PROPERTY DIGEST POOL

A.Y. 2021 – 2022

182908
Case Title: HEIRS OF NARVASA, SR. V. IMBORNAL G.R. No:
06 August
Topic: Accession Natural – Alluvium or Alluvion Date:
2014
Tickler: Heirs, motherland, first and second accretion, preferential right of riparian owner
Article 457. "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters."

Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the public
Doctrine/s:
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to
which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the
owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription
by third persons.
FACTS
Case Type: Petition for Review on Certiorari
Basilia Imbornal had 4 children: Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo. Francisco I.
Narvasa, Sr. and Pedro Ferrer were the children of Alejandra, while petitioner Petra
Imbornal was the daughter of Balbina. Petitioners are the heirs and successors-in-
interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra (Francisco, et al.). On the other hand, respondents
Emiliana, Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all surnamed
Imbornal, are the descendants of Pablo.

During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Barangay
Nibaliw West, San Fabian, Pangasinan (Sabangan property), which she conveyed to her
three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in
1920.

Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio, applied for and was granted a
homestead patent over a riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in
San Fabian, Pangasinan. He was eventually awarded Homestead Patent and and
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was issued in his name. The OCT was cancelled,
and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco.
Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the Motherland, while
respondents occupied the southern portion.
General
Facts Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined
the southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15, 1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued
in the name of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First
Accretion. Decades later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307
sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern portion. On November
10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents covering the
Second Accretion.

Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of
Alejandra and Balbina, filed on an Amended Complaint for reconveyance,
partition,and/or damages against respondents. They anchored their claim on the
allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife Catalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra
to sell the Sabangan property, and that Ciriaco used the proceeds therefrom to fund his
then-pending homestead patent application over the Motherland. In return, Ciriaco
agreed that once his homestead patent is approved, he will be deemed to be holding the
Motherland – which now included both accretions – in trust for the Imbornal sisters.

During trial, it was established from the testimonies of the parties that the Motherland
was eventually sold by the Heirs of Ciriaco to a certain Gregorio de Vera (de Vera), and
that said heirs and de Veras were not impleaded as parties in this case.

U.I.O.G.D.

Pool of: Bae, Escarcha, Fernandez, Lapuz, Mariano, Novales, Paghunasan, Tana
 PROPERTY DIGEST POOL
A.Y. 2021 – 2022

1. Through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent

Victoriano, with respect to the First Accretion, and the respondents collectively,
with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the said accretions
in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners
Petitioner’s (as they did not own the Motherland to which the accretions merely formed
Contention adjacent to).
2. Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their inheritance claims over
the Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they respected respondents’
rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have repudiated their
(Francisco, et al.’s) shares thereon
1. Amended Complaint stated no cause of action against them, having failed to
clearly and precisely describe the disputed properties and specify the
transgressions they have allegedly committed; and the action was barred by
prescription;
Respondent’s
2. Properties sought to be reconveyed and partitioned are not the properties of their
Contention
predecessors-in-interest but, instead, are covered by Torrens certificates of
titles, free from any encumbrance, and declared for taxation purposes in their
names.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Francisco, et al. and thereby directed respondents
to reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland and in the
accretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent.

Trial Court’s With respect to the accretions that formed adjacent to the Motherland, the RTC ruled
Decision that the owner of the Motherland is likewise the owner of the said accretions.
Considering that the Imbornal sisters have become proportionate owners of the
Motherland by virtue of the implied trust created between them and Ciriaco, they
(Imbornal sisters) and their heirs are also entitled to the ownership of said accretions
despite the fact that respondents were able to register them in their names.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision and ruled (a) the descendants of Ciriaco as
the exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano
as the exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo as the
exclusive owners of the Second Accretion.

CA ruled that the respondents – i.e., respondent Victoriano with respect to the First
Accretion, and all the respondents withrespect to the Second Accretion – need not be
the owners of the Motherland in order to acquire them by acquisitive prescription.
Considering that accretions are not automatically registered in the name of the riparian
owner and are, therefore, subject to acquisitive prescription by third persons, any
CA’s occupant may apply for their registration. In this case, the CA found that respondents
Decision have acquired title to the subject accretions by prescription, considering that they have
been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the First Accretion in the concept of
an owner since 1949 (when the First Accretion was formed), which resulted in the
issuance of a certificate of title in the name of respondent Victoriano covering the same.
Accordingly, they have also become the riparian owners of the Second Accretion, and
given that they have caused the issuance of OCT No. 21481 in their names over the said
Accretion, they have also become the absolute owners thereof. Since Francisco, et al.
took no action to protect their purported interests over the disputed accretions, the
respondents’ titles over the same had already become indefeasible, to the exclusion of
Francisco, et al

ISSUE/S

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the Motherland and by extension to the First
and Second Accretion. – NO

RULING

U.I.O.G.D.

Pool of: Bae, Escarcha, Fernandez, Lapuz, Mariano, Novales, Paghunasan, Tana
 PROPERTY DIGEST POOL
A.Y. 2021 – 2022

Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters." Relative thereto, in Cantoja v. Lim, the Court, citing paragraph 32 of the
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936, in relation to Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, as well as related jurisprudence on the matter, elucidated on the preferential right of the
riparian owner over the land formed by accretions, viz.: Being the owner of the land adjoining the
foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore
area as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936,
which reads:

32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands
or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given
preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service,
subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within
sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of
his preferential right.

The Court explained in Santulan v. The Executive Secretary [170 Phil. 567; 80 SCRA 548 (1977)] the
reason for such grant of preferential right to the riparian or littoral owner, thus: Now, then, is there any
justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on
his land?

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which
provides that, while lands added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea form part of the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the
sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the established [sic] of special industries,
or for the coast guard service, "shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to
paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.

The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian
owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers
by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the
encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.

Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of
the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which
it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may
be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners, are not the riparian owners
of the Motherland to which the First Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership
over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely attached to the First
Accretion, they also have no right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show that
they acquired these properties through prescription as it was ·not established that they were in possession
of any of them. Therefore, whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the
discernible conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over the First and Second
Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be reconveyed in their
favor. This is especially so since on the other end of the fray lie respondents armed with a certificate of
title in their names covering the First and Second Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both
of which give rise to the superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners' action for
reconveyance with respect to both accretions must altogether fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in are
hereby AFFIRMED, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the Amended Complaint.

U.I.O.G.D.

Pool of: Bae, Escarcha, Fernandez, Lapuz, Mariano, Novales, Paghunasan, Tana