Amakannu AP Veerapan & Ors V Mayland Development SDN BHD
Amakannu AP Veerapan & Ors V Mayland Development SDN BHD
Amakannu AP Veerapan & Ors V Mayland Development SDN BHD
C
Civil Procedure — Injunction — Application for interim injunction —
Injunction to restrain defendant from demolishing plaintiffs’ houses on land —
Balance of convenience — Whether plaintiffs’ loss could be compensated in damages
— Whether balance of convenience titled in favour of injunction being granted
D
Civil Procedure — Striking out — Application for — Whether action against
defendant should be struck out — Whether plaintiffs had locus standi to institute
action against defendant — Whether plaintiffs had reasonable cause of action
against defendant — Limitation — Whether plaintiffs’ action against defendant
E
was time barred — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19
The property, which was the subject matter of the present case, was land
situated in the district of Kuala Lumpur (‘the land’) and occupied by some of
the plaintiffs. The land was once part of a rubber estate known as the Batu
Estate and the plaintiffs were amongst the former rubber estate workers who G
had worked in the Batu Estate and/or their successors in title. The Batu Estate
belonged to Semantan Estate Sdn Bhd (‘Semantan’), which had sold the land
to Sri Hartamas Develoment Bhd (‘Hartamas’). However, the plaintiffs
contend that at the time of this sale Semantan, Hartamas and the plaintiffs, as
the former Batu Estate employees, had entered into an agreement (‘the H
tripartite agreement’) wherein Hartamas had agreed to develop and give low
cost houses to the Batu Estate employees. The land had subsequently been
bought by the defendant pursuant to a settlement agreement. Although the
land was no longer estate land, the plaintiffs who continued to occupy the land
refused to vacate the land on the grounds that under the tripartite agreement I
they had been granted the right to occupy the land. On 9 April 2010, the
defendant had entered into a settlement agreement to pay RM10,000 –
RM30,000 as ex gratia payment to 31 of the former estate workers. These 31
estate workers had received the ex gratia payment and agreed to vacate the land.
Amakannu a/p Veerapan & Ors v Mayland Development Sdn
[2011] 8 MLJ Bhd (Zabariah Mohd Yusof JC) 683
A Upon discovering that the defendant intended to develop the land, the
plaintiffs commenced a writ action against it wherein it sought, inter alia, a
declaration that the defendant was bound by the tripartite agreement, specific
performance of the tripartite agreement and damages in lieu of performance.
The plaintiffs also applied for an interim injunction to restrain the defendant
B from demolishing the plaintiffs’ houses on the land on the grounds that their
action against the defendant would be rendered nugatory if the injunction was
not granted. The defendant opposed this application on the grounds that it had
entered into a settlement agreement with 31 of the former estate workers to
vacate the land and that there were no issues to be tried in this action. At the
C same time the defendant also applied to strike out the plaintiffs’ claim pursuant
to O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC’). Both the
plaintiffs’ application for an interim injunction and the defendant’s striking out
application were heard together as the issues were intertwined. At the hearing
the plaintiffs in reliance on O 41 r 5 of the RHC raised a preliminary objection
D as to the admissibility of an affidavit filed by the defendant. The deponent in
this affidavit averred that as the Chairman of the Advisory Board Member and
Squatters and Housing Committee of DBKL he had personal knowledge as to
the position of squatters in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and that he
had gone to the land and was familiar with the occupants of the same. The
E plaintiffs submitted that there was no proof that the deponent of this affidavit
had been appointed as the Chairman of the Advisory Board Member and
Squatters and Housing Committee of DBKL and that the said affidavit
affirmed by the deponent ought to be struck out.
F Held, dismissing the plaintiffs’ application for an injunction with costs and
allowing the defendant’s application to strike out the plaintiff ’s action with
costs:
(1) The plaintiff ’s objection on the admissibility of the affidavit is highly
G misconceived at this stage as an affidavit can be affirmed based on one’s
personal knowledge of the matter herein. As a general rule, O 41 r 5(1)
regulates the contents of an affidavit, viz only such facts as the deponent
was able of his own knowledge to prove. However, as an exception O 41
r 5(2) allows an affidavit sworn for the purpose of being used in
H interlocutory proceedings. In the present case, the deponent was only
affirming such facts as he was able to prove and to which he was not a
stranger and the said affidavit was sworn for the purpose of being used in
interlocutory proceedings. Hence the said affidavit could not be struck
out and the plaintiffs’ objection in respect of the same was dismissed (see
I paras 19–21 & 26–27).
(2) It was found that of the 31 plaintiffs in this suit only three, namely the
third, fourth and 24th plaintiffs were former estate workers occupying
the land (the first category), the others were either former estate workers
no longer occupying the land (the second category) or those who were
684 Malayan Law Journal [2011] 8 MLJ
neither estate workers nor occupying the land (the third category). The A
court held that those who belonged to the first category were trespassers
and squatters since the consent or licence for them to occupy the land had
expired; that the second category of plaintiffs were estopped from
claiming any interest on the land as they were no longer occupying the
land; and that the third category of plaintiffs who had never had any B
licence or consent for occupying the land had not right to claim against
the defendant for any interest on the land. Thus, the plaintiffs had no
locus standi to bring this claim against the defendant (see paras 30 &
34–37).
C
(3) The plaintiffs’ entire cause of action, which was premised on the tripartite
agreement, could not stand because the said tripartite agreement was
neither signed nor dated. Thus, the plaintiffs had no reasonable cause of
action against the defendant. Further, even if the tripartite agreement was
validly executed the defendant was not a party to it. As such, the tripartite
D
agreement was not enforceable against the defendant and the relief
sought by the plaintiffs for specific performance of the tripartite
agreement against the defendant was highly misconceived and clearly
frivolous. In any event, even if the defendant was bound by the tripartite
agreement, the plaintiffs are barred by the Limitation Act 1950 as the
E
action was founded on a contract(the tripartite agreement), which was
executed in 1976, ie six years from the date on which the cause of action
accrued (see paras 38–39, 47–48 & 50–51).
(4) If the application for an injunction by the plaintiffs was to be allowed that
would tantamount to depriving the defendant, who was the purchaser of F
the land since 1999 and thus the rightful owner, from its rights. The
defendant’s losses could not be compensated by the plaintiffs, who did
not have any proprietary rights to the land as opposed to the defendant.
Further the plaintiffs were not in a position to give any undertaking as to
damages and it was also clear from the alternative relief sought for by the G
plaintiffs that damages were an adequate remedy. Thus the balance of
convenience tilted in favour of the court not granting the injunction
against the defendant (see paras 68–73).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary H
Hartanah tersebut, yang merupakan hal perkara kes ini, adalah tanah yang
terletak dalam daerah Kuala Lumpur (‘tanah tersebut’) dan didiami oleh
beberapa plaintif. Tanah tersebut dahulunya merupakan sebahagian tanah
ladang getah yang dikenali sebagai Batu Estate dan plaintif-plaintif merupakan
antara bekas pekerja-pekerja ladang getah yang pernah bekerja dengan Batu I
Estate dan/atau pengganti-penggantinya dalam hakmilik. Batu Estate
dipunyai oleh Semantan Estet Sdn Bhd (‘Semantan’), yang telah menjual tanah
tersebut kepada Sri Hartamas Development Bhd (‘Hartamas’). Namun,
plaintif-plaintif menghujah bahawa pada masa penjualan ini, Semantan,
Amakannu a/p Veerapan & Ors v Mayland Development Sdn
[2011] 8 MLJ Bhd (Zabariah Mohd Yusof JC) 685
Cases referred to
Filati Lastex Elastofibre (M) Sdn Bhd v Nikseng Development Sdn Bhd [2009] 8
MLJ 374, HC (refd)
E Mega Sakti Sdn Bhd v Wong Wai Hoi & Ors [2008] 5 MLJ 321, CA (distd)
Nasri v Mesah [1971] 1 MLJ 32, FC (refd)
Padang Serai Kilang Kayu Bhd v Khor Kia Fong & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 589, HC
(refd)
Re Public Bank Bhd [2001] 6 MLJ 330, HC (distd)
F Syarikat Jeleta Bumi Sdn Bhd & Anor v Nadarajah a/l Ramasamy & Ors [2003]
5 MLJ 542, HC (distd)
Legislation referred to
Companies Act 1965 s 114
G Limitation Act 1950 ss 6, 9, 9(1)
Rules of the High Court 1980 O 41 r 5, 5(2), O 18 r 19(1), O 41 r 6, O 89
Stamp Act 1949
K Selvakumaran (SP Muthu Veloo with him) (SP Veloo & Co) for the plaintiffs.
H Wong Kian Kheong (Karen Lee Foong Woon and TS Yeoh with him) (Wong Kian
Kheong) for the defendant.
I
[1] Enclosure 15 is the application by the defendant to strike out the claim by
the plaintiffs under O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980.
to restrain the defendant from demolishing the plaintiffs’ houses lands held A
under Grant No 9413 Lot No 26643 and grant No 9414 Lot No 26644 in the
Mukim of Batu, District of Kuala Lumpur, owned by the defendant.
[3] Both enclosures were heard together as the issues are intertwined.
B
BACKGROUND FACTS
[4] The property in question are all that pieces of lands held under Grant No
9413 Lot No 26643 and grant No 9414 Lot No 26644 in the Mukim of Batu,
C
District of Kuala Lumpur and State of Wilayah Persekutuan (the said land).
[5] The said lands were once part of a rubber estate known as Batu Estate.
The said Batu Estate and the adjoining Segambut Estate belonged to Semantan
Estate Sdn Bhd. D
[7] The plaintiffs are amongst the former estate workers who had worked in
Batu Estate and/or their successors in title and as such were allegedly allowed to E
stay on the land.
[10] The plaintiffs contend that they are one of the parties in the tripartite
agreement between Semantan Estates Sdn Bhd (‘Semantan Estate’), Sri
Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd (‘Sri Hartamas’) and Batu Estate employees.
H
[11] One of the terms of the tripartite agreement is that Sri Hartamas agreed
to develop and give a low cost house to each of the Ladang Batu Estate
employees. The said houses are to be developed in a land held under Geran No
9413 Lot 26643 and Geran No 9414 Lot No 26644 Mukim Batu KL.
I
[12] The said land was subsequently bought by the defendant from Sri
Hartamas on 16 November 1998 pursuant to a settlement agreement (exh
SAA1 of encl 15B). The land is no longer an estate land and is still being
occupied by some of the plaintiffs.
Amakannu a/p Veerapan & Ors v Mayland Development Sdn
[2011] 8 MLJ Bhd (Zabariah Mohd Yusof JC) 689
A [13] Recently on 9 April 2010, the defendant had entered into a settlement
agreement with some of the Batu Estate employees (31 of them) whereby the
defendant would pay RM10,000–RM30,000 as ex gratia payment in
consideration of vacant possession of the land to be given to the defendant.
B [14] As the structure of the houses in the land was built very close and
connected to each other, the plaintiffs contend that the demolition of one
would affect the other houses.
E [16] The plaintiffs aver the following grounds in making this application:
(a) the defendant would demolish the said houses and the plaintiffs’ action
herein would be nugatory if the injunction is not granted; and
(b) to maintain status quo of the land pending the disposal of the plaintiffs’
F action herein.
[17] The defendant avers the following in opposing the application for an
interim injunction:
G (a) the defendant had entered into a settlement agreement with 31 of the
employees on 9 April 2010 and many of them have left their houses and
left vacant;
(b) the defendant bought the land in 1999 and it was bought with a hefty
payment. From 1999 and till todate the defendant cannot develop the
H land as the squatters still stay there and refused to leave the land; and
(c) there is no issues to be tried.
[18] The objection is on encl 28, as a third party had sworn an affidavit of the
690 Malayan Law Journal [2011] 8 MLJ
defendant and that there is no proof that the deponent had been authorised or A
appointed as the Chairman of the Advisory Board Member and Squatters and
Housing Committee of DBKL.
[20] Order 41 r 5 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 relied on by the
plaintiff is of no assistance to the plaintiff. It reads as follows:
D
(5(1))
Subject to Order 14, rules 2(2) and 4(2), to paragraph (2) of this rule and to any
order made under Order 38 Rule 3, an affidavit may contain only such facts as
the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove.
(2) An affidavit sworn for the purpose of being used in interlocutory proceedings may
contain statements of information or belief with the sources and grounds E
thereof.
[23] The deponent in encl 28 avers that he is the Chairman of the Advisory
Board Member and Squatters and Housing Committee of DBKL and has
E personal knowledge as to the position of squatters in the Federal Territory of
Kuala Lumpur. He further avers in para 4 of encl 28 that:
saya telah dilantik, selaku jawatan saya sebagai salah seorang ahli lembaga penasihat
DBKL, oleh Timbalan Menteri Wilayah Persekutuan Y.B. M. Saravanan untuk
F mengengendalikan semua hal ehwal perkara mengenai penduduk-penduduk …
diatas tanah-tanah yang dimiliki defendan …
H [25] The deponent avers that due to his designation he has gone to the said
lands and is familiar with the occupants of the same.
[26] The deponent was affirming ‘such facts as the deponent is able of his
own knowledge to prove’. He is not a stranger to the matter in issue which is
I pertaining to the occupiers of the said land, and that is precisely what he avers
in his affidavit encl 28 is an affidavit sworn for the purpose of being used in
interlocutory proceedings which contain statements of information or belief by
the deponent with the sources and grounds thereof. Hence encl 28 cannot be
struck out.
692 Malayan Law Journal [2011] 8 MLJ
[28] Some of the plaintiffs do not have locus standi to bring this action as B
according to the census made by DBKL in 29 Ocotober 2009 only 52 families
were staying at the said land at the material time (exh SAA1 of encl 6).
[34] Clearly the ‘consent’ and the ‘license’ have both expired, thus the first
category of the plaintiffs are actually trespassers and squatters to the land.
[35] For the second category of the plaintiffs they are no longer occupying I
the land and is thus estopped from claiming for any interest on the land.
Amakannu a/p Veerapan & Ors v Mayland Development Sdn
[2011] 8 MLJ Bhd (Zabariah Mohd Yusof JC) 693
A [36] For the third category of the plaintiffs there had never been any license
nor consent for the occupation of the land. Hence the third category of the
plaintiffs have no right to claim against the defendant for any interest on the
land.
B
[37] Therefore clearly the plaintiffs have no locus to bring this claim against
the defendant.
No issues to be tried
C
[38] The plaintiffs entire cause of action is premised on the tripartite
agreement.
D [39] The alleged tripartite agreement was allegedly signed by the estate
workers. Refer to exh SAA2 of encl 15B. The terms of the said agreement are:
(a) Sri Hartamas agreed to allow the estate workers to occupy the land for as
long as they were on temporary employment in the estates and the land
was not yet required for housing development;
E
(b) Sri Hartamas would offer each worker the purchase of one unit of low
cost house in their development; and
(c) Sri Hartamas would consider a nominal discount of RM500 per house
F for the estate workers.
[42] Since the plaintiffs are alleging that there was a tripartite agreement A
entered between the parties, the burden is on the plaintiffs to show:
(a) the existence of the tripartite agreement;
(b) that it is a validly executed agreement entered between the parties; and
B
(c) the obligations of parties that ought to be enforced.
H
[48] Hence, the defendant has no legal obligation under the terms of the
tripartite agreement. The enforcement, if any should be against Semantan
Estate Sdn Bhd and Sri Hartamas Sdn Bhd, not the defendant. Moreover the
agreement exhibited in BE2 is only a draft.
I
[49] There is also no provision in the tripartite agreement that states that it
will bind the successors or heirs of the agreement ie the defendant.
[50] Since the defendant is not a party in the tripartite agreement, the relief
Amakannu a/p Veerapan & Ors v Mayland Development Sdn
[2011] 8 MLJ Bhd (Zabariah Mohd Yusof JC) 695
[51] In any event, if assuming for a moment that the defendant is bound by
B the tripartite agreement, the plaintiffs are barred by the Limitation Act 1950 as
the tripartite agreement was executed in 1976. Section 6 of the Limitation Act
1950 provides that any action founded on contract shall not be brought after
the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
I agree with the submission of the defendant’s counsel that there are two
C possible dates by which the plaintiffs cause of action could have accrued ie:
(a) in 1978 when the alleged tripartite agreement was signed; or
(b) on 16 November 1998 when the settlement agreement between the
vendors and the defendant was signed, as that was the date when the
D promise to provide the houses to the plaintiffs failed to materialise.
[52] The plaintiffs’ counsel cited case law authorities and states that the
limitation period is not based on a breach of contract but based on the recovery
of land and hence the limitation period is 12 years pursuant to s 9(1) of the
E
Limitation Act 1950. In any event, counsel for the plaintiffs submits that
whether ss 6 or 9 of the Limitation Act 1950 applies, is by itself a triable issue,
and it ought to be determined at full trial and not dismissed summarily.
[56] Similarly in Filati Lastex Elastofibre (M) Sdn Bhd v Nikseng Development A
Sdn Bhd [2009] 8 MLJ 374 is also for specific performance of a sales and
purchase agreement which was entered between the plaintiff and the
defendant.
[57] All the three cases above relates to recovery of land pursuant to a sale and B
purchase agreement which was entered between the parties. Rightly so, the
limitation period should be 12 years pursuant to s 9 of the Limitation Act
1950. None of the cases cited involved squatters.
C
[58] In our case herein it relates to the plaintiffs who have no license or
consent to remain on the land which was owned by the defendant. The fact as
stated at para 9(a) of the settlement agreement between the vendor and the
defendant (exh SAA1 of encl 15B) dated 16 November 1998, that the land was
sold to the defendant by the vendor on an ‘as is where is’ basis does not connote
D
recognition of squatters rights. There was no agreement on the part of the
defendant when the land was sold by the vendors to the defendant that the
defendant was to take the land with the squatters.
[59] The plaintiffs also sought to rely on the case of Syarikat Jeleta Bumi Sdn E
Bhd & Anor v Nadarajah a/l Ramasamy & Ors [2003] 5 MLJ 542 where it was
submitted that the facts are on all fours with our case herein. It was held in that
case that ‘the balance of convenience tilted very much in favour of the
defendants who had been in occupation of the premises for a number of
generations. To ask them to vacate and caused the quarters to be demolished F
would certainly have caused the defendants great hardship, having regard to the
fact that they are poor people with no alternative place to stay’.
[60] However, on reading the facts of Syarikat Jeleta Bumi Sdn Bhd shows the
facts can be distinguished with our present case. In Syarikat Jeleta Bumi Sdn G
Bhd, ‘there was a meeting of 19 October 2001 between the plaintiffs and
NUPW where it was stated in the minutes of meeting that ‘the workers will
only vacate their quarters upon receiving their new low cost houses from the
developer’. And in another meeting of 6 November 2001 it was stated that ‘the
condition given by the state government is the developer must build alternative H
housing for the workers before they could vacate their quarters’. Ultimately, in
Syarikat Jeleta Bumi Sdn Bhd it is stated ‘Hence with such evidence the
defendants have shown that they have a claim to proprietary interest in the said
land. This is a triable issue which should not be summarily dismissed without
trial’. I
[61] In contrast to the facts in our case, the plaintiffs herein have not shown
any evidence that they have a proprietary interest as was present in the case of
Syarikat Jeleta Bumi Sdn Bhd.
Amakannu a/p Veerapan & Ors v Mayland Development Sdn
[2011] 8 MLJ Bhd (Zabariah Mohd Yusof JC) 697
[63] However my view on this is that, firstly, the said letter is a ‘without
B prejudice’ letter. It is pertinent to note that parties often make the statement
‘without prejudice’ as part of an attempt to settle a dispute. When this is done,
the contents of the statement cannot be put in evidence without the consent of
both parties. The statements often relate to the offer of a settlement and, were
it not for the privilege, they would constitute significant items of evidence on
C the ground that they were admissions. It is in the public interest that disputes
are encouraged to be settled to reduce litigation to a minimum. The policy of
the law has been in favour of enlarging the cloak under which negotiations may
be concluded without prejudice.
D
[64] Secondly, there is no admission of liability on the part of the defendant
in the said letter.
[65] Thirdly, the proposal for settlement in that letter was meant to be for
E another suit which was pending.
F BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE
[67]
(a) The defendant is the owner of the said land since 1999;
G (b) during these 11 years the defendant has not been able to develop the land
due to the presence of the plaintiffs who have no rights or interests on the
land;
(c) the lands were bought by the defendant at a high price;
H
(d) the defendant has been paying assessment and quit rent on the land since
1999. Copies of the receipts of payments of quit rent and assessment are
exhibited in exh SAA9 of encl 8.
(e) the defendant has been deprived of the pecuniary benefits which it ought
I to have reaped from the development of the land which they owned;
(f ) plaintiffs 1, 2, 5–7, 9–10, 14–21, 25–31 are not the occupiers of the land
according to the census done by DBKL;
(g) there are a lot of delipidated houses on the land;
698 Malayan Law Journal [2011] 8 MLJ
(h) although the settlement agreement had been executed by the defendant A
with the 31 occupants on the land, in the event the application of the
plaintiffs are allowed by this court, the defendant would be deprived from
executing its lawful rights under the settlement agreement.
B
[68] If the application for injunction by the plaintiffs is to be allowed, that
would tantamount to depriving the defendant, who are the purchasers of the
land and thus are the rightful owners of the same, of their rights. The
defendants would incur huge amount of losses in which could not be
compensated by the plaintiffs herein. C
[69] As far as the plaintiffs are concerned they do not have any proprietary
rights on the land as opposed to the defendant.
UNDERTAKING AS TO DAMAGES D
[72] It is clear from the alternative reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs those
damages are an adequate remedy. G
[73] Thus the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the court in not
granting the injunction against the defendant.
H
ISSUE OF THE TWO EARLIER APPLICATIONS MADE UNDER O 89
WHICH WERE NOT ALLOWED BY THE COURT
[74] At that point in time when the matter was heard before Justice Azmel
Maamor for an application under O 89 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, I
the burden was on the defendant to prove that there was no triable issue. It may
well have been that the defendant has failed to discharge the burden of proof for
the application at the trial of the said matter under O 89 of the Rules of the
High Court 1980.
Amakannu a/p Veerapan & Ors v Mayland Development Sdn
[2011] 8 MLJ Bhd (Zabariah Mohd Yusof JC) 699
A [75] In any event this court is not bound by the decision of Justice Azmel
Maamor which is a decision of another High Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.
Plaintiff ’s application for an injunction dismissed with costs and the defendants
application to strike out the plaintiff ’s action allowed with costs.
C
Reported by Kohila Nesan