Louis Lavelle INTERPRETATION OF THE PROPOSITION Cogito Ergo Sum

Of the Human Soul 242
INTERPRETATION OF THE PROPOSITION

“COGITO ERGO SUM”1
1. THE “COGITO” OR THE ACCESS TO BEING THROUGH INTIMACY.
The soul’s discovery of its own inwardness2 is constitutive of the soul itself.
Not that we can say this intimacy straightaway has an individual character3 and
consequently allows me immediately to determine this soul as mine. For the
discovery of subjectivity precedes, we might say, the discovery of my own
subjectivity. In reality the latter is an experience [which is] not primitive and
instantaneous but constantly goes on and deepens [throughout] my entire life: I
have never [come to the end of] distinguishing between the absolute subjectivity
and this imperfect subjectivity through which I say “me” by contrasting myself
with other beings who also say “me” and are present within [the absolute
subjectivity] like me and with me. Yet the relation of each subjectivity [to] the
pure subjectivity, or [to] another subjectivity, cannot be reduced to the [inside-
1
Chapter Four of Book One, “The Soul’s Inwardness [or Intimacy]”. The phrase “cogito ergo sum” is Latin
for Descartes’ famous formula “I think therefore I am”.
2
I will continue to use “intimacy” and “inwardness” interchangeably to translate a single French noun.
3
This denial of an individual character to the soul at its entry into the world is asserted in various forms
throughout Of the Human Soul. It is not clear to me that Of the Act fully squares with this view. Here soul
is depicted as a kind of anonymous intimacy precisely in need of an individual essence.
Translation Copyright © 2004/2012 by Robert Alan Jones
20 Webb Court, Bingil Bay Q4852, Australia
outside relationship]: it goes beyond it. I become more interior to the interiority
of being in the measure that I become more interior to myself4: and the mutual
exteriority of two particular beings decreases accordingly. This exteriority is
explained by the presence of the body: we know that the I is always linked to the
body as to its limits and that these limits are variable since the I is never
completely slave [to] its body but [then again] never completely [its] master.
In this admirable formula cogito ergo sum Descartes presents in the form of an
invincible reasoning an experience [that is] constant and implicated in all others,
[one] which requires me to enter into existence by way of thinking5, i.e. by way
of pure inwardness.6 Yet he expresses the incomparable grandeur of this
discovery without bothering to make a distinction between the universality of
this thinking and the individual being who takes it upon himself, which gives
way to [divergent interpretations] that we know very well and leads [Descartes]
to set up an absolute separation between the I that thinks and the body—as if it
were possible for this thinking to be mine independently of its relation to the
body.7 What we would like to try to show is how this formula defines a first
beginning of the I to itself, a gnosseological rather than an ontological first
beginning, attested to by its necessary link with the argument we rightly call
“ontological”8; how [the formula] envelopes the experience of participation and,
through the very boldness with which it directly penetrates its source, ignores
the limiting conditions that render it possible: Descartes will restore them later
with much difficulty, precisely for lack of having inscribed them in that initial
affirmation where he expressed the discovery of both being’s inwardness and his
own inwardness to being.
In saying “I think therefore I am” there is indeed no question of passing from
an immanent thinking to a transcendent existence—which allows respect for the
legitimacy of the therefore and protects the formal validity of the argument; it is
solely a question of showing that the sole access to being is through interiority,
not because that interiority might be the reflection of who knows what exteriority
but because [it] is the very absolute of being, such that whatever exteriority we
will thereafter infer will be derived and relative. [This] is the case in particular of
extent9, for which we know that Descartes will [later] be obliged to invoke divine
veracity in order to endow it with a substantial existence comparable to that of
thought. If all the great philosophies—those that rightly marked not exactly a
revolution but a new beginning for philosophy, [those] of Socrates, Descartes
4
Readers will by now recognise this as a central theme in Lavelle’s philosophy.
5
The same French word can be translated as “thought”. In keeping with the active character of Lavelle’s
philosophy I have generally preferred “thinking” to “thought”.
6
A hint is given as to what the author principally means by “thinking”: namely “inwardness”. The word
“pure” suggests engagement in a subjectivity which precedes representation, i.e. thinking in the usual sense
of involvement in words and concepts. More will be noted on this point later.
7
In recent times especially Descartes has come in for much criticism on this count.
8
See Section 6.
9
Spatiality.
[and] Kant—have been characterised by a return to the subject, it is not only

because the return to the subject defined a critical attitude through which all
objective affirmations were validated (though their authors might have thought
so) [but] because it achieved a penetration into the very inwardness of Being
whose [objective aspect gives] us no more than [an] appearance or manifestation.
And The Critique of Practical Reason10, in which the subject is not considered as
merely a legislator of phenomenal experience but as an agent who determines his
own existence through his action, cannot do otherwise than to disclose in him a
participation in the absolute. Likewise the activity I grasp in the Cogito, which
seems to have a spiritual character only because it is an activity of thought, is
above all an activity that produces itself, i.e. that already supposes the entering-
into-play of a will; and Biranian11 “effort” does no more than renew the Cartesian
Cogito, though Biran was more attentive than Descartes to the limitation of our
interior activity, to the resistance opposed to it and against which it constantly
battles. The same exigency is at the source of the Christian philosophy [of] Saint
Augustine who needs the Cogito in order to achieve a meeting-point between the
creature’s being and the creator’s being, [and it is also] in the recent
phenomenological reform of philosophy [by] Husserl12 which proposes a return
to Descartes and finds in the Cogito the indubitable first existence and fundament
of all the affirmations that bear on essences. The primacy of the Cogito evinces the
most profound feature of all philosophy which, instead of being constituted as an
objective system, demonstrates that engagement of the I in being which makes it
indivisibly a science and a wisdom.
2. CARTESION DOUBT AS WILL’S QUESTIONING OF BOTH KNOWLEDGE

AND EXISTENCE.
It seems however that Descartes’ point of departure and essential

preoccupation is primarily theoretical in nature. By [casting] in doubt all his
previous affirmations the subject is affirmed as a thinking being by way of doubt
itself. And one can construe the Cogito [as] saying that, at the moment [the
subject] is affirmed as a [thinking being], the I brings to light only its strictly
critical functions so that all its subsequent affirmations depend on that and find
10
An important follow-up to Kant’s monumental Critique of Pure Reason. It deals with ethical matters.
11
Reference to the philosopher Marie-Francois-Pierre Gonthier de Biran (1766-1824).
12
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), chief exponent of phenomenology and mentor of Martin Heidegger. His
famous 1931 work Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrage (translated as “Cartesian
Meditations”) was developed from two lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in 1929, while Lavelle was living
in Paris. Whether or not he attended the lectures Lavelle is aware that his “Interpretation” stands in direct
relation to Husserl as well as Descartes. Indeed the drift of Husserl’s philosophy is on several counts
similar to that of Lavelle, e.g. Husserl too speaks of the I in terms of an act. Yet it is doubtful that the
careful Husserl would have endorsed the adventurous metaphysics of Lavelle. Likewise Lavelle has
reservations about Husserl, as will be seen later in this chapter.
their fundament in it.13 But this is to restrict the argument’s ontological

significance and perhaps to take away its conclusive force. For thinking’s critical
function is doubtless nothing more than an effect of that immediate penetration
of thinking into being which renders it apt to validate every affirmation in which
it recognises the presence of the being it always brings with it so to speak. The
Cogito emerges from the dubito14 which already reveals thinking to us in its
purest employment. I doubt every object of thought in order to learn that I
cannot doubt the thinking which doubts. We should not forget that doubt is
voluntary; it is therefore the sign of my power rather than my impotence, for
with its initial step it makes me enter into the interior of being, of a being that
immediately becomes mine through the act I carry out. [Where this act is
concerned] doubt is so to speak the first moment, the general and conditional
form, in which is contained ahead of time all the determinations I will be able to
give it, among which [I will have] to choose. [Consequently] it is necessary to
proceed from doubt, though doubt is already the whole of thinking, which
cannot, it is true, be content with the consciousness of its act but must also
determine it.
Doubt is therefore not an exclusively theoretical bearing of consciousness. For
it is inseparable from the will which constantly produces and regenerates it.
Moreover it is not only a questioning of knowledge but a questioning of
existence. In the modern era emphasis has often been placed on the role played
by anxiety in the life of our soul, as if it were in anxiety that the soul took
measure of its responsibility with respect to its own destiny. And we think that
anxiety is to the will what doubt is to the intellect. But there is no doubt that does
not include anxiety, that does not put us in the presence of the I itself which, in as
much as it learns to know itself through its own incapacity to know nothing [at
all], reveals to us that very activity we dispose, which is ever hobbled, yet in such
a way that the use we make of it [determines] all the being we [enjoy], i.e. that we
are capable of giving ourselves.
Also there is no progression when we pass from the dubito to the Cogito since
the dubito is already the soul itself, considered in [the context of] this active and
enquiring inwardness through which it is revealed to itself as a participation (at
first deficient and contingent) in being, with which it does not yet know how it
will be filled. Participation is altogether present in the dubito—yet in its limiting
and negative form, though infinity is already present in it by way of the
multitude of potential affirmations doubt already contains before being broken15.
13
In which case “I think therefore I am” would pertain only to formal thinking processes so that for
example a computer’s confirmation that it is engaged in a computation might have the same value as
Descartes’ personal reflection. Objections to Descartes’ proposition frequently take this cast. Lavelle makes
it plain in the next sentence that he rejects any such an interpretation of the Cogito.
14
“I doubt”—referring to Descartes’ method of progressively putting all things in doubt until he arrived at
something he could not doubt. See Section Four of Discourse on Method and the first of Descartes’
Meditations.
15
Into particular affirmations?
Consequently the sole difference between the dubito and the Cogito is that the
Cogito lays participation bare in its positive form, so to speak, i.e. precisely in that
originary infinitude of affirmation where all particular affirmations find both
their possibility and their reason for being. One can say that the I is inseparable
from doubt; it is the I that doubts, and doubt expresses, [there] within the I itself,
its limited and individual character. But if we hold to the distinction between the
I and the me defined in chapter II16, then we can say that the contrast between the
dubito and the Cogito is in effect the contrast between the me and the I, or the
discovery within the me of the I, there where the feeling of thinking’s apparent
powerlessness is immediately converted into the revelation of its limitless power.
It is therefore at the moment we discover the Cogito in the dubito that we
legitimately ask whether the Cartesian argument reveals to us universal thought
or only the thinking of a particular being who is me. However we cannot
establish any cut between the one and the other. I participate in a rightly
universal thinking which, in the very measure it is truly a thinking, is
coextensive with all thinking but which, in the measure that it is my thinking, is
always an imperfect uncertain thinking which doubts, so that, if it is a true
thinking, it seems that the I is transported beyond itself, and there where it is
nothing more than its own thinking, it discovers in it only the lack of a truth it
calls upon but is refused. However there is neither [a] finished thinking nor [a]
separate I. The experience we have of thinking is the experience of our own
thinking in so far as it affirms itself and [is] conscious of carrying within it a
power of affirmation that surpasses it but to which it is obliged to consent.17
3. THINKING IN SO FAR AS [IT IS] INDIVIDUAL AND IN SO FAR AS [IT IS]

UNIVERSAL.
For I can discover thinking only through the act in which I myself participate.
Moreover we know the impossibility of granting a conclusive character to any
argument that might take a form like “You think therefore you are” or “He
thinks therefore he is”.18 This would be to convert thinking into an object, i.e. to
abolish it, and to evoke in order to support it a hypothetical subject [dwelling] in
[an] intimacy I would not penetrate. The I of intimacy is an I beyond which we
cannot go further back: which is not testimony of an existence situated in the
beyond [but] an interrogation both of self and of all things, which in questioning
itself gives itself the being it is: consequently the argument has value only there
16
Section 3, “DIALOGUE OF THE I AND THE ME”. The distinction in question is between self as
subject and self as object.
17
“In the I think, the I is therefore the ego or the particular I, the Cartesian ego, whereas thinking, instead
of being one of its modes, is the very act in which the I participates, i.e. the I upon which it draws and
imposes its own limitation.” Author’s note.
18
In other words Descartes’ formula requires first-person engagement.
where we have to do with not only a present thinking but a thinking that creates
itself by its very exertion.19 But in affirming itself as thinking within the I that
thinks it, or again that thinks-itself, or that thinks itself thinking, we put into play
this dialogue between universal thinking and individual thinking, i.e. between
the I and the me, or that action of self on self [displayed] by the reflexive or
pronominal verb20 which is characteristic of pure intimacy considered in its very
essence. We are here at the heart of the act through which consciousness is
constituted. Now the most unsound interpretation one can give to the rapport
between my thinking and universal thinking in the Cogito would consist of
saying that, if my thinking is [a thinking] effected by me, or that brings me forth
as me, [then] universal thinking is a thinking in general, or an abstract thinking,
which would only take concrete form in the thinking of each and every particular
I. In reality universal thinking is not a thinking in general to which the particular
I would come along to add [its] existence as a [finishing touch]. Completely to
the contrary, we could say that thinking such as it is realised in the particular I is
nothing other than the universal thinking itself, which the I penetrates, though
only in a partial fashion and without ever managing to equal. Because other
individual consciousnesses also penetrate it, albeit according to a perspective
which is their own, there is a necessary harmony among all consciousnesses,
though [that harmony] can at first escape us, and much effort is often needed to
bring it to light. Thus the “I think” is not an act capable of being indefinitely
repeated among all [those] individuals who might remain separate from each
other on islands of inwardness. We would say rather that it is plunged into an
intimacy which is common to them but in which each consciousness is
surrounded by certain frontiers in the measure that it is not a perfect intimacy,
i.e. where it is associated with a body.
[The remarkable thing] however is not that the thinking discovered in the
Cogito is a thinking that goes beyond the particular I, in which it participates only
imperfectly; it is not even that thinking here embraces, as Descartes well saw, all
the operations of consciousness, and specifically the pair of willing (by which it
produces its own action) and intellect (by which, in producing it, [thinking]
produces its own light); it is that this thinking grasped in the Cogito is still the
thinking of nothing: it is a thinking that grasps itself not in a particular operation
but in the possibility of all the operations it can accomplish. And it is the
possibility of all these operations that is contained in the expression “the thought
of thought”21. For here the thought-object is nothing more than the pure
19
We must actively participate in the process. It seems clear that the Cogito is less a logical demonstration
than a programme to be carried out. Validation comes from the doing.
20
As noted in previous chapters the French language has an entire class of verbs which refer their actions
back to their subjects by way of a pronoun representing the subject. Exactly translated they take the form of
e.g. “He hurries himself”. But in virtually all translations it takes the form: “He hurries.”
21
I gather the author trusts readers to relate this to Aristotle’s Metaphysics A7 1072b 20-22. In any case he
provides this note: “The thought of thought is the indicator of a regressive movement which logically goes
to infinity: yet that proves, not that thinking always escapes us, but on the contrary that from the first step it
possibility of thinking which has become the object precisely of another thinking,
which is my current thinking. Consequently I here think myself as the being of a
possibility, and it is the being of this possibility which is the soul’s very being, as
we will try to show in chapter V22.
Therefore the liaison between the individual and the universal in the Cogito
appears [in a new light]. For that possibility of thinking which is the object of my
current thinking is adequate to universal thinking, though it is never for me
merely a possibility, [or] a possibility I actualise only through particular
determinate operations. Not that we must say, through a kind of idolatry, that
universal thinking is a realised thinking similar to what might be an achieved
science for us (as would be a real space, beyond the one we [occupy], which
would be for us a possible space): it is beyond the contrast between possible and
actual, which [makes] sense only in expressing its capacity for being participated.
We can consider it neither as a possibility that would be still lacking something
in order to be, since on the contrary it is by way of it that this possibility is
actualised—nor as an actualisation or accomplishment in which the very act that
makes [thinking] be would [be rendered] determinate and immobilised. The
distinction between the possible and the actual, or the actualised, therefore
[makes] no sense with respect to universal thinking, in which nothing is possible
(the possible being no more than its universality in so far as it can be
participated) [and] nothing is actualised (actualisation being no more than its
own act in so far as it is effectively participated).
We now understand the sense of the connection between thinking and
existence. There is no other existence than that of my own thinking in so far as it
is the possibility of a universal thinking; adequate in principle to the totality of
being, it is given to itself by way of this possibility in so far as it actualises it and
makes it its own, an intimacy that is a penetration into the intimacy of pure
being. Yet we cannot say that, just as there is a surpassing of the I by thought,
and just as this thinking is delimited in the I and establishes the possibility of
consciousnesses other than mine, so too there is a surpassing of being through
thinking which establishes the possibility of forms of being other than thinking.
Nonetheless Descartes thought so: but it is because extent23 was for him an
independent substance instead of merely [the expression of] that sort of shadow
of the act of participation which requires it--in order to remain of-a-piece with
the totality of being—to apprehend [being] only from the outside in the form of a
pure given. But in fact there is no other being (and Descartes thought [the same]
despite the concession he believed he could make in favour of the existence of
things and the trans-phenomenal reality of the created world) than the very
is revealed to itself as creative of itself in that pure dialogue where it is, dare we say, at once its own subject
and object.”
22
Entitled “POSSIBILITY, OR THE BEING OF A POWER-T0-BE”. Not included among these
translations.
23
Or space.
being we are capable of giving ourselves from within, which [through] our own
intimacy with ourselves reveals to us the absolute intimacy. [Here] is not only
the sole indubitable existence but the sole true existence which is one with me in
the same act through which I constantly question myself about it and make it
what it is.
4. THE “ERGO”24 OF THE “COGITO” AND ITS MEANING.
The “ergo” of the Cogito however calls for some explanation. And too often
one is led to forget it, as Descartes did, in drawing together the two propositions
“I think” and “I am” to the point of identifying them; indeed so much so that
their connection is less an inference than an intuition, or at least one of those
immediate inferences which exclude memory and time and are by consequence
veritable intuitions. We cannot contest that the “ergo” is a call to reflection, that it
consequently evokes a duality of notions, doubtless wrapped up in a single
experience but [in need of being joined together once distinguished]. That I
conclude existence from thinking obliges me to recognise the objectivity of my
own subjectivity. The argument is intended, as [is] all reasoning, to justify an
evidence to another [person and to myself]. It demonstrates that an [element] of
universality is implicated in an experience which is nonetheless the most
personal and even the most secret of all. For not only do I prove myself to myself,
i.e. prove by way of reflection the link between the two notions of thinking and
existence by explaining their rapport [to myself] as if [to] another [person], but I
invite others on the one hand to carry out for themselves the same personal and
secret operation and on the other hand, by giving a logical form to the subjective
connection between thinking and existence, to recognise that [the connection] is
grounded in me as well as in them. We will find here the common goal of all
demonstration, which is to permit [people] to agree by obliging them to effect
internal operations through which they communicate to themselves, in verifying
them so to speak, the certitude of their intuitions, i.e. the means of regaining
them.
Consequently we can say that the Cogito is an intuition yet [one which is]
always readily developed into the form of a reasoning. Descartes shows us how
we learn to discover general principles in individual experience. Thus already in
the intuition of our existence as [a] thinking being we glimpse evidence of [the]
principle that whatever thinks is25, which permits making the sum 26 the
conclusion of a deductive reasoning, while, if we nonetheless [consider] the
historical sequence of our cognitions, it is not only in the necessary connection
between existence and thinking such as I experience it in myself but in their
24
“Therefore”.
25
My italics.
26
“I am”.
original and indivisible unity that the consciousness we [have of the relatedness]
of these two notions is founded as soon as we have separated them. And that is
why, as soon as Descartes’ psycho-metaphysical inquiry is converted into an
intellectualist ontology [in] Malebranche27 and Spinoza28, we observe a kind of
regression from the Cogito: either the impossibility of subtracting existence from
the thinking within me becomes, as [in the case of] Malebranche, a consequence
of the general proposition “nothingness has no properties” or the Cogito again
disappears, as [in the case of] Spinoza, in that it is the personal affirmation of the
I prior to being dissolved in an empirical and anonymous affirmation Homo
cogitat29. But the imperishable glory of Descartes is precisely to have introduced
us to the inwardness of being by way of personal inwardness so that the ergo of
the Cogito expresses nothing more than the necessity of considering as
universally and ontologically valid an experience we might have at first feared to
possess only subjective and individual value.
5. IS IT NECESSARY TO SAY “SOMETIMES I THINK AND SOMETIMES I

AM”?
Nonetheless the value of the ergo, which links thinking and existence within
me, the primitive experience of their indivisibility [there at the summit of]
reason, has been cast into doubt. And we witness a great poet30 establish between
thinking and existence an opposition which seems to constitute a challenge to
idealism yet which [has] an echo in common consciousness. For we are not
always disposed to take thinking as a veritable existence; not only does it happen
that we confound it with dream, or again with a virtual existence, but is it not
always a product of reflection that then seems to isolate itself from existence in
order to enter a completely different world which, far from lending existence, we
constantly deny? And according to the paradox [posed by] certain of our
contemporaries, the negation of being [constitutes thinking’s] very being31. One
could say that the man who thinks the most is also the furthest from existence.
Far from withdrawing us from the world, as [does] thinking, existence engages
us in it: but then it is necessary to say that we cease to think; there is no longer
27
Frequently referred to in previous chapters.
28
Baruch Spinoza (1632-77). A Dutch philosopher who like Descartes attempted to deduce a grand
philosophy from self-evident propositions.
29
“Man thinks”.
30
The author speaks as if every reader will know the unnamed poet in question. The only great poet I know
who presents a “challenge” to Descartes and idealism is D. H. Lawrence. In his poem “Spiral Flame” he
throws down a gauntlet with the words “Sum, ergo non cogito” (I am, therefore I do not think). Was
Lavelle familiar with the writings of this English poet? Whatever the answer, the instance of Lawrence’s
challenge to Descartes sufficiently “fits the bill” for the present discussion. The poet’s case is compelling.
In most cases thinking (as commonly understood) is in fact an impediment to whatever recognition of
being: it tends to be an all-consuming involvement akin to mindless immersion in outside events.
31
Sartre and his followers are perhaps the “contemporaries” in question.
anything virtual in us, everything is actual. There is within us only the density of a
being that coincides with itself, [and is not] distanced from itself in order to regard itself
being.32 Consequently it seems there is a kind of contradiction between thinking
and existence: I constantly swing from one of these poles toward the other
without succeeding in establishing myself, doubtless never being either a
completely pure thinking or a completely pure existence.
Surely no one will fail to recognise either the interest or the truth of this
analysis. And it should be said that it is important to interpret it correctly rather
than to contest it. For we are compelled to recognise that there is an existence
from which thinking separates us: the one Descartes rejects in [his method of]
voluntary doubt, [the one] which is, [there] outside me, the existence of things
and, [here] inside me, my own existence precisely in so far as it is passive,
subjected to and determined by things. However the first is an object for
thinking. And of the second we must say that in the measure it is the subject of
thinking it is mine. It is this act of thinking, i.e. that which makes it mine, which
the Cogito isolates, doubtless not in order to deny all that this thinking contain[s]
so as to reduce it to a simple possibility but in order to allow me to dispose this
possibility myself and thereby render my own what it contain[s]. We will
therefore not be surprised that the thinking which puts existence back into
question eludes existence: but this is a thinking considered in its negative and
critical form, [a thinking] which does not yet go beyond interrogation and doubt
and which is only a problem for itself, though we cannot deny that it precisely
has access to existence at the very moment it sets out to take charge of it. For
there is no existence but that which thinking penetrates and [renders intimate]33.
Up to that point I could attribute existence to myself only in a contradictory
manner, by withholding the I from it and reducing it to the rank of [a] thing: yet I
cannot say that there, where the universe affirms me and not my self, I am. It is
therefore necessary [for me to] put in question the existence that is given me so
as to acquire an existence that is mine: then this existence becomes that of a
possibility whose putting-into-play is left to me.34
The contrast established between thinking and existence has the advantage of
showing us that, in thinking, existence is only ever present as an act that is up to
us to accomplish, instead of [a] bare existence [that] could be considered as a fact
or a given assimilated to the reality in which we are immersed, [and] from
which, it appears, the nature of thinking is to release us. However [we could not
32
To my mind this does not address the possibility of self-awareness while one is engaged in existence. I
suppose the author is referring to complete absorption in outward event. In any case the argument does not
do justice to those who, like Lawrence, feel that thinking, or at least a certain kind of thinking, can be an
impediment to the recognition of being, including self-being. Lavelle begins a subtler analysis in the next
paragraph.
33
Literally “intimises”
34
As I read this, thinking must recognise its own existence (i.e. as an act) in order to have a meaningful
relation with outward existence (i.e. as an observed datum). Support for this view is given in the next
paragraph.
fail to recognise] that thinking is in some way party to the totality of the real or
that it expresses the effort we make [in] replacing existence such as it is given to
us with an existence we give ourselves, thereby attaining existence at its source
and in its very genesis. In this sense being exceeds, doubtless not all possible
thinking, but at least the thinking currently exercised: participation is produced
at the interior of the interval that divides them. Consequently the margin
separating thinking from being expresses nothing more than the need for
thinking to exert itself so as to acquire that existence which gives it a place in the
whole of being where there is nothing that is not interior to itself and creative of
itself. The divorce of thinking from being is therefore the sign of our frailty and,
so to speak, of the impossibility of making our interiority and exteriority come
together. It is [a] sign of our defective thinking that existence [manifests] from the
side of exteriority. However [thinking] relates to interiority only through an act
we must carry out, which penetrates and dissolves [all] exteriority. We have no
other duty than to overcome the opposition between these two terms35: the
nature of the Cogito ergo sum is to be the affirmation of a virtual existence whose
essence is to actualise itself. We could state it in the imperative rather than the
indicative [mode] and say: “Think in order to be” instead of “I think therefore I am.”
And without doubt here is the most profound meaning we can give to the ergo of
the Cogito.
6. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE “COGITO” AND THE ONTOLOGICAL

PROOF36.
It is not enough to have shown that the Cogito considered in itself implies at
once universal thought, individual thinking and the participation of the one in
the other. It is now necessary to show that this participation is explicitly affirmed
as soon as we recognise the connection between the Cogito and the ontological
argument. Still it is not enough to say that the finite supposes the infinite, that I
can have experience of my own thinking only as a thinking which doubts, i.e. as
a finite thinking, and that it is only the limitation of a thinking which does not
doubt, i.e. which is perfect and infinite. We might be tempted but we would be
wrong to interpret the rapport between the finite and the infinite in [Spinoza-
like] language. Doubtless when I say that the finite implies the infinite, that
might mean that the idea of the finite implies the idea of the infinite, as one object
35
The gist of Lavelle’s reply to those who oppose thinking to being. Thinking in the inmost sense is the
same as existence or being. Heidegger takes a similar stance.
36
Though the phrase is often used with respect to a proof of God offered by St. Anselm (d. 1117) it here
refers to Descartes’ related but distinct proof in Section Four of Discourse on Method and in Parts Two and
Three of Meditations. Very briefly the argument asserts that, since no finite being could independently
arrive at the idea of God, the idea must be granted from on high and therefore must attest to God’s
existence. However Descartes himself does not speak of an “ontological proof” or “ontological argument”.
The term appears in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Book Two, Chapter Three.
of understanding implies another, but such language [tends] to destroy the

power of the ontological argument and [only supports the conclusion of] an
existence [as an] idea37. However the Cartesian approach seems to us completely
different. The nature of the Cogito is in effect to reveal my own existence to me in
the act through which I give it to myself. Now it is this act itself which appears to
me as limited; and it is such precisely in the putting-into-play of a possibility that
I find within me and that is given to me, which sufficiently shows that I am a
created being, i.e. created only in the being of its possibility, which is up to me to
actualise. It is therefore not in the idea of myself as [something] finite that I need
to participate: it is in the being of the I as it resides in the very act of its thinking;
consequently the infinity it presupposes is not the infinity of an idea, since that
idea would be necessarily subordinated to it as its object; it is an infinity which is
in some sense homogenous with it and founds its dependant existence, i.e. the
infinity of an act which, in giving itself absolute existence, permits [the I] in turn
to give itself a participatory existence. In the vis probandi38 of the ontological
argument, the idea’s infinity and perfection [make] sense only as a perfection
and an infinity [enacted]39, which alone will permit God to be considered as causa
sui 40. And when Descartes speaks of the idea of God, a representative idea is not
in question, at least [not] in the sense [that] every idea represents a being
different from it41: for there is no representative idea of an act that accomplishes
itself, e.g. of the Cogito. This idea42 is one with the self-accomplishing act. And
consequently the idea of God, of which [the human] act is [a] limitation, is [the
self-accomplishing] act itself in that it [must be] without limits in order [for me]
to make it mine [within] my own limits.43 The term “idea” here expresses no
more than that infinite surpassing of my own act by the act which founds it, and
not a simple representation I might have of the very being which realises such a
surpassing. And it is because I myself exist as a finite thinking being that the
infinite thinking being, without which I could not be, is necessarily an existence
and not only an idea.
37
In the usual sense of a representation, I suppose. For Lavelle an idea is not a mere representation. See
note 41 below.
38
“Convincing force”. The term usually refers to an argument that, while not conclusive in itself, lends
considerable weight to a line of argument.
39
Literally en acte.
40
Self-caused.
41
The comment reflects Lavelle’s own understanding of “idea” as a presence or activity rather than as an
image or schema. Only such an idea could be “adequate to being” (see e.g. The Total Presence.) Heidegger
also has reservations with respect to representation. In a dialogue from his Gelassenheit (1959), Heidegger
writes “If thinking is what distinguishes man’s nature, then surely the essence of this nature, namely the
nature of thinking, can be seen only by looking away from thinking.” (From Discourse on Thinking: A
Translation of Gelassenheit by Anderson and Freund, Harper & Row, 1966). By “thinking” in the last
instance Heidegger means representational thinking as distinct from a sort of thinking that might be
described as contemplative or profoundly aware.
42
The understanding of idea that Lavelle attributes to Descartes.
43
A tortured logic seems at work here.
Also one is struck to see that when Descartes, after having established the
existence of his own I, demonstrates that the finite presupposes the infinite, the
existence of God, and not only the idea of it, is henceforth secured. The three
proofs of God’s existence are limited to developing the implications of this
fundamental affirmation. Moreover there is no one who is not surprised by the
deceptive rapidity with which, in [what is properly called] “the ontological
argument”, Descartes passes from the idea of God to God’s existence: here it is a
[matter of] self-evidence, a proof in plain view. The idea of the infinite [is]
already the infinite Cogito [at work]44, of which it was necessary to posit not only
the possibility but the existence in order to support in me the passage, [there]
within the act of thinking, from the thought of the possibility to existence. And
perhaps we could show why the idea of the infinite and the perfect is beyond
every representative idea by observing that if every idea, in so far as it is not
merely an object but an act of thinking, is itself a spiritual being, [then] the idea
of the infinite is the very infinity of that being for which each idea is only a
determination, destined to become an object in a particular consciousness. The
ontological argument is, we might say, the Cogito on the scale of God as the Cogito is
the ontological argument on the scale of man: either way we touch on the spiritual act
in so far as it is causa sui: in God with his absolute creative efficacy, in us in its
limitative form, as the conversion of a possibility into actuality. Once the Cogito is
grasped in an undeniable experience, which always begins anew, the divine
Cogito—far from expressing an ulterior and hypothetical passage from the finite
to the infinite—is implied by it as [a] condition. It is an argument a fortiori45: if the
finite presupposes the infinite of which it is [a] limitation, and [if] the passage
from thinking to existence is realised in my experience, [then] with stronger
reason [the same must take place] in God. From this [follows] that much picked-
up formula Descartes sometimes employs: I think therefore God is. Neither the
Cogito nor the ontological argument can be considered as simple dialectical
relations among notions. Both [lead] us to plunge from the order of
representation into the order of existence, and indeed of an existence in the
process of creating itself. In this connection the ontological argument presents a
frightening aspect: it transports us to the very source of being. [In] the genesis of
ourselves a kind of genesis of God is brought down into our own experience.
We can present things [a little differently] and say that, if we [take] my
thinking for my essence, the Cogito ergo sum effects for me the passage from
essence to existence at every instant. The distinction between the two terms is
necessary so that as [a] finite being I can precisely give myself being through my
own act. But as happens [with] all notions [where] we are obliged to oppose one
[notion] to the other in order to render participation possible, they must be not
abolished but joined together in [the case of] the absolute. Which allows us to say
44
Again en acte, indicating that the infinite is actively present. The idea here is not a mere representation of
something but an immediate reality, what might be called a “living truth”.
45
“With stronger reason”.
equally that existence adds nothing to essence in God, or that [existence] is the
existence of essence, or again that [God] has existence itself as [his] essence. For it
is impossible to take either of these notions to its limit without it coinciding with
the other. An essence which is total, and not limited or prevented from being
realised by anyone else, is existence considered in itself and not [with respect to]
any other thing for which it would be the existence. And an existence that lacks
nothing or is capable of being self-sufficient is the very fullness of essence. —
Here the distance separating exteriority and interiority has disappeared. In so far
as they are opposed to one another these words no longer make any sense. For
whatever appears as exterior to an imperfect activity surpasses it and possesses
an interiority [the other] does not manage to equal. —By the same token, in
saying that we are cause of ourselves, we can distinguish within time our causal
action from the effect it produces, which however is contained in the infinite. But
in God the distinction is no longer possible. For there is nothing in this action
that is not cause; nonetheless it is entirely cause only because it reabsorbs all its
effects into itself. —However, at the level of participation, in order for it to be
possible, we do not fail to oppose essence to existence, exteriority to interiority
and cause to effect. Which engenders notions of effort, body and time.46
But for us, in holding to the relation between essence and existence, it is
important to observe that it is too often badly interpreted when it is a question of
the Cogito: for we almost always imagine that the Cogito component affords us
only the revelation of essence, to which the sum component adds existence.
However we will show in Book II47 that things ought to be interpreted wholly
otherwise: thinking, such as it is shown in the Cogito, is already an existence;
granted, not yet the existence of an essence but only [that] of a possibility that is
up to us to actualise. One cannot say, as one too often has it, that [thinking]
enters into existence by actualising itself; for it already possesses this existence
before acting: but it is only in acting that it determines itself, or in other words,
gives itself an essence. Consequently we see that the soul’s life consists of the
acquisition of an essence, or in the passage from existence into essence. And the
Cogito therefore expresses nothing more than the introduction of the I into
existence; not insofar as it already is an essence but insofar as it is a possibility
whose putting-into-play will precisely allow it to acquire an essence.
The link between the Cogito and the ontological argument can [also] be
related to the interpretation we have given for the “ergo” of the Cogito. The
“ergo” in effect has appeared to show us the duty we have to realise ourselves
through thinking; and since thinking is here an activity that encompasses willing
we can say the “ergo” expresses less an exigency for thinking to recognise that it
exists, as soon as it begins to be exercised, than an exigency for the will to put
[thinking] into play in order to found my existence. The peculiarity of the
46
The paragraph is substantially a late-life recapitulation and reaffirmation of the ideas expressed in “The
Self-Caused Act” from Of the Act.
47
“The Soul’s Genesis”. No portions of this are included in these translations.
ontological argument, in grounding precisely this power I have of producing my

own existence within the infinity of an act that is the eternal cause of itself, is to
assure me that the possibility of realising and indefinitely enriching myself
through thinking—[though I can always lack thought]—will never be lacking to
me.48
7. THE PROBLEM IS IN KNOWING HOW SOUL AND BODY CAN BE

SEPARATED, AND NOT HOW THEY CAN BE JOINED.
We know how, by way of the Cogito, Descartes sets up a radical separation

not only between thinking and the body but again between thinking and the
world. That separation was already contained in the methodical doubt. And this
caused Descartes [to be] accused of the sin of “angelism”49. [The separation] was
moreover reduced by [modern thinkers] to a putting of the world into brackets,
as if they had recognised the impossibility of effecting [separation] through a real
initiative of consciousness and that it [could] only [be] the outcome of a process
of abstraction.50 In reality the Cogito reveals to me the [naked] existence of my
thinking as a pure power considered independently of both its real limits and its
actual operations. In fact it is always discovered in some particular operation at
the moment the I engages itself in time and the world, making this thinking a
thinking it feels [as its own], and always [in application] to some object that
determines it. Consequently the Cogito, which at first seemed to convey the
immediate and constant experience we have of ourselves, is a singular
purification of that experience which releases [its] essence so to speak by
eliminating the concrete conditions that [occasion] it. However we cannot be
restricted to saying only that there, where I think, I also know I am the one who
thinks so that the revelation of the I to itself, or the “ego” of the Cogito, is
inseparable from the cogitatio: for, though thinking is always inwardness itself
and though the idea of an impersonal thinking is doubtless [an absurdity]51 (or a
least an immersion of thinking in its object rather than in its act) it is nonetheless
true that absolute inwardness can [take] an individual form which allows me to
48
“The relation between the Cogito and the ontological argument brings to light the essential character of
participation, which through the Cogito gives us access both to the infinite thought and the being of this,
and through the ontological argument compels us to recognise that our I is only an individuation of one and
the other.” Author’s note.
49
Being overly pure, unworldly; refusing to accept reality. In describing this as a “sin” Lavelle seems to
mock the zeal of Descartes’ many detractors. Today they have become even more numerous. In some
accounts Descartes is held accountable for a number of modern woes owing to his dualism, often by
authors showing little familiarity with his writings.
50
Doubtless a reference to Edmund Husserl and his followers. The “as if” remark supposes considerations
that are unlikely to have been central to these phenomenologists. For them a more important consideration
was the experienced discontinuity between subject and object: a concrete rather than abstract sense of
separation which is the usual accompaniment of any “real initiative of consciousness”.
51
Literally “a counter-sense”, i.e. something contrary to sense.
say “I” only through its [unbreakable] connection with a privileged body which
is mine. Also it is not enough to say that I know I think; for I feel it rather than
know it 52, and for that reason this thinking is my thinking. By way of thinking I
enter into an inwardness that goes beyond me yet precisely permits my body to
affect me, i.e. to be so to speak the centre of this intimacy which is that of the I to
itself. We will not be surprised therefore that thinking always seems to have the
not-I rather than the I [as its] object, and that its act is both constitutive of the I
and transcendental to [it]; but what [decrees] that this object is thought by me
and that this act is [my] act is that this object, in so far as it is represented, has
[for its] reference the body, inasmuch as it is both represented and felt; [and] that
this act, inasmuch as it is carried out, always concerns the body inasmuch as [the
body] first permits us to carry it out and then obliges us to be subjected to it.
Here again it can be said that the separation of soul and body is never
effected in any other way than by abstraction. Also instead of allowing that in
addition to these two substances—which we [would] be at a loss to know how to
join together once we [had] defined them as independent—there is a third which
is a mixture of the two (but how [could] this mixture succeed in constituting
itself and how could these two substances act on each other [to] form one and the
same whole?) it is on the contrary fitting to consider this apparent mixture as
forming a preliminary unity which analysis dissociates into soul and body
according to whether the spiritual activity we dispose or the passivity which
subordinates us to the rest of the world predominates in it. And it can be said
that this dissociation is never finished, that it is [our] duty to pursue [its]
realisation, and that the word “duty” conveys nothing other than the
consciousness we [have] of our activity itself insofar as it resides in its pure
exertion. Moreover the connection between activity and passivity appears
infinitely easier to understand than that between two substances; and it must
even be said that we can understand neither of these two terms except in relation
to the other. But there is more: if one wanted to show [the extent to which] the
dualism of substances which gave Descartes so much trouble is impossible to
uphold one would have to demonstrate not only that interior activity is our very
being, rather than the world and the body which take part in it [and] have
existence only in rapport with it, i.e. as phenomena, but that this activity cannot
take place from [the side of] the world and the body, which are at once obstacles
it encounters and the means by which it is realised: no activity, however interior
we suppose it, can rightly take place from an effect but from a manifestation.
And the peculiarity of this manifestation, in which [activity] becomes incarnated,
is precisely to permit it to exercise its powers, to render itself passive with
respect to itself and to create that solidarity of the I with the universe which
constantly both limits and enriches it.
52
Most readers will allow that feeling is a kind of knowing but the author apparently wants to distinguish
between intellectual knowledge and something more intimate which he here associates with the body.
From the moment the body is reduced to [a] phenomenon, and the
phenomenon to [a] manifestation53, the liaison between the phenomenon and
being is in some sense experienced by us. And we can even divine how a
distinction is necessarily brought about in the phenomenon between a zone that
affects us in “phenomenalising”54 our own limits and a purely represented zone
that “phenomenalises” all that extends beyond them. Thus this conception of the
Cogito will permit us to understand how the Cogito, instead of enclosing us in the
depths of a subjective and impassable solitude, is on the contrary the revelation
of our own participation in the whole of being: for it is not enough to say that the
Cogito reveals thinking to us in its twofold, universal-and-individual, form with
the participation of the second in the first, it is still necessary to recognise that
they can be separated and united only by way of that opposition within me
between activity and passivity which requires me to grasp my thinking in its
very operation yet as correlative of a body that affects me and an object I
represent to myself. So the Cogito does not give me consciousness of myself as a
separate existence. Indeed I can dissociate my existence neither from pure spirit
nor from the body and the world: according to whether my activity has more or
less perfection I constantly oscillate from one of these extremes to the other. And
my connections with the body and the world trace out, in a kind of cast-shadow,
my relations with pure spirit.
8. KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOUL THROUGH ITSELF.
It is easy now to give a verdict on Descartes’ affirmation that the soul knows
itself better than everything else and that every other cognizance contains and
presupposes it. For: firstly, if it is true that I know only what I detach myself
from, I cannot know my soul since it is that from which I cannot detach myself
without ceasing to be me—indeed intimacy with self is [imparted by the soul to
the I and not by the I to the soul]; secondly, if I know nothing save by [turning it
into an object] I cannot know my soul for I cannot [turn it into] a spiritual or
transcendent object without contradiction, i.e. without unwittingly materialising
it; thirdly, if I know only ready-made things I cannot know my soul which is not
only a self-creating act but the act through which all the representations I can
have of things come to be. Such arguments would suffice to justify and
strengthen the critique that has been made of the “transcendental paralogism”55.
—Only, if there is a paralogism in wanting to convert the soul into an object of
53
In common parlance there is little distinction between a phenomenon and a manifestation. I am uncertain
of what the author intends by the distinction he makes. I hazard that a manifestation is a willed
phenomenon as distinct from a purely observed one.
54
My quotation marks.
55
Apparently a reference to Kant. The paralogism or fallacious reasoning in question refers to
demonstrations of the soul’s existence based on inferences from worldly data.
knowledge, the paralogism is greater still in wanting to dissociate the soul from
consciousness and to confound consciousness with knowledge, which is only a
derivative and divided mode of it. Indeed knowledge, which is only ever
realised through [a] separation of the object and the subject, drives the object
outside the I and makes it a phenomenon. But in the measure that the interval
separating the object from the subject is diminished and abolished, the subject
seeks to reach [the object] within its own [sphere of] intimacy, i.e. in the act that
produces it, instead of intuiting the object as a simple spectacle.56 This is
[something already observed in relation to] the concept, which is an act of
intellect that becomes a cognizance only through the object it is capable of
embracing. But conceptual activity expresses, we might say, the consciousness of
this knowledge. However there, where there is no external object to grasp, where
our activity closes on itself, or on the passivity inherent to it which renders each
of its operations correlative to a state, we witness this activity we exert, and this
state we feel, form a kind of dialogue of the I with itself, which is characteristic of
both of consciousness and of that continuous initiative which makes the soul
creative of itself at every instant.
But consciousness cannot be isolated from cognizance57. How could it be
otherwise, since it is indiscernible from the relations that join it to all that it is not
but that it casts outside itself only in [the sense of] objectivising it, i.e. in
“phenomenalising” it? It therefore contains at once all it knows and all it does.
And what it knows is in a certain fashion only the limit, the projection and the
spectacle of what it does. Consequently it is true that in turning aside cognizance
of the object in order to send it back towards the subject we abolish it as
cognizance. But to know oneself is to have consciousness: and there is no
consciousness of self which is not, up to a certain point, cognizance of the world,
for without this rapport with the world the I would never depart from pure
virtuality. Hence the eyes does not see itself, for it is itself the instrument of the
act of vision; but there is sight only of an object that is seen; and cognizance of
this object is inseparable from the consciousness I have of seeing it.
From this we easily understand why Malebranche58, dissociating the act of
knowing from its object [in accordance with his doctrine of] vision in God, could
not accept that the soul is known better than the body. There is no idea of it, as
[there is none] of God himself. It is an existence we apprehend in itself, and not
through representation. Also it is attained by feeling and not by knowledge59. For
existence is ever encompassed [by] feeling. It is therefore not enough to account
for the privileged role of feeling in the consciousness I have of myself by saying
56
The drift of the convoluted argument seems to be that there is an internal knowledge which is adequate to
the soul because it is indistinct from it. Such knowledge is not an inference from objective data.
57
Knowledge in the objective sense. Consciousness cannot be isolated from what it is conscious of.
58
See note 29 of “Participation and Freedom”. The doctrine of “vision in God” holds that all knowledge is
in God and therefore directly realised or unmediated.
59
Here knowing is aligned with intellect rather than feeling. Nonetheless a revelatory capacity is attributed
to feeling.
that I then apprehend the I in its connection with the body; for feeling then
would be nothing more than a confused knowledge. Moreover, if it were
uniquely a question of my own states, I could nonetheless detach myself from
them in some fashion even though their presence was felt; and one could
conceive of a certain knowledge of it, as the very make-up of psychology shows.
But the feeling I have of my existence penetrates the soul’s inwardness much
ahead [of this]: it is inseparable from the act I accomplish at the moment I
accomplish it; and though that can never become an object it is like the light in
which every object is perceived. Only it is never pure. And what makes me be is
the interior operation through which (thanks to the intermediary of the world
and the body) I am both active and passive with respect to myself, in which
whatever I accomplish finds an echo within me. In this consists the consciousness
I have of myself in its complexity and in its unity.
We see therefore whence proceeds the peculiar difficulty encountered [in
applying] the rule: “know thyself”60. It would first be necessary to realise that it
is not a question here of a knowledge having the same form as knowledge of an
object. But it is not enough to affirm that I am too near myself to make an object
of myself or that I am [both] judge and party [to what is being judged] and that
the knowledge I have of myself cannot have a [neutral] character. It is a question
of seeing that consciousness of the I is consciousness of an activity, i.e. of a power
that is up to me both to discover and to put into play. It is therefore the
consciousness of the power I have of making myself. However if we realise that
the consciousness I have of myself is not consciousness of an indeterminate
power but an individualised power, i.e. which resides in particular powers of
which we must say both that they solicit me and that I govern them, then we take
the measure of all the difficulties of “know thyself”. The distance separating this
knowledge from knowledge of the object is the distance separating the exercise
of a power I wield from the grasp of a reality that is given to me. Here we are at
the very source of [a] being considered in his very virtuality, in that it depends
on his actualising it. Whereas everything that is [an] object of experience is [a]
means of communication and proof, here everything is in suspense and
delivered to the secret initiative of the very one who seeks to know himself yet
must make himself in order to know himself. Also one can say that self-
consciousness goes in the reverse direction of introspection, properly so-called:
for the latter consists of making a spectacle of self. It is the attitude of Narcissus.61
In seeking what I am, I in effect turn toward my own past: i.e. toward a being I
am no longer. Instead, self-consciousness has regard only for the powers that are
within me but that are nothing [save when] put into play, which means that [self-
60
Motto of Socrates associated with an inscription at Delphi.
61
The two senses of “self-consciousness” in English agree with Lavelle’s point: on the one hand it can
mean awareness that one is conscious; on the other hand it can mean dwelling on one’s self-image. Lavelle
in fact wrote a book employing the myth of Narcissus to spell out the difference: L’erreur de Narcisse
(1939). It exists in English translation.
consciousness] is completely turned toward a being that I am not yet and that I
become at each instant, on the condition of willing it. Thus, through a kind of
paradox, it can be said that knowing oneself is making oneself and consequently
changing and becoming other than one was. But this is to say that self-
consciousness is, of all the acts of thinking, the only [one] that allows us to attain
being itself at its source. Self-consciousness therefore reveals [the self-genesis] of
soul. But that does not suffice. The soul properly resides in this genesis of self;
yet precisely because it is a participatory being it has need, in order to realise
itself, of the world and the body through which it is constantly manifest in a
phenomenal form. So the peculiarity of self-consciousness is also to show us how being
constantly produces the appearance or phenomenon of itself.
9. CONCLUSION: THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE “COGITO”.
Because Descartes tried to isolate the soul from both the world and the body,
i.e. from the very conditions that permit it to actualise itself, the Cartesian soul is
a purely intellectual soul. As pure thinking it is [deprived of an individual
character]62 and reduced to its absolute possibility. That is [why] the transition
from the Cogito to the ontological argument is so speak immediate. Also Spinoza
experienced no difficulty immediately installing himself in the infinite substance,
which can be only an “in-itself” or an inwardness considered in its universal
form, i.e. stripped of every relation with the “ego” of the Cogito. But Descartes
never wished to make a cut between the thinking of a finite imperfect I that
doubts and an infinite perfect thinking not subject to doubt. The former is a
participation in the latter. But by trying to define it only as thinking, by
supposing the world and the body abolished [from it], Descartes abolished—in
order to preserve its ontological inwardness--the conditions which alone would
permit it to be individualised. Consequently it was necessary to [attach] it to the
body, as Descartes naturally needed to do, [both] in the theory of the passions
[and] in the examination of its properly moral action, which frees it from slavery
[to] the body, though without being able to repudiate its presence. It tends then,
though not to become a pure thinking, nonetheless to exercise its dominion over
the body instead of forever yielding to it. Thereby the Cogito recovers its moral
significance: it is a duty for us to fill becoming with a pure thinking; but in also
obliging us to become master[s] of the passions and the body, the soul is defined
by the affirmation of value, which means that it recognises itself as the supreme
value. So we are without doubt far from the Aristotelian conception which, in
making the soul the form of the body, seemed to chain it there but which
nonetheless had the advantage of rendering it inseparable from its limiting
62
A more exact translation is “dis-individualised ”.
conditions, of engaging it in the world and of confronting it hic et nunc63 in space

and time with its everyday tasks. It will not be contested any more that the Cogito
of Biran64 responded to the same preoccupations and that, instead of explaining
only our relation with the universal, like the Cogito of Descartes, it taught us to
experience the soul’s existence at the very moment it is incarnated in the body
and is individualised. But [in] a new paradox Descartes’ thought is separated
from the object and the world only in order to become at first the thought of the
object and the world, whereas the Biranian will is exerted only in the encounter
[with] the object and the world, though it has as its true end only freeing itself
from the object and the world. Thus these different doctrines show the outline of
the same fundamental experience: but if participation [has] two faces it is normal
that some [thinkers] prefer to describe the universal source upon which it draws
and others the limiting conditions under which it is accomplished.
We have thus [paved the way] for the description we are now going to
attempt of the soul’s genesis by way of itself65, by showing how it is first a
possibility that gives itself existence; how the transition from possibility to
existence resides in the exigency of value, which is so to speak the soul’s secret
life; [and] finally how, though its activity is ever inseparable from it, the soul
needs time in order to fulfil itself, i.e. in order to produce its own essence.66
63
Here and now.
64
Maine de Biran
65
An introduction to Book Two “The Soul’s Genesis”.
66
“In Descartes there is no distinction between the I and consciousness save in [the] sense that
consciousness is the Cogito of the “ego” cogito, i.e. it is that thinking capable of containing everything in
which the I participates as an ever limited and shackled power. It is indeed noteworthy that the thinking in
question in the Cogito is no more than a sheer power: the power of thinking everything, but not [as] applied
to any object, i.e. not yet [as] an actualised thinking. And it is perhaps more by [reason of] that than by
[reason of] its dissociation [from] the body that thinking is grasped in its pure essence. It is also [for that
reason] that the thinking of the particular I is distinguished from God’s thinking: in the first there is nothing
that it is not in [potential], whereas in God’s thinking there is nothing that is not in play [en acte]. Which
shows rather well how man’s thinking and God’s thinking are at once identical [in] their essence and
heterogenous [in] their exercise. [Here] too is the fundament of the inference of time considered as the
transition from [potential] to act. Finally we understand without difficulty why Descartes, after having
defined the I by way of the experience we have of it, i.e. by way of its relation with a thinking that is
logically adequate to the All, still feels the necessity of saying that the soul is a substance. For beyond the
psychological experience the I has of itself and the affirmation of a transcendental activity through which it
is affirmed as a thinking [ability], it is necessary, in so far as it is a power of thinking everything, that it is
inscribed as such in the very absolute of Being, which the term “substance” is precisely intended to
express.” Author’s note.

Louis Lavelle INTERPRETATION OF THE PROPOSITION Cogito Ergo Sum

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Louis Lavelle INTERPRETATION OF THE PROPOSITION Cogito Ergo Sum

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Of the Human Soul 242

INTERPRETATION OF THE PROPOSITION

1. THE “COGITO” OR THE ACCESS TO BEING THROUGH INTIMACY.

[and] Kant—have been characterised by a return to the subject, it is not only

2. CARTESION DOUBT AS WILL’S QUESTIONING OF BOTH KNOWLEDGE

It seems however that Descartes’ point of departure and essential

their fundament in it.13 But this is to restrict the argument’s ontological

3. THINKING IN SO FAR AS [IT IS] INDIVIDUAL AND IN SO FAR AS [IT IS]

4. THE “ERGO”24 OF THE “COGITO” AND ITS MEANING.

5. IS IT NECESSARY TO SAY “SOMETIMES I THINK AND SOMETIMES I

6. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE “COGITO” AND THE ONTOLOGICAL

of understanding implies another, but such language [tends] to destroy the

ontological argument, in grounding precisely this power I have of producing my

7. THE PROBLEM IS IN KNOWING HOW SOUL AND BODY CAN BE

We know how, by way of the Cogito, Descartes sets up a radical separation

8. KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOUL THROUGH ITSELF.

9. CONCLUSION: THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE “COGITO”.

conditions, of engaging it in the world and of confronting it hic et nunc63 in space

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