G.R. No.

L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were husband and wife. However, their marriage relations turned sour which
resulted in them growing apart. Eventually, respondent sought a divorce decree abroad and married a
foreigner of American descent.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent asking for legal separation and damages.
Respondent, on the other hand, claimed a valid divorce from the petitioner and an equally valid marriage
to her present foreign husband.

ISSUE:
Should respondent’s divorce and second marriage obtained abroad and in accordance with foreign laws
entitled to recognition here in the Philippines?

HELD:
NO. The valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and
undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and
obtained. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Moreover, for the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the
state, especially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the
following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
 G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, and petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino
citizen, were married. However, their marriage relations eventually turned sour. Consequently, private
respondent initiateed a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany.

Thereafter, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery against petitioner, claiming that she had
two affairs with two men while they were still married. The lower court ruled in favor of private
respondent.

Petitioner argues that the Court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.

ISSUE:
Does the foreign divorce decree obtained by private respondent in Germany bind him in the Philippines,
inasmuch as he is no longer considered an offended spouse for the prosecution of the crime of adultery by
the former against petitioner?

HELD:
YES. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
 G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

FACTS:
This case involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not
valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected.

ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce decree on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines?

HELD:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets.
 G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent was married to one Felicisimo San Luis, who previously contracted two marriages. The
latter’s second marriage was with one Merry Lee, an American citizen. However, she was granted an
absolute divorce decree in the US against petitioner. Thereafter, Felicisimo married herein respondent.
Upon the former’s death, respondent went to the court to petition for letters of administration over his
estate as the surviving spouse.

The RTC ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio, for the reason that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. On appeal, the Court of Appeals overturned the decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE:
Should the divorce decree obtained abroad be given recognition here in the Philippines, inasmuch as it
would give the respondent, alleging to be the surviving spouse of Felicisimo San Luos, to have the legal
personality to file the present petition for the administration of the latter’s estate?

HELD:
YES. The Court cited the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera recognizing the
validity of the foreign divorce decree here in the Philippines as sufficient jurisprudential basis to rule in
the affirmative.

Moreover, with the enactment of Article 26, 2nd paragraph of the Family Code which provides that a
divorce validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent.

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. Courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. Thus, the case was remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence.
 G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
Petitioner was a college of law student in the defendant school who was frequently given scholarship
grants by the latter. However, on petitioner’s fourth year, he transferred to Abad Santos University. When
petitioner was about to take the Bar exams, he went to respondent asking for his transcript of records.
However, the latter refused to issue said records unless a refund was made by the petitioner of the
scholarship grants awarded to him in the sum of P1,033.87. This was in pursuance of an agreement
entered into between petitioner and defendant university where the former waived his right to transfer to
another school without having refunded to the University the equivalent of his scholarship cash.

Before said contract was executed, the Bureau of Private Schools issued a memorandum addressed to all
heads of private schools, colleges and universities that the amount of scholarships given should not be
subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.

This notwithstanding, defendant refused to issue petitioner’s records. Hence, petitioner filed an action for
the recovery of said amount.

ISSUE:
Was the contract between the petitioner and defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to
another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash valid?

HELD:
NO. The stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid
memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As the Director of Private Schools
correctly pointed, out in his letter:

'In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as
to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is
inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of
individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy.
Scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to
bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived
it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa
has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which have
received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships
to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some
kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano
University.
 G.R. No. 164815 February 22, 2008

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner,

vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged and found guilty by the RTC and CA with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition under P.D. No. 1866. This was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the
offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the
pendency of the case with the trial court, which changed the penalty from the old law of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua to prision correccional in its maximum period and
a fine of not less than P15,000.

ISSUE:

Can penal laws be given retroactive effect?

HELD:

YES. As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the
offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the
commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations,
but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice."

Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to
the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period
from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.

G.R. No. 104528 January 18, 1996

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, et.al, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. This
notwithstanding, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, Philippine
National Bank (PNB). Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their
obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in question. Subsequently, the
subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As the highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale, the bank became the owner of the lots.

Acting on suits brought by private respondents, the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs (OAALA) rendered a decision and ruled that PNB may collect from private respondents only their
remaining amortizations to Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over
again for the lots they had already bought from said subdivision developer.

Respondent HLURB affirmed this decision. On March 10, 1992, the Office of the President, invoking
P.D. 957, or the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree, likewise concurred with the
HLURB.

Petitioner Bank thus came to the Supreme Court contending that P.D. 957 cannot be applicable in this
case for the mortgage contract in question was executed in 1975, prior to the enactment of the said decree
in 1976.

ISSUE:

Should P.D. 957 be given a retroactive effect?

HELD:

YES. Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided." However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover
even those real estate mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed prior to its enactment, and such
intent must be given effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved.

While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming
subdivision developers. The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation,
circumstances and condition it sought to remedy, must be enforced.
Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly prospective application of
the law. Little people who have toiled for years through blood and tears would be deprived of their homes
through no fault of their own.
What is the Doctrine of Stare Decisis?

- This doctrine of stare decisis means that when the Court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases
where the facts are substantially the same.

What is an obiter dictum?

- An obiter dictum is a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be
considered persuasive).

What is a repeal?

- A repeal is a revocation or annulment of a law. It may either be made:

1. Expressly – By direct act of Congress; or

2. Impliedly – When there are occurring inconsistencies on all points between a prior and a
subsequent law.

What is the Doctrine of Operative Fact?

- The Doctrine of Operative Fact recognizes the existence of a law prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased,
ignored, or disregarded. It nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It
provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.

What are customs?

- A custom is a “rule of conduct” formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory.

Do customs form part of judicial decisions?

- No. Customs are not subject to judicial notice because they must be proven as a fact, according to
the rules of evidence, as stated in Article 12 of the New Civil Code.

What is the territoriality principle?

- The territoriality principle is stated under Article 14 of the New Civil Code, which provides that
“Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to
treaty stipulations.”

What is a penal law?

- Penal laws are laws that are enacted by the legislature which defines crimes and provides for a
penalty or punishment in case of their violation.

What is the nationality principle?

 - The nationality principle is stated under Article 15 of the New Civil Code, which provides that
“Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.”

What is the Doctrine of Processual Presumption?

- The Doctrine of Processual Presumption provides that a foreign law must be properly pleaded
and proved as a fact, otherwise our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law.
What is the rule of lex rei sitae?
- The principle of lex rei sitae can be found in the first paragraph of Article 16 of the New Civil
Code which provides that “Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.”

- This principle, however, cannot be applied when it comes to the intestate and testate succession
of a decedent. Instead, what is applicable is the national law of the decedent, with respect to the
following aspects: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; and (c) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will [See Art. 16, 2nd par., NCC].
What do you call the person who died and who’s succession is under consideration?
- Decedent.
What is the Renvoi Doctrine?
- Renvoi means “referring back”. The problem arises when there is a doubt as to whether a
reference to a foreign law is a reference to the internal law of said foreign law; or a reference to
the whole of the foreign law, including its conflict rules.

- See the case of In the Matter of Testate Estate of the Deceased Edward E. Christensen, G.R. No.
L-16759, January 31, 1963, page 52 in Rabuya’s PFR.