Simon Fair Play
Simon Fair Play
Simon Fair Play
Simon
intelligent, persuasive, and well written. But Professor Simon has improved
the book by including new information, most notably on the issues of genetic
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S.
enhancement and intercollegiate athletic reform. Now, more than ever before,
Fair Play stands out as the premier text in the area.”
—SCOTT KRETCHMAR, THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
“Robert Simon’s new edition of Fair Play is, simply put, the best book of its kind in
the literature. The new section on genetic enhancement and the expanded section
on the moral quandaries of intercollegiate sports are welcome, not to mention
timely, additions. What’s more, the book is a compelling read, free of jargon,
persuasively argued, and teeming with incisive commentary.”
—WILLIAM MORGAN, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
FAIR PLAY
“The role of philosophy is to critically examine the complex issues in sports
and our beliefs about them. Simon is a master at this. . . . This third edition
provides deeper insight into major issues in the philosophy of sport, and its
accessibility makes it a must read for anyone who is interested in sports
or interested in the role sports play in America.”
—JAN BOXILL, THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL
FAIR PLAY
Addressing collegiate and professional sports, this updated edition of Fair Play explores the
ethical presuppositions of competitive athletics and their connection to ethical theory and to
concrete moral dilemmas that arise in actual athletic competition. A major new section examines
the ethics of genetically enhancing athletic abilities. Other new material covers the analysis of
sports and games according to influential philosopher Bernard Suits; the morality of cheating
and the ethics of strategic fouling; and the impact of performance-enhancing drugs on the le-
gitimacy of records. In addition, author Robert L. Simon provides updated considerations of the
morality of competition in sports, the ethical aspects of violence in sports, and the arguments in
The Ethics
defense of intercollegiate sports.
of Sport
ties, he has also served as president of the International Association for the Philosophy of Sport.
EDITION
His books include The Individual and the Political Order, Neutrality and the Academic Ethic, and
THIRD
The Blackwell Guide to Political and Social Philosophy, and he is on the editorial board of the
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport.
Robert L. Simon
COVER DESIGN: MIGUEL SANTANA & WENDY HALITZER
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF
SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page i
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
FAIR PLAY
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page ii
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page iii
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
FAIR PLAY
The Ethics of Sport
THIRD EDITION
Robert L. Simon
HAMILTON COLLEGE
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page iv
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this book may
be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case
of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information, address
Westview Press, 2465 Central Avenue, Boulder, CO 80301.
Westview Press books are available at special discounts for bulk purchases in the United
States by corporations, institutions, and other organizations. For more information,
please contact the Special Markets Department at the Perseus Books Group, 2300
Chestnut Street, Suite 200, Philadelphia, PA 19103, or call (800) 810-4145, ext. 5000, or
e-mail [email protected].
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page v
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
To my grandchildren:
Chika, Maya, Kayla, Jake, Zakary, and Travis
I hope they will enjoy sports as much as I have
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page vi
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page vii
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
CONTENTS
Preface ix
Notes 217
Index 237
applicable copyright law.
vii
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page viii
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page ix
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
PREFACE
S ports play a significant role in the lives of millions of people throughout the
world. Many men and women participate actively in sports and still more are
spectators, fans, and critics of sports. Even those who are uninvolved in sports,
bored by them, or critical of athletic competition often will be significantly affected
by them, either because of their relationships with enthusiasts or, more important,
because of the impact of sports on our language, thought, and culture.
Because sports are a significant form of social activity that affects the edu-
cational system, the economy, and perhaps the values of citizens, they raise a wide
range of issues, some of which are factual or empirical in character. Social scientists,
historians, physicians, and writers have raised many such issues that concern sports.
For example, sociologists may be concerned with whether participation in sports af-
fects the values of the participants, and psychologists might try to determine what
personality features contribute to success or failure in competitive athletics.
In addition to factual and explanatory questions, sports also raise philosophical
issues that are conceptual and ethical. Conceptual questions concern how we are to
understand the concepts and ideas that apply in the world of sports. What are
sports, anyway? How are sports related to rules? Do those who intentionally break
the rules of a game even play it or are they doing something else? Are there differ-
ent forms of competition in sports? Is it possible to compete against oneself?
Ethical questions raise the moral concerns many of us have about sports.
Should sports be accorded the importance they are given in our society? Is there
too much emphasis on winning and competition? Are college sports getting out of
hand? Why shouldn’t we cheat in a game if it will bring us a championship? What,
if anything, makes the use of steroids to enhance performance in sports unethical?
How should men and women be treated in sports if they are to be treated equitably
applicable copyright law.
and fairly? Should we be aiming more for excellence in competition among highly
skilled athletes, or should we place greater value on more participation? Does the
commercialization of sports actually corrupt the game? Fair Play examines such
questions and evaluates the principles to which thoughtful people might appeal in
trying to formulate answers.
ix
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page x
x Preface
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
Not only are questions in the philosophy of sport important in their own
right, they can also serve as a useful introduction to broader philosophical issues.
Most students come to philosophy courses with knowledge of sports, and many
have a deep interest in ethical issues raised by sports. This initial interest can serve
as a launching pad to introduce students to the nature and value of philosophical
inquiry. For example, questions about whether the use of steroids to enhance ath-
letic performance is fair can lead to broad inquiry into the nature of fairness and
the just society.
Perhaps most important, issues in the philosophy of sport are of great intrin-
sic interest and are well worth our attention. Philosophical questions force us to
stretch our analytical powers to the fullest and to question basic presuppositions.
Those that arise in the philosophical examination of sports, like any others, re-
quire us to test and evaluate fundamental justificatory principles and engage in
rigorous critical inquiry.
Readers of earlier editions of this book will find significant changes in the cur-
rent edition. Among the most significant is the addition of a section on genetic
enhancement of athletic abilities, including a discussion of Michael Sandel’s re-
cent work on the topic, in Chapter 4, and an expanded discussion of the issues in
intercollegiate sports, including an examination of recent contributions by Peter
French and Myles Brand, in Chapter 6. Myles focused on strengthening the rela-
tionship between academics and athletics during his tenure as president of the
NCAA, and his untimely death in September 2009 saddened all of us who knew
him. It also must have saddened all those who did not know him personally but
who applauded his efforts at strengthening the academic requirements that ap-
plied to athletes participating at NCAA member institutions.
Other changes in the new edition range from the concrete to the theoretical
and include a discussion of the recent steroid scandals in Major League Baseball,
an expanded account of Bernard Suits’s analysis of games and its influence on the
philosophy of sport, and a fuller discussion of the alleged link between participa-
tion in sports and moral development. The latter focuses on the complications of
assessing the effects of participation in competitive athletics on character devel-
opment. The discussion of the ethics of strategic or “professional” fouling, as it
sometimes has been called, also has been expanded and includes a discussion of
Warren Fraleigh’s most recent criticism of the argument of earlier editions of this
book. Many other sections also have been revised, and new, more contemporary
examples have been incorporated whenever possible. Accordingly, I hope this
applicable copyright law.
book provides a deeper insight into major issues in the philosophy of sport while
remaining accessible to students and others new to the philosophical investigation
of sport.
Fair Play never would have been written had it not been for the challenges to
my own views of sports put forth by friends, colleagues in the philosophy depart-
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page xi
Preface xi
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
ment at Hamilton College, and especially my students, who have been critical of
many of my views but always helpful and insightful. I have also benefited from the
tough questions posed by Scott Kretchmar’s students at Penn State, who have al-
ways presented me with challenging questions whenever I have been able to visit
their classes.
Although I cannot acknowledge and sort out all my intellectual debts here, I
would like to thank the original editors of the first edition of this book, Ray
O’Connell and Doris Michaels of Prentice-Hall, for their initial encouragement,
and Spencer Carr and Sarah Warner, my original editors at Westview Press, for
their insights as to how the earlier editions could be expanded and improved upon.
Indeed, all the staff members at Westview have been wonderful in helping to pre-
pare this edition as well as the earlier ones, and I am very grateful to them for their
assistance and courtesy. I especially want to thank Karl Yambert, my present editor
at Westview, particularly for his patience and understanding when I had to post-
pone work on this edition for a significant length of time due to illness. Without
his encouragement, I’m sure I would not have completed the revision. I also espe-
cially want to thank Sandra Beris, the project editor, for her very helpful assistance
in preparing the manuscript for publication, and Katherine Streckfus for her su-
perb work as copyeditor.
I am indebted to my colleagues in the International Association for the Philos-
ophy of Sport, who have always been encouraging about my work. Their astute
critiques have often inspired me to improve my arguments. Although I am sure I
have not responded satisfactorily to all their suggestions, my work would be im-
measurably poorer without their interest and support.
As always, I also express my special appreciation to my wife, Joy, not only for
her critical help with the manuscript, or for putting up with an abnormal number
of fits of abstraction (“Earth calling Bob” became, once again, one of the phrases
used most often at our dinner table) during the writing of all the editions of the
book, but also and especially for her support and encouragement, which were cru-
cial during my treatment for prostate cancer in 1998–1999 and for a recurrence
in 2008. (She has also been a devoted spectator at numerous golf tournaments in
which I have played, rarely successfully, and in spite of past performance is usually
encouraging about the next competition.) Sports have been one of the major activ-
ities my family and I have shared, so I hope they enjoy reading the finished product
as much as I enjoyed writing it.
Finally, without the participants in sports who demonstrate the kind of quest
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/20/10 12:08 PM Page xii
xii Preface
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
also for making the harsh upstate New York winter one of the most exciting and
pleasurable times of year. I would like to thank my former players on the Hamilton
men’s golf team, during the years I was their coach as well as more recent team
members, for some wonderful experiences with intercollegiate athletics, to say
nothing of not teasing me too much when they outdrive me by 75 yards!
Robert L. Simon
Clinton, New York
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 1
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Ethics of Sport
I would like to think that this book began on an unfortunately not atypical cold
and rainy late October day in upstate New York. I had been discussing some of
my generally unsuccessful efforts in local golf tournaments with colleagues in the
philosophy department and let drop what I thought was an innocuous remark to
the effect that although winning isn’t everything, it sure beats losing. Much to my
surprise, my colleagues objected vehemently, asserting that winning means noth-
ing. In their view, the recreational aspects of sport, such as having fun and trying
to improve—not defeating an opponent—are all that should matter. I soon found
myself backed into a corner by this usually unthreatening but now fully aroused
assortment of philosophers. Fortunately for me, another colleague entered the of-
fice just at the right moment. Struck by the vehemence of the argument, although
he had no idea what it was about, he looked at my opponents and remarked, “You
folks sure are trying to win this argument.”
This incident illustrates two important aspects of a philosophical examination
of sports. First, issues arise in sports that are not simply empirical questions of psy-
chology, sociology, or some other discipline. Empirical surveys can tell us whether
people think winning is important, but they cannot tell us whether that is what
people ought to think or whether winning really ought to be regarded as a primary
goal of athletics. Second, the incident illustrated that logic could be applied to
issues in the philosophy of sport. Thus, at least on the surface, it appeared that my
colleagues were in the logically embarrassing position of trying hard to win an ar-
gument to the effect that winning is unimportant. (Of course, they might reply
that their goal was not winning but the pursuit of truth, but athletes might simi-
applicable copyright law.
larly argue that winning is important because it is a sign of achieving their true
goal, excellence.)
We will return to the issue of whether winning is important in Chapter 2. For
now, let us consider further what philosophical inquiry might contribute to our
understanding of sports.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 2
2 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
Football, baseball, and soccer clearly are sports. But some have doubts about golf.
What about chess and auto racing? How are sports related to games? Is partici-
pation in sport always a form of play? Questions such as these raise issues that go
well beyond looking up words in a dictionary. To settle them, we will need to rely
on a theory of what makes something a game, a sport, or an instance of play. Dic-
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 3
tionary definitions often presuppose such theories. But the theories presupposed
by the definition may be unclear; they may leave open how borderline cases are
to be thought of; or they may just be wrong. For example, one dictionary account
of games classifies them as competitive activities. But must all games be competi-
tive? “Playing house” arguably is a game, but is it competitive? What about play-
ing catch?
Some of the most important kinds of philosophical issues that arise in sport are
ethical or moral ones; these are the kinds of issues about which this book will be
primarily concerned. Some moral issues in sport concern specific actions, often by
athletes. For example, in the championship game of the 1999 World Cup, the
American women’s soccer team completed regulation and overtime play against
China with the score tied. The championship, viewed throughout the world by mil-
lions of fans, many of them young American girls captivated by the success of the
American women, was to be settled by penalty kicks in a game-ending shootout.2
The American goalkeeper, Briana Scurry, decided that one of the Chinese shooters,
Liu Ying, lacked confidence. When Liu made her move, Scurry took two quick steps
forward, in violation of a rule of soccer, to cut off Liu’s shooting angle. The tactic
worked. Scurry deflected Liu’s shot, and the Americans won. But did Scurry cheat
by violating a rule? Was Scurry simply doing what any goalkeeper would do in such
a situation: namely, conforming to a convention of the game tacitly accepted by all
players? Or was the American victory tainted by unethical behavior in a deliberate
violation of the rules?3
Other kinds of ethical issues in sport involve the assessment of rules or
policies—for example, the prohibition by many sports organizations of the use of
performance-enhancing drugs by competitive athletes. What justifies this prohi-
bition? Is it because performance-enhancing drugs such as steroids often have
harmful side effects? But why shouldn’t athletes, especially competent adult ath-
letes, be free to take risks with their bodies? After all, many of us would reject the
kind of paternalism that constantly interferes with the pursuit of our goals when-
ever risky behavior is involved. Think of the dangers inherent in a typical Ameri-
can diet, which contains a high proportion of unhealthy fat and sugar.
Or should performance-enhancing drugs be prohibited because they provide
unfair advantages to some of the competitors? Are the advantages any different
from those conferred by the legal use of technologically advanced equipment?
Moreover, would the advantages still be unfair if all competitors had access to the
drug? Defenders of baseball slugger Barry Bonds, who is alleged to have achieved
applicable copyright law.
his home run records in part with the assistance of performance-enhancing drugs,
claim that some opposing pitchers undoubtedly also used performance enhancers,
thus equalizing the competition.
Questions of marketing, sports administration, and the formulation of rules
also involve moral issues, although the moral character of the questions raised may
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 4
4 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
not always be obvious. For example, consider whether a rule change ought to be
instituted that might make a sport more attractive to fans at the professional or
college levels yet diminish the skill or strategy needed to play the game. Some
would argue that the designated-hitter rule in American League baseball, which al-
lows teams to replace their usually weak-hitting pitcher with a designated hitter in
the batting order, is such a case. The rule may make the game more exciting to the
casual fan, who values an explosive offense. However, it may also remove various
subtleties from the game, such as the decision about when to remove the pitcher
from the game for a pinch hitter, or the value of the sacrifice bunt, which weak-
hitting pitchers might be capable of executing. Although this is not as obvious a
moral issue as some of the other examples cited, it does have a moral, or at least
evaluative, component. It raises questions about the purposes or goals of sports,
what social functions they ought to serve, and whether sports have an integrity that
ought to be preserved. Similar issues may arise when we consider when technolog-
ical innovations ought to be permitted in sport, and when they ought to be prohib-
ited for making a sport too easy.
At a more abstract level, other ethical issues concern the values central to com-
petitive sport itself. Is competition in sport ethically permissible, or even desir-
able, or does it create a kind of selfishness, perhaps an analog of a narrow form of
nationalism that says “My team, right or wrong?” Does the single-minded pursuit
of winning, which is apparently central to competition in sport, help promote
violent behavior in fans? Does it teach competitors to regard opponents as mere
obstacles to be overcome and not as fellow human beings? Is it related to the
anger shown by many parents of participants in youth sports, which culminated
in 2001 in the killing of a hockey coach by an enraged parent? What kind of com-
petition in sport can be defended morally, and how great an emphasis on winning
is too much?
Questions such as these raise basic issues about the kinds of moral values in-
volved in sports. They are not only about what people think about sports or about
what values they hold; rather, they are about what people ought to think. They re-
quire the identification of defensible ethical standards and their application to
sport. Critical inquiry into the philosophy of sport consists in formulating and ra-
tionally evaluating such standards as well as testing them by seeing how they ap-
ply to concrete issues in sports and athletics.
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 5
Philosophy of Sport
Misconceptions about the nature of philosophy are widespread. According to one
story, a philosopher on a domestic flight was asked by his seatmate what he did for
a living. He replied, perhaps foolishly, “I’m a philosopher,” a statement that is one
of the greatest conversation-stoppers known to the human race. The seatmate, ap-
parently stupefied by the reply, was silent for several minutes. Finally, he turned to
the philosopher and remarked, “Oh, and what are some of your sayings?”4
The image of the philosopher as the author of wise sayings can perhaps be for-
given, for the word “philosophy” has its roots in the Greek expression meaning
“love of wisdom.” But wisdom is not necessarily encapsulated in brief sayings that
we might memorize before breakfast. The ancient Greek philosopher Socrates
provides a different model of philosophic inquiry.
Socrates, who lived in the fifth century B.C., did not leave a body of written
works behind him; however, we know a great deal about his life and thought, pri-
marily through the works of his most influential pupil, Plato. As a young man,
Socrates, seeking a mentor from whom to learn, set out to find the wisest man in
Greece. According to the story, he decided to ask a religious figure, the oracle at
Delphi, the identity of the man he was seeking. Much to Socrates’ surprise, the or-
acle informed him that he, Socrates, was the wisest man in Greece. “How can that
be?” Socrates must have wondered; after all, he was searching for a wise teacher
precisely because he was ignorant.
However, looking at the oracle’s answer in light of Plato’s presentation of
Socrates, we can discern what the oracle meant. In the early Platonic dialogues,
such as the Euthyphro, Socrates questioned important figures of the day about the
nature of piety or the essence of knowledge. Those questioned purported to be ex-
perts in the subject under investigation, but their claim to expertise was discredited
by Socrates’ logical analysis. These experts not only failed in what they claimed to
know but also seemed to have accepted views that they had never exposed to criti-
cal examination.
Perhaps in calling Socrates the wisest man in Greece the oracle was suggesting
that Socrates alone was willing to expose beliefs and principles to critical examina-
tion. He did not claim to know what he did not know, but he was willing to learn.
He was also not willing to take popular opinion for granted but was prepared to
question it.
This Socratic model suggests that the role of philosophy is to examine our
applicable copyright law.
beliefs, clarify the principles on which they rest, and subject them to critical exam-
ination. For example, in science, the role of philosophy is not to compete in formu-
lating and testing empirical hypotheses in biology, chemistry, and physics. Rather,
philosophers might try to understand in what sense science provides objective
knowledge and then examine claims that all knowledge must be scientific. If we
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 6
6 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
adopt such a view of philosophy, the task of the philosophy of sport would be to
clarify, systematize, and evaluate the principles that we believe should govern the
world of sports. This task might involve a conceptual analysis of such terms as
“sport” and “game,” an inquiry into the nature of excellence in sports, an ethical
evaluation of such principles as “winning should be the only concern of the seri-
ous athlete,” and an application of ethical analysis to concrete issues, such as
disagreement over whether athletes should be permitted to take performance-
enhancing drugs.
This book is concerned primarily with the ethical evaluation of principles that
many people apply to sports and the application of the analysis to specific issues.
Its major focus is the nature of principles and values that should apply to sports.
Thus, its concern is predominantly normative rather than descriptive—assessing
what ought to be rather than describing what is. Perhaps only a few people think
of sports as activities that raise serious moral issues. They see sports either as mere
instruments for gaining fame and fortune or as play, something relatively trivial
that we do for fun and recreation. However, as the headlines of our daily news-
papers show all too frequently, serious moral issues do arise in sports.
But can moral issues be critically examined? Is rational argument even possible
in ethics? Aren’t moral views just matters of opinion? Can moral principles be ra-
tionally evaluated and defended, or are they mere expressions of personal feelings
that are not even the sorts of things that can be rationally evaluated or examined?
Relativism
Perhaps the most widely cited position that rejects the rationality and objectivity of
applicable copyright law.
ethical discourse is relativism. In his best-selling book, The Closing of the American
Mind, Allen Bloom blames relativism for much of what he sees as the moral and ed-
ucational decay infecting American universities. According to Bloom, “There is one
thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: Almost every student entering the
university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative.”5 Relativism is so widely
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 7
kind at issue here denies that our ethical or moral views ever can be well supported,
or that we can know which moral views are rationally warranted and which are not.
Ordinary skepticism cautions us to look for evidence for our views, but philosoph-
ical skepticism questions whether it is even possible, even in principle, to provide
evidence or rational support for our ethical views.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 8
8 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
Others have suggested that descriptive relativism implies not skepticism but
ethical (value) relativism. Ethical relativism is the view that each culture’s moral
code is right for that culture. For example, according to ethical relativism, repres-
sive sexual practices are morally right for cultures that have such practices embed-
ded in their moral codes but not for more liberal cultures or groups. Applied to
sports, such ethical relativism might assert that we ought to follow the values of
our own sports communities: If we are golfers we should call the penalties on our-
selves, but if we are basketball players, we should leave it to the referees (even if
they make a terrible call in our favor that enables us to win a game). Ethical rela-
tivism differs from skepticism in that skepticism denies that any ethical perspec-
tive is more justifiable or reasonable than any other (or denies that we can know
which perspectives are more justifiable than others), whereas ethical relativism
endorses an ethical view—namely, what is right for you to do is what your culture
or community says is right.
What is the significance of these views for the ethical analysis of sports? If skep-
ticism is correct, it follows that we cannot justify any position on questions of ethics
that arise in sports, since skepticism denies that any ethical perspective is more justi-
fied than any other. For example, we could not justify either the claim that the use of
anabolic steroids to enhance performance is warranted or the claim that it is unwar-
ranted. However, if ethical relativism is correct, what is morally justifiable depends
on the group to which one belongs. Perhaps the use of performance-enhancing
drugs is permissible for cultures that find it permissible but not for those that find it
impermissible.
Does descriptive relativism really have the skeptical implications examined
above? Is relativism acceptable in the forms discussed above?
A Critique of Relativism
First, consider the argument that because the thesis of descriptive relativism—that
moral codes of different cultures and groups conflict—is true, therefore moral
skepticism is true. To evaluate this argument, we need to consider what general
conditions an argument must meet to be acceptable. If the premises of an argu-
ment are to justify a conclusion, two fundamental requirements must be satisfied.
(1) The premises must be true. False statements cannot be acceptable evidence for
the truth of a conclusion. (2) The premises must be logically relevant to the con-
clusion; otherwise, the conclusion could not follow from the premises because they
applicable copyright law.
would be irrelevant to it. For example, we would not accept the conclusion that
“The major goal of competitive sports is winning” on the basis of the claim that
“Washington, D.C., is the capital of the United States.” Even though the latter
claim is true, it has nothing to do with the former claim and so cannot support it.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 9
Consider again the argument that because the moral codes of different cul-
tures and groups conflict, no set of moral judgments or principles can be correct,
reasonable, or justified. First, the argument assumes that descriptive relativism is
true, but is it? If descriptive relativism claims no more than that the moral codes,
principles, and judgments accepted in different societies sometimes conflict, it
may well be true. But it leaves open the possibility that, behind the apparent dis-
agreement, there is deeper agreement on some morally fundamental values. The
area of agreement might constitute the basis of cross-cultural universal values
that some investigators have claimed to detect. For example, people from a wide
variety of cultural, ethnic, socioeconomic, and religious backgrounds condemn
incest, torture, and the random killing of members of one’s community. Protests
against Communist regimes in China and the old Soviet Union and, more re-
cently, against rigid forms of Islamic fundamentalism that deny women funda-
mental rights, or against the murder and rape of non-Arabs, amounting to
genocide in the view of many observers, in Darfur, are evidence for the broad ap-
peal of values such as liberty and human rights.
This point can be taken further. Apparent surface disagreement can disguise
deeper agreement in values. For instance, consider a dispute between a basketball
coach and her assistant before a big game. The head coach wants to use a pressure
defense to take advantage of her team’s agility and the opponent’s lack of speed.
The assistant argues against this strategy because it may cause overanxious and
inexperienced defensive players to commit too many fouls. In this example, there
is disagreement over which tactics to follow. But behind the disagreement is a
common value or principle shared by both coaches. Each is trying to select the
strategy that will lead to victory.
A parallel situation is possible in ethics. Suppose culture A believes that old
people should be separated from the group and left to die when they can no
longer contribute to the general welfare, but culture B disagrees. Clearly, there is a
disagreement here, but both cultures might share deeper fundamental values as
well. For one thing, the circumstances of each culture might differ. Culture A may
barely be surviving at the subsistence level; culture B may be affluent and there-
fore able to care for its older members. Perhaps culture A consists of nomadic
bands that must move fast to keep up with game. Arguably, each culture may ac-
cept the same basic principle of promoting the greater good for the greater num-
ber, but the principle might apply differently in the different circumstances in
which each group finds itself. Accordingly, although the descriptive relativist is
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 10
10 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
Suppose, however, that we concede for the sake of argument that there are no
universally accepted values or moral principles. The greatest weakness of the rela-
tivist argument is that, even if this point is conceded, moral skepticism does not
follow. The premise of descriptive relativism is logically irrelevant to supporting
moral skepticism. If cultures or groups disagree about moral problems, this does
not mean that there are no correct or justifiable resolutions to the dispute. That
certain values are not accepted does not mean they are not acceptable or justifi-
able. Similarly, some cultures believe the world is flat and others believe it is
round, but this does not by itself establish that there is no correct answer concern-
ing the shape of the earth.7 Whether a justifiable resolution of a dispute is possible
depends on whether justifiable modes of ethical (or scientific) inquiry can be ap-
plied to it. Moral disagreement can arise just as much from ignorance of such
modes of inquiry, misapplication of them, or factual disagreement (as when one
group of athletes denies and one asserts that steroids cause harmful side effects) as
it can from the impossibility of distinguishing reasonable moral claims from
those that are less reasonable.
Disagreement alone is not sufficient to show that no rational modes of inquiry
exist, let alone that they are insufficient to resolve the issue at hand. Whether moral
claims can be justifiable depends on the reasons or evidence that might support
them. The mere fact of disagreement on an ethical issue between two sides does
not show that both have equally good reasons for their view. Similarly, moral
agreement that some values are justified does not establish by itself that they are
justifiable; that, too, depends on the reasons that can be provided in their support.
In disagreement or agreement, justification depends on the kinds of reasons that
can be provided to support our moral views, not simply on whether others share
our values.
Of course, the failure of descriptive relativism to establish moral skepticism
doesn’t show that there is a correct resolution to moral controversies, only that
the presence of cultural or group diversity does not rule out such a resolution in
advance of inquiry.
Does descriptive relativism do any better in establishing ethical relativism—
the thesis that what your group or culture says is right or wrong for you is really
right or wrong for you? For example, is it morally right to take anabolic steroids to
enhance your performance in sports just because your peer group or even your
culture says it is right?
Once again, no such implication follows. For reasons similar to those outlined
applicable copyright law.
above, just because groups may disagree on ethical issues does not show that each
group’s moral views are right for its members. One might just as well argue that if
your culture believes the earth is flat, you ought to believe the earth is flat as well.
If such an absurd view were correct, we would never be justified in trying to cor-
rect or change the view of our culture or peer group even if we had strong reasons
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 11
for thinking their views were unfounded. Ethical relativism has the unacceptable
implication that the views of our culture or of other groups to which we belong
are acceptable just as they are. But surely, even if our peer group does advocate the
use of performance-enhancing drugs in sports, they are not automatically correct
to do so. We need to engage in ethical inquiry and argument to see whether the
best reasons that can be given to support this view actually do support it, rather
than accepting it merely because it is the view of the group to which we belong.8
Therefore, moral disagreement among cultures, or other kinds of groups,
should not deter us from engaging in a moral inquiry designed to subject moral
claims in sports or elsewhere to rational criticism and evaluation. Moreover, such a
view does not make us dogmatic or intolerant of the views of others. Indeed, toler-
ance and the avoidance of dogmatism are themselves values, and many think they
have objective support. If moral skepticism were justified, there would be no ratio-
nal basis for tolerance itself if cultures disagreed about its value. Accordingly, com-
mitment to rational inquiry in ethics does not make us arrogant dogmatists; if
anything, it makes us open to the insights of those who may be different from us so
long as we are willing to subject their views as well as our own to the test of rea-
soned inquiry in ethics. Thus, commitment to moral inquiry can help free us from
insular prejudices and allow us to test our views by seeing whether they can stand
up to the reasoned criticism of others.
cally and asserted dogmatically leave no room for reasonable response. Morality
may then be seen as a refuge for dogmatists who assert but never question their
own absolutes and use the fear of being labeled immoral or unfair to force people
to adopt favored views. Part of the reaction against “political correctness” on col-
lege campuses perhaps reflects resentment against ardent activists trying to impose
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 12
12 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
their views on others. Religious zealots and extreme right-wing politicians, as well
as those on the extreme left, sometimes use moral language as a weapon to stifle
dissent.
However, such misuse of moral language does not imply that moral judg-
ments cannot be justified. Indeed, to favor tolerance, judiciousness, and appeal to
reason over dogmatism and zealotry is to favor one set of values over another and
therefore makes a moral judgment. Respect for the views of others and willing-
ness to reason with them about values is as much a moral outlook as dogmatism
and fanaticism are.
Second, many people reject “absolutes.” But moral judgments about what is
right or wrong, fair or unfair, or just or unjust seem to presuppose the very ab-
solutes we are told do not exist. The first thing to note about rejecting absolutes is
that we don’t really know what an “absolute” is supposed to be. If an absolute is a
simple rule that is self-evident and immune from rational scrutiny, it is far from
clear that moral judgments can be absolutes. But if an absolute is a reasonable claim
well supported by evidence, surely we are all committed to absolutes. (The denial
that absolutes exist in this sense seems itself to be one, since presumably it purports
to be reasonable, well supported, and true.) Whether moral claims can be supported
by critical rational inquiry can best be seen by exploring moral issues and not by
dismissing moral claims through fear of committing an absolute (absolutophobia),
no matter how murky that concept may be. In any case, the key point is that even if
no moral judgments can be self-evident or immune from critical scrutiny, some
moral judgments may still be reasonable, well supported, and justifiable.
Perhaps another reason for reluctance to make moral judgments is an interpre-
tation (or misinterpretation) of multiculturalism. Although “multiculturalism”
stands for a family of related positions, not just one central doctrine, most multicul-
turalists hold that we should learn to understand and respect cultures other than
our own. But sophisticated multiculturalists ought not to blur this claim by assert-
ing that we should not criticize the moral views of others. This second claim would
prohibit them from criticizing opponents’ views of multiculturalism, or from ob-
jecting to intolerance of others. Since multiculturalists want to assert that their ap-
proaches are morally more acceptable than those they reject, they would undermine
themselves by embracing extreme forms of moral relativism and skepticism.
I suggest that many who express skepticism about morality are not true skep-
tics or relativists but instead hold a disguised morality that tolerates and respects
diversity. But by denying the moral basis to condemn evils such as the Holocaust,
applicable copyright law.
slavery, and racial oppression, such people are unable to condemn any wrong-
doing; they cannot even defend the values that lead them to tolerate and respect
diversity to begin with. If the legitimate desire to avoid moral fanaticism drives us
to see the condemnation of any evil, however great, as an unwarranted intellectual
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 13
arrogance, then the truly arrogant and the truly fanatical will never fear moral
censure, no matter what evil they choose to inflict.
Moral Reasoning
Dogmatism and fanaticism can be avoided if we base our moral views on reason-
ing and encourage critical examination of them. But how are we to distinguish
cogent from weak or incorrect moral reasoning? Philosophers and ethicists have
not agreed that any one theory of moral reasoning is the correct one or even
whether theories of moral reasoning are morally neutral or are themselves part of
a substantive code of ethics. Some philosophers have serious doubts about the ob-
jectivity of moral judgments, although not on the crude grounds criticized in ear-
lier sections. Perhaps the best way to determine whether moral judgments can be
rationally assessed is to examine moral issues in detail. We will do that, in connec-
tion with sport, in subsequent chapters. The following comments may be helpful
in assessing moral judgment and argument.
At a minimum, it is doubtful that one can evaluate moral arguments with the
precision and rigor appropriate to mathematics. This does not mean that we can-
not recognize the difference between well-supported and poorly supported posi-
tions. As Aristotle suggested, we should “look for precision in each class of things
just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to ac-
cept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician
scientific proofs.”10 This does not mean that ethical reasoning must be imprecise;
it may resemble a sound case made by a skilled judicial scholar rather than strict
mathematical proof.
Although good moral reasoning cannot be totally uncontroversial, the follow-
ing three criteria will prove especially helpful. First, moral reasoning must be im-
partial. In evaluating a moral issue, we are not asking, “What’s in it for me?” We
want to see what position is supported by the best reasons, impartially considered.
Moral deliberation has a broader perspective than self-interest. Thus, we cannot
justify the claim that “the use of steroids by Olympic athletes to enhance their
performance is morally legitimate” simply by claiming that “the use of steroids
will help me gain a gold medal in the Olympics.” The latter claim may show that
the use of steroids is in the speaker’s interest, but it does nothing to show that per-
sonal interest is the only relevant moral factor.
Philosophers have proposed various models or theories of impartial reasoning.
applicable copyright law.
For example, R. M. Hare has suggested that impartial moral reasoning requires
that we imagine ourselves in the place of all those affected by the action or policy
being evaluated, giving no special weight to any one perspective.11 John Rawls of
Harvard, author of the important book A Theory of Justice, has suggested that in
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 14
14 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 15
But let’s say that a particular golfer believed that it was permissible to turn in a
wrong score merely to benefit himself. Reflective judgment about this example
would reveal that turning in the wrong score was a case of lying about the score. The
principle that competitors should not lie can be applied to the example of this par-
ticular golfer and would normally be grounds for rejecting, or at least questioning,
the individual golfer’s belief. After all, if golfers could lie about their scores, the whole
point of a golf tournament, to find out who played best, would be undermined.
Of course, and this is what makes our third criterion controversial, we must be
sure that our reactions to situations are critical and reflective, not merely unana-
lyzed, culturally conditioned responses. It is all too easy to be influenced by cultural,
social, and even biologically based presuppositions. For example, our initial reaction
that it is permissible for hometown fans to boo and wave while an opposing basket-
ball player shoots a crucial foul shot may simply be a prejudice we share with other
hometown fans. However, some of our judgments about particular situations may
be reflective and unbiased and therefore allow us to check our principles.
Thus, our reflective reaction to actual and hypothetical examples may be a use-
ful guide for moral inquiry; without such consideration, our principles would be
empty abstractions. Conversely, we can criticize an abstract principle by showing
that its application would lead to unacceptable consequences for concrete action.
The more an ethical theory survives counterexample and criticism, the more
confidence we would seem to be entitled to place in it. Just as we expose our scien-
tific theories to test, so we should test our moral perspectives by exposing them to
the criticism of others. It may make us feel good to cling to our entrenched moral
views by never exposing them to opposing views. The price we pay for such a pol-
icy is to prevent ourselves from discovering errors that might be recognized by
others. We also lose opportunities for confirming our views when we refute the
objections of our critics. Just as a scientific theory gains credibility by surviving
tests, so may a moral view gain credibility by surviving criticism in the crucible of
moral debate.
From a critical perspective, a moral view can be undermined by at least three
strategies. We can argue that such a view would not be held if impartially consid-
ered, that its various parts are inconsistent or inharmonious, or that the view has
unacceptable implications for action. Nothing said so far implies that only one
moral perspective, code of ethics, or set of principles will survive moral criticism.
It is possible that all who go through an extended process of moral inquiry will
hold the same moral view; it is equally possible that a kind of moral pluralism will
applicable copyright law.
flourish. However, it is unlikely that serious and extended moral inquiry will rate
all moral perspectives as equally justified. Many will be rejected as inconsistent,
biased, vulnerable to counterexample, or deficient on some other appropriate
ground. Thus, although there is no guarantee that our criteria of moral reasoning
are the only defensible ones or that they will yield strictly determinate results for
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 16
16 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
all investigators, they at least provide guidance in the rational evaluation of moral
issues. By applying them, we employ reason in ethics.
Let us turn now to moral issues in sports. The discussion will ask us to make
and evaluate moral judgments about controversial cases; hence the importance of
the discussion about the justifiability of moral judgment. The challenge will be
to develop positions that we can impartially affirm, that are consistent with our
views in related areas, and that rely on principles whose consequences for action
are acceptable. We will begin by examining a fundamental issue: the importance
that should be assigned to competition and winning in sports.
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 17
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
T WO
COMPETITION IN ATHLETICS
Is It Morally Defensible?
“
W inning is not the most important thing; it’s the only thing.” This widely
cited claim, often attributed (perhaps falsely) to the late Vince Lombardi,
famous former coach of the Green Bay Packers, raises a host of issues that are cen-
tral to the moral evaluation of sports.1 What importance should be assigned to
winning in athletic competition? Consider sportswriter Grantland Rice’s declara-
tion, “For when the One Great Scorer comes to mark against your name, / He
writes—not that you won or lost—but how you played the Game,” and the re-
joinder by coach Forest Evashevski that one might as well say of a surgeon that it
matters not whether his patient lives or dies but only how he makes the cut.2
Questions about the importance of winning are closely tied to but not identi-
cal with questions about the value of competition. Should we be concerned pri-
marily with winning or with competing well? Is competition in sport a good
thing, or can it be harmful or even immoral? Should winning be the most impor-
tant goal of an athlete? What degree of emphasis should be placed on competitive
success and winning in athletics?
COMPETITION IN SPORTS
At first glance, competition seems to be the very nature of sports. We speak of
sporting events as competitions or contests, evaluate athletes as good or bad
competitors, and refer to other teams as opponents. But perhaps the connection
between sports and competition is far looser than these habits suggest. Thus,
someone can play golf or run a marathon just for the enjoyment of the activity. In-
applicable copyright law.
deed, all sports can be played noncompetitively. Men and women may participate
for exercise, to forget about work, to enjoy the company of friends, and to enjoy the
outdoors. Another goal of participation might be improvement. Such players, of-
ten described as competing with themselves, aim not at defeating opponents but
at improving their own performances. Still others may have the aesthetic goal of
17
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 18
performing the movements of their sport with skill and grace. For example, play-
ground basketball players may value outstanding moves more than defeating their
opponents. A leading amateur golfer of her generation, after years of hard practice,
remarked that she wanted “to make a swing that you know is as close to perfection
as you can get. And you say, ‘Boy, look at what I did.’ That’s all it is.”3
But just because a player does not aim for competitive success or is not moti-
vated by it, it doesn’t follow that competition isn’t part of the sport. A group of
people may play softball just to interact with friends, but the point of the game, as
defined by the rules, is to score more runs than the opponent. Even if the principal
desire of the participants is to get exercise, they are doing so by trying to achieve
the goals of the game as prescribed by the rules. An outfielder who is playing soft-
ball primarily to escape from the pressures of work still tries to catch a fly ball
rather than just letting it drop, and the reason is that a successful catch may prevent
the opponent from scoring. We need to distinguish, then, between two different
kinds of questions. First, should the principal goal or motives of participants in
sport be competitive, and, if so, to what degree? Second, do sports, insofar as they
are games, structurally involve a competitive element?
Critics of competition in sports do not object so much to games that have an
internal competitive element; rather, as we will see, they object to the defeat of
an opponent as a main desire or goal. Critics also object to institutionalizing this
attitude and to making competition in sports a social practice.
Competition in sports in the fullest sense can be thought of as participation in
sports contests with the intent or major goal of defeating an opponent. In such
clear cases, competition seems to be a zero-sum game. Because not all competitors
can defeat an opponent, defeat by one precludes a like attainment by the other in
the same contest.
Further, the clearest examples of athletic competition involve structured
games such as baseball, football, basketball, and tennis, all of which are governed
by a set of rules defining permissible moves. For example, the rules of basketball
that stipulate what it is to score, foul, or travel are constitutive rules. If players were
unaware of such rules or made no attempt to follow them, they could not be play-
ing basketball (although minimal modifications might be acceptable in informal
play). Constitutive rules should be distinguished from rules of strategy, such as
“Dribble only if there is no faster way of advancing the ball up court.” Rules of
strategy are general suggestions about how to play the game well; constitutive
rules determine what counts as a permissible move within the game itself.
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 19
Competition in Sports 19
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 20
large? The important ethical theory known as utilitarianism holds that an action
or practice is morally justified only if it has better consequences for all affected
than the alternatives.5
Utilitarianism sounds like a relatively simple approach to ethics. Just do a cost-
benefit analysis on the effects of the act or practice being evaluated, and you have
your answer about whether something is ethical. But utilitarianism raises complex
issues of theory and practice before it can even be applied to a problem. For exam-
ple, what are we to count as a good or bad consequence? In economic analysis,
costs and benefits can often be measured in monetary profits and losses, but what
is to count as a cost or benefit in ethics? Should pleasure and pain be the criteria, as
classical utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill suggested? Are
there other criteria, such as excellence in performance, achievement, or knowledge,
that should also count? For example, is a well-played game of greater intrinsic
value than a poorly played game, and is this so even if the participants of both
games experience the same levels of pleasure and pain? If we say that only pleasure
and pain count, our theory may be too narrow. If we add other goods, such as ex-
cellence of performance, how are we to aggregate them with pleasure and pain to
reach an overall total?
Moreover, even if we can agree on criteria of good and bad consequences, they
may admit of different interpretations. For example, should we identify benefits
with what actual participants seem to want or with what they would want if they
were better informed and more rational? Suppose, for example, that Jones, who
sees herself as a potential superstar, despises practices because of her coach’s em-
phasis on teamwork, but would value the practices if she were better informed
about the benefits of teamwork and more honest about her own abilities. Are the
practices beneficial to Jones or not?
None of this totally discredits utilitarianism. We all sometimes assess the con-
sequences of behavior on our own lives and others. An ethical theory that ignored
the consequences of actions or practices on human life would be hard to defend.
How many of us, for example, would advocate an action, however noble, knowing
that one of its consequences would be the painful death of millions? But even
though any satisfactory ethic must give some weight to the effects of acts or poli-
cies on human life, the choice of what framework we should adopt for evaluating
the consequences will often be controversial.
In addition, if we are to evaluate the effects of competition in sports, another
problem arises. Just what practices are we evaluating? Competition in sports can
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 21
Competition in Sports 21
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
out has harmful consequences that could be avoided if sports were properly
conducted.
Accordingly, any utilitarian evaluation of competition in sports will rest on
sometimes unstated and often controversial assumptions. In assessing a utilitarian
evaluation’s significance, we should identify just what presuppositions have been
employed. For example, suppose a study shows that participation in sports has lit-
tle positive effect on character development. To evaluate the significance of the
study, we would need to know what traits of character the researchers considered
positive, what forms of competition they studied, and whether they considered
only competition as actually practiced, or included—or even focused exclusively
on—competition as it should be practiced from the moral point of view.
An exhaustive analysis of the consequences of competition in sports is beyond
the scope of this study, but it is important to remember the philosophical and
methodological assumptions underlying such work. Given that the presupposi-
tions of any utilitarian analysis are likely to be controversial, utilitarianism by it-
self probably cannot provide a decisive evaluation of competition in sports.
For example, we know that proponents of competitive sports claim that partici-
pation promotes loyalty, discipline, commitment, a concern for excellence, and a
“never say die” attitude. These views are often expressed by well-known slogans,
sometimes posted on locker-room walls, such as “A winner never quits, a quitter
never wins” and “When the going gets tough, the tough get going.” That athletics of-
fer unique opportunities for character development is a common general assertion.
However, such claims are difficult to document. Thus, with regard to altruism,
one early but influential study concluded: “Most athletes indicate low interest in re-
ceiving support and concern from others, low need to take care of others, and low
need for affiliation. Such a personality seems necessary to achieve victory over oth-
ers.” More generally, the authors reported: “We found no empirical support for the
tradition that sport builds character. . . . It seems that the personality of the ideal
athlete is not the result of the molding process, but comes out of the ruthless selec-
tion process that occurs at all levels of sport. . . . Horatio Alger success—in sport or
elsewhere—comes only to those who already are mentally fit, resilient, and strong.”6
Although no study is by itself decisive, and conclusions such as the one quoted
above will be challenged later in this book, this study does have significant meth-
odological implications. In particular, even if participants in competitive sports
do manifest desirable character traits to an unusual degree, it does not follow that
participation in sports caused these traits to develop; they may have been there all
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 22
other students from the same institutions. Shulman and Bowen argued that al-
though athletes may well show especially high levels of teamwork and ability to
cooperate with others to achieve a common goal, the athletes had tended to ex-
hibit these traits before participating in college athletics. Therefore, the preexist-
ing character traits of athletes help to account for their athletic success rather than
being created by participation in sports.7
However, the claim that preselection fully explains the virtues exhibited by
many athletes can cut in different directions. For one thing, it can also be used to
discount some of the consequentialist criticism of competitive sports. For example,
competitive athletics may not promote selfishness or cheating, as critics of compet-
itive sport may claim; rather, some successful athletes may already be selfish and
predisposed to cheating before becoming successful in sport. There may be no
causal effect, only correlation.
Thus, it is important not to confuse a factor associated or correlated with in-
tense athletic competition with something caused by such competition. To take
another example, it has been suggested that “athletes whose sense of identity and
self-worth is entirely linked to athletic achievement often experience an identity
crisis when the athletic career has ended, and it becomes necessary to move on to
something else.”8 This statement may be true generally of hard-driving individu-
als who face significant career changes in fields other than sport, and so say little
of significance about participation in competitive athletics itself. Would anyone
be surprised by the claim that “executives whose sense of identity and self-worth
is entirely linked to achievement in business often experience an identity crisis
when their careers end and it becomes necessary to move on to something else”?
Perhaps anyone sincerely committed to a worthy endeavor would feel a sense of
loss over change, which is not necessarily a bad thing. If so, participation in sports
does not cause athletes to have an identity crisis when changing careers; instead,
individuals who already are committed to achievement and dedicated to their ca-
reers are vulnerable to such episodes whether they are participants in athletics,
business, medicine, law, academia, theater, or any other endeavor that demands a
high level of commitment from successful participants. Accordingly, if critics of
competitive sports are right to explain away evidence that participation in sports
develops virtues as simply the result of preselection, they cannot also consistently
claim that participation in sports causes all the vices or harms involving athletes. If
preselection is plausible at all, it applies to both the good qualities and the bad
qualities associated with sports participation. It should not be used to dismiss the
applicable copyright law.
possibility of sports causing the good qualities while asserting that sports must
cause the bad qualities.
But is the preselection theory plausible, even if applied consistently? In fact,
even though there may be no direct and demonstrable connection between partic-
ipation in competitive sports and desirable character development, there may be
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 23
Competition in Sports 23
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
more subtle and indirect connections. Harry Edwards, while acknowledging that
competitive sports do not build character from scratch, suggests that participation
may reinforce and encourage the development of preexisting character traits.9
True, it is not easy to show that participation does or does not promote specific
character traits. Similarly, it is not easy to show that a liberal arts education affects
the values of students. We do not conclude, however, that there are no effects. Do
the alumni of the highly selective colleges and universities studied in The Game of
Life tend to succeed in their careers because of their fine education? Or do the col-
leges and universities in question merely preselect those applicants whom anyone
would predict as the most likely to succeed? We surely need to be careful about a
double standard in attributing the positive character traits of athletes to preselec-
tion while refusing to apply the same argument to our own favorite social and edu-
cational practices. Professors are rightly reluctant to assume that they have no real
influence on their students whose virtues, intellectual or moral, are entirely due to
preselection. But then, why not be equally reluctant to assume that all the good
qualities exhibited by some athletes are entirely the result of preselection, rather
than at least partially the result of their participation in sports?
The commonsense position suggested by Edwards surely has force. Why as-
sume that development and growth in either athletics or academics at the college
level are entirely the result of preselecting those who already have the traits neces-
sary for success? Although it is true that both college coaches and admissions offi-
cers at selective schools recruit students who have already demonstrated a capacity
for success, these individuals also may develop significantly because of the influ-
ence of coaches and professors. Surely the most intuitively plausible model is one
of interaction: Experiences at college, whether in the classroom or on the playing
field, often promote the development of students, although the students selected to
study and play sports at the institutions in question have already demonstrated
some potential for success. The “add-ons” that college provides, whether in studies
or in sports, in all likelihood make the educational experience valuable.
What should we conclude, then, about the consequentialist thesis that partici-
pation in athletics may promote moral and intellectual growth? For one thing, we
have learned that whether the thesis is true or false is not an issue easily settled and
raises many complex questions. Much will depend on context. On one hand, if ath-
letics are conducted in an unethical manner, and if winning at all costs is the only
goal that is emphasized, then participation may impede moral development rather
than advancing it. On the other hand, if what is emphasized is the pursuit of excel-
applicable copyright law.
lence, if winning is considered an important goal but not the only goal, if respect
for opponents and the best values of sport are emphasized, and if athletes are
taught to think critically and reflectively about their performance, then participa-
tion might well have beneficial effects on participants and spectators alike. Surely
much will depend on how sports are conducted in specific contexts.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 24
Finally, and of great importance, even if competitive sports have less impact on
character development than many have claimed (for example, if the preselection
theory is justifiable after all), they still may play a major role in expressing and il-
lustrating our values and even help to justify them; we might call these the expres-
sive and the justificatory functions of sports.10 For example, athletic competition
may illustrate the value of dedication and teamwork by publicly manifesting the
excellence attained through the cultivation of those traits. Close contests can bring
out courage and loyalty. By welcoming challenges in sports, participants and spec-
tators can affirm and exhibit such virtues.
Similarly, a highly talented team that never plays to its potential because its
players are too selfish to work together, or who cannot put aside their differences
to cooperate in a common cause, may provide justificatory support to those who
affirm the importance of teamwork and solidarity with others. It is significant in
this respect that prominent social scientist James Q. Wilson identified athletic
teams as one of the few American institutions that often combined a significant
degree of diversity with trust among participants, pointing out that they thus
illustrated and perhaps helped to justify the thesis that diversity and social unity
could be truly compatible.
In summary, we have seen that evaluating the social practice of competitive
athletics by seeing whether its consequences are harmful or beneficial raises such
complex issues that a decisive and uncontroversial consequential analysis is cur-
rently unavailable. However, we have also seen that those who are skeptical about
the beneficial consequences of participation in competitive athletics have not nec-
essarily won the day. On the contrary, there is much that believers in the benefits
of sports participation can say in reply to the skeptic.
Moreover, although our assessment of consequentialist approaches may not
admit of a decisive conclusion, consequentialism itself may not be the most sig-
nificant part of the ethical story. Competition, the critics contend, cannot satisfy
legitimate ethical requirements that are nonconsequential in character. Are they
right? Maybe if we look beyond consequences (especially if we construe “conse-
quences” narrowly) to other sorts of principles, ones that regard factors other
than consequences as morally significant, we can come to a defensible moral as-
sessment of competitive sports.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 25
of competition is to defeat an opponent and win the contest. The point of this
criticism is not that the consequences of competition are undesirable, but that
competition by its very nature is imbued with values that we should reject.
Thus, some critics of competition throughout society, among them political
theorist John Schaar, see the competitive society as a very unattractive place. It re-
duces human interaction to “a contest in which each man competes with his fel-
lows for scarce goods, a contest in which there is never enough for everybody, and
where one man’s gain is usually another’s loss.”11 Michael Fielding identifies com-
petition with “working against others in a spirit of selfishness.”12
The critics argue, then, that the goal of competition is to enhance the position
of one competitor (or one small group of competitors, such as a team) at the ex-
pense of others. Thus, by its very nature, competition is selfish. Since selfish con-
cern for oneself at the expense of others is immoral, it follows that competition is
immoral as well.
These nonconsequentialist critics of competitive sports do not argue only
against debased forms of competition, such as cheating. After all, virtually every-
one acknowledges that competitive sports are morally objectionable when players
are taught to cheat to win, to bribe officials, or to intentionally injure opponents to
get them off the field of play. The critics, however, object to competitive sports at
their best. Even supposing that the participants are playing fairly, is competition in
sports still not selfish and egoistic?
The argument that competitive sports are selfish by their very nature is not
without some intuitive force, because, in athletic competition, if X wins, Y loses. If
they are good competitors, X and Y each try to win. Nevertheless, even if the argu-
ment that competition is essentially selfish is justifiable when applied to economic
competition in the market, which is hardly self-evident, it faces special difficulties
when applied to athletics.
For one thing, the idea of competition in sports as an unrestricted war of all
against all seems grossly inaccurate. Even though team sports involve competition
between opponents, they also involve cooperation among team members. In many
sports, even at the professional level, it is common for opponents to encourage and
even instruct each other in the off-season or between contests. Critics might reply
that such examples show that even professional athletes find it morally impossible
to live according to a strict competitive ethic. But, as we will see, such cooperative
behavior can be regarded as part of a defensible competitive ethic that is based not
on the idea of a war of all against all but on the value of meeting the challenges
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 26
of the game require that the ball be advanced only through such allowed tech-
niques as passing or dribbling. Good competition requires competitors to forgo
breaking the constitutive rules for momentary advantages. Commitment to this
ideal is perhaps best illustrated by the behavior of athletes in individual sports,
from weekend tennis players to professional golfers, who call penalties on them-
selves in the heat of competition, sometimes at great financial cost. In many
sports, rules are enforced by officials. But although it is legitimate to question the
calls of officials, no one believes they ought not to apply the rules at all, or that
they should apply them selectively.
In addition to obligations to obey the constitutive rules of the sport, there are
obligations of competitive fairness that also restrict selfishness in sports. Thus,
competitive success seems insignificant, or even unethical, if it is obtained by
stacking the deck against one side—say, by bribing an official, or by scheduling
vastly inferior opponents for all or much of one’s season.
Finally, selfishness in competitive sports is often criticized. The basketball
player who is overly concerned with how many points she scores rather than with
whether her team wins is criticized for being selfish; coaches often tell such play-
ers that they must become team players instead of trying to be the star. This re-
sponse would make no sense if selfishness was the norm in competitive athletics.
At this point, critics might concede that normative restrictions apply to selfish
behavior in athletic competition, although they might still argue that, just as lim-
ited war is still war, so minimally constrained selfishness is still selfishness. To an-
swer this point, we need a fuller account of competition in sports. Let us begin by
considering a Yale-Princeton football game played in 1895. Princeton was win-
ning 16–10, but Yale was right on the Princeton goal line with a chance to turn the
tide on the very last play of the game:
The clamor ceased once absolutely, and the silence was even more impressive
than the tumult that had preceded it. . . . While they [the Yale players] were lin-
ing up for that last effort the cheering died away, yells both measured and in-
articulate stopped and the place was so still . . . you could hear the telegraph
instruments chirping like crickets from the side. Yale scored to win the game
on a brilliant run. It is not possible to describe that run. It would be as easy to
explain how a snake disappears through the grass, or an eel slips from your fin-
gers, or to say how a flash of linked lightning wriggles across the sky.13
applicable copyright law.
Is the important point here simply that Yale won and that Princeton lost? Ed-
win Delattre, former president of St. John’s College of Annapolis, Maryland, has
drawn a different lesson from this episode and the many like it that take place in
all seasons and at all levels of competition:
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 27
Such moments are what make the game worth the candle. Whether amidst the
soft lights and sparkling balls of a billiard table, or the rolling terrain of a lush
fairway, or in the violent and crashing pits where linemen struggle, it is the
moments where no letup is possible, when there is virtually no tolerance for
error, which make up the game. The best and most satisfying contests maxi-
mize these moments and minimize respite from pressure.14
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 28
with competitive sports. A. Bartlett Giamatti, former president of Yale and commis-
sioner of baseball, emphasized the quest for excellence:
When . . . a person on the field or fairway, rink, floor, or track, performs an act
that surpasses—despite his or her evident mortality, his or her humanness—
whatever we have seen or heard of or could conceive of doing ourselves, then
we have witnessed . . . an instant of complete coherence. In that instant, pulled
to our feet, we are pulled out of ourselves. We feel what we saw, became what
we perceived. The memory of that moment is deep enough to send us all out
again and again, to reenact the ceremony, made of all the minor ceremonies to
which spectator and player devote themselves, in the hopes that the moment
will be summoned again and made again palpable.16
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 29
The claim that improvement is an ethically better or more defensible goal than
competitive success in sports presupposes, first, that an ethically relevant difference
exists between the two and, second, that the difference contributes to the ethical
superiority of the improvement model. What might that difference be? Perhaps the
difference is that in aiming for improvement, we do not necessarily aim to beat
others. We can all improve together, so the element of the zero-sum game is missing.
Since all can improve together, to aim at improvement does not appear selfish. In-
tending to beat others seems selfish, at least to the critics, because it seems to value
success of the self (or of one’s team) without regard to the interests of others.
There are two defenses against such an approach. The first, as we have seen, is
that competition thought of as a mutual quest for excellence is not necessarily self-
ish or a total zero-sum game. Although only one party can win, each cooperates in
providing a mutually acceptable challenge to the other. Although not all competi-
tors can win, there is a sense, as we will see, in which all the competitors in a well-
played contest can meet the challenge and achieve excellence.
Second, and perhaps most important, we can question the degree to which the
quest for self-improvement differs from competitive sports in an ethically impor-
tant way. At the very least, the two approaches share some central features. For one
thing, an especially significant criterion of improvement is change in one’s com-
petitive standing when measured against the performance of others. Perhaps the
best way of judging one’s progress is to see whether one is doing better against op-
ponents now than in the past.
Doing better against opponents is not merely a contingent sign of improve-
ment; often, what counts as playing well is logically determined by what counts as
an appropriate competitive response to the moves of opponents. For example, it
would be incorrect to say that Susan is playing good tennis if Susan is hitting crisp
ground shots when intelligent play calls for charging the net. Similarly, it would be
incorrect to say that she is improving if she continues to make such competitively
inappropriate moves in match after match.
The conceptual point, then, is that achievement, improvement, or development
cannot easily be divorced from comparison with the performance of others. Rob-
ert Nozick provided a pertinent illustration: “A man living in an isolated mountain
village can sink 15 jump shots with a basketball out of 150 tries. Everyone else in
the village can sink only one jump shot out of 150 tries. He thinks (as do the oth-
ers) that he’s very good at it. One day along comes Jerry West.”17 (West was an All
American for West Virginia University and one of the great professional players of
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 30
about the performance of others. Before the arrival of a great professional basket-
ball player such as Jerry West, the village star may have thought that improving his
average to 17 out of 150 shots would constitute significant improvement. After
the visit, even if it is acknowledged that no villager can ever match West’s skill, the
very criterion of significant improvement would have radically changed. At the very
least, the more expert villagers should expect that, after reasonable practice, they
should make at least 50 shots out of 150 tries. Before the visit, the “30-shot barrier”
must have seemed as impossible to reach as breaking the 4-minute mile must have
seemed to runners of an earlier era.
Does this imply that an athlete seeking to improve really is implicitly compet-
ing with others? Such an athlete is striving to reach standards set by an appropriate
reference group of others, at least if the improvement is thought of as an achieve-
ment. Thus, success or failure is partially determined by how others perform. Ac-
cordingly, those who value “competition with self” because it seems not to involve
(possibly negative) comparisons with the performance of others may need to re-
think their position. Although differences may remain, the quest for improvement
and the quest for victory both share an element of comparison with the perfor-
mance of others. That is why the rhetoric of competition with self can be mislead-
ing; the appropriate reference group is not only an earlier self but also a reference
class of fellow competitors. Even in judging our own performance, we are eval-
uating it by how it compares to a group with whom we believe it appropriate to
compare ourselves.18
And yet, there are important differences between striving for improvement and
striving for competitive success. In particular, the significant improvement of some
participants does not preclude the improvement of others and may even facilitate
it, as when the whole group improves. The attainment of victory by some, how-
ever, does preclude its attainment by the opposition. Although this difference may
not be as important as critics allege, since everyone can meet the challenge of com-
petition, it is true that although all participants can improve, not all participants
can win. Competition emphasizes meeting the challenge set by an opponent,
whereas improvement emphasizes the development of one’s own skills. Even if one
can measure development only by examining competitive performance, the two
goals are conceptually different. One can meet an opponent’s challenge without
improving one’s past performance, and one can improve one’s past performance
while continuing to lose to a more skilled competitor.
Our discussion suggests three conclusions. First, although the quest for im-
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 31
opponent, and that therefore it differs from the notion of simply trying to im-
prove. However, since what counts as improvement often is determined by how
one reacts to the moves and strategies of opponents, trying to meet the challenge
of competition and trying to improve also have a great deal in common.
Second, and perhaps more important, the defense of competition as a mutual
quest for excellence avoids many of the objections to competitive excess that may
have made “competition with self” seem more attractive than competition against
others. As we have seen, athletic competition, conceived of as a mutual quest for
excellence, is significantly cooperative; each competitor freely agrees (if only im-
plicitly) to provide a challenge to the opponent, and each opponent can meet
the challenge by playing well even though only one can win. So even though the
goal or intent of the competitors may be to win, each can meet the challenge by
playing well.
But consider a third point. Suppose dancers were given the following advice:
“It’s unimportant whether you are good or bad dancers. Just try to get better and
better every day.” Surely it is important that dancers improve their performance,
but isn’t the level of achievement they have attained also important? In the dance,
we appreciate personal development, but we also value achievement and a skilled
performance. If athletic performance is regarded as significant, skilled perfor-
mance is important in sports as well. Competition is the mechanism by which
achievement is measured and determined. Improvement is a desirable goal, but
achievement is no less important or noble. Improvement, then, is a worthy goal to-
ward which all competitors ought to strive. But it is not the only goal; high achieve-
ment in athletics can be equally worthy, and sometimes inspiring, and, as Giametti
has suggested, even ennobling as well.19
1. Jones is playing in a touch football game with friends. Jones says, “I’ll be the
quarterback.” The others declare that they, too, want to be quarterbacks
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 32
and suggest the position be shared. Jones replies, “It’s my football! If you
don’t let me play quarterback, I’ll take my ball and go home!”
2. Jones is in a spelling contest between two teams in his fifth-grade class. He
correctly spells a difficult word. As a result, his team wins and the other
team loses.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 33
persons from making and acting upon their critical judgments? Inequalities of
outcome can be avoided only by failing to treat and respect others as the persons
capable of critical choice that they are.23
A similar point can be made about many of the inequalities of result that emerge
from competitive sports. For one thing, most participants want to compete. They
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 34
find the challenge posed by competitors worth trying to meet and the competitive
sport they play worth their commitment. If respect for persons requires that we re-
spect their conception of how they should lead their lives, the inequalities generated
by competition in sports seem no less justified than the inequalities arising from the
autonomous choices of those involved in other areas.
Critics might object that treating people as equals involves more than simply
respecting their choices. The choices must be reasonably informed and compe-
tent; they must not be made if mental illness, depression, or mood-altering drugs
are influences. For example, suppose Jones chooses to humiliate himself to gain
Smith’s affections. Surely, Smith does not treat Jones with respect if she heaps ex-
treme humiliation upon Jones, even though he chooses to leave himself open to
such treatment. Rather, Jones is degrading himself, and Smith is contributing to
that degradation. Similarly, just because participants in sports agree to compete, it
doesn’t follow that their choice ought to be respected. It must be shown that the
competitive relationship itself is not inherently degrading or incompatible in
some other way with respect for persons as equals.
Indeed, competitive relationships are often characterized in derogatory terms.
Competitors are often seen merely as obstacles to be overcome. They are to be
“destroyed,” “humiliated,” and “run off the court.” Persons are reduced to mere
things or barriers standing in the way of competitive success.
For example, in a major college football game, a star running back, playing
again for the first time after experiencing a serious knee injury, reported that dur-
ing a pileup, he felt the opposing players trying to twist his injured knee. Thinking
quickly, he yelled out, “You’ve got the wrong knee! You’ve got the wrong knee!”24
It would clearly be ethically indefensible if competition required that we win
by deliberately injuring our opponents. We already know that the ethics of good
competition prohibits the intentional infliction of injury. Indeed, if competition
is understood as a mutual quest for excellence, competitors should want their op-
ponents to be at their peak so they can present the best possible challenge. Noted
golfer and 2001 British Open Champion David Duval expressed how a good com-
petitor should view opponents when he discussed the possibility of contending
against Tiger Woods in a major championship: “One of the great things about
golf is that you don’t have to have any ill-will in this game. If I come head-to-head
against him at say, the U.S. Open, I want him to be playing as good as he can play
because I want to beat him when he’s playing his best. It would be a heck of a lot
better, if you know he gave you all he’s got, and you beat him.”25
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 35
Is Winning Important?
If we view competitive sports as a mutual quest for excellence in the face of chal-
lenge, what importance should be assigned to winning? Is simply playing well in
an attempt to meet the opponent’s challenge all we should strive for? Why should
who wins or loses matter at all?
Can’t it be argued that winning is significant precisely because it is a criterion
of meeting the challenge? To lose is to fail to meet the challenge; to win is to
succeed. If competition in sports is justified by attempts to meet challenges, it is
surely important whether or not we succeed in meeting them. After all, isn’t the
principal point of deliberately attempting a difficult task to see whether we can
accomplish it?
Although there is much to this position, perhaps it is overstated. Winning is
not necessarily a sign of competitive success, and losing is not necessarily a sign of
applicable copyright law.
competitive failure. If winning were the only criterion of success, it would be sen-
sible to take pride in consistently defeating far weaker opponents by wide mar-
gins. Conversely, if losing were necessarily a sign of competitive failure, a weaker
opponent would have no cause for pride after having extended a far superior op-
ponent to the limit before going down to defeat. Moreover, as Nicholas Dixon has
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 36
pointed out, winning can result from factors other than athletic excellence, such
as a bad call by an official or a fluke of luck.26
This line of argument suggests that winning, while an important criterion of
athletic success, is far from everything in competitive sports. Not everyone can
win, but each competitor may well meet the challenge set by an opponent, al-
though one wins and one loses. But it is not unimportant who wins or loses. If
winning is not everything, it is something. For one thing, if the competition is not
one sided, winning will certainly be an important criterion, sometimes the crite-
rion, of having met the challenge of the opposition. Because one is trying to meet
the challenge set by the opponent, it seems appropriate to feel elated at victory or
disappointed at defeat. Even when opponents are mismatched, pride in victory
may be appropriate: The victors rightly may be proud that they played to their po-
tential without the incentive of strong opposition.
Finally, we should remember that playing well in some aesthetic sense is not
necessarily playing well in the sense of meeting the competitive challenge pre-
sented by an opponent. Remember the earlier example of the tennis player who
hit ground strokes with beautiful form yet lost because the competitive situation
called for aggressive play at the net. Similarly, a 3-point shot from 20 feet may look
good but may make no competitive sense if the team with the ball has a 2-point
lead and 15 seconds left on the clock. What may look like good play from an aes-
thetic standpoint may be poor play given the competitive situation.
Indeed, as sports philosopher Scott Kretchmar recently pointed out, winning
requires the development and use of certain skills that are key elements of the chal-
lenge of sports. Such qualities as “knowing how to hold a lead,” “employing the
proper strategy for the moment,” “knowing how to weather a cold spell,” and
“knowing how to make a run from behind” are key qualities exhibited by top com-
petitors.27 In other words, winning, as opposed to playing well in some aesthetic
sense, requires utilization of a set of abilities and skills that are central elements in
the quest for athletic excellence through challenge.
Therefore, although winning may not be a necessary criterion of competitive
success, it is often the most reliable indicator of it. In many competitive contexts,
it won’t do to separate winning and losing from how well one played the game,
because the outcome of the game is an especially significant indicator of how well
one actually played.
But why should success and failure matter at all? After all, “It’s only a game.” Isn’t
concern for competitive success overemphasized, given the nature of the activity?
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 37
slogan means that success in competitive athletics shouldn’t matter at all, it is far
more dubious.
Competitive sports provide a context in which we can stretch our bodily skills
and capacities to the limits in the pursuit of excellence. The pursuit of excellence in
the use of the body is hardly trivial; on the contrary, for athletes, meeting the de-
mands of the sport often involves beauty, courage, dedication, and passion. If these
things don’t matter, what does? Would the critics say to the artist who botches a
significant painting, a musician who misses key notes during a concert, or the
dancer who performs poorly in a major performance, “Well, it’s only art!” Con-
cern for success and the pursuit of excellence in athletics seems no more deserving
of criticism than concern for success and the pursuit of excellence in other areas of
human endeavor.
Our conclusions do not imply that all sporting activity should always be in-
tensely competitive. Not everyone wants or needs a challenge all the time. At many
levels of play, the trick for coaches and educators is to balance an emphasis on
achievement and competitive success with participation and instruction in devel-
opmental skills. But insofar as an activity is a sport, then, even if played with little
emphasis on competition, it will involve a degree of competitive challenge. The
goal of the participants, as players, will be to make correct moves or plays, which in
turn will be defined by the moves of the opposing players. If standards of good and
bad performance did not apply, the participants would merely be exercising, not
engaging in sports.
This point suggests that critics of overemphasis on winning and competitive
success may take their points too far by ignoring the perhaps equally deleterious
effects of underemphasis. Thus, if participants normally are told that “it doesn’t
matter how you do, just go out and have fun,” the subtle message being conveyed
may be that doing well is unimportant. If participation in competitive sports can
be a form of human excellence, if it can contribute to self-development and self-
expression, and perhaps reinforce desirable character traits, performance may
well matter after all. As William Bennett has observed: “Serious playing and
watching . . . are rarely if ever doing nothing, for sports is a way to scorn indiffer-
ence, and occasionally, indeed, one can even discern in competition those elements
of grace, skill, beauty, and courage that mirror the greatest affirmations of human
spirit and passion.”28
Bennett suggested that competitive sports, at their best, involve applying stan-
dards of excellence to challenges that people regard as worthwhile in themselves.
applicable copyright law.
This idea should be taken seriously. If competitive sports are understood on the
model of a mutual quest for excellence through challenge, they not only can be ac-
tivities of beauty and skill but can represent a striving for human excellence, and in
so doing they can be a paradigmatic way of respecting each other as persons—of
taking our status as persons seriously.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 38
SUMMARY
This chapter suggests that competition in the context of sports is most defensible
ethically when understood as a mutual quest for excellence in the intelligent and di-
rected use of athletic skills in the face of challenge. Athletic competition of this sort,
under appropriate conditions, may have such beneficial consequences as expressing
important values and reinforcing the development of desirable character traits. Per-
haps more important, competition in sports may have intrinsic worth as a frame-
work within which we express ourselves as persons and respond to others as
persons in the mutual pursuit of excellence. Although other such frameworks also
exist, few are as universally accessible and involve us so fully as agents who must in-
telligently use our bodies to meet challenges we have chosen for ourselves.
Competition as the mutual quest for excellence, it must be emphasized, is an
ideal. Actual practices may not conform to its requirements. In the real world, win-
ning may be overemphasized, rules may be broken, athletes may be exploited, and
unfair conditions for competition may preclude genuine challenge. If so, the ideal
provides grounds for the moral criticism of serious deviations from it. In the re-
mainder of this book, the ideal will be applied to the moral evaluation of actual
practices in sports.
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 39
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
THREE
SPORTSMANSHIP, FAIRNESS,
AND COMPETITION IN SPORT
T he victory of the U.S. women’s team in the 1999 World Cup Soccer matches
was one of the most exciting events in sports in the last decade of the twentieth
century. Not only were the contests leading to this triumph hotly contested, the fi-
nal game being decided in a shoot-out, but the team was also taken by many to
symbolize the emergence of women into the center of attention in athletic compe-
tition. The team’s stars, popular and highly skilled players such as Mia Hamm and
Brandy Chastain, were heroes to many young girls who played in soccer leagues
across the country, as well as to adults throughout the United States.
However, as noted in Chapter 1, the final plays of the world championship
game, in which the Americans defeated China, became the center of an important
ethical controversy. Regular and overtime play had ended in a tie, and the game
was to be decided by a shoot-out in which players from each team would go one-
on-one against the opposing goalie. The team that scored the most goals after a
set number of attempts would win the game. Under the rules, which prevented
the goalkeeper from moving forward to cut off the shooter’s angle until a shot was
launched, the offensive player had a major advantage.
So the world championship was on the line while the offensive players matched
each other goal for goal as the shoot-out progressed. The American goalkeeper,
Briana Scurry, decided that one of the remaining Chinese players, Liu Ying, seemed
to lack confidence. When Liu made her move against Scurry, the American goalie
decided on a controversial tactic to stop the shot. As the Chinese player made her
move, Scurry, by stepping forward in violation of the rule limiting the movement
of goalies in such circumstances, attempted to deprive Liu of the angle she would
applicable copyright law.
need to score. The tactic worked, Scurry blocked the shot, and the Americans won.
But did they win fairly?
As one view has it, “It’s only cheating if you get caught.” A more sophisticated
and surely more defensible modification of that view is that it is the referee’s job to
call the game, and as long as the player is willing to accept the penalty if detected,
39
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 40
knows the opponent is her team’s worst foul shooter. She pretends to go for the
ball but in fact deliberately fouls her opponent. Is deliberate fouling to gain a
strategic advantage ethical? After all, fouling is against the rules. But is that suffi-
cient to make it unethical?
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 41
These examples raise questions not about the general issue we examined in
Chapter 2, of whether competition in sports is ever ethical, but about how to con-
duct competition ethically. They raise issues of sportsmanship and fair play. By
examining them, we can better understand the values that may be used in assess-
ing the behavior of competitors within the athletic contest itself.
tially a competitive activity, which has for its end victory in the contest and which
is characterized by a spirit of dedication, sacrifice, and intensity.”4
Sportsmanship, then, is the kind of attitude toward opponents that best
promotes the goal of sports as defined by Keating—namely, friendly, mutually
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 42
satisfactory relationships among the players. “Its purpose is to protect and culti-
vate the festive mood proper to an activity whose primary purpose is pleasant
diversion, amusement, joy.”5 In Keating’s view, the supreme principle of sports-
manship was an injunction to “always conduct yourself in such a manner that you
will increase rather than detract from the pleasure found in the activity, both your
own and that of your fellow participant.”6
Sportsmanship, Keating said, was a virtue that applied to the recreational ac-
tivity of sports, as he understood it, but not to the more serious and competitive
activity of athletics. To Keating, sportsmanship and athletics did not fit together
easily: “The strange paradox of sportsmanship as applied to athletics is that it asks
the athlete, locked in a deadly serious and emotionally charged situation, to act
outwardly as if he was engaged in some pleasant diversion.”7
On Keating’s theory, sportsmanship only applies to athletics in an attenuated
way involving adherence to the value of fair play, which to Keating implies adher-
ence to the letter and spirit of equality before the rules. Since the athletic contest is
designed to determine which competitor meets the challenge best, fair play requires
that competitors not intentionally disregard or circumvent the rules. Broadly un-
derstood, perhaps more broadly than Keating would recommend, fair play requires
that victory be honorable. So fair play can be expected of the serious athlete in in-
tense competition, but to also require sportsmanship—the attempt to increase the
pleasure of the opponent in the contest—normally is to ask too much.
But what is honorable behavior in competitive sport? Is it ethically required?
Do we act wrongly, in a way that is morally prohibited, if we behave dishonorably,
or do we just fail to live up to an ideal that is above and beyond the call of duty?
And what is fair play? Does it mean simply following the rules, or does it require
more than that? Did Scurry act unfairly in the decisive play in the World Cup
championship game? What precisely is the relationship between unfair and un-
sportsmanlike conduct? Did the University of Colorado act dishonorably in ac-
cepting its disputed victory over Missouri? Even if it didn’t, is honorable behavior
too much to expect at elite levels of competitive athletics? Finally, is the line be-
tween sports and athletics as sharp and as ethically significant as Keating’s ac-
count suggests?8
To answer these questions, and to clarify the relationship between fair play and
sportsmanship, we need to say more about how sport is to be understood and the
implications of such an understanding for ethics and fair play. For example, if sports
are understood principally as rule-governed activities, and fair play is thought of
applicable copyright law.
simply as conformity to the rules, any deviation from the rules may be considered
unethical. But if common social understandings and conventions accepted in prac-
tice by participants are ethically relevant, a more permissive account of ethically ac-
ceptable behavior in sport may emerge.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 43
hopper: Games, Life and Utopia is a thesis on the nature and point of games.10 Be-
sides being analytically acute, it is also humorous and just plain fun to read. In any
case, if Suits was correct, we can define “game” and then go on to understand
sports as games of physical skill.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 44
Games, Suits pointed out, are governed by constitutive rules that define what
counts as winning and losing and distinguish moves that are permissible within a
game from those that are impermissible. Thus, dribbling is a permissible way of ad-
vancing the ball in basketball, but running with the ball is not, precisely because the
former is allowed by the constitutive rules and the latter is not. Dribbling too much
can be bad strategy and violate what might be called strategic rules for playing well,
but still, dribbling is allowed in a way that running with the ball is not.
However, many activities, such as taking an examination in a course, are gov-
erned by constitutive rules but are not games. Suits therefore introduced addi-
tional criteria to distinguish games from other practices defined by constitutive
rules. In particular, the rules of games create challenges by setting up what Suits
called unnecessary obstacles to achieving the goals that the players must pursue.
Thus, it is a simple matter to put a ball into a hole, but it becomes exceedingly
difficult to put a ball into a hole when, in golf, it must be done with what former
British prime minister Winston Churchill called “implements ill-designed for
the purpose.” In other words, the constitutive rules of games create unnecessary
challenges that make accomplishing an ordinary task (putting a ball into a hole),
which Suits called the pre-lusory goal, into a challenging game (golf) that requires
a legitimate golf score, the lusory goal.
In a game, moreover, we accept the constitutive rules simply in order to try to
meet the challenge of the game. Suits called this the “lusory attitude.” Thus, to re-
turn to our earlier example, although taking an examination in a college course
may have constitutive rules (for example, that students may not refer to notes or
texts during the examination period), taking a test is not a game, because tests are
normally taken to get grades that enable participants to get jobs or secure entrance
to graduate and professional school.
Consider, then, the suggestion, based on this rough summary of Suits’s ac-
count, that a game is defined by: (1) constitutive rules that set up unnecessary ob-
stacles to achieving a particular goal by defining permissible and impermissible
ways of achieving it; and (2) the rules are accepted just to allow participants to at-
tempt to meet the challenges so created. As Suits aptly said when summarizing his
view, a game is “a voluntary attempt to meet unnecessary obstacles.” Sports, then,
would be, as already suggested, games of physical skill.
Should we accept Suits’s account? Of course, there are difficulties with it. First, it
may be objected, participants may accept the rules for a variety of reasons other
than the lusory attitude—for example, to get exercise, to socialize and make friends,
applicable copyright law.
or, in the case of professionals, to make money. However, a proponent of Suits’s def-
inition might reply, with a good deal of plausibility, that although these may be mo-
tives of the participants, they still get exercise or make friends or make money by
trying to meet the obstacles set by the rules. In fact, professional athletes achieve
fame and fortune precisely by overcoming the challenges of the game. Tiger Woods
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 45
has been considered the best golfer because he does better than anyone else at
shooting low scores within the rules of the game. Thus, professional athletics are
parasitic on the lusory attitude precisely because spectators are willing to pay to see
the performance of professionals in what we called in Chapter 2 the mutual quest
for excellence through competition.
Whether Suits’s definition is completely successful remains debatable by phi-
losophers of sport. Many questions remain to be examined. Thus, a marathon
seems to be a sporting event, but we do not commonly call marathons “games.” A
“game of marathon” might be something played by children in imitation of a
genuine marathon. (Suits might reply, however, that this is just a fault of ordinary
language; a marathon has the structure of a game whether it is called one or not.)
Suits himself at one time raised questions about whether sports like gymnastics or
synchronized swimming are more like performances than games, and his account
of games continues to be interpreted, debated, and evaluated within the profes-
sional literature.
Whether or not Suits has identified the essence of games, his account can illu-
minate the following discussion of the ethics of sport in two ways. First, his ac-
count certainly seems to fit paradigmatic instances of sports such as baseball,
lacrosse, football, soccer, golf, and many other clear instances of sporting activity.
Second, his emphasis on the role that constitutive rules play in setting up unneces-
sary obstacles calls attention to the notion of games as activities undertaken and
valued fundamentally because of the challenge created by the rules. Indeed, in The
Grasshopper Suits suggested that meeting the challenges of games is an intrinsically
valuable human activity, and that a life of game playing might be what constitutes
utopia. Even if we don’t fully accept this last point, we can acknowledge the intrin-
sic interest athletes have in meeting challenges for their own sake, which, as should
be clear, has enormously influenced the account of competitive sport as a mutual
quest for excellence developed in the last chapter.
Keeping Suits’s account in mind, let us see if it can help to illuminate our dis-
cussion of sportsmanship and fair play within competitive athletics.
the beginning of the chapter. We’ll begin by considering two approaches to the
connection between competitive sports and moral values.
Externalism denies that sports are a fundamental source or basis of ethical
principles or values, although sophisticated externalists acknowledge, and even
emphasize, that sports play a significant role in reinforcing values already extant in
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 46
the culture and in socializing participants and spectators to accept those values as
their own. On this view, the values that sports promote either express or simply
mirror, reflect, or reinforce the values dominant in the wider society. Thus, to take
one example, in a predominantly capitalist society sports may emphasize such cap-
italist values as intense competition and rivalry, whereas in more communal and
less individualistic societies more emphasis may be given to teamwork and the role
of opposing players as facilitators who help make good competition possible.
Internalism, in contrast, holds that sports are themselves sometimes significant
sources of or bases for ethical principles and values. Internalists emphasize that
sports can have a significant degree of autonomy from the wider society and that
they can support, stand for, and express sets of values of their own that in particu-
lar contexts may conflict with the values dominant in the broader society. Thus, in
his important work entitled Leftist Theories of Sport, William J. Morgan defended
the idea of a “gratuitous logic” of sports, positing that sports do not merely mirror
or reinforce the values dominant elsewhere.11
Internalism need not, and in my view should not, be taken to mean that the in-
ternal values of sport are entirely unique or have no basis in broader ethical princi-
ples such as respect for persons and fairness.12 Rather, it claims, first, that key values
in sport are not mere reflections of values popular or dominant in the society and,
second, that these values are related to and can at least in part be supported by eth-
ically defensible conceptions or interpretations of competition in sports.
Why is this distinction between externalism and internalism important for the
concrete problems we raised earlier, such as the ethics of rule breaking for strate-
gic purposes? Perhaps it is this. If internalism is correct, then the ethical principles
embedded in or implied by central features of athletic competition may provide a
morally relevant framework for adjudicating difficult moral issues that arise in
athletic competition. Of course, just because some values or moral principles are
internal to sport does not mean they are justifiable or well supported by reasons.
Nevertheless, they may provide a useful starting point for analysis. Let us begin by
considering one form of internalism and the critical response to it.
Formalism
“Formalism” is the name given to a family of positions that characterizes games,
such central elements of games as winning and losing, and allowable moves within
the activity, primarily in their formal structures and particularly in their constitu-
applicable copyright law.
tive rules. Formalism reflects Suits’s emphasis on the constitutive rules of sports as
the formal structure of sports. (The rules of a sport would constitute its structure,
whereas the particular skills and strategies tested in the sport would be its sub-
stance.) Thus, in a narrow sense, formalism has been characterized as the view that
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 47
such game derivative notions as “a move or play within a game” and “winning a
game” are definable by reference to the constitutive rules of the game.
In a broader sense, formalism is the view that games (and sports to the extent
that sports are games of physical skill) can be defined primarily by reference to
constitutive rules. The goals or obstacles of the sport are defined by those rules
and are unintelligible outside the context of the rules. A move within a game is
what is permitted or required by the constitutive rules, and what counts as win-
ning a game also is defined by such rules. For example, using a tank during a foot-
ball game to run over the opposing team’s defensive players is not a move within
the sport, since such moves may be made only in accord with the constitutive
rules. There are different versions of formalism, so “formalism” might best be re-
garded as an umbrella term covering a family of positions that, although closely
related, sometimes differ on points of varying degrees of significance.
Formalism not only is a theory about the nature of games but also has norma-
tive implications. Perhaps the best known is the incompatibility thesis: Cheaters
violate the rules by failing to make moves within the sport and therefore fail to
play it. One can win the game only by playing it, and since cheaters do not play,
cheaters can’t win.
The emphasis of formalists on the constitutive rules of the game has helped
us understand the nature of games. However, formalism lacks the normative re-
sources to address many of the moral problems that arise in connection with
sports. (To be fair, many versions of formalism were developed to define the no-
tions of “game” and “sport” rather than to resolve ethical issues arising in games
and sports.)
Issues of sportsmanship, for example, often go beyond conformity to the for-
mal rules of a sport. Thus, consider the case of clubless Josie, a top amateur golfer
who arrives at a national amateur golf championship without her clubs. Clubless
Josie has lost her clubs not because she is clueless but because her airline was care-
less. Josie’s chief rival, Annika, has a spare set of clubs virtually identical to those
Josie has lost. Should Annika lend poor clubless but not clueless Josie the spare set
of clubs so that Josie can compete in the tournament? Because Josie’s problem
does not concern the application of rules, it is unclear that formalism addresses
this question.13
Some formalists might reply that their view, sympathetically interpreted, sup-
ports lending the clubs to Josie. If we correctly understand the spirit or point of
the rules, which is to promote competition, we should do what enhances compe-
applicable copyright law.
tition. However, in appealing to the spirit of the rules or their underlying point,
formalists go beyond a narrow version of formalism and ask how we are to under-
stand the spirit of the rules or their underlying point. We will consider this
broader form of internalism below.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 48
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 49
Conventionalism
Many theorists argue that in emphasizing the formal constitutive rules of given
sports, the formalists have ignored the implicit conventions that apply to the
sports in question. These conventions are sometimes referred to as the “ethos of
the game.”15 For example, with respect to strategic fouling in basketball, conven-
tionalists argue that a convention in basketball permits such fouls as a legitimate
strategic move within the game. Since the players all accept the convention, and
since each team knows the other team will strategically foul at appropriate points
in a contest, no team has a special advantage over others. Therefore, strategic foul-
ing is not cheating, but is justified by practice and the widely accepted social con-
ventions within that practice.
But can social conventions be a source of value in sports? Conventionalists
have made a contribution to our understanding of sporting practice by exploring
the role of the ethos and cultural context of games. But does the ethos have nor-
mative force? Do the conventions express what ought to take place as well as de-
scribe what does take place in sporting practice?
Consider clubless Josie. For one thing, if such a dilemma were highly unusual,
there might be no applicable convention. Conventionalism, like formalism, would
not tell us what should be done. But suppose there was an applicable convention
under which players were not supposed to lend equipment to fellow competitors.
Would that settle the issue, or would it simply raise the deeper issue of whether
that convention was ethical or reflected appropriate standards of fair play? Thus,
one major problem with conventionalism is the ethical status of the conventions
themselves.
This is true even where conventionalism is plausible—namely, its analysis of
strategic fouls in sports such as basketball. But even in basketball, it is unclear that
the mere existence of conventions settles the issue of strategic fouling. The critics
of strategic fouling acknowledge that they are opposing a widely accepted practice,
as well as the conventional understandings upon which that practice is based, but
they argue that appeal to central values implicit in the logic of sports requires the
reform of existing conventional behavior. Unless we are to immunize conventions
from criticism, and, in effect, always choose to preserve the existing understand-
ings of sport, challenges to existing conventions cannot be dismissed simply be-
cause they counter our present conventional understandings of sporting practice.
It also is unclear whether conventionalism can respond any better than strict
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 50
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 51
The notion of respect for the game provides ample reason for lending Josie the
racquet. At the personal level . . . you would forgo a valuable experience and
personal test if you decline to play Josie. At a more general level, the sport of
squash is enhanced by people playing and competing at their best whenever
possible. Squash at the institutional level would not be served by neglecting to
play a . . . scheduled match. You should want to lend Josie your racquet.20
J. S. Russell in an article entitled “Are Rules All an Umpire Has to Work With?”21
Russell, appealing explicitly to Dworkin’s views in jurisprudence, argued against
the view that rules are all an umpire has to work with. He discussed various games
from American baseball that call on umpires and officials to extend, change, or in-
terpret rules that, by themselves, may be indeterminate when applied to hard cases.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 52
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 53
Consider again the dilemma of Annika and clubless Josie. Surely Butcher and
Schneider were correct to argue that Annika should lend the clubs to Josie. Sport-
ing contests are designed to be tests, and competitors should not avoid a worthy
opponent. However, this suggests that Keating’s distinction between sports and
athletics was, at the very least, overdrawn. Even if the event in question is at an
elite level of golfing competition, Annika still should lend the clubs to Josie (al-
though, to give Keating his due, it may be less blameworthy for Annika to refuse
to lend the clubs and accept the forfeit at the professional level than, say, at the
level of youth sports).
Although Annika should be encouraged to lend the clubs to Josie, and may be
subject to moral criticism on the basis of poor sportsmanship for not doing so, it is
controversial whether she is morally required to make the clubs available to Josie
and should be formally punished or penalized for failing to do so, at least at the
professional or top amateur level. Failing to lend her opponent the clubs arguably
is in a different moral category than, say, trying deliberately to disable an opponent
or bribing an official. The latter forms of external interference with competitors
make it impossible for the good sports contest to occur and undermine the very
point of competitive sports. However, the idea that competitors must take positive
steps to promote good play on the part of opponents, although worthy, is open-
ended and not so clearly essential to the good sports contest. What level of support
should be provided, and in what contexts? Attempts to draw the line somewhere
would no doubt involve controversy. Suppose, for example, Josie needed a golf les-
son from Annika just five minutes before teeing off. It would also be unclear when
noncompliance was worthy of punishment. We would need to distinguish between
prohibited behavior that ought to be penalized or sanctioned, on the one hand,
and desirable behavior that should be encouraged, but for which nonperformance
was not necessarily sanctionable or punishable, on the other.
Competition as a mutual quest for excellence also suggests the attitudes com-
petitors should have toward each other. Although every participant at some time
probably hopes for an easy victory in an important contest, reflective participants
should acknowledge that such an attitude should not be prevalent among com-
petitors. Rather, competitors normally should hope to meet worthy opponents
who can provide a true test of the abilities required in the sport being played. Af-
ter all, as we have seen, if victory is the primary goal, one need simply schedule
vastly inferior opponents. (At the time of writing this sentence I am the best bas-
ketball player on my street; but, as all the other players are less than eight years old
applicable copyright law.
and most cannot even reach the basket, is that anything to take pride in?)
The appropriate attitude toward fellow competitors is well expressed by pro-
fessional golfer David Duval in talking about the prospects of going head-to-head
with Tiger Woods in the last round of a major championship. In a passage also
quoted in Chapter 2, Duval makes this remark: “If I come head-to-head against
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 54
him at say, the U.S. Open, I want him to be playing as good as he can play because
I want to beat him when he’s playing his best.”26 Duval’s attitude seems to be the
one that best fits with the conception of sport as a mutual quest for excellence
through challenge. Good competitors want to be challenged by worthy oppo-
nents. Given that, good competitors should want to promote conditions under
which other athletes can play their best. As we have noted, it is unclear just how
stringent such a requirement should be; however, from the perspective of broad
internalism, there seems to be enough support for it to say that athletes should be
encouraged to follow it as an ideal. Whether they also should adopt it as a moral
rule they have a duty to obey, and if so, to what extent they should be obligated, is
much more controversial.
Broad internalism also suggests that sport presupposes an at least partial con-
ception of the good life for human beings. According to this conception, a signifi-
cant segment of the good life consists of seeking out and trying to meet interesting
challenges, including physical ones. Thus some activities, such as participation in
sport, are worth doing not because of external rewards, but because of the nature
of the activity itself.
Of course, some athletes compete for fame, trophies, and incredibly large
salaries. But although many professional players may not be motivated by the
ideal of meeting challenges for their own sake, their large salaries are still parasitic
on that ideal, as we noted in our discussion of Bernard Suits’s account of games. If
the players did not try to meet the challenges set by the rules of the sport, but in-
stead tried to win through such external means as deliberately injuring opponents
or bribing referees, they would undermine the structure of their own practice and
perhaps even destroy it. Thus, regardless of the personal motivations of the play-
ers, they must meet the challenge set by the sport on its own terms and will be re-
warded to the extent that they do so.
Cheating
What is cheating, and what makes it wrong in athletic competition? Can cheating
ever be allowed by the ethic of the mutual quest for excellence as developed so far
in this book?
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 55
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 56
For example, what about the use of the illegal spitball pitch in baseball? If,
when it is used by a Major League pitcher such as Gaylord Perry, who was well
known for throwing spitballs, it can make the game more fascinating and excit-
ing, isn’t its use justified?
applicable copyright law.
This position seems open to the objection that cheating undermines the idea of
the sports contest as a test of skill, a mutual quest for excellence by the participants.
Sports do, however, serve other purposes in our society, such as providing enter-
tainment and giving professional players an opportunity to secure financial gains.
But these other purposes are parasitic in that what ought to be entertaining about
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 57
our sports, and what makes them sometimes worth paying to see, is the test of ex-
cellence they provide. Pitchers who throw the illegal spitball are taking an advantage
for themselves that is unavailable to competitors who play by the rules, and they are
therefore undermining the idea of competition as a fair quest for excellence.
Perhaps, however, what is being endorsed is not solitary acts of cheating that
deceive opponents, or that in some other way violate the public system of rules
that players are entitled to have apply to the game. Thus, “if . . . cheating is recog-
nized as an option which both sides may morally take up, then in general the prin-
ciples of equality and justice are not affected.”30 Perhaps the practice of strategic
fouling in basketball fits such a description, in that players expect other players to
foul strategically in appropriate situations.
But if the practice is acknowledged and expected and engaged in by all sides, it
is far from clear that it is cheating at all. If all players acknowledge that other com-
petitors will engage in the action at issue, and if the rules contain just compensation
for violation, why is the act one of cheating? The difficulty for those who believe
that cheating in sports is sometimes justified because it makes for better sports is to
find behavior that clearly is cheating and that is also morally permissible.
On one hand, insofar as such activity is acknowledged to fall under the rules,
as interpreted by morally acceptable conventions known by participants and offi-
cials, it arguably is not cheating, especially when it is done openly and with will-
ingness to take the penalty. On the other hand, if the behavior does not fall under
such rules, as interpreted by morally acceptable conventions known by partici-
pants and officials, and is not done openly with willingness to accept the penalty,
it arguably is not permissible. Rather, as in the case of throwing the spitball, it is
not an acceptable violation of the public rules that all participants may reasonably
expect to govern the game. In such a case we do not find an instance of behavior
that is both cheating and morally acceptable. Hence, our conclusion that cheating
is not a morally acceptable form of behavior in athletic competition still stands.
Let us test this thesis by considering the ethics of strategic fouling.
Strategic Fouling
Strategic fouling is an example of the intentional violation of the rules of a sport
for a competitive advantage. Specific instances of strategic fouling already men-
tioned include Scurry’s save at the World Cup, an intentional foul by the losing
team to stop the clock in the last minutes of a basketball game, and a football
applicable copyright law.
team that deliberately incurs a delay of game penalty to get a better angle for an
attempt at a field goal. Is strategic fouling a case of cheating, though? If it is not, is
it unethical in some other fashion?
The debate about the ethics of strategic fouling is not just a narrow contro-
versy that is of interest to only a few “purists” who fail to understand the practice
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 58
of competitive athletics. Rather, the critics of strategic fouling are implying that
we have become so consumed by the pursuit of victory in sports that we embrace
even highly questionable tactics in trying to win. The prevalence of strategic foul-
ing, on this view, is evidence not of smart play but of the corruption of athletic
competition by the cult of achieving victory by whatever means necessary.
Some philosophers would unequivocally assert that strategic fouling is uneth-
ical and perhaps a form of cheating. For example, in an early discussion of the
issue, Warren Fraleigh analyzed the basketball example by maintaining that “in-
tentional holding, tripping, and so on are not part of the game or within the rules
of basketball. . . . [Therefore] the ‘good’ foul is a violation of the agreement which
all participants know that all participants make when they agree to play basket-
ball, namely, that all will pursue the . . . goal of basketball by the necessary and al-
lowable skills and tactics and will avoid use of proscribed skills and tactics.”31 In a
similar vein, Kathleen Pearson wrote that strategic fouling “destroys the vital
framework of agreement which makes sport possible.”32 These comments reflect
the central emphasis of the formalists on the rules. Indeed, one might go further
and argue that cheaters aren’t even really playing the game, since the game is con-
stituted by the rules. Be that as it may, the remarks of Fraleigh and Pearson sug-
gest that strategic fouling is a form of cheating because it intentionally violates the
framework of rules that make the game possible and that the participants have
agreed (either implicitly of explicitly) to obey.
If the analysis of cheating presented earlier is on the right track, this formalist
approach to strategic fouling may be seriously questioned. One criticism is that
the formalist approach does not give sufficient weight to the conventions associ-
ated with specific sports that have sometimes been called the “ethos” of the game.
Thus, in basketball, players understand that losing teams will foul at the end of
the game to stop the clock. Virtually all players expect the losing team to foul to
stop the clock when such behavior is strategically appropriate; the players expect
it of themselves and of their opponents. Similarly, in soccer the goalies generally
try to move into position a bit more quickly than the rules allow in order to cut
down the shooter’s angle, so it can be argued that Scurry’s action in the World
Cup conformed to a convention widely accepted among participants.
Just because such behavior is conventional does not make it morally right or
in the best interests of the game. But if cheating means violating a public set of
norms to gain an advantage for oneself or one’s team, and these norms include
conventions as well as rules, then strategic fouling is not always a form of cheat-
applicable copyright law.
ing. This is in part because conventions exist that sometimes make such behavior
normal and expected. But, more important, it is also because the strategic fouler
acknowledges that such behavior is appropriate for all participants, including op-
ponents. This is quite a different situation from that of the cheater who, say, wants
to get an advantage by falsifying the scorebook, behavior that could not possibly
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 59
be made universal without destroying the game itself. In addition, strategic foul-
ing, at least in basketball, normally is done openly. The fouler in fact wants the
referee to call the infraction, stop the clock, and award compensatory foul shots to
the other team.
Theorists such as Fraleigh and Pearson could object that conventions, unlike
rules, are too vague to form a basis of the common understanding presupposed
by players who commit themselves to respecting the game. For example, is there
really a convention or common understanding in international soccer that goal-
keepers can bend the rules as Scurry did in the World Cup? How are we to tell?
Sigmund Loland and Mike McNamee provided an example of just such a dif-
ference in understanding. In a major soccer competition in England between Ar-
senal FC and Sheffield United, when an Arsenal player became injured, a Sheffield
United player deliberately kicked the ball out of bounds so that during the ensu-
ing pause in play the injured player could receive medical treatment. This is one of
the conventions of soccer: that when an injury appears to have occurred, an out-
of-bounds kick be performed in order to create the pause necessary for the med-
ical personnel to attend to the injured player. According to the convention, once
the ball is back in play, the receiving team, in this game Arsenal, would turn the
ball over to the opposition so that Sheffield would suffer no competitive dis-
advantage for following the convention. But this time, according to Loland and
McNamee, an Arsenal player, a recent recruit from another continent (and pre-
sumably a different cultural setting) “intercepted the ball, crossed it to one of his
teammates, who instinctively (so it is said) . . . scored.”33 Apparently, the under-
standing of the convention was not common to all players.
Conventions, unlike rules, are not usually in written form, and often they are
not explicitly taught or discussed. Thus, the new player did not know the conven-
tion. Indeed, the possibility of misunderstanding conventions may be more com-
mon in international competition, or when competitors come from different sport
cultures. In the women’s World Cup situation, for example, perhaps Scurry’s strat-
egy was not understood in the same way by the Americans, the Chinese, and the
World Cup officials. If that is the case, then her decision to use the strategy would
seem ethically questionable, whereas it would seem more appropriate if all these
participants shared the same view of it as an example of a convention that was
commonly accepted.
Fraleigh and Pearson’s rejoinder that conventions are too vague to form the ba-
sis of a common understanding surely has force. Nevertheless, the idea that strate-
applicable copyright law.
gic fouls are different from paradigm examples of cheating still seems plausible.
Strategic foulers are conforming to a general practice that they are willing to con-
done even when it works against them, whereas cheaters are violating rules in ways
they do not want others to emulate. Moreover, they could not reasonably want
such violations to be part of the public system of rules governing the sport.34 How
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 60
could anyone reasonably advocate a rule allowing falsification of the scorebook, for
example, since this would destroy the ability for anyone to see who really won the
contest?
But even if strategic fouling is not a form of cheating, it may be morally un-
acceptable on other grounds. After all, just because behavior is conventional does
not mean it is ethical. Strategic fouling may be unethical because it is unsports-
manlike or because it shows disrespect for principles that should govern conduct
in competition. Let us explore these possibilities more fully.
is not the price for allowable commission of the act, but rather a punishment for
committing it.
However, not all penalties in sports are punishments or sanctions for prohib-
ited acts. For example, in golf, when balls come to rest in a position from which
players judge no shot is possible, as when a ball comes to rest up against a tree,
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 61
golfers may invoke the “unplayable lie rule.” According to this rule, the player may
either replay the shot from the original location, hit a new shot from two club
lengths from either side of the location of the unplayable ball, or hit a new shot
from as far behind the location of the ball as the player chooses. The penalty for
exercising any of these options is one shot. Here, the penalty clearly is not in-
tended to punish. Rather, the options are there for the player to use. The penalty
in this example is the price of exercising the option rather than a sanction for
doing what is forbidden.36 Of course, invoking the unplayable lie option is unlike
strategic fouling, in that the latter violates a rule and the former is permitted by a
rule.37 The point of the example is not to say the two are totally analogous but
only to illustrate the difference between the two functions penalties may have:
They may be punishments or sanctions for impermissible acts, or they may be the
price to be paid for exercising a strategic option.
But are the penalties for strategic fouls punishments or prices? If the penalties
for the fouls in at least some contexts can be regarded as prices for exercising a
strategy rather than sanctions for violating a rule, then strategic fouling, in those
cases, rather than being unethical, would be a permissible strategy of play.
Although it is sometimes difficult to tell whether a penalty should be regarded
as a sanction or a price, the notion of a fair price might help us distinguish the two.
The intuitive idea here is that if a pricing penalty is fair in sports, then violating the
rule should invoke a fair penalty for the infraction. The penalty for intentional
fouling in basketball is probably best regarded as a price rather than as a sanction if
the foul shots awarded are fair compensation for the violation. Sports authorities
can more clearly distinguish sanctions from prices by making the penalty for pro-
hibited acts more severe than mere fair compensation would require. Recent rule
changes in college and high-school basketball awarding extra foul shots and pos-
session of the ball to the team that is intentionally fouled can be regarded as a step
toward making intentional fouling prohibited rather than a strategy with a price.
This analysis of strategic fouling in basketball in effect rests on a (broad inter-
nalist) theory of the game that views foul shots as fair compensation for the team
that was fouled for strategic reasons. A good team should be able to convert the
foul shots and be no worse off than before the infraction was committed. Inability
to convert the foul shots indicates a weakness that rightly puts that team’s lead in
jeopardy.
The strategic violation allegedly committed by Briana Scurry might be ana-
lyzed in a similar fashion, but arguably is more complex. The penalty for illegal
applicable copyright law.
movement by the goalkeeper allows the shooter to make another attempt to score
if the original shot was missed (otherwise the goal stands), so the rules call for
restoring the situation to what it was before the infraction was committed. But al-
though this suggests that the prescribed penalty is a price rather than a sanction, it
may not demonstrate it beyond reasonable doubt.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 62
Another relevant factor is that officials seldom call the kind of infraction com-
mitted by Scurry. In the World Cup finals, the officials should have suspected that
the goalkeepers would seek every edge in the shoot-out, but either they did not
notice the infraction or deliberately ignored it. Do referees tend not to make this
call because they believe the shoot-out is too heavily weighted in favor of the of-
fense and that goalkeepers have no real chance to stop a shot without moving ille-
gally? If so, the referees, by refraining from calling all but blatant violations by
goalkeepers, may be trying to restore competitive balance to what they regard as
an unfair restriction imposed by the rules. In fact, the reason an implicit conven-
tion allows goalkeepers to move forward in shoot-outs, even though this involves
breaking a rule, is that competitors believe that the rule creates a significantly un-
balanced competitive match-up. Goalkeepers have only the lowest probability of
stopping a shot if they play within the rules. In other words, they believe the con-
vention improves the game.
One might also wonder whether strategic fouling is less acceptable in a low-
scoring game such as soccer than in a high-scoring one such as basketball, where
one play has much less effect on the outcome. Clearly, there is much room for fur-
ther discussion on the ethics of strategic fouling in different sports. Before leaving
the topic of strategic fouling, however, we will consider a more recent argument by
Fraleigh for the view that the practice is unethical.38 This new argument relies on a
distinction made by Cesar Torres between the basic, or constitutive, skills and the
restorative skills of a sport.39 Constitutive skills are the skills that the game is de-
signed to test. In basketball, these would include dribbling, passing, rebounding,
and shooting. Restorative skills are those that are used to restore the status quo af-
ter a rules infraction has been committed. These would include foul shooting in
basketball and taking a penalty shot in soccer.
According to Torres, constitutive skills normally require a more complex set of
abilities to execute and are more interesting than restorative skills. Thus, running
a fast break in basketball is more complex, difficult, and interesting than shooting
a foul shot; running the bases intelligently in baseball similarly is more complex,
difficult, and interesting than being awarded a base as compensation for a fielder’s
interference with a runner.
Although Fraleigh’s argument is complex, his basic point is that strategic foul-
ing ruins the game by making the less complex and less difficult compensatory
skills more central and the basic, constitutive skills less central to the outcome. It is
perhaps for this reason that fans at a basketball game will feel that the game has
applicable copyright law.
been made boring or that it has been ruined by referees who are excessive in calling
fouls. Such fans often will yell “Let them play,” indicating that they do not regard
foul shooting as being as interesting or as central to the game as the more complex
basic skills exercised in the normal course of play. In addition, Fraleigh argued that
strategic fouling often will deprive a player of an advantage earned through excel-
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 63
lent use of basic skills, as when a hockey player, who has been fooled by the brilliant
skating move of an opponent, trips the opponent from behind to prevent a break-
away shot on the goal.
This new argument is an important one and is itself a version of broad inter-
nalism. That is, it advances a theory about which skills are the most important
skills in a sport and indicates why it is important to keep those skills at the center of
play. On this view, strategic fouling, while certainly not cheating, shows a funda-
mental disrespect for what is really valuable about athletic competition—the quest
for excellence—and gives undue priority to winning even at the cost of harming
the game.
Nevertheless, although Fraleigh’s argument is an important one, it may not
carry the day, or at least it may not apply to all cases of strategic fouling.40 For one
thing, not all exercises of restorative skills are routine or require less skill than
constitutive skills require. Running a good power play in ice hockey clearly re-
quires the use of both physical and mental abilities of a high order, but arguably it
is restorative because it compensates an offended team for a rule violation by the
opposition. Even shooting a foul shot in basketball, under pressure at the end of a
close game, can test the composure and shooting ability of the player on the line.
More important, the assumption that team strategy should never make re-
storative skills central to determining the outcome of contests is itself question-
able. Let’s say, for example, that Team A and Team B are meeting for the third
time in the basketball season. Team A won the first game by 3 points, and Team B
won the second by 4 points. So far, in the third and deciding contest, the teams are
evenly matched. Suppose that it is evident from all three games that the two teams
are evenly matched in constitutive skills. However, Team B is awful at foul shoot-
ing, a restorative skill. Team B has possession of the ball and is ahead by 2 points,
with 10 seconds to go.
Team A’s coach realizes that his squad has little chance of stealing the ball and
scoring in only 10 seconds. In fact, Team B is simply trying to hold the ball and
run out the clock without even trying to score. He orders his team to strategically
foul in order to stop the clock, reasoning that if the poor foul shooters on Team B
miss, his team will have a chance to at least tie the game.
It is hard to regard this strategy as unethical or ruining the game. After all, if
we are trying to find out which team is better, and they are roughly equal in con-
stitutive skills, why shouldn’t a difference in restorative skills then be relevant? If
the teams are equally skilled at the constitutive level, but one team is clearly better
applicable copyright law.
at the restorative level, isn’t that the better team? Moreover, it is hard to see how
fouling at such a point in a close game ruins the game or makes it less interesting
than simply letting the team with the ball hold it and run out the clock.
Of course, this example is an extreme case, but it does suggest the following
thesis. According to what I suggest we call the Strategic Fouling Thesis, strategic
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 64
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 65
ples with which we began the chapter. It involved a top-ranked university football
team winning a game on a fifth-down play that was run because officials lost count
and didn’t notice that the allotted number of downs already had been used up.
Should the winning team, the University of Colorado, have accepted the victory,
or, as many critics of the university suggested, should it have refused to accept a
tainted win?
Proponents of one view might begin by appealing to Keating’s distinction be-
tween sports and athletics. They might argue, first, that since a major intercolle-
giate football game is clearly an example of athletics, neither team is under an
obligation to make the experience pleasurable or enjoyable for the other. Generos-
ity should not be expected, either; after all, if a referee had made an incorrect pass
interference call in their favor, Missouri would not have been urged to refuse to
accept the penalty. Second, Colorado did not cheat, as least as we have defined
cheating. There was no intent to violate a public system of rules to gain an advan-
tage. The Colorado team seemed unaware of the true situation. Tapes of the game
reveal that on the fourth-down play, the Colorado quarterback looked to the side-
line, noticed that the play was officially marked as a third down on the official
scoreboard, and intentionally grounded a pass to stop the clock. Had the quarter-
back believed the play was his team’s last down, he surely would have gambled by
attempting a touchdown pass, perhaps successfully.
Although these arguments cannot just be dismissed, some may think they rest on
an indefensible conception of ethics in competition. To begin with, they might reject
Keating’s distinction between sports and athletics as misleading. In particular, if it is
taken as descriptive, it may set up a false dichotomy. Activities need not be classified
exclusively as athletics or exclusively as sports but may share elements of each. Thus,
to refer back to another previous example, Josie’s opponent ought to lend her the
clubs whether it’s for a friendly match or a round of a major tournament.
Second, critics might maintain that sportsmanship, although certainly not an
all-encompassing value, covers more than generosity toward opponents. In partic-
ular, if athletic contests ought to be regarded as mutual quests for excellence, along
lines argued in Chapter 2, implications follow for sportsmanship. Thus, opponents
ought to be regarded as engaged in a cooperative enterprise designed to test their
abilities and skills, and, whether or not they are owed generous treatment, they
should be treated as partners in the creation and execution of a fair test. To treat
them differently is to reject the presuppositions of the very model of athletic com-
petition that ought to be observed.
applicable copyright law.
We can argue that the Missouri team was not treated in such a fashion. The
play that won the game was not allowed by the rules of the game. Even though the
officials were mistaken about how the rule applied, that does not alter the fact that
Colorado did not win the test as defined by the rules. Moreover, there is no com-
mon convention acceptable to all participants that covers the situation. According
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 66
to its critics, Colorado, by accepting the victory, did not treat its opponents as
partners or facilitators in a common enterprise but instead treated them as a
means for attaining the kind of external rewards that go with victory in big-time
college games.
If this point has force, it suggests that the distinction between sportsmanship
and fair play may not be as sharp as Keating’s account suggests. If by “fair play” we
mean adherence to criteria of fairness implied by the idea of a mutual quest for ex-
cellence, it is at best unclear whether Colorado’s decision was truly fair. If its team
did not truly demonstrate superiority by the public code of rules that all parties
agree applied to the game, in what sense was the assignment of a victory fair?
In a famous game played forty years before the contest between Colorado and
Missouri, a similar incident led to a dissimilar resolution. In the late fall of 1940, an
undefeated Cornell team, also in contention for the national championship and a
Rose Bowl bid, played a Dartmouth team that was hoping for a major upset. Al-
though trailing late in the fourth quarter, Cornell apparently pulled out a victory
with a scoring pass on the game’s last play. But did Cornell really win? Film of the
game indicated without a doubt that the referee, who admitted the error, had al-
lowed Cornell a fifth down! The game should have ended a play earlier, and Dart-
mouth should have pulled off a major upset.
Although no rule required that Cornell forfeit the victory, soon after the game
film’s release “Cornell officials (including the Director of Athletics) telegraphed
Hanover formally conceding the game to Dartmouth ‘without reservation . . .
with hearty congratulations . . . to the gallant Dartmouth team.’ Another loss the
following Saturday to Pennsylvania helped the Cornell team drop from second to
15th in the Associated Press polls, its season ruined but its pride intact.”41 Should
Colorado take pride in its victory? Should Cornell be proud of its loss?
Our discussion so far suggests that some of the distinctions with which we be-
gan our discussion may need to be rethought. Suppose we take fair play as a central
value to be articulated along lines suggested by a broadly internalist approach to
sport that encompasses the principles of athletic competition as a mutual quest for
excellence. On this interpretation, fair play would require treating opponents in a
way fitting their status as partners in a partially cooperative enterprise—namely,
the provision of a challenge so that skills and abilities may be tested.
Finally, we can question whether even intense competition at high levels of per-
formance ought to be regarded as pure cases of athletics in Keating’s sense. Al-
though some activities, such as major intercollegiate and professional sports, might
applicable copyright law.
justifiably tend more in that direction, a strong argument can be made that sports-
manship and fair play should both apply, although perhaps with different em-
phases, at all levels of sports and athletics. We can argue that athletics, in Keating’s
sense, ought not to exist at all in its pure form because, unless fair play is under-
stood broadly enough to encompass sportsmanship in the wider sense developed
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 67
above, “athletics” and the ethic of the mutual quest for excellence are incompatible.
Accordingly, the terms “sports” and “athletics” will be used interchangeably in
what follows, unless otherwise indicated.
We also need to consider the role of officials and referees in sports. Should we
conclude that since opponents in many forms of organized competition delegate
responsibility for enforcement of the rules to officials in full knowledge that offi-
cials sometimes make mistakes, the decisions of officials should be accepted as eth-
ically final? Alternately, do participants have obligations not to accept unearned
benefits arising from particularly egregious official errors, especially those that in-
volve misapplication of the rules rather than “judgment calls” about whether a
rule was violated?
Although these questions do not admit of easy answers, an argument can be
made that Colorado’s victory was tainted. Although there was no intention to vio-
late rules and therefore no cheating in a central sense, and although the referees
bear heavy responsibility for what happened, Colorado still had to decide after the
game was over whether or not to accept the victory. Although it may not have been
morally required for Colorado to forfeit the game, as Cornell did in a perhaps
more innocent era of intercollegiate sports, it seems just as clear that Colorado did
not meet the test of defeating opponents within the rules. The Colorado victory
was therefore less meaningful than it otherwise would have been. It would seem,
then, that Colorado’s reasons for wanting the full benefits of victory had more to
do with securing the external benefits of a win, including national rankings and a
bid to a bowl game, than to intrinsic pride in a well-earned victory. Be that as it
may, it is at least questionable whether Colorado met the challenge set by its oppo-
nent, or that Missouri failed to meet it simply because the final score was in Col-
orado’s favor.42
Among the tests of a principled ethical approach to sport are overall consis-
tency and compatibility. Relevantly similar situations should be evaluated in simi-
lar ways, and responses to one set of issues should fit well with responses to others.
Otherwise, the theory appears tailored to the sympathies of its proponents to ra-
tionalize the views they personally favor.
Does our discussion of the 1999 World Cup and our discussion of the Colorado-
Missouri game fit together coherently? A critic might argue that the intentional rule-
breaking by Scurry seems to have been condoned out of hand, while the Colorado
football team’s unintentional violation of a rule has been judged as tainting the
team’s victory. Are these responses compatible, or are they in conflict?
applicable copyright law.
Arguably, there are relevant differences between the two. Scurry’s movement to
cut off the shooter can be viewed as a strategic foul with a set price rather than a
prohibited act. Moreover, it falls under a convention recognized by the players, and
perhaps by officials as well. Presumably, if the situation had been reversed, the
Americans would have expected the Chinese goalkeeper to act in the same way and
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 68
would have regarded her behavior as appropriate. And perhaps such movement by
goalkeepers alters the competitive balance in the direction of fairness, since the
shoot-out in soccer seems far too heavily weighted against the defense. In contrast,
although the Colorado team surely did not cheat (players were unaware they had
been awarded a fifth play), the rules infraction involved was not a strategic foul
with a set price and so was not within the established framework of the game.
This reasoning might not convince all readers. Those who are not persuaded
that the two accounts are mutually coherent have two options. The first is to come
up with a better argument for the overall coherence of the discussion; the second,
of course, is to either reject the conclusion that Scurry’s act was not unethical or
to reject the conclusion that Colorado’s victory was tainted. Although these cases
are controversial, trying to arrive at principled responses to them allows us to for-
mulate and then test our ethical intuitions about specific cases by trying to place
them within the context of an overall theoretical approach to the ethics of sport.
Analysis of these cases is of theoretical as well as practical interest because differ-
ent and sometimes competing factors must all be taken into account before a co-
herent response to both can be formulated and tested through reasoned dialogue.
Cases such as those discussed here are likely to be controversial, and discussion
of them may generate disagreement, but it is important to remember that such dis-
agreement occurs against a general background of deeper agreement on sports
ethics. None of the parties to the discussion endorses cheating, blatant examples of
unfair play, or unsportsmanlike behavior. Rather, the disagreement concerns “hard
cases” that help us define the boundaries of the values we are exploring. Some-
times disagreement over controversial cases is used as a justification for overall
moral skepticism, since a rational resolution may seem impossible. This overall
drift to moral skepticism should be resisted, however, for often rational adjudica-
tion is possible (as application of the model of the mutual quest for excellence to
our cases may suggest); or, if it is not, there still remains deeper agreement on the
moral fundamentals that are not at stake in the controversies at issue.
that were being violated in the first place. Besides, without some standards to aim
for, we would not know the proper recommendations to make for moral change.
Some of the cases we have examined are controversial, and reasonable people
may disagree over their proper resolution. However, as noted earlier, hard cases
are important because they force us to identify the relevant moral factors that
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 69
bear upon them and also require us to see whether our responses to a diverse set
of such cases can fit within a coherent and rationally defensible framework. Hard
cases often presuppose a background of agreement on fundamentals. Disagree-
ment may persist over how the University of Colorado should have responded to
its victory over Missouri, but surely all parties to the discussion would acknowl-
edge that a victory earned through blatant cheating is unearned and should be
disallowed.
Our argument also suggests that athletes not only are morally prohibited from
such practices as cheating but also may have positive moral duties, or at least be
morally encouraged to promote good competition. Perhaps in addition to rules
prohibiting certain acts, there are reasons for encouraging good behavior in sport,
although it undoubtedly is controversial when failure to take encouraged positive
action merits an actual penalty.
Although it may be difficult to define the extent of such positive duties, an ex-
ample at a 2008 high-school state track championship in the state of Washington
illustrated the kind of sportsmanship that is at least encouraged by the theory of
competition as a mutually acceptable quest for excellence through challenge. A se-
nior, Nicole Cochran, thought she had won the girl’s 3,200-meter title but was
disqualified by a highly questionable call by an official, who ruled she had stepped
outside her lane once during the race. According to reports of the incident, even
her competitors thought the judge had made an error, and the error was later con-
firmed by a video of the race.
As a result of the disqualification, the winner was sophomore Amanda Nelson
of Spokane, who had finished second but then was moved up to first as a result of
the disqualification. Nelson, however, thought this decision was unacceptable. As
Nelson said, “It wasn’t fair. She deserved it. She totally crushed everybody.”43 So
when Nelson received the medal, she left the podium and placed the first-place
medal around the neck of the person she regarded as the rightful winner, Cochran.
Moreover, the other girls who placed all did the same thing, removing their medals
and placing them around neck of the runner who would have placed ahead of
them if Cochran had not been disqualified (e.g., the second-place finisher gave her
medal to Amanda Nelson).
I hope our discussion in this chapter illustrates that while it sometimes is diffi-
cult to always draw the line between what sportsmanship and fair play permit and
what they forbid, those values are not vacuous and do apply to the behavior of
competitors in sports. A defensible sports ethic, one that respects participants as
applicable copyright law.
persons, should avoid the twin errors of, on one hand, leaving no room for such
tactics as the judicious strategic foul or, on the other hand, assuming that any be-
havior that contributes to victory is morally acceptable.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 70
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 71
Copyright © 2010. Westview Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
FOUR
I n the summer of 1998, Major League Baseball was abuzz with talk of the home-
run race between Chicago Cubs star Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire of the
St. Louis Cardinals. McGwire would end up with seventy home runs and Sosa with
sixty-six, both eclipsing the single-season record for home runs set in 1961 by
Roger Maris, who had scored sixty-one. Maris had broken Babe Ruth’s previous
record of sixty homers in a single season, a record that itself had stood for forty
years. Maris’s record had stood for thirty-seven years. Yet McGwire’s record was
eclipsed just a few years later by Barry Bonds, who hit seventy-three home runs in
2001. Bonds went on to later eclipse Henry Aaron’s record for career home runs.
The race between Sosa and McGwire attracted tremendous attention by baseball
fans, but by the time Bonds set his career record, all of these figures in the game had
become controversial, the significance of their records called into question. Increas-
ingly, evidence suggested that their achievements were not due entirely to skill but
also to the use of performance-enhancing substances by the players themselves.1
Concern about the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport is hardly new,
but it perhaps first came into the public eye through allegations, since confirmed,
of drug use by Olympic athletes, primarily the East German women’s swimming
team and other East German athletes in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. But the use of
performance-enhancing drugs was hardly restricted to East German swimmers, at
least by the end of that period. A highly publicized incident took place in the 1988
Summer Olympics in Seoul, Korea, in a long-awaited track race between Canadian
star Ben Johnson and American star Carl Lewis. In a hard-fought 100-meter race,
Johnson defeated Lewis and apparently won the gold medal.
applicable copyright law.
Urinalysis tests subsequently revealed that Johnson had been taking the steroid
stanozolol to enhance his performance. To the shock of Canadians, to whom John-
son had become a national hero, and the rest of the sports world, Johnson was dis-
qualified and had to forfeit his medals from the 1988 Olympics, including the
medal he had been awarded for his race against Lewis.
71
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 72
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 73
to deteriorate. Yet four of his five best seasons came after he was thirty-five. Dur-
ing the 2001 season, he batted .318 and hit his record-setting seventy-three home
runs. No other player in the history of baseball had done so well at that age or
later; according to one analysis, “by what should have been the end of his baseball
career, Bonds became a significantly better hitter than at any time in his life.”4
In 2003 a team of federal and state law-enforcement agencies raided BALCO,
which had been the subject of an investigation since 2002. BALCO was suspected
of supplying several MLB players with performance-enhancing substances, and
the raid turned up records showing that Bonds and other Major Leaguers had
been supplied with substances designed to frustrate discovery through tests. Tes-
timony by Bonds’s trainer, Greg Anderson, to a grand jury is alleged to have also
confirmed the hypothesis that Bonds used performance enhancers.5 Bonds him-
self denied knowingly having used steroids, however, and Anderson has recanted
some of his testimony before the California grand jury investigating BALCO—
but it is also worth noting that in 2007 Bonds was indicted for committing per-
jury in his testimony.
Whether or not Bonds used performance-enhancing substances, subsequent
revelations and admissions by players clearly indicated that the use of performance-
enhancing drugs was a big problem for Major League Baseball. As a result of wide-
spread concerns about the legitimacy of competition and of the records set during
the so-called “steroid era,” in 2004 Major League Baseball instituted random testing
of players for drug use. It was one of the last major American professional sports or-
ganizations to adopt such a policy, and the organization, as well as the players’
union, which for a long time opposed testing, has been widely criticized for not re-
acting more quickly.6 However, MLB strengthened the penalties for violating the
rules concerning banned substances in subsequent years and also instituted a policy
of random in-season testing of players for the use of performance-enhancing
substances.
Our major concern, however, is not primarily how many elite athletes use per-
formance enhancers, or the extent of such use in Major League Baseball, but the
ethics of such use. Many sports fans, commentators, and ethical theorists regard the
use of performance enhancers as unethical or a form of cheating. Others, however,
including some philosophers of sport, argue that prohibitions on the use of perfor-
mance enhancers in sport are arbitrary and unjustified. Why shouldn’t athletes be
free to explore how far they can go in setting records and improving achievement in
sport? Why is the use of performance enhancers unethical, but the use of new tech-
applicable copyright law.
nology, such as graphite-shafted titanium golf clubs or oxygen chambers that simu-
late the beneficial effects of high-altitude training for runners, acceptable?
Is the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sports a form of cheating, or, if it
is not cheating, is it unethical in some other way? Or are restrictions on the use of
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 74
to use dangerous and arguably unethical means to achieve success. Losing becomes
identified with failure, and anything that promotes winning is also seen as promot-
ing success. But is winning achieved by any means always a success worth having?
We need to ask how excellence might be achieved. In particular, is the use of
drugs, such as anabolic steroids, an ethically permissible method for achieving ex-
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 75
cellence in sports, or, as most sports authorities argue, should the use of such drugs
be prohibited in organized athletic competition?
organizations want to prohibit from the legitimate use of other substances such as
vitamins or allergy medicine. The situation is complicated further by the fact that
a substance that might enhance performance in one context or sport may fail to
do so, or even harm performance, in another. Thus, moderate use of alcohol nor-
mally would affect performance adversely, but it can be a performance enhancer
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 76
in such sports as archery and riflery. This is because alcohol is a depressant and
therefore slows the heartbeat, which in turn allows for a steadier hand on the
shooting range.
Moreover, it is of little help to say that athletes should be permitted to take
only what is “natural”; steroids are derivatives of the hormone testosterone, which
does occur naturally in the human body, whereas many legitimate medications
that athletes ought to be allowed to take are synthetic and not present in a normal
or natural diet. The term “natural” is too vague and open-textured to be of much
help in this area. In addition, what of practices such as blood doping, where ath-
letes inject stored samples of their own blood in an attempt to boost their oxygen-
carrying capacity? It is doubtful whether one’s own blood can be classified as
“unnatural,” yet major sports organizations regard blood doping as an unethical
form of performance enhancement.
We might also try to distinguish those substances that merely restore normal
function, such as taking aspirin for a headache, from those such as steroids that
enhance performance. While this suggestion has promise, the line between re-
storatives and enhancers is not a sharp one, or at the very least is unlikely to be
uncontroversial. What if a proponent of the use of steroids to enhance perfor-
mance argued that steroids simply restore the ability to work out more intensely
and recover sooner from workouts that imperfections in the human body subvert,
just as a headache might subvert the ability to concentrate intensely?
Rather than search for a precise definition to distinguish the substances that
we intuitively believe are illegitimate performance enhancers from those that are
not, it seems more useful to examine anabolic steroids, prohibited by major sports
organizations. We can then ask what factors, if any, morally justify this prohibi-
tion. If the prohibition is justified, and if we can isolate the moral reasons for it,
then any other substances to which the same reasons apply should also be prohib-
ited. Thus, rather than search for an abstract definition, we should first decide
what ought or ought not to be allowed to affect athletic performance.
some athletes coerces others into using steroids; (3) use of steroids to enhance
performance is unfair, or a form of cheating; (4) use of steroids to enhance perfor-
mance violates justifiable norms or ideals that ought to govern athletic competi-
tion; and (5) use of steroids demeans or cheapens achievement in sport—for
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 77
example, by making home runs too common and too easy to hit in baseball. Let
us examine each kind of justification in turn.
baseball players, or weight lifters from taking risks with their health in pursuit of
their goals?
Although these antipaternalistic considerations have great force, we cannot
yet dismiss paternalism as a justification for prohibiting steroids as performance
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 78
enhancers. First we must consider some difficulties with this view. Even Mill ac-
knowledged that the kind of antipaternalism articulated in his Harm Principle (the
principle stating that the only justification for limiting liberty is to prevent harm to
others) had limits. Mill excluded children and young people below the age of ma-
turity, as well as those, such as the mentally ill, who may require care by others.
Moreover, Mill would surely exempt those who are misinformed or coerced from
the immediate protection of the principle. To use one of his own examples, if you
attempt to cross a bridge in the dark not knowing that the bridge has been washed
away by a flood, I do not violate the Harm Principle by preventing you from at-
tempting the crossing until I have explained the situation to you.9
In particular, before accepting the antipaternalistic argument, we need to de-
cide whether athletes who use steroids to enhance performance really are making a
free and informed choice. If behavior is not the result of free and informed choice,
it is not really the action of a rational autonomous agent. If it is not informed, the
person does not truly know what she is doing; but if the behavior is coerced, it is
not what the agent wants to do in the first place.
Is there reason to believe that athletes who use steroids are either uninformed
about the effects of the drug or that they are coerced or otherwise incompetent to
make rational decisions?
First, those below the age of consent can legitimately be prevented from using
performance-enhancing steroids on paternalistic grounds. In the same way that
parents can prevent children from engaging in potentially harmful behavior, even
if the children want to take their chances on getting hurt, so sports authorities can
prohibit the use of harmful performance enhancers by those who are incompe-
tent because of their age.
Moreover, elite athletes often are role models for younger athletes, who may
strive to imitate their idols or hope to eventually achieve similar levels of success.
When elite athletes use performance-enhancing drugs to better their own perfor-
mance, their use may encourage noncompetent minors to use them as well. As the
Mitchell Report points out, even if steroid use by high-school athletes is declining,
as has been reported, and only 3 to 6 percent of such young people are using
steroids, it still would be the case that hundreds of thousands of young people are
using such drugs.10 Therefore, instead of trying to justify restrictions on the use of
performance-enhancing drugs by any need for paternalism toward competent
adult athletes, we can justify the restrictions by the claim that we must fulfill our
duty to protect noncompetent (or at least less competent) younger athletes from
applicable copyright law.
themselves.
A possible problem with this argument is that it is not completely consistent
with our practices in other areas. We don’t prevent adults from consuming alco-
hol, for example, even though adult drinkers may serve as models for abuse of al-
cohol by underage drinkers. Adults normally are not prohibited by law from being
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 79
bad role models for young people. Why should we apply a double standard to ath-
letes? This point suggests that while we cannot ignore the effects of steroid use by
star adult athletes on young people, the claim that prohibitions on the use of per-
formance enhancers by competent athletes can be justified solely on the basis of
the need to protect younger, less competent individuals is dubious. Such a consid-
eration may factor into the ultimate case against allowing steroid use, but it can-
not bear the whole weight of the argument.
What about the requirement of informed consent? Are athletes who use ste-
roids adequately informed about the serious potential side effects of the drug?
Some athletes, particularly teenagers, may be uninformed or skeptical about the
information available, but it is hard to believe that most adult users of steroids
could be ignorant of the risks involved. Even if H. L. Mencken may not have been
totally off the mark when he suggested that it was impossible to go broke by un-
derestimating the intelligence of the American people, it is difficult to believe, in
view of the amount of publicity devoted to the use of performance enhancers,
that the majority of mature athletes could be unaware that steroid use can be dan-
gerous. However, even if ignorance about the effects of steroids were widespread,
antipaternalists still might argue that the remedy is better education, so that in-
formed choice becomes possible, not simple prohibition.
Accordingly, paternalism alone probably does not provide a strong enough jus-
tification for prohibition of the use of harmful performance-enhancing drugs by
competent athletes, although it does justify prohibitions on use by those below the
age of consent. However, we should leave open the possibility that paternalism,
when conjoined with other premises, may provide partial support for prohibition.
For example, if steroid use by some people reasonably may be thought to threaten
harm to others as well as to the users, and if it is less clear than suggested above that
adult users give free consent to assuming the risk of use, then a limited kind of pa-
ternalism may play a supporting role in the prohibitionist argument. The argu-
ment for prohibiting steroids might then be similar to the argument for requiring
automobile drivers to wear seatbelts: that we may justifiably require automobile
drivers to wear seatbelts because it is for their own protection, because the decision
not to buckle up may not result from thoughtful consideration of the dangers in-
volved, and because of the high costs associated with collisions, which place a bur-
den on the health-care system as well as on the taxpayers who support it.
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 80
the world may not be professionals for very long. Thus, as one writer concluded,
“the onus is on the athlete to continue playing and to consent to things he or she
would not otherwise consent to. . . . Coercion, however subtle, makes the athlete
vulnerable. It also takes away the athlete’s ability to act and choose freely with
regard to informed consent.”11
Although this point may not be without force in specific contexts, the use it
makes of the term “coercion” seems questionable. After all, no one literally is forced
to become (or remain) a professional athlete or to participate at elite levels in ama-
teur athletics. If we want to use “coercion” so broadly, are we also committed, ab-
surdly it seems, to saying that coaches coerce players into practicing or training
hard? Do professors similarly “coerce” students into studying hard? Isn’t it more
plausible to say that although there are pressures on athletes to achieve peak physi-
cal condition, these no more amount to coercion than the pressures on law or med-
ical students to study hard? Rather, the athletes (or the students) have reasons to try
hard to achieve success; the pressures are self-imposed.
At best, it is unclear whether top athletes are coerced into using steroids or can
freely decide that the gains of steroid use outweigh the risks. Surely we are not en-
titled to assume that professional athletes as a class are unable to give informed
consent to steroid use unless we are willing to count similar pressures in other
professions as forms of coercion as well. And if we use “coercion” that broadly, it
becomes unclear who, if anybody, is left free.
Sometimes, however, in particular contexts, athletes may be victims of coer-
cion. Perhaps an athlete who otherwise would not use steroids is threatened with
dismissal by an owner who requires such use. Specific overt or even implied threats
do imply coercion. Apart from such specific situations, however, it appears doubt-
ful that a general desire by the athlete to be successful at his or her profession can
by itself undermine the capacity for free choice.
But is this conclusion too hasty? A critic might point out that even if the athlete’s
own internal desires for success do not rule out free choice, coercion by other com-
petitors could be present. That is, even if we agree that internal pressures generated
by the athletes are not coercive, we might suspect that their competitors create exter-
nal pressures that are. It is sometimes argued that even if some sophisticated athletes
do give informed consent, their drug use may force others into taking steroids as well.
Athletes who would prefer not to become users may believe that unless they take the
drugs they will not be able to compete with those who do. Athletes may believe they
are trapped because they are faced with a choice where neither option is attractive:
applicable copyright law.
Don’t take steroids and lose, or take them and remain competitive.
Note that the argument here is no longer that we should interfere with athletes
on paternalistic grounds—to prevent them from harming themselves—but that
we should interfere with them to prevent them from coercing others. Such an ar-
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 81
gument is in accord with Mill’s Harm Principle: Liberty is restricted, but only to
prevent harm to others.
Do pressures generated by athletes who use drugs coerce other athletes into
using performance enhancers too? One reason for doubting that they do is that it
once again appears as if “coercion” is being used too broadly. One might just as
well say that students who study harder than others “coerce” their classmates into
studying harder in order to keep up, or that athletes who practice longer hours
than others “coerce” their competitors into practicing longer hours as well. The
problem with such claims is that all competitive pressure becomes “coercive.” As
a result, the term “coercion” is deprived of any moral force. Indeed, if all the com-
petitive behaviors that were “coercive” in this way were put into a list, virtually no
competitive behaviors would be left over that were not coercive.
Critics might reply that there is a difference between weight training and extra
studying, on one hand, and steroid use, on the other. As one writer has pointed
out, “Steroids place regard for enhancement of athletic performance above regard
for the health of the athletes themselves.”12 Weight training should make athletes
stronger and more resistant to injury; studying normally enhances the intellectual
ability of students. But steroid use, even if it enhances athletic performance, also
presents serious risk of harm to the user.
These differences are important and suggest that the use of steroids does present
athletes with a difficult choice. But is this enough to show that a user coerces other
athletes into also becoming users? Much depends upon how we understand the
term “coercion.”13 If we understand coercion to mean imposing difficult choices on
others when we have no right to do so, and if we assume the user has no right to im-
pose the choice of using or not using on other athletes, then perhaps a strong form
of the coercion argument can be defended.
But before any such argument can be made good, we need to consider whether
steroid users do have a right to impose the choice of becoming a user on others. And
even if they have such a right, would it be wrong for them to exercise it? Rather than
engaging in a conceptual analysis of the notion of “coercion,” perhaps it will be
more profitable to consider directly whether it is morally wrong for athletes who use
steroids to place other athletes in a situation where they must choose between be-
coming users themselves or becoming competitively disadvantaged.
The appeal to coercion as a justification for prohibiting the use of steroids is open
to the charge that it uses the notion of coercion far too broadly. Perhaps the argu-
ment can be reconstructed or modified without unacceptably stretching the term
“coercion.”
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 82
subject themselves to achieve success. No one is coerced into world class competi-
tion. . . . If they find the costs excessive, they may withdraw.”14
But although such a rejoinder has force, it may not be decisive. Although
steroid use is not strictly “coercive,” because athletes can always withdraw from the
competition, the choice of either using a potentially harmful drug or being non-
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 83
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 84
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 85
with steroids, we might claim, is that they reduce the challenge of sports by making
achievement the result of taking a pill rather than the result of skill. But, as Roger
Gardner pointed out, the same claim can be made about equipment, such as
perimeter-weighted golf clubs that expand their “sweet spot,” thereby reducing the
skill needed for a desirable shot, as well as about diets promoting carbohydrate
loading, high-tech running shoes, streamlined designer swimsuits, and top-of-
the-line practice facilities, all of which are regarded as acceptable parts of athletic
competition.18
The difficulty, then, is that of finding a principled way of drawing the line be-
tween the illegitimate use of steroids and other performance enhancers, on one
hand, and factors that provide legitimate competitive advantages, on the other.
After all, some advances in equipment can make the game too easy and should
be prohibited in the interest of preserving the game’s inherent challenge, but other
innovations should be allowed. (We will return to this issue in Chapter 7 when we
discuss the potential conflict of interest between equipment manufacturers and
sports organizations whose role it is to safeguard the interest of the sport.) Perhaps
steroid use is on one (prohibited) side of the line and effective dieting is on the
other (permissible) side. The problem is to draw the line properly in the first place.
Just when does an innovation make the game too easy?
Although a simple answer to such a question is unlikely to exist, the charge of
unfairness should not be dismissed too quickly. Perhaps by expanding the consid-
erations mentioned in our discussion of the potential coercive effects of steroid use
we can develop a different analysis of the unfairness involved. This analysis may be
able to help us develop a reasonable—although perhaps not conclusive—case that
steroid use should be prohibited in competitive sports.
That steroid use by some athletes creates a situation of unpalatable choices for
others was suggested earlier: Either use steroids and risk harm, or cease to be com-
petitive (or at least assume a significant competitive disadvantage). In a sense, the
steroid user, though perhaps not like the robber who demands your money or your
life, at least creates a dilemma like that facing the workers who must use harmful
stimulants to keep pace with the drug-induced, energetic colleagues. We may con-
clude that neither athletes nor workers should face such choices and that we should
enact legislation to protect them from such a cruel dilemma.
Does a similar line of argument also suggest that the use of performance-
enhancing steroids is unfair? Suppose we ask whether it would be rational for all
athletes to support either the rule “Use of steroids should be prohibited in athletic
applicable copyright law.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 86
John Rawls’s theory of justice, forces the athletes to be impartial and unbiased
rather than to vote according to personal self-interest.19 How would rational and
impartial athletes vote?
Can it be established that a vote for the rule permitting steroid use would be
irrational under such circumstances? One might argue for such a view by point-
ing out that all athletes would know of the general harmful effects of steroids, but,
because of the requirement of limited ignorance, none would have any reason to
believe that steroids would be especially beneficial to them personally. Widespread
use would, at best, yield only minimal gains for any one competitor, since the ad-
vantages gained by some would be largely canceled out by roughly similar advan-
tages gained by others. However, the risk of serious effects on health would be
significant for all.
Under such circumstances, a rule allowing the general use of steroids seems
collectively irrational. Why would rational individuals choose to run great risks for
minimal gains, gains that, from behind the veil of ignorance, they have no reason
to believe will benefit them rather than their competitors? It seems that significant
competitive advantage can be secured only if some athletes use steroids covertly.
Allowing steroid use would not be supported by the informed, impartial choice of
all athletes and would provide only minimal gains relative to the risk of serious
harm. The use of steroids as performance enhancers is unethical precisely because
rational and impartial athletes would not agree to it as a universal practice.
Thus, steroid use may seem rational if users think only about themselves and
hope to secure advantages over nonusers. But if they must think impartially about
what is an acceptable universal practice, steroid use no longer seems rational. This
is why the use of steroids seems to many to be a form of cheating. The user oper-
ates from principles that could not be consented to as principles applying to all.
In effect, this argument appeals to a hypothetical contract among rational and
impartial athletes. It is hypothetical because it attempts to specify what would be
agreed to under specified but not necessarily real or actual conditions of choice. Al-
though it is hypothetical rather than actual, writers such as Rawls have suggested
that such a contract nevertheless is binding on us in that the hypothetical condi-
tions reflect considerations we think ought to apply to moral reasoning. The veil of
ignorance, for example, reflects our belief that moral reasoning should be impar-
tial rather than biased in our own favor and should not be unduly influenced by
our social class, race, gender, religion, or genetic endowment.
Unfortunately for those who oppose the use of performance-enhancing ste-
applicable copyright law.
roids, this sort of argument is hardly free from criticism. In particular, it assumes,
perhaps incorrectly, that the only outcomes athletes would consider behind the veil
of ignorance would be risks to health versus competitive gains over other athletes.
Some athletes might consider other issues: For example, some might believe that a
universally higher level of competition generated by using steroids more than com-
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934
9780813343686-text_Layout 1 5/11/10 10:38 AM Page 87
pensates for health risks. Others may value their greater strength as a result of
steroid use, regardless of competitive gain over others.20 Thus, it is not as uncontro-
versial as it first appeared to suppose that impartial and reasonable athletes would
unanimously agree to prohibit steroid use; their deliberations behind the veil might
even be indeterminate because of conflicting views.
This critique indicates that the contractual version of the argument from fair-
ness is open to reasonable objection. However, further development of the argu-
ment may undermine some of the objections to it. For example, we might consider
whether the official rule-making bodies of sports, such as the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) or the International Olympic Committee (IOC), are
obligated to ignore the idiosyncratic values of individual athletes and simply con-
sider steroid use from the standpoint of promoting good competition. If we can
justifiably rule out the preferences of athletes who value increases in strength or in
overall athletic achievement over risks to health, and only consider the issue from
the standpoint of weighing competitive advantages and disadvantages (which ar-
guably is the point of view that rule-making bodies should take), then our original
conclusion seems to follow. From the standpoint of collective impartial choice
about the conditions of competition, users of steroids are exempting themselves
from rules to which they would not consent under conditions of free, impartial
choice. Because they are making exceptions of themselves arbitrarily, their behav-
ior may be regarded as unfair. Users who engage in a behavior they could not ratio-
nally endorse as a policy for others to follow treat their fellow athletes merely as a
means to their own success.21
Sports organizations such as Major League Baseball or the IOC are justified in
considering things from this perspective—and discounting the possible desires of
those athletes who would like to see the overall level of play improve as a result of
drug use—because their job as organizations is not to make play better and better
but to regulate competition fairly. This conclusion, as we have seen, may not follow
if, behind the veil of ignorance, we take into account the fact that athletes may take
a point of view based on some value not directly connected to competitive success,
such as raising the limits of human performance. However, because sports organi-
zations regulate fairness in competition, it seems reasonable for them to ignore
such idiosyncratic values when making regulations about steroid use.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/3/2018 7:26 AM via UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED
AN: 421182 ; Simon, Robert L..; Fair Play : The Ethics of Sport
Account: s6185934