TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

School of Economics and Business Administration

International Relations institute

Mariliis Otskivi

THE POSSIBLE RUSSIAN THREAT TOWARDS THE BALTIC

STATES AND NATO’S ROLE IN IT
Bachelor’s thesis

Supervisor: PhD, Associate Professor Holger Mölder

Tallinn 2016
I declare I have written the research paper independently.
All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of literature and
elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

…………….…………………………….. .
(signature, date)
Student code: 134051
Student’s e-mail address: [email protected]

Supervisor PhD, Associate Professor Holger Mölder

The thesis conforms to the requirements set for the bachelor’s theses

…………….…………………………….. .
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Chairman of defence committee:

Pertmitted to defence

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... 6

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 7

1. POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE BALTIC STATES ......................................................... 9

1.1 Issues between Russia and the Baltic states ................................................................... 10

1.2 The influence of Ukraine crisis ...................................................................................... 11

2. BALTICS AND RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD ............ 13

2.1 Baltics issues related to the national security threats ..................................................... 13

2.1.1 Energy Security ....................................................................................................... 13

2.1.2 Ethnic minorities in the Baltics ............................................................................... 15

2.2 Deeper look into the Baltic and Russian relations .......................................................... 17

2.2.1 Russia and Estonia ................................................................................................... 17

2.2.2 Russia and Latvia..................................................................................................... 17

2.2.3 Russia and Lithuania ............................................................................................... 18

3. NATO PARTICIPATION IN THE BALTICS .................................................................... 21

3.1 NATO Enlargement and Russia in 2004 ........................................................................ 21

3.2 NATO and Baltics today ................................................................................................ 22

3.3 Participation of the United States ................................................................................... 24

4. RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW ON THE SITUATION ......................................................... 26

4.1 Russia’s intentions towards the Baltic states .................................................................. 27

4.2 Russia’s military competence ......................................................................................... 29

4.3 Russian propaganda ........................................................................................................ 31

5. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES FOR BALTICS ....................................................................... 33

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 5.1 The advantages and disadvantages of NATO development ........................................... 33

5.1.1 NATO enlargement in the Eastern Europe .............................................................. 33

5.1.2 Achieving the peace................................................................................................. 33

5.1.3 Cooperation with third parties ................................................................................. 34

5.2 Prospects for the NATO’s security arrangements in the Baltics .................................... 34

5.3 Baltics armed forces improvement ................................................................................. 35

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 37

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 38

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Figure 1. Russian gas supply .................................................................................................... 14
Figure 2. Ethnic Russian minorities in the Baltics ................................................................... 16
Figure 3. NATO Countries Believe U.S will come to Defence of Allies ................................ 25
Figure 4. Top 11 World Powers .............................................................................................. 30
Figure 5. NATO expenditures on defence ............................................................................... 30

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ABSTRACT
Relations between the Baltic states and the Russian Federation have changed after the
Crimea, Ukraine annexation by Russia in 2014. After the events the Baltic states have felt
threatened, as well as the organisations where the countries belong, NATO and the European
Union. The concerns for potential threat arise from Russia´s military activities in the Baltic
Sea region and their increase in military expenditures. Another issue is that Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania are not certain whether the Alliance’s members would come to their defence if
Article 5 were invoked. The thesis looks as well into the potential changes in the near future
to ensure the Baltics´ national defence.
Keywords: Russian Federation, the Baltic states, NATO, international relations,
Ukraine crisis

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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the thesis is to find out if there is a real threat towards the Baltic states
from Russia. Furthermore, it analyses the concerns for the Baltic security and takes a look
into the common national view on defence of the three countries. Achieving the goal of the
research, the paper relies on the relevant war-games, articles, books and public documents
written by policy makers and shapers. The thesis first states the problem of the topic and what
has influenced it. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) plays a great role in the
three states, it as well finds out its purpose in the area. The paper continues with the possible
solutions and evaluation. It seeks answers to the questions: What are the potential threats to
the Baltic states? How does NATO participate in the Baltics´ national defence? What are
Russia’s objectives in the region? Other issues related to the topic are, for instance, Crimea
occupation by Russia in 2014 and Russia supplying the Baltics with energy and electricity.
The Baltic states are among the nations supporting international sanctions against
Russia following the Ukraine crisis. Nonetheless, Baltic countries are operating within the
limits of the district's economic ties to Russia and the interests of bigger European Union
nations who need to maintain cooperative relations with Moscow. These competing forces
will make it hard for the Baltics to keep up a forceful position on Russia, constraining them to
respond to the occasions as opposed to moving proactively in the standoff between Moscow
and the West.
In the previous years, the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region has
deteriorated significantly. Russia has adopted a forceful hostile approach towards Western
revisionism and has turned out to be an immediate and open threat to NATO. This is
especially relevant to the eastern part of the Alliance, the Baltic states and Poland. NATO,
however, is more advanced than Russia, both militarily and economically. Nevertheless, when
it comes to the Baltic Sea region, the military capability is completely different, concerning
the armed forces in the area and the advantages Russia has of geographic proximity and time
factor.

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 The purpose of the thesis is to find out the most logical approach to accomplish and
maintain a resistant security position in the Baltic Sea area and to analyse the possible ways to
minimize the danger of Russia against the nations in the region. Furthermore, it focuses on the
potential threats from Russia, as well as on the Baltic states` self-defence opportunities,
NATO’s participation in the area and Russia’s military competence in order to find out the
solutions to preserve freedom of the Baltic countries.

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1. POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE BALTIC STATES
A threat against one nation, more specifically a military threat, is defined as a potential
use of military force in resolving diplomatic or economic issues. It is an extreme way to solve
the conflicts between two or more parties.
Russia has frightened the West more than one time with its military capacity. Starting
with Ukraine, when Russia proved their military capacity to the West and turned their
previous thoughts of its inefficiency around, in addition the “hybrid war” while integrating
subversion and invasion with sending military units to pick up an early military benefits.
Russia’s achievements with its actions made Western parties insecure, who started to plan an
intricate answer. At that point, in Syria, Russia utilized military power abroad on its previous
Soviet Union territories significantly since the end of the Cold War.
In spite of the fact that Russia's economic growth rate is decreasing and its military
powers are progressively tied up in Ukraine and Syria, NATO leaders, governments, and
observers are worried that Russian President Vladimir Putin's willingness to take risks has not
stopped (The Economist, 2015). New concerns have emerged after the previous events,
especially from the assumption that the Baltic states might be Russia's next potential military
target. Russia has a lot of support in the Baltics, especially in Estonia and Latvia, which have
large Russian-speaking minorities. Spying in Russia is on high level, as well as Russia’s
media propaganda. As Russia controls the Baltics´ energy and electricity supply, it may use it
against them.
Furthermore, recent events in Ukraine have raised the question, whether the same
could happen in the Baltics. Relations between Russia and NATO strained after Crimea voted
for integration of the region into the Russian Federation following a referendum on March 16,
2014. The West wrongly believed Moscow would be more receptive towards Ukraine
extending relations with the European Union than towards the Baltics joining NATO (Coffey
& Kochis, 2015). For Russia the Ukraine problem consisted in losing influence over an
essential neighbour country, not in the conflict about some particular institutional system.
Russia’s objectives in Ukraine were ensuring the rights of Russian-speakers to use the

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Russian language, establishing a federal Ukraine with devolution of power to the country’s
regions, and ensuring Ukraine’s continued “non-bloc” status. According to Moscow, it was
appropriate that Russia should invade as they did not want Ukraine to join NATO. The
expansion of NATO seemed unstoppable and because of that Russia needed to show its
military capacity.
The Baltic states have been becoming more cautious after the Crimea occupation and
the expansion of Russian military action in the Nordic and Baltic region. As a result Baltic
states are taking measures to secure their own military capabilities. Therefore, considering the
current security approaches and the military of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, all the countries
have expanded their military spending, the quantity of troopers and individuals from
volunteer Territorial Defence Forces, accelerating the modernization of programs, and – on
account of Lithuania – the reintroduction of enrolment (O'Dwyer, 2015). In the following next
years the Baltic states will concentrate on building up their own military abilities with the
insurance of the nation's region. The degree to which these arrangements can be executed will
depend mostly on the monetary and demographic circumstances of Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia.
To sum up, Russian animosity towards Ukraine rose fears among the Eastern-
European individuals from the NATO alliance together, particularly the Baltic states. At
present, the Baltic states are the targeted nations in the point of Russia's danger and to a great
extent rely on NATO for their security. The Baltic states realize that their military capacities
won't hold up against Russia's animosity as the NATO reaction may arrive past the point of
no return. NATO has after the Cold War faced the choice of whether to leave the area or
leave the business and has settled for the previous, changing itself and its power structure to
expeditionary missions far from NATO region, while European members took the chance to
lessen their defence spending in more peaceful times. Furthermore, there are questions
whether to strengthen both of the United States and NATO defence measures.

1.1 Issues between Russia and the Baltic states

In recent years north-eastern Europe has faced important security issues. Since the
three Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania became the members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union in 2004, they also brought along a
remarkable defence increase in the region. But the overall sovereignty and peace concerns in

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the region are serious issues that could damage European security and the state of the NATO
alliance in north-eastern Europe.
There are several security concerns in the Baltic Region. Despite the largely friendly
and open attitude of NATO toward Russia, the Russian regime adopted a distinctly and
publicly anti-NATO position in the past couple of years. Furthermore, Russia considers
NATO as a threat to its own national security (Galperovich, 2016). At the beginning of the
year 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new defence strategy document, where
he stated that “The build-up of the military potential of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and vesting it with global functions implemented in violations of norms of
international law, boosting military activity of the bloc’s countries, further expansion of the
alliance, the approach of its military infrastructure to Russian borders create a threat to the
national security. “ The statement is impelled from the rising military presence by the United
States and NATO’s allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe.
There is still significant attrition between the NATO allies the Baltic states and the
Russian Federation. For instance, there is an unresolved Estonian and Russian border issue
which originates from Russia’s unilateral changing of the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty Line
(Viktorova, 2006). Another case of the attrition is the recent cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007
(The Economist, 2007). There are large Russian minorities’ matters in the Baltic states
susceptible to an anti-Western propaganda spread by the Russian Federation. Another
continuing problem is the energy security for the region supplied by Russia. Finally, in
addition to the above-mentioned concerns, the three Baltic states are also facing the same
terrorism threat as the rest of the NATO nations.

1.2 The influence of Ukraine crisis

The Ukraine crisis started in 2014 with the Russian Federation is playing a certain role
in the problem. The Russian invasion in Crimea and the attempt to destabilize eastern Ukraine
made the Baltic countries anxious and persuaded NATO to send some forces in Eastern
Europe and the Baltic states to back up their security. The relations between NATO and
Russia had a new stage after the Ukrainian crisis, also in NATO's view of Euro-Atlantic
Security. The Alliance applied several measures to guarantee, especially in Eastern European
countries, that NATO is prepared to defend them in the circumstances of common defence. In
addition, NATO announced extra measures at the Wales Summit to adjust the Alliance to
meet up with the new strategy of Russia, named hybrid warfare, and developing challenges

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that will likely threaten the security of Alliance (NATO, 2014). These adaptation measures
include a variety of arrangements, from improving the effectiveness of the NATO Response
Force system to gaining critical capabilities.
The Ukrainian crisis, in addition to the Georgian crisis in 2008, is one of the most
remarkable crises for NATO with Russia in the post-Cold War period. The reason Russia acts
in the Euro-Atlantic region is primarily dependent on the frame of NATO as the main
deterrence force. The Ukrainian crisis demonstrated as well that the standpoint of the Alliance
during the Russia-Georgia war was not sufficient enough to frighten Russia. NATO’s failure
to frighten Russia from illegally occupying Crimea and secretly supporting separatists in
Ukraine, despite all its political pressure on Moscow, pointed out that NATO did not or could
not adjust itself to the new security challenges that were caused by Russia, based on the
lessons learned after the Russia-Georgia war (Gressel, 2015).
Before Russia started its aggression towards Ukraine, including the invasion of
Crimea, three Baltic states had felt a higher level of security because of their participation in
NATO and the EU. The situation changed after that. The authorities of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania claimed that Russia had been seeking for an aggressive policy against them for a
long time, using several tools of power. Baltics agree that Russia is now able to arrange
sabotaging actions against them in various fields and that these could endanger both their
internal stability and the regional solidarity. The Baltic states’ response to the danger from
Russia has showed that the possible cooperation between them is low (The Economist, 2015).
During the difficulties several weaknesses have been revealed in fields of how these states
function, which Moscow might be willing to use as its own interests.
To sum up, the next potential target for the Russian Federation might be the Baltics
because of the similar reason as Ukraine was: being a part of the Soviet Union in the past,
lying next to Russia and having a mentionable number of ethnic Russians living there.
However, Ukraine had in addition to these problems social and economic problems and
strategic ambitions.

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2. BALTICS AND RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD
WAR PERIOD
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania share a large number of the same dangers and
difficulties in the area. Due to that the countries deal with these issues in the same way. The
three Baltic states do not have in general great defence capabilities because of their restricted
assets. The foundation of their power structure comprises of light land forces, and they have
practically no air and maritime force abilities. Estonia depends on a reserve that is based on
the national military service, while Latvia and Lithuania generally move towards having small
professional armed forces of maximum 5000 soldiers (Nikers, 2015). Due to the small
number of forces, Baltics count on the third parties, on NATO and the United States.
The Baltic states, as NATO and EU members, have fully agreed on the security
policies of those alliances. Definitely, the national security problems and priorities appear to
be different from other NATO and European Union nations. If there appears one common
Baltic opinion on the security threat, it is an agreement that Russia is an on-going threat and
problem. Most of the security concerns of the three Baltic states involve Russia in one way or
another. Analysing the reports it is clear that Russia might be a possible threat to the Baltic
Region security in the future. The one possible outcome is that Russia would prefer to use its
soft power, its propaganda, as well as its position as a major energy supplier to the area, and
its diplomatic power to undermine the Baltic states and pull the Baltics back into the sphere of
Russian influence (Persson, 2014).

2.1 Baltics issues related to the national security threats

2.1.1 Energy Security

Russia and Baltic energy relations are inherited from infrastructural interdependencies,
which take roots from Soviet legacies. Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian reliance on Soviet oil
and gas infrastructures has been of crucial importance also since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Every Baltic state depends on the energy sources from abroad (see Figure 1). For
Lithuania, however, this is no longer the case anymore, as from 2014, Norwegian contract

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supplies Lithuania with the energy from Klaipeda (International, 2016). Thus, Lithuania is no
longer the weakest of being manipulated with its energy supplies by Russia, as it was before
2014 (Smith, 2004). Latvia is as well highly vulnerable and counts on Russia for the bigger
part of its gas and oil. Estonia, however, is the least vulnerable in terms of energy, having
some of its own supplies of coal (Krutaine & Sytas, 2014). Estonia also imports oil and gas
through its ports and therefore is less dependent than Lithuania and Latvia, who receive oil
and gas from pipelines.

Figure 1. Russian gas supply

(Kirby, 2014)

These three states have been for a long time dependent on Russian gas supplies and
have had no access to the alternatives. Moreover, since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Russia’s Gazprom gained shares in each of the gas companies of the three states. Since then,
the three Baltic states have often considered a need to decrease a dependency on Gazprom’s
gas and stakes. Challenges emerged when the Baltic states joined the European Union. A
number of competing LNG projects created a tough political competition between the states
in Europe. A bilateral agreement with Norway salvaged Lithuania’s LNG prospects.
Consequently, Gazprom’s move gave a ground for the two other Baltic states´ option for the

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full ownership unbundling as well. However, this still did not decrease Baltic reticence on
Gazprom’s dependence. In this context, development of the gas infrastructure linking the
region to the rest of the European Union is a matter of urgency.
Nonetheless, each Baltic country is fully aware that the most vulnerable sector of their
economy is the energy supply which is mainly coming from Russia; to keep the sources open,
Baltics need to have good relations with Russia.

2.1.2 Ethnic minorities in the Baltics

As previously mentioned, Latvia and Estonia have significant Russian ethnic

minorities (see Figure 2). The Russian minorities are not often welcomed to the Baltic’s
society. Moreover, those who are not speaking either of the Baltic’s native language,
depending on the state, where they are living, are seen as a minor threat from Russia, as they
are not accepted like others (Person, 2015). The Russian regime sees the ethnic Russians as
natural supporters of their interests and contributors of Russian ethnic political parties,
politicians, and institutions in the Baltic states. Since the Baltic states gained independence,
ethnic tensions originating from the Russian minority have caused a few violent conflicts
between the ethnic Russian minorities and the Estonian and Latvian governments, for instance
the Bronze Soldier case in Tallinn 2007 (Hernad, 2012).

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 Figure 2. Ethnic Russian minorities in the Baltics

(Stratfor, 2014)

In the early-1990s, the tensions heightened due to the serious decrease of the economy
as the economies of the Baltic states made the adaptation to capitalist market economies.
Since then, history has played a big role in ethnic tensions as the Baltic governments,
representing the public opinion of the majority, have been trying to forget and remove the
communist-era memorials, which represent some of the ugliest moments of Estonian and
Latvian history. For the Russian ethnic minority, however, the memories of the Red Army
and its occupation of the Baltic states are a reminder of the glorious era of Soviet history. In
2007, the effort of the Estonian government to move an outstanding statue in memorial to the
Red Army in Tallinn created a violent response from Russian ethnic groups (Hernad, 2012).
As a consequence of the event one person died and several were injured, which shows that
there exists a certain threat from the east.

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2.2 Deeper look into the Baltic and Russian relations

2.2.1 Russia and Estonia

Economic ties between Estonia and Russia have become even closer: Russia has risen
to the third position on the list of Estonia’s trade partners, tourism continues to grow rapidly,
however, the border treaty has not been ratified. A low-intensity argument continues at the
diplomatic level: Russia still accuses Estonia of idealising Nazism and discriminating against
the Russian-speaking minority in the nation of 1.3 million - allegations that Estonia dismisses
(Reuters, 2014).
Russian-Estonian economic relations provide an excellent example of the general
development progressing leaving aside the political barriers. Since the two states have not
received by each other the most honoured nation status, the bilateral trade has is certain extent
directed through third countries, the trade capacity has been growing despite an unofficial and
politically motivated restriction imposed by Russia (Tüür, 2014). Restrictions on cross-border
trade imposed by Estonia on the basis of an official policy have removed an excessive
workload from border crossings and facilitated an explosive growth of tourism. Therefore it
seems that transit through Estonia will decrease somewhat because Russia has been
redirecting cargo traffic to its own ports. However, these losses will be compensated by other
joint activities, including the development of industrial parks in Ida-Viru County with the
participation of Russian capital.
Since there are no changes in the principle standpoints of Estonia and Russia in
relation with each other, their mutual complaints will also stay the same. Russia cannot
obviously stop blaming Estonia of having a wrong standpoint of history, an overwhelming
gap concerning the Second World War and its consequences. Moscow’s complaints
concerning the alleged national minority problem are not going away either, because this
statement is part of Russia’s major diplomatic game in Europe. Estonia, in its turn, will
continue pointing fingers at Russia’s optional and questionable law implementation customs,
leaving with zero solutions.

2.2.2 Russia and Latvia

Latvia is having the same issues as Estonia, the Russian minorities living there.
Although there has been some criticism, expressed by the Russian side’s representatives for
the decrease in the importance of the Russian language in Latvia, nevertheless the overall tone

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is much more moderate. The prediction regarding the Russian citizens’ interest in the
possibility to obtain residence permits by purchasing real estate and investing in Latvian
banking sector, has fulfilled. The principle topics in Latvian foreign policy are related to the
European Union and Latvia joining the euro-zone (Bukovskis, 2016).
In cases of the elections of the European Parliament and Latvian Parliament, the
problem of residence permits will be brought up again. National Alliance indicates that the
already misshaped state demographic circumstance is still aggravated. Furthermore, the real
estate prices are raised disproportionally. The influence of Russian mass media and Russia’s
policy toward the compatriots in Latvia will also become topical with the approach of the
elections. The Harmony Centre will be positioning itself as political force that can resolve
issues of Latvian non-citizens (Baltic Worlds, 2013). Their activities will be backed up by the
Russian media that will complete so called Russian speakers’ rights issues. Along with the
previously mentioned, liberalization of the gas market in Latvia will also affect the relations
between Latvia and Russia.
The full introduction of the EU third energy package is hampered by the
understanding between Latvijas Gaze (LG) and Latvian Government, conceiving the
imposing exclusive rights for Latvijas Gaze till 2017 (Kudors, 2014). LG’s 34 percentage
share is owned by Gazprom; in this manner Latvijas Gaze and Itera Latvia are effectively
contradicting the liberalizing of the economic sector in Latvia. Latvian Ministry of Economics
is developing a law to make a basis for the integration of the other natural gas suppliers to
Latvian market; however, Gazprom is getting prepared for a juridical and political fight in
order to achieve the delay of this decision.
To sum up, Russia will try to persuade the Latvian foreign policy makers through
diplomatic channels to be not “overactive” in the setting plans for the implementation of EU
Eastern Partnership. However, Russia will not achieve any serious results with centre-right
Latvian govern coalition in charge.

2.2.3 Russia and Lithuania

The last several years of Lithuanian – Russian relations have been under the constant
silent pressure: few open clashes, but plenty of silent collisions and indirect tension. Energy
projects, gas prices and the negotiations with Gazprom have been on the agenda for the whole
year. The new Lithuanian government promised to renegotiate the conditions of gas import,
but has not managed to produce any favourable results. The politics of history re-emerged

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from time to time with growing passions. The most prominent event was the prohibition of
the PBK TV channel in Lithuania after it showed the documentary about the January 13, 1991
events which was considered propagandistic misrepresentation of the recent history
(Jakniunaite, 2014).
The positive economic relations towards the second part of the year appeared in
September 2013 that Lithuania and Russia became included in border dispute and “milk war”
(The Moscow Times, 2013). Which brought along the custom check-ups in the lines at the
borders, and later Russia banned dairy imports from Lithuania. Inquisitively, the increased
custom check-ups were strongly criticized not only in Lithuania or the EU, as well as the big
wave of critique came also from inside, from Kaliningrad oblast. It can be even estimated that
the area suffered most as they could not timely receive numerous exports goods and their
production facilities suffered enormous misfortunes.
When just before the summit Ukraine rejected to sign the agreement, the scepticism
towards Russia aggravated. Behind Ukraine’s changing its mind Russia was considered as a
main culprit. And at the end of the year it became almost impossible to find a beneficial view
towards Russia’s foreign policy in the Lithuanian public discussions.
None of the Lithuanian political forces is prepared to invest in improving relations
with Russia although they are discussing Russia’s impact on important domestic projects, for
instance, the new nuclear power plant or the LNG terminal (Pavilionis, 2015). This, however,
can barely change the official relations between Lithuania and Russia and they will keep
working in a cool mode.
The implementation of the EU’s Third EU energy package accelerated in 2014 and
that means more intense pressure on Gazprom to separate its supply and transit business in
Lithuania, as elsewhere. Naturally, this will develop in the context of the EU-Russian
relations, but will have direct consequences for bilateral relations as well by increasing
tensions.
Quarrels about interpretations of the events of 1940s or January 1991 are already a
constant feature of the Lithuanian – Russian relations (Jakniunaite, 2014). The particular
events are of course unpredictable, but one can say for sure that one or two cases that will
weaken one of the sides will inevitably occur. These events will just emphasize the
incompatible and contradictory views on history that both sides hold.

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 To sum up, there are a few differences and similarities of having the potential threat
from Russia between the Baltic countries. For instance, Estonia and Latvia both have a
remarkably high percentage of ethnic Russians living there, while Lithuania does not. It could
pose a problem because the propaganda from the Russian Federation could influence the
Russian minorities living abroad. This, however, is happening in Lithuania as well, although
for different reasons. As Lithuania was for many years dependent on the energy supply from
Russia, they are still looking for potential economic investments in Lithuania. As the energy
discussion is still going on, the Russian media tries to influence their people in Lithuania
through campaigns or any other way. The same goes on in Latvia, as they are dependent on
Russia’s energy supply to some extent. Estonia, however, is the least influenced in energy
matters, because of having its own resources of coal.
The Kaliningrad region, which is situated next to the Baltic Sea, has long held
strategic value. After Lithuania became a member of the European Union in 2004,
Kaliningrad became an enclave inside the union, making the settlement of its status even
more critical for EU-Russia relations than it had been previously. The European Union
recognized Russia’s concerns about a possible negative impact of the enlargement on the
transit of people and goods between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. Due to the fact that
the transportation between Russia and Kaliningrad passes through Lithuania, the main fear
exists in the possible provocations on transit routes, both railways, or gas pipeline, or
electricity transit routes. They can be considered as actions that are organized in order to have
some type of pretext from Moscow's side, for Russia's side, to begin some aggressive actions .
Therefore, there exist concerns whether Russia has placed its Iskander missiles in
Kaliningrad. If the missiles were stationed in Kaliningrad many European cities would be in
their range.

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3. NATO PARTICIPATION IN THE BALTICS
The NATO’s expansion in Eastern Europe initially happened without the risk that any
threats would appear to NATO at first. In the 1990s the Baltic states, similarly to the rest of
Europe back then, built up their military reserve based on the national military service, as well
as supplemented by regional volunteer protection powers (Gressel, 2015). They co-worked
with numerous nations regarding the acquisitions of armament and military equipment, while
preparing the military units and their performance according to NATO norms. Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania succeeded in 2004 by joining both the European Union and NATO
(International Business Publications, 2015).
According to the NATO’s Article 5 of Washington Treaty an attack on one NATO
member would be considered an attack on all members (NATO, 2016). In the previous
occasions, before the illegal Crimea invasion by Russian forces, NATO did not concentrate
on the Baltic Sea territory as a potential military region, however NATO started to pay
attention when episodes began to happen that influenced its partners, for example, the Russian
cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007 (NATO, 2012). While the region is remarkably small for the
worldwide superpower to completely concentrate on, it never totally abandons it either. Since
the invasion of Crimea, NATO has started to concentrate on simple and effective exercises in
the Baltic Sea district to develop their security, including submarine control and rescue
practices open to all NATO allies, and also examining mine transfer and treatment of
dangerous chemicals in the ocean. Clearly, the Baltic states want to be seen as making a
useful contribution to the alliance and getting visibility in NATO and the European Union on
issues of broad concern. Within the European Union, the three Baltic states want to be seen as
modern, competent, and cooperative, which is why the three states try to avoid direct
confrontation with Russia.
3.1 NATO Enlargement and Russia in 2004
Even more than the Polish case, the three Baltic republics integration issue was highly
sensitive to NATO and West’s relationship with Russia. Thus, the case for integration into the
institutions of the West in the early post-Cold War was made cautiously and more slowly than

21
those made for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. After much debate inside the
Clinton interagency process, integration of the Baltics into NATO was left for a future round
of enlargement. That said, Clinton was firm in not allowing Russia a veto over future Baltic
integration (Hampton, 2015). Also, the Clinton administration reassured the Baltic republics
of the United States’ earnest intentions regarding integrating them into the West through the
successful completion of United States-Baltic Charter signing on January 16, 1998.
More than the second round of enlargement in 1999, the 2004 iteration problematized
NATO-Russian relations. Not only did NATO now extend to Russian borders, the new Baltic
republic members brought with them threat perceptions that included first and foremost
concern about a revanchist Russia. Having just won their independence from Russia in 1991,
which included some actual combat, the republics have been the most sensitive in the
Alliance to potential Russian aggression and as 2014 has shown, with good reason. Putin’s
behaviour has confirmed inside NATO the Baltic states’ and Poland’s fears of “worst case
scenarios”, and their desire to refocus the Alliance on Article 5 and territorial defence
(Ondrejcsák, 2014).
Aside from NATO absorbing the security concerns of the Baltic members with
enlargement, the institution also incorporated their nationalities problems. The politicized
issue of Russian minorities living inside the Westernizing Baltic republics is a live security
concern, especially in Latvia and Estonia, where Russian minorities measure about 25 and 27
percentage of the populations respectively (Stratfor, 2014). In Lithuania, the Russian minority
stands at about 6 percentage of the population. This problem has become much more dramatic
since threatening Russian irredentist rhetoric increased throughout 2014, explicitly targeting
Baltic republics on a number of occasions.
3.2 NATO and Baltics today
NATO-Russia tensions have manifested themselves in many ways in recent years.
2014 was an especially tense year, when the two sides hardened their positions following
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, continued interventionism in Ukraine, and military action
concerning further irredentist claims in former Soviet and historic Russian spheres of
influence. Especially troublesome for NATO has been the repeated rhetoric issued by Putin’s
regime threatening intervention in the Baltic republics to save Russian minorities that are
allegedly being mistreated: “We will not tolerate the creeping offensive against the Russian
language that we are seeing in the Baltics.” (Hampton, 2015) As observed in a Financial

22
Times article, “Nowhere is Russia’s growing swagger triggering more concerns than in the
Baltic states, which have a history of Soviet occupation, heated political arguments with
Russia and sizeable Russian populations.“
The re-emerging outlines of a new Cold War in 2014 were reflected in the remarks of
the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, delivered in May: “We must adapt
to the fact that Russia now considers us its adversary” (Reuters, 2014). A military doctrine
signed by Putin in December 2014 confirmed Rasmussen’s sentiment. The new document,
revised from the 2010 Russian defence mission document, explicitly identifies NATO as
Russia’s main adversary, and defends Russia’s right to use conventional and nuclear weapons
in the case of attack or perceived aggression.
Russian irredentist and revisionist claims were expressed through a number of
provocative behaviours in recent years that rattled NATO member-states like the three Baltic
republics, and affiliated non-member states like Finland and Sweden. Russia has greatly
increased surveillance in the Baltic region holding dual citizenship and of Allied soldiers and
airmen working in the region. A very clear example of defiant Russian policy intended to
pivot attention in the West to Moscow’s re-emerging power and unsatisfied claims was the
“burst of activity” of Russian military forces near or over NATO soil, especially in the Baltic
Sea region (Gotkowska, 2014).
The Russian navy has harassed neutral Sweden and Finland as their cooperation with
NATO increased. Throughout 2014, an unprecedented number of air space violations and
incidents have required NATO Baltic Air Policing to scramble jets in response. Most
significantly, there has been a dramatic increase in Russian military exercises in the area
(Michta, 2014). Russia’s behaviour has led in both countries to a growing national debate
about and appetite for NATO membership, surely a negative effect given Moscow’s intention
of pre-empting that outcome. Even more common have been the multiple cases of Russian
planes violating NATO member or affiliate airspace, buzzing NATO aircraft, and flying
sorties in or near airspace over NATO member-states, behaviour reminiscent of the Cold War.
The Baltic Sea region has been a favourite target of the provocative and often dangerous
displays of Russian airpower. These displays include Russia patrols or sorties involving
surveillance aircraft, fighters, long-range bombers, and even long-range nuclear bombers on
exercises (Gotkowska, 2014). Typically in these incursions, Russian pilots do not use on

23
board transponders or shut off communication access, bringing them very close on occasion
to civilian aircraft unaware of their presence.
3.3 Participation of the United States
Since the Baltic states are so small, they do not play any significant role in the United
States’ policy. If the Baltics have any concerns about the United States, there is not much they
can do about it. When it comes to Baltic Sea security and Swede’s and Finland’s participation
in this regard, the Americans are dedicated, engaged, and seemingly ready to put their effort
into the problem. In the meantime, the lack of strategy on the European scale implies that it
would be too much to expect the Americans to come up with an effective strategic plan for
the Baltic Sea region (Hampton, 2015). In spite of the present threat level, it would be
continually required to remind the United States the importance of their contribution in the
region.
NATO has understood that the Baltic Sea region must be seen as one separate military
range. The fast reinforcement of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the United States after
Crimea was appreciated by the Baltic states (Shlapak & Johnson, 2016). There was a general
feeling among the nations that this time, if necessary. they would be protected by the NATO’s
allies more than during World War II when they had not been effective and competent enough
to even join the allies.
To improve the cooperation with the allies, various exercises are carried out with the
United States´ troops, who have been sent to the Baltics for training. The American rotational
military units in the Baltic states will be there as long as they are needed; however inside
NATO there is a developing acknowledgment that guaranteed measures are not proportional
to adequate in the long term prevention measures (Coffey, Heritage, 2013). As more time
goes by from the Cold War, many Americans start to forget the importance of NATO and the
relationship between its allies. Nonetheless, when a survey was carried out (see Figure 3),
most of the NATO member states who participated answered that the United States will most
likely defend other allies against Russia. Only in Poland less than 50% answered that the
United States would come to an ally’s aid.

24
Figure 3. NATO Countries Believe U.S will come to Defence of Allies
(Pew Research Center , 2015)

25
4. RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW ON THE SITUATION
In the previous decades, Russian attitude toward the Baltic states has changed
considerably while remaining negative. Since the time when the Baltic states of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania regained their freedom and autonomy after the breakdown of the Soviet
Union in 1991, they have firmly followed a Western-oriented system of integration with the
two decisive Euro Atlantic institutions, NATO and the EU. Russia has, after 1991, tended to
see this western move as a potential danger to its own interests. Nevertheless, for a couple of
years at the end of the 1990s, the Russian government under Boris Yeltsin appeared to adjust
to this process and to move towards normal relations with the three nations.
After Vladimir Putin took over Yeltsin’s place as a Prime Minster in 1999, he initially
seemed to remain consistent to the Baltic policy of the Yeltsin years. But since returning to
more oppositional principles to the West by the middle of the 2000s, Putin’s Russia has
delivered threats and assaults against the Baltics. The turning points for the Baltic countries
were Russian cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 and its war against Georgia in 2008. In
Moscow, the effective and maintainable change of these nations to democracy and market
economy has been taken as a threat to Russia’s own dictator and corruptive model of process
(Freudenstein, 2015). Russia has used economic, financial, diplomatic, and many other tools
in an attempt to hold a level of control over the Baltic states´ improvements, damage their
sovereignty and autonomy, and to hold a gap amongst them and their partners in NATO and
the European Union.
Russia’s unprovoked attack against Ukraine in Crimea and the Donbas region in the
spring 2014 shows a totally new quality of Russian hegemony, which has risen from the
ashes. Russia has been testing the limits in the past years of how far it can go in undermining
the Baltic states, starting from the propaganda and ending with the violations of the borders
and airspace to other minor activities to direct assaults. Vladimir Putin’s objective in
undermining the Baltic states, as for now, is not necessarily territorial in essence. His purpose
is not expanding Russia into the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, or creating states
that are sovereign but in Russia´s sphere of influence like Georgia, Moldova or Ukraine. His
main objective for the foreseeable future is to weaken and damage NATO and the European

26
Union. His means is demonstrating that the solidarity of these organizations is basically non-
existent.
On the other hand, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are still irrevocably part of the West.
They have steady democracies and market economies that have come out of the financial and
economic crisis since 2008 outstandingly well (Freudenstein, 2015). They have responded to
Russia’s post-Soviet neo-imperial aspirations with firmness, while maintaining a willingness
to cooperate. In all Baltic countries, there has been broad political support for this policy from
most parts of the political spectrum. Baltic-Russian relations are considered as general East-
West relations in Europe.
In the 2000s, the Baltics have reacted to Russian threats by bolstering their defences,
including cyber defence. As a consequence of Russian aggression against Ukraine and other
hostile moves in 2014, the Baltic states have pledged to substantially increase their defence
budgets, stepped up their efforts for energy independence, and asked for permanent
redeployments of NATO forces (Hampton, 2015). The latter has so far only partly happened
after the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014 (Freudenstein, 2015).
4.1 Russia’s intentions towards the Baltic states
From purely military viewpoint, Russia has achieved superiority in the Baltic Sea area.
The Kremlin is not prone to launching a wide-scale war there to recover its previous
possessions, yet a small military activity towards a Baltic state to test NATO’s resolve to
protect its members might be on the cards.
The West has believed quite long enough that the Kremlin would have neither the
abilities nor the notion to put NATO on test (Gressel, 2015). The alliance did not see it
important to support the shore in its Eastern side, even despite Russia’s military development
in the region. Up to this point, the value of the security umbrella provided by NATO
participation was not addressed in Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia. Their low expenditures on
national defence have proved that.
At the moment, after Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea and its war against Ukraine,
the Baltic states may seem weak and vulnerable. Russia’s objective in Central Europe is most
likely to bring previous Soviet coalition countries back into its sphere of influence. With the
greater probability, Kremlin tries to threaten NATO and rearrange the post-Cold War order
(The Economist, 2015).

27
 Russia's expanded military exercises in the greater Baltic Sea area are intended to test
the West’s resistances. The quantity of NATO jet observances of Russian military planes
testing the airspace over the Baltic states has expanded quadruple over the last couple of
years. Non-NATO members in the Baltic area have likewise been tested by Russia
(MacAskill, 2015).
A significant development in Russian armed forces has taken place in the region over
the past couple of years. Russian forces have improved their combat abilities in trainings
preparing for various conflict scenarios in the Baltic Sea region, including the annexation and
embargo of the Baltic states.
With regard to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Russia has waged war in the political,
economic and information areas. These exercises of Moscow in the Baltics have been
strategically determined.
Weakening the Baltic states would dissolve the member nations’ trust in the West’s
capacity to act in their protection. Russia wants to prove that admitting previous Soviet
coalition nations into NATO was a mistake for all the interested parties, which ought to be
prevented in the future (Gressel, 2015). Deference to Russia´s military pressure would erode
the post-Cold War security architecture of Europe. The probability of a wide-scale
conventional attack by Russia against the Baltic countries remains low, since it seems to be
clearly too dangerous. Russian President Vladimir Putin is not, spectators agree, against
taking risks, but by no means is he reckless.
A constrained conventional assault situation, on the other hand, represents a more
likely experiment for the Baltic states and for NATO. In such a situation, Russia's
methodology would be to initiate a restricted military operation against a Baltic state, so
adjusted that it could possibly be seen as below the entrance of Article 5 (NATO, 2016). For
instance, it could be a fast regional snatch in Lithuania by a small Russian special force
brigade unit, put through under the excuse of, say, ensuring a regional hallway to the Russian
enclave of Kaliningrad from a prepared terrorist threat.
Such a regional conflict could be hard for NATO to handle. If Brussels refrains from a
military response – to avoid expanding it to a nuclear confrontation – NATO would suffer a
blow. Its power of prevention would be highly hollowed as the cooperation would have
shown that, at least when it comes to collective security, some alliances are more equal than
others.

28
 The member state has to act to contradict such gloomy scenarios. A permanent
presence of NATO forces in the state threatened by Russia could have a game-changing
effect, yet it has been difficult to achieve (Shlapak & Johnson, 2016). NATO actions should
be aimed at achieving political unity and improving the common defence capability.
Otherwise, it can be argued NATO is only pretending to defend the Baltics.
4.2 Russia’s military competence
The main external military risk for Russia is the expansion of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the military infrastructures of NATO allies inching closer to the Russian
borders, including through further enlargement of the Alliance. In short, NATO’s power
demonstrations with exercises in the border states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, close to
the Russian Federation and its allies can be considered as threats. The conflicts can be treated
as integrated use of military force together with political, economic, informational and other
non-military measures for the purpose of creating disruption in the civil population.
The military policy of the Russian Federation is aimed at avoiding and preventing the
military conflicts, through improving the military organization and operational doctrines of
the Armed Forces, and increasing mobilization readiness to ensure the defence and security of
the Russian Federation, as well as the interests of its allies (Russian MFA, 2013).
A fight for territory, in case of an open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried out
between nations, states or parties is considered as military conflicts, which in turn dictates a
focus on land forces and operations. Nevertheless, Russia has made great progress in the
conduct of joint operations, and its capable airborne and aerospace forces, as well as its navy
forces cannot be ignored. In fact, these components are crucial, particularly in the early phases
of a conflict, before land forces become fully engaged in the conflicts.
Russia in matter of fact has the world’s second most powerful military (see Figure 4.).
Having about 70,000,000 available manpower with approximately 3,500 aircraft in service,
350 naval power and 15,400 tanks (Global Fire Power, 2016). Moreover, Russia has allocated
46.6 US dollars for defence budget, which almost the same as the NATO’s expenditures as a
whole in 2015, having a budget with 45.5 US dollars (see Figure 5.).

29
Figure 4. Top 11 World Powers
(Karpova, 2016)

Figure 5. NATO expenditures on defence

(NATO, 2016)

30
 It can be seen that the Russian expenditures on defence are considerably higher,
compared with the NATO’s alliance as a whole. The aim for the Russian Federation is to
ensure the effective functioning of its military-industrial complex as a high-tech, multi-sector
economic activity, able to meet the needs of the Armed Forces in terms of modern armament
and other equipment, while at the same time sustaining the strategic presence of the Russian
Federation in the world markets for high-tech products and services (Commonwealth of
Independent States, 2015).
4.3 Russian propaganda
The Russian information campaign mounted against the Baltic states can also be
considered as one of the serious threats to their national security. For a long time, the Baltics
have had to deal with a Russian campaign through news, media and television that have put
the Baltic governments in the worst light. Russia generously supports its ethnic groups and
political parties in the three Baltic states, and Russian television, which puts ahead the
propaganda picture of the Russian regime, is outstanding in all three Baltic states where it is
seen by the Russian minorities (Kuokkanen, 2015). As people tend to believe everything that
is said in the media they are starting to feel anxious about the countries and yearning for the
Russian Federation without moving there. Due to that Russian propaganda causes more
friction between the Baltics and the Russian Federation.
Without the Russian information campaign in the Baltics, the three Baltic
governments would not be so worried about Russian investment in the area, and Russian
organizations purchasing interests in Baltic organizations would not be seen at first as a
compromise of their national security (Coffey & Kochis, 2015). The Baltics are, of course,
unable to completely neutralize the influence that Russia exerts through certain groups that
continue to support the Kremlin’s policy in the public sphere. Clearly, Russians cannot learn
that soft power is best employed and wins the best results when it is introduced as an
attractive suggestion to the local populations and governments. Soft power that consists of
lies, bullying, and coercion is not soft power at all.
Konstantin Kosachev, the head of a Russian agency Rossotrudnichestvo, has
announced that Russia’s soft power will be based on the ideological concept of Russian
World including both Russia and its diasporas abroad. Kosachev has also indicated that it is
necessary to improve one of the components of soft power- Russia’s state branding in the

31
foreign countries (Kudors, 2014). It is sure that the numerous Russian non-governmental
organizations in Latvia will be involved in creating a positive image of Russia by granting
sponsorship to various projects related to culture and history. Moreover, the Russian side will
probably continue making timely the theme of protection the compatriots’ rights. Although
granting the official status to the Russian language was already denied by the referendum of
2012, the calls to protect the Russian language in Latvia will be expressed also in the future.

32
5. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES FOR BALTICS
5.1 The advantages and disadvantages of NATO development
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO concentrated on development, on global
achievement for peace and on building associations with non-part countries, forming what
was frequently named the new NATO. The consequence of the recently improved NATO is
important to the Baltic Sea locale from all these of points of view.
5.1.1 NATO enlargement in the Eastern Europe
An easy assumption that the eastward expansion of NATO worries only the foreign
policy elite in Moscow has been a characteristic of Western explanations of Russia’s response
to enlargement. This view, often supported by references to public opinion polls showing that
Russians are more concerned about economic and social issues, is dangerously misleading.
The Alliance developed with twelve new individuals, including the Baltic states and
Poland. This added to its quality as far as troops and capacities, by expelling the danger of
security poorness in parts of Europe and extending the extent of the transoceanic security
group. Then again, the new individuals, once part of the Eastern coalition, are presently the
nations who see themselves as most open to respect to Russia, which constitutes a quandary
for the Alliance. On the domain of new individuals there is no NATO structures built not that
long ago, nor any perpetual troops or atomic weapons, as per the NATO-Russian Founding
Act.
5.1.2 Achieving the peace
After the Cold War, NATO continuously turned out to be more active (Gressel, 2015).
Through global foreign missions NATO tried its arranging, basic leadership, direct and
control, military units and interoperability in genuine battle circumstances. On a strategic and
operational level this unquestionably enhanced NATO military capacity to fight close along
each other. Furthermore, contrasted with Russia, NATO is a way more advanced when it
comes to standard forces. However, as the choices made things are being changed into
military arranging, it has turned out to be progressively obvious that the re-organizing and
experience of expeditionary strengths in peace missions has constrained worth for regional

33
barrier. Diverse arranging, abilities, power structure and more warriors are required.
Availability necessities are tested by obstacles, for example, administrative green light to
move military units quick over the territorial outskirts, and designated power to the military
so it can act quickly. Extra issues incorporate how to interface ordinary with atomic strengths,
and how to react to hybrid war. To wrap things up, the development of Russian hostile to get
to the region dissent capacities, for instance, in Kaliningrad and Crimea have lately modified
NATO's perspective on both lasting troops and relational word of overwhelming hardware in
the Eastern part (Gressel, 2015).
5.1.3 Cooperation with third parties
NATO manufactured a wide system of associations with nations to direct peace
operations, assist change and adjustment, and give the gathering to conferences to construct
trust and meet regular difficulties together. In this case, Sweden and Finland are the perfect
partners and as interoperable as most collusion individuals. In the previous year, collaboration
between NATO, Sweden and Finland has grown considerably with an emphasis on the Baltic
Sea area inside the Enhanced Opportunity Program (Coffey, Heritage, 2013). With respect to
the estimation of associations, a fundamental inquiry ahead is whether there is a part for
accomplices in aggregate barrier, and if yes, how to build up an idea of module, yet no
assurances, that fits both the structure of the Alliance, and the national structures of
accomplices, and serves the enthusiasm of both.
5.2 Prospects for the NATO’s security arrangements in the Baltics
In the outcome of the Crimea, the Baltic states will develop the capability of their
military keeping in mind the end goal to expand ability to protect their own regions, while
looking for a reinforcing of aggregate defence inside NATO. In the meantime Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia will be not able surrender their support in the missions abroad. Their
inclusion in operations abroad ensures their position inside the Alliance, and empowers them
to develop their picture as solid partners, particularly in the relations with the USA. In
perspective of the Ukrainian clash, the Baltic states will look for nearer military co-operation
with the United States, which they see as their key partner and underwriter of security. The
Baltic states will likewise look for more noteworthy military nearness of European NATO
individuals (Rühle, 2014).
The principle target of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia at NATO's Warsaw summit will
be to get assurances of the perpetual nearness of unified powers on their domain. At present,

34
the United States gives a diligent rotational nearness in the Baltic states as a component of the
Atlantic Resolve operation. Germany and the United Kingdom have submitted themselves to
conveying rotational powers in the Baltic states and Poland for more periods and all the time.
At the same time, the European partners have been sending rotational strengths on a specially
appointed premise, for maybe a couple month drills. Since there are no arrangements to set up
any changeless NATO bases in the Baltic expresses, to guarantee a relentless nearness of
powers bigger than the single organizations from the US arrangements. In addition, Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia are in cutting edge talks with the United States concerning the pre-
situating of a few hundred things of US military gear (Coffey, Heritage, 2013). Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia have pronounced that NATO Force Integration Units, tasked with
coordinating Host Nation Support, will turn out to be completely operational in the primary
portion of 2016. It is additionally essential for the Baltic states to guarantee that NATO
proceeds to monetarily favour the advancement of their military bases and the fortifying of
airspace observation, and keeps up the fortified BAP mission.
The feeling of risk from Russia will add to a venturing up of trilateral military co-
operation between Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, though just to a constrained degree. From
one viewpoint, the Baltic states have been growing nearer cooperation in a few zones, for
example, cyber security, information sharing and Host Nation Support work out. However, as
it may be, the monetary deficiencies and different needs as indicated by which singular Baltic
nations have been building up their military, and for some situation likewise their shared
doubt, will confine the degree for cooperation between Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The
withdrawal of Estonia from the BALTRON joint mine countermeasures squadron in January
2015 is a valid example. Collaboration in planning the three states' military modernization
projects and joint acquisitions of deadly implement and military hardware is missing, as
showed by the tendering systems now in advancement. The Baltic states have been
motorizing their infantries in co-operation with various Western accomplices, who offer
diverse sorts of protected vehicles. They have likewise made separate acquisitions of man-
compact air-safeguard frameworks and different sorts of hardware.
5.3 Baltics armed forces improvement
Indeed, even with impressively expanded defence uses, acquires of deadly implement
and military hardware and the enrolment of new soldiers, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would
not have the capacity to completely adjust for the negative changes in their security

35
surroundings. Accordingly, the endeavours to fortify the customary capability of the military
of the three Baltic countries will be supplemented in the coming years by measures to
enhance these nations' capacity to have unified backing and upgrade their observation and
early cautioning abilities. In the meantime, the Baltic states will concentrate on anticipating
unusual dangers. Subsequently, the significance of extraordinary strengths will increment,
seeing that they are equipped for conveying a prompt reaction to emergency circumstances.
The elements of progress inside the Baltic states' military will to a great extent rely on
upon the financial circumstance, which will thusly decide the measure of safeguard spending
plans. Demographic patterns will likewise be an essential component, restricting the Baltic
states' capacity to man their troops. A portion of the changes may turn out to be excessively
eager, or their usage might be spread after some time, with respect additionally to the
appointive cycle. In any case, the Russian animosity in Ukraine has added a support in
protection interests in the Baltic states (Nikers, 2015). Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia at present
have the political will to deliberately build up their military possibilities, and there is likewise
rising open enthusiasm for state security issues. The progressions at present saw in the
military of the Baltic states will be steady, in any event inside the time allotment of the
coming decade.

36
CONCLUSION
Potential threats in the Baltics may occur due to the fact that Russia is growing
economically and the fact that Russia is trying to weaken NATO. As the Baltic states seem to
be an easy target by having a close connections with Russia, especially Estonia and Latvia,
where the Russian minorities reach up to 25 percentages and, as well as, Lithuania where the
transit roads between Kaliningrad and Russia go through. In addition to that, the three state’s
military posture alone, without NATO, is relatively vulnerable to Russia, therefore from its
perspective the Baltic states are excellent place to show its power.
After the Russian invasion in Ukraine, NATO and the three Baltic states, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania felt threatened. Despite of the fact that NATO responded rapidly both
military and politically, it took a quite long time to realize that the next potential target may
be the Baltics. Feeling the attrition from Russia, NATO is becoming more engaged in the
Baltic states by guaranteeing and improving the countries´ defence and military capability and
sending rotational troops for trainings to improve the cooperation between the countries. The
Baltic states, however, demonstrate a degree of willingness for NATO and transatlantic
relations currently not found on either side of the Atlantic.
Russia has acknowledged that expanded NATO can be considered a threat. They have
repeatedly criticized the eastward enlargement of the Alliance and the planned missile
defence shield in Europe. Therefore, Russia aims to demonstrate NATO its power to show
how vulnerable NATO actually is. In summary, Russia does not really aim for another
occupation of the Baltic states, but rather a situation where Russia can dictate economic and
energy policy and has the power to largely control foreign and security policy of the Baltic
states.

37
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