Fundamentals of Operational Design

by
Richard Swain
[email protected]
At any time or place, executive judgment involves answering three sets of questions: “What is going on?”; “So what?” (or, “What difference
does it make?”); and “What is to be done?” The better the process of executive judgment, the more it involves asking the questions again
and again, not in set order, and testing the results until one finds a satisfactory answer to the third question….1
Ernest R. May
Author's Preface

Design is a concept describing creative activity. In that define them. Not surprisingly, operational design
his pamphlet, Design: A Very Short Introduction, John presumes that the key to dealing with social-political
Heskett writes, “design, stripped to its essence, complexity is deep understanding of its structure
can be defined as the human capacity to shape and and competing motivations. Only by identifying the
make our environment in ways without precedent various interwoven tensions within a human system,
in nature, to serve our needs and give meaning to can one begin to identify patterns and possibilities for
our lives.”2 However, design lacks practical content changing the current distress to something like future
when it appears without an antecedent. This is why satisfaction.
schools of design organize themselves around specific
A number of military authorities have argued that
applications: architecture, industrial design, graphic
operational design is a set of tools, not a process.
design, network design, organizational design, and so
This argument risks missing the logic essential to
on. Operational design, which this short introductory
the practice. Design involves a skeptical yet inquiring
paper discusses, is “a method of critical and creative
intellectual approach to learning that cannot be
thinking for understanding, visualizing, and describing
assumed, and a critical stance regarding declared
complex problems and the approaches to resolve
truths and beliefs. Practice of design is progressive if
them.”3 The adjective, operational, is used consistent
not sequential. Some activities must take place first
with Joint Doctrine, i.e., involving “the carrying out
for others to proceed, although there is an expectation
of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training,
that the “steps” will double back on themselves
or administrative military mission.”4 Complex refers
continuously as design is applied. If the “tools” are
to situations that are dynamic, ill defined, and fluid
applied randomly, without reference to or application
because of the presence of numerous interactive
of the discipline of the logic of design, it is unlikely the
and largely autonomous actors, where the number
designer will realize the benefits of his or her efforts.
of separate interactions indicates the degree of
While design is not a rigid process—as the Military
complexity. Complex systems display capabilities for
Decision Making Process (MDMP) is taken to be by
self-organization and emergence, where emergence
some—it does have a character and logical order that
is “the appearance of behavior that could not be
must be appreciated and respected.
anticipated from a knowledge of the parts of the
system alone.”5 They are inherently unpredictable. There is a rich and highly nuanced theoretical exegesis
on design for those of a philosophical or theoretical
Operational design provides an effective response
bent, entitled The Structure of Operational Revolution.
to situations and missions that are of sufficient
The book was written for Booz Allen Hamilton by BG
obscurity that the first requirement is to gain
(Res), Dr. Shimon Naveh, Israeli commando, division
a deep understanding of the situation in which
commander, historian, professor, and philosopher;
action is intended and from that to develop a fuller
Professor Jim Schneider, historian of Soviet military
understanding of the problem(s) to be resolved.
theory and long the military theorist at the Army’s
Operational design begins with the postulate that
School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS); and Dr.
strategic situations are human in origin and therefore
Timothy Challans, warrior, philosopher, retired infantry
are inherently complex. Understanding these situations
officer, and sometimes philosophy professor at West
starts with gaining an appreciation for the web or
Point and SAMS. Naveh is a charismatic genius. He
network of individual and collective human connections

iii
 developed his philosophy of Systemic Operational in detailed study. Busy leaders do not generally have
Design over a period of 20-odd years by combining the time for such narrow and deep study of a single,
his extensive combat experience with a broad and partial aspect of their professional repertoire, even
deep study of Soviet military theory, architectural and when it could be very useful. Fortunately, in the case
cybernetic design theories, learning theories, and the of operational design, this is not necessary. The basic
expressive formulations of Gilles Deleuze and Felix notions of operational design can be acquired without
Guattari.6 The Structure of Operational Revolution: A learning a whole new vocabulary. This paper serves
Prolegomena, is a valuable Ur-text for Naveh’s theory, as an introduction for interested parties. Those with a
the parent of all operational design theories.7 The greater interest or desire for understanding should turn
text is often difficult and fully understood only by to the more detailed text.
readers prepared to invest significant time and energy

iv
Table of Contents

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1

I. Operational Art . .............................................................................................................. 3

History of Operational Art............................................................................................... 3

Comptemporary Operational Art...................................................................................... 6

II. Operational Design ......................................................................................................... 8

System Framing............................................................................................................. 8

The Cognitive Transition................................................................................................ 12

Operation Framing........................................................................................................ 13

III. Methodology ............................................................................................................... 16

Leading Collaborative Learning..................................................................................... 16

Discourse................................................................................................................... 18

Rules to Guide Discussion Leaders............................................................................... 19

IV. Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 21

V. Endnotes ..................................................................................................................... 23

About the Author............................................................................................................... 26

About Booz Allen............................................................................................................... 27

Principal Offices................................................................................................................ 28

v
vi
Introduction

Since publication of the US Army’s 1986 FM 100- officers at US Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
5, which introduced both the US Army concept of and Third Army, and worked with the School of
operational art and the notion of more or less official Advanced Military Studies supporting its instruction
“Concepts of Operational Design,” Army and later Joint in design. Booz Allen instructor advisors have learned
manuals have alluded to the practice of operational a great deal from the SOCOM Staff’s practical work
design without going beyond manipulation of certain applying design, as they have learned also from
approved design elements or concepts as its content.8 much different work at Third Army. The SOCOM J5
The 2006/08 Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations, Staff has been engaged in creating a global strategic
describes operational design this way, recognizing its vision to guide SOCOM leaders in preparing for the
core relationship with the practice of operational art: future. Third Army, as Army Service Component for
Operational art is applied during operational US Central Command, has been involved in gaining a
design—the conception and construction of the deeper understanding of the US Central Command’s
framework that underpins a campaign or joint highly complex area of responsibility and, led by its
operation plan and its subsequent execution. commander, in developing operational concepts that
While operational art is the manifestation of can serve as a basis for his dialogs with the theater
informed vision and creativity, operational design
commander and other interested authorities, as well as
is the practical extension of the creative process.
Together they synthesize the intuition and provide guidance for more traditional planning activities.
creativity of the commander with the analytical Operational design consists of three major activities,
and logical process of design. Operational
creating a System Frame,11 participating in an activity
design is particularly helpful during COA [course
of action] determination. Resulting design General Naveh calls the Cognitive Transition12, and
alternatives provide the basis for selecting a COA creating an Operation Frame. The System Frame is
and developing the detailed CONOPS [concept of the expression of an understanding of the governing
operations]. During execution, commanders and human system that has created the situation that
their staffs continue to consider design elements is the object of design activity.13 The Cognitive
and adjust both current operations and future
Transition, the climax of the process, consists of the
plans as the joint operation unfolds.9
conceptual actions required to move from developing
The discussion of design that follows is heavily situational understanding to formulating relevant
indebted to General Shimon Naveh’s work on Systemic actions. The Operational Frame encompasses the
Operational Design. The good ideas, the framework most visible creative part of operational design, the
particularly, and most of the terms are derived from development of the design itself, a combination of
General Naveh’s work and that of Dr. Jim Schneider. form and function, expressed as guidance to orient
The purpose of this document is to provide an planners.14 This three-element structure forms
elementary introduction to the ideas contained in their the framework of the discussion that follows. Both
more theoretical effort, written in collaboration with the Cognitive Transition and Operations Frame are
Dr. Timothy Challans and entitled, The Structure of grounded on the learning that supports creation of the
Operational Revolution: A Prolegomena.10 System Frame.
Booz Allen Hamilton has had a fruitful relationship Like the larger work of Naveh, Schneider, and
offering introductory instruction on design to the Challans, this discussion begins by relating the

1
 practice of design to the notion of operational art, underlying logic is intended to be nothing more than
taking as the definition of the doctrinal concept a more the arguments it makes, tested against the practical
simplified notion, hopefully freed of baggage related experience of those midcareer officers for whom it is
to hierarchical jurisdiction of contemporary joint and intended as a guide for instruction and practice.
service organizations. The justification of this paper’s

Exhibit 1 | Stages of design

Source: Booz Allen Hamilton, Center of the Application of Design factsheet, 2009

2
I. Operational Art

Operational Art tactics solves problems.”20 Operational art, then,

The application of creative imagination by mediates between the strategy and tactics, imposing a
commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, governing logic on tactics while pursuing strategic goals.
knowledge, and experience—to design strategies,
campaigns, and major operations and organize and The Red Army concept of operational art was a
employ military forces. Operational art integrates response to the recognition in theory that the
ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. possibility of the Napoleonic campaign, conducted in
(JP 3-0)16 a single season and culminating in a single decisive
tactical encounter, had become unlikely—at least
History of Operational Art in continental conflicts with peer competitors. The
The practice of operational design, though not limited changes came about because of the size of industrial
to the domain of operational art, resonates with the armies, the resisting power of modern weapons,
broader concept defined originally in the interwar and the robustness of modern forces provided with
years of the 20th century by Soviet military theorists, material by modern logistic communications and
especially A. A. Svechin, called “the Red Mandarin” possessing the self-organizing capacity created
by Dr. James Schneider in his book, The Structure by instruments of command and control reaching
of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of throughout the force. Red Army theorists, disposed
the Soviet Warfare State.17 It was Svechin who first ideologically to comprehensive theories of politics
gave a name to operational art and set it within a and the state, developed a unique theory of the
hierarchy of activities unified in their nested logics conduct of war, accounting for actions from the
and distinguished by their purpose and instruments. councils of government to the factory floor and on to
Svechin wrote— the furthest reconnaissance unit, on or beyond the
Tactics and administration are the material of battlefront.21 The function of operational art was to
operational art…On the basis of the goal of an mediate between the goals of strategy and discrete
operation, operational art sets forth a whole series tactical actions, carried out in parallel and in series,
of tactical missions and a number of logistical
to achieve intermediate objectives contributing to
requirements…Strategy is the art of combining
preparations for war and the grouping of operations the final desired outcome. As developed, Red Army
for achieving the goal set by the war for the armed operational art consisted in general of techniques
forces.18 for successive use of massive forces on converging
narrow but deep sectors of broad fronts, leading
Svechin distinguished between tactics and operations
eventually to destruction of all the enemy forces and
in terms of their basic functions. He defined the
capture or destruction of their means of war.22 While
essence of tactics as “adapting equipment to battle
the proponents of operational art were killed in the
conditions.”19 Operations required combining a
Stalinist purges, notions of operational art were revived
number of heterogeneous activities: developing a plan,
in practice during the Soviet Great Patriotic War and
preparing supplies, concentration of forces, building
practiced with great success from Kursk to Berlin once
defenses, marching, fighting to destroy a portion of
mastered in the field.
the enemy force and forcing withdrawal of others, and
capturing and holding a given line or area. In a critical Following World War II, just as the technologies of
note, Svechin wrote. “While strategy pursues goals, war between early 20th century industrial powers had

3
 created the need for new frameworks for thinking of potential force. It is concerned not just with
about the conduct of war, so the experience of World enemies who dislike each other but with partners
War II and the anticipation of war with nuclear weapons who distrust or disagree with each other. It is
concerned not just with the division or gains
demanded new paradigms—not to mention means—to
and losses between two claimants but with the
address the requirements of the new forms of war possibility that particular outcomes are worse
that were emerging in retreat from empire and carried (better) for both claimants than certain other
on below the nuclear threshold. Strategically, as Sir outcomes.27
Michael Howard observed more than 40 years ago,
On the continent of Europe, following the war, the
“…these wars are not simply military conflicts with
Soviet Army retained the vision of massive forces,
a complex political background; they are rather
distributed across a broad front, conducting successive
political conflicts which involve an unusually high
operations into the enemy’s strategic depths, adding
level of violence.”23
in the use of airborne forces and nuclear weapons.
The magnitude of national efforts involved in the US forces, which had practiced operational art in all
conduct of global war, and the culminating introduction theaters in the recent war, did not develop a theory
of nuclear weapons in the years after World War II, for it until the defeat in Vietnam.28 General Dwight
tended to confirm for all nations the elevation of Eisenhower probably reflected the pragmatic American
strategy from the operational realm, as described view in 1946 when he wrote a letter to a recent
by Clausewitz (“the use of the engagement for the biographer of U.S. Grant. Eisenhower reflected on
purpose of war”24), to the political councils of chiefs of reading Grant’s July 1865 Report to the Secretary of
state. The strategic influence exerted by professional War and particularly the impression made by Grant’s
military men like George C. Marshall and the wartime concept for the 1864 operations leading to the defeat
Combined Chiefs of Staff diminished in the face of of the Confederacy. Eisenhower went on to say:
challenges by civilian academic theorists like Bernard I think people frequently lose sight of the
Brodie and Albert Wohlstetter. The notion of strategy importance of this broad scheme which lies
as the use of battles for the purpose of the war was behind every move the Commander makes. As a
extended, French strategist Raymond Aron wrote, until consequence we see people—sometimes highly
“there is no difference between what was once called informed critics—attempting to separate one battle
or one point of a campaign from the whole and in
a “policy” and what is now called a “strategy".”25
doing so they get it completely out of focus.29
Another academic theorist, Thomas C. Schelling, in a
1980 book entitled The Strategy of Conflict, adopted
a notion of strategy drawn from game theory, where
games of strategy are “those in which the best
course for each player depends on what the other
players do.”26 From this concept, Schelling drew two
conclusions regarding conflicts short of existential war.
The first was that winning in conflict “is not winning
relative to one’s adversary. It means gaining relative
to one’s own value system….” The second, more
pertinent to the notion of design applied to national
level political-military problems, was the following:
Thus strategy—in the sense in which I am using
it here—is not concerned with the efficient
application of force but with the exploitation

4
The US Armed Forces did not adopt a concept of 2. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce
operational art until 1986, although the 1982 FM 100- that condition?
5, as part of its discussion of Combat Fundamentals, 3. How should the resources of the force be applied
did announce the discovery of three “levels of war”: to accomplish that sequence of actions?
strategic, operational, and tactical. “The operational
Shortly after the publication of the 1986 manual,
level of war,” it said, “uses available military resources
the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated a new superior
to attain strategic goals within a theater of war.” The
level of joint doctrine, which was published under
single-paragraph discussion focuses on the conduct of
authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
the campaign, characterized as “sustained operations
Institutional thinking about campaign planning found
designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified
itself caught on the jurisdictional boundary between
place and time with simultaneous and sequential
service competence and joint authority, where it has
battles.”30 The paragraph listed a collection of tasks,
languished ever since.
not dissimilar to Svechin’s, that were included at the
operational level. The problem of crossing the nuclear US Army thought about operational art may have
threshold and the fear that once crossed, one could culminated in the preface to an excellent historical
not go back, always gave Cold War discussions of anthology published by the Army’s Center of Military
operational art a surreal quality, which was never History (CMH) in 2005. The general editors, Colonel
resolved. The gap between nuclear and conventional Michael D. Krause, one of the Army’s most brilliant
warfare remained broad and deep, and because historians, and R. Cody Phillips, a civilian historian at
fortunately it was never crossed, it was without CMH, wrote early in their joint preface that—
reference to experience.
Strategy, operations, and tactics routinely affect
In the 1986 FM 100-5, a discussion of operational the dimensions of military conflict, each in a
different manner. For instance, the strategist
art was part of the “Structure of Modern Warfare”
aims at the enemy center of gravity, which often
and was defined as “the employment of military is the nation’s will to fight, or perhaps the key
forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or resources or the delicate bond that holds an
theater of operations through the design, organization, alliance together. The operational artist’s center of
and conduct of campaigns and major operations.”31 gravity is the mass of the enemy’s military force
Practice of operational art was reduced to answering and its ability to command and control its forces.
At the tactical level, the battlefield commander
three questions:
has a more limited and proximate perspective
1. What military condition must be produced in and focuses on his immediate foe. Strategy may
the theater of war or operations to achieve the dictate whether or not to fight, but operations will
strategic goal? determine where and when to fight and tactics how
to conduct the fight. In turn, tacticians employ fire
and maneuver to achieve a limited objective, while
operational commanders use fire and maneuver on
a larger scale to create an imbalance against the
enemy and set the tempo of a campaign.32

One hundred years earlier, Colonel Arthur L. Wagner,

one of the US Army’s intellectual leaders prior to World
War I, defined strategy as “the art of moving an army
in the theater of operations, with a view to placing it in
such a position, relative to the enemy, as to increase
the probability of victory, increase the consequences

5
 of victory, or lessen the consequences of defeat.”33 although Mao’s Problems of Strategy in China’s
Current Army doctrine simply parrots the Joint Definition, Revolutionary War (December 1936) may still have
shown at the top of this section and then adds, much to offer.35
gratuitously, “It is applied only at the operational level.”34
Military forces still construct campaigns in which
Design offers a creative logic and a set of useful tools battles are mere incidents in operations, and success
to revive thinking about the practice of operational is sought by development of a creative ensemble of
art and to apply it in the creative ways required for tactical actions of even greater variety to develop
resolving the unique kinds of operational challenges desired transformational conditions. Although Western
thrown up by today’s unsettled world. The premise societies seem to have lost the capacity for full
of the discussion that follows is that, although the mobilization, armies conduct year-round operations,
circumstances of continental industrial war on land no tied to their homelands by continuous logistics and
longer obtain, the concept of operational art retains its personnel flow. Campaigns are prolonged, if the
validity, pretty much as described by Svechin. It is used annual costs can be met, because wars seem not
today at much lower levels of hierarchy than those to be existential in content and mass armies are a
assumed by either Svechin or the authors of the thing of the past in the West, a condition that allows
1986 FM 100-5. small, mobile, decentralized enemy forces to conduct
prolonged dispersed operations of hit and run as long
Comtemporary Operational Art as they are tolerated by the people they live among.
While large-scale, existential, continental war between Intelligence, and particularly network analysis, rises
peer states seems ruled out for the foreseeable to supreme importance, in part compensating for
future, the political–military conflicts of today still the absence of numbers capable of full occupation.
seem unlikely to be resolved by decisive battles on Providing oversight and security to target populations
single fields as those of the early 19th century were, requires even greater distribution and decentralization
albeit for entirely different reasons. Land forces of both tactical and operational initiative for, as Tip
confront even more distributed enemies, networked O’Neill said long ago, “all politics are local.”
electronically, collaborative more than hierarchical
in structure, and often armed, at least in niches as
well as U.S. forces. These foes move among and are
often indistinguishable from the people at large and
therefore are essentially invisible until they act. Their
immediate goals are often local, resourced selectively
by franchisers to advance larger political causes. Even
where traditional conventional operations may initiate
a war, as in Iraq, these seem likely to be succeeded
by irregular wars among the people for some time
after, until stability can be returned on some terms.
Moreover, conventional adversaries, such as North
Korea and Iran, are prepared to employ irregular
or paramilitary forces in large numbers, behind the
conventional front and among the people. Such wars The operational artist is still required to take the
must be fought very differently than the existential measure of the situation and environment, and
war between armed forces of rival powers the Red invent patterns of action that will create the desired
Army theorists of the twenties and thirties anticipated, strategic results over time while wearing away the

6
enemy force and will faster than the enemy wears are doing looks a lot like what Svechin defined as
down one’s own. Today, before they can withdraw to operational art, even when it is qualitatively different
their camps, commanders must coordinate, creatively, than what is done at the theater level.
their more traditional military activities with a range
The function of design in operational art is to produce
of non-military actions required to build viable social
the skills that Schneider, referring to U.S. Grant,
organizations capable of maintaining relative local
lists for operational artists: the “unified and holistic
peace and social stability. Often that entails designing
approach in the design, execution, and sustainment
comprehensive campaigns and then negotiating unity
of their campaigns. They have had that intuitive ability
of effort with collocated but independent governmental
to render incomplete and ambiguous information into
and nongovernmental agencies, to follow a common
a meaningful impression of the true state of affairs in
operational path to the successful situational
their theater of operations.”36
transformation, which is the goal of all campaigns.
Design helps the commander confronted with a
While senior joint commanders still apply operational
complex multifaceted situation to develop a deep,
art by planning campaigns and major operations
nuanced understanding of the factors creating the
involving major forces, today’s mid-level commanders
situation, an understanding not likely to result from
are no longer challenged only to find the most efficient
immediate pattern recognition based only on prior
combination of physical means to achieve assigned
experience. Design then adds a creative dimension to
tasks. They too are often given vague, abstract
operational planning, helping the commander answer
missions, extending in duration over time, for which no
the three questions of the 1986 FM 100-5, based on
single tactical action will be decisive. They are required
understanding grounded in sophisticated and thorough
to understand the complex human situations they
insight into the circumstances of the situation. The
confront and develop patterns of “tactical” responses
function of design is to help the commander, or staff
(where tactical may include well digging and conducting
leader, choose the best way forward dealing with the
effective constabulary operations), which, together, will
situation as it is, not to mistake it for what one might
accomplish the desired goals—at least in the small
believe or wish it were.
theaters for which they are responsible. What they

7
 II. Operational Design

Operational design is a highly reflective and Because each situation is unique, designers begin
introspective process. It fosters a posture of by defining the governing situation in some detail
skepticism about the possibility of completeness of and then develop a unique theory for transforming
understanding, presuming that, however good one’s it. Because the observed situations are likely to be
current understanding, the nature of human problems complex and will evolve as operations are executed,
condemns us to continual revision to keep pace with planners produce schemes for ensembles or patterns
changing circumstances. Design can be initiated by of actions intended to produce fundamental and self-
a commander, a staff leader, or a superior authority, sustaining systemic change. A single design may result
either to direct the organization to a new task or in a number of operational plans, each largely self-
to update current understanding or declare it false contained and intended to be pursued through success
and replace it with a sounder version. As skeptics, or abandonment in favor of another plan.
operational designers practice Karl Popper’s theory of
Planners inform and often participate in development
falsification, presuming that hypotheses can never be
of a design as members of a design team. In some
fully validated, only disproven and rejected for better
headquarters, designers are all planners, and the
approximations.37 All conclusions in operational
only distinction between the roles is that between
design, then, remain provisional.
the activity in hand and that to follow—where
It is useful to distinguish here between designing and movement is back and forth. In cases where they
planning. Planning, when it is referred to in this paper, are separate groups, if both are to be effective, there
is the absolutely essential work to identify, acquire, must be continuous comprehensive communications
and maximize the forces, the material means, and the between the two, and both must focus on serving the
actions required to accomplish assigned missions. commander whose vision, in the end, is the one that
Staff planners do the sums and assist the commander matters.
in realizing his or her vision. Design is all about helping
the commander to create his or her vision of a future System Framing
campaign or operation and to formulate this vision System Framing40 is a critical examination of a
in a fashion that can be passed on to subordinate situation deemed problematic. It asks, in effect: ”What
and collaborating actors in order to carry out the are the conditions that cause this situation to exist?”
necessary planning to achieve the assigned tasks System Framing includes examination of the initiating
through action. This distinction is somewhat artificial directive; developing a deep, nuanced understanding
to the extent that the Marine Corps and Army doctrine of the system underlying the unsatisfactory situation,
writers, each in their own way, already account for both including the path that brought you there; and the
functions within planning. The Marine Corps planning formulation of a more desirable state of affairs.
doctrine describes planning as “the art and science System Framing addresses Clausewitz’s famous
of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective admonition:
ways of bringing it about.”38 The Army has adapted its The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act
doctrine on Battle Command to account for anticipatory of judgment that the statesman and commander
creation of understanding as the basis for action.39 have to make is to establish by that test [the

8
 subordination of war to policy] the kind of war on current system got to be what it is to set the present
which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, in an historical or genealogical perspective.
nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to
nature41 The purpose of the initial inquiry is exploratory. The
goal is mutual understanding between superior and
System Framing is carried out using a collaborative
subordinate, and often, an initial discussion is required
process of interpretative criticism, here called
for clarification. Aside from the desirability of avoiding
discourse. Discourse will be discussed more fully later
unproductive or counterproductive work, this initial
in the paper.
inquiry is necessary in the methodology to provide a
standard of relevance for further inquiry. A personal
Legacy System
exchange is often useful to help the superior clarify
Even before seeking to understand the current
his own views, and such an exchange provides an
or observed system,42 operational designers ask
opportunity for the executing leader to offer advice
themselves one of their most important questions:
on the suitability of a particular directed action, or
What has brought us together? Why are we here?
apparent contradictions with standing instructions. In
General Naveh uses the formula of the Passover Seder.
an army as hierarchical as the US Army and in a society
“Why is this night different from all other nights?”
as jealous of civilian control of the military as the United
No part of operational design is more important than
States, the tone of this inquiry is obviously is critical.
examining critically the motives and expectations
Such discussions are a basic professional obligation.
that serve as pretext for the design effort. This often
seems impertinent to military officers, accustomed
The Current System
by discipline to accept missions at face value and
Once the motivation for the design inquiry is clear, the
immediately to begin to reduce them to executable
design team can begin to explore the existing situation.
tasks. On reflection, however, it is apparent that this
It does so, counter-intuitively—not by addressing “the
initial examination is an essential part of intelligent
problem”—but by developing a deeper understanding
discipline because it assures that whatever follows will,
of the environment, or ecology of the situation that will
in fact, satisfy the wishes of the commander or higher
have to be transformed. The only intrusion of the task
authority, however imperfectly the initial guidance may
itself at this point is in its role in bounding the inquiry
have been framed or expressed. Matthew Ridgway
by indicating which actors, influences, potentials, and
described his approach to command in 1952, saying,
tensions44 (positive and negative) within the existing
“When you get a new job to do, spend most of your
system are relevant to the concern expressed by the
time discovering exactly what your new mission is.
instigator and indicating the governing motivations of
Then break it down into workable units.”43
the United States as a player in the system.
The object of this first inquiry is to discover what
Designers lay out a plan of inquiry created uniquely
has happened that made the existing situation
to address the particular kind of situation they are
unsatisfactory. Where a new mission is assigned,
confronting and the kind of action their guidance
it is likely that some existing condition has become
envisions. This plan is provisional and subject to
unsatisfactory, or a new situation has been recognized
adaptation as more is learned about the situation.
that requires a response to restore conditions to
(Fundamental adaptation is called reframing.) The
an acceptable state. In either case, it is particularly
inquiry itself must be self-consciously unbounded;
important to tease out precisely what needs changing,
that is a deliberate effort must be made to expand
what limits circumscribe possible solutions, and how
one’s inquiry beyond circumstantial limits, such as
the new mission affects existing guidance and policies.
assigned areas of responsibility, national borders, or
Often it is useful to review the history of how the

9
 organizations of thought that have become customary will be of second order, that is, disinterested in the
over time. Examples of the latter are regional particular issues but concerned about the effects of
abstractions like “West Africa,” which may no longer possible outcomes with regard to the status of other
reflect critical relationships, or considerations of the interested parties. For entirely unrelated reasons, a
Far East that continue to separate Hong Kong from player may be loath to see a rival benefit. Actors may
China, long after it has passed back to sovereignty of be individual or collective, and deep understanding
the Chinese authorities.45 will often call for the deconstruction of collective
actors, say states, into constituent interest groups.
The critical task of System Framing—understanding the
Sometimes second-order actors will form contingent
current or observed system—involves an exhaustive
groups—a set of otherwise unrelated actors may
mapping of interested actors and their relationships
share a common interest that causes them to act
relevant to the situation in question. Actors are
as one.47 Transnational actors, religious bodies,
included according to their ability to influence future
criminal cartels, supranational associations, and
actions but exploration of their relationships is not
multinational corporations must be considered,
limited to those involving the particular issue at this
as well as indigenous actors in the political form
point. Rather, the goal is to gain an understanding
contingent groups—a set of otherwise unrelated actors
of the contextual system in general, as a set of
may share a common interest that causes them to
relationships motivated by any number of agendas or
act as one. Transnational actors, religious bodies,
influences. Influences may include history, relevant
criminal cartels, supranational associations, and
cultures, political ideologies and structures, economic
multinational corporations must be considered, as well
issues, and social structures.46 All these should be
as indigenous actors in the political system. The map
considered, although no standard list should limit the
of relationships should be captured graphically and in
range of possible perspectives to be considered in
narrative form for use as a reference and, eventually,
defining any given situation.
to share learning.
This desire to un-constrain the initial analysis ought not
to be taken as justification to ignore entirely physical
realities (geography), which will present themselves
objectively in all perspectives alike (although their
impact will be different in benefits and vulnerabilities
realized according to situation). In fact, defining the
situation will be enhanced by considering the spatial
relationships offered by graphic portrayal on maps.
Physical features and relative positioning “are what
they are.” For that matter, international boundaries
exist in fact. Even if they do not necessarily “bound”
anything, they bring with them certain expectations
and therefore suggest certain lines of inquiry. It Mapping relationships between actors must recognize
would be wrong to ignore them entirely in the name that players often reflect different identities according
of free speculation. A large map should be posted to the question they are addressing and that each
for reference in the design team work area to ensure identity may prompt a different response to an issue,
these realities are considered. depending on how the stimulus is interpreted. The key
is that the design team must enter into the conscious
Actors may be involved or neutral but interested. They
mind of the subject actor sympathetically and make
may be proximate or distant. Sometimes their interest
the best judgment possible about how that actor sees

10
the world and his/her/its place in it. To make this kind failed for lack of adequate insight, which he found to
of judgment effectively, the design team will have to be a remedial fault. He said—
learn as much as possible about the culture and self- Insight—or the ability to see the situation as it
identity of the various players. Often, use of a trained really is—is the most valuable asset an advisor
“Red Team,” skilled at playing “the other,” will assist in can have. Intellect alone does not guarantee
this effort. insight. Soldierly virtues such as integrity, courage,
loyalty, and steadfastness are valuable indeed, but
The design team will draw on all available sources of they are often not accompanied by insight. Insight
expertise in making these judgments and consider comes from a willing openness to a variety of
various factors of social conditioning that can be stimuli, from intellectual curiosity, from observation
expected to influence interpretation. The overlapping and reflection, from continuous evaluation and
testing, from conversations and discussions, from
influence of cultural forces in modernizing regions
review of assumptions, from listening to the views
can be very complicated indeed. Take the perspective of outsiders, and from the indispensable ingredient
of the Middle Eastern Arab in whom the Sunni-Shia of humility. Self-doubt is essential equipment for
and Arab-Persian cultural divides may be expected a responsible officer in this environment; the man
to produce different effects according to which who believes he has the situation entirely figured
predominates in a particular setting. How do Iraqi out is a danger to himself and to his mission.48
Arab Shias relate to Iranian Shia interventions in Iraqi Framing the current system is all about creating such
affairs? How do Palestinian Arab Hamas Sunnis relate understanding-based insight.
to Lebanese Arab Hezbollah Shias who acknowledge
Iranian clerical authority, and vice versa? How do The Desired System
intervening variables, say mutual enemies, affect their There comes a point in System Framing when a
responses? Identities are multiple and overlapping, provisional understanding is adequate to move to
and sometimes the governing identity is difficult to the next level, or time forces forward movement
discern. despite the promise that in design one is always
It is important to remember to include one’s country free to go back and revisit earlier steps to fill gaps
in the mix of actors. Analysis of one’s own national and omissions. The final act of System Framing is
perspective and cultural biases is also important. creating a Desired System Frame that will produce the
To continue with the Middle Eastern example, the necessary conditions—the desired state—that meet
American concern with equality of the sexes can make the wishes and expectations of the initiating sponsor.
full cooperation with conservative Muslim nations The creation of the desired state supposes a
problematic, as can the Arab view of the history of review of the revised understanding of the initiating
US relations with the State of Israel. Part of this directive in light of the new understanding of the
initial analysis must be historical, asking how things working of the current system. If guidance requires
have come to their current pass, recognizing that the modification, recommendations should be made to the
history understood by each actor will be different in originating authority. If the guidance does not require
both perspective and content. This searching inquiry reconsideration in light of new knowledge, the design
provides the basis for the necessary insight to team looks at its handiwork, marks the conditions
construct a new fuller understanding of the governing and relationships that make the existing system what
situation. it is, and creates a concept or vision of what a new
Writing at the end of the War in Vietnam, General Jack situation or state, more satisfactory to the sponsor’s
Cushman reflected that US Army advisors had often desires, would look like. This creation is a strategic
act that provides necessary detail for the sponsor’s

11
 guidance. This, in turn, makes possible the operational action that will move existing conditions toward the
decisions involved in translating broad strategic goals desired end state.”51
into temporal and spatial patterns of sufficient clarity
The Cognitive Transition provides for the identification
to take action.
of changes required in the current system to allow for
Based on their now deeper understanding of transformation from the existing or observed to the
existing circumstances and relationships, designers desired state. It does so by identifying the relevant and
propose changes to the observed system’s defining practical considerations useful for shaping a system
relationships and governing conditions that, if of intervention in the construction of the Operational
accomplished, might lead to creation of a new more Frame. Creation of a problem statement, indicating
desirable and hopefully sustainable state or situation. what must be done, completes the bridge to move
The action is highly subjective and provisional. At the from System Framing, a process of describing the
theater or regional level, even in occupied districts, the existing and desired state, to the Operational Frame,
action involves positing new or revised relationships a portrayal of intended actions expressed as a broad
among key actors and proposing modification of pattern organized sufficiently in spatial and temporal
conditions estimated to produce identified negative terms to guide more formal planning. This requires
tensions and trends toward manageable levels or further system study in light of the desired goals.
desirable directions. Where military forces are involved,
Once the design team has created a vision of its
this will normally include removal of certain actors
desired system, designers must go back to their
from the system entirely, or at least forceful limitation
Current System Frame and identify the actors who
of their freedom of action. Goals at this point are
could be expected to resist such a change, those who
broad and general. Designers take a holistic view
would support it, and those who would be interested
and do not limit themselves to military or security
but not become involved if handled with care. Further,
goals. The desired state should be portrayed similarly
they must identify those negative tensions and trends
to the observed system, that is graphically with an
that would retard movement forward and those
accompanying narrative. Creation of the desired
positive tensions and trends that, if reinforced, would
system sets the context for the climax of the design
accelerate the change. Finally, designers make a
process, called the Cognitive Transition.
tentative assessment of available sources of energy
from all sources that might be marshaled to encourage
The Cognitive Transition or force the desired transformation.
Arriving at the problem statement is the unique
contribution of the phase of design called the Cognitive Designers revise and reorganize their understanding of
Transition.49 This particular sequence is critical to the the current system. They create three new conceptual
logic of the process or methodology of operational systems: a system of opposition,52 a system of
design. It represents the climax or turning point of command,53 and a system of logistics or support.
operational design because it effects the shift from The system of opposition describes, as a system,
learning to creation, from the description involved those actors, trends, and conditions that must be
in System Framing to the formulation of action in overcome to accomplish the desired transformation.
Operation Framing.50 This turning point imposes The system of command describes the organizational
a different character on the inquiry. The Cognitive and cybernetic structures that will be required to
Transition is decisive in the design process because it accomplish the desired transformation.54 The system
is the core of the translation of system understanding of support, or logistics, describes those features of
to creative action, from strategic choice to operational the current system that can be exploited to make the
form, defining “in text and graphics, the areas for desired change.

12
This new design stage is as complex as the earlier guidance. It identifies the functions that need to be
System Framing, and it is carried out the same way, accomplished and stipulates the form, as a pattern
by discourse and debate. It is important to realize of actions in space and time, to be performed in a
that building the system of opposition is not simply particular ensemble, to transform the existing situation
collecting opposing actors. There may be features into the desired state.60 Design is not planning,
within oneself or one’s allies that will be an obstacle although designers left to their own devices will intrude
to doing what the design team feels must be done. on planning, so seamless is the line dividing the two.
One recurrent US example is the division of authorities An architect sketches a commission in line with the
and responsibilities for aspects of US strategic policy piece of ground on which it is to sit. So the operational
between the Departments of State and Defense. design team lays out the activities necessary to
Different structures and different institutional priorities achieve the desired transformation against the
often challenge the ability of US agents on the knowledge they have acquired in their learning, in
ground to create unity of effort without expenditure accordance with a sense of time and priority. They
of significant effort to overcome divisions that make leave it to the planners to perform Ridgway’s second
very good sense in Washington.55 A second example step of breaking tasks down into workable parts and
involves allies unable or unwilling to have their forces assigning each to appropriate units.61 Design is
participate in certain activities. The presence of allies not planning. It is, in essence, a form of mediation
is still part of the system of support but their caveats between the strategist or goal setter and the tactician
and reservations may be seen as part of the system or actor/ artisan.
of opposition, requiring accommodation or effort to
Operation Framing is the point where talent and
resolve. Similarly, the opposing forces may have certain
creativity reap their greatest rewards. Faced with the
ideological configurations or certain contradictions
need to design a building, an architect may produce
in their structures, beliefs, and actions that can be
a perfectly functional but pedestrian concept, or he
made part of the system of support, as features to be
or she may move the boundaries of the possible, use
exploited.
materials in new ways, and create the Sydney Opera
Based then on the understanding gained by this House. The “designers” who could envision using Army
tripartite refinement of the System Frame, the design bombers from the decks of aircraft carriers to make a
team can describe the cognitive distance between the one-way flight over Japan in Doolittle’s raid showed this
two states—the current state and the desired state— gift of creativity, as did the Al Qaida terrorists who saw
in terms of the conditions, actors, and relationships that box cutters and intercontinental airplanes could
that need to be changed to move from one state be combined, turning sophisticated transportation
(the existing system) to another (the desired system) platforms into weapons of mass destruction.62
in order to transform the current situation into the
There is a well-known tendency of design students,
desired state. This action is called problematization,56
concerned to properly frame the task they have been
and from the results, designers should develop
assigned, to expand their project and forget their task.
a problem statement, a brief document defining
Bryan Lawson, Dean of the Faculty of Architectural
graphically and in narrative their hypothesis about what
Studies at Sheffield University, attributes a story to
needs to be done to effect the changes desired.57
J. P. Eberhard, Chairman, Faculty of Architecture and
Planning, Carnegie-Mellon University, about a student
Operation Framing assigned to design a doorknob for a government office.
Operation Framing involves formulating a theory of
The student begins by questioning whether a doorknob
action,58 turning it into an operational design,59
is the right piece of hardware. Then he questions the
and transmitting it in useful form as commander’s
need for the door. Soon, he decides to abolish a staff

13
 division, and ultimately he comes to his instructor The Operational Design
with a solution that recommends reorganization of The operational design consists of a statement of the
the whole government, instead of designing a piece tasks the command as a whole must perform, laid
of functional hardware.63 The current necessary against those that collaborating authorities and allies
emphasis on developing whole-of-government solutions should accomplish if the design is to be realized,
to complex situations abroad, a concomitant to expressed in a way that indicates the temporal-spatial
the mixed nature of contemporary struggles, feeds pattern of action the commander desires in order to
this propensity. Booz Allen experience in the past 2 have the most productive effects. Where adequate
years observing midgrade officers doing operational forces and resources are not immediately available,
design has demonstrated that an ambiguous initiating the concept should indicate as much and estimate
directive can easily turn into “a work order for the the risk to success if identified needs are not met.
Secretary of Defense to submit to the rest of the The concept is translated into planning guidance
executive branch.”64 In part, this reflects the reality from the commander to interested subordinates and
the commander lives in. He or she must negotiate collaborators. The detail of this commander’s guidance
the total design with those whom he cannot direct, is whatever the commander feels necessary, and it will
or be prepared to adjust his ambitions and planning vary with his audience and tasks.68
accordingly. Designers and planners must keep this in
Normally, a commander’s guidance will include the
mind, ultimately producing an executable concept for
commander’s statement of intent, that is his or
the forces assigned, or likely to be assigned, for the
her vision of how the various tasks identified for
part of the design the commander will control and for
forces under military command or direction will
which he or she will be responsible.
be accomplished, what they entail in broad terms,
time considerations and anticipated resources, and
Theory of Action
guidance about the strategic communications message
Operation Framing begins with creation of a theory of
with which operations are expected to be consistent.
action, a description of the actions necessary to move
Resources and timing considerations will be subject
from the current or observed system or state, to the
to questioning and modification in the planning
desired system or state, thus resolving the issues
process as practical realities become more evident.
identified by the problem statement.65 The theory of
Finally, a narrative and graphic portrayal of the design
action serves as a basis for the commander’s intent
and design process should be passed by the design
statement, indicating what he intends his forces and
team to the planning staff to serve as a reference.
others responsive to his lead (within existing limits66)
Experience indicates this is most often done in the
to do. In turn, the theory of action serves as the
graphical form of lines of effort, accompanied by a
basis for development of an operational design67
narrative explanation. More than one operational plan
that provides sufficient detail to serve as a basis for
may be required to implement a given design.
planning by subordinate commanders, supporting
and coordinating authorities, and the commander’s In addition to operational considerations, the
own staff. The theory of action, as the basis of the commander’s guidance should contain direction for
commander’s intent statement, should properly come regular review of the collective understanding in light
from the commander himself, expressing his vision. of new observations. Provision for regular deliberate
This suggests that the commander needs to join his review is required to ensure the general understanding
design team to participate in the actions we have remains relevant to observed facts and to ensure the
referred to here as Operation Framing. actions growing out of that understanding continue to

14
be effective in light of the changes to the system state The design team meets periodically during execution
engendered by the infusion of energy through action. of an operation to share new insights and new learning
The commander should indicate possible evolving and to evaluate whether any of this rises to level
conditions that would cause him or her to reconsider requiring reframing. Does the understanding currently
the fundamental understanding, or trigger reframing. held, still account for the behavior of the system as it
Simply put, reframing is called for when the existing is observed? If it does not, the design team advises
understanding can no longer account for observed the commander to reframe his or her understanding.
system behavior. At the same time, the commander At some point, whether or not the broad system
must guard against allowing the sensitivity to reframing understanding has broken down, all initiatives will
moments to undermine the “strength of character” reach the point of diminishing returns beyond which
that allows great commanders to prevail in uncertain they should not be pursued. So the design team
circumstances.69 This choice between adaptability should also ask the question: Are ongoing actions
and steadfastness is a complicated act for which little still relevant to the movement from the existing
useful advice can be given. system to the desired system that the team originally
envisioned? If not, adjustments must be made to
actions.

15
 III. Methodology

Leading Collaborative Learning and, very likely, the commander will be a participant in
Collaborative learning does not come naturally to a design group led by his or her superior. So, at best,
hierarchical organizations. Armies work well tactically the commander probably will give guidance and interact
because they can be employed rapidly in response with his or her design team only at critical points.
to a single will, each actor behaving in a relatively If that is the case, the commander must appoint a
predictable fashion. The natural move by Soldiers design team leader to stand in for him or her to guide
entering a room is to see who is in charge by virtue of the work and keep the learning focused and on track.
rank and position and to defer to authority expressed And, when the time comes, the commander must
from that direction. Discursive learning is quite engage the design team, challenge its work and permit
different. The intent here is to engage the full intellect its members to challenge his or her understanding
and imagination of the entire group, with each member until he or she has made the learning common and the
engaged fully and contributing as he or she can, either understanding his or her own.
by virtue of some unique expertise or acuteness
of judgment or vision. This sort of sharing will not
take place if the protocols of hierarchy are strictly
observed. Each member must come to the discourse
as an equal, free to disagree about any expressed
understanding so long as disagreement is based
on evidence and logic. The challenger is prepared,
equally, for his or her argument to be contested in turn,
again based on evidence and logical inference. For
collaborative learning, there can be no understanding
privileged beyond criticism because of its origin and
yet, it is ultimately the commander’s understanding and
decision that will go forward. The challenge is how to Design teams may be ad hoc organizations, called
conduct the learning collaboratively while maintaining into being only when the commander or leader
respect for the authority of the commander to decide recognizes the need to develop a deep, multi-
and direct. perspective understanding of a given situation, or they
The role of the commander or leader is critical can be standing teams with whom the commander
in the conduct of design. In an ideal situation, is comfortable testing his or her ideas. The groups
the commander would spend a good deal of time may be formal or informal, large or small. The large
organizing the design team, guiding its work and the group can represent more perspectives and do wider
learning of its members. However, while individual research but will inevitably have to subdivide to
staff leaders may have time to devote directly to conduct the kind of searching critical discourse that
such efforts, the commander seldom will. Indeed, design calls for to tease meaning from assembled
his or her formal design group in the staff will likely facts. The small team, because it can learn more
be just one of the designing groups in which he or about the techniques of design over time, may do
she participates. Others will involve subordinate better distilling meaning from fewer facts but may
commanders and leaders of coordinating organizations suffer from narrowness of view or development of tacit

16
rules of behavior that can lead to “group think” and on the ground and what the boss really has in his
unwarranted satisfaction with existing interpretation. mind in assigning the current project. Early in the
It is essential that there be some familiarity with design process, there may be long periods when the
the conduct of design in the group in either case. design team is self-directing. As the process moves
A useful compromise may be to have a small core toward concept development, the commander must be
to which others can be added as desired to expand more involved with the evolution of his design, as he
the perspective set, expertise, or access to external develops his guidance for planners, subordinates, and
knowledge. Where design intends to comprehend collaborators based on the design team learning that
future actions of external agencies or authorities, it he must make his own.
is wise to bring their representatives into the process
There are two major parts of the design learning
so their particular sensitivities and agendas can be
process. One is a research effort—seeking information
considered from the outset.
from whatever sources are available. The second part
To lead collaborative learning in design teams, a involves evaluating the role that specific information
commander must do three things. First, he or she plays in creating a provisional but comprehensive
must make it clear that disagreement is invited, indeed understanding of the situation at hand, teasing
considered a duty, for each member of the design meaning from factual data, and accepting that the
group. Second, the commander must demonstrate that total available data is always incomplete and subject
this is so by the way he or she responds when his or to revision. While some design proponents believe
her understanding is challenged. Finally, it is helpful if only the interpretive function matters, it is more logical
the commander, or group leader, remains in the middle to believe that more facts, well understood, are more
distance from the process itself, what Harvard Kennedy likely to provide the desired, nuanced understanding
School of Business professors Ronald A Heifetz and of the situation than a much smaller number of facts
Marty Linsky call “taking the balcony perspective,” exquisitely tortured for understanding. One of the most
giving broad guidance, organizing the learning group, important qualities of a design effort is the extent to
and then standing outside the process of learning and which it draws on multiple perspectives and sources
observing how the group works, intervening only by of expert counsel. On the other hand, the design team
exception as the learning process unfolds.70 must balance the desire for the greatest possible store
of data with the need to conduct an adequate cross-
This is often not difficult because the commander
examination of the data it already possesses.
is normally too busy to participate in the detailed
learning that begins the design process. Generally, the The learning process itself must be self-conscious
commander will be represented by a designated leader and reflective. The design team must organize its
and will interact periodically to check on progress, campaign of learning deliberately, in light of what it
influence the direction of inquiry, and sometimes apply knows to begin with about the nature of the situation
pressure for progress when time is a compelling factor, and the commander’s requirements. Participants must
recognizing that completeness may be sacrificed. frequently pull back and take an introspective view
These interactions, expressed in Heifetz’ terms, of how their approach is working and how well the
occur when the leader comes down on the dance members are collaborating. Then they must adjust their
floor, metaphorically, to see where the dancers are behavior as required. As new information is developed,
going, ask questions, and provide adjustments where new lines of relevant inquiry will suggest themselves,
required. The commander, who circulates abroad and the team should be reorganized to pursue them by
more than the staff and engages with a wider circle either breaking off an inquiry team or bringing in new
of executive contacts, will bring a good deal of useful experts. Sometimes just reorganizing subgroups will
information to these sessions about how things look generate new perspectives on stalemated problems.

17
 Periodically, the whole team must get together to share In discourse, members lay out their interpretation of
its learning and test the findings of one group against the meaning of facts, first, with regard to portraying the
the perspectives of others. At the end of the day, web of relationships that define an existing situation.
time should be reserved to evaluate how the learning They do so, expecting their understanding to be
process itself is going, identify required information, challenged by their peers, using different perspectives
and develop a plan for continuation the next day. The and bases of fact. The explanations are then modified
group should be self-critical, insisting on participation to the extent that agreement can be reached on a
and contribution by all members and on demeanor common understanding. Where agreement is not
that respects the person while disagreeing, sometimes possible, the differences are captured and defined and
intensely, with the understanding. Groups progress the question left open. Gradually, a narrative is built and
best that keep a running narrative, employed self- captured that describes how the human system under
critically to sharpen the logic of group conclusions. observation works and why it works as it does under the
circumstances as they are known and understood.
Discourse Discourse is a time consuming and sometimes painful
The method of collaborative learning is called
process. Not everyone is capable of separating
discourse. Discourse is carried out best by small
themselves emotionally from their positions or of
groups, although small groups can meet together as a
attacking understanding rather than the believer.
large group and meld their insights, once developed.
Discourse works rather like Thomas Kuhn explained
“Discourse is democratic and asymmetric.”71 It is
the process of normal science in his classic text, The
democratic in that everyone is expected to participate.
Structure of Scientific Revolutions.72 The collective
It is asymmetric in that it respects differences in
learning or understanding increases, along with a
knowledge—where these can be backed up with
set of unresolved issues, until the list of exceptions
evidence and reason. The goal of discourse is a
requires a new explanation, a new paradigm that
shared understanding of the broad situation, where
comprehends both the facts explained by the old
shared understanding does not imply consensus.
understanding and the set of exceptions. In operational
Consensus implies agreement on all particulars.
design, this reinvention or explanation is called
In discourse, shared understanding provides for
reframing and it may occur at anytime that the current
disagreement on particulars. Discourse is satisfied
understanding can no longer explain the observed
with common understanding of the limits of agreement
behavior of the system. Sometimes the discourse will
and of the relevant discontinuities, which become
become stuck as it progresses. Then, a process called
areas for further research.
meta-questioning is called for.

Meta-questioning, Donald A. Schön calls it

“Reflection-in-Action,” means simply raising one’s
perspective. Meta-questioning is questioning one’s
own line of questioning to structure one’s process of
thought in order to discover why the discussion has
reached an impasse.73 In general, meta-questions
involve asking: “What are we doing and why are we
doing it?” Meta-questioning often involves thought
experiments to gain different perspectives on the
manner in which the inquirer is approaching the issue.
Sometimes it involves imposing a new angle of vision
or approach to break the stalemate. Meta-questioning

18
can lead to a “Copernican breakthrough,” as when reflection. The narrative also captures nuance that
the astronomer, Nicolaus Copernicus, discovering he gets lost in simple depiction.
could make no progress explaining the movements of
The product of all this work is a hypothesis about
the heavenly bodies while assuming the Earth was the
how the macro-system of actors, within which the
center of the universe, reversed his view and assumed
undesirable situation has developed, actually operates.
that the Earth revolved while the sun remained at
It is defined as a set of positive and negative
rest.74 In short, Copernicus reversed his perspective
relationships linking the members of the system. It is
and made the unexplainable explainable.
always subject to disproof if new information appears
or new observations are made that were not possible
Meta-questioning can free understanding by causing within the old understanding.
the questioners to unpack their metaphors and
Operational designers face two issues as they
evidence and reassemble explanations from a better
construct their description of the strategic system
vantage point. Eventually the web of understanding
confronting them. First, knowing the mission already,
will become so complex that it is overwhelming. It
they may begin to get ideas about approaches, which
is here that insight begins to come to the fore, or
are not useful for describing the system and which are
as one student at the Army’s School of Advanced
premature until a solid understanding of the system is
Military Studies once remarked, “Here is where the
built up. These should not be discarded, but set aside
magic happens.” Insight is not magic at all. In fact, it
to be considered and tested again later in the process.
is a kind of pattern recognition based on the totality
Insights and inspiration should not be cast aside and
of one’s experience addressing similar appearing
lost. Second, when interpretations are undermined in
problems and the detailed learning that has gone on
the process of discourse, they too should be recorded
during the process of collaborative inquiry.75 The
for future reference. New, confirming information
observers must stand back and simplify the mass of
may surface that will restore an abandoned position.
insights into a useful summary. In doing so, they will
Design does not waste knowledge. Like confirmation,
seek to describe system tendencies and potentials,
rejection is always tentative, and the explanation of the
where the former indicate movement the system is
moment is never more than provisional, always subject
likely to realize in the absence of any intervention,
to reconsideration when warranted by new information,
while the latter makes a judgment about the extent
even when a given understanding has become the
to which the system is open to change.
foundation of action. Design offers the agility to move
Again, the process of discourse, of searching back and forth to respond to new information or new
assertion, challenge, and response (or description, questions, as required.
problematization, construction76) is used to
avoid the self-deception likely to occur when Rules to Guide Discussion Leaders
this conceptual leap is the property of only one Experience suggests some rules to guide discussion
observer. The process and result must be captured leaders. There are undoubtedly others, and not all will
diagrammatically and in narrative to document apply in any particular inquiry.77
the learning process and provide a reference for 1. Conduct collaborative planning for the next effort
others who will come to it later. As indicated above, prior to each work session based on current
experience in teaching design has shown that understanding. Revalidate the plan if there is a gap
the composition of a running narrative, reviewed in time between sessions. (People always learn by
periodically in the process, serves as a check reflection or individual effort between sessions.)
against logical leaps that cannot be justified on

19
 2. Full participation is expected. Those who hang identify the sources of difference and whatever new
back must be drawn out by asking “What do you evidence the expert offers that you must reconsider.)
think about this?” and “Why do you think that?”
8. When discourse freezes, ask the meta-questions.
3. Relevance to the goal is the test but it should “What are we asking?” “What does the question
be applied with a light touch to avoid overly itself entail?” “Is there a different perspective that
constraining conceptual initiative. might be more productive?”

4. Don’t bypass disagreement. Clarify it and 9. Maintain a record of the learning—retain all diagrams
document it. You may change your judgment later. and produce a running narrative. Conduct regular
review of the narrative. The documentation will serve
5. Don’t discard inspiration. When possible solutions
as a check on the design team’s logic in process
jump out of initial inquiry, list them somewhere for
and a reference for those who receive the design
future reference. Meanwhile, get back to the task
to indicate how particular insights developed—and
at hand.
perhaps reveal weakness in the process.
6. Identify gaps in knowledge. Take steps to fill them.
10. At the end of each session, allow time to reflect on
7. Seek the advice of experts to add to content and what has been learned and how the learning journey
to evaluate what you think you have learned from has gone. (“Where are we?” “How has our learning
their perspective. (Don’t accept their evaluation as journey gone so far?” “How can we organize our
the new answer; question it where it differs so you efforts and ourselves better to move forward?”)

20
IV. Conclusions

Operational design is a creative approach to should be seen in their political rather than military
problem solving for leaders confronted with complex characters—the operational art of today’s conflicts
situations—situations that conceal their actual nature requires new construction for every necessarily unique
under a set of surface appearances. Operational situation, corresponding to the uniqueness of the
design is particularly useful to those required to defining contexts. Operational design, then, becomes
translate large, abstract goals into ensembles of the means to revitalize and rebuild a useful concept of
instrumental acts over time, those we call operational operational art, broader and more flexible in application
artists. Operational design adopts a skeptical posture and practice than its predecessors under the old
regarding the finality of learning, or achieving stasis paradigm. As understood by Schilling, design is just
in human situations. It assumes intervention in a as useful in designing strategies that recognize the
situation by one party will elicit a variety of responses “interdependence of the adversaries’ decisions and…
from other interested parties—an assumption often their expectations about each other’s behavior.”79
omitted by military planners who behave as though
There has been a strong reluctance to call operational
they believe they can act on a passive opponent before
design a process, for fear it will harden into a
a local and global audience that will interpret those
sequential series of actions frozen in posters on staff
planners’ motives with the same sense of altruism
college walls. This fear has led to a general neglect
they assigned to themselves. Operational design offers
of the governing logic of the actions that constitute
a conceptual framework that can revitalize moribund
operational design, some of which must, logically,
professional theory and practice of operational art,
come before others. Operational design is not a frozen
understood as the mediating activity between strategy
sequence but neither is it a random application of
and action in the conditions and circumstances of the
cognitive tools. Some actions must be complete before
day.
others are examined and, while turning back to earlier
The US Army came late to the concept of operational stages is expected, operational designers must be
art, then quickly took the notion, created to deal with sensitive to the logic that says that if you reframe your
clashes of symmetrical industrial armies, as settled; system understanding midway into the effort, this will
failing to notice that the original conditions requiring naturally require review of the subsequent conclusions
the triune differentiation—tactics, operational art, drawn from the old understanding.
and strategy—were largely disappearing from the
Finally, the practice of operational design is predicated
nature of contemporary war. Jim Schneider, whose
on the practice of collaborative learning, which, in turn,
groundbreaking work has been discussed above, took
requires employing collaborative leadership, at least in
the position in his book that operational art requires
the development of design concepts. Because of the
a symmetrical opponent.78 This paper has tried to
hierarchical nature of the US Armed Forces, this can
indicate, to the contrary, that Svechin’s definitions—
only be done deliberately and self-consciously, with
precisely because they do not tie the concepts to
sensitivity by the senior leaders to the added volume
temporally limiting features—in fact are still useful,
their rank and position gives their opinions when they
that operational art is still required but must develop
are offered, particularly in heat, which may actually
a new content. Indeed, following the direction
reflect depth of belief more than a will to impose an
indicated by Sir Michael Howard—that contemporary
idea. Humility requires admission that you might just
conflicts (in his case post-colonial wars of the 1960s)

21
 be wrong, depth of belief notwithstanding. Collaborative does not replace either efficient planning or tactical
learning will not just happen. It must be planned for virtuosity in execution. It does keep one, however, from
and arranged deliberately. jumping on one’s horse and riding off in all directions
at once because one has failed to ask the proper
Operational design is an approach to addressing
questions and ferret out the right answers before
complex strategic and operational problems. It
beginning to act aggressively without evident purpose.

22
V. Endnotes
1 Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (New 15 FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft), page 3-7.
York: Hill and Wang, 2000), page 458. 16 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (17 September 2006:
2 John Heskett, Design: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford Incorporating Change 1, 13 February 2008), page IV-2.
University Press, 2002), page 5. 17 James J. Schneider, The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total
3 FM 5-0, Operations Process (Revised Final Draft) (5 June 2009), War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State (Novato, CA:
para. 3-3, page 3-1. Presidio Press, 1994). Schneider argues that operational art
4 Joint Publication 1-02[1], Department of Defense Dictionary of emerged as a separate activity during the American Civil War with
U.S. Grant the exemplary practitioner.
Military and Associated Terms (12 April 2001: As Amended
Through 17 October 2008), page 397. 18 Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, A Translation of Strategiia
5 “Complex or just complicated: What is a complex system?” Fact (Moscow: Voennyi vestnik, 1927), Kent D. Lee, editor
(Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1991), pages 68–69.
sheet prepared by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organization (CSIRO) Centre for Complex Systems 19 Ibid, page 68.
Science. Available online at http://www.csiro.au/resources/About- 20 Ibid.
Complex-Systems.html. Accessed on 22 July 2009.
6 Shimon Naveh, Operational Art and the IDF: A Critical Study of a 21 Jacob W. Kipp, “The Origins of Soviet Operational Art, 1917–
Command Culture (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment 1936,” in Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, Michael
(CSBA), September 30, 2007) for the Director of Net Assessment, D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, general editors (Washington,
Office of the Secretary Defense. DC: Center of Military History, 2005), pages 213–239. See also
Condoleezza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” in Makers
7 Shimon Naveh, Jim Schneider, Tim Challans, The Structure of of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter
Operational Revolution: A Prolegomena (1.0) (Leavenworth, KS: Paret, editor (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986),
Booz Allen Hamilton, 2009). pages 648–676.
8 “Key Concepts of Operational Design,” Appendix B, FM 100-5, 22 See, for example, G. S. Isserson, The Evolution of Operational
Operations (May 1986), 179 et seq. In 1986, there were only Art, Bruce W. Menning, trans. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of
three: Center of Gravity, Lines of Operation, and Culminating Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, July 2005).
Points. JP 3-0 currently lists 17 “Elements of Operational Design.” 23 Michael Eliot Howard, “The Demand for Military History,” The
JP 3.0, Joint Operations (17 September 2006), Incorporating
Change 1 (13 February 2008), page IV-6. Times Literary Supplement (13 November 1969), page 1295. This
outstanding essay, one of Howard’s best, has not been included
9 JP 3.0, page IV-3. in any of his anthologies.
10 Published by Booz Allen Hamilton. 24 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Peter Paret and Michael Howard,
11 Called the Environmental Frame in FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft), eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), page 177.
(5 June 2009). 25 Raymond Aron, “The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought
12 Called the Problem Frame in the Environmental Frame in FM 5-0 (1945–1968)” Chapter 10 in Raymond Aron, Politics and History,
Miriam Bernheim Conant, translator and editor (New Brunswick,
(Revised Final Draft) (5 June 2009). The terms frame and framing NJ: Transaction Books, 1984; The Free Press, 1978), page 187.
have fairly specific meanings in design. They are used here
according to the definitions of Martin Rein and Donald A. Schön. 26 Thomas C. Shelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Boston: Harvard
“A frame is a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined University Press, 1980), page 3 (note 1).
problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon.” 27 Ibid., page 5.
“Framing is…a way of selecting, organizing, interpolating, and
making sense of a complex reality so as to provide guideposts for 28 For US experience, see Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson, in “The
knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting.” In Martin Rein and
Origins of Operational Art,” in Historical Perspectives of the
Donald A. Schön, “Frame-reflective policy discourse,” in Social
Operational Art, Krause and Phillips, general editors, pages
Sciences, Modern States, National Experiences and Theoretical
333–348. Nelson is a former US Army Chief of Military History
Crossroads, Peter Wagner, Carol Hirschon Weiss, Bjorn Wittrock,
and a long-time professor at the Army War College.
and Hellmut Wollman, editors (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), page 263. 29 General Dwight D. Eisenhower to William Elizabeth Brooks,
13 Called a “frame of understanding” in Naveh et al., The Structure November 12, 1946, number 1180 in The Papers of Dwight David
Eisenhower: The Chief of Staff, Vol. 8 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns
of Operational Revolution, page 62.
Hopkins University Press, 1978), pages 1372–73.
14 Called a “frame of intervention” in Naveh et al., The Structure of
30 FM 100-5, Operations (20 August 1982), pages 2–3.
Operational Revolution, page 62, and the “Design Concept” in FM
5-0 (Revised Final Draft).

23
 31 FM 100-5, Operations (May 1986), 9-11. The 1986 FM 100-5 47 See Manuel De Landa, A New Philosophy of Society; Assemblage
is also significant for its discussion of campaign planning, Theory and Social Complexity (New York: Continuum, 2006).
which broadened the focus of the manual compared with its two FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft), paragraph 3-72, page 3-11, refers
predecessors, which were almost entirely tactical in focus. to “groupings of actors that exert influence in the operational
32 Krause and Phillips, general editors, Historical Perspectives of the environment, perhaps without even sharing a common goal
among the members.”
Operational Art, pages v, vi.
48 LTG (Ret) John H. Cushman. Fort Leavenworth—A Memoir.
33 Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, Strategy: A Lecture Delivered by Colonel
(Annapolis, MD: Private Printing, September 2001), pages 46-47.
Arthur L. Wagner, Assistant Adjutant-General, U.S.A., to the Officers
of the Regular Army and National Guard at the Maneuvers at West 49 Called Problem Framing in FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft).
Point, Ky., and at Fort Riley, Kansas (Kansas City, MO: Hudson- 50 Called Operations Framing in FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft).
Kimberly Publishing Co., 1904), page 5. Wagner attributed his
definition to the influence of British Major General Edward Bruce 51 FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft), paragraph 3-78.
Hamley’s Operations of War, a didactic text first published in
1864 and remaining in print through the First World War. 52 Referred to by General Naveh at one point in his theory
34 Para 6.1, FM 3-0. Operations (February 2008), page 6-1. development as The Rival as Rationale.
53 General Naveh called this focus area, Command as Rationale.
35 Available on line at http://www.marxists.org/reference/
archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1-12.htm. What 54 General Naveh describes this as “the systemic conditions, means
is particularly interesting is the dialectical relationship between and measures affording reflective learning, critical understanding,
the general and the particular, the laws of war and the laws of and effective execution of the operational framing in the course
revolutionary war conducted in China. Accessed on 17 May 2009. of the campaign.” Briefing Operation Renegade, slide titled
36 Schneider, Structure of Strategic Revolution, page 24. “Hezbollah Directive.”
55 See NSPD 44, Subject: Management of Interagency Efforts
37 Karl R. Popper, “Falsifiability as a Criterion of Demarcation,”
Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, December 7, 2005.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Routledge (Taylor and
Francis Group), 1959, 2002), pages 17–18. 56 Or “making a problem of.” This is the macro-use of the term
38 Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 5, problematization. It is also used below in a micro-sense to
describe the part of the process of discourse where the assertion
Planning (1997), page 3.
of one interlocutor is challenged from another perspective by
39 Department of the Army, Figure 5-1, Battle Command, Field another in order to achieve a more accurate synthesis.
Manual 3-0, Operations, page 5-3. 57 FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft), paragraph 3-89, page 3-13, says,
40 Environmental Framing in FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft). “The problem statement clearly defines the problem or problem
set that commanders must manage or solve.”
41 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Peter Paret and Michael Eliot
58 Called the Operational Approach in FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft).
Howard, trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976),
page 88. 59 Called the Design Concept in FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft).
42 Also referred to as the existing system.
60 FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft), paragraph 3-90, page 3-14, says,
43 Quoted in Adrian R. Lewis, The American Culture of War (New “The operations frame bounds the selection of possible actions
York: Routledge, 2007), page 109. Ridgeway’s remarks, taken as that together lead toward achieving the desired end state.”
a whole, do make a case for design by any means. He goes on 61 Ibid, paragraph 3-92, page 3-14, which defines the operational
to say of the next steps: “Then break it down into workable units.
approach as “a visualization of the broad general actions that will
Establish an organization that will enable each unit to accomplish
produce the conditions that define the desired end state.”
its particular mission. Then try to find good men to fill the key
spots. Give them full authority for individual action, but check 62 The Doolittle raid is one of the examples of creative operational
them relentlessly to see they speed the main job. And if they design used by General Naveh and Dr. Jim Schneider.
don’t produce, fire them.”
63 Bryan Lawson, How Designers Think: The Design Process
44 Tension is defined as “the resistance or friction among and
Demystified (Oxford: Architectural Press, 2006), pages 56–57.
between actors.” FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft), paragraph 3-78,
page 3-12. 64 An observation made by LTG (Ret) Mike Steele to a group
45 Both examples provided by LTG (Ret) Bill Carter. of operational designers at a US Army Training and Doctrine
Command wargame.
46 In their introduction to the anthology, The Making of Strategy, 65 Theory of Action was a term used in an early doctrinal draft, Field
Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley list as critical influences: Manual Interim (FMI) 5-2 Design (DRAFT) (20 February 2009),
geography, history, nature of regime, religion, ideology, culture, page 25. The draft defines the theory of action as “a single logic
economic factors, and organization of government. The Making of that binds together the pattern of actions into a coherent whole.”
Strategy: Rulers, States and War, Williamson Murray, MacGregor The draft combined the theory of action and what came to be
Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, editors. (New York: Cambridge called the Problem Statement, continuing: “The theory of action is
University Press, 1994), pages 7–20. defined as a hypothesis about the nature of the problem together
with a proposed solution.” Here it is used only the latter sense.

24
66 Other governmental agencies and supporting commanders 72 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed.
normally have limits set on their collaboration, either deliberately, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 1970), pages 5-6.
or de facto, by their higher authorities. Most often, the same 73 Donald A. Schön, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals
applies to allied forces under nominal allied command, often
hemmed in by various reservations. Think in Action (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pages 128-133.
67 Called the Design Concept in FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft). 74 This is a paraphrase of Immanuel Kant’s famous “Copernican
move,” which, coincidently (or perhaps not) is referenced by
68 FM 5-0 (Revised Final Draft), paragraphs 3-104 and 3-105, pages Thomas Kuhn. Immanuel Kant, “Preface to the Second Edition,”
3-15 and 3-16, list as minimum content for the Design Concept: Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn Translation, Vasilis Politis,
Narrative and graphics from the design activities; problem editor (London: John Dent, Everyman Edition, 1934, 1991, 1993),
statement; initial commander’s intent; operational approach; and page 15 [Bxv]. Kuhn’s first book was The Copernican Revolution
commander’s initial planning guidance. The planning guidance, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).
it says, “is the commander’s visualization and description of the 75 Schön, Reflective Practitioner, page 130.
desired end state and its implications for future planning. The
planning guidance orients the focus of operations, links desired 76 General Naveh’s formulation of the same process. In this case,
conditions to potential combinations of actions the force may
problematization is used in a micro-sense to mean looking
employ to achieve them. Other information provided in the initial
for flaws in the assertion, that is “making a problem” of the
planning guidance includes information integration, resources,
formulation. The larger sense of the term is explained above in
[and] risk.”
the discussion of the cognitive transition.
69 The term “strength of character” refers deliberately to the
77 See Ronald A. Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers
discussion by Clausewitz in Chapter III of Book I, On War.
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
70 Ronald A. Heifetz and Marty Linsky, Leadership on the Line: 1994), page 128
Staying Alive through the Dangers of Leading (Boston, MA: Harvard 78 Schneider, Structure of Strategic Revolution, pages 50–51, 53.
Business School Press, 2002), pages 51–74.
79 Schilling, The Strategy of Conflict, page 3 (note 1).
71 Phrase used frequently by General Naveh.

25
 About the Author
Dr. Richard Swain ([email protected]), an from Duke University. He is one of the authors of The
Associate at Booz Allen Hamilton, currently supports Armed Forces Officer and he is the author of ‘Lucky
UNIFIED QUEST and instruction in Operational Design. War': Third Army in Desert Storm; “Neither War Nor
Dr. Swain was Director of Fellows at the School for Not War: Army Command in Europe During the Time
Advanced Military Studies from 1994 to 1999, where of Peace Operations; Tasks Confronting USAREUR
he taught courses in ethics, military history, and the Commanders, 1994-2000” (SSI); “AirLand Battle,”
history of military thought. From 2002 to 2007, he Chapter 11 of Camp Colt to Desert Storm; The History
was Professor of Officership at the William E. Simon of US Armored Forces; “Filling the Void: Operational
Center for the Professional Military Ethic at the US Art and the US Army," Chapter 8 in The Operational
Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Swain is a Art: Developments in the Theories of War, and various
1966 graduate of West Point and holds a doctorate articles in journals and reviews.

Contact Information:

Richard Swain Bob Mayes Rolly Dessert
Associate Senior Associate Senior Associate
[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
845/401-9104 913/682-3159 913/680-6571

26
About Booz Allen
Booz Allen Hamilton has been at the forefront of information technology, systems engineering, and
strategy and technology consulting for 95 years. Every program management, Booz Allen is committed to
day, government agencies, institutions, corporations, delivering results that endure.
and not-for-profit organizations rely on the firm’s
With more than 22,000 people and $4.5 billion in
expertise and objectivity, and on the combined
annual revenue, Booz Allen is continually recognized
capabilities and dedication of our exceptional people
for its quality work and corporate culture. In 2009, for
to find solutions and seize opportunities. We combine
the fifth consecutive year, Fortune magazine named
a consultant’s unique problem-solving orientation
Booz Allen one of “The 100 Best Companies to Work
with deep technical knowledge and strong execution
For,” and Working Mother magazine has ranked the
to help clients achieve success in their most critical
firm among its “100 Best Companies for Working
missions. Providing a broad range of services in
Mothers” annually since 1999.
strategy, operations, organization and change,

To learn more about the firm, visit www.boozallen.com.

27
Principal Offices
ALABAMA KANSAS OHIO
Huntsville Leavenworth Dayton
CALIFORNIA MARYLAND PENNSYLVANIA
Los Angeles Aberdeen Philadelphia
San Diego Annapolis Junction
San Francisco Lexington Park SOUTH CAROLINA
COLORADO Linthicum Charleston
Colorado Springs Rockville TEXAS
Denver
MICHIGAN Houston
FLORIDA Troy San Antonio
Pensacola
Sarasota NEBRASKA VIRGINIA
Tampa Omaha Arlington
Chantilly
GEORGIA NEW JERSEY Falls Church
Atlanta Eatontown Herndon
HAWAII McLean
Honolulu NEW YORK Norfolk
Rome Stafford
ILLINOIS
O’Fallon WASHINGTON, DC

The most complete, recent list of offices and their and addresses and telephone numbers can be found on
www.boozallen.com by clicking the “Offices” link under “About Booz Allen.”

www.boozallen.com ©2009 Booz Allen Hamilton Inc.