debate
by continued reference to them.26 Therefore, if only in recognition of
political reality, it would seem that the future stockpile should (and
likely will) retain a similar range of weapon effects options as the cur-
rent stockpile, but not necessarily in the Cold War stockpile ratios.27
Although eventually the introduction of RRW could change the types
of warheads in the stockpile, it would seem likely that these replacement
warheads together with any retained LEP warheads—all within exist-
ing weapons—would maintain a sufficient diversity of weapon effects to
meet the roles described previously.28
Selective retirement of warheads during drawdown toward the Mos-
cow Treaty commitment (or beyond if the Strategic CTM proposal is
adopted) from the current stockpile has the potential to change its com-
position, albeit within the limits of existing weapons designs (and thus
existing weapon effects), to meet current security needs. For example,
the ratio of W76 to W88 warheads retained in the operationally de-
ployed stockpile could change.
Notwithstanding these observations, it should be noted that there are
currently two schools of thought among proponents of stockpile mod-
ernization. The first is that the generic stockpile composition of today
(although not ideal) is sufficient for deterrence, as the negative implica-
tions on nonproliferation of modernization that involves any new de-
sign with new military characteristics (e.g. warhead effects) would likely
outweigh any potential benefits.29 The second is that if new designs are
 Strategic Conventional Trident Modification   185

to be put into service (e.g. RRW), driven by the safety, reliability and
rejuvenation of the intellectual capital imperatives (which also commu-
nicates U.S. resolve), negative impact will occur. So the argument goes,
the United States might as well include some new—some say neces-
sary30—military characteristics in some variants of the designs to better
address post-Cold War, post-9/11 threats.
Secretary Rice’s 2006 visit to Tokyo created the impression that Japan
sees the character and composition of the U.S. stockpile as a secondary
issue. During the visit Secretary Rice publicly stated, “I reaffirmed the
President’s statement of October 9th that the United States has the will
and the capability to meet the full range—and I underscore full range—
of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”31 Japan’s reaction
was heartening: “we, the Government of Japan, has [sic] no position at
all to consider going nuclear.”32 Outside the context of an arms race, as
long as the U.S. believes its stockpile to be credible—as part of an overall
credible deterrence posture—it is likely that allies and adversaries alike
will adopt the same view.33

Size
The planned size of the operationally available stockpile (as codified
in the Moscow Treaty), of 1700-2200 by December 31, 2012, and the
reserve stockpile of around 3500 warheads, is based on a capabilities-
based planning approach. This approach is distinct from previous tar-
get-based planning that sized and structured the U.S. nuclear force and
war plans around a defined target set (and assigned all nuclear warheads
to particular targets). It is judged by the U.S. administration that the op-
erationally deployed stockpile is now sized a little smaller than would be
required for a response against Russia under current targeting guidance
and large enough to dissuade competition from China or other emer-
gent near peers.34 It should also be noted that the U.S. posture must
avoid initiating a nuclear arms race with China—a consideration that
must go beyond “dissuasion.”
While no longer prompted by antipathy to Russia, the implicit policy
of maintaining a stockpile “second to none” and of near numeric par-
ity with Russia, together with limited missile defense and proposals for
advanced conventional munitions, risks the misunderstanding by critics
and by Russia itself that U.S. planning is still focused on Russia (po-
tentially with a first strike “nuclear primacy” strategy).35But this must
186   CHAPTER TEN

be balanced against the benefits of maintaining nuclear weapons as a

hedge against an uncertain future. Decreased alert levels, de-targeting
former adversaries, declaratory language, increased transparency, com-
munication and signaling, and other confidence building measures such
as military-to-military dialogue, have the potential to ameliorate such
concerns. The size and composition of the U.S. nuclear stockpile could
be changed to reinforce the benign U.S. intent; there is clearly no wish
to launch a sneak attack.
Although inherently political, noting the capability-based approach
to its current sizing plans, the size of the stockpile in 2012 could still ca-
ter to the worst-case reference scenario. Such a scenario would be based
on the need to deter or, in the event of deterrence failure respond to, a
resurgent Russia or massive attack by a resurgent Russia. Such a scenario
is considered by the author as worst case, as its magnitude bounds any
other reasonably foreseeable nuclear crisis. Other factors that complete
the picture will be considerations for the need to maintain intra-war
deterrence of the adversary and other potential adversaries—through
maintenance of a secure reserve—and targeting policy, doctrine and
guidance. Also, many other aspects need to be taken into account, such
as the cost of ownership, costs of ownership imposed on potential ad-
versaries, the number of warheads not available owing to maintenance
and other logistics activities, confidence in stockpile reliability, produc-
tion and assembly capacity, and intelligence assessments of the size and
production capabilities of potential adversaries’ stockpiles.36 Sizing a
stockpile is truly a system issue.
From the near-term choices identified in Figure 10.1, three generic
strategic options are identified: “Baseline,” “Minimum Counterforce”
and “Minimum Assured Destruction.” The table below provides indica-
tive stockpile sizes (numbers of warheads) for these.

Approaches to stockpile size reduction

Next, for the sake of completeness, before turning to the “Minimum
Counterforce” proposal central to this chapter, it is worth examining
how the stockpile (operationally deployed and reserve) could be further
reduced to meet the president’s vision. The following approaches—in no
particular order—are the most obvious candidates, although it is by no
means certain that all would yield net benefits:
 Strategic Conventional Trident Modification   187

Table 10.1. Indicative Stockpile Sizing

Conven-
tional Trident
Operation- Modification
ally Deployed Reserve (CTM)
Options Stockpile Stockpile Warheads Notes

Baseline 1700-2200 3536-4036 0 Current CTM

proposals are
limited to two
missiles per
boat for the
Prompt Global
Strike Mission
Minimum 1190 0 1120 Based on the
counter- assumption
force that 1700
nuclear
warheads are
sufficient to
meet today’s
stockpile
requirements

Minimum 500 0 ? 500 is about

assured the minimum
deterrent necessary
(mad) to maintain
continuous
patrols1
1Forexample see, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, ‘What Are Nuclear Weapons For?
Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces,’ (Arms Control Association,
2005) http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/USNW_2005_Drell-Goodby.pdf

■ Adoption of a counter-value targeting doctrine (or, under current

planning guidance, recognition that the “urban withhold” 37 would
have to be released early in a nuclear exchange), and a reexamina-
tion of the doctrine of nuclear sufficiency, or adequacy;
■ Incorporation of conventional munitions into the nuclear war
plans, particularly the prompt global strike proposal, Conventional
Trident Modification (CTM);
■ Improved accuracy for the current stockpile weapons;
■ Development and deployment of the Reliable Replacement
188   CHAPTER TEN

Warhead (RRW) design to alleviate fears about long-term reliability;

■ Construction of pit production facilities sufficient to respond to
any future increases in tension or strategic surprise—this can be
viewed as a system trade. Which is better, a large stockpile and no
manufacturing capability (the current position), a small stockpile
with a large production capacity, or a modest stockpile and modest
production facility?
■ Further engagement in bilateral or multilateral strategic nuclear
arms reduction and control, transparency, confidence building
measures and nonproliferation, intelligence, etc.

Targeting Doctrine and Weapon Accuracy

The first and third must be dismissed as unrealistic approaches. For some
of the reasons George Nagy touches upon in Chapter 11, adoption of a
counter-value targeting doctrine or “minimum deterrence” is unthink-
able in U.S. civilian and military planning circles. It is not thought that
improvements in accuracy would significantly reduce the operationally
deployed stockpile size, although proponents argue that certain target
types may be better held at risk. However, again, looking at consistent
legislative trends, the political reality is that the U.S. Congress is unlikely
to authorize accuracy improvements to nuclear weapons in the foresee-
able future.

Introduction of the Reliable Replacement Warhead

The introduction of Reliable Replacement Warhead designs into the op-
erationally deployed stockpile should reduce the reliance on the reserve
stockpile, which is currently kept, in part, as a hedge against uncertain
aging of the Cold War designs and its potential impact on reliability.
This, together with a modest pit production capability, could allow for
the retirement of part, or all, of the 3500 warhead reserve stockpile.
Francis Slakey and Benn Tannenbuam discuss how LEPs are an alter-
native approach to RRW. However, even with the establishment of pit
production capacity, the LEP approach does not seem to offer realistic
prospects for deep cuts in the reserve stockpile size.

Construction of pit production facilities

Pit production is only one small aspect of the infrastructure that is nec-
essary to manufacture and integrate nuclear weapons. However, it is the
 Strategic Conventional Trident Modification   189

current production bottleneck. The only facility able to produce pits

(Technical Area 55 (TA-55) at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New
Mexico) is not currently able to make certified pits at its design capacity
(reported to be as high as 50 pits per year). Further, is too small to sup-
port NNSA stockpile plans at projected stockpile sizes (requiring a rate
of over 100 pits per year), assuming that the RRW program proceeds to
development and production.38
If a pit production facility of any significant size were established it
would reduce the reliance on the current reserve stockpile. It could be
used to reduce the average age of warheads and to remanufacture exist-
ing designs or new (RRW) designs in the event of serious problems with
one of the designs in the stockpile or in the event of a strategic surprise
that demands a larger stockpile.
Alternatively, if the reserve stockpile can be eliminated and the op-
erational stockpile much reduced, it is possible that the TA-55 facility
could have sufficient capacity to maintain the stockpile. If the stockpile
size ever proved to be insufficient, the production rate could be stepped
up by the addition of a second production shift.
Furthermore, it would likely be more acceptable politically to build a
new pit dismantlement facility (as part of a consolidated facility)39 that
could process plutonium components from retired and dismantled war-
heads. Such a facility could be used to support stockpile stewardship
and be a contingency for pit production.

Arms Control
With the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
treaty in 2009 and the Moscow Treaty in 2012 there is ample opportuni-
ty to consider further cuts in offensive strategic arms. However, it is the
view of the U.S. administration that 1700-2200 is a practical minimum
to meet the dissuasion (of strategic nuclear competition by China) mis-
sion, so any form of agreement offering further reductions would need
to involve other parties.

The Way Ahead

The combined introduction of RRW and the operation of pit produc-
tion facilities offer the prospect of reducing or eliminating the reserve
stockpile.
With the exception of the introduction of CTM, the remaining ap-
proaches might allow some operationally deployed stockpile reductions,
190   CHAPTER TEN

if the marginal advantages are matched by marginal cost increases. How-

ever, based on simplistic analysis, the Strategic CTM approach offers the
potential to make politically significant reductions in the operational
stockpile with more certainty than those introduced above.

Minimum Counterforce Stockpile and Strategic CTM

In order to examine the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons
consistent with U.S. national security needs, two studies have been ex-
amined to gauge the sufficiency of the Moscow Treaty numbers as a
starting assumption. This is necessary as it is generally acknowledged
that the Treaty numbers were politically influenced, as previously noted,
rather than having been solely generated from a bottom-up assessment
of the nuclear war plan needs to meet targeting guidance—target-based
planning.40
The studies conclude that approximately 1000 warheads are needed
for their counterforce Russia scenarios.41 Moscow Treaty reductions by
Russia and a general decline in Russian nuclear forces may reduce the
number further. A percentage would need to be added to this for logistics
purposes and a few hundred would be needed to deter China—a highly
risk averse state with a no first use policy42—and other small WMD
states following any U.S.-Russian exchange. Finally, it is assumed that
a few hundred more for a strategic reserve would need to be retained.
Therefore, it is believed that 1700-2200 represents the smallest nucle-
ar-only strategic stockpile (given its present composition) that would
support current U.S. nuclear deterrence criteria. Indeed, 1700 could be
sufficient. Also, it is worth noting that the modest inventory of tactical43
nuclear weapons, together with conventional forces, could be used to
deter smaller WMD states with rogue regimes. However, this ignores
the concerns about the aging stockpile and potential reliability problems
in the future and the potential for strategic surprise (or a future nuclear
arms race), which led to the creation of the reserve stockpile. As already
discussed, the former could be addressed in large part by the introduc-
tion of RRW and the latter by the resumptions of pit production.
Given the above, the challenge is how to achieve the same—or en-
hanced—deterrence and the threat of nuclear war fighting effects, which
could be used in the event of deterrence failure, with a significantly
smaller operationally deployed nuclear stockpile, without perceptions
 Strategic Conventional Trident Modification   191

of lowering the nuclear threshold. Here the potential role of the CTM
technology in conjunction with nuclear forces—here termed Strategic
CTM—is examined.

Introducing Conventional Munitions into

the Strategic Nuclear Stockpile
The 2006/7 CTM proposal
Provision was made in the 2007 and 2008 president’s budgets for the
CTM program.44 Deployment of the CTM technology—two missiles of
non-nuclear warheads per ballistic submarine (SSBN)—was proposed
to provide a conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capability.45
This would give the National Command Authority the ability to strike
a few targets anywhere on the globe within about 30 minutes. PGS was
aimed at deterring and, if necessary, defeating high value targets—such
as WMD missiles being prepared for launch or terrorist leaders—that
could not otherwise be struck and for which a U.S. preemptive nuclear
strike is not credible.46

Strategic CTM
However, by applying this in greater numbers of conventional warheads
deployed on submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the pro-
posed conventional warheads are capable of defeating at least 30 per-
cent of the traditional nuclear target set. For illustrative purposes, it is
assumed that 1700 nuclear warheads are sufficient for the current nu-
clear war plans. The addition of CTM warheads into the existing Ohio
Class Trident SLBM submarine fleet, without any change of doctrine
and targeting guidance, could reduce the stockpile size to 1190 nuclear
warheads if complemented by 1020 CTM warheads (see the calculation
below). This ignores much targeting detail and subtlety not available to
the author, but the implication of such issues could be addressed by in-
creasing the number of CTM warheads up to the maximum capacity per
missile and the potential of fielding conventional ICBMs.47 If the ICBM
leg of the nuclear triad were to be retained in the case of Strategic CTM
deployment, at least a further 450 spaces would be available on SLBMs
for CTM warheads.48 Alternatively, 900-1350 conventional warheads of
a different design could be uploaded to the existing fleet of 450 ICBMs
to augment the strategic nuclear mission.
192   CHAPTER TEN

Illustrative Strategic CTM upload calculation

■ SLBM capacity
❑ 14 ballistic submarines (SSBNs) less 2 in overhaul = 12 SSBNs
❑ 24 Trident II D5 missiles per boat = 288 operationally deployed

missiles
❑ 8 warheads per missile (START counting rules)

❑ Maximum capacity of 2688 operationally deployed warheads

under START counting rules, 2304 operationally available

■ Impact of CTM warheads to augment the strategic strike
❑ Assume 1700 nuclear warheads (NW’s) needed to deter (hold
at risk) the worst case ‘reference scenario’ (targets)
❑ 30% of targets can be held at risk using CTM, but assume that

all the NW’s can defeat up to 2 targets (and 2 CTM warheads

are needed to destroy some targets)
❑ 30% of 1700 = 510 NW targets. 510 x 2 = 1020 CTM targets

■ Therefore same counter force effect could be achieved with 1190

nuclear and 1020 CTM warheads. A total of 2210 warheads
(average of 6.6 warheads per missile) would be required.

Use of CTM (and / or ICBMs) for a non-nuclear element of this stra-

tegic mission would have the additional benefit of making good use of
existing military platforms and missiles that have a projected service life
well into the 2040s. Keeping such systems in service would, in itself, be
a hedge against an uncertain future.
In addition to facilitating a near 50 percent reduction in the opera-
tionally deployed nuclear stockpile, the introduction of Strategic CTM
together with deployment of RRW into the operational stockpile could
eliminate the need to construct large, expensive new pit production fa-
cilities. Making only modest assumptions about warhead life (30 years),
surveillance activities (4 per year) and starting with the current stockpile
size, a 50 pits per year facility based on the TA-55 facility at Los Alamos
is a credible alternative to a larger new facility. However, this does not
take dismantlement requirements for retired warheads into account.
 Strategic Conventional Trident Modification   193

Prompt Global Strike with Strategic CTM

In addition to augmenting the strategic strike role of nuclear forces,
the introduction of CTM warheads into the SLBM force could be used
for the PGS mission, similar to the 2006/7 proposed deployment plans
for CTM, in a way that would bolster deterrence and dissuasion strate-
gies. Some critics will, of course, observe that such a move would lend
credibility to “nuclear primacy” accusations, saying that this lowers the
nuclear threshold as it make nuclear war seem less unthinkable.49 But,
to the author, a nuclear war where the world has to live with the after-
math of an exchange of 1000-2000 warheads rather than 1700 or 4400
warheads is no less horrific. And something short of mutual assured
annihilation—where some sort of society has to live with the horrific re-
sults of such an exchange—might prove a better deterrence in the post-
Soviet era. Also, the availability of a PGS option would obviate the need
to consider U.S. nuclear use in some scenarios (e.g. preemptive strike
against well-located WMD targets). Therefore, the addition of CTM—
whether in small or large numbers—would raise the nuclear threshold,
especially if U.S. strategic deterrence doctrine were to remain essentially
unaltered.

Likely Criticism of Strategic CTM

If CTM were to be integrated in larger numbers than the 2006/7 admin-
istration proposal, some of the current criticisms of the administration’s
CTM proposal would need to be addressed. These are principally the
issues of “ambiguity” and “recklessness.” For the former, it is argued that
launch of CTM warheads in small numbers for a PGS mission (and not
part of a nuclear strategic response) would risk accidental misinterpreta-
tion by Russia, which could lead to an inadvertent nuclear war. Launch
notification and other forms of cooperation could address this.50 It
could also be potentially addressed by (legally required) segregation of
CTM and nuclear ballistic submarines. CTM submarines could be oper-
ated openly in different patrol areas—to address the PGS mission—and
only be tasked to operate in strategic deterrent patrol areas clandestinely
in times of increased tension.51 Alternatively, legislation could man-
date that CTM warheads be mingled on the same missiles as nuclear
warheads to eliminate the PGS role and remove the potential for ambi-
guity. In this case, Strategic CTM would only have the role of augment-
ing a strategic (massive) nuclear strike. This could either be achieved by
194   CHAPTER TEN

mixing the CTM warheads on the same SLBMs as nuclear warheads,

leaving no missile with only CTM warheads, or by placing 900 conven-
tional warheads on the current 450 nuclear ICBMs.52 This would elimi-
nate the PGS role as, 1) each ICBM would retain a nuclear warhead,
and 2) the minuteman missile silos are sited inappropriately for the PGS
mission.
The likely Russian and Chinese responses to any Strategic CTM force
structure and doctrine would need to be assessed and handled care-
fully, prior to any such proposal by the U.S. administration. Some sort
of transparency might need to be considered. However, although these
nations might not fully trust the United States, they are likely to view the
United States as scrupulous to a fault for declared activities. Therefore,
for example, legislating the mixture (or separation) of nuclear and CTM
warheads (as discussed above) could mitigate their concerns without
the need for extensive transparency activities. A net assessment would
need to be made to ascertain whether any such negative impact would
outweigh the security and nonproliferation (NPT Article VI) benefits.
Consultation with allies would also be important. “Recklessness”—fear
that the president may be tempted to use conventional PGS assets too
readily—is a political issue associated with Congress’s relationship with
President George W. Bush. And therefore it is transitory and unlikely to
endure beyond this administration. If necessary, this could be addressed
by abandoning the option to use CTM for the PGS mission through
legislated upload requirements.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Integration of large numbers of conventional warheads into the current
SLBM fleet (and/or ICBMs) has the potential to reduce the operation-
ally available strategic nuclear stockpile by approximately 50 percent,
while maintaining the military capability to meet existing deterrence re-
quirements. The technology, which was proposed for the Conventional
Trident Modification (CTM), is already available and could be rapidly
deployed at a modest cost. Strategic CTM could also serve to provide a
Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capability and make good use of existing
military assets and technologies. Alternatively, Strategic CTM could be
introduced in a manner to prevent it from being used for the PGS role, if
this became politically unacceptable. If implemented together with the
RRW program, this Strategic CTM proposal could realize a “minimum
 Strategic Conventional Trident Modification   195

counterforce” nuclear stockpile, which could significantly reduce the in-

frastructure needs and costs by allowing a much smaller plutonium pit
production complex to be maintained; this could center on an existing
facility.
Whether simply motivated by a desire to meet the U.S. president’s
policy of achieving the smallest operationally deployed stockpile con-
sistent with national security requirements or as part of a larger systems
approach to nuclear modernization—offering demonstrable commit-
ments to the Nonproliferation Treaty Article VI without relaxing (or
otherwise changing) deterrence requirements—this Strategic CTM
proposal and its potential variants should be investigated in a classified
study to examine whether it stands up to scrutiny in a detail that cannot
be achieved in unclassified form.
Last, it is noted that this proposal will have its critics. However, the
questions before the U.S. administration and Congress will require po-
litical judgments, weighing tangible benefits against costs and risks. Is-
sues that have dogged the 2006 and 2007 CTM proposals are to some
extent shared with this Strategic CTM proposal. However, the issues in
either case are not insurmountable. This paper offers some potential so-
lutions. It is the judgment of the author that the proposals in this chap-
ter, considered along with introduction of the Reliable Replacement
Warhead (RRW) program, could productively contribute to the debate
and perhaps facilitate a “grand bargain” to allow appropriate and over-
due modernization of the U.S. nuclear force and complex.

Notes
The author acknowledges and thanks Jenifer Mackby and Drs. Clark
Murdock, Benn Tannebaum, and Richard Weitz and the Senior Editors
for their help and advice in writing this chapter and editing the vol-
ume.
1. National Defense University, May 1, 2001
2. Much of the Bush administration’s national security strategy was well ar-
ticulated by Condoleezza Rice in , ‘Campaign 2000: Promoting the National
Interest’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000 http://www.foreignaffairs.
org/20000101faessay5/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-na-
tional-interest.html?mode=print The National Security Strategy, 2001 Nuclear
Posture Review and Quadrennial Defense Reviews have built on such founda-
tions. There has been much policy development since the 2001 Nuclear Pos-
ture Review, which has for the most part articulated through top-level policy
196   CHAPTER TEN

documents such as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and congressional

testimony. For example, see Statement of Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., USN
Commander in Chief U.S. Strategic Command before the Strategic Forces Sub-
committee Senate Armed Services Committee on the Nuclear Posture Review,
http://fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/021402ellis.pdf and subsequent testimony,
for example, the Statement of Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., USN Commander U.S.
Strategic Command before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee Senate Armed
Services Committee on Strategic Deterrence and Strategic Capabilities March
24, 2004, http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test04-03-24Ellis.doc and Testi-
mony of Amb. Linton Brooks to the same hearing, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/
docs/Congressional/2004/2004-Mar-24_SASC_testimony-19Mar04.pdf.
3. It is clear that there is no consensus on whether the NPR set out a poli-
cy that actually reduced the salience of nuclear weapons. See George Farfour,
“Deterrence: Cold War to Tailored, It is time To Think Differently,” High Fron-
tier, Vol. 2, No. 4, 32, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-
060912-044.pdf.
4. It is acknowledged that much effort and expenditure has been made on
missile defense and C3I.
5. The administration’s plan for the RRW and Complex 2030 offer a strategy
to meet these aspects of the vision, but it is clear that neither has yet achieved
sufficient political traction to receive sustained Congressional support and
funding. These are discussed in other chapters.
6. There has been considerable criticism of the previous plans for new nu-
clear weapons, for example see Roger Speed and Michael May, “Assessing the
United States’ Nuclear Posture,” 248-296, George Bunn and Christopher Chyba,
ed. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2006). Contin-
ued reference to long-abandoned administration proposals detracts from the
debate on current proposals risking entrenchment of a chronically declining
‘status quo’.
7. It is assumed that if there is a codified (treaty or written) agreement to
follow the START Treaty, which expires in 2009 and the Moscow Treaty, which
expires in 2012, owing to comparatively small stockpiles and overcapacity for
deployment systems (e.g. ICBMs could be MIRV’d, if necessary), the focus of
such a treaty and its verification protocols would be focused on warheads. The
START Treaty verification protocols focus on strategic platforms. The Moscow
Treaty has no specific verification protocol. The Cold War pit (the plutonium
‘primary’ component of a nuclear weapon) production plant, Rocky Flats
closed in 1989 after having been stormed by the FBI after concerns about its
environmental performance.
8. This reality need not be incompatible with expressing a commitment to
Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty and thus visions and practical steps
 Strategic Conventional Trident Modification   197

toward disarmament, for example those identified by George Schultz, William

Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nun, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Wall
Street Journal, January 15, 2007 and Joseph March, see “Los Alamos scientist
criticizes federal approach to arsenal,” sfgate.com, February 13, 2007, need not
be dismissed as utopian.
9. The author is not alone in this suggestion. For example, see Walter Pincus,
“Bush Urged to Develop Overall Nuclear Arms Policy,” Washington Post, March
18, 2007, A05
10. Rep. Ellen Tauscher has made it clear that the RRW program will need
to be coupled with a continued commitment to the U.S. nuclear test mora-
torium, but it is not yet clear that this ‘horse trade’ will be sufficient political
compromise to allow the RRW program to proceed to full development and
deployment. Rep. Tauscher summarized the congressional review process for
the RRW program in a congressional Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing
held on March 8, 2007, http://hascaudio.house.gov/Strat030807.wma.
11. The nuclear triad, although replaced conceptually by the new triad, re-
tains nuclear bombers, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and land
based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It is argued that the three ele-
ments provide unique characteristics and the necessary redundancy to mitigate
potential system reliability risks and strategic surprise. Some critics suggest that
retirement of the ICBM leg could be beneficial to security—contributing to
strategic stability—by eliminating the need for a rapid (at worst ‘hair-trigger’
response), although there are others that point out that U.S. unilateral leader-
ship in this respect would not likely motivate Russia to respond likewise.
12. The evolution of proposals for these and related technologies and the
issues facing lawmakers—in the context of Prompt Global Strike—are summa-
rized in Amy F. Wolf, Conventional Warheads for Long Range Ballistic Missiles
(Washington, D.C.: CRS, February 9, 2007) http://fpc.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/81935.pdf and Todd C. Shull, Conventional Prompt Global Strike:
Valuable Military Option or Threat to Global Stability?(Monterey: Naval Post
Graduate School, September 2005), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/the-
ses/shull05.pdf.
13. If adopted, owing to ambiguities in interpretation of the terms and
deeply held views in the Whitehouse and Office of Secretary of Defense (for
targeting policy and guidance) over successive administrations (and its likely
continuation into the future), this should be interpreted as a recognition that
any nuclear response against a peer adversary would arrive at the Presiden-
tial decision of whether to release the “urban withhold” to allow targets near
population centers to be struck sooner than for previous nuclear postures. For
a good summary of the evolution of U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine, see Charles
H. Fairbanks, Jr., “MAD and U.S. Strategy,” in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), Getting
198   CHAPTER TEN

MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origin and Practice (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 137-147.
14. It is considered axiomatic that any deterrent posture and stockpile of
any size would need to remain credible (e.g. retain the command and control,
planning and targeting functions for use if necessary) to be an effective de-
terrent. But a) how large does that need to be, and b) what of the deterrent
value of conventional forces? Also a small stockpile can conceivable be used to
underpin explicit or implicit extended deterrence—the assurance of allies—as
demonstrated by the British and French. By necessity the figure has been sim-
plified. For example, a “Minimum Counterforce” posture could include a small
number of bombers, which might be retained for signaling purposes. Equally, it
is not certain that a “Minimum Assured Destruction” force would require CTM
or conventional ICBM’s.
15. See Chapter 14, “The Nuclear Weapons Production Complex and the
Reliable Replacement Warhead,” in this volume.
16. The size of facilities for the dismantlement of retired warheads also needs
to be considered. Strategic surprise, by definition, cannot be forecast; common
examples include a resurgent Russia and an arms race with China.
17. Walter Pincus “Bush Urged to Develop Overall Nuclear Arms Policy,”
Washington Post, March 18, 2007, A05.
18. It is the author’s view that no such bargain can be struck until the next
administration takes office, although much groundwork can be laid.
19. For a good summary of “entrenched views” and “alternate views” about
nuclear weapons matters see, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Nuclear Capabilities, Report Summary, December 2006, 3, http://www.acq.osd.
mil/dsb/reports/2006-12-Nuclear_Capabilities.pdf.
20. The deterrent is much more than the stockpile. For examples of other
elements of a credible deterrent, see Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman,
Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), 14.
21. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September
2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
22. Such a justification was well articulated by Prime Minister Tony Blair and
the British Defence White Paper, see http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10532.
asp and http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePubli-
cations/PolicyStrategyandPlanning/DefenceWhitePaper2006Cm6994.htm.
23. For a good deterrence model, see Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Wat-
man, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995),
14. The Global Deterrence Joint Operating Concept, http://www.dtic.mil/future-
jointwarfare/concepts/do_joc_v20.doc reflects how the U.S. military (or at least
 Strategic Conventional Trident Modification   199

U.S. Strategic Command) thinks about and operationalizes (or is beginning to

think and operationalize) deterrence.
24. See the U.S. National Security Strategy.
25. Some designs, e.g. B61 free fall bombs, are reported to provide lower
yield options and other military characteristics, such as limited earth penetra-
tion capability. These designs are believed to be retained in relatively small
numbers at low states of readiness.
26. Such proposals allowed misinterpretation of U.S. intent leading to ac-
cusation of the United States seeking nuclear (first strike) primacy over Russia.
The administration needs to set out a clear policy that reassures critics and Rus-
sia that this is not its strategic aim.
27. It is recognized that the continued reference to what Speed and May
refer to as the Bush Doctrine is technically valid as there has been no formal
revision of the 2001 / 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and therefore even when
proposals are not pursuing the contentious (and now debunked) elements of
the policy, they get tarred with the same brush and critics remain skeptical of
the administration’s motives. It is also noted that reported developments such
as W76-1 have addressed some of the new NPR missions in a way much more
acceptable than the previously proposed low yield bunker busters.
28. The RRW program proposal would not change the military effects of
the weapons into which it may be integrated. This was confirmed in congres-
sional Strategic Forces Subcommittee testimony on March 8, 2007 by Gen.
James Cartwright, USSTRATCOM Commander, http://hascaudio.house.gov/
Strat030807.wma.
29. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities,
Report Summary, December 2006, 5 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2006-
12-Nuclear_Capabilities.pdf.
30. Ibid.
31. Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Remarks With Japanese Foreign Minister
Taro Aso After Their Meeting, (transcript). Tokyo, Japan, October 18, 2006
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/74669.htm.
32. Foreign Minister Taro Aso, Remarks With Japanese Foreign Minister Taro
Aso After Their Meeting, (transcript). Tokyo, Japan, October 18, 2006, http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/74669.htm.
33. Such empirical evidence has been challenged by a recent DTRA/SAIC
study, Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture, December 2006.
34. Explicit decoupling of the stockpile size and the (traditional) Russian
target base was necessary, as President Bush had stated that Russia was no lon-
ger an enemy of the United States.
200   CHAPTER TEN

35. The Russian reaction to suggestion of a U.S. strategy of nuclear primacy

and the potential role of CTM for PGS was twofold. The first impulse was to be
dismissive and technically discredit the notion of U.S. nuclear primacy and the
second, seeing U.S. provocation, was to capitalize upon for domestic political
reasons—an excuse to modernization of Russian nuclear and nuclear related
assets. For examples of how Russia responded to proposed U.S. weapon devel-
opments, see President Putin’s state of the union speech: http://www.mosnews.
com/column/2006/05/11/PutinAddress.shtml. Another example is a retired
General’s reaction to suggestions of first strike primacy, “There is no fundamen-
tal difference in the fact that the United States is capable of destroying Russia
several times over whereas Russia can destroy the United States once or twice…
likelihood of a world or large-scale nuclear war is infinitesimal… [the United
States] is already predominant… and will undoubtedly be willing to put its well
being at risk [through nuclear preemption],” Viktor Yesin, “Replying to Foreign
Affairs Article, Expert Mulls Nuclear Arms Programs,” Krasnaya Zvezda, April
12, 2006, translated in OSC, Doc ID: CEP20060411330004; and “Russian Me-
dia See Article on U.S. Nuclear Primacy as Provocation,” OSC Analysis, April 3,
2006, in Doc ID: CEF20060403324001.
36. The historical evolution of the U.S. thinking about some of these issues is
discussed by Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, ‘What Are Nuclear Weap-
ons For? Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces,’
(Arms Control Association, 2005), http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/USNW_
2005_Drell-Goodby.pdf. They conclude that only 500 operationally deployed
warheads (with 500 in a reserve stockpile) are required for foreseeable nuclear
missions.
37. It is understood by the author that further presidential authority is re-
quired to launch nuclear attacks against targets in or near population centers
after initial authority for a nuclear (counterforce) strike is given. Authority is
withheld until released by the President.
38. See, Plutonium Pit Production — LANL’s Pivotal New Mission, Los Ala-
mos Study Group, http://www.lasg.org/campaigns/PUPitProd.htm.
39. Stemming from the Overeski Report there is Congressional pressure
to consolidate all fissile material operation in a single location within the U.S.
nuclear complex. Realization of such a vision seems impractical with NNSA
budgets, while maintaining warhead production and dismantlement schedules.
This issue has become politically entangled with the RRW program proposal.
40. Personal communication.
41. Matthew G. McKinzie, Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Wil-
liam M. Arkin, The Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change (Natural Resources
Defense Council, June 2001); and Michele Flournoy and Clark A. Murdock,
 Strategic Conventional Trident Modification   201

Revitalizing the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent (Center for Strategic and International
Studies, July 2002).
42. This of course could change and the actions and strategic posture of the
United States will do much to influence China’s strategic choices during its
“peaceful rise.”
43. Although the author believes that there is a role for small numbers of
nuclear weapons for tactical platforms—so-called tactical nuclear weapons—
especially to deter regional rogue regimes, such a need is considered inconse-
quential for the purposes of this study.
44. Congress expressed concerns about the proposals that are discussed later
in the text. As a result, at the time of writing, it is not clear whether the CTM
proposals will progress to deployment or not.
45. Kathleen McInnis and Owen Price, “Iran Claims Nuclear Rights; U.S.
Seeks Safer Stockpile”, Defense News, March 6, 2006 http://www.defensenews.
com/story.php?F=1578923&C=commentary
46. Amy F. Wolf, Conventional Warheads for Long Range Ballistic Missiles, 3
47. START counting rules limit U.S. SLBMs to a maximum of eight war-
heads.
48. Conventional ICBM warhead used for the augmentation of the strategic
nuclear stockpile rather than the proposed “Strategic CTM” SLBM based ap-
proach, especially if one nuclear warhead were retained on each minuteman
missile, would eliminate the ambiguity issue, which has also dogged the CTM
proposal, as such weapons could not be used for the Prompt Global Strike mis-
sion. However, it is the author’s preference that the Strategic CTM be investi-
gated first, as 1) the technology is currently available, 2) PGS remains a mission
requiring such assets, and 3) Strategic CTM provides the potential to retire the
ICBM leg of the old nuclear triad—further cost savings and contribution to a
modernization “grand bargain.”
49. For example Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nu-
clear Primacy”, Foreign Affairs (March/April 2006) and David S. McDonough,
Nuclear Superiority, The ‘new triad’ and the evolution of nuclear strategy, Adel-
phi Paper 383 (London: IISS, 2006), 63 argue that modernization proposals are
sought to underpin a nuclear first strike strategy.
50. Scholars such as Theodore Postol and Pavel Podvig question this as-
sertion, often citing the Russia reaction to the Norwegian sounding rocket
incident. See, Joseph Poznanski, Refit of Trident debated, http://media.www.
avionnewspaper.com/media/storage/paper798/news/2006/10/17/Aeronautica/
Refit. Of.Trident.Debated-2352394.shtml Theodore Postol and Nikolai Sokov
voiced such concerns at a seminar entitled, “Conventional Missiles and Early
202   CHAPTER TEN

Warning Systems” held on October 6, 2006 at Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC. For other examples of criticism see, Russia and the Prompt
Global Strike Plan, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0417.pdf Den-
nis Shorts offers an alternative view of the evidence presented by the sounding
rocket event in his chapter. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that such criticisms
have influenced the U.S. Congress on CTM proposals and therefore this coun-
ter to “ambiguity” is insufficient.
51. It is noted, however, that the very act of changing the patrol patter could
either be an effective signal or risk exacerbating an escalating crisis.
52. Further variations that should be considered include (1) uploading three
conventional warheads per existing ICBM in place nuclear warheads, as the
non-nuclear component of the strategic force, and (2) a combination of mixed
nuclear and CTM warheads on SLBMs and ICBMs. Both would eliminate am-
biguity and preclude the use of the technology for the PGS mission.
 Chapter eleven

Nuclear Deterrence and the American

Way of War
A New Look for the Post-9/11 Era?
Lieutenant Colonel (select) George Nagy, USAF

S
ince the dawn of the nuclear age in 1945, U.S. military officers have
struggled over how best to integrate nuclear weapons into this
country’s defense posture. While many politicians, public officials,
academics, and ordinary citizens debate the consequences of nuclear
weapons, few outside the military planning community fully understand
how U.S. military culture influences the detailed planning and targeting
for their potential use. Old habits die hard, and any attempt to change
how nuclear weapons are integrated into U.S. defense policy must con-
sider this cultural environment, even though U.S. nuclear weapons are
explicitly under civilian (presidential) control to a level far beyond that
of most military matters.1 Despite the assertion by some in the policy
community that U.S. nuclear weapons planning today is driven solely by
the President, Secretary of Defense, and their supporting staffs, this has
not always been the case and may, again, prove untrue in the future. For
this reason, it is crucial to understand how U.S. military culture influ-
ences decisions regarding the use of particular weapon technologies in
wartime.
This military culture is commonly referred to as “The American Way
of War” after Russell Weigley’s 1973 book of the same name.2 While
never explicitly defined by Weigley, the American Way of War suggests
a uniquely U.S. approach to combat emphasizing: 1) conflict waged as
a last resort; 2) the massive use of firepower in combination with other
technological enablers; 3) a preference for total victory or unconditional

203
204   CHAPTER ELEVEN

surrender; 4) the complete destruction of an enemy through the annihi-

lation of his military forces, and; 5) the presumption that such destruc-
tion would force the enemy to capitulate, thereby ensuring victory for
the United States.
In her 1993 award-winning essay, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant
Colonel Anita Arms identified the following values as historical-
ly having the greatest impact on U.S. political and military establish-
ments:3
■ The tendency towards isolationism based on North American ge-
ography
■ The adherence to an ideology based on individual rights and free-
dom
■ The purely political (rather than ethnic) interpretation of what it
means to be American
■ The balance between education, the Protestant work ethic and capi-
talism
■ The moralistic approach to politics and affairs of state
■ An ethnocentric belief that Americans occupy the moral high
ground
■ The chauvinistic opinion that the entire world aspires to be Ameri-
can
■ The belief in the extremely high value of human life
■ The overwhelming need for immediate action and gratification
■ The use of force to accomplish national security objectives as a last
resort; but once committed, war is to be won by methods as brash
as necessary without regard to style, subtlety, or logic
This last point is particularly illuminating and points to the paradoxi-
cal role of firepower and the means of violence employed throughout
U.S. military campaigns. Historically, the U.S. military has relied upon
precision and technology to make up for limited numbers of troops
on the battlefield—the experience of settling the American wilderness
manifesting itself through the Industrial Revolution and substitution of
capital for labor. In civilian terms, technological innovation expressed
itself through inventions such as the steam engine and the cotton gin;
in military terms, this same preference led to the rifled musket, steam-
powered ships, and precision aerial bombardment.
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR   205

In execution, however, U.S. battlefield experience with technology

has been decidedly mixed. Limited application of force has often given
way to a strategy of total annihilation when faced with seemingly insur-
mountable odds. Ulysses S. Grant’s unsuccessful attempts to destroy the
Confederate Army outright ultimately gave way to Sherman’s burning
of Atlanta; precision bombing of Japan during World War II was su-
perseded by the firebombing of Tokyo and other major industrial cen-
ters—ending in the use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
To quote Weigley on this paradox:
If the total submission of the enemy had to become an object of war,
Sherman’s design for pursuing the object by attacking the enemy’s
resources and will could well appear preferable to Grant’s method
of destroying the enemy armies by direct means, a process almost
certain to cost heavy casualties among one’s own soldiers. When a
new technology of war, offered by the internal combustion engine in
the airplane and the tank, seemed to promise new ways of invoking
Sherman’s strategy, then its appeal rose especially high. If Sherman
had had the airplane, then he might indeed have been able to deprive
the Confederate armies of the economic resources they needed to
continue the fight, while destroying popular morale as well.4
One might just as easily believe, however, that any new technology
could be equally applied to Grant’s strategy of attacking enemy forces
directly. This is particularly true if a technology offers the promise of
success while saving American and noncombatant lives. This is the U.S.
military’s unstated preference for many reasons, in particular because
it views itself as a force for moral good. When precision has proved in-
adequate, however, American generals and admirals have shown little
hesitation in resorting to the massive application of force.
To understand the American experience with nuclear weapons since
World War II, it is important to put these weapons in the context of the
preceding historical discussion. It is also important to understand the
military planning culture central to the U.S. defense establishment. This
planning culture drives U.S. military operations in ways that are most
often unseen by the general public and misunderstood by many except
for, perhaps, those individuals in government most closely connected
to the process. Some government civilians have argued that, in the case
of nuclear weapons, policy considerations trump military consider-
ations almost exclusively, and that military culture plays no part in the
206   CHAPTER ELEVEN

planning and target selection process.5 This assertion, while perhaps

true today, neglects both the early history of U.S. nuclear planning as
well as its indirect influence on subsequent events. As described in Fred
Kaplan’s seminal history of the U.S. nuclear community, The Wizards
of Armageddon, no civilian (including the President and the Secretary
of Defense) had seen the military’s own nuclear planning guidance un-
til 1960, fifteen years after the introduction of nuclear weapons.6 The
subsequent thirty-plus years of the Cold War saw occasional (but note-
worthy) differences of professional opinion between senior military and
civilian leadership on a variety of defense topics, nuclear weapons fore-
most among them. During the 1980s, military historian John Keegan
went so far as to refer to the demands of supreme (i.e. civilian) com-
mand as the “post-heroic” model: decision-making focused on inaction
and preservation of the status quo, with prudence and rationality trium-
phant over all other political considerations in order to prevent nuclear
holocaust.7 Another observer similarly suggested that “the first duty of
the U.S. government is to avoid defeat, not to enforce defeat upon the
enemy.”8 No single phrase better captures this philosophical difference
between politicians, whose principle aim to is avoid defeat and preserve
future political options, and military officers, who are charged with de-
feating adversaries when directed by their civilian masters.

The U.S. Military Planning Process

The U.S. military planning process is complex and highly stylized. The
basic outputs of the process are informally known as “war plans,” or
more formally Operations Plans (OPLANs), and other plans of lesser
scope (OPLANs in concept form, Functional Plans, etc.). The purpose
of these plans is to provide for the orderly translation of national politi-
cal and military objectives under postulated threat scenarios into con-
crete military actions that achieve these objectives in peace, crisis, and
war. Although administrative details have changed over the decades,
the basic process for creating U.S. war plans has not changed signifi-
cantly since World War II and is derived from the Prussian General Staff
model.9 War plan development falls primarily on the staffs of the 4-star
geographic and functional combatant commanders responsible for their
execution. These plans outline the commander’s strategic intent and
operational focus, identify enemy and friendly centers of gravity, and
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR   207

describe the general phasing of operations, including the commander’s

intent for each phase. A full OPLAN, including annexes, might easily
be several hundred pages in length. This top-level plan, however, is still
insufficient to support the actual accomplishment of large-scale mili-
tary operations. Subordinate units complete additional plans for accom-
plishing assigned tasks, including weaponeering, logistics, and support
activities at the tactical level. The time and effort expended in planning
activities is enormous—the document that describes the process itself
is currently 104 single-spaced pages in length—yet generally remain
unrecognized by the public, academia, Congress, and others.10 Histori-
cally, the bulk of U.S. war plans have focused on traditional full-scale
conflict between nation states. When U.S. military forces enter combat,
their actions are most likely scripted (in whole or in part) by either a
deliberate military plan or a crisis-action plan modified on short notice
from an existing deliberate plan.
While most military observers have heard the aphorism, “no plan sur-
vives first contact with the enemy intact,” fewer acknowledge the warn-
ing that “failure to plan is planning to fail.” The outcomes of military
planning are much more than the war plans themselves; they include
standard operating procedures, organizational relationships, planner
familiarity with regional issues, lines of communication, etc., that allow
for military operations to proceed despite the fog and friction of actual
combat. Through planning, military staffs try to reduce the likelihood
that unforeseen events will occur in wartime, while at the same time
recognizing that military force is a blunt instrument whose outcome
cannot be predicted with certainty; nor can its violence be controlled
with infinite precision. Additionally, war plans explicitly account for
the limited force structure (ships, divisions, air wings, etc.) available to
planners at any given time.
Although the basic war plan development process includes flexibility
to accommodate a wide variety of military strategies (such as blockades/
quarantines, punitive raids/strikes, or counterinsurgency methods), in
practice the U.S. military has structured its war plans very tradition-
ally. A “typical” regional OPLAN most often resembles the large-scale
combined arms style of war fighting perfected during World War II.
It includes phases devoted to pre-crisis (general) deterrence and mo-
bilization, halting enemy forces, offensive operations, and post-con-
flict rebuilding.11 Why this is true is open to debate; arguably, today’s
joint doctrine represents the services’ consensus on proper roles and
208   CHAPTER ELEVEN

missions based on the last fully satisfying application of the American

Way of War over 60 years ago.
Several assumptions are often made for planning purposes: 1) mobi-
lization will not precipitate a crisis by itself, yet pre-conflict deterrence
will fail; 2) planning for either the “most threatening” or “most likely”
adversary responses will bind the scope of U.S. military activities once
hostilities commence; 3) “major combat” offensive operations constitute
the bulk of the U.S. military effort, since the enemy’s war-making po-
tential is usually the center of gravity which must be neutralized. These
assumptions drive a series of planning decisions that are almost entirely
predictable: the mobilization of crisis-response forces constitutes the
bulk of escalatory deterrence efforts (deterrence presumed to be a by-
product of the mobilization itself); the enemy will capitulate when their
fielded forces or defense infrastructure are destroyed; mobilized U.S.
forces are precisely those optimized for destroying the enemy’s major
combat units (army divisions, ships, aircraft, etc.). The overall result is
a war plan that is very tidy in conceptual terms and wholly consonant
with the American Way of War and corresponding value structure.

U.S. Nuclear Planning

U.S. nuclear planning has historically followed a different, sometimes
disconnected path from the rest of conventional military planning, but
is nonetheless shaped by the services’ general planning culture and mili-
tary perspective. The introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945 ushered
in new possibilities for advancing this American Way of War—namely,
the potential to devastate a country’s military power rapidly (within
hours or days) without the need for a large standing army or navy. Air-
power finally had at its disposal a weapon that might fulfill the prom-
ises of strategic bombing advocates in the manner predicted by Giulio
Douhet in the 1920s.12 Nuclear weapons drove new requirements for
improved planning processes and support activities such as intelligence
collection and target development. The newly created U.S. Air Force
(acting through its Strategic Air Command (SAC)) concentrated on
planning for independent air campaigns to be conducted against the So-
viet Union. In 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated three basic target
categories for nuclear weapons in order of priority: 1) BRAVO (blunt-
ing) targets—those targets affecting the [Soviet] capability to deliver
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR   209

atomic bombs; 2) ROMEO (or retardation) targets—targets intended

to stop the advance of conventional forces into Western Europe; and 3)
DELTA (disruption) targets—characterized as vital elements of Soviet
industrial war-making capacity.13 These target categories represented
a traditional approach to U.S. military strategies by placing emphasis
first on the enemy’s military capabilities—Grant’s approach—and only
then on the industrial infrastructure required to sustain it (Sherman).
In the early 1950s, however, the SAC’s ability to destroy BRAVO targets
was considerably weaker when compared to its ability to attack DELTA
targets. This shortfall was a result of the limited intelligence available be-
hind the Iron Curtain, the moderate navigation and bombing accuracy
of then-current technology, the limited promptness of bomber-deliv-
ered weapons, and the inherent biases of SAC leadership based on their
wartime experiences in World War II. Nuclear counterforce capabilities
developed slowly through the 1950s and 1960s, relying first on advances
in nuclear weapons technology to produce increased explosive yields,
but subsequently giving way to improved accuracy (particularly with
later generations of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and in-
creased responsiveness (both ICBMs and Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Missiles (SLBMs)).
It is important to understand how fundamental this “counterforce”
targeting bias is to the American Way of War (both nuclear and conven-
tional).14 The basic assumption that destruction of an enemy’s military
might is the core activity of military planning is so ingrained in U.S.
military thinking that it generally goes unquestioned throughout the
planning process. Targeting requirements typically drive the size and
number of military forces required to execute a particular plan. Never-
theless, a basic outcome of even the earliest nuclear war plans was that
the large-scale use of nuclear weapons would utterly devastate a country
such that other military operations would be superfluous to achieving
total victory. It is this second point that politicians, academics, and lay-
people most often focus on when discussing nuclear deterrence—the
horror accompanying nuclear use that would surely give rational lead-
ers pause. In creating military war plans that are consistent with presi-
dential guidance military leaders propose “Grant” strategies that many
civilians perceive as “Shermanesque.” Given the enormous destructive
power of nuclear weapons, this is not an unreasonable conclusion. The
differing institutional viewpoints also help explain many differences
in policy regarding U.S. nuclear weapons strategy and force structure
210   CHAPTER ELEVEN

during the past sixty years. For example, while the demonstrative use of
nuclear weapons to indicate political resolve may be an attractive con-
cept to civilians, it makes little sense to a military officer charged with
providing planning options for the prompt destruction of offensive mili-
tary forces.
It is useful to consider a concrete example of the counterforce bias
shown during the early phase of the Korean War. In July 1950, both
the Army and Air Force staffs examined the feasibility of using nuclear
weapons to halt the North Korean offensive. The Air Force staff con-
cluded that their use would be militarily ineffective and place the United
States in the untenable propaganda position of “a butcher discarding his
morals and killing his friends in order to achieve his end.”15 The Army
staff study concluded that “at the present time, the use of atomic bombs
in Korea is unwarranted from the military point of view, and question-
able from the political and psychological point of view,” but that eventu-
al use of the weapon might be necessary “to avert impending disaster.”16
Importantly, the first consideration by both staffs was the military utility
of nuclear use rather than their psychological impact or consequences
of collateral damage.

The SIOP
As the number of nuclear weapons increased dramatically during the
1950s (including deployments by the Army and Navy in quantity), plan-
ning for their effective employment became a major undertaking. In
particular, the development of the long-range Polaris SLBM required
the deconfliction of U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy plans to prevent
fratricide; this deconfliction would eventually extend to NATO forces
as well.17 The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) became the
primary focus of U.S. nuclear planning efforts with the creation of the
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) in 1960.18 At the outset,
the SIOP represented an all-out general war plan designed to deter the
Soviet Union by threatening massive nuclear retaliation. Its design was
colored by the experiences of World War II and represented the ulti-
mate expression of the American Way of War. Interestingly, the SIOP
represented an entirely new type of military planning effort organized
through JSTPS and distinctly separate from the traditional activities of
the regional military planning staffs (although regional staffs retained
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR   211

the ability to plan short-range “tactical” nuclear weapons). Creation

of the SIOP was driven primarily by civilian policy makers, although
the idea originated with the Air Force (presumably for reasons of or-
ganizational politics—to keep the Navy in line by preventing SLBMs
from competing with tasks of bombers and ICBMs).19 The SIOP was
an exceedingly centralized approach to planning, and its execution rep-
resented the execution of national capabilities in a manner previously
unheard of in U.S. military planning and operations. The resources and
personnel required for SIOP development were enormous, requiring
hundreds of individuals working full-time in a never-ending cycle of
intelligence analysis, target updating, and plan rework. Ironically, these
JSTPS preparations were in many ways the best example of “jointness”
(i.e., the deliberate coordination of two or more military service activi-
ties by an integrated staff) prior to the enactment of the 1986 Goldwa-
ter-Nichols legislation.
With the development of the SIOP and the massive growth in nuclear
arsenals during the 1960s (including the emergence of nuclear weap-
ons states in addition to the United States and Soviet Union), a conflict
arose between lay and military opinions on the ultimate utility of nu-
clear weapons. Many concluded that vast Cold War arsenals somehow
made war obsolete—that Mutual Assured Destruction (relying upon
the ultimate vulnerability of both sides) represented a Mexican standoff
from which neither side could escape. Others, including many in the
U.S. military, disagreed with this assessment. War in the era of nuclear
weapons was still an extension of policy by other means, even if their
primary role was to prevent a general superpower conflict by threaten-
ing the vital centers of both sides. However, the belief that conflict could
be successfully waged by the Soviet Union “below” the nuclear thresh-
old (while their nuclear arsenal held U.S. leadership in check) drove the
U.S. defense establishment to consider fighting conventional wars that
could achieve U.S. political and military objectives while avoiding mas-
sive societal destruction on both sides.

Conventional vs. Nuclear Planning—

The Pendulum Shifts
The U.S. military’s institutional desire to reduce its reliance on the threat
of nuclear retaliation was the result of many factors, including the U.S.
212   CHAPTER ELEVEN

failure in Vietnam and the perception of decreased U.S. military strength

during the 1970s. While the NATO strategy of Flexible Response ad-
opted in 1967 explicitly linked both conventional and nuclear respons-
es to a Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe, many senior
U.S. military leaders (particularly within the U.S. Army) were wary of
embracing this “political” solution to the exclusion of more traditional
military approaches.20 Tactical nuclear weapons might prevent the So-
viet Union from successfully invading Western Europe, but they were by
no means capable of doing so without unleashing a devastating nuclear
retaliation on the United States or the rest of the Western Alliance in
response. Consequently, the overall Soviet/Warsaw Pact advantage in
conventional armaments might cause Western leaders to capitulate in
the face of Soviet aggression rather than risk igniting an all-out global
war (this calculation no doubt played a part in the British and French
political decisions to maintain independent nuclear forces).
At roughly the same time, senior U.S. political leaders demanded
greater planning flexibility for strategic nuclear forces to counter per-
ceived challenges to American credibility. The so-called “Schlesinger
Doctrine,” named after President Nixon’s Secretary of Defense James R.
Schlesinger and announced in 1974, called for limited nuclear options.
In theory these options provided “escalation control,” e.g., an allowance
for a negotiated pause after the limited use of nuclear weapons in con-
flict. However, at least one senior military advisor to the President dur-
ing this period has stated that “precisely how limited nuclear options
were to work was never made clear.”21 While counterforce standing
alone might make sense as a military strategy, its viability as a political
strategy was less obvious.
These developments had two important outcomes for the U.S. mili-
tary. First, the U.S. armed forces began a concerted effort in the 1980s
to decrease their reliance on nuclear weapons. Doctrinal concepts such
as AirLand Battle, the Maritime Strategy, and the Warden “5 Rings” air
campaign model—authored primarily by senior U.S. military officers—
implicitly rejected nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of their execution,
instead focusing on conventional maneuver warfare conducted “below”
the nuclear threshold.22 These plans were heavily focused on region-
al objectives and relied upon the conventional military capabilities of
U.S. theater commanders for their success. To implement these new
concepts, non-nuclear weapons were required that could defeat Soviet/
Warsaw Pact military forces while limiting damage to their immediate
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR   213

surroundings (including both Western and Eastern European popula-

tion centers). The U.S. military rejuvenated its conventional capabili-
ties with a new generation of technologically reliant precision weapons
(laser-guided bombs, non-nuclear cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, etc.)
capable of achieving significant military objectives while limiting collat-
eral damage. With the development of precision non-nuclear weapons
(and better target acquisition, geolocation, and communications), the
U.S. military by the 1990s had developed an unparalleled conventional
war fighting capability.
Coincidentally, the development of this conventional war-fighting
juggernaut occurred at exactly the same time that the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact disintegrated from within. Rather than being used against
the adversaries for which they were intended, the new advanced con-
ventional weapons saw their baptism by fire in Operation Desert Storm
against Iraq in 1991. Subsequent actions in both the Middle East and
Southern Europe (Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and Operation
Allied Force in Kosovo) validated the value of these new technologies.
Of particular note, none of the adversaries engaged in conflict with the
United States during this period possessed nuclear weapons (although
Iraq was seeking them and possessed chemical and biological weap-
ons). With the threat of superpower conflict greatly diminished in the
1990s, nuclear weapons planning took on a reduced role within the
U.S. military. A major restructuring of the Air Force in 1992 resulted
in the dissolution of the SAC and the creation of a new unified com-
mand headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), which
replaced JSTPS and assumed the majority of nuclear planning functions
across the Department of Defense. Cold War arsenals shrank as a result
of arms control treaties and the number of military officers with nuclear
weapons experience decreased dramatically. By the beginning of the
new millennium, some political and military leaders dared to entertain
the belief that the nuclear era was finally over—or at least reduced to
the point that the declared nuclear powers needed only a handful of
weapons in reserve to prevent the outbreak of full-scale war between
nations.23

Today’s Planning Landscape

In 2007, the view of the global strategic/political landscape looks decid-
edly less optimistic than it did less than a decade ago. The emergence of
214   CHAPTER ELEVEN

the Global War on Terrorism following 9/11 presents several challenges

to the traditional American Way of War. Foremost among them is the
lack of a clear mechanism for “victory,” at least in the traditional sense
(a trait shared, ironically, with nuclear war). Previously, the defeat of a
nation state’s armed forces or conquest of their territory was believed to
lead inexorably to capitulation. Today’s potential adversaries may not
agree with this conclusion. Although “traditional” nation-state threats
still exist, a growing number of adversaries are of the non-state actor
variety—either widely dispersed across friendly, adversarial, neutral, or
ungoverned spaces (e.g., al Qaeda) or parasitically embedded within a
host nation (e.g., Hezbollah). These adversaries do not have the tradi-
tional dependencies of nation states that can be defeated through large-
scale combat in a Grant or Sherman mode; instead, these groups must
be defeated or neutralized in a highly dispersed manner, sometimes at
the level of finding and eliminating specific individuals. Additionally,
the destruction of these organizations must often be accomplished while
simultaneously preserving the support of the host nation or rebuilding
the weakened infrastructure of a failed nation. The U.S. counterinsur-
gency experience to date in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that the U.S.
military has been slow in effectively planning for and defeating these
threats. Indeed, the major U.S. military response to Vietnam was to ig-
nore the primary lessons of that conflict and instead focus on the kinds
of conflict it preferred to fight (e.g., major combat operations) and for
which the American Way of War was best suited. Now, almost forty
years later, this weakness is reemerging as an Achilles heel. Resources
for managing this type of conflict are scarce within the Department of
Defense and the military services are struggling to adapt.
Correspondingly, the current crop of adversaries appears acutely
aware that they do not have to decisively defeat the U.S. military in
traditional combat. Instead, they undermine U.S. political support for
military intervention through attritional attacks against U.S. fielded
forces and non-combatants, combined with the use of modern commu-
nications (including television, digital imagery and the Internet). This
is deliberately aimed against the American perception of the value of
human life in an attempt to sap U.S. resolve. So-called “rogue” nations,
such as Iran or North Korea, could leverage these terrorist movements
to threaten allied interests around the world while advancing their na-
tional political interests. These same nations appear to be developing
and acquiring nuclear weapons to prevent the successful application
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR   215

of conventional U.S. military power as accomplished in Iraq, Bosnia,

and Kosovo. Far from being a “weapon of the weak” as characterized by
many anti-nuclear activists, nuclear weapons are clearly weapons of the
strong—since their presence may prevent the unfettered application of
conventional military power.

Planning for the Future

What does all this imply for the future of nuclear weapons planning
within the U.S. military? Since 2001, the Department of Defense com-
pleted two Quadrennial Defense Reviews and one Nuclear Posture
Review with a renewed emphasis on broadening the U.S. approach to
strategic deterrence generally and modernizing U.S. nuclear capabilities
in particular. The realignment of several combatant commands in 2002
(including the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTH-
COM) and the reorganization of USSTRATCOM) and their subsequent
publication of the Homeland Security and Strategic Deterrence Joint
Operating Concepts suggest a major shift is underway in the approach
of these organizations to their future military planning activities.24
Current U.S. defense initiatives are intended to better integrate the
entire spectrum of U.S. military force against current and projected
threats. Increasing emphasis has been placed on improving the Unit-
ed States’ ability to deter via the denial of “rogue state” military capa-
bilities.25 Active missile defense, long-range conventional counterforce
missiles, and improved homeland security mechanisms all contribute
to damage-limitation for the U.S. and its allies. Additionally, new meth-
ods of inflicting unacceptable punishment on adversaries may include
computer network attacks or directed-energy weapons. The emphasis
on both the “New Triad” and “tailored deterrence” provides a wider
portfolio of defense options for countering the entire range of potential
adversaries—from terrorists, other non-state actors, “rogue states,” and
traditional nation-state threats.26 Nuclear weapons remain a corner-
stone of the New Triad, but their role is downplayed in many respects
when compared to the other elements of the force construct (defenses,
advanced conventional weapons, infrastructure, and integrating com-
mand and control). Public debate, however, has remained focused on
the nuclear aspects of policy guidance, presumably since nuclear weap-
ons generate more discussion than other subjects.27
216   CHAPTER ELEVEN

Inherent in these new approaches is an understanding that the un-

conditional surrender of a conventional military force may not signal
victory in conflict. Coinciding with these technical developments are
changes in the military planning process, specifically an increased fo-
cus on adversary behavior and motivation (particularly in cultural and
cognitive terms), as well as better integration of military plans across re-
gional boundaries in a manner not seen since the end of the Cold War.28
The difficulty of meshing the planning efforts of regional and functional
commands should not be underestimated. For example, if a missile was
launched from North Korea against the United States, it would require
a coordinated response from at least three major combatant commands
(U.S. Pacific Command, USNORTHCOM, and USSTRATCOM) to ad-
dress all defensive and offensive options currently available. Although
the military planning process allows for staff coordination across com-
mand lines, this process has traditionally been quite cumbersome. Fu-
ture military command and control mechanisms require significant
attention, since vertically stovepiped organizations designed for indus-
trial age warfare are likely to prove inappropriate in a networked world.
In all cases, these planning initiatives are intended to better link political
objectives to military actions. A broader set of strategic response op-
tions beyond simple fixed-target retaliation is needed for this approach
to succeed.
For offensive operations, the American Way of War has tilted towards
a clear preference for precision conventional weapons to achieve battle-
field results. These weapons are able to swiftly destroy fielded military
forces while limiting damage to non-combatants, consistent with the
prevailing American morality and military culture (Grant’s approach).
Additionally, these weapons could provide the distributed operations
and fractionated application of firepower necessary for the likely skir-
mishes in the global war on terrorism. Planning for counterinsurgency
campaigns will be difficult, since success will require a persistence not
normally found in U.S. military culture. If the U.S. Army’s 19th Cen-
tury experiences in the American West and the Philippine-American
War are any indicator, the pressure to apply Sherman’s tactics in search
of a quick military solution will be enormous. “Winning” will be mea-
sured in very subjective terms and extended military campaigns will re-
quire long-term support from both the U.S. Congress and the American
public.
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR   217

However, for traditional nation-state threats and those terrorist tar-

gets which conventional weapons are incapable of defeating, nuclear
weapons remain available to ensure the success of our military efforts,
while protecting the citizens of the United States and our allies. The em-
ployment of nuclear weapons in these situations will be given serious
consideration undoubtedly only under the gravest of circumstances.
With current and projected conventional capabilities, the major fore-
seeable role for U.S. nuclear weapons remains as a damage limitation
option, when no other recourse is available. The types of targets or
scenarios that might drive nuclear planning would include adversary
WMD threats (nuclear, biological, or chemical) for which no other mili-
tary option would suffice—targets very much in the mold of the BRAVO
category of the 1950s.
Except for a possible conflict with a major nuclear power such as Rus-
sia or China, it is not clear that planning for nuclear weapons use should
involve more than a handful of actual weapons employed selectively
against critical targets. For purposes of military planning, it may be use-
ful to discern (and, in some instances, make known to others the scope
and purpose of) damage limitation plans where military effectiveness
outweighs all other considerations. An example of this situation might
be the destruction of a confirmed terrorist WMD facility. Alternatively,
military plans intended for preserving or restoring the status quo might
not require the same level of military planning detail, yet they would
still be politically effective if viewed as credible by adversaries.

Deterrence
Deliberate deterrence planning for these targets will be essential, since
the United States will wish to refrain from actual nuclear employment,
except in the most dire circumstances. A detailed understanding of ad-
versary leadership is essential for the U.S. to effectively communicate
both the rewards of “good” behavior (i.e., complying with courses of
action consistent with U.S. goals) as well as the certainty of failure and
subsequent punishment, should the adversary remain unpersuaded.
This approach requires a parallel change in the military planning cul-
ture, with less emphasis placed on plans that “service” large numbers of
targets and a correspondingly greater effort placed on understanding
the cultural, sociological, and cognitive aspects of the adversary’s deci-
sionmaking.
218   CHAPTER ELEVEN

This change will not be easy, as the U.S. military must forgo decades
of established doctrine to successfully implement these new approaches.
Rather than simply allocating weapons against prescribed target cat-
egories and determining the physical destructiveness of their planned
actions, military planners must now consider the extended military, po-
litical, economic, and social effects of military operations. They must
also shift their concepts of operation according to the stated objectives
of U.S. civilian leadership. For nuclear weapons planning, this might in-
clude more deliberate peacetime political signaling (shows of force and
restraint) than has been the case since the end of the Cold War. Unlike
the Cold War nuclear alerts, however, these actions must be taken with
a greater understanding of how particular exercises or planning options
are likely to be perceived by their intended target. For example, former
Soviet military leaders interviewed in the early 1990s consistently stated
their perception that U.S. actions throughout the Cold War were actu-
ally preparations for a surprise nuclear first strike.29 These deep-rooted
fears came from Russia’s historical experiences with Napoleon and Hit-
ler and failed to recognize the U.S. military’s institutional biases on how
to execute the American Way of War. Given the increased likelihood of
post-9/11 conflict with unfamiliar cultures, U.S. military planners must
explicitly consider these reaction dynamics when developing specific
military plans or actions.
Additionally, an enhanced level of integration between U.S. nuclear
and conventional weapons planning is increasingly needed. In the post-
9/11 networked world, the antiseptic “spectrum of conflict” conceived
during the Cold War does not adequately describe the strategic impact
of state-sponsored terrorism on regional conflicts, the possession of
deadly biological weapons by millennialist cults, or the use of com-
puter connections to wage worldwide psychological “hearts and minds”
campaigns. Correspondingly, military plans will be delineated more by
their functionality (e.g., counterforce, damage-limitation, countervalue,
counter-economic, etc.) and less by the types of weapons planned or
available for employment.
It is not clear that current U.S. nuclear capabilities are particularly
well suited for the most likely types of future targets. Current U.S. nu-
clear weapons lack precision guidance and consequently have much
greater yields than would be required if such guidance were retrofit-
ted. Even the newest designs in the U.S. arsenal date back to the 1980s,
when maximizing explosive yield (while minimizing mass and volume)
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR   219

produced nuclear weapons with reliability, safety, and security features

that are dated by today’s demanding standards. During the Cold War,
planners could account for reliability issues and the desired probability
of destruction by simply allocating extra weapons against a target, the
so-called “overkill” factor. By comparison, a future U.S. military planner
might need only a single nuclear weapon in the entire war plan to target
a specific biological weapons bunker; but that weapon must detonate
with the correct yield exactly as planned. If adversaries have reason to
question our promised nuclear capabilities, then our deterrence cred-
ibility may be weakened immeasurably.
Critics may deride such improvements as preparations for nuclear
“war fighting,” which, indeed, they are in some sense. However, it is
anathema to the American Way of War for the United States to limit
itself to retaliatory courses of action solely reliant upon destruction not
clearly tied to military purposes. Although a single nuclear strike might
well kill tens or hundreds of thousands dependent on target location, it
is against U.S. policy to systematically target nuclear weapons against
civilians. Despite the views of those who claim that nuclear strategy re-
lies solely on maintaining vulnerability between civilian populations,
the U.S. military remains wedded to the Clausewitzian doctrine that
war is the continuation of politics by other means. Therefore, military
actions must have a clear and logical connection to achieving military
objectives in support of overarching political goals. When the United
States resorted to widespread attacks against urban industrial centers in
Germany and Japan during World War II, it recognized the limits of the
military technology and believed that ending the conflict more rapidly
would save lives in the long term.. LeMay’s methods, however bloody,
served their purpose just like Sherman’s had a hundred years earlier.
In the twenty-first century, the role of nuclear weapons may not
change greatly when deterring traditional nation-state conflict. How-
ever, the same doctrine, if applied to terrorists or “rogue-state” dicta-
tors (who, some would argue, are supported by “enslaved” populations)
might well lead to disaster. Against these adversaries, deterrence by
threat of punishment is a dubious proposition at best. The United States
would be better served in these cases by concentrating on deterrence
by denial—with nuclear weapons, if need be—and on other methods of
inducing adversary restraint. This capability must mesh with the abil-
ity to conduct extensive coalition ground operations that can secure an
enduring result, should deterrence fail.
220   CHAPTER ELEVEN

While the future of U.S. nuclear deterrence still may not be clear in
the post-9/11 world, changes are emerging that suggest the American
Way of War and the corresponding role of nuclear weapons are indeed
evolving. Advanced conventional technologies now allow the U.S. mili-
tary to defeat opposing armies with only a modicum of effort; therefore,
the need to maintain thousands of strategic nuclear weapons is doubtful.
Paradoxically, industrial base requirements (or the desire to dissuade
other nuclear powers from increasing the size of their current arsenals),
rather than targeting considerations, may drive the size and shape of
U.S. nuclear force structure. As with the SIOP, planning for the strategic
dismemberment of whole nations might well be accomplished with a
combination of advanced conventional, cyber, and other non-nuclear
methods, with only a small number of nuclear weapons held in reserve
to influence political (rather than military) calculations. Given the dis-
position of U.S. military planning towards counterforce targeting, it is
interesting to hypothesize that future military leaders might advocate an
even greater proportion of non-nuclear weapons in the arsenal, based
on their perceived military utility, while politicians would cling to great-
er numbers of nuclear weapons.30 A two-tiered nuclear force structure
might emerge: “slow” (second-strike) counterforce weapons in larger
quantities for stabilizing great power relations, and robust damage limi-
tation capabilities available in small numbers for “rogue state” confron-
tations.31 The crux of the debate is not so much about nuclear weapons
as it is about a differing perspective on the role of force in politics: for
military officers peace is viewed as an outgrowth of military superiority;
for many politicians it is seen as a result of shared military vulnerability.
Despite popular perceptions on the matter, the U.S. military is institu-
tionally less wedded to maintaining large numbers of nuclear weapons
than it is to maintaining the American Way of War by whatever means
most effective.
The greatest emerging threats to U.S. security appear to be not from
regional powers, but from so-called “non-state” actors, including trans-
national terrorists. These threats are so dispersed both geographically
and organizationally that their total destruction seems unlikely when
compared to defeating a traditional nation-state. Nuclear weapons
probably offer little in the way of a direct solution against these threats,
except perhaps in taking out the adversary’s WMD (through destruc-
tion in storage or transit) or deterring the nation-state transfer of WMD
to terrorist groups. In these cases, U.S. nuclear planning, though small-
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR   221

scale, must be exceedingly robust, with an eye towards how the politi-
cal and military landscape will change when the next nuclear weapon
explodes in anger.

Conclusion
The noted observer Colin S. Gray once remarked that:
U.S. military power, like American society, is a powerful but blunt in-
strument. U.S. strategic culture performs certain military enterprises
admirably. Fortunately, those enterprises include virtually all of the
larger, more orthodox tasks that bear upon war and peace between
states and coalitions. Planning and execution of a D-Day landing, of
nuclear deterrence, of SIOP-level nuclear war, or of large-scale non-
nuclear war all exploit America’s strengths and avoid the worst of
America’s weaknesses. The larger and more violent the endeavor, the
more effectively the United States is likely to perform.32
This observation clearly extends to the American Way of War and
the U.S. military’s experience with nuclear weapons over the last sixty
years. The challenge for the U.S. military will be how well it can adapt to
the changed post-9/11 era, where the kinds of threats it has countered
successfully in the past are perhaps the least likely to be encountered in
the future. If current trends continue, warfare in the twenty-first cen-
tury is likely to be increasingly small-scale, decentralized, and violent
on an individual level. Agility, rather than mass and firepower, will be
the most important trait of U.S. military forces. This change portends
fundamental adjustments to the American Way of War if the U.S. mili-
tary is to remain successful in future conflict. If nuclear weapons are to
continue as a useful tool for deterrence and defense of the United States,
then the planning for their potential use must reflect the changed secu-
rity environment in which they exist. More effort must be given to un-
derstanding the scenario-specific requirements for deterring particular
adversaries from taking specific actions, since “generalized” deterrence
(both nuclear and non-nuclear) will likely be less effective against ter-
rorists and “rogue states” than during the Cold War. The dual require-
ments for greater accuracy and minimized collateral damage will drive
U.S. military planners to either seek improved nuclear weapons capable
of meeting military needs, or abandoning them in favor of advanced
conventional weapons that can do the job instead. In either case, the
222   CHAPTER ELEVEN

total numbers of nuclear weapons required to fulfill U.S. military plan-

ning requirements will continue to decrease, at least until U.S. policy
makers feel so uncomfortable that they believe regional powers might
challenge U.S. nuclear superiority for political gain.
Many nuclear policy debates during the Cold War hinged on a com-
mon understanding of nuclear weapons colored by the institutional
biases of those involved in the discussion: politicians, academics, schol-
ars, etc. These groups would be well advised to also consider the in-
stitutional biases of those called upon to execute U.S. nuclear weapons
policy, the U.S. military and its uniquely American Way of War. Only by
understanding this strategic culture can an informed policy discussion
regarding the present and future roles of nuclear weapons take place.
Political leaders can then decide whether their subordinates’ planning is
worthy of Ulysses S. Grant—or perhaps William Tecumseh Sherman—
and appropriate to the task.

Notes
 1. “The decision to employ nuclear weapons at any level requires the explicit
decision of the President.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Pub 3-
12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,” 18 December 1995, vi.
 2. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States
Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).
 3. Lt Col Anita M. Arms, USAF, “Strategic Culture—The American Mind,”
Essays on Strategy, vol. 9 (1993): 3-32.
 4. Weigley, 152.
 5. Franklin C. Miller, former Special Assistant to President George W. Bush,
communication with the author, 2007.
 6. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schus-
ter, 1983), 277.
 7. John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Penguin Books, 1987),
330-351.
 8. Colin S. Gray, “Presidential Directive 59: Flawed but Useful,” The Nuclear
Arms Race Debated (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1986), 271.
 9. Col Christopher R. Paparone, USA, “U.S. Army Decisionmaking: Past,
Present and Future,” Military Review (July-August 2001): 45-46.
10. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Plan-
ning Joint Operations,” 13 April 1995, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_
pubs/jp5_0.pdf.
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR   223

11. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine
for Campaign Planning,” 25 January 2002, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/
new_pubs/jp5_00_1.pdf.
12. Giulio Douhet (English translation by Dino Ferrari of the 1921 original
text), The Command of the Air (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office (reprint), 1983).
13. David M. Kunsman and Douglas B. Lawson, A Primer on U.S. Strategic
Nuclear Policy (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, 2001), 29-30.
14. “Counterforce targeting is a strategy to employ forces to destroy, or
render impotent, military capabilities of an enemy force. Typical counterforce
targets include bomber bases, ballistic missile submarine bases, ICBM silos,
antiballistic and air defense installations, C2 centers, and WMD storage facili-
ties (Joint Pub 3-12 Chap. 2 para. 3b).” This is contrasted in the same paragraph
with countervalue targeting, “Countervalue targeting strategy directs the de-
struction or neutralization of selected enemy military and military-related ac-
tivities, such as industries, resources, and/or institutions that contribute to the
enemy’s ability to wage war. In general, weapons required to implement this
strategy need not be as numerous or accurate as those required to implement a
counterforce targeting strategy, because countervalue targets generally tend to
be softer and unprotected in relation to counterforce targets.”
15. Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea (1950-1953)
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 37.
16. Ibid
17. Jerry Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers (Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 206-227.
18. Charles K. Hopkins, “Unclassified History of the Joint Strategic Tar-
get Planning Staff (JSTPS)” (pamphlet produced by the Staff Historian of the
JSTPS, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, June 1990).
19. Kaplan, 263.
20. Major Paul H. Herbert, USA, “Deciding What Has to Be Done: General
William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations,” Leavenworth
Paper #16 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col-
lege, 1988): 90-91.
21. Lt Gen William E. Odom, USA (ret.), “The Origins and Design of Presi-
dential Decision-59: A Memoir,” in Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured De-
struction, Its Origins and Practice (Henry D. Sokolski, ed.) (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004): 177.
22. Dept. of the Army, “FM 100-5, Operations,” May 1986. U.S. Naval
Institute, “The Maritime Strategy,” January 1986. Col John A. Warden III,
224   CHAPTER ELEVEN

USAF, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press,
1988).
23. Michael J. Mazarr, “Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War,” The Washing-
ton Quarterly, vol. 15 no. 3 (Summer 1992): 185-201.
24. Department of Defense, “Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept,”
and “Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept,” February 2004. http://
www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/joc.htm. In December 2006 a revised version
of the latter document (primarily incorporating greater discussion of terror-
ism and non-state actors) was approved by then-Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and published on the website with the title “Deterrence Operations
Joint Operating Concept – Version 2.0.”
25. Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept – Version 2.0, 26.
26. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” 6 Febru-
ary 2006. http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf. 49-51.
27. Kurt Guthe, “The Nuclear Posture Review: How Is the ‘New Triad’ New?”
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002).
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/R.20020729.Nuclear_Pos-
ture_Review/R.20020729.Nuclear_Posture_Review.pdf
28. The latest version of the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept
identifies a five-step process for deterrence planning: 1) Specify the deterrence
objective(s) and strategic context; 2) assess the decision calculus of adversary
decision-makers; 3) Identify desired deterrence effects on adversary decision
calculus; 4) Develop and assess tailored courses of action (COAs) designed to
achieve desired deterrence effects; 5) Execute deterrence COAs and monitor
and assess adversary responses. The deterrence planning process is intended to
be integrated into the current military planning process, which primarily takes
into account only U.S. military objectives.
29. John A. Battilega, “Soviet Views of Nuclear Warfare: The Post-Cold War
Interviews,” in Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins
and Practice, 157-164.
30. It appears this trend is already occurring. In his annual statement to
the House Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2007, the Commander of
U.S. Strategic Command, USMC General James E. Cartwright, included the
following remarks: “We have a prompt delivery capability on alert today, but it
is configured with nuclear weapons, which limits the options available to our
decision-makers and may reduce the credibility of our deterrence. The capabil-
ity we lack is the means to deliver prompt, precise, conventional kinetic effects
at inter-continental ranges.” Testimony accessed online at http://armedservices.
house.gov/pdfs/Strat030807/Cartwright_Testimony030807.pdf
 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR   225

31. Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 90-93.
32. Colin S. Gray, “Strategy in the nuclear age: The United States, 1945-
1991,” in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (Williamson Murray,
MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994): 613.
 Chapter TWELVE

Nuclear Command and Control

in the Twenty-First Century

Trends, Disparities and the Impact on Stability

Jerome M. Conley

W
ith the turn of the twenty-first century a renewed interest has
arrived in the role of nuclear weapons as symbols of national
power as well as tools for strategic posturing. The 1998 nu-
clear tests in South Asia, the 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
the British debate over Trident replacement, and the overt pursuit of
nuclear capabilities by Iran and North Korea represent key examples of
an overall shift in the number of states with nuclear capabilities, nuclear
aspirations, and legacy systems that require modernization. However,
the 2001 attacks on the United States with airplanes and anthrax un-
derscore a changing security environment in which asymmetric risks
created by non-state actors may alter and/or diminish the degree of se-
curity afforded by nuclear deterrence.
As discussed in the previous chapters, these multifarious factors con-
verge to provide a rich forum for assessing the future utility of nuclear
weapons and the transformation of nuclear deterrence. These assess-
ments and projections, however, focus almost exclusively on the quan-
tity and quality of warheads and delivery systems and seldom broach
the equally critical topic of the command and control (C2) systems that
define nuclear operations. As the design and robustness of C2 systems
impact the safety, security and reliability of nuclear weapons during
peacetime, crises, and wartime, an adequate and balanced assessment of
nuclear deterrence and stability in the twenty-first century must simul-
taneously explore the quantity and quality of nuclear weapon systems as
well as the systems and processes that control them. In an era when the

226
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   227

true strategic intentions of existing and aspiring nuclear nations grow

more opaque, an analysis of the command and control trends within
these states can serve to clarify the role of nuclear weapons for these
actors.

Key Aspects of Nuclear Command and Control

This chapter explores the technical and procedural aspects of nuclear
safety, security, and reliability, the ongoing changes in global and re-
gional security dynamics, and the implications of these factors on nucle-
ar deterrence and stability in the twenty-first century. Overall, nuclear
command and control1 involves the designation of select personnel who
have the authority to determine the disposition and employment of nu-
clear weapons; it also involves the creation of systems and processes to
ensure that the intentions and decisions of these authorities are properly
executed. The U.S. Department of Defense defines nuclear command
and control as:
The exercise of authority and direction by the President, as Com-
mander in Chief, through established command lines, over nuclear
weapon operations of military forces; as Chief Executive over all
Government activities that support those operations; and, as Head
of State over required multinational actions that support those op-
erations. The [nuclear command and control] structure supports the
exercise of authority and direction by the President.2
The means through which this presidential authority is executed is
the nuclear command and control system and includes the “combina-
tion of facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and person-
nel essential for planning, directing, and controlling nuclear weapons,
weapons systems, and associated operations.”3 Though the names and
authorities may vary, all C2 programs involve the same attributes of a
human decisionmaker(s) and the employment of technical and pro-
cedural control measures to ensure the safe, secure, and reliable exe-
cution of these decisions. Differences occur, however, in the types of
control measures emphasized by these actors and the ability of their
command and control systems to ensure consistent and balanced safe-
ty, security and reliability during times of peace, crisis, and hostility
(nuclear or otherwise).
228   CHAPTER TWELVE

The “Always-Never” Challenge and the Role of

Positive and Negative Controls
A core challenge in the design and development of a C2system is the
need to strike a balance between having a process that ensures nuclear
weapons are always employed when proper authorization is provided,
and ensuring they are never employed (or detonated) in the absence
of proper authorization. From a system design perspective, this “al-
ways-never” challenge is addressed through the development of posi-
tive controls (measures that ensure nuclear employment when properly
authorized) and negative controls (measures that prevent accidental or
unauthorized nuclear employment).4 In mature C2 systems, these posi-
tive and negative controls are applied in a layered and redundant man-
ner in order to achieve six primary functions:
1. Maintain the technical conditions and combat readiness of the strate-
gic systems;
2. Prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
3. Facilitate routine operations among staff and subordinate forces;
4. Provide inter-service and interagency coordination on all aspects of
the nuclear mission, to include ballistic missile defense, early warning,
reconnaissance, etc.;
5. Develop and update nuclear war plans; and
6. Enable the combat use of nuclear weapons.5
As detailed below in Figure 12.1, two general approaches are applied
when developing the negative and positive controls necessary for achiev-
ing these six functions: the use of procedural and technical measures.

Procedural Approaches to Negative and Positive Controls

Procedurally, operational plans, doctrine, and training can dictate vary-
ing degrees of safety, security, and reliability as the strategic forces transi-
tion from a peacetime posture through a crisis, and toward employment.
Procedural measures in support of negative controls can include: the
use of a two-person rule that makes it impossible for a single person to
initiate a launch; the separation of special nuclear material (SNM) from
the high-explosive assembly of a warhead; the separation of a warhead
from its delivery vehicle; or restricting access to launch codes. In addi-
tion, a strategic doctrine that espouses no-first use (NFU) or delayed
retaliation posture can be considered a negative control. These postures
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   229

seek to provide a cushion of time for strategic decision-makers who may

be subject to stress and “the fog of war” during a crisis and potentially
face the unintended use of nuclear weapons due to the inadvertent es-
calation of a crisis.6 In this context, nuclear use is authorized by the
appropriate command authority, but “unauthorized” in the context of
inaccurate and incomplete knowledge or not meeting the original, pre-
crisis intent of the strategic authority.

Figure 12.1. Procedural and Technical Approaches to Negative and

Positive Controls

Negative Controls (-) Positive Controls (+)

• Delayed retaliation posture • Airborne alert status
• No-first use or Launch on • Launch on Warning (LOW)
Warning posture
Procedural Controls

• Two-person rule • Strip alert for strategic bombers

• Restricted access to launch • Pre-delegation of launch
codes authority
• Separation of warhead • Final assembly of warhead
components • Mating warhead with delivery
• Separation of warheads & vehicle
vehicles • Other
• Other

• One-point safety warhead • Fully automated launch system

design • Frequency diversity
Technical Controls

• Mechanical / electrical locks • Hardened communication

• Fail safe weapon designs systems
• Electrical exclusion regions • Sea-based delivery vehicles
• Weak-link designs • Mobile command systems /
• Environmental sensing posts
devices • Jam / interference resistance
• Other • Other

Examples of procedural measures that promote positive control over

nuclear forces include the delegation of launch authority to subordinate
or field commanders, the final assembly of warhead components, the
mating of warheads with their delivery vehicles, the initiation of air-
borne alert status for bombers and the deployment of mobile missile
forces. These measures provide for the rapid execution of authorized
launch orders and an assurance of nuclear use. From a doctrinal per-
spective, a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture (sometimes referred to
230   CHAPTER TWELVE

as a “hair-trigger” posture) can also provide rapid and assured nuclear

use.7

Technical Approaches to Negative and Positive Controls

A broad array of technical measures for providing negative and posi-
tive controls have been developed and fielded over the past sixty years,
though the availability and use of these measures vary among the spec-
trum of nuclear nations. Technical measures include “one-point safety”
designs for weapons that ensure the accidental detonation of a weapon’s
high-explosive assembly does not provide an adequate impulse for deto-
nation of the nuclear core. Other negative controls include mechanical
and electronic locks (to include Permissive Acton Links - PALs), fail safe
designs, weak links, electric exclusion zones, and other technical mea-
sures that prevent unauthorized or accidental use. Technical measures
that provide positive nuclear controls include hardened communica-
tions systems, frequency diversity, mobile command posts, interference
resistant communications, and environmental sensing devices for war-
head arming.8 An additional technical positive control measure is a ful-
ly automatic launch system, such as the Dead Hand (“Mertvaya Ruka”)
system explored but never deployed by the Soviet Union.9 This type of
automatic system, however, may be considered destabilizing as it re-
moves the human decisionmaker from the response cycle and does not
allow for a strategic pause if de-escalation is desired.

General Impressions on Strategic Stability and Negative

and Positive Controls
Figure 12.2 provides a summary graphic of the general implications and
trends associated with the procedural and technical measures of nega-
tive and positive control. As this overall analysis centers on the role of
command and control within strategic stability, it is important to note
that certain C2 trends may bias a system toward use, but this bias does
not predetermine actual use. From a strategic stability perspective, the
maintenance of negative controls during peacetime, crisis, and conflict
ensures that nuclear assets are only employed when properly authorized
by the designated authority(s). In many cases, however, the procedural
aspects of negative controls rely on the proper and disciplined execution
of these measures by people within the command and control system.
For this reason, Personnel Reliability Programs (PRPs)10 are critical in
established as well as emerging nuclear programs.
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   231

Figure 12.2 also underscores the critical procedural transition that

can occur during a crisis when the negative control measures of hav-
ing warheads disassembled and unmated with delivery vehicles change
to positive control measures of fully assembled warheads being mated
to delivery vehicles and deployed to the field. This “either-or” aspect of
negative/positive controls poses significant risk for countries lacking
mature technical negative controls, as the decision to cross into positive
procedural controls eliminates the primary negative controls provided
by weapon disassembly.11

Figure 12. 2. Balancing the “Always-Never” Challenge

Negative Controls (-) Positive Controls (+)

Procedural Controls

System bias toward non-use System bias toward use

Over-reliance on human controls

Notional balance
of control
measures
Technical Controls

System bias toward non-use System bias toward use

Over-reliance on technical Over-reliance on technical controls
controls

System bias toward non-use

Over-reliance on technical controls

The role of technical approaches to negative and positive controls is

perhaps the most significant and destabilizing aspect of C2 disparity in
the twenty-first century, as new and emerging nuclear custodians rely
heavily on procedural measures, due to their limited expertise and finan-
cial resources for developing robust technological measures. Moreover,
unlike positive procedural controls that foster a bias toward use, most
positive technical controls (with the exception of fully automated launch
232   CHAPTER TWELVE

systems) foster a bias toward non-use during crises. This is because the
robustness and assurances provided by these technologies can allow ad-
equate guarantees against the complete loss of nuclear forces and/or C2
in the case of an adversary’s first strike. In this respect, a balanced mix of
positive technical controls and negative controls (both procedural and
technical) and the limitation/avoidance of positive procedural controls
can provide a sufficiently robust C2 system to ensure a safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear arsenal. Stated differently, the promotion of a C2 posture
that continuously maintains positive and negative controls within the left
side and bottom right portion of Figure 12.2 will meet the requirements
of the “always-never” challenge for a nuclear custodian while simultane-
ously assuring a credible deterrent to potential adversaries.

Cuba 1962: Historical Example of the Role of C2

within the “Always-Never” Challenge
The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 is the most cited case of the
potential risks created when two nuclear nations enter into a crisis.
Analysis of the Soviet records of this event show that heavy reliance on
negative controls (primarily procedural) provided a sufficient C2 bias
toward non-use and that the actual approach toward the nuclear brink
was perhaps less precipitous than often cited. Central to this assertion
is the fact that General Issa Pliyev, commander of Soviet forces in Cuba,
did not have full authority to employ nuclear forces. In addition, proce-
dural safeguards were enacted to ensure that the nuclear weapons on the
island were stored separately from their delivery vehicles and required
authorization directly from Moscow (instead of General Pliyev) to re-
move them from storage.12 Figure 12.3 captures the resultant non-use
bias created by these procedural negative controls.
As stated above, however, heavy reliance on procedural measures
during a crisis places significant emphasis on the personnel within the
C2 structure and their ability (and willingness) to execute the orders of
the national command authority. During the Cuban crisis, General Pli-
yev made repeated requests to Moscow to remove the warheads for the
medium-range Frog missiles from storage. Though these requests were
all denied, as commander of all Soviet forces on the island, he could the-
oretically have forced the officer in charge of the nuclear storage site to
release the weapons to him, at which point General Pliyev had the tech-
nical capability to launch the nuclear-armed missiles without final au-
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   233

thorization from Moscow. Due to the strict Soviet command structure,

General Pliyev did not violate his orders from Moscow and the nega-
tive procedural controls remained intact. This potential loss of negative
controls unnerved the Soviet leadership and as Mark Kramer recently
observed, “After the Cuban missile crisis, however, the option of relying
solely on the physical separation of warheads and delivery vehicles was
deemed inadequate.”13

Figure 12. 3. Cuba, 1962: Historical Example of C2 System

Bias Toward Non-Use

Negative Controls (-) Positive Controls (+)

• Launch authority not
Procedural Controls

delegated to Soviet forces on

Cuba

• Warheads not mated with

delivery vehicles

C2 posture of Soviet
nuclear forces in
Controls

Cuba • Soviet
field commanders in Cuba
had technical ability to arm missiles
with nuclear warheads and to
Technical

• Limited, cable communications launch them

between Cuba and Moscow

Twenty-first Century Nuclear Actors

and their C2 Postures
Given the previous discussion on the key concepts and aspects of nega-
tive and positive controls, it is appropriate to explore these issues with-
in the context of the international actors that currently possess or are
pursuing nuclear capabilities. Though certain limitations exist on the
availability and quality of open source data for some actors, sufficient
information exists to identify trends and potential biases within their
C2 postures.
234   CHAPTER TWELVE

The P5 Nations
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are
all custodians of legacy nuclear capabilities and their associated com-
mand and control systems. In the sixteen years since the end of the Cold
War, each nation has explored the future structure and posture of their
strategic arsenals in the context of the changing global security environ-
ment.14
The specific design and construct of the Chinese nuclear command
and control system is believed to be based on an assertive, centralized
command structure with the Chairman of the Central Military Com-
mission, currently President Jiang Zemin, as the national authority for
nuclear use. For negative controls, China is believed to employ a “two
man rule,” as well as the separate storage of warheads and delivery vehi-
cles. Positive technical controls include hardened command and control
facilities, redundant, flexible and EMP-hardened communication net-
works, and the pursuit of new digital microwave communication sys-
tems for all weather and encrypted capabilities. China is not believed to
employ permissive action link (PAL) technologies but maintains a suf-
ficient land-based and sea-based ballistic missile capability to meet the
survivability requirements of its minimal nuclear deterrent posture.15
France has recently placed considerable emphasis on the need to have
a tailored deterrent that goes beyond its large, cold war posture of “de-
terrence by the weak of the strong.”16 This desire to develop flexibility
through smaller, more accurate warheads on its submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) is a departure from France’s cold war policy
of executing a complete sixteen-missile retaliatory response from its
ballistic missile submarines17 and will require enhanced communica-
tion procedures and C2 planning. France also employs procedural nega-
tive controls such as the two-person rule, technical negative controls
that include a locking system similar to PALs, and redundant, hardened
command and control facilities. France’s nuclear launch authority is ex-
pected to remain firmly centralized and under presidential control.18
Russia has a long history of utilizing a broad range of negative and
positive controls for ensuring the safety, security and reliability of its
nuclear deterrent. However, recent Russian emphasis on the develop-
ment and deployment of new Project 955 Borey class submarines, Bu-
lava SLBMs and Topol-M mobile ICBMs, and the 1999 abandonment of
its no first use doctrine were seen by some observers as a shift toward
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   235

a preemptive strike posture.19 In response to these assertions, a leading

Russian strategic analyst remarked that the development of survivable
strategic systems, at a much greater cost than silo-based systems, repre-
sents a significant investment by Russia in an assured retaliatory strike
capability. These investments in new delivery vehicles are also accom-
panied by the enhancement of certain aspects of the Russian command
and control system.20 Similar to the United States, however, Russia has
significant negative control procedures, including the use of the two-
person rule, employment of feedback loops that allow senior commands
to monitor subordinate commands, electronic systems that allow higher
echelons to remotely disable missile launchers, and the use of blocking
devices to physically prevent unauthorized use of weapons.21 From a
C2 perspective, therefore, these efforts to enhance the survivability of
delivery vehicles and communications networks, coupled with a strong
Russian/Soviet history of negative controls, promote an overall Russian
C2 bias toward non-use under crisis conditions.22
The nuclear arsenal of the United Kingdom is centered on a sea-based
nuclear deterrent with current discussions exploring the moderniza-
tion of this single-legged capability. The warhead currently employed
on the British Trident missile is similar to the U.S. W76 warhead and is
presumed to have similar technical positive and negative control mea-
sures, since the Arming, Fusing and Firing System (AF&F) is reported
to be designed by Sandia National Laboratory in the United States.23
The United Kingdom has a centralized strategic release structure, with
the prime minister maintaining launch authority. In addition, the Unit-
ed Kingdom relies heavily on procedural measures such as two-person
rules, as well as authentication codes to prevent unauthorized nuclear
use aboard its submarines.24
The United States employs many of the technical and procedural as-
pects of negative and positive controls discussed at the beginning of this
chapter, including the two-person rule and use of PALs.25 For negative
controls within the U.S. SSBN fleet, a “Use Control” system was installed
during the summer of 1997 that requires the receipt of an external code
in order to unlock a critical component of the SSBN system (the Cap-
tain’s Indicator Panel Key) which is stored in a safe onboard the subma-
rine. Without this component, the system is unable to launch.26 In 2001,
the Department of Defense initiated an “End-to-End Review of the U.S.
Nuclear Command and Control System.” Though many of the find-
ings from the review were classified, some of them included: the need
236   CHAPTER TWELVE

to enhance system survivability and hardness due to degradation since

the end of the cold war; a decline in the number of people who have
expertise in nuclear command and control; challenges associated with
incorporating a vertical, hierarchical C2 structure with the new broad,
dispersed mission space of U.S. Strategic Command; and the integration
of nuclear and conventional capabilities within the new U.S. strategic
triad.27 A central challenge posed by this C2 modernization is the main-
tenance of nuclear positive and negative controls if certain components
and delivery vehicles of the nuclear system are simultaneously conduct-
ing conventional operations. This challenge is discussed below.
Though not a declared nuclear weapon state, Israel is believed to
maintain up to 300 nuclear warheads of various types that can be deliv-
ered by aircraft, ballistic missiles, and, potentially, artillery. Israel is also
pursuing an assured second-strike capability through the acquisition of
three Dolphin-class submarines from Germany. The authority to em-
ploy nuclear weapons rests with the Israeli prime minister and physical
control of the weapons falls under the defense minister. For negative
controls, Israel is believed to store its weapons disassembled, with the
capability to rapidly assemble them and mate the warheads with their
delivery vehicles.28 Due to the opaque nature of its nuclear deterrent,
further details about the technical control measures for Israeli nuclear
weapons are not openly published.
Following the 1998 nuclear tests in India and Pakistan, both coun-
tries forfeited the luxury they previously had of not having to discuss
their strategic command and control procedures. India released its draft
nuclear doctrine in the summer of 1999 and began to discuss more
openly some of the positive and negative controls that it was enacting.
These included the creation of a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA),
maintaining civilian control of nuclear weapons, the declaration of
an NFU doctrine, keeping warheads unmated from delivery vehicles,
keeping weapon components disassembled with separate custody or-
ganizations, and pursuing a retaliatory strike capability through hard-
ened command bunkers and a sea-based leg of the deterrent.29 Some
concern remains, however, over the chain of succession in the case of
the demise of the prime minister, the sole authority over nuclear use, as
well as operational challenges for the military units who are tasked with
nuclear employment responsibilities during war but are unfamiliar with
the weapons for training purposes. In certain circumstances, India is
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   237

expected to pre-delegate nuclear authority to military leaders to ensure

a retaliatory strike capability.30
Pakistan has also recently increased its public discourse on its nuclear
command and control structure and processes. These include an an-
nouncement about separation of the authorities to use nuclear weapons
from the authorities responsible for executing use,31 establishment of
an organization dedicated to weapon security, and not mating warheads
with delivery vehicles. Unlike India, however, Pakistan retains the right
to first use in its nuclear doctrine. In addition, Pakistan relies heavily
on negative procedural controls that are slowly degraded during a crisis
in favor of positive procedural controls (such as assembling warheads
or mating warheads with delivery vehicles), thus creating a potential
C2 bias toward nuclear use.32 The implications of this degradation are
discussed below.
The final two nuclear actors to be explored in this chapter are North
Korea and Iran. Due to the nascent and secretive nature of both pro-
grams, limited information is readily available through open sources
about any negative and positive controls measures that may exist, though
it is expected that both nations maintain a tight, centralized control over
their limited nuclear stockpiles. On 9 October 2006, North Korea openly
stated its nuclear intentions by conducting a nuclear test. The technical
challenges apparently experienced during the test underscore the early
stages of the North Korean program and the likelihood that any negative
control measures currently in place, such as storing weapon components
disassembled, will be primarily procedural. North Korea is expected to
rely initially on aircraft delivery for any nuclear devices it develops for
operational purposes, with positive controls restricted to procedural
measures related to the forward deployment of assembled weapons at
airfields and possibly the mating of assembled weapons with the air-
craft. In addition, the authoritarian nature of the North Korean regime
raises concern over the chain of custody for nuclear devices if Kim Jong
Il dies.33 One U.S. expert who visited North Korea shortly after the Oc-
tober 2006 test remarked, “The officials we met appeared to have little ap-
preciation for the new challenges they faced for nuclear weapons safety
and security that results from the possession of nuclear weapons.”34
Similar to North Korea’s secrecy regarding its nuclear program, Iran
continues to claim that its nuclear aspirations are strictly peaceful and
serve no military purpose. Due to the lack of transparency, analysis of
238   CHAPTER TWELVE

Iranian nuclear C2 is limited to the current understanding of civilian-

military authorities within Iran and its previous command and control
procedures for its chemical weapons program. Central to the develop-
ment and potential deployment of Iranian nuclear capabilities is the
role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG). Iran maintains
a dual military structure, with the regular armed forces responsible for
the defense of Iran’s territory and political integrity, while the IRGC is
responsible for preserving the Islamic revolution. The IRGC is believed
to be developing nuclear weapons through four military organizations
in Iran and operates at a much higher strategic level than the regular
armed forces. Due to the immaturity of Iran’s nuclear program, safety
and security procedures for the initial nuclear devices will primarily in-
volve procedural measures such as the separation of warhead compo-
nents for storage; but these procedural negative controls will be forfeited
if warheads are assembled and mated to delivery vehicles during a crisis
(i.e. a transition to procedural positive controls). In addition, it is pos-
sible that an internal security organization may be created specifically to
ensure the security of Iran’s nuclear weapons.35

C2 Stability Dynamics in the Twenty-first Century

and Implications for Policy
The preceding discussion explores the stability dynamics associated
with a variety of negative and positive nuclear control measures. This
assessment highlights the potential stability provided by a non-use bias
during a crisis when procedural negative controls (such as two-person
rules, restricted access to launch codes, or a delayed response posture)
are maintained simultaneously with technical negative controls incor-
porated in the weapon design and positive technical controls that en-
sure system robustness and survivability during combat operations. The
overview above of existing nuclear C2 postures highlights four key ar-
eas, depicted graphically in figure 12.4, where existing command and
control systems risk transitioning toward a use bias during a crisis:
1. Procedural chain of custody measures (negative controls) in Iran,
North Korea, and Pakistan that potentially exist without complimen-
tary negative technical controls;
2. South Asian security dynamics and the degradation of Pakistani nega-
tive control procedures during crisis escalation;
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   239

 3. U.S.-Russian crisis management during conventional SLBM and

BMD engagements against third party threats; and
4. Deliberate asymmetric threats against existing C2 systems.
Though Iran and North Korea maintain a greater shroud of secrecy
around their nuclear weapons programs than Pakistan, all three na-
tions appear to rely on negative procedural controls and the associated
personnel reliability procedures as the primary means of ensuring the
safety and security of the nuclear capabilities. With its totalitarian orga-
nizational structure, North Korea may have adequate security for its nu-
clear devices as long as they remain in a non-deployed and disassembled
status. The safety of North Korea’s devices, however, is most likely lack-
ing since technical measures such as one-point safety, weak links and
electrical exclusion zones are probably inadequately incorporated in
their weapon designs. For this reason, policy efforts should focus on not
provoking any nuclear posturing from North Korea that may include
the final assembly and potential deployment of their nuclear devices.
Iran poses a significant challenge in that its negative procedural
controls appear inadequate if the forces transition into a deployed sta-
tus. Even if they remain under the control of the authorized nuclear
command structure, it would be the IRGC, which is the more bellicose
branch of the Iranian armed forces. The end result is a challenge similar
to North Korea in that external pressures may have limited ability to
prevent the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons, but ill-
considered external pressures may result in a deployed nuclear posture
and a potential C2 instability bias toward use.
Pakistan, a more advanced nuclear state than Iran and North Ko-
rea, can leverage the influence of external actors to assist in dampen-
ing regional crisis escalation involving India, which is the most likely
reason for a Pakistani transition from negative to positive procedural
controls. South Asian security dynamics highlight an Indian C2 posture
that is biased toward non-use and a Pakistani C2 posture biased toward
use.36 The geography of the region provides India with sufficient strate-
gic depth to assure some level of retaliatory strike capability, an advan-
tage that simultaneously creates an almost immediate requirement for
Pakistan to transition toward a use bias in order to present a credible
deterrent. Pakistani confidence in the survivability of its nuclear deter-
rent can decrease the perceived need for positive procedural controls
and reduce crisis instability and escalation. Potential bilateral measures
240   CHAPTER TWELVE

that can contribute to a non-use bias during a crisis include the avoid-
ance of counter-force targeting—including C2 networks and command
posts—by conventional as well as nuclear forces, and the declaration of a
no first use posture.37 Overall, the criticality of C2 stability in South Asia
is captured well by one expert who noted, “A peacetime environment in
the region will pay the dividend of keeping arsenals non-deployed and
the safety and security coefficient will remain high. This situation would
change, however, if regional strategic dynamics lead to formal nuclear
deployments…”38 Finally, Pakistan may be willing to receive informa-
tion and assistance on negative technical controls as long as this level
of cooperation does not threaten the security of its nuclear stockpile.39
This type of assistance can provide safety during regional crises as well
as scenarios involving theft of a device where negative procedural con-
trols are insufficient.

U.S.-Russia
The ongoing transformation in U.S. and Russian strategic postures
poses a unique challenge and has global implications. Though both
countries have stated policies that they are no longer adversaries and
do not target each other with strategic systems, the adaptation of legacy
weapon systems and legacy command and control processes to address
new and emerging threats can still place these two nations at strategic
odds during a crisis. The pursuit of global strike and global missile de-
fense capabilities by the United States significantly increases the need
for transparency between the two countries, as misperceptions may re-
sult during the employment of conventionally armed ballistic missiles
(especially submarine-launched) or interceptor flight paths that broach
Russian airspace. The U.S. Congress identified some of these risks in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 in which Con-
gress calls upon the Secretary of Defense to provide:
■ a report on the capabilities of other countries to discriminate be-
tween the launch of a conventional or nuclear sea-launched bal-
listic missile;
■ an assessment of the notification and other protocols that would
have to be in place before using any conventional sea-launched bal-
listic missile and a plan for entering into such protocols; and
■ a joint statement by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
State on how to ensure that the use of a conventional sea-launched
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   241

ballistic missile will not result in an intentional, inadvertent, mis-

taken, or accidental reciprocal or responsive launch of a nuclear
strike by any other country.40
Some of these concerns and requirements can be addressed through
the execution of the June 2000 “Memorandum of Agreement Between
the Government of the United States and Government of the Russian
Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of
Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launch-
es.”41 This agreement, commonly referred to as the Joint Data Exchange
Center (JDEC), is held up by legal wrangling between the two countries
over personal tax and liability issues for U.S. personnel working in the
proposed Moscow-based center.42

Figure 12.4. C2 Stability Dynamics and Policy Implications

Negative Controls (-) Positive Controls (+)

Iran Must prevent this transition from

Procedural Controls

North Korean negative to positive procedural

Pakistan measures during crises by these
countries.
Indo-Pak: No counterfor ops
Pakistan: Personnel reliability
U.S.-Russia: LUA, not LOW

Notional balance
of control
measures
Technical Controls

Pakistan: Help develop Avoid any country

PALs? fielding automated
launch systems
US-Russia: Joint data exchange
US-Russia: Dialogue on negative
controls India: Hardened communications
systems and centers.

An additional bilateral concern involving the United States and Rus-

sia is their maintenance of launch on warning (LOW) postures despite
their stated non-adversarial relationship. This perceived “hair trigger”
environment was tested during the 25 January 1995 launch of a Norwe-
gian sounding rocket from an island off the northwest coast of Norway,
a perceived area for U.S. Trident submarine patrol routes.43 A senior
242   CHAPTER TWELVE

Russian general who served in the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) com-
mand center during the event asserts that the negative procedural con-
trols in place adequately diffused the situation and Russian forces were
never prepared for launch. The launch commands associated with the
Russian strategic systems involve four stages:
■ preliminary command—after the identification of a potential threat

from EW systems;
■ permission command—upon confirmation of a missile attack against
Russia, preparation by the president, minister of defense and chief
of the General Staff of authorization for nuclear use, and delegation
of use to the three military commanders in chief;
■ direct command—submission of launch commands with special
unblocking code values and the number of the operational plan to
launch crews at the operational level; and
■ launch command—the execution of the launch order by the missile
crews.44
According to the Russian General, only the first level of launch com-
mand was initiated during the Norwegian incident as command center
personnel recognized the launch as an anomaly and considered it very
unlikely that the United States would engage Russia with a single sub-
marine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). American officials have also
stated that their perception of the incident was that the Russian system
“worked” and no launch authorization was issued over a misinterpreted
threat.45 Despite these assurances, however, experts from the Russian
and American strategic communities agree on the need to enhance bi-
lateral transparency in the areas of early warning and data exchange.
A final area for exploration in C2 stability dynamics is the potential
risks created by deliberate, asymmetric attacks against the command
and control system of a nuclear nation in order to generate false warn-
ings or unauthorized procedures. These attack profiles may involve
the degradation of negative control procedures or the manipulation
of positive control procedures and center on taking remote control of
command systems rather than physical control of the actual nuclear
weapons. In the investigations following the September 11 attacks in
the United States, intelligence officials discovered that one of the plots
discussed in an Al Qaeda training camp was the hijacking of a Rus-
sian ICBM launcher and forcing the crew to launch their missile against
the United States.46 Though much more technically challenging (if not
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   243

impossible), this asymmetric attack profile represents a scenario that

merits further consideration and consultation: the intentional manipu-
lation of nuclear command and control procedures in order to execute
nuclear release.47 Of particular concern is the assurance that negative
control procedures are adequately robust from a security perspective
(and safety perspective) to prevent all possible avenues for initiating nu-
clear release. Moreover, the joint exploration of negative controls can be
conducted without posing a risk to the positive control measures or de-
grading the efficacy of the negative controls.48 Finally, joint discussions
on negative controls can also cover potential insider threats emerging
from underpaid nuclear scientists and military personnel serving in
nuclear duties, a cause of concern in the West.49
This chapter highlights the role of nuclear command and control
systems in promoting strategic stability during a crisis. The previous
discussion underscores the importance of promoting a non-use bias
through sustained procedural and technical negative controls and as-
sured system robustness and survivability through positive technical
control measures. The end result of this balanced mix of control mea-
sures is that command and control systems are sufficiently safe, secure,
and reliable during the transition from peace to crisis, and into wartime,
that nuclear use never occurs as a result of unauthorized or accidental
events, and that nuclear authorization is less likely to occur as a result
of the fog of war.

Notes
1. This chapter uses the term “command and control” to represent all aspects
of the system developed by a state to conduct its nuclear operations and provide
safety, security and reliability to its arsenal. Included in this discussion are the
communication processes that are part of the command and control system but
not the supporting intelligence capabilities. As such, this discussion of nuclear
command and control also explores the topic of nuclear command, control,
and communications (C3) but not command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I).
2. “U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff,” Department
of Defense Directive 3150.06 (dated August 25, 2006). Available online: www.
fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3150_06.pdf.
3. Ibid, 2.
4. See for example John D. Steinbruner, “Choices and Trade-offs” in Ashton
B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, Managing Nuclear Oper-
244   CHAPTER TWELVE

ations (Washington, D.C, Brookings Institution, 1987), 539-541; and Bruce G.

Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washing-
ton, D.C, Brookings Institution, 1985), 68-69. It should be noted that positive
controls are different from “positive measures” which the U.S. Department of
Defense defines as “design features, safety rules, procedures, accident preven-
tion or mitigation measures, or other controls including physical security and
coded systems, used collectively or individually, to enhance safety and to re-
duce the likelihood, severity, or consequences of an accident, unauthorized act,
or deliberate threat.” Source: DOD 3150.2-M, DOD Nuclear Weapon System
Safety Program Manual (December 1996).
5. The six functions are based on a list provided in Valery E. Yarynich, C3:
Nuclear Command, Control Cooperation (Washington, DC: Center for Defense
Information, 2003), 17.
6. Inadvertent escalation refers to scenarios where conventional operations
may result in the unintended targeting of an adversary’s strategic assets and the
potential triggering of a nuclear response by the adversary who perceives the
conventional strike as a decapitation or counter-force attack. This type of sce-
nario is commonly mentioned in the need for escalation control in South Asia.
On “inadvertent escalation,” see Barry R. Posen, “Inadvertent Nuclear War? Es-
calation and NATO’s Northern Flank,” International Security Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall
1982), 28-54. For a theoretical discussion on inadvertent escalation in South
Asia, see Rajesh Rajagopalan, “The Threat of Unintended Use of Nuclear Weap-
ons in South Asia,” India Review Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 2005), 214-232. Concerning
the limited time available for executing strategic decisions, Dr. Zbigniew Brzez-
inski has stated his training indicated he had “roughly three minutes in which
to verify the nature of the attack and its scale, which would involve several pro-
gressive steps. The President, once I reached him, would have four minutes to
decide how to respond depending on the scale of the attack. Then the execution
would be set in motion.” The Atlantic Council of the United States, Christopher
J. Makins Lecture given by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski on 31 May 2006 at the Brit-
ish Ambassador’s Residence in Washington, DC (transcript page 3). Former
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev stated in a 14 July 2006 interview on radio
station Echo in Moscow that when conducting exercises to simulate a strategic
attack from China, “they suddenly report to me that missiles are flying from a
certain direction, I give a command, I receive proposals [for action], I give my
agreement…and it all takes 10-15 minutes…” Available in Russian at: http://
www.echo.msk.ru/programs/razvorot/44851/index.phtml (Translation provid-
ed by Dr. Mikhail Tsypkin). The September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States
highlight, however, that unplanned, real-time communications cannot always
be achieved for national leaders. President Bush was unable to conduct critical
communications with key strategic advisors in the White House while he was
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   245

aboard Air Force One. Kimberly Weisul, “How Air Force One Let Bush Down,”
Business Week (4 November 2002). Available online: http://www.businessweek.
com/magazine/content/02_44/c3806015.htm
7. Further discussion on the operational risks associated with no first use
(NFU), launch under attack (LUA), and launch on warning (LOW) postures
are discussed in the final section of this chapter.
8. For a detailed discussion on the technical aspects of positive and nega-
tive nuclear controls, see Chuck Hansen, The Swords of Armageddon: U.S.
Nuclear Weapons Development Since 1945, Volume VIII (1995); Donald R.
Cotter, “Peacetime Operations: Safety and Security,” in Ashton B. Carter, John
D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations (Wash-
ington, D.C, Brookings Institution, 1987), 42-55; and Chris Burroughs, “Tiny
‘Micro Guardian’ Promises to Safeguard Nuclear Weapons in Big Way, Sandia
Lab News Vol. 51, No. 1 (15 January 1999).
9. Some confusion exists over whether the Soviet Union ever fielded Dead
Hand and the misidentification of this system with the Soviet Perimetr system.
A recently declassified top secret memorandum drafted in 1985 for the Soviet
Politburo by Oleg Belyakov (titled “On Shortcomings in the Organization for
Work to Increase the Effectiveness of Strategic Armaments”) states that “no
attention at all has been given to an extremely important military-political pro-
posal to create a fully automated system for retaliatory strike operations that
could be activated by the highest command levels during a threatening period.”
The implications of this memorandum and the known Soviet emphasis on cen-
tralized, assertive control seem to indicate that Dead Hand never went beyond
the proposal stage. Correspondence with Mark Kramer, 1 March 2007. For a
discussion on the Perimetr system that employs rocket-borne transponders to
communicate launch orders to Russian ICBM crews when landlines are sev-
ered, see Valery E. Yarynich, 156-159. Perimetr concepts appear to mirror those
of the U.S. Emergency Rocket Communication System (ERCS).
10. Personnel Reliability Program refers to the screening of military and ci-
vilian personnel before they are assigned to nuclear duty positions. Nuclear
duty positions are generally divided into two categories: a critical nuclear duty
position (where the person has served in a command and control position, has
technical knowledge of the system, or has access to nuclear weapons under the
two-person rule), or a controlled nuclear duty position (where the person has
access to nuclear weapons but does not require technical knowledge). Criti-
cal nuclear duty positions include personnel who perform maintenance and/or
modifications on nuclear weapons or serve in critical command and control
positions such as PAL teams, delivery and warhead support units, or emergen-
cy action message authentication and employment responsibilities. Controlled
nuclear duty positions include personnel who handle nuclear weapons, such
246   CHAPTER TWELVE

as vehicle, equipment and aircraft operators, and members of nuclear weap-

on storage site security forces. See Donald R. Cotter, “Peacetime Operations:
Safety and Security,” 60-61; and “DODD 5210.42 Nuclear Weapon Personnel
Reliability Program (PRP)” (15 December 1995). Available at: www.fas.org/
nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/dodd-5210_42.htm
11. This point is explored in the final section during the discussion on South
Asian stability dynamics.
12. Soviet operational procedures in the early 1960s specifically required that
theater commanders receive approval prior to using tactical nuclear weapons in
a war. General Anatolii Gribkov, whose comments at a U.S.-Russian meeting in
Havana in 1992 initiated some of the rumors about Soviet delegation of launch
authority to General Pliyev, later retracted his comments to state Pliyev “was
categorically forbidden to use nuclear weapons of any type” during the Cuban
crisis. Quoted in Mark Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command
Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Colonel Nikolai Beloborodov, who
commanded the storage site for the Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, stated
in an interview, “No nuclear munitions of any type, whether for the medium-
range or the tactical weapons, were ever moved out of storage during the crisis.
Nor could they have been moved without my knowledge.” Quoted in Mark
Kramer, “‘Lessons’ of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 353, footnote 17.
13. Mark Kramer, “‘Lessons’ of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact
Operations,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 352.
14. As the space constraints of this chapter do not allow for a detailed dis-
cussion on the warheads and delivery vehicles employed by each of the nuclear
actors, this section focuses on general trends as they impact command and
control requirements.
15. “Command and Control—China Nuclear Forces.” Federation of Ameri-
can Scientists. Available at: http://www.fas.org. While trying to improve its stra-
tegic communications capabilities, China has openly admitted that the Second
Artillery Corps continues to be challenged when conducting field exercises.
See Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese
Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning. Federation of American Scien-
tists & The Natural Resources Defense Council (Washington, DC, November
2006), 47-52.
16. David S. Yost, “France’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy,” Survival Vol. 47, No.
3 (Autumn 2005), 122.
17. David Yost, “France’s New Nuclear Doctrine,” International Affairs Vol.
82, No. 4 (2006), 704. Dr. Yost also highlights French discussions on possibly
reducing the yield of existing weapons to only a detonation of the “primary”
warhead stage (“amorce”) thus reducing collateral damage. See also Bruno Ter-
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   247

trais, “Nuclear Policy: France Stands Alone,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(July/August 2004), 48-55.
18. David Yost, “France’s New Nuclear Doctrine,” Bruno Tertrais, “Nuclear
Policy: France Stands Alone,” as well as a discussion on French nuclear com-
mand and control in Gurmeet Kanwal, “Command and Control of Nuclear
Weapons in India,” Strategic Analysis Vol. 13, No. 10).
19. Mark Schneider, “The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Fed-
eration.” A Publication of the United States Nuclear Strategy Forum (Washing-
ton, DC, National Institute Press, 2006).
20. Vladimir Dvorkin, “On Strategic Relations between Russia and the U.S.:
An Analysis of Mark Schneider’s paper titled ‘The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine
of the Russian Federation,’” (September 2006). General Dvorkin also observed
that the Russian abandonment of its no first use doctrine mirrored the postures
of France, Great Britain and the United States (Dvorkin, 13-18).
21. Valery Yarynich, 206-209.
22. The final section of this chapter includes a more detailed discussion of
Russian procedural negative controls in the context of the January 1995 launch
of a Norwegian sounding rocket and Russian response to this event.
23. Paul Robinson of Sandia National Laboratory is reported to have stated
in 1994 that “Sandia also designs the arming-fusing-firing mechanisms for the
British nuclear weapons programme.” Included in these design features would
be two strong links and one weak link component. See John Ainslie, “The Fu-
ture of the British Bomb,” WMD Awareness Programme (Glasgow, UK, Clyde-
side Press, 19 October 2006).
24. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “British Nuclear Forces, 2005,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 61, No. 6 (November/December 2005),
77-79.
25. An extensive discussion of U.S. command and control procedures and
technologies can be found in Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control:
Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985);
Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, Managing Nu-
clear Operations; and Valery E. Yarynich, C3: Nuclear Command, Control Co-
operation.
26. Mel Lyman, “Crimson Tide: They Got It All Wrong,” The Submarine Re-
view (April 1999).
27. Robert D. Critchlow, “Nuclear Command and Control: Current Pro-
grams and Issues,” CRS Report to Congress (3 May 2006).
28. Seth Elan et al, “Open-Source Research on Nuclear Doctrine and Strat-
egy, Command and Control, and Delivery Systems in Iran and Israel,” Library
248   CHAPTER TWELVE

of Congress (December 2005). “Israel Nuclear Overview.” Center for Nonpro-

liferation Studies (September 2004). Available at: www.nti.org; and Warner D.
Farr, “The Third Temple’s Holy of Holies: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons,” The Coun-
terproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No. 2 (Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama, September 1999).
29. Ashley J. Tellis, “Toward a ‘Force-in-Being’: The Logic, Structure, and
Utility of India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture”; Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear
Command-and-Control in South Asia during Peace, Crisis and War,” Con-
temporary South Asia Vol. 14, No. 2 (June 2005), 163-174; Peter R. Lavoy and
Christopher Clary, “Strategic Stability in South Asia: Conference Summary,”
(29 June–1 July 2004), available at: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/
jul04southasia.pdf; and Harsh V. Pant, “India’s Nuclear doctrine and Command
Structure: Implications for India and the World,” Comparative Strategy Vol. 24
(2005), 277-293.
30. Peter R. Lavoy and Christopher Clary, “Strategic Stability in South Asia:
Conference Summary.”
31. Though some observers believe key people in Pakistan have both use and
execution authorities.
32. Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Command-and-Control in South Asia
during Peace, Crisis and War” and Peter R. Lavoy and Christopher Clary, “Stra-
tegic Stability in South Asia: Conference Summary.”
33. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “North Korea’s Nuclear Pro-
gram, 2005,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (May/June 2005), 64-67.
34. Siegfried S. Hecker, “Report on North Korean Nuclear Program,” Center
for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University (15 November
2006). Available at: www.fas.org.
35. Gregory F. Giles, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Weapons,” in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz,
eds., Planning the Unthinkable. How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 79–103; Seth
Elan et al, “Open-Source Research on Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy, Com-
mand and Control, and Delivery Systems in Iran and Israel;” and Jack Boures-
ton and Charles D. Ferguson, “Schooling Iran’s Atom Squad,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists (May/June 2004), 31-35.
36. Peter R. Lavoy and Christopher Clary, “Strategic Stability in South Asia:
Conference Summary.”
37. Though India already has a no first use policy and is believed to have a
counter-value targeting strategy, the inability to verify/enforce these policies
makes it difficult for Pakistani officials to be comfortable accepting these In-
dian declarations at face value. For conventional operations, India can avoid
 NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY   249

offensive actions against known weapon and vehicle storage sites and known
command and control networks and posts.
38. Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Command-and-Control in South Asia
during Peace, Crisis and War,” Contemporary South Asia Vol. 14, No. 2 (June
2005), 170-171.
39. The sharing of PAL technology and other negative controls is viewed by
many observers as a violation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)
since it would be a de facto acceptance of Pakistan as a nuclear weapons state.
Similar discussions surround the sharing of civilian nuclear energy technolo-
gies with India by the United States. From a policy perspective, therefore, the
crux of the issue is that negative controls prevent unauthorized use but can
be perceived as enhancing Pakistani nuclear capabilities and increase the risks
they might be able to take during a crisis. From a nuclear safety and security
perspective, however, negative controls can also prevent the use of a nuclear
device due to theft or diversion by an insider.
40. Section 219, paragraph b (5), (6) and (14).
41. “Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Warning Center for the Ex-
change of Information on Missile Launches and Early Warning.” White House
Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary (4 June 2000).
42. Wade Boese, “Joint Data Exchange Center on Hold,” Arms Control To-
day (June 2006). Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/Cart-
wrightInterview.asp#Sidebar
43. Pavel Podvig, “If It’s Broke, Don’t Fix It,” Bulletin of the American Scien-
tists (July/August 2005), 21-22. Despite some reporting, this launch of a Black
Brant XII was not an unannounced event but part of a series of three rocket
launches scheduled for the period of 15 January–10 February 1995 from the
Andoya Rocket Range. See “Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Oslo) letter to
The Heads of Mission,” Number 21776/VII/94 (dated 21 December 1994).
44. Valery E. Yarynich, 152-153.
45. Interview with Russian and American officials directly involved in the
incident (July 2002).
46. Faye Bowers and Peter Grier, “9/11 Panel Details Plots of Al Qaeda,”
Christian Science Monitor (17 June 2004).
47. Valery E. Yarynich, “The Ultimate Terrorism,” Washington Post (30 April
2004), A29.
48. For an extensive discussion on this topic, see Valery E. Yarynich, C3:
Nuclear Command, Control Cooperation.
49. There was a highly publicized incident in September 1998 in which a
sailor killed a guard and seven crew members aboard an Akula-class SSN at the
250   CHAPTER TWELVE

Northern Fleet’s Gadzhiyevo Base and then attempted to detonate the subma-
rine’s torpedoes (resulting in his own death). Western experts often cite this as
an example of potential vulnerabilities created by poor living conditions and
low pay for Russian service members. See James Clay Moltz and Tamara C.
Robinson, “Dismantling Russia’s Nuclear Subs: New Challenges to Non-prolif-
eration,” Arms Control Today (June 1999). For a discussion on Russian efforts
concerning nuclear security, see Yevgeny Maslin, “Security of Nuclear Arsenals
in the Russian Federation,” Yaderny Kontrol Digest Vol. 9, No. 3-4 (Summer/Fall
2004), 6-13; and Vladimir Verkhovtsev, “Nuclear Weapons Security—Russia’s
Top Priority in the Long Term,” Yaderny Kontrol Digest Vol. 10, No. 1-2 (Win-
ter/Spring 2005), 38-45.
 Chapter Thirteen

Transformation of the
Nuclear Weapons Complex
Overcoming the Legacy of a Sprawling Enterprise
Lani Miyoshi Sanders

T
he Nuclear Weapons Complex (Complex) began as a geographi-
cally sprawling enterprise, peppering the country with the physi-
cal underpinnings of the nuclear age. Today, a buzzword for the
Complex is consolidation, reflecting the paradigm shift from the origi-
nal Manhattan Engineering District and Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) siting strategies to the current strategies for creating a more
sustainable and affordable future Complex.1 That this future Complex
cannot be constructed de novo, but must emerge from a physical foun-
dation largely misaligned with today’s environment, is the challenge of
transformation.2
The physical foundation of the current Complex can be simplisti-
cally summarized as eight major sites in seven states operated (singly
or in partnership) by almost a dozen different entities. From one van-
tage point, this geographic dispersal and relative independence creates
a Complex that “does not operate as an integrated enterprise with a
shared purpose…resulting in redundant programs and facilities, in-
creasing costs and reducing productivity.”3 Yet, from the point of view
of the Complex’s original architects, geographic separation, indepen-
dent operations, and duplication of missions of the sites was a conscious
strategy, intended in part to meet three key drivers continuing to have
top priority today: security, safety, and responsiveness.

251
252   CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Security and Safety: In the Eye of the Beholder

Designing for security and safety held a vastly different meaning in the
1940s and 1950s, when the majority of the Complex was sited and con-
structed. At that time, security centered on secrecy, compartmentalizing
knowledge, and the ability to sustain capabilities, even if a site was com-
promised by an attack; this was the “policy of strategic dispersion.”4 As
a result, the AEC sometimes duplicated missions at separate sites, often
far from the first location of the mission (e.g., Hanford and Savannah
River). Note, almost 60 per cent of the states had a nuclear weapons site
resident in them at one time or another.5
Security and safety were also intimately linked with remoteness of
sites. Remoteness provided secrecy, an utmost concern, as well as pro-
tection of the public if there was an accident.6 The first production fa-
cilities for the Manhattan Project, constructed in Tennessee (Y-12 and
K-25, for electromagnetic separation and gaseous diffusion of U-235,
respectively; and X-10, for the experimental plutonium pile and separa-
tion facilities), were “located in valleys away from the town…provid[ing]
security and containment in case of explosions.”7 The choice of Hanford
(a half-million acre site) as the full-scale plutonium facility reflected the
need for greater isolation than what Oak Ridge could provide.8
Today, threats to the security of the Complex stand in stark contrast
to those at the time of its inception. Clearly, the September 11 terrorist
attacks epitomized that change. The siting and design of the Complex
reflected the security concerns of the day—more on the order of Soviet
long-range bombing or keeping the Manhattan Project secret than ter-
rorists on suicide missions. In short, “no threat of the current nature
was envisioned.”9 For example, the location of production facilities in
isolated valleys may have been a reasonable choice when security was
synonymous with secrecy, but is a very poor choice in today’s environ-
ment, where those with the high ground enjoy a huge tactical advantage
in a conflict.
Safety is also a very different business today.10 Note that it took not
one, but two deaths, utilizing the same plutonium core, to end hands-on
criticality work at Los Alamos in 1946.11 In this same year, the Atomic
Energy Act was passed, and “its major safety concern, other than na-
tional security, was protection of the public and property.”12 In other
words, worker safety, while important, was not the highest priority.
Today, remoteness remains important in mitigating consequences of
 TRANSFORMATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX   253

accidents to surrounding populations, and worker safety is viewed as

critically important.
Yet, an effective balance between productivity (from a program stand-
point) and safety and security performance has yet to be struck. In 1997,
the “120-Day Study” noted that “the largest single problem uncovered is
that…DOE’s practices for managing environmental, safety, and health
concerns are constipating the system.”13 In 2005, the “Overskei Task
Force” noted that “the DOE has burdened the Complex with rules and
regulations that focus on process rather than mission safety…resulting
in a risk-averse posture at all management levels.”14 That safety and se-
curity can still wield such power in the Complex, yet mean something
quite different to the infrastructure and its operation than in the past,
illustrates the profound importance of considering a variety of poten-
tial futures when shaping an infrastructure to meet multiple decades to
come.

Consolidation and Responsive Infrastructure:

Friends or Foes
Although the safety and security needs of the Complex have changed
as the world has changed, the meaning of responsiveness has remained
deeply tied to what the Complex can do—and in what timeframes. Re-
sponsive infrastructure is currently defined with temporal criteria (for
example, time to fix, adapt, prototype, produce, or dismantle weapons)
or by “the resilience of the nuclear enterprise to unanticipated events or
emerging threats and the ability to anticipate innovations by an adver-
sary and to counter them before our deterrent is degraded.”15 Although
the specific temporal criteria (i.e., number of months) have evolved,
the meaning and intent underlying responsiveness have not evolved as
dramatically as the safety and security landscapes, for example. What
has changed is the willingness to pay the cost. In other words, using
today’s lens, a hedge for deterring a resurgent Russia appears expensive
(through the lens of the Cold War, the costs looked quite different).
For example, the duplication of capabilities, originally intended to
provide strategic redundancy for responsiveness, still provides that re-
dundancy in some cases, but is now often perceived as wasted resources.
In recent years, the pressure on the National Nuclear Security Admin-
istration (NNSA) to reduce duplication has increased measurably. Yet,
254   CHAPTER THIRTEEN

reduction in strategic redundancy can have a cost: increased risk and

reduced innovation and creativity. A study examining options for “re-
configuring” the Complex in the early 1990s (Complex-21) put it this
way: “The thrusts to downsize, consolidate, and privatize must be bal-
anced with a level of prudent redundancy in selected key capabilities,
which, if lost, would cause significant and rapid degradation of overall
Complex effectiveness.”16 In other words, the responsiveness functions
of surge capacity, redundancy, and intellectual capital can be degraded
by consolidation and elimination of duplication.
Note that even in the early days of consolidation, the government
sometimes chose to pay for responsiveness. For example, in 1963, the
AEC decided not to begin shutting down all the reactor operations at
either Savannah River or Hanford, but to alternate closings back and
forth between sites, although the former made more economic sense.
Acting AEC chairman Robert E. Wilson justified this decision to Presi-
dent Kennedy based on the need to maintain surge capacity and strate-
gic redundancy.17 Minimizing local economic impacts was also given as
justification, indicating that politics played an important role then, as it
does now.
From a security standpoint, consolidation versus the high expense of
a “policy of strategic dispersion” remains a subject of debate. The recent
Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure stated “the
broad distribution of special nuclear materials (SNM)…increases the
number of potential terrorist targets within this country…With physi-
cal security costs approaching 15 percent of the budget, the benefits of
SNM consolidation are substantial, both in terms of reducing capital
and operating costs as well as reducing risk to adjacent populations.”18
The opposing viewpoint was captured by Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr.,
USN (Ret.): “We should disperse the facilities that undertake nuclear
weapons infrastructure design and manufacturing activities…If these
facilities were located in a single site, that location would offer an at-
tractive target to an adversary, who would then be able to cripple our
capability for maintaining our present and future stockpile.”19
This contrast in perspectives hints at a larger question about the role
of consolidation in realizing a responsive infrastructure. Consolidation,
at its core, is about economics—reducing the fixed costs of the Complex.
Although economics certainly play a role in the sustainability of the en-
terprise as a whole, the explicit tie between responsive infrastructure
and consolidation deserves closer scrutiny. Conceptually, a responsive
 TRANSFORMATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX   255

infrastructure could be achieved independent of a geographically con-

solidated enterprise, if cost was not a central factor. And, indeed, it has
been.

The Manhattan Project: From scratch, with deep

pockets, in a unique moment
When discussing the lack of responsiveness of today’s Complex, the
Manhattan Project is often held up as evidence of what the Complex
(and indeed, the nation) could be capable of accomplishing under spe-
cific world conditions (a crisis or strategic surprise). It stands as an en-
during benchmark for responsiveness—and an obvious antithesis of
consolidation. There can be little disagreement that the journey from
“laboratory research [to] design, construction, operation, and product
delivery in two-and-a-half years (from early 1943 to Hiroshima) [was] a
major industrial achievement.”20 The Manhattan Project can be under-
stood as a paragon of responsive infrastructure, even as defined today.
The Manhattan Project had three pivotal responsive infrastructure
enablers lacking today: (1) starting from scratch, (2) deep pockets, and
(3) a unique world environment. History reveals insights about how
necessary and/or sufficient these three enablers can be in creating a re-
sponsive infrastructure, and their relevance to consolidation.
The Manhattan Project had the distinct advantage of starting from
scratch—a chance to create its own infrastructure to fit the needs of the
day, rather than transform an aging infrastructure ill-suited to the needs
of the day. The benefits are obvious: no legacy facilities, no contamina-
tion, no outdated technology, and clean sheet designs tailored to the
needs.
It also had the benefit of deep pockets. With “AAA Priority,” top pro-
curement priority obtained by General Leslie Groves from the War Pro-
duction Board, new and expansive facilities (peopled by some of the
best minds in the world with whole new communities to support them)
were rapidly constructed for the Manhattan Project.21 For example, in
30 months, 554 non-residential buildings (including B, D, and F Reac-
tors, and T, B, and U Processing Canyons), 64 underground high level
waste tanks, 544 miles of road/railways, and the “government city” of
Richland (housing 17,500 people) were constructed at Hanford.22
Despite what the Manhattan Project was able to accomplish, it is dif-
ficult to argue that starting from scratch is either necessary or sufficient
256   CHAPTER THIRTEEN

for pursuit of a responsive infrastructure. In essence, it is simpler—it

is creation, rather than transformation. The primary option that would
mimic starting from scratch today would arise out of consolidation of
current facilities at a greenfield site. In other words, consolidation, per-
haps more than any other infrastructure transformation strategy, holds
the promise of releasing the Complex from the shackles of an infrastruc-
ture born out of another time—a chance to start anew, with smaller,
highly modernized facilities that reflect the needs of today and what is
imagined for tomorrow.
However, consolidation to new infrastructure incurs significant up-
front costs. The theory is that these costs are an investment ultimately
recouped by the reduction of fixed costs that come from shutting down
weapons operations at legacy facilities. This was the argument used to
accomplish the one, arguably transformational23 consolidation of the
past few decades, Nonnuclear Reconfiguration, which consolidated
missions from Mound and Pinellas primarily to the Kansas City Plant.
The up-front cost of this consolidation was around $440M, with an es-
timated savings of $250M per year hence.24 However, Nonuclear Re-
configuration consolidated nonnuclear missions to existing sites. The
up-front costs of relocating nuclear missions to a new facility would be
expected to be significantly more.25
Clearly, consolidation is about more than just reducing the fixed costs
of the Complex and starting from scratch with modernized facilities. It
can be argued that a consolidated Complex provides increased efficien-
cies (reduced transportation burdens, leveraged interdependencies, such
as those between design and production, minimization of duplication,
reduced safety and security burdens, etc.). In other words, consolidation
can be understood as a potential pathway to responsive infrastructure,
due to the efficiencies discussed above.
However, other methods exist for creating efficiencies that can be in-
dependent of consolidation. The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)
program seeks to create efficiencies in existing facilities through the
types of materials and manufacturing techniques employed, the inher-
ent safety features of the warhead, and other characteristics which have
led it to be called “the enabler for transformation” of the Complex.26 It
can be argued that these types of efficiencies could come to fruition with
or without accompanying Complex consolidation. Indeed, the connec-
tion between the RRW program and consolidation is more about poli-
tics than strict interdependencies. Representative David Hobson, former
 TRANSFORMATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX   257

chair of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcom-

mittee, put it this way: “RRW is a deal with Congress, but the deal re-
quires a serious effort by the Department to modernize, consolidate,
and downsize the weapons complex.”27
In summary, the primary, tangible (vs. political) link between respon-
sive infrastructure and consolidation is cost. From a business stand-
point, consolidation is a way to achieve a return on investment for new
facilities (i.e., starting from scratch). Consolidation can also be a way
to pay for increased efficiencies. In other words, if cost is an issue and
starting from scratch desirable, consolidation is a strategy for a return
on investment for new facilities and efficiencies.
The caveat is that it can take a very significant up-front investment,
which can lead to a very long payback period.

Secrecy: the Silver Bullet for Responsiveness

Holding up the Manhattan Project as evidence of how responsive the
Complex (and indeed, the nation) could be must also be examined
in the light of the third responsive infrastructure “enabler” discussed
above—a unique world environment. In particular, the world environ-
ment created a national environment (wartime, a simple, coherent na-
tional vision) allowing a secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project
that entirely transformed the timescale for progress. Secrecy lent enor-
mous freedom and latitude for decisionmaking. Secrecy allowed the ac-
ceptance of tremendous risk.
A primary result of the exhaustive secrecy was the ability to make and
execute decisions rapidly. “Groves told me many times that [the Man-
hattan Project] would not be possible in peacetime… many urgent deci-
sions he had to take could not be made by committees, or by consent,
or by asking permission each time.”28 Put another way: “secrecy made
it possible to make decisions with little regard for normal peacetime
political considerations.”29
It is questionable that the nation could ever resuscitate such a tol-
erance for secrecy in the future. For example, the tolerance for even
perceived secrecy in more recent times was strikingly captured during
Nonnuclear Reconfiguration in the Congressional Record, in a record
titled Unbelievably Arrogant Conduct by the Department of Energy: “Mr.
Speaker, the Energy Department announced plans to consolidate the
258   CHAPTER THIRTEEN

nonnuclear manufacturing activities of the weapons complex…I submit

an editorial…which expresses the outrage which is felt when an agency
of the U.S. Government tries to make major decisions in secrecy.”30
Even with the knowledge of the different world conditions and the
contrasting culture that existed during the Manhattan Project, it is
striking to imagine the kinds of decisions that were executed, and their
timescales. It is striking to imagine that the government “could throw
people off their land with little explanation...fifteen hundred indignant
residents of the Richland, Hanford, and White Bluffs areas…refused to
believe that in democratic United States, peaceful, law-abiding citizens
could be chased from their homes. But very quickly they came to realize
that opposition was useless.”31 Although one can imagine a future where
those same fifteen hundred indignant residents end up being displaced
to support a war effort, it is much more difficult to imagine the process
being resolved in a 30-day period. One need look no further than the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, to understand the vastly
different landscape a Manhattan Project could face today.
The acceptance of meaningful risk also accelerated timescales pro-
foundly. For example, pilot plants for many of the new, sometimes
speculative, processes were skipped; some processes were simply imple-
mented full scale. “The usual practice with a new process is to test it
out…in a pilot plant, and only then to proceed to the full-scale plant.
The plants Groves had to build were so novel that in normal times this
procedure would have been regarded as doubly necessary.”32 Although
one can envision a world environment where available funding increas-
es dramatically or new facilities are on the table, it is more difficult to
imagine that the culture of acceptance for risk (especially for safety) or
extreme secrecy could ever be fully “reset.”

The Destination or the Journey

The preceding discussion proposes that consolidation and responsive in-
frastructure are primarily linked through cost. Unfortunately, these two
are primarily linked in the end state, and a very steep price must be paid
to realize that end state. In other words, only after the consolidation has
occurred, and only after the responsive infrastructure has been achieved,
can the cost savings begin to be realized. Therein lies the dilemma. Given
that the consolidated end state is reached, the savings tend to be the pri-
mary subject of current debate. Yet this debate is secondary to whether
 TRANSFORMATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX   259

nuclear consolidation is possible on an acceptable timescale, even given

the assumption of a compelling future return on investment.33
No events in recent history indicate that the nation is capable of get-
ting over this mountain, despite strong and comprehensive efforts to do
so over time. Virtually all of the more recent nuclear consolidation, such
as the transition of Rocky Flats, Hanford, and Fernald out of the Com-
plex in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was catalyzed by external events.
Rather than transformational—designed and executed according to a
larger vision—these changes were largely evolutionary.34 The Complex
did indeed become smaller, but at the loss of significant capabilities,
such as pit production.
In the early 1990s, the massive “Complex-21” attempt to reconfig-
ure the Complex resulted in the consolidation of only the non-nuclear
portion of the Complex. In the end, the nuclear portion was “consoli-
dated in-place.” In other words, downsizing was completed within the
footprint of the existing sites—making them smaller without eliminat-
ing any sites. In the mid-1990s, the Stockpile Stewardship and Man-
agement Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (SSM PEIS)
again evaluated consolidation of the nuclear portion of the Complex. In
the end, the decision was to “rightsize in place.” Today, NNSA’s plan for
transforming to a “more modern, cost-effective nuclear weapons com-
plex,” Complex 2030, is to continue to rightsize in place, consolidating
special nuclear material where possible, but within the existing footprint
of the current eight sites.35 Because this “rightsizing” does not include
a decrease in the number of sites, this proposal has been interpreted by
some to have written off true consolidation.
The effectiveness or responsiveness of the Complex as measured in
terms of number of sites is distracting at best, destructive at worst. Much
criticism has been dispensed over the failure of past efforts to consoli-
date the Complex. These criticisms have largely overshadowed thought-
ful dialogue on more elusive, but grave, intangible costs incurred with
each and every dance towards and away from consolidation. One exam-
ple is the degradation of trust within the Complex and the relationships
between sites. Unlike a corporation considering downsizing, discussion
and evaluation of elimination of sites in the Complex—sites that are op-
erated independently, with different developmental histories, cultures,
skill sets, and allegiances—can lead to protective behavior that destroys
synergy, understanding, and cooperation. Although this may be the
260   CHAPTER THIRTEEN

price of shutting down sites, it is a high price to pay if such consolida-

tion does not ultimately happen.
An alternative to criticizing past efforts is recognizing that the inabil-
ity of the nation to consolidate the nuclear missions of the Complex may
simply reflect the significant strength of the barriers. These barriers are
many, reflect far more than simple economics, and are not new.

Barriers to Change
First and foremost is the legacy argument. The sites of the Complex
have fed the economic engines of their communities and their respec-
tive States for over half a century. The personnel of these sites represent
meaningful constituencies in the political landscape. This is not a new
dilemma. Consolidation of the Complex began as early as 1952, and
even at that time the social implications of downsizing were a major
factor in decisionmaking. The stated goals were to reduce cost while
balancing the need for strategic redundancies and minimizing “negative
social consequences” accompanying closures.36
Even in the early days of the Complex, political sensitivities to siting
and consolidating missions in the Complex were paramount. Many les-
sons were learned the hard way. For example, prior to the decision to site
the Reactor Testing Station in Pocatello, Idaho, another site in another
state heard that it would be chosen. This led to congressional hearings,
placing the entire siting process under intense public scrutiny.37
On the other hand, barriers also exist for expanding or siting new
missions at existing or new sites. This is the “not in my backyard” argu-
ment, and it is neither new nor unique to the nuclear weapons business.
For example, in 1952, although Portsmouth was a less attractive choice
than Louisville on the basis of siting criteria for a gaseous diffusion plant,
the local population was “vehemently opposed to the construction of an
‘atomic plant’ in the area,” and Portsmouth was ultimately chosen.38
The skilled workforces cultivated over many decades that fuel the ex-
isting sites also represent a major piece of the legacy argument. These
workforces cannot be developed (or be relocated from one state to an-
other) overnight—even under conditions like the Manhattan Project.
For example, at Hanford in 1943, despite a “relative labor surplus in the
Pacific Northwest, shortages plagued the project.”39 Even more recent
“rightsize-in-place” strategies (Complex-21 and SSM PEIS) were found
 TRANSFORMATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX   261

to create “demographic distortions in the Complex…skew[ing] the age

profile of the workforce, increasing the average age, and reducing the
experience level.”40
Moreover, a vast quantity of dollars has already been invested in ex-
isting sites. This was one of the primary arguments used in the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Record of Decision to justify the decision
to “rightsize in place” versus consolidate the missions at the plants to the
weapons laboratories and the Nevada Test Site.41
Most important, nuclear consolidation as a long term cost-saving
strategy requires a near term investment on the order of billions of dol-
lars. Having the credibility to make this kind of investment and capital
project delivery requires a track record for cost estimating and budget-
ing that has rarely existed in the nuclear enterprise. For example, in
1942, the estimated cost for the Manhattan Project was approximately
$148M ($1.85B 2006 dollars). The costs of the project through the end
of 1945 have been estimated at $1.9B ($21.5B 2006 dollars)—roughly an
order of magnitude off the original estimate.42
Even assuming adequate credibility could be established that the
expenditure of billions of dollars in up-front investment for nuclear
consolidation could be paid back in a reasonable time period, with com-
mensurate savings thereafter, the yearly reality of the budgetary process
by which decisions about government spending are made—yielding
scarce power to arguments regarding future return on investment—
could dwarf all the other barriers discussed above.

Learning from the Past

The Nuclear Weapons Complex today faces an opportunity called trans-
formation. While releasing the Complex from the shackles of an aging,
ill-fitting infrastructure, it must also confront a largely unknowable fu-
ture. It must stimulate, revitalize, and inspire the intellectual capital of a
new generation in the absence of underground tests, important manu-
facturing capabilities, and a vibrant debate or consensus on the role of
nuclear weapons in our national security. The Manhattan Project created
an infrastructure from scratch to confront its own, unknowable future,
without the benefit of hindsight. In essence, this is where transforma-
tion has a leg up on creation—the ability to learn from the past.
Thus, looking back at the events that brought the Complex to its cur-
rent configuration yields four important conclusions. First, consolida-
262   CHAPTER THIRTEEN

tion can reduce the fixed costs of the Complex in the end state. Second,
unfortunately this fundamental cost argument has been proven many
times to be overwhelmed by the powerful, yet often underestimated,
barriers against nuclear consolidation. Third, consolidation is not syn-
onymous with responsive infrastructure, and the linkage between con-
solidation and responsive infrastructure depends on the perspective.
Finally, the rationale and plan for a responsive infrastructure should be
decoupled from the rationale and plan for consolidation, lest the bar-
riers that thwart consolidation needlessly bar the chance for a future
responsive Complex.

Notes
1. In 2004, the House Energy and Water Appropriations Committee, led by
Representative David Hobson, requested an independent review of the Nuclear
Weapons Complex by a team of outside experts. One of the primary motiva-
tions was to “evaluate options for the consolidation of special nuclear materials,
facilities, and operations across the complex to minimize security requirements
and the environmental impact of continuing operations.” (108th Congress,
House of Representatives Report 108-554, Energy and Water Development Ap-
propriations Bill, June 18, 2004.)
2. Note that an analogous argument applies to stockpile transformation.
3. David O. Overskei, Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infra-
structure Task Force of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Statement to
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services
hearing on the topic of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Future
Plans for the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure, April 4, 2006. (Note:
this work was the response to the request noted in note 1.)
4. William F. Burgess, Jo Anne McCormick, and Eileen Pingatore, History of
the Production Complex: The Methods of Site Selection (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Energy, 1987), ii-iii, vi-vii.
5. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management, Link-
ing Legacies, DOE/EM-0319 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy,
1997), 16-17.
6. Burgess et al, History of the Production Complex, i.
7. F.C. Gosling, The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb, DOE/HR-
0096 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Energy Office of Admin-
istration and Human Resources Development, 1994), 20.
8. Ibid., 28.
 TRANSFORMATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX   263

9. Linton Brooks, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator,

National Nuclear Security Administration, Testimony to the Committee on
Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations, Hearing on Nuclear Security, “Can DOE Meet
Physical Security Requirements,” April 27, 2004.
10. John May, The Greenpeace book of the nuclear age: the hidden history, the
human cost (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989).
11. Note that the first accident, which resulted in the death of Harry Daghl-
ian, occurred on August 21, 1945, and the second accident, which resulted in
the death of Louis Slotin, occurred on May 30, 1946. Martin Zeilig, “Louis Slo-
tin and the Invisible Killer,” The Beaver 75, no. 4 (August/September 1995).
12. Joseph DiNunno, Integrated Safety Management, DNFSB TECH-16
(Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 1997), 1-1.
13. P.H. Richanbach, D.R. Graham, J.P. Bell, and J.D. Silk, The Organization
and Management of the Nuclear Weapons Program (Washington, D.C.: Institute
for Defense Analyses, March 1997, ES-1).
14. D.Overskei, J.Crawford, H. Grunder, D. Kaczynski, R. Nickell, D. Trost,
Recommendations for the Nuclear Weapons Complex of the Future (Washington,
D.C.: Department of Energy Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, 2005), vi.
15. Thomas P. D’Agostino, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, Na-
tional Nuclear Security Administration, Testimony for the House Armed Ser-
vices Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 5, 2006.
16. U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration
Study (Complex-21), DOE/DP-0083 (Springfield: National Technical Informa-
tion Service, 1991).
17. Burgess et al., History of the Production Complex, 33-34.
18. Overskei et al., Recommendations for the Complex, 2.
19. Henry G. Chiles, Jr., “Providing Responsive Infrastructure for Updat-
ing and Maintaining the Nuclear Stockpile,” Final Report of the 36th Annual
IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security and Policy, Implementing the
New Triad: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Forces in 21st Century Deterrence (The
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and The Fletcher School, Tufts University,
2005), 85.
20. Gosling, The Manhattan Project, 19.
21. Stephane Groueff, Manhattan Project: The Untold Story of the Making of
the Atomic Bomb (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 14.
22. M.S. Gerber, Legend and Legacy: Fifty Years of Defense Production at the
Hanford Site, WHC-MR-0293, Rev. 2 (Richland: U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Westinghouse
264   CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Hanford Company, 1992), 6.

23. Lani Miyoshi Sanders and Linda J. Branstetter, Change and the Nucle-
ar Weapons Complex: Key Studies and Outcomes in the Final Decades of the
20th Century, SAND2005-3505 (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories,
2005).
24. Charles R. Loeber, Building the Bombs: A History of the Nuclear Weap-
ons Complex, SAND2002-0307P (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories,
2002), 221
25. Note that the recent Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Nuclear Weap-
ons Complex Infrastructure Task Force estimated ~$10B up-front investment
(over a period of ten years) for such a consolidation, with ~six-year payback
period after the new consolidated nuclear production facility was operating.
26. Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administra-
tion, U.S. Department of Energy, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 4, 2005. Also see Benn
Tannenbaum’s and Francis Slakey’s chapter in this book.
27. Letter from Representative David L. Hobson to Secretary of Energy Sam-
uel W. Bodman, November 16, 2006.
28. Stephane Groueff, “The Manhattan Project: An Extraordinary Achieve-
ment of the ‘American Way,’” Remembering the Manhattan Project: Perspectives
on the Making of the Atomic Bomb and its Legacy, Cynthia C. Kelly, ed. (New
Jersey: World Scientific, 2004), 34.
29. Gosling, The Manhattan Project, 19.
30. Tony P. Hall, “Unbelievably Arrogant Conduct by the Department of
Energy—Hon. Tony P. Hall,” Congressional Record, Friday, March 20, 1992:
31. Groueff, Untold Story, 137.
32. Alwyn McKay, The Making of the Atomic Age (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1984), 71
33. That the current infrastructure is incomplete (missing large-scale pit
production, for example) compounds the argument.
34. Sanders and Branstetter, Change and the Nuclear Weapons Complex, 35.
35. Linton Brooks, “Notice of Intent to Prepare a Supplement to the Stock-
pile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement—Complex 2030,” Federal Register 71, no.202 (October 19, 2006):
61731-61736.
36. Burgess et al, History of the Production Complex, iii.
37. Burgess et al., History of the Production Complex, v.
38. Burgess et al, History of the Production Complex, vi.
 TRANSFORMATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX   265

39. Gosling, The Manhattan Project, 32.

40. Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise
(Chiles Commission), Report to the Congress and Secretary of Energy, March 1,
1999, D-1.
41. Hazel O’Leary, “Record of Decision Programmatic Environmental Im-
pact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management,” Federal Register
61, no. 249 (December 26, 1996): 68014-68026.
42. Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1998), 55-60.
 Chapter fourteen

The Nuclear Weapons Production Complex

and the Reliable Replacement Warhead
Francis Slakey and Benn Tannenbaum

A
fundamental question in developing a long-range plan for the
nation’s nuclear weapons complex is: what is the long-term
stockpile required by the Department of Defense and how
should the Department of Energy size the capability of its complex to
match those requirements? This question has not yet been addressed
by Congress, DOD, or DOE. Indeed, the Defense Science Board high-
lighted the “need for a national consensus on the nature of the need for
and the role of nuclear weapons.”1 Absent a consensus, the long range
plans for the nuclear weapons complex are being based on an arsenal
size in the range of 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads, as detailed in the
terms of the Moscow Treaty.2
This default stockpile size places high demands on the nuclear weap-
ons complex. Consider a potential stockpile of 3000 total weapons
(counting both reserve and deployed weapons) and assume a functional
lifetime of 30 years per warhead, at which time the warhead either needs
to undergo life extension or replacement by a new warhead. If only life
extension is pursued, this requires processing 100 weapons per year on
average. For a new stockpile, this corresponds to a greater workload be-
cause every new warhead will be accompanied by the dismantlement of
an old warhead, so the steady state throughput in the complex would
need to be roughly two hundred weapons per year.3
Several groups and individuals have stated that these production and
dismantlement numbers present a significant problem: they are in ex-
cess of what is currently practical.4 Consequently, either the production
complex needs to be substantially refurbished, or the arsenal size needs

266
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION COMPLEX AND RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD   267

to be reassessed. This chapter considers the refurbishment of the com-

plex in light of the proposed Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW).
Chapter ten of this volume assesses the potential for reductions in the
size of the arsenal.

THE PROBLEM
Currently, the nation’s nuclear arsenal is maintained through a combi-
nation of surveillance, assessments, and refurbishments known as the
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)5 that was established in the mid
1990s. Several groups are reviewing the SSP, to determine whether it
is providing a safe and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons that is af-
fordable, sustainable and can maintain the necessary skill base.6 The
preliminary assessment is that SSP is doing well for now, but there are
inadequacies in the production complex. In particular, the nuclear
weapons production infrastructure needs to be “transformed” into one
that can dismantle, refurbish, or build new weapons in a timely and af-
fordable manner.
According to these groups, some capabilities have been effectively
restored, but the uranium work at Y-12, the throughput at Pantex, and
the pit production at Los Alamos have not yet reached necessary levels
to maintain the arsenal.7 Many factors contribute to this, including: ag-
ing facilities that in many instances are more than 50 years old; lack of
money for capital investment to replace or modernize those facilities;
more stringent safety and security requirements that have doubled or
tripled the cost of doing business; closure of the Rocky Flats plutoni-
um processing facility due to safety violations; and manufacturing with
“legacy” materials and processes that are technologically obsolete.

TWO PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Reducing the arsenal below the size established in the Moscow Treaty
could ease the demands on the production complex. Absent a consensus
on reductions, there are essentially two proposed paths for solving the
problem. Either the production complex can be refurbished as part of
the existing SSP Life Extension Program (LEP), or a new program can
be developed.8 The new program that has been proposed is the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW).
268   CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Under the SSP LEP, the production infrastructure will refurbish war-
heads and sustain the capability to design, manufacture, and certify
warheads. Successful refurbishment would extend a warhead’s life by
30 years or more and revitalize the production complex. As a proof of
concept, the NNSA recently completed a life extension refurbishment
program for the W87 warhead. LEPs are currently planned for the B61
and the W76 and could be extended to all warheads in the arsenal.9
Under a RRW program, a new warhead (and subsequent generations
of RRWs) would be designed and manufactured to replace one or more
weapons in the current stockpile. The RRW would be specifically de-
signed for ease of manufacture, and would have upgraded safety and
security features. Thus, in the end, it might be a “better” warhead: safer
and more secure, potentially provide more flexibility in performance
characteristics, and possibly lead to a reduction in the costs needed to
maintain an RRW-based stockpile.10 RRW could transform the complex
by modernizing and consolidating manufacturing at a few sites that no
longer have to retain legacy practices.
In principle, both the SSP path and the RRW path could be used to
revitalize the decaying production complex.11 However, under either
approach, the modernization is projected to require billions of dollars
and take until 2030 to fully implement.12 Given the large budget and
long timetable, there is an associated political challenge that must be ad-
dressed regardless of the path taken: both require a budgetary commit-
ment that must be sustained over 12 Congressional terms and at least
three Administrations.
In general, there are two strong, non-partisan arguments that could
sustain a decision to pursue one path over the other:
■ Cost: One path offers a cheaper means of maintaining the nuclear
deterrent over the long term.
■ Technical Challenges: One path presents fewer technical challenges
for maintaining the nuclear deterrent over the long term.
At this time, neither argument can be persuasively used to argue for one
path over the other, as discussed below.

COST
To date there are limited budget details from NNSA for the transforma-
tion plan. A Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force did a very
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION COMPLEX AND RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD   269

rough approximation of long-term costs for three different program

options, but not at a level of detail that can be considered a rigorous
estimate. In part, this is because the overall plan requires a number of
major new investments (such as a pit facility) and activities (such as
conjectured surety savings at some sites) whose budgets have yet to be
vetted by an extensive professional process. More important, however,
is the development and promulgation of the DOD requirements that
will dictate the stockpile size and diversity. How many warheads of what
kind will be needed, and how much reserve capacity13 and surge ca-
pability14 will satisfy the DOD? With an RRW program, this question
becomes even more complicated, because the willingness of the DOD
to reduce numbers may not occur until the RRW program has been
proven feasible, which may not be authorized until the DOD can ac-
cept lower numbers. Consequently, the DOE/NNSA budget is strongly
dependent on the DOD stockpile requirements. In addition, the RRW
would require flight-testing,15 at an additional cost, before the DOD
would accept it.
What is certain, however, is that there will be very little discretionary
flexibility in the NNSA budget.16 The ability to design and manufacture
an RRW (and future RRWs) depends on the knowledge gained in the SSP
program, so reducing the SSP expenditures would eliminate an essential
source of data for the RRW program. It is difficult to reduce safety and
security costs until major consolidation in the complex has completely
taken place. Modernization of existing sites and clean-up of former sites
will entail significant new expenditures, even if the eventual operating
costs may decrease. Consequently, under a constant purchasing power
budget, one of the few budgetary areas available for RRW development
is in the LEP funding.17 If some of these LEPs can be delayed, stretched
out, or cancelled because of a change in stockpile requirements, then
some funds could be freed for new investments. It is then a matter of
whether these “savings” might be applied to dismantlement or produc-
tion of RRWs, or made available for building new facilities. However,
delaying or curtailing LEPs might then require the introduction of more
RRWs at an accelerated pace, possible further increasing the cost.
Given such limited flexibility in a constant NNSA budget scenario,
even with a reduction in the LEPs, significant new funds will be needed
to produce a responsive production complex. The introduction of RRWs
is unlikely to lead to operational savings until all of these investments
have been made and amortized. Consequently, an RRW program would
270   CHAPTER FOURTEEN

likely add to costs in the near term and it is not yet possible to determine
whether or when the RRW could lead to savings in the long term.
Given these uncertainties, cost issues have not been sufficiently de-
veloped to persuasively drive a decision in favor or against RRW.

TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
A Weibull Curve, or “bathtub curve,” characterizes the rate of defects
over time for a typical manufactured system (e.g. cars, DVD players,
nuclear weapons).18 The curve has three distinct parts: 1) ‘birth’ defects
that gradually decrease over the early period of the systems life; 2) a
quiescent period when the system is relatively trouble free; and 3) an ag-
ing period marked by increasing appearance of defects in which various
parts begin to wear out and need to be fixed or replaced.
In the nuclear weapons design and maintenance community, the de-
fects are referred to as “findings” and the more serious among them are
referred to as “significant findings” or “SFIs.” As part of the surveillance
activity within the SSP program, the SFIs are closely monitored. Most of
these “findings” are due to aging in the non-nuclear part of the warhead
system and are relatively easily fixed, but some are potentially more seri-
ous and could require cycling through the full production complex for
remediation, or involve the refinement of a warhead design.
To date, plutonium aging data has not revealed indications of any
significant nuclear physics problems related to aging. Indeed, recent re-
ports suggest that the plutonium lifetime may be more than 100 years.19
Nevertheless, there are aging issues associated with a plutonium pit
(such as corrosion) that are independent of plutonium lifetime. Con-
sequently, there will be a time when significant aging effects begin to
emerge and the number of SFIs for each nuclear warhead system begins
to rise upwards on the Weibull Curve and enter the end of life phase.
Nuclear warheads have a projected minimum design lifetime of 20-25
years,20 which means that the oldest systems are beyond the age when
a rise in defects might begin to occur. However, while aging defects are
present, the defects are not emerging at a rate that is a significant statisti-
cal departure from previous years.21 Consequently, there is no indica-
tion to date that any deployed weapons system is reaching the end of life
phase on the Weibull Curve. In fact, according to the most recent infor-
mation, the SFIs have actually decreased for one of the oldest systems,
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION COMPLEX AND RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD   271

though this falls within expected statistical variation.22 Consequently, at

this time, aging defects do not argue for an RRW.
In fact, even after aging defects do emerge, there would not necessar-
ily be an associated technical benefit to switching to an RRW. As a new
system, the RRW itself would be expected to follow some version of the
Weibull Curve; the RRW will have birth defects of its own. While the
RRW is intended to have design features to effectively manage the birth
defect problem,23 it is not known with any certainty whether those de-
fects would present a greater or lesser technical challenge than manag-
ing the aging defects of the legacy weapons or even if they would occur
at a greater or lesser rate than currently seen in the legacy systems.

BUILDING CONSENSUS
The non-partisan arguments of cost and technical challenges are not yet
sufficient to drive a decision toward RRW at this time. Consequently,
if a decision is made to pursue RRW, then developing a long-term bi-
partisan consensus might require combining various arguments. Such a
consensus has been developed in the past to support programs, includ-
ing the current SSP. The consensus for SSP was built on two points: 1)
sustaining a strong nuclear deterrent; and 2) providing demonstrable
arms control benefits. An RRW program could be developed in pre-
cisely this manner.24
By any measure, the current nuclear arsenal is a Cold War stockpile
designed to maximize the yield to weight ratio in the warheads and to
act as a deterrent to the Soviet Union. Although the actual numbers
of weapons have gradually been reduced in accord with arms control
agreements, the existing stockpile is increasingly disconnected from
most national security debates because of its focus on massive firepower.
Accordingly, there is a desire on the part of some military planners to
develop nuclear options that could play a more active role in national se-
curity discussions. No military or congressional consensus has emerged
on developing such options.25 Indeed, these options are available in the
existing stockpile, as many of the warheads can be used in a much lower
yield mode than their nominal deployment. A critical question that has
not yet been addressed by Congress, NNSA, DOD or any other group is
one of priorities: what is the long-term stockpile required by the DOD
and how should the DOE size the capability of its complex to match
those requirements?26
272   CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Absent debates to clarify those questions, the RRW could still be de-
veloped in a manner that advances non-proliferation goals.
In debates about the RRW, the arms control topic is usually raised
in the context of the destabilizing effect of “new” nuclear weapons. Ig-
noring semantic issues, it is hard to see how a warhead designed to do
the same mission with the same general characteristics introduces any
important differences of “newness” from its predecessor. There is a le-
gitimate concern that the infrastructure necessary to build an RRW—or
LEPs for that matter—would be capable of producing new weapons
with new missions. However, if the RRW program leads to reduced total
stockpile size (by reduction of the reserve stockpile or reduction of the
actively deployed stockpile) and if it is congressionally constrained to
require legislative approval for new missions, then it could be perceived
as an overall arms control benefit.27
Such assurances can be built into the RRW program in several ways.
The earliest RRW concepts can put a transparent and strong emphasis
on test pedigree to alleviate any worries about trusting computers to an
unnecessary extent.28 The closer the RRW adheres to tested analogs, the
more likely it is that RRW can be deployed without testing. Consequent-
ly, by designing conservatively, a clear statement can be delivered that
the U.S. will abide by the testing moratorium under an RRW. An even
stronger assurance could be delivered legislatively if the RRW program
were coupled to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty.29
A further assurance would emerge by more clearly linking the RRW
program to arsenal reductions. To date, these have not been rigorously
or even formally coupled and a clearer argument can be made that a
responsive infrastructure can lead to significant reductions in the re-
serve arsenal. The “manufacture on demand” concept behind the RRW
responsive infrastructure relieves the need for a warehouse of reserve
nuclear warheads. However, maintaining legacy weapons does require a
large reserve - and thus requires excess warheads - until the RRW would
be substantially introduced into the arsenal. Clarifying the amount and
time over which the reserve arsenal can be reduced under an RRW
would demonstrate a net arms control gain.
There may also be a possibility to couple the RRW to emerging dis-
cussions over the role of nuclear weapons in global strike options. In
particular, STRATCOM has proposed that under some scenarios it may
be possible to shift from nuclear weapons to non-nuclear kinetic weap-
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION COMPLEX AND RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD   273

ons.30 If an RRW could be shown to enable this shift, then it would

clearly demonstrate objective arms control benefits.

SUMMARY
A number of groups have determined that maintaining a nuclear weap-
ons arsenal of the size established in the Moscow Treaty will require
refurbishing the production complex. There are two proposed paths to
refurbishing the infrastructure: SSP/LEP and RRW. While either path
can, in principle, address the infrastructure problems, it is too early in
the RRW planning process to determine whether RRW would offer a
cheaper long-term solution with fewer technical problems. In fact, RRW
planners believe that the RRW path will be more expensive than SSP/
LEP in the near term.
Refurbishing the production complex will require a sustained bud-
getary commitment that must last over 12 Congresses and at least three
Administrations. That long term bi-partisan consensus can be built on
two distinct points: 1) sustaining a strong and serviceable nuclear deter-
rent; and 2) providing demonstrable arms control benefits. To overcome
inevitable criticisms of near term cost increases, the RRW program
would need to make a clearer connection to arms control benefits such
as arsenal reductions, the nuclear testing moratorium, and possibly the
enabling of a new global strike configuration.

Notes
This paper is based in part on work done in preparation for the AAAS
Nuclear Weapons Complex Assessment Committee. 31
1. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities,
December 2006.
2. State Department fact sheet on the Moscow Treaty: http://www.state.gov/
t/ac/trt/18016.htm
3. These numbers decrease for a smaller arsenal and/or a longer weapon
lifetime and thus are only an upper limit to guide thinking.
4. “Sustaining the Nuclear Enterprise - A New Approach”, O’Brien et al,
May 2005; Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) report “Recommenda-
tions for the Nuclear Weapons Complex of the Future”; Testimony of Thomas
D’Agostino before the House Armed Services Committee, April 2006; Testimo-
ny of Linton Brooks before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 2005.
274   CHAPTER FOURTEEN

5. For a full description of the Stockpile Stewardship program, see http://

www.llnl.gov/annual02/pdfs/stockpile.pdf.
6. These include its proprietor, the NNSA/DOE, the authorizing and appro-
priating committees of the Congress, and its direct customer, the DOD (OSD,
STRATCOM, and the involved services [the Navy and the Air Force]). It also
includes a number of outside reviews such as those done by the GAO, the CRS,
the TRAC, the JASONs, the DSB, and the AAAS Nuclear Weapons Complex
Assessment Committee.
7. In general, the identified problems are in the major nodes of the complex:
Y-12 (uranium processing), Pantex (warhead dismantlement and refurbish-
ment), and TA-55 (planned plutonium pit production). A major component
of the complex is, naturally, the skilled and trained workforce that operates the
complex.
8. This either/or approach is a simplified but useful way of framing the prob-
lem and long term solutions. Indeed, the NNSA planning document suggests a
future arsenal made up exclusively of RRWs: “Complex 2030 An Infrastructure
Planning Scenario” October 23, 2006. The either/or approach was also used
by the Congressional Research Service in the Report “Nuclear Warheads: The
Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program” De-
cember 13, 2006.
9. Currently there are nine systems in the combined deployed and reserve
stockpile, two SLBMS (the W76 and the W88), three ICBMS (the W62 [sched-
uled for retirement], the W78, and the W87), two aircraft delivered bombs (the
B61 [various versions] and the B83) and two cruise missiles (the W80 and the
W84 [reserve only]).
10. As currently proposed, the RRW would not have new military charac-
teristics (e.g. yield and effects). Instead, the RRW would replace the yield-to-
weight criterion as a measure of merit by a set of criteria that include adequate
yield-to-weight, greater reliability of the nuclear part of the warhead, easier
manufacturability using modern materials and processes, improved safety and
security (collectively called surety) warhead features, and greater flexibility in
design to meet the future needs of military planners. As stated in Public Law
109-163, Section 3111: (b) Objectives- The objectives of the Reliable Replace-
ment Warhead program shall be (1) to increase the reliability, safety, and secu-
rity of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile; (2) to further reduce the
likelihood of the resumption of nuclear testing; (3) to remain consistent with
basic design parameters by using, to the extent practicable, components that
are well understood or are certifiable without the need to resume underground
nuclear testing; (4) to ensure that the United States develops a nuclear weapons
infrastructure that can respond to unforeseen problems, to include the ability
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION COMPLEX AND RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD   275

to produce replacement warheads that are safer to manufacture, more cost-ef-

fective to produce, and less costly to maintain than existing warheads; (5) to
achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile based
on increased reliability of the reliable replacement warheads; (6) to use the de-
sign, certification, and production expertise resident in the nuclear complex
to develop reliable replacement components to fulfill current mission require-
ments of the existing stockpile; and (7) to serve as a complement to, and poten-
tially a more cost-effective and reliable long-term replacement for, the current
Stockpile Life Extension Programs. In addition, Congressman David Hobson
(R-OH), Chair of the House Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Subcommittee, has stated that he will seek to constrain DOD from pursuing
new nuclear missions.
11. George Miller, Director, LLNL, briefing to the AAAS Nuclear Weapons
Complex Assessment Committee, August 10, 2006. The House Armed Servic-
es committee requested the Nuclear Weapons Council to submit a report by
March 2007 that explains the relationship of RRW within SSP and its impact
on LEPs.
12. Complex 2030, National Nuclear Security Administration, October
2006.
13. Reserve capacity indicates the number of warheads, not necessarily con-
nected to a delivery system, that are maintained as a hedge against a failure of a
particular type or class of weapon. This gives the military additional confidence
that some nuclear deterrent will always be available.
14. Surge capability is the capacity of the nuclear weapons complex to drasti-
cally increase the production rate of weapons if needed for a particular crisis.
Others suggest as examples of such a crisis a resurgent Russia or a dramatic
increase in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal.
15. While it is possible to engineer new warheads to the same shape and total
mass as existing warheads, producing new warheads with identical mass dis-
tribution is highly unlikely. These new weapons must be flight tested to ensure
proper targeting capabilities, etc.
16. The General Accounting Office projected that “flexibility will decline
drastically” in future budgets. It has identified transformation of the nuclear
complex as a key topic for Congressional oversight: GAO-07-235R.
17. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board proposed consolidating the
weapons labs to generate savings: SEAB report “Recommendations for the Nu-
clear Weapons Complex of the Future.”
18. For a detailed discussion of the Weibull curve: http://www.weibull.com/
hotwire/issue21/hottopics21.htm
276   CHAPTER FOURTEEN

19. JASON panel report, “Pit Lifetime,” JSR 06-335, November 20, 2006. The
NNSA response to this report is available in the NNSA Press Release “Studies
Show Plutonium Degradation in U.S. Nuclear Weapons Will Not Affect Reli-
ability Soon”, November 29, 2006.
20. Department of Energy, “Analysis of Stockpile Management Alternatives,”
July 1996.
21. Gene Schroeder, Senior Technical Director, Global Strike Capabilities
Division, STRATCOM in a briefing to the AAAS Nuclear Weapons Complex
Assessment Committee, October 24, 2006.
22. Ibid.
23. For example, condition monitoring and lower marginality.
24. Some would add the notion of preserving “human capital,” i.e. the cap-
turing of knowledge and experience from soon-to-be-retired experts. However,
the RRW program is far from the only way to retain this knowledge. In fact,
programs dedicated to doing just this already exist and may be more cost effec-
tive than an entirely new program such as the RRW.
25. A Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator was proposed by NNSA but was op-
posed in Congress. For details on the debate see: http://www7.nationalacad-
emies.org/cisac/Medalia_Presentation.pdf
26. This question is examined in another chapter in this book.
27. For those for whom the goal of arms control is to immediately eliminate
nuclear weapons, such an RRW program would represent a backward step.
28. While it is not expected that the U.S. release detailed design specifica-
tions, it would be possible to release statements to the effect that “RRW1 is
based on design components which were thoroughly tested at the Nevada Test
Site.”
29. The “Supreme National Interest Clause” allowing for testing would be
critically necessary for achieving consensus on coupling RRW and CTBT.
30. Brian Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, http://www.ifpaf-
letcherconference.com/oldtranscripts/2005/Brian_Green.ppt. This issue is ex-
amined by Owen Price in chapter ten of this book.
31. http://cstsp.aaas.org/content.html?contentid=899
 Part Four

Nonproliferation in a
nuclear age

277
 Chapter fifteen

Beyond the NPT

The Emerging Nonproliferation Environment
Whitney Raas

I
n 1963, President John F. Kennedy famously envisioned “a world in
which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five” states would possess nuclear
weapons, possibly even as early as the 1970s.1 Although today there
are now up to five more states with nuclear weapons than at the time
President Kennedy made his dire prediction, there are many fewer than
were predicted or even expected. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is widely credited with slowing the worldwide
spread of nuclear weapons since its entry into force in 1970.2 Since the
earliest days of the NPT, however, proliferators have found devious ways
to develop nuclear weapons programs while signatories to the NPT, call-
ing into question the lasting efficacy of the treaty and the possible col-
lapse of the non-proliferation regime.3
The NPT mandates that nuclear-weapon states refrain from assist-
ing non-nuclear weapon states with the acquisition of nuclear weapons,
while non-nuclear signatories to the treaty must declare nuclear materi-
al to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), accept safeguards
on peaceful nuclear facilities and refrain from seeking the acquisition
of nuclear weapons or receiving nuclear weapon technology. In return,
non-nuclear weapon states are promised access to peaceful nuclear en-
ergy. This agreement allows states to develop indigenous uranium en-
richment facilities and plutonium reprocessing facilities legally under
international observation (safeguards), setting the scene for a number
of nascent nuclear-weapon states. As more states gain the ability to pro-

279
280   CHAPTER FIFTEEN

duce fissile material, either legally through the NPT or illegally through
the black market, the question that the nonproliferation regime must
address is: what means do the United States and the international com-
munity have to combat the spread of nuclear weapons and encourage
states to refrain from developing nuclear weapons programs?
The answer is a multi-pronged nonproliferation regime consisting of
both a diplomatic and control structure and a more active counterprolif-
eration arm. For the purposes of this chapter, nonproliferation refers to
the international arms control regime, while counterproliferation indi-
cates those procedures used to actively prevent the spread of nuclear-re-
lated items, information, and material. In other words, nonproliferation
is the process by which states are persuaded not to attempt a nuclear
weapons program, while counterproliferation is intended to prevent a
state involved in proliferation activities from developing a weapons ca-
pability.
Since the NPT entered into force, a number of international agree-
ments on arms control have augmented its capabilities, including the
Additional Protocol, which establishes a baseline for intrusive inspec-
tions and monitoring of NPT signatories’ nuclear and non-nuclear
facilities, and the provisions on exports set by the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), as well as multiple agreements on weapons testing and
the control of delivery system technology. Counterproliferation tools, in
contrast to the international monitoring system, are not limited to in-
ternational diplomacy and agreements and include active involvement
by states to oppose proliferation. These approaches include withhold-
ing aid, sanctions, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), clandes-
tine efforts (for example to uncover and stop transfers of knowledge and
technology), and ultimately, military pre-emption to disrupt emerging
nuclear programs.
There are distinct conceptual differences between the two branches.
International norms and agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation
are intended to urge countries to refrain from undertaking proliferation
activities. The NPT provides an incentive to avoid the development of
nuclear weapons: the exchange of civilian nuclear information and ben-
efits as well as international support. Bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments among countries (such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) bind states
to a common goal of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only.
States are encouraged and legally bound not to attempt to build nuclear
 BEYOND THE NPT   281

weapons by the diplomatic side of the nonproliferation regime. Coun-

terproliferation refers to the actions that states (or international bodies)
can take once proliferation has begun. Once a state decides to begin a
nuclear weapons program and takes active steps towards that goal, dip-
lomatic efforts must be combined with counterproliferation measures
both to halt progress towards a nuclear weapon and to encourage the
proliferant to end its program.
This chapter will focus on the interaction of the two approaches to
nonproliferation. The first section summarizes key international agree-
ments, especially the NPT and the Additional Protocol (AP). The sec-
ond section will focus on interdiction and enforcement mechanisms,
and the third will discuss the seven steps the George W. Bush admin-
istration has put forth to address proliferation. The fourth section will
focus on future diplomatic action that can be taken to address nuclear
proliferation fears. Finally, a brief discussion on the role of nonprolifera-
tion efforts with respect to the threat posed by terrorist groups will be
addressed.

International Agreements
International agreements form the foundation of the non-proliferation
regime, and will likely continue to do so well into the future. Howev-
er, there are some who believe the NPT has failed, citing the ongoing
North Korean nuclear program and Iran’s stubborn refusal to abide by
IAEA requests. This prophecy is not only at risk of being self-fulfill-
ing, but would remove the legal norms (and perceived consequential
improved security context) that may be constraining some states from
nuclear weapons acquisition. Binding multilateral agreements such
as the NPT—often called the cornerstone of nonproliferation—have
worked well to stigmatize nuclear weapons and halt a rapid spread in the
number of nuclear-capable nations.4 Since the implementation of the
NPT, only one signatory to the treaty has developed nuclear weapons,
although all three non-signatories are de facto nuclear powers.5
To be sure, there are nonetheless states that have, or are believed
to have, attempted to circumvent the letter and spirit of the treaty by
developing secret nuclear weapons programs under the guise of civil-
ian programs or entirely clandestinely. In the last two decades, three
states were found or suspected to be developing clandestine nuclear
282   CHAPTER FIFTEEN

programs within the confines of the “peaceful uses” clause of the NPT,
namely Iraq, Libya, and potentially Iran. Iraq admitted to its nuclear
ambitions following the 1991 Gulf War, while Libya formally renounced
its nuclear weapons program in 2003. While other states (such as Ja-
pan, South Korea, Germany, and Brazil) are widely regarded to have
the latent indigenous capabilities and the finances necessary to acquire
nuclear weapons, several “rollback” states have a variety of such latent
capabilities.6 However, the NPT and the inspection regime have been
fundamental to ensuring that these latent capabilities have not evolved
into full-scale nuclear weapon programs.
While stated commitments to nuclear proliferation are important, one
should always “trust, but verify.” A primary criticism of the nonprolif-
eration regime is the lack of enforcement of the NPT and the nonprolif-
eration agreements of the member states. The NPT allows all signatories
access to “peaceful” nuclear technology under international safeguards,
but some states have used their uranium enrichment facilities, nuclear
reactors, and plutonium reprocessing facilities to try to produce nuclear
weapons.7 It is estimated that up to forty states currently have the in-
frastructure needed to produce the material for nuclear weapons, all
operating legally under the NPT in accordance with IAEA safeguards.
Determining the final use of these facilities and ensuring their peaceful
nature falls to the inspectors of the IAEA, although it is assumed that
national intelligence assessments have a significant role to play. Due to
the difficulties in inspections and the ability of states to hide facilities, a
recurring theme among proliferation pessimists is that the IAEA is fail-
ing in its inspection regime and enforcement of nonproliferation agree-
ments is failing.
The inspections regime to enforce Article III of the NPT was estab-
lished to ensure that civilian nuclear programs were not diverted to
weapons development; however, these inspections put into place proved
to be insufficient. Following the first Gulf War in 1991, IAEA inspec-
tors in Iraq found evidence that Iraq had undertaken significant work
on a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The world was shocked to
discover the extent of Iraq’s nuclear program, especially given Baghdad’s
history of relative compliance with the IAEA. This violation of inter-
national agreements led the international community to strengthen
the IAEA inspection and safeguard mandate by adding an Additional
 BEYOND THE NPT   283

Protocol agreement. States that sign an Additional Protocol agreement

with the IAEA consent to more robust inspections, allow inspectors ac-
cess to undeclared nuclear facilities on short notice, and must disclose
significantly more information to the IAEA than previous safeguards
have required.8
In addition to the NPT and the safeguards that are its enforcing
mechanism, there are a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements
to address regional proliferation concerts. These agreements include,
among others, the Argentinean and Brazilian nuclear agreements and
the recent cooperative efforts on behalf of the Gulf States in the Middle
East to form a joint civilian nuclear program. Argentina and Brazil, two
long-time nuclear rivals, signed a bilateral agreement in 1991 providing
for safeguards on all nuclear activities and establishing a joint monitor-
ing system to account for all nuclear material.9 At the time, neither state
was a signatory to the NPT, and this agreement allowed for previously
absent robust safeguards and a commitment to a nuclear-weapons-free
South America.
The newly announced agreement among the six Gulf Cooperation
Council states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bah-
rain), rather than focusing on security concerns, has addressed the eco-
nomic and political considerations of nuclear power.10 The proposed
agreement would create a common nuclear energy infrastructure, obvi-
ating the need for any individual nuclear programs, such as enrichment
or reprocessing, that could be diverted for use in a nuclear weapons pro-
gram. The common interests of all involved would increase barriers to
nuclear weapons development.
An example of bilateral nuclear cooperation is the U.S.-India nuclear
deal, in which the United States has offered aid to India’s civilian pro-
gram (among other aid offers) in return for India placing its civilian
nuclear sites under safeguards and pledging not to export nuclear tech-
nologies.11 These examples of bilateral and regional agreements work
well to address the concerns of states who wish to develop nuclear ener-
gy programs while satisfying the desires of the United States and others
who would like to reduce proliferation. Whether multilateral, bilateral,
or regional treaties, formal commitment to use nuclear technology only
for peaceful purposes is the common thread that runs through all non-
proliferation agreements.
284   CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Informal Agreements
Other informal agreements have also been crucial to the success of the
nonproliferation regime. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a col-
lection of countries that supply nuclear-related material, promotes nu-
clear nonproliferation by further regulating the items that can be sold
or transferred to non-nuclear countries, and the Zangger Committee
placed the first export controls on “trigger list” items related to nuclear
power and proliferation.12 The states cooperating under the guidelines
of the NSG and Zangger Committees agree to enforce export controls
over nuclear or dual use items, updated when needed to address the
spread of technology. This has obvious limitations: participating coun-
tries must have control over exports and be willing to take action to
halt those sales that do not adhere to NSG guidelines. This is an area
where strong oversight, including additional monetary and personnel
resources devoted to export control, could make a large difference in
nuclear proliferation. Including other countries with the ability to ex-
port nuclear-related technology and information, such as Pakistan and
India, will improve the nonproliferation environment.
The combination of diplomatic agreements, inspections to enforce
those agreements, and voluntary commercial controls over dual-use and
prohibited items related to nuclear weapons has served well to slow the
spread of nuclear technology to nuclear-weapon programs. Although
there have been instances of proliferation among signatories of the NPT,
these instances have been few. Moreover, the result of these breaches
was a strengthening and expansion of safeguards, export controls, and
attention to nonproliferation, rather than the dissolution of the NPT.
Since the Treaty came into force, only one state has withdrawn—North
Korea in 2003—and has since announced its intention to allow inspec-
tors to return.13 There is no reason to expect this trend not to continue,
and although challenges to the NPT are sure to arise in the future, it is
more likely that the end result will be stronger safeguards, not a collapse
of the nonproliferation regime itself.14

Enforcement of Nonproliferation Goals

Enforcement of nonproliferation goals after states have begun nuclear
weapons programs is the next layer of defense following diplomatic ac-
tivities. These steps, referred to here broadly as counterproliferation,
 BEYOND THE NPT   285

include sanctions, among other activities. Sanctions and withholding

of trade or material aid have been commonly used in the past both to
punish states for attempting to produce nuclear weapons and to impede
their progress.15 The goal of these activities is to make the cost of con-
tinuing a nuclear program prohibitive, thereby encouraging proliferants
to end their programs.
Sanctions have been used many times in the past, for varying rea-
sons, with varying degrees of success.16 Sanctions were imposed by the
United States on India and Pakistan in 1998 following their May nuclear
tests, but were lifted in 2001 in response to cooperation received after
the September 11 terrorist attacks. Similarly, sanctions were imposed
on Iraq and Libya for reasons not directly related to those states’ sus-
pected nuclear programs, but a side effect was to reduce funds available
for nuclear activities. In addition to directly affecting nuclear programs,
the financial hardships imposed by sanctions can have such an affect
on the overall health of a nation that they may respond by doing what
they can to have the sanctions lifted.17 This, of course, is what sanctions
are meant to achieve, but the circumstances in which this result can be
attained may vary. However, it is advantageous for those nations closely
aligned with proliferants and those who are adversaries to adhere to
a “carrot and stick” approach. Offers of aid, combined with threats of
sanctions, may prove to be instrumental in curbing proliferation.
Other than sanctions and similar high-level approaches to halting
proliferation, there has not been a formal means of interdicting inter-
national trade in nuclear technologies beyond the export controls of a
given country. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a strong first
step in providing state enforcement of nonproliferation efforts, and has
been noted for its success in stopping a shipment of centrifuge parts to
Libya in 2003, helping to bring an end to that country’s nuclear ambi-
tions.18 The PSI is an agreement among states that allows for boarding
of vessels with the agreement of the host country.19 The PSI is intended
to deter or interdict shipments of material related to WMD, within cur-
rent laws governing shipping and the seas.20 Currently, fifteen states are
members of the PSI, including Russia, a key exporter; however, many
important providers of WMD and related materials, such as China, re-
main outside the PSI. Constructive discussions to bring these states into
the PSI and actively engage them in stopping shipments of WMD are
crucial to the success of the PSI and similar agreements.
286   CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Enforcement of nonproliferation agreements is the most difficult

aspect of nonproliferation efforts, and the most important. Effec-
tive monitoring, enhanced cooperation and information sharing, and
strengthened, standardized rules regarding nuclear material and infor-
mation is necessary to address the difficulties inherent in a secretive
subject. With the increase in technical knowledge and the increasing
number of dual-use technologies, it is ever more important to identify
distinct, or at least the most important, technologies related to nuclear
weapons development. By narrowing the export controls to focus on
these more specific targets, less confusion and more oversight among
governments over the end use of the equipment can be realized. Fur-
ther, informal agreements that seek to provide a means to act against
proliferators, such as the PSI, should be encouraged and augmented.
For example, one important change to the PSI would be an agreement
among states that offer “flags of convenience” to shippers that would al-
low interdiction in international waters on the open sea.
The international community should embrace the concept that the
goal of nonproliferation is just that—no new nuclear weapon states. Thus,
action to prevent states from developing nuclear weapons—whether by
offers of aid and matériel, sanctions, or forceful interdiction—should
be tailored to the specific weaknesses of the proliferator, and may in-
volve compromise and sacrifice on the part of those states that desire
to curb proliferation. The synthesis of these tools has convinced at least
two states to renounce their nuclear programs, and more can do so in
the future.

The Rise of Military Counterproliferation

The start of the 21st century has seen the rise of military action as a
means of countering nuclear proliferation and the proliferation of other
weapons of mass destruction. The Bush Administration’s 2002 National
Security Strategy is based on the premise that nuclear proliferation in
the case of certain states is irreversible and unstoppable, and thus the
United States must act militarily when possible to pre-empt or prevent
the use of nuclear weapons and keep other nations from gaining access
to nuclear weapons technology.21 Some other countries have accepted
this premise, as a “coalition of the willing” joined the United States in
a campaign of regime change in Iraq in 2003 with the stated goal of
 BEYOND THE NPT   287

removing Saddam Hussein’s suspected nuclear capability.22 Those who

advocate military action in the form of precision strikes against nuclear
facilities or regime change generally believe that the role of multilateral
and bilateral agreements for curbing nuclear proliferation have failed,
and the best way to stop the spread of nuclear weapons is to destroy the
means of producing them.23
A military strategy to curb nuclear proliferation is not new. The Unit-
ed States contemplated military action against Chinese nuclear facilities
and North Korean nuclear facilities to prevent those two countries from
becoming nuclear powers, and the Israelis conducted a militarily suc-
cessful raid against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 to keep Iraq
from producing plutonium.24 Currently, the United States and Israel are
publicly denying they have plans to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, but
many news reports are focusing on the possibility that either country
may conclude that military action is the only means of curbing Iran’s
suspected nuclear ambitions in light of the stalled diplomatic efforts.25
Military action may, in some very select cases, be the appropriate re-
sponse to nuclearization by some countries. However, in many cases, a
military role in nonproliferation efforts may very well encourage those
same countries to increase their proliferation efforts. For example, fol-
lowing the 1981 Israeli raid on Osirak (which destroyed the reactor),
Iraq turned to uranium enrichment as a means of developing nuclear
weapons. The extent of Iraq’s uranium enrichment program was kept
hidden from the IAEA until after the 1991 Gulf War, when it was re-
vealed that the program was significantly more advanced than previous-
ly assumed. Similarly, although an attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure
is possible, the effect on any nuclear weapons program could be small if
any unknown facilities exist,26 and Iran’s retaliatory capabilities are nu-
merous. Military action should be considered only as a last resort, and
only then with full understanding that the consequences may be worse
than diplomatic compromise.

Addressing Nuclear Terrorism

The rise of terrorism early in the 21st century and its subsequent high
profile in international affairs has led to increasing worry over nuclear
terrorism—the stated desire of terrorists to acquire weapons of mass de-
struction, especially nuclear weapons. In the 2004 U.S. presidential de-
288   CHAPTER FIFTEEN

bate, both President George Bush and Senator John Kerry stated that the
greatest threat to the United States was nuclear weapons in the hands of
terrorists. A significant amount of effort has been devoted to reducing
this threat by denying terrorists access to fissile material and assembled
nuclear weapons.
Other than appropriate security activities tailored to civilian research
reactors, these efforts have been focused primarily on securing fissile
material in Russia and other former Soviet states and down-blending
highly enriched uranium. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, thou-
sands of nuclear weapons and huge amounts of fissile material were left
unsecured. Multiple policy initiatives were established by the Depart-
ments of Energy and State and the U.S. Congress, among others, to re-
duce the threat posed by former Soviet weapons and nuclear material.
These cooperative policies have worked very well. For example, thou-
sands of weapons were removed from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
and these countries joined the NPT as non-nuclear states.
Denying terrorists access to nuclear weapons or weapons-grade ma-
terial is largely an exercise in reducing the amount of nuclear material
available.27 In other words, the fewer states with nuclear weapons that
can be sold or stolen, and the fewer states with facilities that can pro-
duce highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium, the fewer
access points terrorists will have to nuclear weapons and material. Thus,
cooperative threat reduction measures that can be implemented with
states are increasingly a “non-proliferation” measure against terrorists as
well. While this may be an emotionally unfulfilling means of preventing
nuclear proliferation to terrorists, given its passivity, it cannot be denied
that deterrence by denial is effective.28
Active means of denying terrorists access to nuclear material and
weapons have also been proposed, including manipulation of the black
market with undercover buyers and sellers, disinformation campaigns,
and increased monitoring of nuclear traffic.29 Terrorists groups such as
al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo have attempted to buy nuclear materials
off the black market. As far as we know from reports, these efforts have
been unsuccessful: al Qaeda operatives were duped into purchasing
harmless materials believed to be nuclear-related, while Aum Shinrikyo,
despite close ties to former Soviet nuclear experts, were unable to ob-
tain nuclear materials.30 Other attempts, however, have been somewhat
more successful. Thefts of small amounts (microgram or milligram
quantities) of radioactive material are periodically reported by various
 BEYOND THE NPT   289

monitoring agencies or seized by police and other law enforcement or

intelligence personnel, but the small amounts and types of material are
generally of no value for nuclear weapons.31
More serious are the proliferation “networks” such as the A. Q. Khan
nuclear network that have quasi-official backing.32 These networks are
more dangerous than the simple black market, as highly enriched ura-
nium and weapons-grade plutonium seems to be available. Given the
high level of the officials involved in such networks, the information
exchanged or sold is deemed to be fairly accurate and can lead to signifi-
cant advances in nuclear expertise on the part of the receiver. Libya, for
example, admitted to receiving assistance with its centrifuge program,
and it is suspected that Iran has obtained a great deal of information
regarding P-1 and P-2 centrifuges from A. Q. Khan.
The great fear is that terrorist will be able to take advantage of these
sophisticated networks and procure nuclear material, an assembled
weapon (or its components), or less likely, the technology for produc-
ing nuclear material. Infiltrating nuclear networks and the nuclear black
market is key to preventing the transfer of nuclear expertise to terrorist
groups. Greater cooperation with other countries to secure nuclear ar-
senals, material, and technical knowledge will protect nuclear material
and information to begin with, and manipulation of the black market
can increase the cost to terrorists and force them to divert their energy
elsewhere. Finally, the United States and others have worked to develop
forensic “attribution” tools to determine the origin of nuclear material
used in a nuclear weapon, but there is work to be done to establish the
necessary international cooperation.33 Convincing other countries of
the effectiveness of nuclear forensics and the willingness of the U.S. to
respond to a nuclear terrorist attack will provide a considerable deter-
rent effect on would-be sponsors of terrorists.34
Nuclear terrorism is a grave concern, and will remain a threat as long
as states have unsafeguarded nuclear material or are willing to assist ter-
rorists. Terrorists are highly unlikely to achieve the capability to pro-
duce their own weapons-grade uranium or plutonium; the most likely
pathway for acquisition of these materials is through the sale or theft of
nuclear weapons or material, or coercion of states with nuclear weap-
ons. This can be avoided by striving to secure nuclear facilities, mate-
rial, and weapons in other nuclear capable states, reducing the number
of states that can produce fissile material or nuclear weapons, and en-
suring that those facilities that remain operating are monitored under
290   CHAPTER FIFTEEN

comprehensive international safeguards (including the Additional Pro-

tocol and appropriate international security standards). Adequately se-
curing nuclear material, infiltrating the nuclear black market, shutting
down nuclear networks, and convincing potential suppliers of retalia-
tory action will go far towards denying terrorists an opportunity to pro-
cure nuclear weapons.

A Path Forward
Nuclear proliferation continues to be problematic more than sixty years
after the first nuclear weapon was used in 1945. Nuclear technology
has spread across the globe. While the great majority of countries that
maintain active nuclear power plants, enrichment facilities and repro-
cessing plants act in accordance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards,
a few manipulate the safeguards agreements to create nascent nuclear
weapons programs or secretly engage in activities that could be used
to develop nuclear weapons without informing the IAEA. As the tech-
nology needed to produce fissile material and build nuclear weapons
becomes ever more available, the international community must shift
its efforts towards enforcement of international agreements and bilateral
and multilateral cooperation to prevent and interdict transfers of nucle-
ar-related technology. While promising new efforts have been made and
many proposals have been put forth to combat the spread of nuclear
weapons, they do not address some concrete steps that can be taken to
help curb proliferation. This section will suggest some additional steps
to dissuade states from pursuing nuclear weapons and discuss some of
the difficulties of proposed actions.
The Bush Administration proposed in 2004 seven steps towards
reducing nuclear proliferation: expand the PSI; strengthen interna-
tional nonproliferation controls; expand the Nunn-Lugar programs to
keep nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists and “rogue states;”
strengthen the requirements for use of peaceful nuclear technologies;
require ratification of the Additional Protocol; strengthen the IAEA’s
safeguards and verification division; and, finally, prevent those states ac-
cused of violating nonproliferation controls from serving on the IAEA
Board of Governors.35 Assuming these ideas are fully funded and im-
plemented, the proposals can go far towards improving proliferation ef-
forts. However, they are primarily concentrated on enforcing existing
 BEYOND THE NPT   291

international agreements and laws and are designed to force states into
compliance with nonproliferation goals.
To create a lasting reduction in nuclear nonproliferation, policies
must encourage states not to pursue nuclear weapons in the first place.
Counterproliferation tactics may not compel a state to renounce nuclear
weapons; a truly determined state may decide that nuclear weapons are
so important that the consequence of noncompliance with international
laws is worth the benefit of nuclear weapons. Law enforcement and ad-
ditional safeguards may delay a “rogue” state’s nuclear program, compel
leaders to implement even more secrecy, and make it more difficult to
purchase items for a nuclear program, but without a genuine desire on
the behalf of a leader to forgo nuclear weapons, proliferation will con-
tinue despite best efforts to stop it.
For many years, the NPT provided a framework within which states
could receive assistance with peaceful nuclear power while refraining
from nuclear weapons. The international environment during the Cold
War encouraged weaker states to secure nuclear guarantees from the
great powers, i.e., the Soviet Union and the United States, while re-
nouncing nuclear weapons under the NPT. With the collapse of the So-
viet Union, the security fears of many states may not be conducive to
seeking a nuclear umbrella, and the retaliation promised by the United
States (or Russia) may not be as believable. The reasons that states pur-
sue nuclear weapons must be addressed when searching for nonprolif-
eration tactics. Many of these reasons have little to do with security per
se, but are the result of a desire for prestige and domestic pressures both
for and against nuclear weapons.36
The international nature of nonproliferation agreements does not
satisfy the security and economic needs or the desire for prestige of
many states. Bilateral and regional agreements among states must be
utilized to a greater extent to satisfy the needs of any given country. For
the United States and other nuclear powers, the need is to reduce the
number of states with nuclear weapons and encourage states to forgo the
nuclear option. For non-nuclear states, however, needs vary along with
the reasons that states decide to build nuclear weapons. A single inter-
national agreement cannot hope to satisfy the diverse needs or desires
of all states, but bilateral and regional agreements can. These agreements
can take the form of bilateral security arrangements, trade negotiations,
or regional security and economic pacts.
292   CHAPTER FIFTEEN

There is ample evidence that indicates this approach will be success-

ful and easily realized. The most recent positive indication that bilateral
agreements can be successful in reversing proliferation is the 2003 deci-
sion by Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi to disband his country’s nuclear pro-
gram. This decision was likely brought about due to the diplomatic work
of Britain and the United States, resulting in increased economic trade
with Libya, removal of sanctions, and reintegration of Libya into the
international community. Financial hardship resulting from sanctions,
strenuous efforts in reducing nuclear transactions, and the enforcement
activities of the PSI undoubtedly played a role in Qaddafi’s decision to
renounce nuclear weapons; however, the final decision was due largely
to diplomatic agreements.37
In future arrangements, the United States or others may have to con-
cede more than they wish or have had to do in the past, but the final goal
is to have states without nuclear weapons. North Korea, for example,
apparently decided that the repercussions of its October 2006 nuclear
test were unacceptable. In the face of economic and political pressure
from China, economic sanctions from the UN, and significant conces-
sions on behalf of the United States, North Korea agreed to shut down
its plutonium-producing reactor and accept intrusive inspections.38
Some critics in the United States thought this deal gave too much to a
“rogue” regime,39 but others support the engagement. Although in its
infancy, this deal may end North Korea’s nuclear program by providing
the regime with the aid and security assurances it wanted. In return,
the United States and the world contend with one fewer nuclear state
and lose relatively little in the bargain.40 Future nonproliferation efforts
should follow the model of Libya and North Korea, with positive in-
ducements offered in exchange for nuclear disarmament.

A Positive Outlook
Any changes to the nonproliferation regime will be difficult to imple-
ment and will require sustained effort and diplomacy. In spite of many
who claim that the nonproliferation regime is crumbling, the reality is
much brighter: the NPT has prevented a significant number of states
from becoming nuclear powers and will continue to do so. The 2006
North Korean nuclear test and the difficulties in resolving the situation
over Iran’s nuclear program are tests of the nonproliferation regime, but
 BEYOND THE NPT   293

they also offer opportunities. In 1991, the extent of Saddam Hussein’s

nuclear weapons program prompted positive changes to the nonpro-
liferation regime. The Additional Protocol strengthened international
weapons inspectors’ abilities and allowed the IAEA oversight of previ-
ously inaccessible facilities, while the disclosure of Iraq’s delinquency
helped to drive multinational cooperation in curbing the spread of nu-
clear technology. Similarly, the challenges to the NPT and the nonpro-
liferation regime today present a chance to improve upon the current
standards for nonproliferation. First, with the NPT as the fundamen-
tal binding agreement on the vast majority of states, the international
community can work towards strengthening enforcement of oversight
and providing the IAEA with more information and more resources
to combat proliferation among states. Second, outside of formal UN
agreements, states should improve upon the Nuclear Suppliers Group
and Zanggar Committee guidelines to identify the key components of
nuclear technology and increase the emphasis on keeping the most im-
portant tools and information away from states of concern. Third, the
U.S. should work with other countries to strengthen bilateral interdic-
tion and enforcement agreements which have proven to work well to
combat proliferation efforts (for example, by enacting a United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) resolution that legalizes interdiction on the
high seas). Fourth, emphasizing cooperation and enforcement of inter-
national agreements, rather than military action, is paramount, as mili-
tary action often involves unforeseen consequences and is frequently not
supported by key UNSC members and U.S. allies. Finally, these actions
to reduce proliferation should be supplemented with terrorist targeted
infiltration of the nuclear black market, improved nuclear forensics, in-
telligence sharing, and a renewed effort to convince potential terrorist
suppliers of the capability and willingness of the U.S. to retaliate follow-
ing nuclear attack by state-sponsored terrorists.
Reducing the spread of nuclear weapons will require greater effort
and attention as nuclear technology becomes more available to a greater
number of states and organizations. Those countries that currently are
considered nuclear powers must realize that in some cases compromises
must be made to ensure safety and security. Given the rather exciting
beginning of the 21st century with the North Korean nuclear test and
the controversy over Iran’s nuclear program, it would be easy to con-
clude that the nonproliferation regime has failed. However, these events
294   CHAPTER FIFTEEN

provide a unique opportunity for the international community to recog-

nize the failings of the current nonproliferation regime, undertake action
to remedy the deficiencies, and work towards dramatically strengthen-
ing the underpinnings of nonproliferation in the future.

Notes
1. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963
(Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1964), 280.
2. The exact number of states with nuclear weapons is somewhat opaque:
Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear arsenal but has not officially admitted
it; and North Korea conducted a nuclear test in October 2006 that was reported
by Western agencies to have been less successful than expected..
3. An entire book could likely be written on the success or failure of the
NPT. For a relatively brief discussion of its successes, see Jim Walsh, “Learning
from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Nonproliferation,” Report for the
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission No. 41, September 2006,
http://www.wmdcommission.org. For the opposite view, see William C. Martel,
“The End of Non-proliferation?” Strategic Review, 28:4 (Fall 2000), 16-21.
4. See Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear
Taboo,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), 5-49 for an example
of how international structures have constrained or encouraged states to adopt
cultural norms and ideas.
5. Only a maximum of five states have developed nuclear weapons since
the NPT entered into force—India, Pakistan, Israel (widely assumed to pos-
sess nuclear weapons), and North Korea, assuming the October 2006 event to
be evidence of an embryonic nuclear weapon capability. South Africa also de-
veloped nuclear weapons, but Pretoria unilaterally destroyed its small nuclear
arsenal and signed the NPT in 1991.
6. “Rollback” refers to those states that have dismantled their nuclear weap-
ons. South Africa is an example, as is Ukraine.
7. Examples are Iraq, North Korea, and potentially Iran.
8. Additional information on the Additional Protocol, including a model
agreement, can be found at
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html.
9. Michael Z. Wise, “Argentina, Brazil Sign Nuclear Accord,” The Washington
Post, December 14, 1991, A19.
10. Ed Blanche, “GCC Pursues Nuclear Energy Programme,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, December 20, 2006.
 BEYOND THE NPT   295

11. The influence of nuclear cooperation between India and the United
States on nuclear proliferation is not yet clear, and a primary criticism of the
India deal is the lack of control for New Delhi’s nuclear weapons facilities. See
Chapter 16 in this volume.
12. For detailed information on the NSG, including participating govern-
ments, guidelines, and reports, see http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org.
13. Edward Cody, “Tentative Nuclear Deal Struck With North Korea,” The
Washington Post, February 13, 2007, A1
14. It is important to note that the same dire predictions given today about
the demise of the NPT and the failure of the nonproliferation regime were also
heard after India’s 1974 nuclear test, the revelations of Iraq’s nuclear program
in 1991, and again following India and Pakistan’s 1998 tests. In all these cases,
the NPT was further strengthened. See Joseph F. Pilat, “Iraq and the Future of
Nuclear Non-proliferation: The Roles of Inspections and Treaties,” Science, Vol.
255, March 1992, 1224-1229.
15. Sanctions for violating the terms of the NPT or for having been found
“noncompliant” have been imposed on North Korea and Iran via UN Security
Council Resolutions 1718 and 1737, respectively. There is also evidence that
comprehensive sanctions levied against Libya and Iraq played a significant role
in undermining those countries’ ability to finance a nuclear weapons program.
16. For arguments for and against sanctions, see Robert A. Pape, “Why Eco-
nomic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn,
1997), p.. 90-136; George Tsebelis, “Are Sanctions Effective? A Game-Theoretic
Analysis,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 1990), 3-
28; and Kimberly Ann Elliot, “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely
Empty?” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), 50-65.
17. There is some evidence that the effect of sanctions imposed on North
Korea following its nuclear test significantly hurt the DPRK. There is also re-
porting that indicates that a desire to have sanctions lifted and normal trade re-
sumed was a factor in Libya’s decision to renounce nuclear weapons. On North
Korea, see David Sanger, “Outside Pressures Snapped Korean Deadlock,” The
New York Times, February 14, 2007, 1; for information on Libya, see Bruce W.
Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who “Won” Libya? The Force-Diplo-
macy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,” International Security,
Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005/2006), 47-86.
18. Andrew C. Winner, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face
of Interdiction,” The Washington Quarterly, 28:2 (Spring 2005), 129-143.
19. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Proliferation Security
Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles,” September 4, 2003, http://www.
state.gove/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm.
296   CHAPTER FIFTEEN

20. In practice, this means that maritime interdiction will likely occur within
sovereign waters with the cooperation of the appropriate domestic authorities.
21. See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Sec-
tion V, September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
22. Nuclear disarmament was not the sole reason for the 2003 Iraq war: con-
cerns of other forms of WMD and Saddam Hussein’s suspected ties to terrorists
were also cited.
23. See Jason D. Ellis, “The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. Na-
tional Security,” The Washington Quarterly, (Spring 2003) 26:2 115-133.
24. For details on the 1981 raid, see Rodger W. Claire, Raid on the Sun, (New
York: Broadway Books, 2004) and Shelomoh Nakdimon, First Strike: The Ex-
clusive Story of How Israel Foiled Iraq’s Attempt to Get the Bomb, (New York:
Summit Books, 1987). For details on U.S. concerns over China, see Jeffrey T.
Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Ger-
many to Iran and North Korea, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Ltd., 1996).
25. One widely cited example is Seymour M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” The New
Yorker, April 17, 2006. See also Uzi Mahnaimi and Sarah Baxter, “Israel read-
ies forces for strike on nuclear Iran,” The Sunday Times (online), December 11,
2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-1920074,00.html; Ian Bruce,
“Israelis plan pre-emptive strike on Iran,” The Herald (online), January 10, 2006;
http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/53948.html; and Josef Federman, “Israeli
Hints at Preparation to Stop Iran,” The Washington Post, January 22, 2006.
26. See Whitney Raas and Austin Long, “Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli
Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities,” International Security, Vol.
31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 7-33. For one widely cited example of the poten-
tial of a secondary secret Iranian nuclear program see Graham Allison, “How
Good Is American Intelligence on Iran’s Bomb?” YaleGlobal Online, 13 June
2006, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu, accessed 12 November 2006.
27. William Langewiesche, “How to Get a Nuclear Bomb,” The Atlantic
Monthly, December 2006, Vol. 298, No. 5, 80-99.
28. The United States is making contingency plans to deal with the situation
of a “failed state” possessing nuclear weapons, as could occur in the event of a
coup in Pakistan. See Rebecca K. C. Hersman and Todd M. Koca, “Eliminat-
ing Adversary WMD: Lessons for Future Conflicts,” October 2004, National
Defense University, Strategic Forum No. 211.
29. Michael V. Hynes, John E. Peters, and Joel Kvitky, “Denying Armaged-
don: Preventing Terrorist Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Annals, AAPSS, 607, Sep-
tember 2006, 150-161.
30. Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, “Aum Shinrikyo, al Qa-
 BEYOND THE NPT   297

eda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combat-
ing Nuclear Terrorism,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, DB-458-AF,
2005, http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented _briefings/DB458/
31. Most seizures have not been highly enriched uranium or plutonium, but
rather other nuclear material that could be used in radiological dispersal de-
vices (“dirty bombs”).
32. Michael V. Hynes, John E. Peters, and Joel Kvitky, Denying Armaged-
don.
33. For example see, Michael May, Jay Davis, “Preparing for the worst,” Na-
ture 443, 907 - 908 (25 Oct 2006).
34. Caitlin Talmadge, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11,” The Washington Quarterly,
Spring 2007, 30:2, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
35. See “Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation,” Fort Lesley J. McNair—National Defense University, Wash-
ington, D.C., February 11, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releas-
es/2004/02/20040211-4.html, accessed 31 December 2006.
36. Widely cited on reasons for proliferation is Scott Sagan, “Why Do States
Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Se-
curity, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-1997), 54-86.
37. See Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who “Won” Lib-
ya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,”
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005/2006), 47-86.
38. Whether or not this deal lives up to expectations and succeeds in the
future remains to be seen.
39. John Bolton, former Ambassador to the UN, was quoted as denouncing
the agreement as a “bad deal.” See Glenn Kessler, “Conservatives Assail North
Korea Accord,” The Washington Post, February 15, 2007, A1.
40. This agreement is arguably very similar to previous agreements with
North Korea such as the Agreed Framework, which did not succeed. However,
the price paid for the attempt is small, and the return could conceivably be
large.
 Chapter SIXTEEN

The India Deal and its Implications

Mary Beth Nikitin

“For many years, the United States and India were kept apart by the
rivalries that divided the world. That’s changed. Our two great de-
mocracies are now united by opportunities that can lift our people,
and by threats that can bring down all our progress. The United States
and India, separated by half the globe, are closer than ever before, and
the partnership between our free nations has the power to transform
the world.”—President George W. Bush, New Delhi, March 3, 2006

T
he U.S.-India announcement of cooperation on civilian nuclear
energy technology, announced in March 2006 and approved in
principle by Congress in December 2006, was hailed as the cen-
terpiece of President Bush and Prime Minister Singh’s New Delhi sum-
mit, and touted as the key to moving the bilateral relationship forward
on all fronts. President Bush has cited the agreement as a major non-
proliferation victory. While it focuses on opening up India’s access to
civilian nuclear technologies, the “nuclear deal” has implications for
India’s strategic nuclear program, and gives insights into Washington’s
changing perspective toward the Indian nuclear arsenal. Furthermore,
agreement on this issue was reached in the context of a broadening co-
operative security relationship between the United States and India. Its
conclusion entails costs and benefits for India’s own nuclear program
and has implications for the global nonproliferation system.
President Bush has characterized the shift in U.S. policy toward India
as a reward for its good nonproliferation behavior, although it is not a
party to the Nuclear Nonroliferation Treaty. However, the agreement

298
 THE INDIA DEAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS   299

has broader meaning as part of a developing bilateral strategic partner-

ship: it is a recognition of common goals, that “both our countries are
linked by … a desire to increase mutual security against the common
threats posed by intolerance, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of
mass destruction.” The Bush administration sent a clear message that
curbing vertical proliferation of India’s arsenal is no longer a policy goal.
Moving the bilateral relationship forward was prioritized over any po-
tential costs that breaking the civil nuclear trade barrier might have for
global nonproliferation goals. Furthermore, it will test whether states
that are not parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) can
be brought into the nuclear nonproliferation regime and nuclear supply
regime to net positive advantage. While these effects are yet to be fully
seen, the proposed agreement sets a precedent and tests the effective-
ness of making case-by-case nonproliferation policy.

Evolving U.S.-India Relations

The transforming moment in U.S.-India relations may have come much
earlier than March 2006. In the words of former Indian Foreign Min-
ister Jaswant Singh, when President Clinton visited India in 2000, “the
U.S. helped India cross the bridge to the rest of the world.” 1 This visit
followed two years of intense shuttle diplomacy after the 1998 Indian
nuclear tests, led by U.S. Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.2 These
talks began the process of broadening the context for dialogue on secu-
rity, ending the “cold war” between the U.S. and India.3 Besides nuclear
proliferation questions, the two sides discussed a wide range of geopo-
litical questions.
Another jump forward in relations occurred when India immediately
offered its support to the United States following the September 11 at-
tacks in the war against terror—250 Indian citizens died in the attack on
the World Trade Center.4 President Bush waived U.S. economic sanc-
tions against India and Pakistan that were imposed after their nuclear
tests, due to the new defining policy priority of defeating Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan, and in December 2001 military-to-military contacts were
resumed with India through the Defense Policy Group that had been
suspended for three years.5
The Bush administration continued the bilateral security dialogue
in the intervening years and in January 2004 the two countries agreed
300   CHAPTER SIXTEEN

on the “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP).” The NSSP stated

the countries’ intention to expand cooperation in the areas of civilian
nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high technology trade,
and to expand dialogue on missile defense.6
In June 2005 at the Pentagon, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and Indian Minister of Defense Pranab Mukherjee signed the
“New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship.”7 Declaring
that the United States and India have “entered a new era” in which the
two countries will build a strategic relationship, the document sets out
goals for the partnership over the next ten years. The Framework pledg-
es to: conduct joint and combined exercises and exchanges, collaborate
in multinational operations, strengthen capabilities to defeat terrorism,
expand interaction with other nations to promote stability, enhance ca-
pabilities to combat weapons of mass destruction proliferation, expand
“two-way defense trade” as a means of strengthening the strategic part-
nership, increase technology transfer and R&D collaboration, expand
collaboration relating to missile defense, strengthen abilities to respond
quickly to disasters, work to build worldwide capacity for peacekeeping
operations, conduct exchanges on defense strategy and defense trans-
formation, increase intelligence exchanges, and continue high-level
strategic dialogue.
Language in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2006 com-
pared to the NSS of 1998 also highlights the dramatic change in bilateral
relations. In 1998, India and Pakistan were treated in similar fashion.
The document emphasized a freeze on nuclear weapons development
and promotion of confidence building measures, and stated that, “In-
dia and Pakistan are contributing to a self-defeating cycle of escalation
that does not add to the security of either country.” In contrast, while
relations with Pakistan have improved but the major disputes are not
yet resolved, the 2006 NSS treats India and Pakistan distinctly and dif-
ferently. It emphasizes that the United States is seeking good relations
with both and recognizes an improvement in India-Pakistan relations,
but it makes no reference to their nuclear weapon programs. Indeed,
it focuses on U.S.-India bilateral relations as such: “We have set aside
decades of mistrust and put relations with India, the world’s most popu-
lous democracy, on a new and fruitful path,” and states that India is now
“poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United
States in a way befitting a major power.”
 THE INDIA DEAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS   301

Strong statements by the U.S. military leadership further highlight

the extent to which this partnership has developed. For example, Gen-
eral Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a briefing
with his Indian counterpart, Admiral Arun Prakash in New Delhi on
June 5, 2006, “Our way forward is to… find ways that our two militar-
ies can interact that will reinforce to our friends that we are capable of
defending ourselves and our friends, and to reinforce to any potential
enemy that India as a sovereign nation and the United States as a sover-
eign nation, and together as partners, are going to protect our citizens
against harm.”8 Indeed, U.S. military cooperation involves significant
conventional arms purchases as well.9 Cooperation following the tsu-
nami in December 2004 also played a role in solidifying these ties. The
emphasis on deterring common enemies and combating weapons of
mass destruction proliferation reveals that the United States does not
see any threat from an Indian nuclear weapon arsenal itself.
The U.S.-India “Strategic Partnership” was further detailed in a July
18, 2005 summit statement. President Bush characterized the partner-
ship as such, “[The] relationship is based increasingly on common val-
ues and common interests. We are working together to promote global
peace and prosperity. We are partners in the war on terrorism and we
are partners in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and the means to deliver them.” This is part of the shift in rhetoric
in U.S. policy from addressing India as part of the proliferation prob-
lem to emphasizing its role as partner in preventing further weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. The partnership based on “our
shared values” that was further developed is part of a scientific, military,
and economic package that includes cooperation in energy, agriculture,
science and technology, trade and investment, high technology, health
and a clean environment. The outcome of the March 2, 2006 Summit in
New Delhi solidified the July 18 pledges.10

The Nuclear “Deal”

It is in this broadened context of cooperation that the so-called ‘nuclear
deal’ was born. The agreement to establish civilian nuclear cooperation
between the United States and India was viewed by the Bush administra-
tion as a key to progress on other strategic issues. The linkage between
nuclear cooperation and cooperation in other areas was highlighted by
302   CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Secretary Rice in congressional testimony in April 2006: “in order to

fully realize the potential of this vision for India, we do have to deal
with the longstanding impediments associated with civil nuclear coop-
eration and we need to resolve them once and for all. We believe that
this initiative will unlock the progress of our expanding relationship in
other areas.”11 Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, who was and is
closely involved in every step of the negotiations, has said that the civil
nuclear accord is the “symbolic centerpiece” of bilateral engagement.12
The agreement is meant to politically cement the U.S.-India strategic
relationship, viewed as critical for ensuring America’s strategic and eco-
nomic strength in the region in the years ahead.
Even with the will on both sides to leave the past dynamic behind,
until the last moment it was not clear that they would be able to reach
agreement on this most controversial of the July 18 pledges—agreement
on the terms of negotiation for a civil nuclear cooperation agreement.
When agreement on basic terms was announced by the two leaders at
the March 2006 summit, it was greeted with a mixed reaction in both
the United States and India.13
In effect, the inclusion of civilian nuclear cooperation in the strategic
partnership means that the United States has clearly recognized India as
a de facto nuclear weapon state and implies that it will not seek Indian
disarmament until India itself is ready for this. This is especially signifi-
cant since it not only gives India de facto recognition of its nuclear weap-
ons but could in effect give it standing akin to de jure status without any
commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith, as the other
de jure Nuclear Weapon States of the NPT committed to under Article
VI.14 In the eyes of the deal’s supporters, this shift is justified since India
is seen as a “responsible” nuclear weapons power that does not prolifer-
ate to other programs. The terms announced at the March 2006 summit
explicitly set no limits to Indian nuclear arsenal development.
Nevertheless, summit statements promising civil nuclear cooperation
with India were only a first step. The U.S. administration next needed to
obtain authorization from Congress to negotiate a civil nuclear coopera-
tion agreement with India, under section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.15 Since India is not a member of the Nuclear NPT, express
permission was required by Congress under U.S. law. This enabling
legislation was passed as the Henry Hyde United States-India Peaceful
Atomic Energy Cooperation Act on December 18, 2006.16
 THE INDIA DEAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS   303

Further changes to the export rules of the multilateral Nuclear Sup-

pliers Group (NSG) are also required for cooperation to take place.
Nuclear trade between India and other countries would then be per-
mitted, as was recognized in the March 2006 statement, “This historic
accomplishment will permit our countries to move forward towards
our common objective of full civil nuclear energy cooperation between
India and the United States and between India and the international
community as a whole.” This access is intended to improve the safety of
Indian nuclear facilities, as well as the ability of India to provide energy
for its advancing economy, with residual benefits for the United States
and others. India will be invited to join research consortia on future
reactor technologies.
In return, India has promised to add IAEA safeguards for more exist-
ing power reactors that are not relevant for weapons production and to
put future reactors that India determines are for civil use under IAEA
safeguards. India has recommitted itself to its informal moratorium on
nuclear testing. This does help reinforce the global norm against nuclear
testing.
However, India avoided any commitment not to be the first to break
the moratorium and successfully resisted U.S. requests that it adopt a
moratorium on the production of nuclear materials for weapons, despite
U.S. negotiators’ attempts to include this in the early phases of the ne-
gotiations in the summer of 2005. The five NPT Nuclear Weapon States
(U.S., Russia, France, Britain and China) are all currently under infor-
mal unilateral moratoria on the production of fissile material. There
are also no calls for India to join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty or sign up to the Additional Protocol of IAEA safeguards, long
part of the U.S. position towards India’s military nuclear program. Thus,
in the end, India has retained the freedom to expand and advance its
nuclear weapon program in exchange for placing a portion of its energy
producing reactors under international safeguards.
To make the deal a reality, the U.S. administration is working to carve
out a legal exception for India in both domestic law and the interna-
tional export control regime. This case solidifies a trend toward a selec-
tive approach to the problems of proliferation, and ultimately sends the
message that it is acceptable for some countries to have nuclear weapons
and for others not to. This is perhaps an honest and clear reflection of
current U.S. policy. How it affects others’ view of the value of nuclear
304   CHAPTER SIXTEEN

nonproliferation itself, as well as what other exceptions will be made for

other states, are yet to be seen.

Debate & Controversy

Internationally, the March 2006 announcement was welcomed by IAEA
Director General Mohamed El Baradei, along with UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac.17 All emphasized the
positive sides of bringing India more closely into the nonproliferation
framework through safeguards, improving safety for future power reac-
tors in India and cooperating to prevent nuclear terrorism. “The agree-
ment would assure India of reliable access to nuclear technology and
nuclear fuel. It would also be a step forward towards universalisation of
the international safeguards regime,” Dr. El Baradei said. “This agree-
ment would serve the interests of both India and the international com-
munity.”18
For many, opening up civil nuclear cooperation with India is simply
a practical step forward in light of existing realities, namely that India
does not intend to give up its nuclear weapons any time soon, yet it
needs energy security for its growing population. It was seen by some in
the United States and abroad as a relief—the irritant of India’s nuclear
weapons status could be put aside and their friend no longer would have
to be ostracized. Others saw it as a confirmation of their view that the
United States held its friends up to a different nonproliferation stan-
dard.
In the United States, the reaction to the news was mixed. Nonpro-
liferation experts sounded the alarm that carving out an exception for
India--with limited actions requested in return--at a time when the
United States was working to decrease incentives for countries to gain
nuclear weapons, was shortsighted at best. The timing was particularly
criticized, as the United States is working to halt the spread of enrich-
ment and reprocessing technologies, in particular in Iran. The NPT19 is
also at a fragile point in its history. Debate centers on whether civilian
nuclear cooperation would enhance or assist India in building up its
nuclear weapons arsenal. While experts seemed to agree that a closer
relationship with India on a variety of fronts was desirable and welcome,
the so-called nuclear “deal” was seen as going too far toward accom-
 THE INDIA DEAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS   305

modating India and lacking any long-term vision on how this would
impact U.S. nonproliferation policies. There was also little accountabil-
ity created on how India should improve its own nuclear security and
export control practices. In fact, many quiet non-governmental efforts
to move India closer to the nonproliferation regime and construct con-
fidence-building measures with Pakistan on these issues were derailed
when it became clear to India that the U.S. government was changing its
position dramatically.
Just as after the 1998 Indian nuclear test, the United States’ concern
over Indian nuclear weapon development has overridingly centered on
the effect of this program on other countries and the nonproliferation
regime more generally, rather than a threat from Indian nuclear weap-
ons themselves.
When this debate played out on Capitol Hill, another focus of atten-
tion was India’s business dealings with Iran and its diplomatic actions
toward that country in its stand-off with the Security Council. Some of
these concerns were included in final language of the Hyde Act.20 Con-
gress has fundamentally said that the United States recognizes India’s
right to have the nuclear arsenal it now has, but civilian nuclear trans-
fers should not include any enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water
technologies and all cooperation would be stopped if India conducted
a nuclear test.
In addition to arguments based on economic development and envi-
ronmentally sound energy expansion, outside experts in support of the
deal point to the advantages of India having a robust nuclear arsenal to
the extent that this is a balance to China’s growing military strength.21
U.S. deterrence of China would therefore be strengthened with India as
a military partner.
In India, the controversy has centered on those not wanting any lim-
its whatsoever on the nuclear activities in the country and those who
oppose a closer security and foreign policy relationship with the United
States. The latter fear a threat to India’s independent foreign policy. The
former are concerned that any leverage the United States held over In-
dia in the nuclear area could threaten energy supplies in the future
should India decide, for example, that it needed to conduct a nucle-
ar-weapon test.
306   CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Implications
It can be argued that the pursuit of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement
with India reveals several trends in U.S. foreign policy, and nonprolif-
eration policy in particular: rewarding India for ‘good’ nonproliferation
behavior outside its borders, creating incentives for these nonprolifera-
tion actions beyond ‘virtue as its own reward,’ exceptionalism for the
friendly, democratic country with a nuclear arsenal, and inclusion of
nuclear issues in part of a security package.
Ultimately, it is not at all clear that this deal was necessary to advance
bilateral partnership, although many argue that this issue was symboli-
cally a pressure point in bilateral relations that needed to be removed.
In many ways the de-prioritization of nuclear nonproliferation issues to
the wider question of strategic partnership and sustainable development
for India was a conciliatory gift to India. Unfortunately, for many others,
especially non-nuclear weapon states, it only enhances the perception
that U.S. nonproliferation policies are full of double standards that break
the “deal” of the NPT—that those states that agree not to develop nuclear
weapons will have preferential access to civilian nuclear technology and
that the five official nuclear-weapon states will work to reduce nuclear
weapons in the world. Instead, they see the United States abandoning
one of the key principles of its foreign policy (no nuclear cooperation
with states outside the NPT) and cannot help but reconsider their own
country’s place in this bargain.
Additionally, opening up civilian cooperation with India —if this al-
lows India more nuclear material for its nuclear weapons program —
may affect and accelerate strategic development in Pakistan and China,
both of which might feel they need to respond to a more robust Indian
nuclear weapons posture. It would therefore be tougher for the United
States to argue for limits to those programs. Herein lies the difficulty
in carving out an exception for one country, an issue that the Nuclear
Suppliers Group is debating. The deal may already have set a precedent,
and it may be more difficult than expected to create a one-country ex-
ception to NSG rules. China and Pakistan, for example have already dis-
cussed concluding a similar civilian nuclear cooperation agreement.22
The United States thus far has refused to do so, citing the proliferation
problems from Pakistan posed by the A.Q. Khan network.
There are clear benefits from tying India more closely to the inter-
national nonproliferation regime. It is critical that all states with sig-
 THE INDIA DEAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS   307

nificant nuclear capabilities place a maximum number of their facilities

under safeguards and ensure that nuclear materials under their control
are adequately protected. However, this agreement does not place any
constraints on India’s growing nuclear weapon program or reduce pres-
sure among other states in the region to limit their own nuclear weapon
programs.
A build-up of nuclear weapons material anywhere in the world is
clearly against U.S. efforts, joined by other like-minded states, to reduce
and consolidate this material worldwide to prevent nuclear terrorism.
Thus, in moving forward with the agreement, the ultimate outcome of
the net positive versus negative impact on the nonproliferation regime
depends greatly on holding India accountable for its nonproliferation
promises and maximizing its contribution to the global system against
the spread of nuclear weapons to new states or to non-state actors. These
steps should be taken regardless of civil nuclear “deal” status.
There is also a continued role for other countries—especially the
non-nuclear states of the NPT—to encourage further Indian nuclear re-
straint, commitments to arms control (limits on stockpile growth and
modernization), confidence-building measures and transparency (espe-
cially with Pakistan and China) and long-term multilateral disarmament
commitments. India has again begun to emphasize its desire to achieve a
nuclear-free world “through global, verifiable, and non-discriminatory
disarmament.”23 It is time that India be held to account for this rhetoric
and also asked what it is doing to advance its professed goals.
Between the United States and India, maintaining a positive nonpro-
liferation outcome for a civil nuclear cooperation agreement will take
continued dedication to a security partnership and constant attention
to nuclear stewardship cooperation, such as material security best prac-
tices and counterterrorism measures. Counterproliferation and coun-
terterrorism cooperation will require intelligence sharing and military
ties. True cooperation on these fronts, even more than in the civil nucle-
ar arena, is the real key to a stability-building relationship between the
United States and India and is essential for India to become a nonpro-
liferation partner.

Notes
1. Jaswant Singh, remarks to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies, November 1, 2006, http://www.sais-jhu.edu/.
308   CHAPTER SIXTEEN

2. For a detailed account, see Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, De-
mocracy, and the Bomb, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2004, and
Jaswant Singh, “A Call to Honor,”
3. Strobe Talbott, remarks to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies, November 1, 2006, http://www.sais-jhu.edu/.
4. Statement by Shri Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs and Defence
on attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon, New Delhi, September 11,
2001, http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2001/sep/sep_11.htm
5. India Nuclear Milestones, The Wisconsin Project website, http://www.
wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/india-nuclear-miles.html
6. U.S. President’s Statement on Strategic Partnership with India, January 12,
2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040112-1.html
7. “New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship,” signed June
28, 2005, http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ipr062805.html
8. http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr060706.html
9. Ashish Kumar Sen, “Nuclear Battle Lines Drawn,” Asia Times, August 12,
2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GH12Df01.html
10. U.S.-India Joint Statement, New Delhi, March 2, 2006, http://www.white-
house.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060302-5.html
11. Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Opening Remarks Before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, April 5, 2006, http://www.state.
gov/secretary/rm/2006/64136.htm
12. R. Nicholas Burns , Under Secretary for Political Affairs and Indian For-
eign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC, February 22, 2007, http://www.state.gov/
p/us/rm/2007/81207.htm
13. William Potter, “India and the New Look of U.S. Nonproliferation
Policy,” CNS Research Story, August 25, 2005; Robert J. Einhorn, “U.S.-India
Nuclear Deal Falls Short,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 17, 2006; Sam Nunn,
“Nuclear Pig in a Poke,” Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2006; Ashley Tellis, “Atoms
for War? U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arse-
nal,” Carnegie Report, June 2006;
14. Article VI of the NPT states, “Each of the Parties to the Treaty under-
takes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to ces-
sation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effec-
tive international control.”
15. http://epw.senate.gov/envlaws/atomic54.pdf
 THE INDIA DEAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS   309

16. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061218-1.html
17. France had concluded a similar nuclear cooperation agreement with In-
dia during President Chirac’s visit to New Delhi in February 2006. http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4768422.stm
18. IAEA Press Release 2006/05, “IAEA Director General Welcomes U.S.
and India Nuclear Deal,” March 2, 2006.
19. Article 1 of the NPT commits the nuclear-weapon state parties “not to
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-
sive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or in-
directly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear
weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”
20. Congressional Research Service Summary of H.R. 5682 [109th]: Hen-
ry Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of
2006, December 18, 2006, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:
HR05682:@@@D&summ2=m&
21. See Robert D. Blackwill, “The India Imperative,” National Interest, Sum-
mer 2005.
22. Sudha Ramachandran, “Good deals, but no nukes for Pakistan,” Asia
Times, November 28, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/
HK28Df01.html
23. Statement of Nuclear Disarmament by Ambassador Jayant Prasad, Per-
manent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva,
February 13, 2007, http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2007/02/21ss01.htm ; also
see http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Disarmament/note_india_disarma-
ment.htm
 About the Editors and Authors

Jerome M. Conley
Jerome Conley is the director of research for Operational Concepts, LLC
and a senior research scientist in the Institute for Crisis, Disaster and
Risk Management, George Washington University. After eleven years
of service in the United States Marine Corps, Mr. Conley served as an
advisor in the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, where he conducted analysis on global and
regional trends in nuclear proliferation, U.S.-Russian cooperation in
strategic crisis management, and risk management approaches to WMD
threats. Ongoing research includes the analysis of factors contributing
to situational awareness in a tactical environment. He is the author of
Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Lessons and Options for
U.S. Policy in South Asia (Lexington Books, 2001). Mr. Conley received
his undergraduate degree from the College of the Holy Cross, his M.A.
from the Naval Postgraduate School, and is completing his doctorate at
the George Washington University.

Jonathan Hagood
Jonathan Hagood is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History
at the University of California, Davis and is a member of the National
Science Foundation’s Graduate Research Fellowship Program. He has
participated in the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues since 2004 and is an
associate of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation’s Public

311
312    ABOUT THE EDITORS AND AUTHORS

Policy and Nuclear Threats program. Mr. Hagood has an M.A. in history
from U.C. Davis, and he has published articles on topics such as nuclear
dissuasion, post-Second World War nuclear research in Latin America,
and technology transfer in the twentieth century.

Jenifer Mackby
Jenifer Mackby is a fellow in the CSIS International Security Program.
She has worked on the Strengthening the Global Partnership project,
a Russian-European project on bioterrorism, the Project on Nuclear
Issues, and a number of European projects. She was a contributor to
The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices
(Brookings, 2004) and has written articles for the New York Times, News-
week, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, among other publications.
Ms. Mackby served as a senior political affairs officer in the Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva, where she worked on negotiations for the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and then on the verification of
the treaty in Vienna.

Eric A. Miller
Eric A. Miller is a research associate at the Institute of European, Rus-
sian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University in Wash-
ington D.C. He previously worked at the U.S. Missile Defense Agency,
where he specialized in Russian and Ukrainian affairs. He has served as
a consultant and international affairs analyst for the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense, Joint Forces Staff College, and U.S. Coast Guard and
held teaching positions at Old Dominion University and Christopher
Newport University. His articles have appeared in Defense News, Jane’s
Intelligence Review, Problems of Post-Communism, and Security Studies,
among others. He is also the author of To Balance or Not to Balance:
Alignment Theory and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Ash-
gate, 2006). He holds a B.A. in political science from the University of
Florida and an M.A. and Ph.D. in international studies from Old Do-
minion University.

Lieutenant Colonel (select) George R. Nagy, USAF

George R. Nagy is a career space and missile officer with the United
States Air Force. He was commissioned in 1992 through the Reserve
Officer Training Corps at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
 ABOUT THE EDITORS AND AUTHORS    313

was assigned from 1993-1997 as a Minuteman III missile launch crew

member with the 91st Missile Wing, Minot AFB, North Dakota. His
assignments include experience in missile warning and space surveil-
lance test and evaluation as well as serving as a strategy/policy officer
from 2002-2005 at Headquarters, United States Strategic Command,
Offutt AFB, Nebraska. In 2003 Major Nagy coauthored the Strategic
Deterrence Joint Operating Concept at the direction of the secretary
of sefense. Major Nagy holds separate master’s degrees in space stud-
ies, space operations, and applied physics from the University of North
Dakota and the Air Force Institute of Technology and is a fully qualified
joint specialty officer. He currently serves as the chief of Spaceflight Mis-
sion Design, DOD Space Test Program, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico.

Mary Beth Nikitin

Mary Beth Nikitin is a fellow in the CSIS International Security Pro-
gram, where she concentrates on issues related to preventing weapons
of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism. She is coordinator of
the Strengthening the Global Partnership project, a consortium of 23
research institutes in 18 European, Asian, and North American coun-
tries working to build political and financial support for G-8 efforts to
reduce the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials. She has
worked at the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs in New York
and at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey. She regular-
ly publishes and presents her research at international conferences. She
received her master’s degree at the Monterey Institute of International
Studies and her bachelor’s degree from Dartmouth College.

David D. Palkki
David Palkki worked as a defense analyst for the U.S. government from
2002 through 2006. He is currently an associate fellow for Public Policy
and Nuclear Threats at the Institute on Global Conflict and Coopera-
tion, a PONI Young Nuclear Scholar, and a Ph.D. candidate at the Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles. His dissertation is on the efficacy of
coercive disarmament.

Owen C.W. Price

Owen C.W. Price was a visiting fellow in residence at the CSIS from
2006 through early 2007, on leave from the UK Atomic Weapons Estab-
314    ABOUT THE EDITORS AND AUTHORS

lishment (AWE), where he worked for 12 years. He recently returned to

AWE, where he leads warhead capability programs. From 2000 to 2003,
he led the AWE Verification Research Program, was a technical adviser
to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and was a member
of the UK delegation to the Nonproliferation Treaty Preparatory Com-
mittee Meetings in 2003 and 2004. Mr. Price has published articles on
nuclear matters in Defense News, The Washington Times and specialist
publications. Mr. Price holds an M.A. in engineering from the Univer-
sity of Cambridge, England, and an M.B.A. in engineering management
from the University of Bradford, England. He is currently reading (part
time) for an M.Sc. in systems engineering at the UK Defence Academy,
Cranfield University, Shrivenham, England.

Whitney Raas
Whitney Raas is a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses in
Alexandria, VA. She has previously worked on the research staff at MIT
Lincoln Laboratory. Her recent publications include “Osirak Redux? As-
sessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities,” Inter-
national Security, Spring 2007 (co-authored with Austin Long), “Design
and Testing of a High Pressure Gas Target for Fast Neutron Resonance
Radiography” and “Neutron Resonance Radiography for Explosives De-
tection: Technical Challenges,” both in Proceedings of the IEEE (October
2005). Her primary research interests are nuclear weapons, nuclear pro-
liferation, and energy. She recently received a Ph.D. in nuclear engineer-
ing and an M.S. in political science (with a focus on security studies)
from MIT. Dr. Rass also holds a B.S. in physics from the University of
California, Los Angeles.

Nick Ritchie
Nick Ritchie is completing his Ph.D. at the Department of Peace Stud-
ies, University of Bradford, United Kingdom on the evolution of U.S.
nuclear weapons policy since the end of the Cold War. He has worked
for the Oxford Research Group, a UK think-tank involved in research
and advocacy on global security issues, particularly nuclear prolifera-
tion and disarmament, since 1999. Recent publications include The Po-
litical Road to War with Iraq with Paul Rogers (Routledge, 2007) and
“Replacing Trident: Who Will Make the Decisions and How?” (Oxford
Research Group report, August 2006).
 ABOUT THE EDITORS AND AUTHORS    315

Lawrence Rubin
Lawrence Rubin is a fellow for Public Policy and Nuclear Threats at the
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, a PONI Young Nuclear
Scholar, and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Los Ange-
les. Mr. Rubin also serves as the assistant editor of the journal Terrorism
and Political Violence. Mr. Rubin has worked at the RAND Corporation
and has been a visiting research fellow at NDU’s Near East South Asia
Center for Strategic Studies. He has conducted field work in Yemen,
Morocco, Egypt, and Israel, and he speaks both Arabic and Hebrew. Mr.
Rubin’s dissertation focuses on threat perception and foreign policy de-
cision-making of Middle East states.

Dakota S. Rudesill
Dakota Rudesill is a visiting fellow at CSIS. He served as national se-
curity advisor to Senator Kent Conrad and senior defense, intelligence,
and international affairs analyst for the Senate Budget Committee. Mr.
Rudesill has been a member of PONI since its inception, is a term mem-
ber of the Council on Foreign Relations, and is a member of the Brady-
Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University. He has consulted
on strategic programs for the private sector and briefed on nuclear is-
sues at the U.S. Strategic Command and UK Ministry of Defence. Mr.
Rudesill received his B.A. in foreign policy from St. Olaf College and
his J.D. from Yale Law School, where he was executive editor of the Yale
Journal of International Law.

Lani Miyoshi Sanders

Lani Miyoshi Sanders is a principal member of the technical staff at San-
dia National Laboratories. Prior to Sandia, Dr. Sanders worked for the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board at its headquarters in Washing-
ton, D.C. and on assignment at the Savannah River Site. Dr. Sanders
holds a B.S. from Rice University, an M.S. from Stanford University in
civil engineering, and a Ph.D. from the University of New Mexico in
chemical engineering.

Dennis Shorts
Dennis Shorts is currently a consultant at Booz Allen Hamilton working
within the Operations Directorate (J3), U.S. Forces-Korea (USFK). Pre-
viously, he conducted research and taught on a Fulbright grant in South
316    ABOUT THE EDITORS AND AUTHORS

Korea. He has also served on the research staff at the National Defense
University in Washington, D.C. A former Army officer, he holds a dou-
ble B.A. degree from Texas Christian University and a M.S. in foreign
service from Georgetown University.

Francis Slakey
Francis Slakey holds an endowed position at Georgetown University
where he is the Cooper/Upjohn Professor of Science and Public Policy
and the co-director of the Program on Science in the Public Interest.
His technical publications have received more than 500 citations. He
has also written widely on science policy issues, publishing more than
fifty articles for the popular press including The New York Times, The
Washington Post, and Scientific American. He has served in advisory
positions for a diverse set of organizations, including the Council on
Foreign Relations, the National Geographic and the Creative Coalition.
He is a fellow of the APS, a MacArthur scholar, and currently a Lemel-
son Research Associate of the Smithsonian Institution. He is also the
associate director of public affairs for the American Physical Society.
Dr. Slakey received his Ph.D. in physics from the University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign.

Michael Sulmeyer
Michael Sulmeyer is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics and
International Relations at Oxford University, where he writes about the
termination of major weapon systems under development. From 2003-
2004 he was special assistant to the principal deputy under-secretary
of defense for policy. Previously, he was a research assistant at the Cen-
ter for Strategic and International Studies. As a Marshall scholar he re-
ceived his master’s from the War Studies Department at King’s College,
London. Mr. Sulmeyer earned a B.A. in political science from Stanford
University.

Benn Tannenbaum
Benn Tannenbaum is currently project director of the Center for Sci-
ence, Technology and Security Policy at the American Association for
the Advancement of Science, focusing on connecting scientists with
government on security matters. He has testified before the U.S. House
of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security about radiation
 ABOUT THE EDITORS AND AUTHORS    317

portal monitors. Dr. Tannenbaum also serves on the American Physical

Society’s Panel on Public Affairs and on the board of directors of The
Triple Helix. Dr. Tannenbaum was the 2002-2003 American Physical
Society Congressional Science Fellow, during which time he worked for
Representative Edward J. Markey (D-MA) on nonproliferation issues.
He has authored or co-authored over 150 papers on technical matters
and has published widely on science policy and advising. Dr. Tannen-
baum holds B.A., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in physics from Grinnell
College, Michigan State University, and the University of New Mexico,
respectively.

Bruno Tertrais
Bruno Tertrais is a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la
Recherche Stratégique (FRS), as well as an associate researcher at the
Centres d’études et de recherches internationales (CERI). Between
1990 and 1993 he was the director of the Civilian Affairs Committee,
NATO Assembly, Brussels. In 1993 he joined the Délégation aux Af-
faires stratégiques (Policy Division) of the French Ministry of Defense.
In 1995-1996, he was a visiting fellow at the RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica. From October 1996 until August 2001 he was special assistant
to the director of strategic affairs at the French Ministry of Defense. He
is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a
contributing editor to Survival, and a member of the editorial board of
The Washington Quarterly. His latest book in English is War Without
End (New-York: The New Press, 2005). Dr. Tertrais graduated from the
Institut d’études politiques de Paris in 1984. He also holds a master’s de-
gree in public law from the University of Paris (1985) and a doctorate in
political science from the Institut d’études politiques de Paris (1994).

Michael Tkacik
Michael Tkacik is an associate professor of political science at Stephen
F. Austin State University in Nacogdoches, Texas. His book, The Future
of U.S. Nuclear Operational Doctrine (The Edwin Mellen Press), was
published in 2003. He also writes on security issues, including nucle-
ar weapons, terrorism, democratic transitions, and ethnic conflict. Dr.
Tkacik has been a Fulbright scholar. He is currently involved in western-
izing the education systems of former Soviet republics. Dr. Tkacik holds
a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Maryland, an M.A. in
318    ABOUT THE EDITORS AND AUTHORS

political science from Columbia University and a J.D. from Duke Uni-
versity School of Law.

Richard Weitz
Richard Weitz is a senior fellow and director of program management at
the Hudson Institute. By employing scenario-based planning and other
techniques, he analyzes mid- and long-term national and international
political-military issues. His current areas of research include U.S. for-
eign policy, Eurasia, defense reform, and homeland security. He also
has contributed articles to journals such as The National Interest, The
Washington Quarterly, NATO Review, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
and The Journal of Strategic Studies. His commentaries have appeared
in Washington Post.com, The Washington Times, Wall Street Journal
(Europe), Aviation Week & Space Technology, and many Internet-based
publications. He has appeared on the BBC, CNN, ABC, MSNBC, CBC,
CTV, Al-Hurra, Al-Jazeera, VOA, Pacifica Radio, and additional broad-
cast media. He has been a PONI member since 2003. Dr. Weitz is a grad-
uate of Harvard College (B.A. with highest honors in government), the
London School of Economics (M.Sc. in international relations), Oxford
University (M. Phil. in politics), and Harvard University (Ph.D. in po-
litical science).