G.R. No.

130872 March 25, 1999

FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, father and son, were convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. 1 They
now seek a review of their conviction as they insist on their innocence.

Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his
son, his co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay
(KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Municipality of Santa Cruz, and concurrently a member of its
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays.

In the 1985 election for the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red 2 won as KB Chairman of Barangay
Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Parenthetically, Lenlie Lecaroz, did not run as candidate in this electoral
exercise as he was no longer qualified for the position after having already passed the age limit
fixed by law.

Sometime in November 1985 Red was appointed by then President Ferdinand Marcos as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality.
Imee Marcos-Manotoc, then the National Chairperson of the organization, sent a telegram to
Red confirming his appointment and advising him further that copies of his appointment papers
would be sent to him in due time through the KB Regional Office. 3 Red received the telegram
on 2 January 1986 and showed it immediately to Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz.

On 7 January 1986, armed with the telegram and intent on assuming the position of sectoral
representative of the KBs to the SB, Red attended the meeting of the Sanggunian upon the
invitation of one of its members, Kagawad Rogato Lumawig. In that meeting, Mayor Francisco
M. Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until his
appointment had been cleared by the Governor of Marinduque. Nonetheless, the telegram was
included in the agenda as one of the subjects discussed in the meeting.

Red finally received his appointment papers sometime in January 1986. 4 But it was only on 23
April 1986, when then President Corazon C. Aquino was already in power, 5 that he forwarded
these documents to Mayor Lecaroz. This notwithstanding, Red was still not allowed by the
mayor to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian.

Meanwhile, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and approved on different dates the payment to Lenlie
Lecaroz of twenty-six (26) sets of payrolls for the twenty-six (26) quincenas covering the period
16 January 1986 to 30 January 1987. Lenlie Lecaroz signed the payroll for 1-15 January 1986
and then authorized someone else to sign all the other payrolls for the
succeeding quincenas and claim the corresponding salaries in his behalf.
On 25 October 1989, or three (3) years and nine (9) months from the date he received his
appointment papers from President Marcos, Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino
Administration a confirmation of his appointment as KB Sectoral Representative to the
Sanggunian Bayan of Santa Cruz.

Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against
Mayor Francisco Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz arising from the refusal of the two officials to let
him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) Informations for estafa through
falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1) Information for violation of Sec.
3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against Mayor Lecaroz
alone.

On 7 October 1994 the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two (2) accused guilty
on all counts of estafa through falsification of public documents and sentenced each of them to
—

a) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of FIVE (5)

YEARS, ELEVEN (11) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional to a
maximum of TEN (10) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prison mayor FOR EACH
OF THE ABOVE CASES;

b) a fine in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000) FOR EACH OF

THE ABOVE CASES or a total of SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P65,000);
and

c) perpetual special disqualification from public office in accordance with Art. 214
of the Revised Penal Code.

. . . (and) to pay jointly and severally the amount of TWENTY-THREE

THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS (P23,675), the amount
unlawfully obtained, to the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque in restitution.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that since Red was elected president of the KB and took his oath of
office sometime in 1985 before then Assemblywoman Carmencita O. Reyes his assumption of
the KB presidency upon the expiration of the term of accused Lenlie Lecaroz was valid.
Conversely, the accused Lenlie Lecaroz ceased to be a member of the KB on the last Sunday
of November 1985 and, as such, was no longer the legitimate representative of the youth sector
in the municipal council of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque.

In convicting both accused on the falsification charges, the Sandiganbayan elucidated —

. . . . when, therefore, accused MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ entered the

name of his son, the accused LENLIE LECAROZ, in the payroll of the
municipality of Sta. Cruz for the payroll period starting January 15, 1986,
reinstating accused LENLIE LECAROZ to his position in the Sangguniang
Bayan, he was deliberately stating a falsity when he certified that LENLIE
LECAROZ was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. The fact is that even
accused LENLIE LECAROZ himself no longer attended the sessions of the
 Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz, and starting with the payroll for January 16 to
31, 1986, did not personally pick up his salaries anymore.

The accused MAYOR's acts would fall under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised
Penal Code which reads:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or

ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer, employee, or notary public who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts: . . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts.

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, falsification of public documents has been committed by accused

MAYOR LECAROZ.

Likewise from these acts of falsification, his son, accused LENLIE LECAROZ,
was able to draw salaries from the municipality to which he was not entitled for
services he had admittedly not rendered. This constitutes Estafa . . . . the deceit
being the falsification made, and the prejudice being that caused to the
municipality of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque for having paid salaries to LENLIE
LECAROZ who was not entitled thereto.

Conspiracy was alleged in the Informations herein, and the Court found the
allegation sufficiently substantiated by the evidence presented.

There is no justifiable reason why accused MAYOR LECAROZ should have

reinstated his son LENLIE in the municipal payrolls from January 16, 1986 to
January 31, 1987, yet he did so. He could not have had any other purpose than
to enable his son LENLIE to draw salaries thereby. This conclusion inescapable
considering that the very purpose of a payroll is precisely that — to authorize the
payment of salaries. And LENLIE LECAROZ did his part by actually drawing the
salaries during the periods covered, albeit through another person whom he had
authorized.

By the facts proven, there was conspiricy in the commission of Estafa between
father and son.

However, with respect to the charge of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the
Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Francisco Lecaroz. It found that Red was neither authorized to
sit as member of the SB because he was not properly appointed thereto nor had he shown to
the mayor sufficient basis for his alleged right to a seat in the municipal council. On this basis,
the court a quo concluded that Mayor Lecaroz was legally justified in not allowing Red to
assume the position of Kagawad.
On 1 October 1994 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration of its decision
filed by the accused. This prompted herein petitioners to elevate their cause to us charging that
the Sandiganbayan erred:

First, in holding that Red had validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation
President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assembly woman Carmencita Reyes on 27
September 1985, and in concluding that the tenure of accused Lenlie Lecaroz as president of
the KB and his coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had accordingly
expired;

Second, assuming arguendo that the term of office of the accused Lenlie Lecaroz as youth
representative to the SB had expired, in holding that accused Lenlie Lecaroz could no longer
occupy the office, even in a holdover capacity, despite the vacancy therein;

Third, granting arguendo that the tenure of the accused Lenlie Lecaroz as federation president
had expired, in holding that by reason thereof accused Lenlie Lecaroz became legally
disqualified from continuing in office as KB Sectoral Representative to the SB even in a
holdover capacity;

Fourth, in not holding that under Sec. 2 of the Freedom Constitution and pursuant to the
provisions of the pertinent Ministry of Interior and Local Governments (MILG) interpretative
circulars, accused Lenlie Lecaroz was legally entitled and even mandated to continue in office in
a holdover capacity;

Fifth, in holding that the accused had committed the crime of falsification within the
contemplation of Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and in not holding that the crime of estafa
of which they, had been convicted required criminal intent and malice as essential elements;

Sixth, assuming arguendo that the accused Lenlie Lecaroz was not legally entitled to hold over,
still the trial court erred in not holding — considering the difficult legal questions involved — that
the accused acted in good faith and committed merely an error of judgment, without malice and
criminal intent; and,

Seventh, in convicting the accused for crimes committed in a manner different from that alleged
in the Information under which the accused were arraigned and tried.

The petition is meritorious. The basic propositions upon which the Sandiganbayan premised its
conviction of the accused are: (a) although Jowil Red was duly elected KB Chairman he could
not validly assume a seat in the Sanggunian as KB sectoral representative for failure to show a
valid appointment; and, (b) Lenlie Lecaroz who was the incumbent KB representative could not
hold over after his term expired because pertinent laws do not provide for holdover.

To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of KB youth
sectoral representatives to the SB and of the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51
and Sec. 1 of the KB Constitution respectively provide —

Sec. 7. Term of office. — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective
officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which
shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
 In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of
barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataan barangay,
their terms of office shall be coterminous with their tenure as president fo their
respective association and federation.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold
office until the last Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the newly elected
officers shall have qualified and assumed office in accordance with this
Constitution.

The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB
since he did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a
valid oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of
the SB although in a holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan
however rejected this postulate declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above
pertains only to positions in the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in
Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB.

We disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer
implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding
term. 6 It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall
remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified.
Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term
if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry
over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by
law. 7

In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue
to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does,
not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional
or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is
appointed or chosen and has qualified. 8 The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be
clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, 9 otherwise it is reasonable to
assume that the law-making body favors the same.

Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, 10 and courts generally indulge in the strong
presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an
executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied
by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. 11 This is founded on obvious considerations
of public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public
convenience from suffering because of a vacancy 12 and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of
government functions. 13

The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office before Assembly woman Reyes
in 1985 Red validly assumed the presidency of the KB upon the expiration of the term of Lenlie
Lecaroz. It should be noted however that under the provisions of the Administrative Code then
in force, specifically Sec. 21, Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not
authorized to administer oaths. It was only after the approval of RA No. 673314 on 25 July 1989
and its subsequent publication in a newspaper of general circulation that, members of both
Houses of Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths.
Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Jowil Red before a member of the
Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no
oath at all.

To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the
full investiture with the office. 15 Only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath
that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. Until then, he has none at
all. And for as long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant. It is thus
clear in the present case that since Red never qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz
remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every
aspect a de jure officer, 16 or at least a de facto officer 17 entitled to receive the salaries and all
the emoluments appertaining to the position. As such, he could not be considered an intruder
and liable for encroachment of public office. 18

On the issue of criminal liability of petitioners, clearly the offenses of which petitioners were
convicted, i.e., estafa through falsification of public documents under Art. 171, par. 4, of The
Revised Penal Code, are intentional felonies for which liability attaches only when it is shown
that the malefactors acted with criminal intent or malice. 19 If what is proven is mere judgmental
error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully
imputed to him. Was criminal intent then demonstrated to justify petitioners' conviction? It does
not so appear in the case at bar.

Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general
rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from
felonious responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in the discharge of a duty or
indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal intent, for in this instance, the
element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence. 20 In the
instant case, there are clear manifestations of good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part
of petitioners.

First. When Jowil Red showed up at the meeting of the Sanggunian on 7 January 1986, what he
presented to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz was a mere telegram purportedly sent by Imee Marcos-
Manotoc informing him of his supposed appointment to the SB, together with a photocopy of a
"Mass Appointment." Without authenticated copies of the appointment papers, Red had no right
to assume office as KB representative to the Sanggunian, and petitioner Mayor Lecaroz had
every right to withhold recognition, as he did, of Red as a member of the Sanggunian.

Second. It appears from the records that although Red received his appointment papers signed
by President Marcos in January 1986, he forwarded the same to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz only
on 23 April 1986 during which time President Marcos had already been deposed and President
Aquino had already taken over the helm of government. On 25 March 1986 the Freedom
Constitution came into being providing in Sec. 2 of Art. III thereof that —

Sec. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise, provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation of their successors if such appointment
 is made within a period of one (1) year from February 26, 1986. (emphasis
supplied).

Duty bound to observe the constitutional mandate, petitioner Francisco Lecaroz through the
provincial governor forwarded the papers of Jowil Red to then Minister of Interior and Local
Government Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., requesting advice on the validity of the appointment signed
by former President Marcos. The response was the issuance of MILG Provincial Memorandum-
Circular No. 86-02 21 and Memorandum-Circular No. 86-17 22 stating that —

PROVINCIAL MEMORANDUM-CIRCULAR NO. 86-02

2. That newly elected KB Federation Presidents, without their respective

authenticated appointments from the president, cannot, in any way, represent
their associations in any sangguniang bayan/sangguniang panlalawigan, as the
case may be, although they are still considered presidents of their federations by
virtue of the July 1985 elections.

MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 86-17

It is informed, however, that until replaced by the Office of the President or by

this Ministry the appointive members of the various Sangguniang Bayan,
Sangguniang Panlunsod, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall continue to
hold office and to receive compensation due them under existing laws, rules and
regulations.

The pertinent provisions of the Freedom Constitution and the implementing MILG Circulars
virtually confirmed the right of incumbent KB Federation Presidents to hold and maintain their
positions until duly replaced either by the President herself or by the Interior Ministry. Explicit
therein was the caveat that newly elected KB Federation Presidents could not assume the right
to represent their respective associations in any Sanggunian unless their appointments were
authenticated by then President Aquino herself. Truly, prudence impelled Mayor Lecaroz to take
the necessary steps to verify the legitimacy of Red's appointment to the Sanggunian.

Third. Petitioners presented six (6) certified copies of opinions of the Secretaries of Justice of
Presidents Macapagal, Marcos and Aquino concerning the doctrine of holdover. These
consistently expressed the view espoused by the executive branch for more than thirty (30)
years that the mere fixing of the term of office in a statute without an express prohibition against
holdover is not indicative of a legislative intent to prohibit it, in light of the legal principle that just
as nature abhors a vacuum so does the law abhor a vacancy in the government. 23 Reliance by
petitioners on these opinions, as, well as on the pertinent directives of the then Ministry of
Interior and Local Government, provided them with an unassailable status of good faith in
holding over and acting on such basis; and,

Fourth. It is difficult to accept that a person, particularly one who is highly regarded and
respected in the community, would deliberately blemish his good name, and worse, involve his
own son in a misconduct for a measly sum of P23,675.00, such as this case before us. As aptly
deduced by Justice Del Rosario. 24

If I were to commit a crime, would I involve my son in it? And if I were a town
mayor, would I ruin my name for the measly sum of P1,894.00 a month? My
 natural instinct as a father to protect my own son and the desire, basic in every
man, to preserve one's honor and reputation would suggest a resounding NO to
both questions. But the prosecution ventured to prove in these thirteen cases that
precisely because they were father and son and despite the relatively small
amount involved, accused Mayor Francisco Lecaroz conspired with Lenlie
Lecaroz to falsify several municipal payrolls for the purpose of swindling their
own town of the amount of P1,894,00 a month, and the majority has found them
guilty. I find disconhfort with this verdict basically for the reason that there was no
criminal intent on their part to falsify any document or to swindle the government.

The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good
faith. 25 In Cabungcal v. Cordova 26 we affirmed the doctrine that an erroneous interpretation of
the meaning of the provisions of an ordinance by a city mayor does not amount to bad faith that
would entitle an aggrieved party to damages against that official. We reiterated this principle
in Mabutol v. Pascual 27 which held that public officials may not be liable for damages in the
discharge of their official functions absent any bad faith. Sanders v. Veridiano II 28 expanded the
concept by declaring that under the law on public officers, acts done in the performance of
official duty are protected by the presumption of good faith.

In ascribing malice and bad faith to petitioner Mayor Lecaroz, the Sandiganbayan cited two (2)
circumstances which purportedly indicated criminal intent. It pointed out that the name of
accused Lenlie Lecaroz was not in the municipal payroll for the first quincena of 1986 which
meant that his term had finally ended, and that the reinstatement of Lenlie Lecaroz by Mayor
Francisco Lecaroz in the payroll periods from 15 January 1986 and thereafter for the next
twelve and a half (12-1/2) months was for no other purpose than to enable him to draw salaries
from the municipality. 29 There is however no evidence, documentary or otherwise, that Mayor
Francisco Lecaroz himself caused the name of Lenlie Lecaroz to be dropped from the payroll for
the first quincena of January 1986. On the contrary, it is significant that while Lenlie Lecaroz'
name did not appear in the payroll for the first quincena of January 1986, yet, in the payroll for
the next quincena accused Lenlie Lecaroz was paid for both the first and second quincenas,
and not merely for the second half of the month which would have been the case if he was
actually "dropped" from the payroll for the first fifteen (15) days and then "reinstated" in the
succeeding payroll period, as held by the court a quo.

From all indications, it is possible that the omission was due to the inadequate documentation of
Red's appointment to and assumption of office, or the result of a mere clerical error which was
later rectified in the succeeding payroll. This however cannot be confirmed by the evidence at
hand. But since a doubt is now created about the import of such omission, the principle of
equipoise should properly apply. This rule demands that all reasonable doubt intended to
demonstrate error and not a crime should be resolved in favor of the accused. If the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 30

Petitioners have been convicted for falsification of public documents through an untruthful
narration of facts under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code. For the offense to be
established, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a document
statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third
person.

The first and third elements of the offense have not been established in this case. In approving
the payment of salaries to Lenlie Lecaroz, Mayor Francisco Lecaroz signed uniformly-worded
certifications thus —

I hereby certify on my official oath that the above payroll is correct, and that the
services above stated have been duly rendered. Payment for such services is
also hereby approved from the appropriations indicated.

When Mayor Lecaroz certified to the correctness of the payroll, he was making not a narration
of facts but a conclusion of law expressing his belief that Lenlie Lecaroz was legally holding
over as member of the Sanggunian and thus entitled to the emoluments attached to the
position. This is an opinion undoubtedly involving a legal matter, and any "misrepresentation" of
this kind cannot constitute the crime of false pretenses. 31 In People v. Yanza 32 we
ruled —

Now then, considering that when defendant certified she was eligible for the
position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law which turned out to be inexact
or erroneous — not entirely groundless — we are all of the opinion that she may
not be declared guilty of falsification, specially because the law which she has
allegedly violated (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, in connection with other
provisions), punishes the making of untruthful statements in a narration of facts
— emphasis on facts . . . . Unfortunately, she made a mistake of judgment; but
she could not be held thereby to have intentionally made a false statement of fact
in violation of Art. 171 above-mentioned.

The third element requiring that the narration of facts be absolutely false is not even adequately
satisfied as the belief of Mayor Francisco Lecaroz that Lenlie Lecaroz was a holdover member
of the Sanggunian was not entirely bereft of basis, anchored as it was on the universally
accepted doctrine of holdover. La mera inexactitude no es bastante para integrar este delito. 33 If
the statements are not altogether false, there being some colorable truth in them, the crime of
falsification is deemed not to have been committed.

Finally, contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan, we hold that conspiracy was not proved in
this case. The court a quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused Mayor
certified the payrolls authorizing payment of compensation to his son Lenlie Lecaroz and that as
a consequence thereof the latter collected his salaries. These are not legally acceptable indicia,
for they are the very same acts alleged in the Information as constituting the crime of estafa
through falsification. They cannot qualify as proof of complicity or unity of criminal intent.
Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself and must meet the same
degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established
by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime, all taken together however, the evidence must reasonably be
strong enough to show community of criminal design. 34

Perhaps subliminally aware of the paucity of evidence to support it, and if only to buttress its
finding of conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan stressed that the two accused are father and son.
Granting that this is not even ad hominem, we are unaware of any presumption in law that a
conspiracy exists simply because the conspirators are father and son or related by blood.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of 7 October 1994 and
Resolution of 1 October 1997 of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
petitioners FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ are ACQUITTED of all the
thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents (Crim. Cases Nos.
13904-13916). The bail bonds posted for their provisional liberty are cancelled and released.
Costs de oficio.