Explaining Russia’s Foreign Policy after

Ukraine and Syria: Liberalism, Constructivism,

Realism and the Security Dilemma.

MA Thesis in European Studies

Graduate School for Humanities
Universiteit van Amsterdam

Name Hasar Demnati

Student number 6206565
Main supervisor A.M. Kalinovsky
Second supervisor M.M. Lok
Date July 2016
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Content
Preface.............................................................................................................................................. 3

List of abbreviations ......................................................................................................................... 4

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 5

Chapter 1: Theoretical Approach ................................................................................................... 9

Liberalism .................................................................................................................................. 11

Social Constructivism ................................................................................................................ 13

Realism....................................................................................................................................... 15

Chapter 2: Theories as guides for policymakers .......................................................................... 17

Realpolitik .................................................................................................................................. 17

Liberal internationalism ............................................................................................................ 20

Chapter 3: Russia’s shift from a liberal worldview to realism and the pursuit of security ........... 23

The Security Dilemma .............................................................................................................. 24

Chapter 4: The road to the Ukrainian conflict ............................................................................. 27

The source of Russia’s aggression: Fighting for security .......................................................... 27

Ukraine, Russia’s last frontier ................................................................................................... 32

Crimea........................................................................................................................................ 37

Chapter 5: Russia-Syria allies or illusions? ................................................................................... 42

The cradle of Russian-Syrian cooperation ............................................................................... 42

Nostalgia and Minimal Interests? ............................................................................................. 45

Russia’s biggest Security threat .................................................................................................. 51

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 57

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 61

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Preface
Even before I began my Master European Studies I was intrigued by the Russian President
Vladimir Putin and his course of actions regarding the past five years. However, from a
layman’s perspective it was hard to understand what the basis was for the contemporary
upheavals in Ukraine and Syria. During the last year of my Bachelor European Studies I
followed the course Putin’s Russia, but I still seemed to be missing the point and my curiosity
remained unsatisfied. Nevertheless, as I started my Master degree I followed an eye-opening
course, Geopolitics by dr. Luiza A. Bialasiewicz in which I got to learn more about inspiring
and influencing geopolitical figures, such as Sir Mackinder and Alexander Dugin. At this point a
new world had opened for me and I was dedicated to find out what drove world leaders into
pursuing certain approaches.
This thesis, is the product of my curiosity and the beginning of a new adventure in my
life. Nevertheless, this amazing journey contained both ups and downs, but still I have never
stopped from attempts to confront any occurred challenges and accomplish the objectives I
have set. Luckily, I have had a great supervisor who really believed in me and the analysis I was
dedicated to produce. Therefore, I would like to express many thanks to Professor dr. Artemy
M. Kalinovsky who seemed to be able to encourage me every time I felt lost, and I can promise
you that this occurred a few times. Besides, he managed to get me on the right track every time
I struggled to comprehend delicate issues and provide me with the right advice.
Other people who also greatly influenced my performance during my research is my
brainstorm buddy Tijana Vojnovic, my inspiring and patient husband Rachid el Hassani and my
beautiful little girl, Amber who gave me the strength to pursuing my dreams even when I
thought I could not. And last but not least I would also like to express my appreciation to the
rest of my family, my friends, including Fadoua Rahhou and Karima Bouchatoui for their
contribution and moral support that helped me in writing this thesis. I am extremely honored
to have had such a proficient supervisor, loving and supporting family and friends. And if I
forgot to mention anyone that should be mentioned I hereby apology as I undoubtedly
appreciate any contribution from anyone.

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List of abbreviations

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

ECSC European Coal and Steel Community

EU European Union

IMF International Monetary Fund

IR International Relations

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nation

UNSC United Nation Security Council

US United States of America

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWII Second World War

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Introduction

R
ussian foreign Policy, particularly in Ukraine and Syria is vexing scholars, pundits and
politicians in the West. Many of whom are relying, overtly or not, on one of several
dominant International Relations (hereinafter: IR) paradigms to try to understand
Russia’s behavior. These dominant paradigms are among others realism, liberalism,
constructivism, and functionalism. While all have their explanatory value, this thesis will argue
that the explanatory value of liberalism is limited by the fact that the way leaders believe the
world works, has changed over time. Leaders themselves turn to different paradigms to guide
their approaches. In the case of Russia and the West, a liberal approach after 1991 was gradualy
replaced by a realists perspective, which sees the acumulation of power and the preservation of
its national security as its most significant interests. However, Russia’s behavior has also put it
into the position of a security dilemma, which is a situation in which the actions taken by states
to guarantee their own security are considered to be a threat to the security of other states.
Therefore, I will be applying the notion of the security dilemma to the present situation
concerning Russia’s behavior in Ukraine and Syria. With this I will try to demonstrate the
relative explanatory value of three specific theoretical frameworks: liberalism, constructivism,
and realism.
Liberalism, begins with the premise that humans are naturally good and the individual is
self-sufficient. Liberalism in IR advocates public and political autonomies, supervision by law in
harmony with the ruled, and security from autocratic power (Beavis, 2015). In economics, as
well as in politics liberalism’s emphasis on the collective results of individual actions leads to the
analysis of markets and policies, market and policy failure, and institutions to correct such
failure. In traditional IR theory it implies attempts to reconcile state sovereignty with the reality
of strategic interdependence.
Constructivism approaches IR as rooted in creations of history and society.
Constructivist theory condemns the basic hypothesis of realism that the state of anarchy is a
structural situation characteristic to the structure of states. Rather, they argue that the world is
made up of social constructions (i.e. ideas, or meanings people attach to objects) – that is, that
material forces do not have any fundamental significance only that what actors define as their
meaning (Webber, 2013, 43-4). Thus, anarchy is a situation of the system of countries, since
(heads of) states choose to create it a certain way. Anarchy is therefore, the outcome of a
process that builds the norms that administer the collaboration of countries rather than an

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intrinsic element of state-to-state affairs. Thus, in constructivism one would argue that it is
possible to alter the anarchic essence of states’ structure (Jørgensen, 2010, 160-3).
Nevertheless, in the case of liberalism the conventional liberal assumptions stating that
economic interdependence between states reduces conflict, seem to be contested ever since the
conflicts arose in Ukraine and Syria. Constructivism, while offering an alternative to explaining
Russia’s behavior in the past five year; that is, that Russian leaders have been developing a
certain kind of domestic consensus around ideas of stability, tradition, and their approach to
foreign policy emerges from that and while putting great emphasis on historical process,
constructivism still fails to analyzing how realistic and cautious leaders handle possible future
issues of uncertainty, as leaders do not have the capacity to read the minds of other leaders.
Besides, the fact that social constructs and human beings are alterable and if these alteration
were to happen independent of diplomatic collaboration this could create uncertainties and
generate a security dilemma (Copeland, 2000, 210).
In realism, states are the main actors and characteristically hold some sort of power,
which could cause them to be a possible threat to each other. States fear that a lack of security
makes them vulnerable to domination, exploitation, and subjugation (Herz, 1950, 157). This
fear exists due to the fact that leaders will never be able to foresee what goes on in the heads of
other state-leaders, and as their goal is to preserve their sovereignty and survive in security, they
are required to think strategically. As a result, states seek power to overcome this fear and
uncertainty, which in turn sets the ball rolling towards “the vicious circle of security and power
accumulation” (Ibidem.). This process in which states seek more power to overcome the
security dilemma is referred to as the ‘security dilemma’.
The security dilemma is the final effect of uncertainties and fear between opposing
sides. While each side sees its efforts to reinforce national interests – diplomatically, or
militarily - as protective precautions, the other side interprets these attempts as a subjective
threat which needs an instant reaction. Their response to the threats from those other states,
such as setting up more of their own military services, as a counteract can than again be
considered to be a threat to the prior state (Mearsheimer J. J., 2006, 75). The dilemma is a key
source of arms races in which states spend large amounts of money on equally threatening
weapons that in the end does not even offer the security that is needed. The contemporary
situation concerning the West – the United States (hereinafter: US), European Union
(hereinafter: EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter: NATO) - and
Russia, which led to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis, is fed and maintained by a past of endemic
and shared distrust, which seems to be an exemplary case of the security dilemma.

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In addition, the security dilemma, also offers valuable insight into the ongoing conflicts
in Syria. While, Putin was concerned about US, EU and the NATO’s increasing involvement in
former Soviet-controlled Europe and the possible NATO and EU expansion into Ukraine, in
the case of Syria, the Russian president seems to be more concerned about the growing
influence of Islamist extremists in the Arab Middle East. The fear and uncertainty of these
extremists taking over Syria and expanding eastward and southward into Muslim regions in
Russia, causes more than just external security concerns for Putin. Russian elites believe that
these Islamists expansions could lead to turmoil, security threats and possible separatism within
Russia itself and thus, these concerns need to be eliminated directly by the Russian government.
For that reason, Putin’s concerns in the case of Syria could not only be explained by the security
dilemma, as it also involves another dilemma referred to, by Brian L. Job1 as the ‘insecurity
dilemma’.
Knowing that Russian leaders are concerned about the increasing involvement of
Islamist extremists, such as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Quada, and Ahrar al-Sham, they are
likewise concerned about Russian fighters for these organizations returning home and causing
turmoil and a rise of extremist movements on Russian soil, such as in Chechnya, and the Volga
and Urals region, where the biggest Muslim populations live. For that reason the ‘insecurity
dilemma’, which unlike the security dilemma - where states are exposed to the threat of the
international anarchic order and thus have to protect themselves from what might occur outside
their borders – perceives the surrounding areas as the basis of security instead of threats, seems
appropriate as well. Job argues that the concept of the “insecurity dilemma” is capable of
capturing Russia’s current problems, since its state weakness and insecurity have led the Russian
leaders to try to find external support to improve their own security position. The increased
Russian involvement in the Arab Middle East, in particular Putin’s support for the Syrian Al-
Assad regime, and the increased security threat from Islamist extremists appears, thus, to be a
good example of Job’s insecurity dilemma.
However, Russia has not always pursued a realist posture and principle. After the fall of
the Soviet Union in 1991, the former Russian President Boris Yeltsin turned to the West for
post-war aid. Nevertheless, as a precondition of support the West demanded Russia to abandon
the communistic principles and adopt the liberal world order. For a while this worked, until
Yeltsin felt deceived and felt that he was relying too much on “fictitious Western assistance”.
He changed his course and pursued a more self-centered and assertive approach. After twenty-

1
Brian L. Job (PhD, Indiana University) is a specialist in Political Science and a resident Faculty Associate of the
Liu Institute.

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five years it appears as if the liberal democratic policies has failed for Russia. The conflicts in
Ukraine and Syria, that both seem to contests the conventional perceptions of liberal theories
about the relationship between economic interdependence and conflict, further deepened this
perception among Russian leaders.
While liberal democratic policies seem, thus to be failing in the case of Russia, the
security dilemma is, in fact able to demonstrate the value of an explanatory theoretical
framework: realism. I will argue that the main reason for Putin’s course of actions with regard to
both of my case studies, Ukraine and Syria, is the security threat Russia is experiencing. The
results advocate that security concerns about the conservation of the sphere of influence over
Ukraine and the protection of Russia from Islamist extremists from the Arab Middle East,
influenced to a great extent Russia's course of actions in the past five years. Besides, as will be
evident later on this thesis, the EU and NATO expansion process towards former Soviet-
controlled Europe, caused the Russian-Western (i.e. US and its European allies) relationship to
deteriorate over the past several years.
This thesis will analyzing Russia’s course of actions with respect to Ukraine and Syria.
The emphasis will particularly be on the issues that generated the security dilemma for Russia,
causing President Putin to pursue his national interests and safeguard Russia’s own security.
This thesis will thus start with a more detailed discussion of Liberalism, Constructivism, and
Realism. This will be followed by an analysis of two theories, realism (or realpolitik) and liberal
internationalism, as political approaches to foreign policy rather than as IR theories.
Furthermore, I will continue by exploring what led to Russia’s course of actions with regard
to the two case studies, Ukraine and Syria, and show how the concept of the security dilemma
best explains Russia’s current behavior and predicament. Finally, I will close with a brief
analysis of the “insecurity dilemma” that also seemed to be generated among Russian elites as
a consequence of the growing Islamist extremists in Syria.

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Chapter 1: Theoretical Approach

I
n this chapter I will start demonstrating why I believe that the main reason behind Putin’s
course of actions with regard to both of my case studies, Ukraine and Syria, is the security
threat Russia is experiencing. Therefore, the emphasis will be put on the security dilemma
within realism. Two alternative theories that might help us understand Russia’s behavior are
liberalism - though not in the case of Ukraine - where the emphasis will be put on cooperation
and peacekeeping due to the close interdependence of states, and social constructivism. In
addition to providing liberalism, constructivism, and realism as explanatory theories, two of
these theories (realism and liberalism) will be analyzed as guiding ideas for policymakers, as
they are often used by politicians, including Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Rather than looking at Putin’s course of actions with regard to the Ukrainian and Syrian
crisis from an empirical perspective, this chapter will provide a theoretical analysis. It will
analyze to what extent theories in the discipline of IR can explain Russia’s course of actions in
the past five years with respect to Ukraine and Syria. This discussion will help substantiate the
primary argument of this thesis, that the contemporary situation concerning the West – the US,
EU, and NATO - and Russia, which led to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis, is fed and
maintained by a past of ubiquitous and shared distrust, and is an exemplary case of the security
dilemma within theoretical frameworks: realism. However, as mentioned before another
possible alternative theory (constructivism) for Russia’s behavior will also be briefly discussed.
Realism (also known as political realism) is a school of thought that explains IR in terms
of power (J.S. Goldstein, 2014, 43). Realism is marked by actors acting out of self-interest and
the accumulation of power and security is the main driving force behind the rhetoric of realism.
Like many other scholars, including Andrej Kreutz2, I argue that ever since Putin’s alliance with
Syria, the rest of the Arab World have been characterized by self-interested rationality and
therefore, it is only logical to use the realist framework in understanding Russia’s course of
actions with regard to Syria. The following chapters will expand on the arguments provided by
scholars and politicians on both Ukraine and Syria, to see whether these fit within the
assumptions of a realist framework and thus whether realism would be able to explain Russia’s
course of actions in these two countries.
Academics seem to consider theories in IR to be the key tool for guiding a research. It is
true that these theories are outstanding tools to compete with prejudices, conventional world

2
Kreutz, a specialist on Russia’s policy in the Middle East and the author of the book Russia in the Middle East:
Friend or Foe?

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perspectives and/ or wisdom. Moreover, theories harvest interesting issues to examine and they
allow the analysis of inherent conventions and outlooks. This is equally true in the case of both
Ukraine and Syria, where many observers consider marginal and pragmatic issues to be at the
heart of Russia’s behavior. However, the intervention and increasing Russian involvement in
both cases revealed profounder Russian concerns. In addition, theories make the
comprehension of complex political issues easier, as they lay out possible ways of analysis,
clarify compound issues, and conceptualize the world (Jørgensen, 2010, 6). And last but not
least theories can contribute to the evaluation of political performance. However, the goal of
this is not to evaluate every possible explanation or theory, but rather those that are used most
frequently in debates about Russia’s behavior.

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Liberalism
Liberalism is a prominent political discipline in IR that dates back to the 17th and 18th century
and can be branded by the fact that liberalist have strong trust in human reason. In the course
of the 20th century liberalist theorists managed to establish the theory in the discipline of IR and
position the worldview as one of the most significant theories in IR. It is therefore often
associated with Western civilization with determined obligations to individual liberties. The
political liberal worldview strongly values free markets and marginal state interference with
regard to economics. Moreover, it advocates public and political autonomies, supervision by law
in harmony with the ruled, and security from autocratic power (Beavis, 2015). However,
liberalism in the study of IR comprises a large range of outlooks varying from the democratic
peace thesis to the Wilsonian Idealism.
Unlike in realism, liberal theories argue that states are merely one of the actors in world
politics, and that states might collaborate via institutional mechanisms (Beavis, 2015). Besides
interdependent states, other actors like multinational corporations, NATO, International
Monetary Fund (hereinafter: IMF) and United Nations (hereinafter: UN) play a vital role as
well. That is why after WWII, when the US and its European allies adopted liberalism as their
world order, such organizations were established. The functions of such organizations was to act
as overarching organizations to preserve a liberal world order in an otherwise anarchic system.
According Adrew Moravcsik3, liberalism as a social science theory strives to clarify what
states should do rather than what states do and is therefore often perceived as a normative
approach rather than an explanatory one. Nevertheless, as argued previously liberalism beholds
a large variety of outlooks, but even within liberalism as a social theory Moravcsik distinguishes
liberalism in four categories, 1) republican liberalism, 2) pluralist liberalism, 3) commercial
liberalism and 4) regulatory liberalism. He states that the first category is when liberal
democracy tends to be more soothing in contrast to other forms of administration. The second
category argues that incentives for international conflict are produced by maldistribution of
social power, or the presence of endemic social segmentation. The third category argues that
economic interdependence clears the way for peace and collaboration. Whereas the forth
category opposes that international institutions and law stimulate international accommodation
(Moravcsik, 1992, 2).

3
He is a politician and the author of many articles concerning liberalism, including Liberalism and International
Relations Theory.

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For the sake of my argument,
it might be convenient to consider
“IN ECONOMICS, LIBERALISM’S
liberalism as a theory (a study of social
EMPHASIS ON THE COLLECTIVE
reality) that begins with individuals as
RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS
its significant actor, but also a theory
LEADS TO THE ANALYSIS OF
that tries to understand how groups of
MARKETS, MARKET FAILURE, AND
individuals make shared decisions and
INSTITUTIONS TO CORRECT SUCH
how organizations made up of FAILURE; IN TRADITIONAL
individuals cooperate. Furthermore, it INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
is a theory that encloses this study in a THEORY IT IMPLIES ATTEMPTS TO
perspective that stresses individual RECONCILE STATE SOVEREIGNTY
rights and that implements a WITH THE REALITY OF STRATEGIC

beneficial view of evolution in human INTERDEPENDENCE”

(Keohane, 2002, 45)
affairs. As argued by Robert Keohane,
“In economics, liberalism’s emphasis on the collective results of individual actions leads to the
analysis of markets, market failure, and institutions to correct such failure; in traditional IR
theory it implies attempts to reconcile state sovereignty with the reality of strategic
interdependence” (Keohane, 2002, 45). In addition, much of the literature on interdependence
argues that increased economic interdependence reduces the possibility of conflict between
states4.
As opposed to realism, liberalism is not devoted to any striving and parsimonious
fundamental theory, which is often perceived as vaguely identified and incompatible to produce
determinate outcomes. However, constructivism might in fact have the capacity to explain
Russia’s course of action in Ukraine and Syria.

4
Solomon W. Polachek, ‘Conflict and Trade’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1980), pp. 55 – 78;
William Domke, War and the Changing Global System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988);
Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W.W. Norton,
1997);
Michael W. Doyle, ‘Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3
(August, 2005), pp. 463 – 6;
John R. O’Neal and Bruce Russett, ‘Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace’, International
Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2001), pp. 469 – 85; Zeev Maoz, ‘The Effects of Strategic and Economic
Interdependence on International Conflict across Levels of Analysis’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.
53, No. 1 (2009), pp. 223 – 40.

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Social Constructivism
Compared to all the theories that will be discussed in this section, constructivism is the latest
participant in the discipline of IR. Constructivism is an approach that believes that vital aspects
of IR, are a construct of history and society (Jørgensen, 2010, 160). Social constructivists
consider the behavior of states to be formed by power, emotions and subjective beliefs. Besides,
they agreed on the fact that the anarchical character and power of IR exclusively, failed to
outline the national interests and policies of states, declaring that power is a tool rather than an
ambition of social acts (Tsygankov, 2012, 19). Despite the fact that constructivists recognize the
importance of state power, security, and status, in realism, they argue that in understanding
Russia’s foreign policy it is key to acknowledge that a policy cannot emerge without due concern
for the prevailing framework of the international structure. Moreover, realism tends to
underrate the contribution of ideas and culture of a country’s assertive international behavior
(Tsygankov, 2012, 7). Constructivist theorists argue that without discovering the values and
emotions behind IR, one is not likely to effectively explain and forecast state’s course of actions.
What is more notable is that constructivism focusses on how external issues influence
the behavior of a state, but also how internal issues contribute to a state’s behavior. For
example, Andrei Pavlovich Tsygankov5 in his book Russia and the West From Alexander to
Putin, argues that the ‘sense of honor’ of states is essential for their behavior (Ibidem). Russia’s
sence of honor is that it wishes to be a significant player on the world stage, and also Russia
wants the West to consider the state to be a vital player of the Western world. Yet, internally it
wishes to be observed as a great power, and a strong and stable state. In other words, the logic
of honor is a social construction of Russia’s past experiences and its relations with other states
(Ibidem, 19).
Therefore, constructivists claim that when a state is (internaly) weak and does not form a
strong unity, state leaders will seeks to bind the state together by allying themselves with
surrounding states that might be capable of supporting the weaker state in its internal battle.
Looking to Russia’s history, having had several conflicts in the last 25 years in the Southern
regions within its own periphery6, it might not be far fetched to claim that, from a constructivist
perspective, Russia is seeking for alliances that could offer support if internal conflicts occur in
the future. Russia’s alliances with Arab Middle Eastern states and support for the al-Assad
regime in Syria, who are already fighting the enemy, namely Sunni Islamist extremists, could

5
He is a Russian Political Scientist and specialist of IR
6
A few of the examples are the Chechen War in 1994 and 1999, the War of Dagestan in 1999, the North
Caucasus insurgency in 2009 and more.

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thus be preparatory work for the unlikely upcoming conflict with Islamist extremists in Russia.
Therefore, Russia’s behavior towards Syria is not quite surprising, as Russian analysts are
noticing an increase in Islamist extremists movements and study groups in Russia, with in
particular in the North Caucasus regions, such as the Volga and Urals regions.
Although these observations make the internal instability and growing division within
Russia undeniable, and make it seem as if constructivism might be able to help analyse Russia’s
support for Syria in their battle against Islamist extremists, it is does not have the capacity to
offer as much in terms of explanation as realism and the security dilemma. This does not mean
that constructivism is useless, on the contrary, as constructivism is argued not to be an absolute
theory it is an approach that goes hand in hand with dominant traditional theories. In other
words, it is not a theory that is similar to conventional theoretical traditions like liberalism and
realism, rather it can be amalgamated with all theoretical conventions to provide a more
complete and broader understanding of complex issues (Jørgensen, 2010, 21).
Nevertheless, while some scholars, such as Robert Jervis an International Affairs scholar
at Colombia University7 consider constructivism to be opposed to realism, others such as Henry
Nau a Political Science and International Affairs scholar, argue that realist and constructivist
approaches concerning power and identity can be perceived as harmonizing approaches.
Moreover, they have the capacity to be combined effectively within one and the same analytical
framework (Jørgensen, 2010, 161). Thus, even though constructivist and realist approaches
might be based on contrasting conventions and might deliver contrasting visions, their relation is
not by definition opposing, or incompatible. However, I consider realism and the security
dilemma to be more capable of providing a comprehensible and complete explanation of
Russia’s course of actions in the past five years with regard to Ukraine and Syria. Stated
differntly, the fact that the Russian government fears NATO and EU expansion into more
regions of former Soviet-controlled Europe, including Ukraine that trigged Russia’s behavior,
and also Russia’s fear of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (hereinafter: ISIS) and its
affiliates spreading from Syria into the North Caucasus and other surrounding regions on
Russian soil, cause Russia’s behavior to be a textbook case of the security dilemma.

7
He holds the Adlai E. Stevenson Chair, and one of the main representatives of (neo)realism within the discipline
of IR

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Realism
This IR theory as we know it now emerged in the1930s and was developed by the realists John
H. Herz, E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, who are thus regarded as the
school’s founding fathers. Since Second World War (hereinafter WWII), realists have blamed
idealists for looking too much at how the world should be instead of how it really is. The
notion was therefore established as a challenge to the idealistic international politic of the 1920s
and was derived from the German word ‘Realpolitik’8. Realists are disposed to see political
power detached from, and predominant over, ideals such as morality, ideology, and other social
and economic features of life. For them, ideologies are factors that should not be considered in
IR, nor should religions, or other cultural features with which states may legitimize their actions.
Realists regard states with dissimilar religions, philosophies, or economic structures as relatively
akin in their actions with regard to national power (Jørgensen, 2010, 78).
Realism is thus a theory used to clarify social phenomena’s in societies described as a
specific theoretical approach (a.k.a a paradigm) defined by revolutionary international
territories, which are made up of independent political components, i.e. states. These states are
the main actors and characteristically hold some sort of power (offensive military capability)
which could cause them to be a possible threat to each other. In addition, states fear that a lack
of security makes them vulnerable to domination, exploitation, and subjugation (Herz, 1950,
157). This fear exists due to the fact that leaders will never be able to foresee what goes on in
the head of other state-leaders, and as their goal is to preserve their sovereignty and survive in
security, they are required to think strategically. As a result, to overcome this fear states begin to
seek power, which in turn sets the ball rolling towards "the vicious circle of security and power
accumulation" (Ibidem.).
Professor Mearsheimer stated in his chapter of the book International Relations
Theories: Discipline and Diversity, realists believe that power is the currency of international
politics. According to realists, the structure of the international world order, forces states to care
sincerely about the balance of power and forces them to either gain power at the expense of
others, or at least to make sure they do not lose power and all this just in order to survive
(Mearsheimer, 2006: 77-8). Consequently, realists argue that IR is (partly) best elucidated by the
actions of rational actors aimed at maximizing their self-interests in an international system of
sovereign states without a central authority. This sounds quite similar to what Kreutz argues to
be the fact in the case of the Russia-Syria relation. He argued that “during the past five years,
Putin’s relations with Syria and the rest of the Arab World have been cautious and marked by
8
Politics of the real possible.

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self-interested pragmatism.” (Kreutz, 2007, 25). Remarkable is that this logic can also be
observed in the case of Ukraine. Mikhail Suslov, a researcher at Uppsala University wrote an
article “Crimea Is Ours!” Russian popular geopolitics in the new media age, where he examines
how the annexation of Crimea has been embodied and discussed on Russian social media.
Many Russian observers, i.e. participants of Russian social media forums, consider the
annexation of Crimea to be plain geopolitics. One Russian participant even said that Ukraine
should not be offended, since it was nothing personal. He claimed that Russia was required to
annex Crimea, as it is a great power, and great powers have to pursue their great national
interests (Suslov, 2014, 598).
It is evident that many regard Russia’s course of action, especially with respect to
Ukraine – but also Syria – as a textbook case of the security dilemma. Moreover, such
expressions indicate that the influence of these scholarly theories extends beyond tenure
organizations and universities. Policymakers invoke features of realism and liberalism as well,
when laying down solutions to global security dilemmas and therefore, these theoretical
approaches are often reflected in international politics. However, it is important to make a clear
distinction between scholarly theories, realism and liberalism, and theories as guidance for
policymakers, realpolitik and liberal internationalism (a.k.a. liberal world order). So in order
not to be confused, a short reiteration: the philosophy of political realism and liberalism is
aimed on the explanations, descriptions and predictions of events in IR, and is thus a
descriptive paradigm, whereas realpolitik and the liberal internationalism are designed to guide
politicians in the making of their foreign policy. We will explore the latter two concepts in more
detail in the following section.

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Chapter 2: Theories as guides for policymakers

T
he end of the Cold War had profoundly changed international politics and a new,
postnational order, liberal internationalism, had substituted the realist rationality that
used to administer Europe. The US was not only the “indispensable nation,” as
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it; it also took on the role of a benign leader and thus,
the US was unlikely to be regarded as a threat in Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014, 7). Since, the fall
of the Soviet Union the new Russian Federation, led by former President Boris Yeltsin has
been operating within the liberal world order and trying to integrate into the West, but as soon
as he felt cheated by the actors of this liberal order, he pursued a more self-centered direction
for Russia. Having observed former President Yeltsin, and served as an advisor his successor
Vladimir Putin, followed his lead, and is therefore often referred to as a realpolitiker. As will be
evident, Russia changed its direction over the years from liberal world order to realpolitik, for
that reason it is useful to see where this deflection of direction was based on, and whether it will
help us understand Russia’s contemporary course of actions with respect to Ukraine and Syria.
What follows in the next section is, thus an introduction of the two worldviews in question,
realpolitik and liberal internationalism.

Realpolitik
Realist politics (i.e. Realpolitik) are based on real and physical factors rather than theoretical, or
moral objectives. It is a notion first introduced in 1853, by the German publicist Ludwig von
Rochau, in his Grundsätze der Realpolitik. In this publication he explained the notion as
followed:

“The study of the forces that shape, maintain and alter the state is the basis of all political
insight and leads to the understanding that the law of power governs the world of states just
as the law of gravity governs the physical world. The older political science was fully aware of
this truth but draw a wrong and detrimental conclusion - the right of the more powerful. The
modern era has corrected this unethical fallacy, but while breaking with the alleged right of
the more powerful one, the modern era was too much inclined to overlook the real might of
the more powerful and the inevitability of its political influence.” (von Rochau, 1853, p)

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However, it only became popular in the time Otto von Bismarck was Minister President of
Prussia, as his policy towards the unification of Germany seemed to be comparable with the
principle of Realpolitik. His foreign policy was aimed on re-uniting Germany and growing
economically and therefore his actions were described as, “a scrupulous attention to what is
possible, a shrewd estimation of what one’s opponent really wants, rather than what he says he
wants, and a preparedness to assert force when necessary” (Scruton, 2007). The notion of
Realpolitik is also known as Machiavellianism, which refers to the Italian political philosopher
Niccolò Machiavelli, who argued that the main goal of a prince is to seek power, irrespective of
ethical and/or religious concerns. The policies, or politics that Realpolitik conceives are
considered to be amoral, coercive and pragmatic (in the context of politics). As von Bismarck
said: “Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day decided... but by
blood and iron.”
Although it had existed for almost a century it was formally introduced in the US by the
political scientist Henry Kissinger during the presidency of Richard Nixon and had been
deployed ever since. However, after WWII the US, United Kingdom (hereinafter: UK), and
their alliances were searching for a new order that would help them keep peace and security.
Leaders and scholars were convinced that the interdependence of states, with shared norms and
values, such as democracy would eliminate conflicts and war they shifted to the liberal world
order with all the commitment they could muster. This flawed view of international politics has
been the reason why they were frequently bushwhacked by events. He states that foreign
politicians, mistakenly, tended to underplay the importance of realpolitik (Mearsheimer, 2014,
2).
On the other hand, Keohane argues that, a lot of what liberals seek to explain about
world politics firstly, is able to indicate the nature and actions of world capitalism and, secondly,
the character of political-military rivalry (Keohane, 2002, 46). Senator John Kerry during the
2004 presidential campaign, for instance, said that US’s foreign policy has achieved greatness
only when it has combined realism and liberalism (Snyder, 2004, 54). There are many other
advocates for an amalgam of the theories, such as the pundit Charles Krauthammer who
backed the Middle East policy imposed by Bush’s administration by arguing for an assertive
combination of liberalism and realism, which he called: democratic realism (Ibidem).
Nonetheless, the American political scientist and political economist Francis Fukuyama9
replied on Krauthammer’s argument by saying that the use of force and the feasibility of

9
Francis Fukuyama is the author of The End of History and the Last Man, which is one of the key works in the
liberal tradition.

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democratic change in Iraq blinds him to the war's lack of legitimacy, a failing that "hurts both the
realist part of our agenda, by diminishing our actual power, and the idealist portion of it, by
undercutting our appeal as the embodiment of certain ideas and values"(Ibidem). While Robert
Keohane condemns that liberal theories are not able to meet social scientific standards of
parsimony10 set, if not always attained, by realism, he did claim that an amalgam would in fact be
benificial (Moravcsik, 1992, 3). Many current great world leaders pursue a liberal world order in
theory, but in practice they seem to be pursuing the state’s national and private interests. This
state of affairs arguable describes the relationship between Russia and the US.

10
Parsimony refers to the law of parsimony (i.e. Ockham's razor) which prescribes that a theory should deliver the
simplest imaginable (feasible) explanation for a phenomenon.

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Liberal internationalism
As was mentioned earlier, after WWII the US and UK had introduced a new world order,
liberal internationalism, also known as the liberal world order. The WWII had severe impact
on Western European states, leaving one state more devastated than the other. The aftermath
of the war caused fear and consternation to be the dominating feelings among the Western
population and their leaders. In addition to these bitter emotions, was the terrible economic
situation of these states, which did not only need a onetime financial boost, but a solid approach
on which state heads could rely. This postwar situation was an excellent opportunity for the new
liberal world order, championed by the US, to play its part. The trademarks of liberal
internationalism, which were openness and rule-based relations, human rights, and democratic
solidarity protected by big institutions, such as the UN, and IMF and standards, such as
multilateralism, were going to bring prosperity and security and were to become the new guide
for foreign policymakers. And alongside these institutions, common security alliances and
regional institutions were founded (Ikenberry, 2011, 450).
As a consequence of war and settlement, the great powers learned the right way to
function within a multipolar balance-of-power system (Ibidem). The US had advocated its ideas,
such as liberal democracy, free markets, alliances, and the tolerability of US military
power, ever since 1940s, resulting to many leaders of western and non-western countries
wanting to be part of this new world order, as they firmly believed that it would likewise provide
their states the benefits of prosperity and security.
US President Franklin Roosevelt’s government devoted their time and effort to building
a liberal world order, which incorporated the idea of an open trading system and a collective
security alliance in which the great powers would collaborate in order to be able to overcome
the ‘security dilemma’ in IR, that was perceived to be the reason behind many great wars in
history (Russett, 2013, 95). Due to the severe economic and social impact the war had on global
level, international diplomacy was needed. Leaders of the affected countries established
cooperation organizations in order to overcome the security threat that could produce warfare,
as they believed that, from a liberalist perspective, high level of interdependence between states
decreases the possibility of political conflict (Doyle, 2005, 465). The US took the initiative to
become the hegemonic leader, by taking on the rights and responsibilities to organize and run
the liberal world order, in the years that followed WWII. The US led and controlled a wide-
ranging hierarchical liberal order, which was arranged around alliances, multilateral
organizations and special partnerships (Ikenberry, 2011, 450).

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In line with the post-Cold war, the idea that a liberal world order would provide
prosperity and security, leaders were convinced that the new liberal world order was the Holy
Grail, which would consequently lead to the expansion of liberalism into the rest of the world.
Western leaders firmly thought that staying behind, or failing to adopt the liberal world order
would cause exclusion, which would be unbearable for any country. In order for a non-liberal
state to compete with the US and its European allies, a state would need to become like them.
However, to become like them, a state would need to turn into “the kind of wishy-washy,
pacifistic milquetoast society” (Mead, 2014, 71-2). The only possible threats could be from
states, such as North Korea which might be willing to challenge actors within the liberal world
order, but this was a minimal threat since they were too weak to do anything, as a result of their
non-liberal system. Thus, choices needed to be made: you [non-liberal states] either join and
turn into an open and pacifistic liberal system, or you could stick to your guns and your culture
as the world passed you by. Initially, it all seemed to be working properly (Ibidem, Mead, 2014,
72).
As the US, along with the other four victors11 of WWII, created the UN, including its
Security Council (hereinafter: UNSC), which was aimed at taking away all possible concerns
about security matters and providing peace and security; Europe founded the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC), from 1992 on known as the European Union, to avoid further
war between Germany and France. As Robert Schuman, one of its founding fathers, stated my
aim is to “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible” (Europa, sd). The liberal
world order has been dominating over the years, as a result of its diverse rules and organizations
that not only preserved open markets and trade, but provided tools for its governments to
achieve security and economic interdependence as well (Ikenberry, 2011, 453).
And yet, the liberal world order had minor flaws as it was a creation of the Western
world and did not esteem upcoming non-Western states, such as China, India and Brazil. Due
to the fact that these states had different sets of cultural, political, and economic knowledge, and
they perceived the world through their own pasts – be it communism, anti-imperial, or anything
in that order – the trademarks of this order have been pushed to the limits. Many scholars
argue that its western design is one of the reasons why the ‘old’ liberal order is not suitable for
the globalizing world. Nevertheless, the liberal world order rests on open rule-based relations,
which are kind of the basic principles for liberal internationalism. Whereas openness involves
the capacity of states to participate in exchange and trade – of thoughts, capital, merchandises,
etc. – rule-based relations involve the relations between states that are arranged confirming to

11
China, USSR, France and the United Kingdom

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general values and arrangements. These general values and arrangements together with
institutions turn into a multilateral structure (Ikenberry, 2011, 451). Thus, even though liberal
internationalism may have failed in accounting non-western states and in explaining the
behavior of states, it has been a guide to how both Russian and western leaders tried to structure
their relations after 1991, and up until now the basic principles of liberal order, openness and
ruled-based relations, are not being contested.
On the other hand however, it needs to be visibly spelled out that, while the liberal
institutions, UN and EU, were established to overcome the security dilemma in IR, other
organizations simultaneously established for the same reason seemed to generate the security
dilemma. For instance, NATO that was established to “safeguard the freedom and security of
its (Western) members through political and military means” (NATO, sd) caused the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter: USSR) to estalish the Warsaw Pact in reaction to
NATO. This vicious circle created by fear and uncertainty is called the ‘security dilemma’.
Despite the fact that Russia is often accused for pursuing policies of assertiveness towards the
West, it is incontestable that fear and uncertainty are often the driving force behind these
policies and actions. Therefore the security dilemma allows us to understand concequences of
Russia’s actions over the past five years with respect to Ukraine and Syria.

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Chapter 3: Russia’s shift from a liberal worldview to realism and

the pursuit of security

R
ussia’s opposing and hostile attitude towards NATO in the past 25 years proves that
the military alliance organization poses a serious threat to the security and sphere of
influence of Russia. This conflicting perspective towards NATO, as well as towards
the EU deteriorated even further in the course of events, causing these organizations to form a
serious threat to Russia and even led to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Nevertheless, over
the years many other arguments have been mentioned for the Ukrainian upheavals in 2014,
ranging from a holy war to Putin’s secrete-service background and personality being the driving
force behind the conflict. And whereas the West blames Russia, Russia blames the West for the
turmoil caused by its military intervention, pointing them on Russia’s actions being a counteract
against their violation of international law.
However, I will argue in this chapter that Russia’s course of actions regarding Ukraine
could be explained through the lens of a realist theory, with in particular the security dilemma.
With this lens the focus will be put on three important factors, namely the increasing EU
involvement in the East of Europe (i.e. former Soviet-controlled Europe); Ukraine’s
geographical position; and the pro-western angle of Ukraine’s new regime. These three factors
combined give Russia a good motive to pursue a self-assured policy towards Ukraine (Götz,
2015, 3). Given Ukraine’s strategical situation, it is of utmost importance to Russia, thus not
only Putin, but any other Russian leader will try to avoid Ukraine joining a ‘collective security
alliance (i.e. NATO), or geopolitical blocs. If they do not succeed in pursuing this goal, Russia
will continue to try to create a forward security zone along its western border (Ibidem, 4). As
Putin once argued, “Russia should protect its own interests and act flexible in the pursuit of its
goal.”
I will justify my argument, which is, that the generated security dilemma will be best
capable of providing us a clear and comprehensible explanation of Russia’s course of action
regarding the conflict in Ukraine (and Syrian), by using the ongoing eastward NATO expansion
process, which went almost simultaneously with the eastward EU expansion, into former
communist states as the most significant reason for the current upheaval with respect of
Ukraine. Another thing this chapter will show, is that Putin has been highly capable of playing
the games needed to regain his power position on the world stage and secure Russia from
external threats. Both scholars and politicians argue that his strategies in pursuing Russia’s
national interests correspond with a traditional realpolitik approach. However, first the ‘security

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dilemma’ will be elucidated, before we continue to display that the course of history has
resulted in Russia pursuing this realist’s strategy.

The Security Dilemma

Realists argue that the actors in IR frequently generate a security dilemma —a situation in which
the actions taken by states to guarantee their own security (such as setting up more military
services) are considered to be a threat to the security of other states (Mearsheimer J. J., 2006,
75). Their responses to the threats
from those other states, such as setting
up more of their own military THE GREATEST WAR IN HISTORY

services, as a counteract can than COULD BE PRODUCED WITHOUT

THE INTERVENTION OF ANY GREAT
again be considered to be a threat to
CRIMINALS WHO MIGHT BE OUT TO
the prior state (Ibidem). The dilemma
DO DELIBERATE HARM IN THE
is a key source of arms races in which
WORLD. IT COULD BE PRODUCED
states spend large amounts of money
BETWEEN TWO POWERS BOTH OF
on equally threatening weapons that WHICH WERE DESPERATELY
in the end does not even offer the ANXIOUS TO AVOID CONFLICT OF
security that is needed. ANY SORT.”
The ‘security dilemma’ was H. Butterfield, 1951

articulated by one of the founding fathers of realism, John H. Herz and was perceived as an
undesirable result of anarchy in the international system. This model is now probably the
furthermost used and cited model in textbooks of IR. The notion of 'security dilemma' is not a
new one in IR, as it was first introduced in 1951 in Herz’s book Political Realism and Political
Idealism (Herz, 1951). In that very same year the British historian, Herbert Butterfield also
described a situation in his book History and Human relations, which was similar to ‘the
security dilemma’ nonetheless, he used other words to describe it12. Ever since, the model has
become one of the most significant theoretical ideas in IR.
Herz and Butterfield shared the same main argument, namely that a ‘security dilemma’
arises when two actors, none of them actually attempting to harm the other, wind up going to
war, their understandings of the notion differed from each other. Butterfield argued that, “The
greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminals who
might be out to do deliberate harm in the world. It could be produced between two powers

12
Unlike Herz, Butterfield referred to ‘the security dilemma’ as the 'absolute predicament and the irreducible
dilemma' (Butterfield, 1951: 19)

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both of which were desperately
anxious to avoid conflict of any sort”
“BECAUSE NO STATE CAN EVER FEEL (Butterfield, 1951, 19-20). Thus even
ENTIRELY SECURE IN SUCH A WORLD if men were up to no harm the fear
OF COMPETING UNITS, POWER
and uncertainty that is genarted by
COMPETITION ENSUES, AND THE
precautionary measures functions as a
VICIOUS CIRCLE OF SECURITY AND
vicious circle. Butterfield listed six
POWER ACCUMULATION IS ON.”
indication, which according to him
John H. Herz, 1951
define the ‘security dilemma’ in the best way, with on number one fear, derived from the
“universal sin of humanity”13; number two is the uncertainty over others’ intentions; number
three is the unintended nature; number four is the tragic results the security dilemma produces;
number five is the possible intensification by psychological aspects; and last but not least is the
essential source of all human conflicts (Butterfield, 1951, 19-22).
Herz did in fact agree with Butterfield when stated that the key to understanding how
the security dilemma can occur is ‘fear’ and ‘uncertainty’. In 1966 in his book International
politics in the Atomic Age, Herz notes that: 'it is one of the tragic implications of the security
dilemma that mutual fear of what initially may never have existed may subsequently bring about
what is feared the most' (Herz, 1966, 241). In other words, it is a tragedy when state leaders
never having any intentions to causing a conflict with another nations, are taken over by
concerns and uncertainty about the intentions of the other nations, which eventually leads to the
production of men’s greatest fear, namely a conflict. This fear created by uncertainty with
regard to the future of Syria and Ukraine is expressed very often by the Russian President
Vladimir Putin in his speeches and interviews, however this will be further addressed in the
following chapters.
To continue with the analysis of Butterfield’s indications of the security dilemma,
Professor Shiping Tang of the school of IR in Shanghai, rightly criticized, in his article The
Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis, that Butterfield’s first indication of the ultimate
source of security dilemma, the “universal sin of humanity” is logically incompatible with his
other theses, which argue that the security dilemma is unintentional in origin and that conflicts
driven by the security dilemma are tragic (Tang, 2009: 590). This would mean that if the
“universal sin of humanity,” causes us to be preset to harm each other there should be no

13
With “universal sin of humanity” Butterfield refers to the ‘will to power’ or Machiavelli’s ambizione, and Hans
Morgenthau’s “lust for power.”

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exception to this rule; thus, making this attribution incompatible with Butterfields’ second
indication of ‘uncertainty’ as well.
This flaw within Butterfield’s definition was addressed by Herz and Robert Jervis when
they attributed the final source of the security dilemma to the anarchical structure of
international politics. Herz, described it as follows: “Groups and individuals who live alongside
each other without being organized into a higher unity . . . must be . . . concerned about their
security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and
individuals. Striving to attain security from such attacks, they are driven to acquire more and
more power in order to escape the effects of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the
others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Because no state can ever feel
entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious
circle of security and power accumulation is on.” (Herz, 1951, 157). The way the security
dilemma is generated among Russia’s government by uncertainty and fear, and the desire of
states to preserve their power in order to be able to protect one’s state is an important issue.
Russia’s biggest fear is losing its great power position and consequently be subject to a security
threat. Besides it seems as if NATO is doing its best to exclude Russia from all the important
security issues, and with this Russia is being removed out of the great power sphere of influence
by NATO. Moreover, although Russia possesses a significant regional power position in the
Middle East, Europe and Europe, these regions are in their own turn extreme strategically
important regions, this again leads to severe security concerns and substantial temptations for
Russia to accumulate more power (Braun, 2008, 56).
We might be able to conclude that Russia’s course of action with regard to both Syria
and Ukraine can thus be explained under the banner of ‘fear’ and ‘uncertainty’, compatible with
the security dilemma of realism, since Russia’s in the case of Ukraine fears NATO and EU
expansion into more former communist regions and in the case of Syria fears the expansion of
the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (hereinafter: ISIS) and its affiliates into the North
Caucasus and other surrounding regions on Russian soil. But how is it that an institutions like
NATO, established to overcome the security dilemma, which existence is also acknowledged
within liberalism and constructivism, seems to generate rather than overcome a security
dilemma among Russian leaders. The answer to this question will be addressed in the following
chapter, in which I analyze my first case study, Ukraine.

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Chapter 4: The road to the Ukrainian conflict

The source of Russia’s aggression: Fighting for security

T
hroughout the Cold War the West maintained strong diplomatic relations with
Russia. Russia has been and still is an important country for the West, since the role
of Russia was read as a threat to security in Europe’s neighborhood and it was thus
considered to be, to a certain extent, partly responsible for global stability and security
(Galantino & Freire, 2015, 283). Although Russia was never considered to be complying with
the Washington approved model of liberal democracy, it generally had similar interest as the
West. Nevertheless, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, it seemed as if former President
Yeltsin mistakenly depended too much on the “fictitious Western assistance”, where the West
promised Russia all kinds of aid that was never received, if they would abolish communism and
adopt a liberal world order. Therefore, Russia was committed to change its foreign policy by
publishing a document called ‘The Fundamental Principles of Russia’s Foreign Policy
Conception’ in April 1993, which stimulated three main goals for Russian Foreign Policy. The
document stated a realist approach for Russia, its main goals was to revive, uphold its private
interests and regain it great power status (Xia Yishan, 1997, 22).
The striving towards these goals have recently been very visible, as the national interests
of Russian leaders have changed, as well as the Western “collective security alliances as means
to overcome the security dilemma of the international system” (Russett, 2013, 95). The
NATO– Ukraine relation, more than any other, confirmed that NATO did not view the former
Soviet periphery as a separation line. Every step that Ukraine took towards NATO was
affectionately recompensed. When the current Russian President Vladimir Putin, came to
power in 1999 – first as prime minister and then as president - a more realistic perspective on
international order was created. Rather than distancing Russia from a multipolar world order, it
was reconsidered into a more practical alternative which was beneficent for Russia (MacFarlane,
2008, 42). Instead of focusing on the West, Putin pursued allies all over the world who shared
common interests on ‘matters of significance’, which however did not always meant that these
allies corresponded with the liberal framework of the West , like its alliance with Iran (Ibidem).
Moreover, it was exactly this collective security alliance, i.e. NATO’s process of expansion that
created the security dilemma for Russia in the first place.
Even though Russia frequently tried to cast vetoes with respect to the UNSC draft
Resolutions and was not amused by NATO expansion into former communist states (such as

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the first NATO expansion into the three former Soviet regions, Hungary, Poland and the
Czech Republic), for quite a long time it was not strong enough to raise objections to vital
interests of the West, or protect its own interests (Mearsheimer, 2014, 2). However, as the
country started to stabilize economically, cooperate with another great power, China, it regained
its great power status and Russia was dedicated to letting the West know that is was no longer
weak and that it was going to pursue its realists approach that it had created shortly after the fall
of the USSR. Russia has, from the start, truly appreciated its permanent membership of the
UNSC14 with its power to veto and it seemed that it was finally coming to great use.
Given Russia’s enduring opposition to external (military) intervention on the basis of
humanitarian support – as it claims that these interventions are just an elaborate smokescreen to
topple any regime not complying with the Washington approved model of liberal democracy –
combined with its support to countries viewed as important potential international partners for
Russia, its power to veto has frequently been circumvented. Such as the constraint of NATO
military intervention in 1999 in Yugoslavia by Russia with the support of China. Followed by
Russia preventing the UN from issuing a mandate for the incursion of Iraq by the US.
Furthermore it prevented severe sanctions to be taken against the nuclear explosions of North
Korea, President Mugabe’s dictatorship in Zimbabwe15, and Iran’s nuclear program (Oldberg,
2010, 32)
Although it had achieved these successes, Russia had a lot to endure subsequent to the
fall of the USSR, according to many scholars amongst whom are Roger Kanet and Joseph Black
NATO’s first eastward expansion into former USSR states in 1999 was a matter that elevated
the most serious Russian concerns at this time, and remained a significant matter till this day
(Kanet, 2010, 208). In January 1999, former member of the Duma Defense Committee
Vladimir Volkov said during a press conference that Russia preceived the NATO’s new
strategic concept to be a “geostrategic threat to peace” which would result into “adequate
measures”. Besides that Putin, later repeatedly claimed that NATO’s expansion is a severe
provocation that needs to be taken seriously by Russia as diminishing common trust would be
perceived as a serious threat to the security of Russia.
Despite Russia’s attempt to oppose this eastward expansion by offering three conditions
for the membership of the three former Soviet states to overcome the security dilemma. First of
all membership of these countries had to be according to the ‘French model’, meaning that they
were allowed to join the political organization without being involved in the military cooperation

14
With the power to cast vetoes
15
The genocide in Darfur

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of NATO. The second conditions was that NATO was not allowed to position its forces in
regions close to the Russian borders, neither was NATO allowed to place military, or nuclear
bases in Central Eastern Europe. Thirdly and last, NATO was to be limited in its further
enlargements signifying that no expansion into Baltic states were tolerated, since this would be
interpreted as a direct challenge to Russia’s national security interests (Xia Yishan, 1997, 24)
Nevertheless these conditions were never taken into consideration and Russia failed to prevent
NATO expansion by Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.
During its 50th anniversary in Washington in the same year NATO announced a new
strategic doctrine, which stated that in case of a regional crisis, for instance, at the border of the
Alliance, NATO would response with force without permission from the UNSC. And since the
borders of some of its Alliances were, due to its enlargement, likewise borders of Russia this
strategy meant a direct threat to a region which Russia believed to be inside its rightful sphere of
influence (Light & Allison, 2006, 5). From Russia’s point of view this implied that NATO
provided itself with a carte blanche to act with military force wherever it considered to be
needed and that it wanted Russia to be excluded from decision taking on security matters in
Europe. This was confirmed when, in accordance to its new strategy doctrine, NATO launched
its first airstrike against Serbia in response to the Kosovo crisis (Ibidem). Following these
developments, the eastward expansion of NATO, weakening of international security
mechanisms (such as UN and the OSCE), Russia seemed to be facing several external threats.
In the end, with the threat of global terrorism lurking after 9/11 and the creation of a security
dilemma, President Putin decided to change its security perception in that terrorism,
separatism, border security and military conflict were now regarded as the primary threats and
resume its cooperation with NATO (Li, 2008, 151-2).
Nevertheless, Russia was not alone in changing its strategy after 9/11, apparently so did
NATO. Subsequently to 9/11, NATO dedicated itself to further enlargement in both
geographical as well as functional matters. Although it appeared as if NATO expansion was put
on hold and for a little while relations between Russia and the West looked to be moderately
improving, it did not however, result into compromises on strategic matters that involved Russia
(Light & Allison, 2006, 11). As NATO started to engage in US-led missions in regions that were
subject to the Russian sphere of influence, such as the Caucasus, and Central Asia the earlier
concerns voiced by Russia turned out to be completely justified (Simon, 2008, 98). Consequent
to the broadened NATO commitments and the supposed ‘global terrorism threat’ a US-led

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invasion toppled the Sadam Hussein regime in Iraq16. Although, some members of the UNSC
were opposed to the US-led invasion and subsequently former UN secretary general Kofi
Annan even announced that the invasion was not in conformity with the UN Charter and thus
illegitimate (MacAskill, 2004), the US proceeded with the invasion on Iraq. Along with plans for
the EU’s first eastward expansion and NATO second, whereas the former expansion made
Russia slightly nervous the latter gave Russia real security challenges to worry about and once
again generated the security dilemma.
Many Russians regard the EU as a “Trojan horse” for NATO expansion (Götz, 2015,
4). This fear may be unfounded, but it can hardly be denied that the second expansion of
NATO – into seven former Soviet-controlled sates - went almost simultaneously with EU
enlargement as is illustrated by table 2.1. This evidently led to an increasing lack of trust in the
West from Russia’s perspective. Clearly NATO’s expansion process was perceived by Russia as
a blunt threat, which is perfectly logical, since from a realist perspective, the enlargement of the
North Atlantic Alliance deteriorates Russia’s position in Europe (MacFarlane, 2008, 39).
Despite Russia’s resistance and its direct and indirect threats, it failed to stop the inclusion of
these states as they joined in March 2004. Although Russia had previously faced several western
intimidations, it had now changed its willingness to accept a position of weakness, or
dependence in Russian relations with the West (Kanet, 2010, 208).
Nevertheless, the desire and effort of former Soviet-controlled states, such as Ukraine to
join the western democracy, which they believed would flourish their economy and would
provid them protection and security under NATO, grew bigger. These efforts ultimately led to
the so-called Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004. This nonviolent campaign, supported by
the West, lasted two months and resulted into a repeat run-off election which led to the election
of pro-Western President Yushchenko. This loss from the West made the revolution a hard
pill to swallow and became the next matter to elevate serious Russian concerns. Followed by a
Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict in 2006 and again one in 2009, it appeared that the fight against
Western democracy in Ukraine was about to be a high-profile task of the CIS17, where most
states are either authoritarian, or dictatorial (Oldberg, 2010, 37).

16 16
According to the US government diplomacy failed in Iraq and therefore it would carry on with a coalition to free
Iraq from weapons of mass destruction –which the US claimed Iraq obtained.
17
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan and Ukraine are associate member states (Georgia who was a member since 1993, withdrew as a
result of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008)

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Table 2.1 Simultanious enlargement processes

Date NATO Enlargement Date EU Enlargement
March 1999 Czech Republic Czech Republic
Hungary Hungary
Poland Poland
March 2004 Estonia May 2004 Estonia
Latvia Latvia
Lithuania Lithuania
Slovakia Slovakia
Slovenia Slovenia
Malta
Cyprus
Bulgaria January 2007 Bulgaria
Romania Romania
April 2009 Croatia July 2013 Croatia
Albania (Albania is an official candidate of the EU since 2009)

Elaborating on the Orange Revolution the following section will concentrate on explaining why
Ukraine is of utmost importance to Russia and why earlier NATO and EU expansion were of
marginal interest to Russia, but when it came to Ukraine it generated the highest security threat
one might imagine. Furthermore, the next section will briefly discuss other developments that
played a significant role in generating a security dilemma for Russia that led to the Ukrainian
crisis and ultimately to the annexation of Crimea.

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Ukraine, Russia’s last frontier
Many scholars argue that the presidential elections that were held in October 31, 2004 in
Ukraine was one of the triggers for the current Ukrainian upheavals. Russia perceived the
elections as quite challenging since the run-off was between the popular pro-Western candidate,
Viktor Yushchenko and Russia’s favorite, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Ever since
Ukraine18 expressed its aspiration to anchor itself to the EU and NATO, as it was attracted by
the prosperity that the EU assured and the security that NATO’s Article 5 common defense
commitment provided, Russia has been more aware of the threats that pro-Western sentiments
of the populace and the elites pose to it (Rogov, 2015, 83)(Joseph, 2014). As Elias Götz argued,
given Ukraine’s geopolitical location, the Russian government will go to great lengths to
maintain some form of control over Kiev’s foreign and defense policy (Götz, 2015, 3-4). Thus,
the risk of a pro-western candidate becoming the new president needed to be eliminated at any
cost, besides Putin repeatedly warned that NATO expansion toward Ukraine would mean that
Ukraine as we now know it would cease to exist (Mearsheimer, 2014, 3).
Russia’s increased activism in the presidential elections in Ukraine had its roots months
before the build-up to the elections, as Putin visited Ukraine several time showing support for
Yushchenko’s opponent Yanukovych (Karatnycky, 2005, 49). This was necessary as pro-
western Yushchenko voters dominated central Ukraine and the city of Kyiv, which were the
regions that decided the faith of the elections (Kuzio, 2005, 507). However, it did not stop with
marketing of Yanukovych, as Yushchenko became the target of a series of harassments19, such
as his illness that made him out of the running for almost a month, which later turned out to be
dioxin poisoning. In addition to the harassments, the incumbent president, Leonid Kuchma,
had personally chosen Yanukovych as his successor. And finally on the day of the elections, at
some polling sites where support for Yushchenko was high, observers found out that the ink of
pens had been replaced by disappearing ink, so that ballots would turn out blank after they were
cast (Ibidem, 37) Nevertheless, the political party of Yanukovych was still losing popular
support as Yushchenko was gaining support by a united opposition, thus when the elections
yielded no victor20 most opposition groups already suspected fraud.
The revolt against the suspected election fraud, went down in history as the “Orange
Revolution”, which was the campaign color of Yushchenko. The evidence of ballot

18
And Georgia
19
Yushchenko was subject to negative press and misrepresentations by government-controlled national television.
Besides personal attacks Yushchenko's campaign faced other barriers as well as sometimes his plane was denied
landing privileges minutes before major rallies. Road barriers slowed his travel and, once, a truck tried to force his
car off the road (Karatnycky, 2005, 36)
20
Each candidate receiving about 40% of the votes

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manipulation caused Yushchenko’s supporters to protest in large-scale on November 22,
resolute to protect their right to free elections and to appoint the fair victor. These
demonstrators gathered in Kiev’s main square, the Maidan (Rennebohm, 2011). Finally, former
President Kuchma and his successor Yanukovych decided to hold a new run-off vote, on the
condition that Yuschenko and the parliament would agree to measures limiting the future
president’s power. When they agreed the new run-off was held on December 26, 2004. To
prevent fraud from occurring again the election were supervised by observers from around the
world and when the votes had been counted they revealed that Yushchenko won, 52% to
Yanukovych’s 44%, causing the Ukrainian Orange Revolution to be a success (Karatnycky,
2005, 46).
The victory of Ukraine’s pro-western and democratic leader was a humiliating defeat for
Putin and a setback for Russia’s hegemonic inclinations and thus caused the Russian elites to
become more suspicious of NATO and EU expansion and their increased activism in Ukraine
(Ibidem, 50). Yushchenko victory was dangerous to national unity, due to the East-West split it
creates in the country, besides Ukraine was becoming a serious security issue for Russia. Russia
needed to eliminate this security issue therefore, State Duma speaker Boris Gryzlov claimed in
December 2004 that Ukraine faced a simple choice either it will split up, or it will go down into
a civil war (Kuzio, 2005, 507). Russian concerns augmented further when on January 13, the
European Parliament voted 467 in favor, 19 against for a resolution calling on Ukraine to be
given "a clear European perspective, possibly leading to EU membership." Although the vote
was nonbinding, The Financial Times declared that it "was the clearest sign to Kiev that the
door to the European Union is open” (Karatnycky, 2005, 50). However, although Ukraine had
a clear aspiration to join the West as an NATO and EU alliance, at that moment there seemed
to be little interest for this from the West.
Nevertheless, according to John J. Mearsheimer21, for Russia “the illegal overthrow of
Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president was the final straw” (Mearsheimer,
2014, 1). Therefore, Russia’s course of actions with regard to Ukraine should not have come as
a surprise to the West, as they’ve been moving into Russia’s sphere of influence and threatening
its main strategic interests (Ibidem). As negotiations started between the US, Poland, and the
Czech Republic, former soviet-controlled states which were drawn into Western alliances (EU
and NATO) in 1999 only a few years prior to the US’s plans for a Ballistic Missile Defense
system (hereinafter: BMD) in these regions, they antagonized and threatened Russia and
evoked an even stronger response.

21
is an American political scientist and an advocate of the theory of offensive realism

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The plans to deploy a US missile defense generated a typical security dilemma as the
Russian Security Council declared that it was to revise its military policy so that Russia would be
able to angle US efforts to reinforce its military alliances, i.e. NATO (Braun, 2008, 187). In
fact, Putin discussed the arm race in his annual speech in 2006 and assured that Russia would
not fall behind, but would keep pace with the US in nuclear weaponry (Shearman, 2010, 19).
This emerged a Russian threat on November 14, 2007 warning that it was to locate short-range
nuclear missiles in a second location on the EU's periphery if the US declines to abandon its
plans to deploy a missile defense system (Blomfield, 2007). The Russian concerns were real
and it was evident, as in a speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference Putin fired his
strongest criticism on the US posing the question to whom this expansion was aimed, since
ensuring Europe’s security was obviously not the purpose.

“I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation
of the Alliance itself, or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a
serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against
whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners
made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one
even remembers them.” (Putin, 2007)

Furthermore, he criticized the USA for using “an almost uncontained force in IR” besides the
US had “overstepped its national borders in every way” (The Associated Press, 2007).
Before the tide seemed to be turned, NATO began planning further eastward
expansion. During the 2008 summit in Bucharest, NATO took the admission of Georgia and
Ukraine into consideration. However, although the Bush government was in favor of this,
France and Germany were not, since they rightly feared that Russia would be extremely
provoked by this. In the end, all members of NATO agreed that although it was not going to
begin the formal process at that moment, it approved the Georgian and Ukrainian ambitions
and thus confidently proclaimed, “These countries will become members of NATO”
(Mearsheimer, 2014, 3). With the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, Putin’s respond to this
promise seemed to be a clear message for Russia’s opposition to the accession of Georgia and
Ukraine into NATO and proved the German and France fear to be justified. Besides, this was
not the only Western project that seemed to be on hold, in 2009, partly due to Polish and

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Czech Republican opposition activity groups and other oppositions the BMD project was also
abandoned by the US government.
Nevertheless, this did not mean the end of a NATO threat for Russia, as its third
expansion towards Eastern Europe took place in April 2009. The accession of Croatia and
Albania into NATO caused the already antagonized Russia to perceive the expansion as hostile
to its national security and country’s interests, as it once again diminished its sphere of influence
in the former Soviet-controlled Europe. Russian reaction to this expansion seemed to
demonstrate that the central element of growing Russian antagonism was eastward NATO and
EU expansion. Former Russian Foreign Minister even accused the EU for attempting to build a
Western sphere of influence within the Eastern periphery (Mearsheimer, 2014, 3). The
following statement by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov neatly captures this accusation: “We [the
Russians] are accused of having spheres of influence. But what is the Eastern Partnership, if not
an attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of influence.” (as cited in Pop, 2009)
It is not unlikely to assume that a Western orientated government in Ukraine will –
eventually – develop closer relations with NATO and in fact lead to an NATO expansion into
this region, as was evident in the past with eastward EU and NATO expansion practically going
simultaneously (Götz, 2015, 4). Nonetheless, when pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, who
initially was supposed to be the successor of Ukraine’s third President Leonid Kuchma in 2004,
finally became president of Ukraine in 2010, Russia seemed to be able to score out the threat of
a pro-western Ukrainian regime leaning further to the West. Russian leaders have been trying to
pull Ukraine into its sphere of influence since the fall of the Soviet Union, and with
Yanukovych as Ukraine’s president, Putin appeared to have secured that ambition. The pro-
Russian Viktor Yanukovych had good ties with Russian President Putin and resulting into the
abandoning of all plans to chase NATO membership by Yanukovych’s government.
Moreover, Ukraine established a closer relationship with Russia, particularly in security
and military matters, as the Kharkiv agreement22 was extended for another 25 years beyond its
expiration in 2017 (Götz, 2015, 4). Furthermore, Ukraine and Russia exacerbated defense trade
and intelligence collaboration. Indeed, President Yanukovych and his government shifted
towards Russia and the West’s grander strategy to drag Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of
influence and to integrate the country to West appeared to be on hold again. However, the EU
kept on trying to persuade the new Ukrainian government under Yanukovych by offering him
financial support and an association agreement. Developing economic and political steadiness
in Ukraine and integrating Ukraine into its markets (preferably into both Europe’s as Russia’s

22
The Russian lease of naval installations on Crimea

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markets) is crucial for Europe. Nevertheless, neither Brussels, nor Moscow can politically
afford to let one another fully incorporate Ukraine (Schubert, Pollak, & Brutschin, 2014, 5).
The importance of Eastern Ukraine to Russia goes beyond national identities, thus when Putin
learned of EU’s persuasion package, he used a stick and carrot approach to draw Ukraine back
to Russia. He first responded in the summer of 2013 by launching a trade war against Ukraine,
in which Russia blocked many Ukrainian merchandises from being imported23. This trade war
deteriorated the already poor Ukrainian economy. And simultaneously Russia responded by
offering Ukraine a package of economic and financial support, which contained 15 billion US
dollars in low-interest loans and a sharp reduction on Russian gas delivery, provided that
Yanukovych fulfilled Russia’s demands and refused the EU association agreement (Götz, 2015,
5).
This approach seemed to have worked in Yanukovych’s account, as he turned down
EU’s association agreement. However, it did not consider the response of the Ukrainian
population. Ever since the Orange Revolution the Ukrainian citizens have learned that the voice
of the people was strong if united. The turndown of the agreement provoked a political
revolution amongst the predominantly pro-western Ukrainian population. This revolt was the
beginning of what went down in the annals of history as Putin’s ‘Hitler-style’ land grab in
Europe since the WWII (Kralova, 2014). Nonetheless the following section will prove that the
annexation of Crimea in 2014 is anything from unusual and even a quite logical and predictable
response from the perspective of realpolitik.

23
Goods such as chocolate

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Crimea
According to the perception of the Western media and politicians the upheavals in Ukraine can
be blamed almost exclusively on Russian aggression. The assertiveness and aggression of the
Russian government resulted into numerous accusations namely by the US, EU, for violating
both legal and political obligations under the Geneva Conventions (Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights), Council of Europe instruments, OSCE human dimension etc. (MacFarlane,
2008, 40). In addition, they have claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed
Crimea out of an enduring longing to restore the Soviet realm. It is unlikely that Putin will,
sooner or later, go after the remaining parts of Ukraine, including other East European regions.
However, the bigger picture, I have argued is the Russian security concerns and the loss
of Russia’s sphere of influence. This, again has been the case with the annexation of Crimea as
will be evident in this section. Ukraine, as I have argued before, is of great importance to Russia
for its strategical position. It is the only region that divides Russia from NATO and EU-
controlled Europe, thus it is often referred to as Russia’s last frontier. Over time, Russia has
tried several times to incorporate Ukraine within its sphere of influence, with the
Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter: CIS), and the Common Economic Space
(Mychajlyszyn, 2008, 32) and with the election of Yanukovych it seemed as if Putin’s mission, to
draw Ukraine to Russia, was completed. Neverteheless, many Ukrainians were fed up with their
corrupt and incompetent government that was not able to deal with the economic problems of
Ukraine.
As a consequence of former President Yanukovych pulling back from the EU
association agreement, many Ukrainians took to the streets to demonstrate against his decision.
The aftermath of this demonstrations is well known, and was, unfortunately not as peaceful as
the Orange revolution in 2004. After almost three months of increasingly violent protests on
Kiev’s Maidan Square, former President Yanukovych agreed not to stand for elections after his
term expired in 2015, nevertheless, the Ukrainian protestors wanted him to resign immediately.
When demonstrations became worse, representatives of the US and its European allies went
down to Ukraine to mediate, and they managed to close a deal, which permitted President
Yanukovych to remain in control until new elections were held. However, this deal did not
stand for long, as he was overthrown on February 22, and fled to Russia (Götz, 2015, 5). For
President Putin, the illegal topple of the democratically elected Ukrainian President
Yanukovych, which he referred to as a ‘coup d'état’ was the last straw. Russian leaders have
obsessively been against NATO expansion, and Putin made it very clear that he was not about

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to stand by while Ukraine, which is Russia’s strategically important neighbor, converted into a
NATO, or EU stronghold (Mearsheimer, 2014, 1).
The concerns of the Russian president were exaggerated, since the newly appointed
Ukrainian government was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core. Besides the new
government consisted of four eminent members who could rightfully be labeled neo-fascists
(Mearsheimer, 2014, 5). For Putin, and many others it was evident that the coup was backed by
the increasing US and EU involvement, even though the complete level of their involvement
has not yet clear. Before and after Yanukovych was overthrown American political figures, such
as Senator John McCain, contributed to antigovernment protests, to the extent that US
ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt, declared that the ousting of Yanukovych was “a day for
the history books” (Ibidem). With Russia’s national security and interest being at stake it is no
wonder that Putin felt it was time to respond to the increased EU, NATO and US involvement
in its strategically important neighbor, Ukraine. In addition, a leaked telephone recording
between Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland24 and Geoffrey Pyatt revealed that they had
encouraged regime change and preferred Arseniy Yatsenyuk, an anti-Russian Ukrainian
politician to become the new prime minister of Ukraine, which he did on February 27 (BBC
News, 2014).
As a result of the ‘coupe d’état’, Putin commanded Russian forces to seize Crimea from
Ukraine, a region where a Russian naval base is located, and of which Putin feared would
accommodate a NATO naval base if Ukraine was drawn into the EU and consequently into
NATO. However, as Richard Feinberg argues, it was no forced seizure as the Crimeans, who
are predominantly ethnic Russians, became anxious, particularly as the new government voted
for regulation to subdue the use of the Crimean language (Feinberg, 2014). Even though the
regulation was annulled, the harm was done and the Crimeans expected Russian support and
protection as they claimed independence. On March 16, 2014, the Crimean Supreme Court
held a referendum asking, whether Crimea should join Russian Federation as a subject of
Russia, or restore the 1992 Crimean constitution, and Crimea’s status as part of Ukraine, which
the Ukrainian government had formerly invalidated (Yuhas & Jalabi, 2014). Over ninety-five
percent voted to join the Russian Federation as a subject of Russia, thus Putin would have
undermined its credibility both in Russian and Crimeans eyes if he was to be a passive onlooker
and fail the Crimean people who are being subjected to repression. Therefore, on March 18, he
acted by annexing Crimea.

24
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the United States Department of State

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Many scholars argue that Putin has never had the intention to launch a full-size
incursion of Ukraine, from the start Putin’s strategy has been to destabilize Ukraine until it
abandoned its efforts to join the West. Being well-aware of the fact that, according to NATO’s
guidelines, countries tarnished by ethnic struggles and unsettled territorial disagreements cannot
be part of the Western collective security alliance (Götz, 2015, 7). Rather, Putin’s goal is to
regain its control over the pro-western angle of Ukraine’s new regime and play it safe by
spreading turmoil in Eastern Ukraine. Russia’s behavior, we can conclude, is mainly motivated
by geopolitical imperatives (Götz, 2015, 7).
Nevertheless, the annexation of Crimea seemed to be planned well ahead as it proved to
be rather simple, yet the reason may be due to the Russian troops already stationed at the
Crimean port of Sevastopol’s naval base. In addition, the annexation, as evident by the mostly
pro-Russian votes of the Crimean status referendum, was with the consent of the majority of the
Crimean population. Besides, Mearsheimer claims that Putin had put enormous strain on the
new pro-western Ukrainian government to deter it from teaming up with the West. Moreover,
Putin ensured that he would rather ruin Ukraine as a functioning state than allow it to turn into
a Western bastion on Russia’s doorstep (Mearsheimer, 2014, 5). In the wake of destabilizing
Ukraine, the Russian government provided the Russian separationists in Eastern Ukraine with
advisers, arms, and diplomatic support to lead the country toward civil war. And with an army
awaiting on the Ukrainian periphery, Putin threatened to attack Ukraine if protestors were
attacked vociferously. Furthermore, Putin raised the Ukrainian gas price and required pay off of
past exports debts (Ibidem).
Although it seems as if Putin is aggressive and heartless, the annexation of Crimea was
merely a defensive response to Western attempts to drag Ukraine into its own sphere of
influence. As it was worried that after the toppling of the Yanukovych government the new
Ukrainian leader would be determined to sign the EU’s association agreement. For the
Russians, this was unacceptable due to Ukraine’s immensely geostrategic importance, especially
that of Crimea. One of the most dominant versions of the “geopolitical” role of Crimea for
Russia was delivered in Aleksander Dugin’s book of 1997, in which he emphasized that if
Russian leaders would lose control over Crimea this would generate a direct geopolitical threat
to Russia, in other word: “whoever controls Crimea controls the Black Sea”25 (Suslov, 2014,
597).
With this in mind, Putin’s behavior should appear more than logical. Throughout
history Ukraine appeared to be of immense importance to Russia as it served as a buffer zone

25
Direct reference to Dugin 1997, 380 and Shirokorad 2014a

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that Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany all tried to traverse,
ineffectively, to attack Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014, 5). As argued earlier, not only Putin but any
other Russian leader will try to prevent Ukraine from joining a ‘collective security alliance (i.e.
NATO), or geopolitical blocs. Neither would any other Russian leader be a passive onlooker
while the West encouraged the regime to be changed in favor of an anti-Russian government
that was dedicated to incorporate Ukraine into the EU, and – sooner or later- NATO.
Nevertheless, most leaders of the US and its European allies continue to refute that Putin’s
behavior could be driven by genuine security concerns.
In response to Russian annexation of Crimea, which according to US and EU leaders
was a violation of international law and will, thus, not be recognized, Western leaders have
sanctioned Russia to discourage any additional violence. On the other hand, neither the US,
nor its NATO allies were willing to use military power in order to protect Ukraine, even though
Kerry claimed that “all options are on the table” (Mearsheimer, 2014, 9). Instead, the West is
still depending on economic sanctions26 to pressure Russia into ending its backing of the
protestors in Eastern Ukraine. Conscious of the fact that such measures will have little effect,
there are advocates and opponents for the sanctions, however none of them will contest that
these sanctions will further irritate Putin and arouse a stronger response from Russia (Götz,
2015, 10). Even if severer sanctions are endorsed, it would almost certainly not change Putin’s
decision-making, as the past demonstrates that countries will bare massive sanctions to protect
their core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represents an exception to this
rule (Mearsheimer, 2014, 10).
Besides, as Guriev27, rightly observed, the Crimean escapade has revealed that Russia
does not put its priorities in economic improvement and its incorporation into the global
economy and can, therefore undoubtedly be abandoned if the government believed it is
threatened (Guriev, 2015, 20). This Russian commitment should set an example for US and
EU leaders, in the sense that, if the US and EU decide to expand into Eastern Europe, they
should end the making of empty promises28 and back up their words with action29 (i.e. stop

26
The West sanctioned Russia for the use of aggression by freezing their business accounts, stopping the
equipment of military tools and innovative solutions and technologies for Russia and the Western countries
stopped renewing loans of Russian banks. Nevertheless, the sanctions carried out by them had little to no effect on
the government itself, while they did heavily effect the Russian population.
27
Sergei Guriev, is a political economist who was the director of the Moscow New Economic school until he flew to
France in April 2013 after frightening and humiliating interrogations by government investigators, who focused on
Guriev’s contribution to a panel of professionals that directed an independent analysis of the Mikhail
Khodorkovsky affair (Lipman, 2013).
28
NATO agreed that it approved the Georgian and Ukrainian ambitions and thus confidently proclaimed, “These
countries will become members of NATO” (Mearsheimer, 2014, 3).

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making promises which they are either unwilling, or unable to fulfil). As Götz rightly argues:
“Poking the Russian bear with a stick in the eye and letting smaller neighboring countries take
the swipe of his paw is the worst policy of all” (Götz, 2015, 10).

29
Götz advises that: “Brussels and Washington should provide substantial diplomatic, economic and military
support to countries that summon the courage to strengthen their ties with the West in the face of Russian
pressure.”(Götz, 2015, 10)

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Chapter 5: Russia-Syria allies, or illusions?

E
ver since the crisis in Syria emerged in 2011, the discussion about the ambiguous
relationship between Russia and Syria have been filling both newspapers as well as
academic journals. However, the situation is different than many may know, first in
the case of Ukraine, Putin was concerned about US, EU and NATO’s increasing involvement
in former Soviet-controlled Europe and possible NATO and EU expansion in Ukraine,
whereas in the case of Syria, he seems to be more concerned about the growing influence of
Islamist extremist in the Arab Middle East. Second, while surprising to many observers, the
intervention and increasing Russian involvement in Syria revealed a profounder bilateral
relationship. Nevertheless, this relation, as will be evident in the next section, has not always
been as strong and stable one. Thus, to understand why Putin, this time, opted to present
himself as a reliable and strong ally by backing Syria throughout this period a short historical
background might be useful. I will therefore start with some history and continue this chapter by
stating some of the frequently mentioned arguments and conclude with what I consider to be
the most vital arguments for understanding the current situation in Syria and Russia’s role in this
turmoil.

The cradle of Russian-Syrian cooperation

Let us say that it all started with the recognition of the Syrian Arabic Republic as an
independent state by the USSR in 1944. Unlike the West, which only formally recognized Syria
as an independent state in April 17, 1946. Already in the time of the USSR, Syria’s role in the
Russia’s security became evident, as the USSR acknowledge the independency of the Syrian
Arabic Republic in 19944. It is argued, by Kreutz, that two important motives lay in the core of
this deliberate strategic move by the USSR. First of all one of geopolitical nature, since for the
USSR having Syria as its ally meant the ability to by-pass Turkey and Iraq who were both
considerably leaning towards the Western camp. The loss of these two countries to the West
created a security issue for Russia, as accessibility to the Mediterranean Sea is immensely
important for a country surrounded by landmass. Therefore, Russia needed to find itself
another strong ally in the Arab regions with access to the Mediterranean Sea to continue to
safeguard its national security. Syria seemed to be perfectly fit for the job, since it not only
compensated the loss of Iraq and Turkey it also almost immediately after being recognized by
the USSR establishing its military and economic structure according to the Soviet model
(Aghayev & Katman, 2012, 2067).

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The second motive was more
strategical in nature, as the choice to
“IN THE OCCURRENCE OF ally with Syria was partly based on the
SITUATIONS JEOPARDIZING PEACE influence that was already gained by
AND SECURITY FOR EITHER the largest Communist Party in the
PARTY, THE TWO PARTIES Arab world (Kreutz, 2013, 13). At the
WOULD PROMPTLY CONTACT same time, Syria had significant oil
EACH OTHER TO COORDINATE and gas reserves, which offered the
POSITIONS AND COOPERATE TO Soviets an opportunity to provide
ELIMINATE EMERGING THREATS technological support to its energy
SO THAT PEACE CAN BE ventures (Knight, 2015).
RESTORED” Although relations did not
(Sputnik news, 2015) always went so smooth, throughout
history Syria and Russia always appeared to resume their cooperation and support for each
other. As time passed by the Russo-Syrian ties enhanced and the mutual benefit of their alliance
was starting to become visible. When the relationship with Egypt went sour within years after
the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970 and the new regime in Egypt led by President Anwar
Sadat began leaning more towards the West, the USSR had once again good reasons for
strengthening its relation with Syria.
The rise of the Ba’ath regime in 1971, led by Hafiz al-Assad, appeared to be
advantageous for the elites of the USSR. The new Syrian leaders saw mutual political,
strategical, and security benefits in the intentions Russia had towards the Middle East, which
included a naval and air base and listening station and managed to raise the Russian-Syrian
relation to the next level. It seemed as if Hafiz al-Assad saw mutual benefits
This ameliorating cooperation resulted in the signing of an agreement in 1971 between
both parties that allowed the USSR to use Syria’s deep-water port at Tartus. This port would
not only benefit Syria, as export from the USSR would go via the port, but also provided the
USSR access to the Mediterranean Sea allowing the security of both states to enhance. Shortly
after the establishment of the Russian naval base, their relation led to yet another important
moment for the intensification of the Russo-Syrian cooperation, namely the signing of the
Treaty of Friendship and cooperation in October 1980. In this treaty the Soviet Union and
Syria promised “to build up universal peace and security of nations, to facilitate détente and
embody it in specific forms of cooperation, to resolve contentious issues by peaceful means and
to eliminate hegemonism and aggression from international relations” (Sputnik news, 2015).

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The treaty contained a clause that stated that, “in the occurrence of situations jeopardizing
peace and security for either party, the two parties would promptly contact each other to
coordinate positions and cooperate to eliminate emerging threats so that peace can be restored”
(Ibidem). The Treaty served as a tool to further guarantee their mutual security and emphasized
once more the benefits both countries gained from their alliance.
This was becoming a source of concern for the US and this concern was further
confirmed by a yearbook about the World’s Armament and Disarmament published in 1987
by The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). According to this yearbook
the USSR had provided Syria with large amounts of combat equipment and therefore one
could argue that the cooperation is mainly based in strategic interdependence rather than on
other grounds, such as ideology, or economy. Although the cooperation between the two
parties has not always been as strong and stable as it should have been, it managed to survive
and remain in force these days, even when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and introduced
his glasnost and perestroika policies.
For a little while, it seemed as if the cooperation between the two parties would indeed
vanish, however this rather ambiguous security based relationship was not only able to endure
the fall of the Soviet Empire in 1991, it has been one of the reason for Russia to support the al-
Assad regime in the turmoil that has been going on for over five years now. This observation
raises the question: What might be the arguments that could explain the steadfast Russian
course of action regarding the crisis in Syria? For that reason, the next section will consist of an
analysis of arguments made by various academics, which will help provide an explanation that
comprehends all the factors and help us elucidate Russia’s course of actions with regard to the
current situation of its Syrian ally. Furthermore we will finish off this chapter by discussing
whether, or not these arguments fit within a realist framework as described in the first chapter.

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Nostalgia and Minimal Interests?
Since the historical background is now briefly elucidated, it is time to move on to the arguments
provided by different academics that could be useful in understanding and explaining Russia’s
course of action with regard to the Syrian conflict. An important argument brought up by Roy
Allison30 is that the relationship is considered to be the only Soviet residue in the Middle East,
for that reason, Russia is not eager to erupt this continuing political relations with the security
elite of al-Assad (Allison, 2013, 802-3). Although this argument is rather vague and could by
itself never explain the main reason for Putin to stand by his Middle Eastern ally, Syria. The
line, which Russian leaders and policy analysts unconsciously and frequently find themselves
crossing is a rather fine one, considering the capacity of a profounder Soviet and Russian
tradition of geopolitical and realist thought. For instance, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign
minister, remarked in an interview that:

Assad has been turned into a bogeyman. But, in reality all of these groundless charges—that
he is to blame for everything—are a cover for a big geopolitical game. The geopolitical map
of the Middle East is once again being reformatted as different players seek to secure their
own geopolitical positions. Many are concerned more about Iran than Syria. They are saying
bluntly that Iran should be deprived of its closest ally, which they consider Assad to be.
(Vorobyov 2012)

In this interview, Lavrov was claiming that the Syrian crisis beheld more profound (geo)
strategical security issues that might not always be so obvious for the majority of the observers.
While the West alleges that the al-Assad regime is to blame for the contemporary turmoil in
Syria, this assumption seems rather unjustified. It was exactly this quote that got me so curious
about the underlying reasoning behind the Russian support for the al-Assad regime in Syria.
Another argument that is often quoted, is the Russian naval base situated in Syria’s port
at Tartus. Despite the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has managed to keep its naval base
manifested at Tartus, this was accomplished by former Russian Minister of Finance, Aleksei
Kudrin. In May 2005, he settled an agreement with former Syrian Minister of Finance,
Muhammad al-Hussein that deducted 73 percent of Syria's Soviet-era debt which rose to $13.4
billion largely due to the purchasing of arms31. This deal guaranteed Russia’s base rights at
Tartus under the 1971 treaty. In addition to this, it enabled Syria to buy more armaments from
30
Is a scholar specialized in Russian and Eurasian IR and Director of the Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre
31
Moscow Writes off 73% of Syria’s Debt,” Interfax, 25 January 2005.

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Russia (Synovitz, 2012). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that Russia has restricted economic
benefits from Syria, as it represented merely 0.1% of Russia’s total trade in 2011 (Juneau, 2014,
47) and although Syria is an significant consumer of Russian armament, accounting 72% of its
arms purchase from 2007 to 2011, it only represents 5% of Russia’s total arms deliveries abroad
(Dannreuther, 2015, 88). Besides, Syria seems not to be paying for the Russian arms delivery,
due to the severe impact the war has on Syria’s economy. And if one should believe media
publications it will cost Syria 30 years to recover it economy to prewar standards (Baker, 2014).
For that reason, Russian support of Syria on economic grounds could well be rejected.
Nevertheless, since the shipment of armaments as well as the return of armaments for
restoration go via the port at Tartus, which is perfectly linked with progressive systems of roads
and highways, the preservation of this sea port is, thus more importantly for Syria. This is more
in line with Samuel Charap’s32 argument, saying that Syria and Russia are mostly dependent on
one another regarding support on issues such as, military, military-industrial, intelligence-
sharing, arms and a diplomatic shield, i.e. self-interest (Charap, 2013, 35). Thus, according to
Charap, Moscow could justify its motivations in keeping Assad in power from a realist’s point of
view. In addition, Amy Knight, an American historian of the USSR and Russia, states that
Russia could perceive a threat to its national interests as a threat to its structural international
position, which causes the upheaval around the port at Tartus to perfectly fit within a realist
perspective as well (Knight, 2015).
In contradiction to the previous authors, Roy Allison33 argues that Tartus merely
represents ‘strategic nostalgia’, since it only households three floating piers of which only one is
in actual use, a repair vessel on loan from the Black Sea fleet, warehouses and barracks housing
about 50 personnel (Allison, 2013, 807). Besides, the Russian government has been negotiating
with Lebanon and reached a deal to shift port calls by Russian naval vessels to Beirut. (Military
news agency Interfax-AVN Military news agency, 2013) Although Allison’s argument might be
over-exaggerated the naval base’s historically restricted character makes it hard to argue that
Putin regards the base to be so immensely crucial that a significant intervention was needed to
protect it. Therefore, a more encompassing argument should be provided in explaining Russia’s
position in Syria. One that might have to do with the gateway to the Mediterranean Sea that is
indeed provided by the Russian naval base at Tartus.
Additionally, the Russian Navy considers the Mediterranean gateway to be of immense
importance for operations in the Mediterranean and surrounding regions. Particularly for the
32
Samuel Charap is the Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
based in the IISS–Americas office in Washington DC
33
Who is he?

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reason that Russia’s operational competences could improve by the base, since vessels based
here are able to reach certain Seas and Oceans in only matter of days. Thus, although the
eastern parts of the Black Sea’s seashore continues to be under Russia’s regulation, Russian
elites endure to consider the states situated in the Eastern Mediterranean as necessary allies34,
despite the fact that they are not Russia’s surrounding neighbors. From both a realist
perspective as well as from a Russian perspective, this strategic access to the Mediterranean Sea,
which is extremely valuable for Russia as a country largely enclosed by land, opens a fast way to
the Indian Ocean and Red Sea through the Suez Canal and the Atlantic Ocean through the
Straits of Gibraltar and thus it provides extra security to its southern borders. This once more
confirms that the only relation that is to be found between Russia and Syria, is that of strategic
dependence.
On the other hand, the Russian government also finds it extremely important to come
across as a reliable ally to its other international political relations35. According to the standards
of these kind of credibility, Russia needs to be, at least supportive of Russia-friendly leaders and
their associates and oppose any sort of western campaigns to change their regime by force
(Allison, 2013, 800-5). With regard to Libya, that ship has sailed. For that reason, Russia needs
prove itself again for being a steadfast ally. During a news conference in Copenhagen President
Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister, gave the impression that Russia needs to redeem for its
abstention in accordance to UNSC Resolution 1973 and if it was up to him, he would have
casted a veto against Resolution 1973 (Barry, 2011). The Russian elites regret the fact that the
Medvedev administration abstained on UNSC Resolution 1973, which led to the approval of an
intervention in Libya. These regrets emphasize the importance of deeply held values, rather
than concrete regional interests, in Russian way of thinking (Charap, 2013, 37).
Initially, Russia did not seek to privilege Libyan sovereignty over the need for ‘all
necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’, as
it was under the belief that it was purely based on resolving the intensifying humanitarian crisis
(Alison, 2013, 797). However, as soon as Russia discovered that humanitarian intervention
under the banner of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was a smokescreen for ending the regime of
Gaddafi, Putin’s accusation towards the West about the political validity of a leadership was
confirmed (Alison, 2013, 797). Since that date, Russia has strongly been opposed to the George

34
Arab Mediterranean countries are situated nearby transportation lines crucial for Russian relations with the
southern hemisphere, and they represent an important strategic interest to Moscow.
35
The commercial relationship and Russian Naval Base in Syria have been at stake together with the Russian image
of being a steadfast ally seems important internationally for the credibility of Russia’s other political alignments. It is
therefore important for Russia to stay loyal to Syria since it has already lost some credibility due to the 2011
situation in Libya.

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W. Bush administration’s interpretation of “democracy promotion” and “transformational
diplomacy”, whereby it is justified to change a regime by force that does not comply with the
Washington approved model of democracy (Lukyanov, 2016, 34).
In contradiction to what many Western states claim, namely that Russia is against the
need for radical reform in Syria and that Russia is just unconditionally supporting Asad, Putin
elaborated himself during an interview on August 2013, saying that a naïve glorification of
liberal democracy, supported and promoted by the West, was a key issue of the violence in the
region (Dannreuther, 2015, 81)

In my opinion, this is happening because some people from outside believe that if the region
were to be bought into compliance with a certain idea—an idea that some call democracy—
then peace and stability would ensue. That’s not how it works. You can’t ignore the region’s
history, traditions and religious beliefs, and you can’t just interfere (Putin, 2013)

Furthermore, since the start of the military offensive by the US and European countries
to change the Gaddafi regime, which was far from what was agreed upon, both Russia and
China felt misled. Therefore a similar situation like with Libya was not to happen again under
the administration of Putin, as he referred to it as ‘a medieval call to crusade’ (Putin, 2011).
Thus, instantly after his re-appointment, in May 2012 Moscow took a stand against UN in
accordance to the Syrian upheaval. Both Russia and China stated that their goal was to guard
against instability and with the help of each other they casted a veto against a resolution in
October 201136, one in February 201237 and again in May 201438. They declared that they just
cannot be certain that the intentions of the UN are purely humanitarian (Charap, 2013, 37).
Severe suspicion and distrust of intervention by the West has also been an endless
subject in post-Soviet Russian strategic philosophy, where interventions by the West, justified on
humanitarian bases, into Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 were largely observed in Russia to
be an elaborate cover for a calculated strategy of expansionism by NATO (Dannreuther, 1999,
152-3). According to Roland Dannreuther39, suspicions from Russian elite eventually went so far
as to the belief that the West was using its ‘soft power’, predominantly through support of
36
A draft UN Resolution calling for a Syrian-led political process and condemned ‘grave and systematic human
rights violations’ in Syria.
37
A draft UN Resolution calling for the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down.
38
A draft UN Resolution calling for the crisis in Syria to be referred to the international criminal court
39
Is of head of the Department of Politics and International Relations and Professor of International Relations at
the University of Westminster and International Fellow at the Department of International Relations at Tbilisi
State University in Georgia. His studies revolve around the area of security and IR with a particular focus on
Russia, the Middle East and Central Asia.

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Western-oriented Non-Governmental Organizations, to foment domestic political opposition
and to engineer ‘colored revolutions’ among the former Soviet states (Dannreuther, 2015, 82).
Russia constantly fears the threat of stability that successes with the Arab Spring would
create, giving the West more opportunities to participate in regime change through the
justification of ‘humanitarian intervention’ led by the UN. Especially, since a national
dissatisfaction and open hostility to the leading regime rose in 2011 and 2012, and blew out
right to the heart of Moscow as large opposition demonstrations complained about the
corruption and autocracy of Russia’s political structure (Ibidem). Safeguarding against such
intervention was, for that reason, a crucial objective of Russian policy-making which resulted in
Russia’s opposition to external military intervention in the Syrian situation and above all the
casting of vetoes to all draft UN Resolutions as it claimed that they were just an elaborate
smokescreen for regime change by force. As a countermeasure Russia equipped Syria with a
diplomatic shield, arms, financial aid, and air forces.
Yet, arguments for Russia’s course of actions vary from an act out of justice to prevent
the Assad’s regime from being toppled, since this would be against international law, to a way
for Russia to re-assure its place on the world stage, as doing nothing would mean another battle
lost for Russia against the West. Georgy Mirsky, Professor at Moscow’s Higher School of
Economics argued that, since Putin has been supporting the al-Assad regime for quite a while,
letting him be toppled at this point would mean that Putin is withdrawing under US force, which
is something Putin would not allow to happen (N.S., 2015). This is in line whit what Ronald
Dannreuther argues, namely that there was an intentional implementation of self-control in
Russia, which was to restrict Russia’s fulfillment and sense of schadenfreude that the approach
of the Western world was not successful in realizing its main strategic goals. On the contrary,
their goal to topple the al–Assad regime actually caused the regime to gain in power and attain a
few military successes in 2014 (Dannreuther, 2015, 79). On the other hand Sergey Karaganov40
argued that it was to put a halt to Western expansionism with an “iron fist” (S. Karaganov,
2011).
More controversial to the abovementioned arguments is Andrej Kreutz argument,
stating that Russia needs to have a healthy relations with the centers of the Islamic World, since
it inhabits Europe‘s largest Muslim population41. Besides, the Russian government and Russian

40
Sergey Karaganov is a Russian political scientist who leads the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, a security
analytical institution founded by Vitaly Shlykov. Karaganov was a close associate of Yevgeny Primakov, and has
been Presidential Advisor to both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin.
41
According to the Pew Research Center report ―On Mapping the Global Muslim Population‖, as of 8 October
2009, Russia had 16,482,600 Muslim inhabitants, which represented 11.7% of its total population. However, the

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analysts considered the Arab Spring to be an enhancement and affirmation of Islamist
extremism which was considered to undermine stability within the Middle East as well as
(potentially) Russia (Dannreuther, 2015, 78). Therefore, the next section is dedicated solely on,
what I consider to be one of Russia´s biggest security threats, extremist Sunni Islam.

real figures are difficult to establish. One needs to distinguish between practicing and cultural traditional Muslims,
the latter number probably being much higher. As the peoples of the former USSR had been submitted to a long-
lasting anti-religious campaign, the religious attachments often survived as a part of social traditions and popular
culture.

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Russia’s biggest Security threat
As shown in the previous sections, from the start of the Syrian crisis, in 2011 various media
sources have persistently produced information on Russian arms sales to Syria, Russia’s desire
to obstruct Western intervention in Syria, its naval facility at Tartus and Russia’s access to the
Mediterranean Sea. A more noteworthy and plausible argument that is often less highlighted,
and by way of which the security dilemma in realism could explain Russia’s course of actions
with regard to Syria has been the concerns Russia has about the replacement of secular leaders
in Syria (and other Arab states) by Sunni Islamist governments from the moment the Arab
Spring began.
To elaborate on this, Russia is worried that the complete breakdown of Syria would
mean the termination of a decades-old cooperation and jeopardize Russia’s strategic position in
the rest of the Middle East. Besides, the Syrian crisis has expanded the capacities of Islamist
terror organizations, which implies that Islamic insurgents do not solely pose a threat to the al-
Assad regime, but a potential threat to Russia as well and could therefore be perceived as a risk
to Russia’s structural position. As illustrated by the map in the image below, image 3.1, Russia is
directly surrounded by regions, such as the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where a threat of
Sunni Islamists cannot be excluded.

Image 3.1. Russia and its neighbors

Figure 1. Russia and its neighbors. Reprinted from “Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are fighting for
Isil?”, by A. Kirk, 2016, The Telegraph, Copyright 2016 by The Telegraph.

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From a Russian point of view, Russia has been part of a nearly constant battle against
Islamist extremism ever since the late 1970s, which ranges from the Soviet experience in
Afghanistan, to the Islamist civil war in Tajikistan, and to the revolution in Chechnya in the
North Caucasus, which in the late 1900s remarkably changed from being a primarily chauvinist
separatist to a more fundamental Islamist battle (Dannreuther, 2015, 81). In addition to this, by
early 2000, the Islamization of the Chechen revolution found a way to further transform into a
more widespread Islamist revolution in the entire North Caucasus, which endures to threaten
the stability of the North Caucasus region, first and foremost considering that Russia has already
fought two civil wars and endures to fight the so-called Caucasus Emirate (Charap, 2013, 35-36).
The escalation in Islamic extremism has, however not been restricted to the Caucasus
Emirate. In the first decade of the 21st century, the formerly reasonably peaceful Volga Region,
which is the industrial and political heartland of the Russian Federation, along with some other
regions that inhabit large Muslim population experienced an increase in Islamists movements.
In July 2012 extremists seriously wounded a prominent mufti of Tatarstan, Ildus Faizov, in a car
bomb attack and on the exact same day his deputy the Muslim cleric of Tatarstan, Valiulla
Yakupov, was shot and killed (Malashenko, 2013, 18). These attacks were similar to others
attacks executed by extremists in the Caucasus, which caused this revolutionary period to be
characterized by the visible increase of radical point of views, attacks, and radical organizations
as well as study circles became vigorous. Soon the term “Caucasization of Tatarstan” arose to
define the changes in the largest Muslim republic of the Volga basin and Urals region
(Malashenko, 2015, 142).
The March 2010 bombing attack in Moscow‘s metro, along with the abovementioned
developments once more drew the attention of the world to the fact that Russia is still presently
threatened by extensive terrorist threats and separatist movements in Northern Caucasus
(Kreutz, 2010, 5). One must not forget that Russia households Europe’s largest Muslim
populations which contains of over 20 million Russian Muslims, the majority of whom are
Sunni and live in the North Caucasus (Charap, 2013, 35-36). For that reason, a security
dilemma is generated, wherein Russia has valid motives for fearing the rise of Islamic
extremism, even as engaging in activity against potential foes exposes it to greater security
threats.
Furthermore, the Russian government definitely considers Islamist extremist
organizations, such as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and Ahrar al-Sham, which are the largest
organizations and are all located in Syria, to be a threat to Russia’s national security. For the

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most part, this is due to the fact that hundreds of volunteers from the North Caucasus have
joined and are still joining the positions of one of these organizations (Baev, 2015, 13). Besides,
as shown by table 3.2, ISIS fighters from abroad, Russians are the fourth largest group of
foreign volunteers that travelled to Syria to fight, many of whom joined extremist groups such as
ISIS, whereas others formed their own groups that fought side-by-side with ISIS (Barrett, 2014,
16). These volunteers might cause security problems if they return to Russia, as Islamist
organizations could destabilize Russia’s North Caucasus region (Barrett, 2014, 27-28). Notably
since the spokesman of ISIS, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, made a territorial claim on the
Southern of Russia, declaring it to be a ‘province’ of the emirate (Oliphant, 2015).
According to realists approaches the actions of states, principally super powers, in IR
could be generally understood regarding a logic of competitive behavior intended to increase
the power and/or security of a state (Jackson, 2003, 1-2). To a certain extent it is thus logical that
Putin worries about the possibility of the loss of the North Caucasus to ISIS, since he argued in
an interview, in 2000 that ‘Russia as a state in its current form would cease to exist’ if that was to
happen. In a series of interviews in 2000 Putin claimed that “the essence of the ... situation in
the North Caucasus and in Chechnya ... is the continuation of the collapse of the USSR.... If we
did not quickly do something to stop it, Russia as a state in its current form would cease to
exist” (Hill, 2013). These kind of announcements strengthen the argument that for Russia a
security dilemma is generated, as Putin implies the Russian government considers its security
and hence its structural position is threatened by Islamist extremist groups.

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Figure 3.2. ISIS fighters from abroad

Figure 2. ISIS fighters from abroad. Reprinted from “Foreign Fighters in Syria,” by R. Barrett, 2014, The Soufan
Group, p. 13. Copyright 2014 by The Soufan Group.

In addition to local security threats, Putin also justified Russia’s invasion in Syria as a
battle against global terrorism, signaling that Islamist extremists who are fighting alongside with
ISIS could come back home and execute terrorist attacks. Accordingly, the Russian government
has implemented a law in November 2013 that forbids participation in an armed group in a
foreign country opposing to Russian policy (Barrett, 2014, 27). Be that as it may, it seems far
more plausible that Russia’s own contribution to the Syrian conflict will stimulate, instead of
restrain, such threats (Knight, 2015). However, these kind of laws do not act as a restrain and
instead purely complicate joint legal support between States (Barrett, 2014, 27). However,
measures need to be taken to decrease the number of so-called ‘jihadist’ leaving and returning
to Russia.
Also, as discussed earlier Russia counts a large population of Sunni Muslims, and many
millions more live in the former Soviet republics that surround Russia; and although Russia has
a long history of rebellious and extremists attacks, up to this day, fortunately no incidents are
connected to the Syrian conflict, or ISIS in general (Knight, 2015). Nonetheless, as have been
argued Russia’s incursions on Sunni Islamist extremist in Syria might effect a radicalization and
counterattack mainly from the Muslims that live in the North Caucasus (Knight, 2015). For the
most part, since Russian analyzes are starting to perceive a serious threat from the old secular
Arab nationalist structure, they claim that the moderate political Islam, like the Muslim

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Brotherhood are struggling with Sunni extremists organizations, like ISIS, al-Quada, and their
associates. Dannreuther argues that this perceptions of a dichotomized civil war in Syria is
profoundly entrenched in Russian thinking, saying that Russia’s philosophy is founded on
Russia’s own experiences of dealing with the Muslim world (Dannreuther, 2010, 9).
The Russian elites had emphasized the threat of a rise of Islamist extremist and used
this threat to legitimize Russian intervention. Lavrov has characterized ISIS as Russia’s most
important threat (Kozhanov, 2015). This is confirmed in several statements of the Russian
president, Putin including one in which he stated that by the intervening in Syria he was acting
out of precautions, fighting and destroying terrorists and militants in Syria before they come
back home to Russia (BBC News, 2015). Since the expansion of Islamist extremists could lead
to turmoil, more security threats and possible separatism within Russia itself, they need to be
eliminated directly by the Russian government. Therefore, Putin’s concerns in the case of Syria
do not only comply with the security dilemma, as it also involves another dilemma referred to,
by Brian L. Job42 as the ‘insecurity dilemma’.
Hence, in addition to the concerns of the Russian government about the increasing
involvement of Islamist extremists, such as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Quada, and Ahrar al-
Sham, Russia is likewise concerned about Russian fighters for these organizations returning
home and causing turmoil and a rise of extremist movements on Russian soil, such as in
Chechnya, and the Volga and Urals region, where the biggest Muslim populations live. For that
reason, the ‘insecurity dilemma’, seems appropriate as well. Opposed to the security dilemma,
where states are exposed to the threat of the international anarchic order and thus have to
protect themselves from what might occur outside their borders, the ‘insecurity dilemma’
perceives the surrounding areas as the basis of security instead of threats. Job argues that the
insecurity dilemma is capable of capturing the security dilemma of Russia, since its state
weakness and insecurity have led the Russian leaders to try to find external support to improve
their own position. State weakness refers to the divided Russian regions and the various internal
conflicts as a result of this strong division and insecurity in Russia. The state weakness and
insecurity led the Russian elites to search for external support to enhance their own position
(Fumagalli, 2011, 193-4). Russia’s increased involvement in the Arab Middle East, in particular
Putin’s support for the Syrian Al-Assad regime, consequently of the augmented security threat
from Islamist extremists appears, thus, to be a good example of Job’s insecurity dilemma. In the

42
Brian L. Job (PhD, Indiana University) is a Political Scientist and a resident Faculty Associate of the Liu Institute
who wrote the book The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States.

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sense that, the battle against terrorism created a favorable circumstance for making a discursive
connection between national upheaval and the international threat of terrorism (Ibidem).
For all the above reasons, relations with Arab Middle Eastern leaders (states) might even
be more important for Moscow than they might be for the U.S.A. and other Western powers.
This makes the expansion and cultivation of these Middle Eastern relations more essential for
Russia. Moreover, Moscow identifies itself as a possible negotiator between the Muslim Arab
states and the West considering the history of cooperation Russia shares with the Islamic world,
since the Soviet era and its own large Muslim population (Oliker, K. Crane, & Yusupo, 2009).
Cooperation with the Islamic World might be useful in the battle against anti-Russian
extremism and Caucasian separatism (Kreutz, 2010, 5).

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Conclusion
In this thesis I have focused on explaining Russia’s behavior and the way its relationship with
the West has changed over the past several years. Rather than trying to understand Putin’s
course of actions with regard to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis from an empirical perspective
alone, this thesis tried to do so by applying and testing several theoretical approaches. That is, it
analyzed to what extent theories in the discipline of IR can explain Russia’s course of actions in
the past five years with respect to Ukraine and Syria. The focus was put, in particular, on the
contemporary situation concerning the west – the US, EU, and NATO - and Russia, which led
to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis. I argued that the situation between these parties is fed and
maintained by a past of endemic and shared distrust, and was therefore an exemplary case of
the security dilemma within theoretical frameworks: realism.
This, however, does not mean that other theories might not be able to provide an
explanation for Russia’s course of action with regard to Ukraine and Syria. That is why this
thesis also briefly analyzed alternative theories, such as liberalism and constructivism, to
discover to what extent these theories will be able to explain Russia’s behavior in the past five
years, even though they are not at the heart of my theory. But, as with any explanation, choices
need to be made and for that reason, one should be aware of the fact that such an undertaking
could mean that some arguments were not included in the outline of this thesis, which is logical
since some theories consider some factors substantially less important to prove their point.
The point that this thesis wanted to prove was that while liberalism failed to analyze how
world leaders handle possible future issues of uncertainty and fear, as leaders do not have the
capacity to read the minds of other leaders, the security dilemma was indeed able to
demonstrate the value of an explanatory theoretical framework: realism Nevertheless, liberalism
is one of the traditional disciplines within IR that has been a guide to how both Russian and
Western policymakers sought to structure their relationship after the Cold War. But due to the
ever changing world, state leaders were obliged to change their track in order to compete within
the globalizing world, the new balance of power and the global security threats, as is the case
with Russia’s leaders, including President Vladimir Putin.
Although Yeltsin started off embracing the Western world order and liberalism, his
successor Putin saw the need to change to a more realist approach when he became the second
president of the Russian Federation in 2000. The globalizing world unfortunately did not only
create positive changes, as it also made terrorism a global issue. And although Russia was willing
to fight terrorism with the West after 9/11 Putin was not going to allow the West to promote

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their democratic standards to the rest of the world, especially not in countries that are of vital
importance to Russia’s sphere of influence and national security.
What seems to vex Putin, is that Western leaders appear to believe that they possess
such a successful formula for securing human rights and liberal democracy that they fail to see
that this formula is not a one-size fits all approach. During a visit to the Middle East in 2007,
Putin expressed his fairly realist approach and rightly argued that if a political system is not
within the nature of a nation, and thus is imposed by external world leaders this could likely
lead to disastrous consequences. Putin’s realpolitik approach was applauded by leaders of the
Arab Middle East.

From the point of view of stability in this, or that region, or in the world in general, the
balance of power is the main achievement of these past decades and indeed of the whole
history of humanity. It is one of the most important conditions for maintaining global
stability and security […]
I do not understand why some of our partners (Europe and the U.S.).. see themselves as
cleverer and more civilized and think that they have the right to impose their standards on
others. The thing to remember is that standards that are imposed from the outside, including
in the Middle East, rather than being a product of a society’s natural internal development,
lead to tragic consequences, and the best example of this is Iraq (Cohen, 2007).

Nevertheless, I strongly believe that Western world leaders have also come to realize
that imposing their liberal standards has not always been as fruitful as they would have want it to
be. However, this did not lead to a change of track for the West as it did for Russia. Russia
gradually turned into an aggressive and assertive great power that was dedicated to securing its
national interests and security. Thus, when Western involvement further increased in former
Soviet-controlled Europe reaching Ukraine, knowing the country expressed its vested interest in
EU and consequently NATO membership Russia reacted in a way that went down in history as
a ‘Hitler-style’ land grab. But before the West had time to recover from this unpleasant,
unexpected and humiliating Russian response to a generated security dilemma, another security
dilemma was lurking on Russia’s southern periphery.
The growing influence of Islamist extremist organizations, such as ISIS and Al-Quada in
Arab Middle Eastern states, resulting into the Arab springs was progressively approaching the
Russian borders. After the North Caucasus had been declared a province of the caliphate of
ISIS and Islamist extremist activities had increased resulting in some terrorist attacks on anti-

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extremist muftis, the security threat had to be taken seriously. According to Job there is a need
to reconsider the conventional realist notions of states. Regardless of the rise of studies on
Russian security issues, for the most part concerning the period of Vladimir Putin, security
remains to be mostly incorporated within the wide-ranging literature on Russian foreign policy.
(Kuhrt, 2014, 130). Consequently, these studies are designed to analyze external rather than
internal security issues. However, in Russia’s case it is vital to deal with both internal and
external security issues that it is experiencing, this approach is referred to as the “insecurity
dilemma”. The fact that Russia is a weak and instable state causes Russia to seek support from
outside its periphery to overcome both internal and external security threats from Islamist
extremist (organizations).
Regardless of Putin’s weak hand, he has been remarkably successful at vexing Western
projects on former Soviet-controlled Europe and the Arab Middle East. He managed to end
further eastward expansion by NATO and together with China Russia has been successful in
interfering with the realization of a UNSC Resolution that would allow interference in Syria on
ground of humanitarian support. Putin was able to dismember Georgia, annex Crimea and
tightened his hold on other East Ukrainian regions. According to Western scholars, pundits
and politicians, Putin seems to be sentencing Russia to a bleak future of poverty and exclusion
(Mead, 2014, 76-7). However, the Crimean adventure has made it evident that Russia does not
put its priorities in economic improvement and its incorporation into the global economy if its
national interests and security are at stake.
Putin considers Russia’s influence in the Arab Middle Eastern regions as a vital
advantage in Russia’s competitiveness with the US. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Putin
will automatically contradict U.S. objectives every time, but it does mean that Putin will try his
best not to allow Western leaders, led by the US to propagate their Washington approved
liberal democratic standards all over the world and force regime change under the banner of
humanitarian aid. With Russia increasingly aligning itself with Arab Middle Eastern and Asian
countries rather than the West, it might be possible that conflict in the European region
increase. However, it is still too early to predict Russia’s future course of actions with regard to
both the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis, as they are still ongoing at time of writing this thesis.
Nevertheless, it is more than evident that Putin believes that Russia ought to protect its
own interests and be flexible in the search of this goal. For the Russian president, this seems to
be a rational conclusion, considering that it is a country largely enclosed by land with rich
deposits of mineral resources, and surrounded by Western allies which could pose a security
threats for Russia. In addition, Russia is threatened by growing separatism and the struggles with

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Chechnya, which are as reported by Russia provoked by the extremists that stood behind 9/11
as well. It should not come as a surprise that Putin therefore wishes to maintain and if not
increase Russian-Syrian relations in order to preserve positive aspects of the former Russia-
Middle Eastern relation. Moreover, Russian leaders want to verify Russia’s reputation as an
approachable country toward Islam and its people (Dannreuther, 2010, 17). Nevertheless, Putin
seems to know his limits in supporting Syria and opposing the West in its projects, as he does
not want to completely undermine the possibility of cooperation with Washington and other
western countries, which he sees as still being important power players.
To conclude, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support to Syria as a reaction to the
course of events of the past five years is more than logical from a realist perspective. Many
realism theorists, including Mearsheimer and Götz argue that any state leader who might be
experiencing a possible security threat is willing to go to extremes to guarantee the security of his
nation. When Putin annexed Crimea to secure his nation’s periphery, this should not have
come across as something unusual, or remarkable, as states have been doing this for centuries.
As for Russia’s support for the upheavals in Syria, Putin not only seems to fear the expansion of
ISIS into Russia, but he also seems to fear the threat of stability that successes with the Arab
Spring would create. This would give Western leaders more opportunities to impose regime
changes justified by the means of ‘humanitarian intervention’. Russian elites fear that their
nation might be the next in line, especially since a national dissatisfaction and open hostility to
the leading regime rose in 2011 and 2012.
However, with the casting of vetoes by Russia and China to draft UN Resolutions
concerning intervention in Syria, Western leaders hopefully have come to realize that liberal
democracy is not the Holy Grail and imposing it randomly on any non-western nation is a
recipe for failure. In general though, since many current great world leaders (including Russia
and the US) already pursue a liberal world order in theory, but in practice they seem to be
pursuing the state’s national and private interests, they should continue to walk this road. A mix
of realpolitik and liberal internationalism might not be bad after all.

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Figures
Figure 1. Russia and its neighbors. Reprinted from “Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters
are fighting for Isil?”, by A. Kirk, 2016, The Telegraph, Copyright 2016 by The
Telegraph.
Figure 2. ISIS fighters from abroad. Reprinted from “Foreign Fighters in Syria,” by R. Barrett,
2014, The Soufan Group, p. 13. Copyright 2014 by The Soufan Group

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