Horace's Satires - A Moral Purpose - A Literary Game - Jerome Kemp

A Moral Purpose, A Literary Game: Horace, "Satires" 1.
4
Author(s): JEROME KEMP
Source: The Classical World, Vol. 104, No. 1 (FALL 2010), pp. 59-76
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press on behalf of the Classical Association of
the Atlantic States
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A Moral Purpose, A Literary Game:
Horace, Satires 1.4
ABSTRACT: In Satires 1.4 we are apparently shown Horace's views on the
purpose of satire and its status as a literary genre. His possible irony and
the extent to which he should be taken at face value (a long-standing source
of debate are) are addressed here with particular reference to Aristotelian
and Philodeman influence. This recently analyzed influence is reappraised
and challenged with regard to its extent and implication. But first I look at
the moral purpose?or otherwise?of Horatian satire as expressed in 1.4.
I. The Moral Purpose of Horatian Satire

Satires 1.4 is the first sustained piece in Horace's oeuvre which
concerns literary theory. In the context of the Satires it is program
matic: Horace sets out his opinions on satire and thus in a sense
suggests to his readers how his satires should be appreciated. In so
doing he colors 1.4 with the subject matter of the previous three
"diatribe" satires (greed, ambition, and excessive, misguided sex)
thus making clear the importance of moral content, as here:
. . . quemvis media elige turba:
aut ob avaritiam aut misera ambitione laborat;
hie nuptarum insanit amoribus, hie puerorum:
hunc capit argenti splendor . . . (1.4.25-28)
Choose anyone you like from the midst of a crowd:
he's oppressed either with avarice or the wretchedness
of ambition; this one's crazy with passion for married
women, this one for boys: this one's a prisoner to the
gleam of silver . .
Doubt, however, has been placed on the seriousness of the
moralizing in the opening satires, almost to the extent that in fact
they serve little moral purpose.2 While the humor of the Satires, or
the mere commonsense value of Horace's hexameters, should not be
discounted in favor of a deliberately philosophical interpretation, the
tendency to play down the philosophical content?regarding it as
decorative or simply part of the joke?is too dismissive.3 It would
1 Translations of Satires 1: P. M. Brown, Horace, Satires I (Warminster 1993).

2 E.g. K. Freudenburg, Satires of Rome: Threatening Poses from Lucilius to
Juvenal (Cambridge 2001) 15-23; W. Turpin, "The Epicurean Parasite: Horace, Satires
1.1-3," Ramus 27.2 (1998) 127-40. In response to Turpin's view that the satirist in
1.1-3 should be regarded as an incompetent Epicurean moralist, deliberately displayed
as such by Horace, see J. E. Kemp, "Irony and Aequabilitas: Horace, Satires 1.3,"
Dictynna 6 (2009) 84-107.
3 See, e.g., on the Epistles: R. G. Mayer ("Horace's Epistles 1 and Philosophy,"
AJP [1986] 55-57), who plays down the philosophical aspects, and C. W. Macleod ("The
Poetry of Ethics: Horace Epistles 1," Collected Essays [Oxford 1983] 280-91), who
regards the Epistles as very much entrenched in ancient ethics. Mayer takes the view
that the Epistles concern good conduct, which need not point to philosophy, whereas
Macleod maintains that in an ancient context good conduct and manners directly relate
59
60 JEROME KEMP
be more accurate to say that the joke, the irony of the satirist's
persona (by turns glib, hypocritical: in 1.2 sexually obsessive and
adulterous [at 1.2.126-34] in 1.3 inconsistent)4 in fact enhances the
philosophical content?to some extent as an ironic living example of
the particular folly under attack. If the philosophical element in the
Satires is largely dismissed because of its lack of seriousness, then
the Satires' irony (and thus piquancy) is also diminished.5
From 1.4.103 to the end Horace describes his satirical method,
underlining the importance of satire's moral function. He shows how
laughing at folly can serve a serious moral purpose, so explaining
the link between satire and ethics. Two examples follow depicting
his father giving advice through the observation of people's folly. The
first involves the vice of prodigality, brought up previously in Satires
1.2.7-11, and, in terms of the resultant Epicurean advice (as presented
by Horace) of living within one's means, in Satires 1.1 and 1.2 more
generally;6 the second brings to mind Horace's own advice in 1.2:
... a turpi meretricis amore
cum deterreret, "Scetani dissimilis sis":
ne sequerer moechas concessa cum Venere uti
possem, "deprensi non bella est fama Treboni". . . .
(111-114)
when he was warning me against a shameful passion
for a prostitute, "Don't copy Scetanus," or against
chasing after adulterous wives when I could indulge
in a permissible liaison, "Trebonius was caught in the
act and you wouldn't want his reputation."7
to ethics. Mayer ("Sleeping with the Enemy: Philosophy and Satire," in K. Freudenburg,
ed., The Cambridge Companion to Roman Satire [Cambridge 2005] 146-59) again
inclines to discount the importance of the philosophical content in Horace's Satires.
Rudd ("Horace as Moralist," in N. Rudd, ed., Horace 2000: A Celebration: Essays for
the Bimillenium [London 1993] 64-88), takes a similar line to Mayer with regard to
philosophical material in Horace, somewhat modifying his position from 1966. As to
the claim that the Epistles are about life, not philosophy, J. Moles ("Poetry, philosophy,
politics and play. Epistles 1," in A. Woodman and D. Feeney, eds., Traditions and
Contexts in the Poetry of Horace, (Cambridge 2002) 141-57), essentially in agreement
with Macleod, rightly says: "The dichotomy is false. The Epistles are recte vivere as
interpreted by different philosophies" (149). See D. Fowler, "Lectures on Horace's
Epistles;' PCPS (2008) 99-102. J. Moles ("Philosophy and Ethics," in S. Harrison, ed.,
The Cambridge Companion to Horace [Cambridge 2007] 165-80), further explains the
significance of the philosophical content in Horace's works.
4 On the ironic inconsistency of the narrator in Sat. 1.3, see Kemp (above, n.2).
5 See Fowler (above, n.3) 101, on Horace's ironic, changeable philosophical
positioning, and underlying philosophical seriousness in Epist. 1.
6 . . . intra/naturae finis viventi (1.49-50). This suggests, in Epicurean terms,
living according to the fulfilment of desires that are natural and necessary, or merely
natural: Ep. Men. 127.
7 As Brown (above, n.l) 137 rightly notes, his father does not disapprove of
his son using a prostitute, but of his shameful passion (1.4.111). This distinction is
further reinforced by the fact that in his warning against the pursuit of married
women, he suggests seeking gratification that would be permissible, and which could
reasonably include (as in 1.2) a meretrix.
A MORAL PURPOSE, A LITERARY GAME: HORACE, SATIRES 1.4 61
But more importantly his father's explanation for his advisory

observations at 115-120 is a reflection of Horace's explanation for
his satirical method: its underlying moral purpose. It is summed up
at 115-116 (sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu/sit melius, causas reddet
tibi, "a philosopher will give you theories as to what it's better to
avoid and to pursue") in terms reminiscent of 1.2.74-76 and 1.3.114,
where Horace advises, through observation, what should be sought
and what avoided within a noticeably Epicurean framework.8 Indeed,
in quoting his father as referring to what a sapiens advises (and thus
what Horace's father advises by example), Horace is deliberately
indicating that his father's instruction, even if in an apparently in
cidental way, would be similar to that of a philosopher.9
In fact, Leach has noted that in the passage 105-126 Horace
may also have in mind Terence's portrayal of a father at Adelphoe
414-19,10 thus making a comic reference, which is in keeping with
Horace's claim as to the link between satire and comedy at the
start of the poem; and although this may to some extent ironically
deflect the reader from the serious moral tone, it again exemplifies
Horace's wish to speak the truth with a laugh (quamquam ridentem
dicere verum /quid vetat 1.24-25): the underlying moral seriousness
of the passage remains.11 From 129 to the end, Horace then goes on
to testify personally to the beneficial effects of his father's methods
of moral guidance through observation, as well as of being open to
criticism of one's own faults from a liber amicus (132): through his
satire Horace would thus hope that he himself is a liber amicus?
particularly given that initially at least his Satires were intended to
be read in private, to his friends (73-74).12
8 See Epicurus Ep. Men. 128; RS 15, 21. Although the context here points to
Epicureanism, the notion of choice and avoidance also appears in Aristotle (Top.
5.6. 135M5, De motu an. 8. 701b34, Eth. Nic. 3.12 1119a22, Rh. 1.5 1360b5), and
Stoicism (SVF 3.24, 62, 88, 118, 262).
9 The thought here is very similar, in fact, to one expressed in Rep. (1.2),
where Cicero maintains that one can come to the same ethical conclusions, through
practical (non-theoretical) experience, as philosophers do through theoretical argu
ment. Horace is also highlighting the notion of Roman wisdom passed down through
the generations (116-117)?as he does in Sat. 2.2, when relating Ofellus' precepts.
10 E. W. Leach, "Horace's Pater Optimus and Terence's Demea: autobiographical
fiction and comedy in Serm. 1.4," AJP (1971) 616-32.
11 A. Cucchiarielli (La Satira e il Poeta: Orazio tra Epodi e Sermones [Pisa
2001]) recognizes the parallel with Terence, though rightly does not regard this as
necessarily undermining the passage's serious moral purpose (109, n.88). See also
W. S. Anderson, Essays on Roman Satire (Princeton 1982) 53-56, and D. Armstrong
Horace (New Haven 1989) 2-4.
12 R. L. Hunter ("Horace on Friendship and Free Speech," Hermes 113 [1985]
480-90) sees liber amicus as suggestive of the Epicurean and in particular Philode
man practice of frank speech?naQQûia?which Philodemus discusses (in On Frank
Speech and On Flattery) in relation to amicitia. For example: "Let us make it clear to
them that the goods of friendship are very durable and that flattery is the antagonist
of friendship; let us also consider well the goods that arise from frank speech, both
directed towards one's intimate associates and directed towards all men, and let us
avoid as vain the company of adulators, and still more let us not mix with them but
seek the fellowship of those who speak candidly." PHerc. 1082 (col.2.1-14), which
62 Jerome Kemp
F. Muecke draws a comparison between Horace's description

of his father's moral teaching (and thus his own method of satire)
and ethologia, a method of teaching through the observation of
examples, as mentioned by Seneca (Ep. 95. 65-66) in connection
with the Stoic Posidonius.13 In this context one could also regard
the character sketch of the pest in 1.9 and the immoderate, incon
sistent singer Tigellius at 1.3.3-19 as examples of ethologia; indeed
Seneca himself quotes Horace's depiction of Tigellius (1.3.11-17)
in Epistle 120.20-21, which he concludes on the theme of aequali
tas.14 Ethologia can also be seen as very much in the tradition of
the character sketches of Aristotle and Theophrastus (in Eth. Nic.
4 and Theophr. Char), which were clearly intended to be morally
instructive. Indeed the use of exempla for generally moral purposes
featured widely in literature and historiography as, for example, in
the works of Horace's near contemporary, Livy (in his preface Livy
points to the early Romans as examples of good moral conduct). So
it seems unlikely that Horace's use of moral exempla is necessar
ily a reflection of a specifically Posidonian influence?rather, that
Posidonius was aware of the instructive potential of characterization.
Seneca's discussion of ethologia also shows that characterization for
moral purposes in literature generally would have been associated
with ethics by Horace's readership, as philosophical discussions of
Homer demonstrate.15
C. Schlegel regards Horace's depiction of his father as moral
guide, and in a sense the reason for his writing satire, as a way
of saying that his father is a more important influence for Horace,
the satirist, than Lucilius, who, as satire's inventor (Sat. 1.10.48) is
Horace's literary model.16 Schlegel maintains that this siding with his
father rather than Lucilius is strongly suggested by Horace's apparent
distancing of himself from Lucilius in 1.4.17 Certainly the stress on
moral exempla and the use of his father as a sort of moral guide,
underlines Horace's own satirical agenda, but it must be noted that in
Satires 2.1 (at 24-42) Horace defends his satire, on moral grounds,
is from On Flattery, translation: C. E. Glad, Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in

Epicurean and Christian Psychagogy (Leiden and New York, 1995) 109.
13 F. Muecke, "Horace the Satirist: form and method in Satires 1.4," Prudentia
11 (1979) 66.
14 Seneca goes on to give examples of ethologia from poetry (Verg. G. 2.77-81)
and, historically, in the exemplum of Cato (Ep. 95.68-73), so relating exempla in
literature generally to ethics and implying that Posidonius' own historical work
was ethologia: L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd, eds., Posidonius. Vol.2, Commentary
(Cambridge and New York, 1989) 651.
15 The Stoics on Homer: Balbus' account in Cic. Nat. D. 2.63-72; Plut. De plac.
phil. 879c-880d (D. M. Schenkeveld, "Language," in K. Algra et al., eds, The Cam
bridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy [Cambridge 1999] 222, n.270). Philodemus
discusses Homer in terms of moral relevance in B. Horn.
16 C. Schlegel, Satire and the Threat of Speech: Horace's Satires, Book 1
(Madison and London, 2005) 38-51.
17 Schlegel (above, n.16) 49-51.
on the basis of his continuing the Lucilian tradition. It is Lucilius'

style, in particular, that Horace criticizes, not his content, of which
his humor and moral aspect are a part: at 1.4.9-11 Horace criticizes
Lucilius' style but he also grants that he was witty and observant:
facetus,/emunctae naris (1.4.7-8 and again at 1.10.3-4, 64-67).18 In
fact, Horace is explicit in his approval of Lucilius' moral content
as effected by his libertas?outspokenness?at the beginning of the
satire, in that it was aimed at anyone who deserved (dignus) such
ridicule.19 Nevertheless, it could be inferred from Horace's criti
cism of Lucilius' style?in his lack of restraint in versifying itself
(9-11)?that Horace may have felt Lucilius' libertas also lacked
restraint. Indeed, E. Gowers sees the depiction of the awful dinner
guest described at 83-89 as an example of flawed, Lucilian libertas.20
But when Horace claims he is nothing like the type at 83-89 (and
also that he should not be accused of being like the type depicted at
34-38, as discussed below), in 1.4 Horace is defending the genuine
satirist, and therefore Lucilius as well as himself.21 Even though
Horace's employment of libertas is more restrained than that of his
literary precursor, he is, in principle, a firm supporter of Lucilian
libertas.22 Horace sees Lucilius and his father as allied to the same
moral cause; this is clear in 2.1, and is indeed suggested at 1.4.7-8
in his appreciation of Lucilius' observational humor.
18 E. Oliensis (Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority [Cambridge 1998] 40),

rightly sees Horace as critical of Lucilius but for the most part respectful. C. A. Van
Rooy ("Arrangement and Structure of Satires in Horace, Sermones Book 1, with more
special reference to Satires 1.4," AC 11 [1968] 61-71) discusses Horace's balancing
of Lucilius' virtues (content) against his vices (style). Also, on Horace's views of
Lucilian satire in terms of style and content, see S. Oberhelman and D. Armstrong,
"Satire as Poetry and the Impossibility of Metathesis in Horace's Satires;' in D.
Obbink, ed., Philodemus and Poetry (Oxford 1995) 239.
19 Van Rooy (above, n.18) 61.
20 E. Gowers, The Loaded Table (Oxford 1993) 127.
21 C. O. Brink, Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles (Cam
bridge 1963) 157; N. Rudd, The Satires of Horace (Cambridge 1966) 89; Muecke
(above, n.13) 57. Also, I do not agree with the view that Horace is criticising Lu
cilius for his propensity towards invective at 1.10.11-15: et sermone opus est modo
tristi, saepe iocoso, /defendente vicem modo rhetoris atque poetae, /interdum urbani,
parcentis viribus atque/extenuantis eas consulto. ridiculum acri/fortius et melius
magnas plerumque secat res ("And a style is needed that is sometimes stern, often
playful, maintaining the part now of the orator and poet, sometimes of the civilized
individual who reserves his strength and deliberately underplays it. Humor decides
great issues more forcefully and more effectively than severity"). K. Freudenburg,
The Walking Muse: Horace on the Theory of Satire (Princeton 1993) 102, rightly
makes the point that this passage is dealing with poetic style rather than invective
versus innuendo. Also, it seems that at 1.10.11-15 Horace is making general points
as to what he regards as good style in writing satire, and that these points are no
longer specifically made with reference to Lucilius.
22 As C. A. Van Rooy (Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory
[Leiden 1966] 62) notes, the difference between Horace and Lucilius in terms of
libertas was one of degree only: while Lucilius wrote cum multa libertate (1.4.5)
Horace's satire is liberius (103). See further, below, part 2.
64 Jerome Kemp
II. Satire and Its Moral Constraints
The moral function of Horatian satire is not only in keeping with
Horace's praise of his father (even if ironically tempered by the nod
to New Comedy) as one who observed social behavior and from this
drew moral lessons, but it is also in keeping with the practice in
Old Comedy, and Lucilius, of lampooning certain individuals whose
behavior warrants such ridicule, as put in the opening lines:
Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae,
atque alii quorum comoedia prisca virorum est,
si quis erat dignus describi quod malus ac fur,
quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui
famosus, multa cum libertate notabant.
hinc omnis pendet Lucilius . . . (1.4.1-6)
The poets Eupolis, Cratinus and Aristophanes, and
other exponents of Old Comedy, had this habit: if
anyone deserved to be noted down for being a villain
and a thief, for being an adulterer or an assassin or
otherwise infamous, they would show great freedom
of speech in branding him. On them Lucilius depends
totally. . . .
However, later on at 1.4.34-38 Horace depicts the satirist (and
thus himself) being criticized for going too far for the sake of a laugh:
perhaps this kind of humor is not always warranted. In response to
this Horace puts forward his views regarding the appropriate use of
humor in an ethical light. The depiction of the humorist at 34-38
(that Horace might be accused of being) in fact appears to represent
just what Horace would disapprove of?the implication being that
Horace is certainly nothing like the type thus described:
. . . dummodo risum
excutiat, sibi non, non cuiquam parcet amico;
et quodcumque semel chartis illeverit, omnis
gestiet a furno redeuntis scire lacuque,
et pueros et anus. (1.4.34-38)
As long as he extracts a laugh, he won't spare himself,
he won't spare any friend; and whatever he's once
scrawled on his pages he'll be itching for everyone
to know as they return from the bakehouse and the
water tank, both slave-boys and old women.
As G. L. Hendrickson first noted, this appears to be an ad
of a view found in Aristotle's portrait of the (3o)u6Aoxog, buff
in Nicomachean Ethics 1128a4-7:23
23 G. L. Hendrickson, "Horace, Serm. 1.4: a Protest and a Programme,"

(1900) 121-24; G. C. Fiske, Lucilius and Horace (Madison 1920) 278; and
(above, n.13) 66.
a Moral Purpose, a Literary Game: Horace, Satires 1.4 65
ol [xkv ouv to) yeAoiCf) U7i?q|3dAAovT?<; |3a)|aoA6xoi
Sokouctiv eivai Kal cpoQTiKoi, yAixoLievoi navTcog
tou yeAolou, Kal LidAAov axoxctCoLievoL tou yeAcoxa
7ioLfjaaL f] tou Aeyeiv euoxnôva Kal far] AutceIv tov
aKuj7ix6|Li?vov. (1128a4-7)
Those then who go to excess in ridicule are thoug
to be buffoons and vulgar fellows, who itch to ha
their joke at all costs, and are more concerned to rai
a laugh than to keep within the bounds of decoru
and avoid giving pain to the object of their raillery.
This characterization of |3a)|aoAoxux or scurrilitas?o
who knows no bounds in his quest for laughs?may well
from the Peripatetics to Panaetius,25 in that it appears in
In fact, the depiction of someone laughing behind someon
Off. 1.134 is similar to Horace's depiction at 1.4.81-89 of
"humorist" he advises people to be wary of?rather than
satirist, like himself: absentem qui rodit amicum, qui n
culpante ("The man who disparages a friend behind hi
fails to defend him against someone else's criticisms,"
tu, Romane, caveto ("Of him, true Roman, pray bewar
From these Ciceronian parallels, it is likely that suc
appropriateness and limits in humor draw from a traditio
to Aristotle's criticisms of |3a)|aoAoxux in Nicomachean Et
The role of the satirist thus concerns matters of conduct
to ethics. And this is enhanced by the fact that the sat
ticular Horace?regards moral instruction as part of satire's
If Horace (or any other satirist for that matter) takes it u
to lampoon others' behavior on ethical grounds, then he
care that in doing so he himself is not exceeding the li
mined by reasonable conduct.
There is a tension, however, in Horace's position.
Aristotelian theory this kind of low humor (pcojaoAox
34-38 and 83-89, is aligned with the kind found in Old
opposed to the subtler brand of humor found in the Ne
Nicomachean Ethics 1128a20-24:
24 Translation: H. Rackham, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Lon

York, 1926, reprinted 1962).
25 Fiske (above, n.23) 278.
26 Off 1.134: In primisque provideat ne sermo vitium aliquod i
in moribus; quod maxime turn solet evenire, cum studiose de absentib
causa aut per ridiculum aut severe, maledice contumelioseque dicit
take care above all that his speech does not reveal that there is som
behavior; in general that happens particularly when someone speak
ately about people who are absent in an abusive or insulting mann
disparage them, whether he does so to raise a laugh or with severity
E. M. Atkins and M. T. Griffin, trs. and eds., Cicero: On Duties [Cam
Again, in De. or. (2.247) Cicero distinguishes between the scurra an
Muecke (above, n.13) 63.
66 Jerome Kemp
l&oi b' dv xig Kai ck xdrv kwuco&lcov xoov 7iaAaicov Kal
xdrv Kaivcov- xoig uev ydp f]v yeAolov r] alaxQoAoyia,
xoic; be udAAov rj u7i6voia- biacpeqei b' ou uikqov
xauxa tcqoc; ?uaxr)uoauvnv.
And one can see [the difference] in the case of com
edies, the old and the new. For in the case of old
comedies, obscenity was a source of laughter, while
for the new it is, rather, innuendo. These things differ
greatly in regard to suitable behavior.27
And Horace, having begun the satire by implicitly siding himself,
and explicitly Lucilius, with libertas?outspokenness, and the comic
tradition that goes back to Eupolis, Cratinus, and Aristophanes28?
then goes on to put scurrilitas/|3couoAoxux, (which Aristotle sees as
a trait of Old Comedy) in an unfavorable light.
Since support of libertas and Old Comedy on the one hand, and
the disapproval of it, via Aristotle's views on pcouoAoxux represented
at 1.4.34-38 and 81-89, on the other, appears to be an inconsistent
position, Hendrickson argued that Horace was actually distancing
himself from this comic tradition, and thus also from the satire of
Lucilius.29 Hendrickson regarded Horace's alignment of Lucilius with
Old Comedy in the opening lines as suggesting that Lucilius' brand
of humor was closer to that of the scurra or pcouoAoxog, in line with
Nicomachean Ethics 1128a. But while Lucilian humor was certainly
less subtle and more flagrantly critical of individuals, it does not
necessarily follow that Horace wholeheartedly sees Old Comedy and
Lucilian satire under the same umbrella as pcouoAoxia; the paral
lels drawn between Horace's depictions at 1.4.34-38 and 81-89 and
those found in Aristotle and Cicero are certainly convincing, but
need it automatically follow that Horace would adhere to Aristote
lian theory quite that assiduously? In fact, Freudenburg has accepted
the interpretation that Horace adopts an Aristotelian view regarding
the practice of comedy, but has also rightly maintained that Horace
remains loyal to the tradition of Lucilian humor and Old Comedy.30
Freudenburg looks into these two opposing theories regard
ing comedy: the Peripatetic (represented by New Comedy) and?as
Freudenburg puts it?the iambographic, (from Lau|3iCto, to lampoon,
rather than necessarily denoting metrical form) represented by Old
Comedy31?and notes that the latter, through its continuation in
27 Translation: Freudenburg (above, n.21) 66-67; obscenity, alaxpoAoyia, in this

context clearly is aligned with the humor of |3co|aoAoxux.
28 Even if the claim that Lucilius was wholly dependent on Old Comedy is
clearly a generalization, see Rudd (above, n.21) 89 and D. R. Shackleton Bailey, A
Profile of Horace (London 1982) 27.
29 Hendrickson (above, n.23) 121-42; see also Fiske (above, n.24) 277-306 and
R Lejay, Oeuvres d'Horace (Paris 1911, reprinted Hildesheim 1966) xlvii-1.
30 Freudenburg (above, n.21) 52-108; see Hunter (above, n.12) 480-90.
31 Freudenburg (above, n.21) 78 notes that Horace's identification with the tra
dition of invective rather than the Aristotelian is further evidenced in his Epodes
6.11-16; also, retrospectively, Epist. 1.19.21-25. Hendrickson's argument (above, n.23,
Iambic poetry, and the Cynics and the diatribe, would have been a
recognized rival to Aristotelian theory in the Hellenistic period and
up until Horace's time.32 Thus the idea that the allusion to Aristote
lian theory on (3co[aoAoxia shows an absolute adherence to it starts to
become questionable: Horace sees value in both comedic approaches.
Freudenburg maintains that Horace takes on both traditions and thus
makes "a unique contribution to ancient theories of poetic libertas"
even though the combination of these traditions?because they ought
to be irreconcilable?is "impossible and absurd."33 Although he argues
convincingly for the existence of this hybrid, Horatian theory, the
interrelation between its two antithetical, constituent parts?as put
into practice in Horatian satire?is not fully explained.
The key to this interrelation is indicated at the start of the poem:
that those who are liable to outspoken criticism from the Old Comic
poets are wrongdoers; lampooning those who deserve such treatment
is justified (a point Horace discusses with regard to himself and Lu
cilius at 2.1.24-42). But to lampoon the undeserving, and to do so
merely for the sake of a laugh (that is, without any moral purpose)
is clearly wrong, as exemplified in the two recognizably Aristotelian/
Ciceronian depictions of (3co|aoAoxia at 1.4.34-38 and 81-89. Freud
enburg considers the moral justification and function in the tradition
of Old Comedy and lampoon to show that it can be recognized as a
rival to Aristotelian theory;34 but the important point here is that it is
this moral function, in terms of its practical application to Horatian
satire, which affords its compatibility with Aristotelian theory: it is
the moral function of satire, the major theme of 1.4, as personally
experienced by the satirist himself (first through his father, then
through his liberi amici, and indeed himself [131-138]), which enables
Horace to use lampoon correctly, appropriately within Aristotelian
limits. Clearly, the tradition of invective practiced in Old Comedy
and continued through the Cynics would be theoretically more suited
to satire than the gentler, more impersonal approach propounded by
Aristotle. Horace therefore uses Aristotelian theory to set ethical
limits to a form of comedy which, in its very essence, is opposed to
such Aristotelian theory. This conflict is deliberate: on the one hand
satire has to exercise libertas to be effective, but when the use of
such libertas concerns moral advice and reproof, then it must itself
be subjected to moral constraints, and this is indicated by Horace's
application of Aristotelian theory. Thus these two theoretically ir
reconcilable traditions can, in the practical context of Horatian satire,
121-41) that 1.4 is programmatic, in that from then on Horace abandons Lucilian
invective and the tradition of Old Comedy for a gentler Aristotelian approach, could
to some extent still stand, bearing in mind the fact that the Epodes were likely to
have been composed before 1.4. But to reject the tradition of Old Comedy totally,
in favor of the Peripatetic theory and New Comedy, given the Epodes and Sat. 1.2,
seems to be an unlikely (and very obliquely implied) U-turn. Also, at 1.10.16-17,
Horace openly praises Old Comedy.
32 Freudenburg (above, n.21) 72-86.
68 JEROME KEMP
function and interact side by side. The apparent inconsistency here

certainly complements the mishmash nature of the satire form; but
Horace's position is understandable enough: he is telling us that he
is aware of both positions and his aim is to steer a path adhering
to both, without being too extreme or partisan in either direction.
III. Is Satire Poetry?

Just as Horace draws from the traditions of Old Comedy and
Aristotle in order to direct the tone?to define the libertas?of his
satire, so he draws from literary theorists to address the other main
concern of 1.4: the literary status of Horatian satire. In fact it is
with reference to satire's moral function that Horace introduces this
literary discussion. In response to the complaints (imagined or real)35
of those who dislike poets for exposing their folly, Horace claims
that he should not be liable to such complaints, because he does not
regard himself as a poet. The passage begins:
primum ego me illorum, dederim quibus esse poetis,
excerpam numero: neque enim concludere versum
dixeris esse satis; neque si qui scribat uti nos
sermoni propiora, putes hunc esse poetam.
ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinior atque os
magna sonaturum, des nominis huius honorem.
(39-44)
First, I wouldn't include myself amongst those I'd
recognise as poets, because you wouldn't say it's
enough to turn out a metrical line, nor, supposing
someone wrote, like me, what's pretty near conver
sational prose, would you think him a poet. Someone
with genius, with inspiration, and a voice capable of
a mighty resonance, is the one you'd dignify with
this title.
Most commentators36 have taken 1.4.39-62 more or less at face value:
while Horace's claim not to be a poet (with regard to the Satires) is
perhaps, in one way, ironically self-deprecating, in another it is nev
ertheless clear that he is not an epic poet or tragedian, and indeed he
has not yet taken up the lyric form: it could be fair to take Horace
35 Hendrickson (above, n.23) 121-42, G. Williams (Horace: Greece and Rome,

New Surveys in the Classics 6 [Oxford 1972] 15-16), and Oberhelman and Armstrong
(above, n.18) 237, regard the apparent attack against Horace for malevolence as a
fictitious device to facilitate his own argument. Rudd ("Had Horace Been Criticised?"
AJP [1955] 165-75) regards this as a response to actual criticism. More appealing
is the stance of Brink (above, n.21) 157 n.l, who suggests that Horace may in part
be reacting to actual criticism, but the poet's analysis and defence of his own work
should nevertheless be considered in its own right, regardless of whether or not it
is a response to criticism.
36 E.g. Brink (above, n.21) 162-63; G. M. A. Grube, Greek and Roman Critics
(Toronto 1968) 232; E. Fraenkel, Horace (Oxford 1957) 126-27; Rudd (above, n.21)
92; Brown (above, n.l) 130-31.
a Moral Purpose, a literary Game: Horace, Satires l .4 69
here as simply pointing out generic differences within poetry.37 There
have recently been, however, two studies?by Oberhelman and Arm
strong, and by Freudenburg38?which interpret the passage 1.39-62
as strongly indicating that Horace does in fact regard his satire as
true poetry (iustum . . . poema, 63), and both studies refer to liter
ary theory, in Aristotle and Philodemus, to support their arguments.
Perhaps not surprisingly the introduction to the discussion of the
literary/poetic status of satire is illogical. In response to the state
ment "all these fear verses and hate poets" (omnes hi metuunt versus,
odere poetas, 33), Horace claims, illogically, that he is exempt from
such hatred because he is not a poet: all those who hate poets do
not, in fact, hate poets as Horace apparently understands the term;
they hate satirists. And Horace certainly is a satirist.39
This illogical basis to his line of defense should perhaps warn
the reader of the doubtful seriousness and rationale behind Horace's
apparent claims about the literary status of his own satire. Ober
helman and Armstrong make the fair point at the outset that one
should be guarded in taking Horace at face value.40 They then go on
to draw attention to the fact that in the opening lines of the satire
Horace labels Eupolis, Cratinus, and Aristophanes as poets, so as
to strengthen their argument that Horace would thus (in belonging
to this comedy/satire tradition) see himself as a poet; and again, at
the end of the poem, Horace refers to himself as one of the manus
poetarum (141).41
But why should one take the opening lines, or line 140-41, at
their surface level, though not the discussion (some twenty-three lines)
at 39-62? Indeed, simply following the run of the satire, it seems
that Horace refers to Aristophanes et al. as poets at the beginning,
since that is how they would have been generally regarded, but then
questions labeling them (and himself) as such later on, when he can
address the question both in more detail and in a broader context.
Indeed, it could be that Horace deliberately refers to the writers of
Old Comedy as poets at the beginning almost to prompt the discus
sion of considering their status as such at 45-62. And again, at the
end of the satire, when Horace refers to himself as one of the "band
of poets," it may be reasonable to regard this as Horace again us
ing the word poeta in its broadest sense?that is, bearing in mind
the preceding discussion from 39-62 which, for the time being, has
been deferred:
37 So Brown (above, n.l) 131: "The real object of the passage is to distinguish
between grand poetry, like epic, and less elevated poetry, like comedy and satire."
38 Freudenburg (above, n.21) 119-28; Oberhelman and Armstrong (above, n.18)
233-54.
39 Fraenkel (above, n.36) 127 comments, "This whole section is clearly marked
as a digression." C. Schlegel ("Horace and his Fathers: Satires 1.4 and 1.6," AJP 121
[2000] 97) and Freudenburg (above, n.21) 119 comment on the illogicality.
40 Oberhelman and Armstrong (above, n.l8) 235.
41 Oberhelman and Armstrong (above, n.l8) 239.
70 JEROME KEMP
hactenus haec: alias iustum sit necne poema,

nunc illud tantum quaeram, meritone tibi sit
suspectum genus hoc scribendi.
(1.4.63-65)
So much for these questions: whether this type of
writing is proper poetry or not I'll ask on another
occasion, and confine myself for now to whether your
suspicions of it are justified.
Also, the word poetarum in line 141 is not applied specifically, but
generally: Horace is including himself in the group of prominent liter
ary artists of the day, who?by general reckoning?would have been
regarded as poetae. And indeed this comes directly after his referring
(albeit somewhat ironically) to his habit of writing satire as one of
his minor vices: hoc est mediocribus Mis/ex vitiis unum (139-40).
Oberhelman and Armstrong go on to argue that Horace, in his me
ticulous use of word order, is very much affirming that his satire is
true poetry, and this would have been recognized by his readers?
particularly, as we will see, in the context of Philodeman literary
theory.42 They show that Horace's surface argument, that word order
need not always be important for true poetry, is ironically opposed
by the careful arrangement of words in this very passage (39-62).
They note, for example, the alliteration at the end of line 46 (acer
spiritus ac vis), which would obviously be ruined by rearranging
the words.43 They also cite the elision of primum into ego and me
into illorum (line 39) which, for them, strongly implies that Horace
(me) is one of the poets (illorum) he claims, on the surface, not to
be.44 The implications of Horace's skillful word placement, given its
effect on the sound and meaning in these very lines, would seem to
be ironically at odds with what he says at 56b-62: that word order
is not necessarily an important characteristic of poetry:
. . . his, ego quae nunc,
olim quae scripsit Lucilius, eripias si
tempora certa modosque et quod prius ordine verbum est
posterius facias, praeponens ultima primis,
non, ut si solvas "postquam Discordia taetra
Belli ferratos postis portasque refregit,"
invenias etiam disiecti membra poetae.
(1.4.56b-62)
With these verses which I'm writing now or which
Lucilius wrote before me, if you stripped away the
42 Oberhelman and Armstrong (above, n.18) 240-44; they also note the subjunc
tives dixeris, putes, des, and excerpam (1.4.39-42), which could suggest that these
statements here ought to be taken as theoretical and not necessarily representing
Horace's real view.
43 Oberhelman and Armstrong (above, n.18) 242.
A Moral Purpose, A Literary Game: Horace, Satires 1.4 71
pattern of the quantities and rhythm and put the
earlier words later, interchanging first and last, you
wouldn't find?as you would if you broke up "when
once dread Discord broke open War's iron-clad posts
and portals"?the limbs of even a dismembered poet.
It is notable, however, that Anderson (to whom Oberhelman and
Armstrong refer) has suggested that the elisions in line 39 are de
liberately awkward?the satirist (me) being as it were drowned out
by the epic poets (illorum)?and in fact serve to imply Horace's
relative inferiority.45 So the virtuosity of Horace's word placement
may rather be a means to enhancing his somewhat self-deprecating
surface argument.
The consequent claim that the Ennius quotation at 60-62 fur
ther backs up the implied undercutting meaning of the elisions (as
Oberhelman and Armstrong interpret them) and that the underlying
implication in these lines is that word order is important for good
poetry is also questionable. They suggest that the Ennius quotation
is not really notably "poetic": "There is not a single 'poetic' word
in the quotation, while the word order is that of standard Ciceronian
prose!"46 According to the surface argument, however, the regularity
or otherwise of the word order is not what makes these lines of En
nius poetry. The quotation is, surely, poetic because it is a striking
metaphorical allusion, Belli ferratos postis portasque refregit allud
ing to the custom that the temple of Janus was opened at times of
war.47 So in fact the allusion would have had a particular resonance
for a Roman readership; indeed Vergil thought it striking enough to
borrow at Aeneid 7.622.48 In its power and simplicity it stands (in the
run of the narrative) as an example of Ennius' ingenium, his mens
divinior, and the potency of the metaphor will more or less remain
whatever the word order. Therefore, the implication of the Ennius
quotation can in fact be seen as support for Horace's surface argument
and adds weight to W. S. Anderson's interpretation of the elisions
at the beginning of the passage, rather than that of Oberhelman
and Armstrong. Certainly, we can accept that Horace's adept word
placement raises questions in the passage 39-62, but in assessing
the implications of this it may be that Oberhelman and Armstrong
have attempted to define the purpose of Horace's irony too exactly.49
Oberhelman and Armstrong then set these observations on Hor
ace's word order in the context of Philodeman literary theory?in
particular Philodemus' views on poetry and matathesis. Metathesis
(the rearrangement of words) as a method of poetic criticism was
a way of assessing style: the way in which (and extent to which)
45 Anderson (above, n.ll) 24-25.

47 O. Skutsch, The Annals of Q. Ennius (Oxford 1985) 402.
48 Brown (above, n.l) 132.
49 On the evasiveness of Horace's position in the Satires, see J. E. G. Zetzel,
"Horace's Liber Sermonum: The Structure of Ambiguity," Arethusa 13.1 (1980) 71.
72 JEROME KEMP
after a rearrangement of words poetry is made inferior in terms of

its sound and rhythm.50 Philodemus was critical of this method of
poetic criticism in its analysis of style alone, because for him style
and content are inseparable51?a view which Horace seems to imply
at Ars Poetica 38-47:52 a poetic composition can only be assessed
as a whole.
For Philodemus metathesis of good poetry?as a way of judging
style?was impossible because a change in style would also affect
the content: if the original is good poetry, it will always be made
inferior by metathesis; even if the new arrangement of words does not
appear to have damaged the verses' rhythm and sound, the content,
the thought, will always be altered.53
Thus, in a passage which concerns word order, Horace's word
placement can be seen to imply his poetic proficiency: if Horace's
words were rearranged, the quality (both the style and content/mean
ing) would be damaged, which, according to Philodeman theory,
indicates that Horatian satire is very much true poetry. And indeed
the fact that metathesis would have a less damaging effect on the
verses of Ennius would indicate that as real poetry they are inferior
to those of Horace.54 Although it certainly seems likely that Horace
is ironically showing his awareness of?indeed applying?Philode
man theory here, as we have seen, this theory is perhaps also being
genuinely challenged?not just by the surface argument but by the
resonance of Ennius' metaphor.55
50 D. Armstrong, "The Impossibility of Metathesis: Philodemus and Lucretius

on Form and Content in Poetry," in D. Obbink, ed., Philodemus and Poetry (Oxford
1995) 221.
51 Col. xii.1-17, C. Jensen, Philodemus: Epigrammata, Liber 5 (Berlin 1923);
Freudenburg (above, n.21) 141; col. x.32-11.2, Oberhelman and Armstrong (above,
n.18) 218-19; Brink (above, n.21) 57-58.
52 Horace certainly regards style and content as, in practice, very much en
twined at Ars Poetica 38-47a. Here he begins by talking about subject matter:
sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, aequam viribus ("Take a subject, those of you
who write, equal to your strength"). Translations of Ars Poetica: H. R. Fairclough,
Horace: Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica (Cambridge, Mass.; London 1926, reprinted
1970). And then, at 40: . . . cui lecta potenter erit res, nec facundia deseret hunc
nec lucidus ordo ("Whoever will choose a theme within his range, neither speech
will fail him, nor clearness of order"). Ordo here means aptness in the timing and
arrangement of particular points, which relates to style; and then, at 46-47a Horace
continues with style in terms of arrangement of individual words: in verbis etiam
tenuis cautusque serendis dixeris egregie, notum si callida verbum reddiderit iunc
tura novum ("Moreover with refined taste and care in weaving words together, you
will express yourself excellently, if a skilful setting makes a familiar word new").
53 "But we will say that the man . . . who accepts that the thought of the poet
is unchanged, if another form of speech is used, is praising or blaming it to no pur
pose." PHerc. 1676 fr. Ix. Translation: Oberhelman and Armstrong (above, n.18) 245.
54 Oberhelman and Armstong (above, n.18) 244.
55 In light of this possible Philodeman influence, and since satire's moral purpose
is a major theme in 1.4, it should also be noted that Philodemus was not as strongly
opposed to the idea of a moral component in poetry as earlier Epicureans (Ep. Hdt.
38)?as suggested by the fact that remains of Lucretius' De Rerum Natura have been
found at Philodemus' library (K. Kleve, "Lucretius in Herculaneum," Cronache Ercolensi
19 [1989] 5-27). Although, from what can be ascertained, Philodemus did not advocate
Oberhelman and Armstrong's observations?particularly with

reference to Philodemus' views on metathesis?are in themselves
convincing, but in the context of the discussion from 33-62 and the
whole poem, it is difficult to attach to them quite the importance
they suggest. Horace may certainly be showing his verbal dexterity
as well as indicating that, from a Philodeman perspective, he writes
real poetry?and to those familiar with Philodemus' views on metath
esis and poetry, a humorous irony could be detectable here; but this
does not necessarily negate the statements he makes earlier, of the
reasonable distinction between satire (and comedy) and poetry written
in the grand style. The elisions which Oberhelman and Armstrong
cite to strengthen the argument that Horace wishes to imply that his
satire is true poetry, can still be interpreted as implying that he sees
satire as something decidedly separate from the poetry of epic, lyric,
or tragedy. And the Ennius quotation could itself be regarded as an
ironic response to the ironic undertones suggested by Philodeman
theory. In his exquisite word placement and use of the Ennian meta
phor (in the context of Philodeman views on metathesis), Horace can
in fact be seen to be both ironically subverting and enhancing his
surface argument. It would nevertheless certainly appear that Horace
wants to indicate that his satire?in its careful composition?can
be seen as technically poetic, so knowledge of Philodeman literary
theory is certainly relevant to a proper understanding of 1.4.39-62.
Freudenburg's analysis, although independent, complements that
of Oberhelman and Armstrong, though he bases his argument on
Aristotelian literary theory: in particular that uiunaig is the major
defining aspect of poetry:
6f)Aov ovv ?k toutcov otl tov -oir)Tf]v fidAAov tcov
uu0cov ?LVai &?l 7iolt)Tf]V fj TO)V [IZTQCOV, OOCp 7TOir|Tf]<;
Kaxd xf)v ULurjaLV eotlv, uifi?!xai bk rac, nqdêic,.
(Poet. 1451b27-29)
Thus, from this it is clear that the poet should be more
a maker of stories than a maker of rhythms, insofar
as he is a poet by virtue of imitation (utunaig), and
he is an imitator of actions.56
At Satires 1.41-42 Horace appears to suggest that his satire does
not deserve the title of poetry because it is almost conversational
prose (sermoni propiora), and at 47b-48: nisi quod pede certo/dif
fert sermoni, sermo merus ("apart from the fact that it differs from
the position that the function of poetry should be both moral and aesthetic (unlike
Horace at Ars. P.: 99-100; 333-34; 343-44.), it appears that he did not actually oppose
it: in C. Po. 5, col.i [iv] 1-21 (Jensen [1923] and Mangoni [1993]) Philodemus says that
poetry can be morally instructive, or not. Also on Philodemus and the moral content
of poetry, see E. Asmis, "Philodemus on Censorship, Moral Utility and Formalism in
Poetry," D. Obbink, ed., Philodemus and Poetry (Oxford 1995) 155; and see above, n.15.
56 Translated by Freudenburg (above, n.21) 121; Freudenburg also refers to
Aristotle to make a similar point to that of Oberhelman and Armstrong concerning
metathesis: at Poet. 1451a30-35 Aristotle discusses the importance of the unity of all
the parts (xa |ieor|) and how rearrangement or removal of one part affects the whole.
74 Jerome Kemp
prose by its set metre, it's unadulterated prose"). Freudenburg argues

that when Horace says that satire is similar to conversational prose
(or indeed conversation), he is in fact?according to Aristotelian
theory?asserting (not negating) the poetic status of his satire.57 And,
since Horace's readers would be familiar with Aristotelian theory on
poetic realism, his apparent disqualification of his own poetic status
would be recognized as disingenuous.58
The meaning of sermo, however, in this context requires some
consideration. On the one hand it could mean, as Freudenburg would
have it, "conversation" (so supporting his Aristotelian, jLU|Lir)au; argu
ment) or, on the other, it could mean "prose," which would be a very
explicit way of saying not poetry. At face value the argument would
seem to suggest the latter meaning, as being in deliberate antithesis
to poetry, and for this reason it may be doubtful that Horace's read
ers saw this as deliberately problematic but rather, in the context,
simply understood Horace as meaning poetry as opposed to prose, or
indeed conversational prose, rather than conversation in particular.59
But then, in lines 48-53, the example from New Comedy of the
father being angry with his wayward son is made to highlight the
likeness between comedy and everyday conversation, which could
again support the Aristotle/|jL|ar)cri<; argument:60
. . . numquid Pomponius istis
audiret leviora, pater si viveret? ergo
non satis est puris versum perscribere verbis,
quern si dissolvas, quivis stomachetur eodem
quo personatus pacto pater. (52-56)
Would Pomponius get a lesser dressing-down were his
father still alive? So it's not enough to write out a line
in plain language, so that, if you broke it up, any father
would express his anger just like the one in the play.
Even if, however, one were to accept the application of Aristotelian
theory in these lines (or indeed in the passage 39-62 as a whole),
one could interpret Horace here as in fact subtly criticizing the Ar
istotelian tenet that laijarjaig is the most important defining aspect
of poetry. Indeed, it would seem that by this theory the mime-artist
Laberius, referred to with apparent contempt and as explicitly not
a real poet at Satire 1.10.5-6, could, at least, be considered a true
poet (nam sic/et Laberi mimos ut pulchra poemata mirer).61

58 Freudenburg (above, n.21) 128.
59 Brown (above, n.l) 46, translates sermo at 42 as "conversational prose," at 48
simply "prose" (as opposed to poetry); N. Rudd (The Satires of Horace and Persius
[London 1973]) translates both 42 and 48 as "prose"; H. R. Fairclough (Horace,
Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica [Cambridge, Mass., and London 1926]) translates
42, "prose," 48, "prose-talk," "prose."
61 As Brown (above, n.l) 184, notes, Laberius was partly responsible for mime
(farce, based on real, contemporary life) being accorded literary status. On Laberius:
Also, the surface argument in Horace that meter is not the defin
ing characteristic of poetry (39-41) is also to be found in Aristotle
(as Freudenburg notes, to point out that uiunaic; is the defining
characteristic),62 and it seems that the view that comedy was not,
strictly, poetry, because of its closeness to colloquial speech, was
not uncommon. C. O. Brink draws attention to a passage in Cicero
(Orat. 67), where it is noted that Plato and Democritus are regarded
by some as more poetic, because of their style and rhythm, than the
verse of comedy, which is so close to everyday speech.63 Freuden
burg stresses that Cicero then goes on to comment that poets have
greater freedom in fashioning and joining words together (Orat. 68),
and takes this as Cicero's claim that compositio (the fashioning and
arrangement of words) is poetry's defining characteristic.64 But this
does not effectively detract from the previous remarks discrediting
comedy as poetry. It suggests, rather, that Cicero regards compositio
as another important, perhaps more important factor in poetry and
indeed as such some comedy, at least, and Lucilian satire (given
Horace's criticism of Lucilius' style)?being so close to everyday
speech?could still be regarded as not true poetry.
Thus Horace's surface argument can still essentially hold. While
his apparent assertion that he is not himself a true poet (at least not
yet) can be interpreted as rather extreme and thus somewhat disin
genuous, the distinction being made between comedy and satire, and
poetry of the grand style (epic, tragedy, and lyric), is real enough,
and Horace may even be ironically hinting that Aristotle's stress on
the importance of uiurjaig is itself somewhat extreme.
Although the arguments of Freudenburg and of Oberhelman and
Armstrong supporting the presence of Aristotelian and Philodeman
literary theory to determine Horace's position regarding the literary
categorization of satire (particularly his own), are both enlightening
and in some respects convincing, their resultant conclusions?that
Horace is wholly asserting that as a satirist he is indeed a true poet?
are too definitive. The fact that Horace can be taken in several ways
with regard to his possible irony, or at face value, and with regard to
Macro., Sat. 2.7. Also, on the possible influence of scenarios from mime on Ho
race's Satires (the adulterer escaping at 1.2.126-134, the witchcraft scene in 1.8) see
E. Fantham "mime," in OCD, rev. 3rd ed. (2003) 982, and on Laberius, 809.
62 Arist. Poet. 1, 1447M5; 9,1451b27.
63 Cic. Orat. 67: Itaque video visum esse nonnullis Platonis et Democriti lo
cutionem, etsi absit a versu, tamen, quod incitatius feratur et clarissimis verborum
luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum quam comicorum poetarum, apud quos,
nisi quod versiculi sunt, nihil est aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis ("For that reason
some, I know, have held that the language of Plato and Democritus, which, though
not in verse, has a vigorous movement and uses striking stylistic ornaments, has
more right to be considered poetry than has comedy, which differs from ordinary
conversation only by being in some sort of verse") G. L. Hendrickson, Cicero: Bru
tus; Orator, H. M. Hubbell tr. (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1939): Brink (above,
n.21) 162-63; also cited by A. Kiessling and R. Heinze, Quintus Horatius Flaccus,
Satiren (Berlin 1886, reprinted 1957) 76-77.
76 Jerome Kemp
Aristotelian and Philodeman literary theory, suggests that he would

rather not categorize himself or his satires in the way in which both
Freudenburg and Oberhelman and Armstrong have attempted.
When Horace sweepingly states that he is not a poet, and then
indirectly shows, through the application of earlier literary theory,
that he is, he is deliberately leaving the question open to interpre
tation. His irony seems to express, more than anything else, his
ultimate independence.
IV. Conclusion
In Satires 1.4 Horace concentrates on the moral purpose of
satire, with particular reference to the use of exempla, which was
pertinent to Peripatetic ethics, as well as other literary forms. The
ironic stance, the humor, in much of Horace's satire, and most im
portantly in relation to 1.4, in the first three "diatribe" satires, does
not detract from the importance of the moral content, the genuine
moral purpose of the Satires. Horace combines comedy and moral
content?indeed employs humor, the ironic persona of the narrator,
to strengthen certain moral positions?as he implies is his inten
tion at Satire 1.24-25; and in so doing he puts moral philosophy
into a practical context. The influence of Aristotle's discussion of
fkouoAoxux indicates Horace's moral position with regard to satire: in
its essential libertas (which serves a moral purpose), satire requires
ethical constraints.
The nature of language and its meaning was important to phi
losophers, and Philodemus' views on metathesis strengthen the belief
that Horace's position on satire's literary status in 1.4 should not
simply be taken at face value. Horace's elusive position is further
reinforced by references to satire's realism, which points to Aristo
tle's theory of uiunaig. But his use of Aristotelian and Philodeman
literary theory must be appraised with caution: it seems that he is
playing with certain prevalent ideas in literary theory, as well as
propounding a fairly logical, understandable surface argument, so as
to ask his readers what they think constitutes real poetry.
London, England JEROME KEMP

Classical World 104.1 (2010) [email protected]

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A Moral Purpose, A Literary Game: Horace, "Satires" 1.

I. The Moral Purpose of Horatian Satire

1 Translations of Satires 1: P. M. Brown, Horace, Satires I (Warminster 1993).

But more importantly his father's explanation for his advisory

F. Muecke draws a comparison between Horace's description

is from On Flattery, translation: C. E. Glad, Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in

on the basis of his continuing the Lucilian tradition. It is Lucilius'

18 E. Oliensis (Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority [Cambridge 1998] 40),

23 G. L. Hendrickson, "Horace, Serm. 1.4: a Protest and a Programme,"

24 Translation: H. Rackham, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Lon

27 Translation: Freudenburg (above, n.21) 66-67; obscenity, alaxpoAoyia, in this

function and interact side by side. The apparent inconsistency here

III. Is Satire Poetry?

35 Hendrickson (above, n.23) 121-42, G. Williams (Horace: Greece and Rome,

hactenus haec: alias iustum sit necne poema,

45 Anderson (above, n.ll) 24-25.

after a rearrangement of words poetry is made inferior in terms of

50 D. Armstrong, "The Impossibility of Metathesis: Philodemus and Lucretius

Oberhelman and Armstrong's observations?particularly with

prose by its set metre, it's unadulterated prose"). Freudenburg argues

57 Freudenburg (above, n.21) 120-24.

Aristotelian and Philodeman literary theory, suggests that he would

London, England JEROME KEMP

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