Tan-Andal vs.

Andal (2021)

Summary Cases:

● Tan-Andal vs. Andal

Subject: Psychological incapacity, as interpreted and applied by the Courts; Re-evaluation of the Molina
guidelines; Mario is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations;
Property relations of the spouses (Mario has no share in the lot nor the duplex); Custody of Ma.
Samantha awarded to Rosanna, without prejudice to Mario’s right to visit his daughter;

Facts:

Mario Victor Andal and Rosanna Tan married on December 16, 1995 and had their only child, Ma.
Samantha, the year after. Mario and Rosanna separated in 2000. Rosanna has since kept the sole
custody of Ma. Samantha.

In 2001, Mario filed a Petition for custody of Ma. Samantha before the RTC praying that he be allowed to
exercise parental authority over his daughter.

In 2003, Rosanna filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage, claiming that Mario was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to her. The cases for
custody and declaration of nullity were then consolidated.

According to Rosanna, there were times when Mario “would be unaccounted for a whole night or an
entire day. When asked where he went, Mario would allegedly say that he was working. In July 1995,
Mario left for Italy supposedly to return to his job there and that he would be back by November for their
December wedding. However, Mario was back by September. It turned out that Mario had quit his job.

Since Mario had no work, Rosanna taught him to run Design and Construction Matrix, the construction
firm she had set up before she married Mario. She also introduced Mario to firm clients and brought him
with her to client meetings.

Mario would leave their house for several days without informing Rosanna of his whereabouts. Once he
returned home, he would refuse to go out and would sleep for days. Mario was also “hyper-active” late at
night. When Rosanna confronted Mario about his behavior, he admitted that he was using marijuana,
although he claimed that he was not addicted. He then promised to stop using it, but Mario continued
with his drug use. An employee at the firm allegedly found a packet of shabu among Mario's office
belongings. When confronted by Rosanna, Mario explained that it was the only way he could normally
function due to the heavy pressures of world at the firm

Mario showed symptoms of paranoia. He thought everyone was out to attack him and, at times, would
hide Ma. Samantha from those he thought were out to hurt them. Mario would also take large cash
advances from Design and Construction Matrix every week.

Rosanna left Mario twice but also took her back both times after he promised he would change. Mario
also tried to leave with Ma. Samantha but was stopped in time by Rosanna after she was alerted by the
child’s nanny.

Rosanna decided to have a duplex built on a lot in Parañaque City that her aunt had donated. The family
would live in one apartment, and Rosanna's parents would live in the other half of the duplex. Mario
asked that a four-square meter room at the back of the duplex be constructed. The small room would
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allegedly be Ma. Samantha's playroom. After the room was constructed, Mario had an air conditioning
unit installed inside. He also brought in a television set, a computer table, and some personal belongings
into the room. He would then spend days in the room alone and, at times, would even bring Ma.
Samantha with him. an electrician working on the wires of the house opened the door to the small room.
He found Mario and Ma. Samantha inside, with the room filled with smoke that did not quite smell of
cigarettes. Rosanna petitioned the RTC to voluntarily commit Mario for drug rehabilitation. However,
Mario escaped from Seagulls (rehab center). Rosanna took her husband in, but Mario would again
relapse into his drug use. Mario was recommitted to Seagulls but the rehabilitation center released Mario
without completing his rehabilitation program.

To prove Mario’s psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Valentina Garcia, a

Mario contended that it was Rosanna who was psychologically incapacitated. Rosanna would box and
kick him whenever they argued. To avoid any untoward incident, Mario would leave the house to keep
his cool. Mario prayed that the trial court nullify his marriage to Rosanna due to her psychological
incapacity and prayed that the custody of Ma. Samantha be awarded to him.

The RTC voided Mario and Rosanna's marriage. It awarded the custody of Ma. Samantha to Rosanna,
with Mario having visitation rights. As to the Parañaque duplex, the trial court declared Rosanna as its
sole and absolute owner, including the parcel of land on which it was built.

Reversing the RTC, the Court of Appeals (CA) declared Mario and Rosanna's marriage valid. The CA
found Dr. Garcia's psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be “unscientific and unreliable” since she diagnosed
Mario without interviewing him. Hence, Rosanna filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari

Held: Petition granted

Psychological incapacity, as interpreted and applied by the Courts

1. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for voiding marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code, was
first interpreted in Santos v. Court of Appeals. Despite the wife's abandonment of the family, this Court
in Santos refused to void the marriage. After reviewing the Family Code Revision Committee
deliberations, this Court determined that psychological incapacity should mean “no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It added that
“psychological incapacity” must refer to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

2. In reference to the Catholic roots of Article 36, it being derived from the New Canon Law, this Court
cited the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso who opined that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

3. Building on these three criteria, this Court promulgated Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina in
2007 where this Court laid down the guidelines for interpreting and applying Article 36. The Molina
guidelines are as follows (summarized):

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff
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(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. Such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

4. Because of the restrictive interpretation resulting from the application of the Molina guidelines, this
Court pronounced in the 2009 case Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te that jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily
imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed,” a view that is “totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated. In Ngo Te, this Court remarked that the Molina
guidelines worked like a “strait-jacket” in which psychological incapacity cases are forced to fit. In its
2015 Resolution in Kalaw v. Fernandez, this Court made a similar statement that “Article 36 of the
Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the
drafters to adopt its enacted version of less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its
application.” This Court's statements in Ngo-Te and Kalaw notwithstanding, the tendency to rigidly apply
the Molina guidelines continued.

Re-evaluation of the Molina guidelines

(a) Clear and convincing evidence as the quantum of proof

5. The first Molina guideline reiterates the fundamental rule in evidence that one who asserts a claim
must prove it. Molina, however, is silent on what quantum of proof is required in nullity cases. While
there is opinion that a nullity case under Article 36 is like any civil case that requires preponderance of
evidence, we now hold that the plaintiff-spouse must prove his or her case with clear and convincing
evidence. This is a quantum of proof that requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

6. The reason is that this jurisdiction follows the presumption of validity of marriages. As with any
presumption—such as the presumption of regularity in the issuance of public documents, regularity in
the performance of duty, of good faith, or of sufficient consideration—it can only be rebutted with clear
and convincing evidence.

(b) The second Molina guideline is abandoned. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental
incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion

7. By equating psychological incapacity to a “mental incapacity” and to “personality disorders” (as held in
Santos and Molina) this Court went against the intent behind Article 36. The Code Committee was clear
that psychological incapacity is not a mental incapacity. Among the earlier wordings of the provision
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on psychological incapacity included “mentally incapacitated, and “mentally” is obviously absent in the
present Article 36. This means that for the Code Committee, “mental” is not synonymous with
“psychological.” The reason for deleting “mental” was given by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa, a member of
the Code Committee. He said that “mental” would give the wrong impression of psychological incapacity
being a vice of consent. If psychological incapacity was to be an acceptable alternative to divorce, as
was intended by the Code Committee, it cannot be a mere vice of consent. Psychological incapacity
must consist in a lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage, making the marriage
void ab initio.

8. Psychological incapacity is also not a personality disorder, as explained by amicus curiae Dean
Sylvia Estrada-Claudio. Psychological incapacity cannot be found in the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), the authoritative listing of
various mental, including personality, disorders recognized by the scientific community. Yet, to comply
with the second Molina guideline, psychologists and psychiatrists, when serving as expert witnesses,
have been forced to assign a personality disorder and pathologize the supposedly psychologically
incapacitated spouse.. This cruelty could not have been the intent of the Code Committee.

9. This Court, in the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos, declared that “a medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. Instead, as this Court said, ‘be totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. This pronouncement seemed to do
away with the requirement of expert opinion on the root cause of the psychological incapacity, but this
Court was not categorical with this. It even said in Marcos that the “root cause may be ‘medically or
clinically identified” --implying that although medical opinion may be done away with, a clinical
identification, which is still expert opinion, must nevertheless be presented. For this reason, this Court
was inconsistent in requiring expert evidence in psychological incapacity cases and not all cases
promulgated after Marcos required the totality of evidence rule.

10. This Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline. Psychological incapacity is
neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There
must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person's personality, called
"personality structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that
undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to
understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations. Proof of these
aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the
life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have
consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will decide if
these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital
obligations. There will be no need to label a person as having a mental disorder just to obtain a decree of
nullity.

11. Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding
and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a
medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert opinion is not
required.

(c) Requirements of Juridical antecedence and Incurability

12. Difficult to prove as it may be, a party to a nullity case is still required to prove juridical
antecedence because it is an explicit requirement of the law. Article 36 is clear that the psychological
incapacity must be existing “at the time of the celebration” of the marriage, “even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” This distinguishes psychological incapacity from divorce.
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Divorce severs a marital tie for causes, psychological or otherwise, that may have developed after the
marriage celebration.

13. Furthermore, not being an illness in a medical sense, psychological incapacity is not something to be
cured. And even if it were a mental disorder, it cannot be described in terms of being curable or incurable.
Reading together the deliberations of the Code Committee and our rulings in Santos and Molina, we hold
that the psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the
medical, but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly. This means
that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a
situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and
antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown
of the marriage. “[A]n undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful,
respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a
psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other.

14. With respect to gravity, the requirement is retained, not in the sense that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be a serious or dangerous illness, but that “mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts are excluded. The psychological incapacity
cannot be mere “refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less ill will.” In other words, it must be shown that the
incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.

(d) Essential marital obligations embraces obligations to the children

15. Molina provides that the essential marital obligations are “those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.

16. Justice Perlas-Bernabe opined that the essential marital obligations are limited to those between the
spouses. It is true that marriage is a contract primarily between the spouses; but its cause remains to be
the establishment of not just conjugal but also family life. Article 70 of the Family Code provides that the
spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. As such, once the parties decide and do
have children, their obligations to their children become part of their obligations to each other as spouses.

17. Not all kinds of failure to meet their obligations to their children will nullify the vinculum between the
spouses. In each case, it must be clearly shown that it is of such grievous nature that it reflects on the
capacity of one of the spouses for marriage. The easy cases are when one of the spouses sexually
abuses one of their children; or, when unknown to the other spouse, a child is subjected to domestic
violence; or when due to the spouse's refusal to go through counseling or rehabilitation, his or her
substance abuse puts a child through a Situation of neglect or outright danger. As in all cases, the
context of the whole case, shown by clear and convincing evidence, should be taken into consideration.

(e) Canonical decisions are merely persuasive and not binding on secular courts

18. The persuasive effect of the decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church of the Philippines on nullity cases pending before secular courts is retained. Without prejudice to
the separation of Church and State, the inescapable reality is that Article 36 of the Family Code was
lifted from canon law, specifically, Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law. As such, Canon 1095
should be taken into account in interpreting Article 36 and in deciding psychological incapacity cases.

19. This persuasive effect is especially true in cases where the Catholic Church had already voided the
canonical marriage, because it is the explicit intent of the Code Committee to solve “the problem of
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marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. In Antonio, this Court
even reproached the Court of Appeals for failing to consider the prior church annulment of the parties’
marriage as indicative of the void nature of the secular marriage. This Court even called the error a
“deliberate ignorance.

20. Under Canon 1095, the following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1) those who lack the sufficient use of reason;

21. The concept under the first paragraph of Canon 1095 is explicitly outside the realm of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as envisioned by the Code Committee. To recall, the
Code Committee did not view psychological incapacity as a mental disorder.

22. However, psychological incapacity under Article 36 is actually closer, concept-wise, to lack of due
discretion under the second paragraph of Canon 1095, rather than lack of due competence
contemplated in the third paragraph. This is strange, because while Article 36 of the Family Code is
similarly worded to the third paragraph of Canon 1095, its meaning is similar to that embraced in the
second paragraph. Therefore, while Article 36 of the Family Code is similarly worded to the third
paragraph of Canon 1095, canonical decisions based on the second paragraph should likewise have a
persuasive effect in secular decisions on psychological incapacity, if we are to avoid anomalous
situations where canonically void marriages remain valid under civil law.

23. Canonical decisions are, to reiterate, merely persuasive and not binding on secular courts.
Canonical decisions are to only serve as evidence of the nullity of the secular marriage, but ultimately,
the elements of declaration of nullity under Article 36 must still be weighed by the judge.

Mario is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations

24. Clear and convincing evidence of Mario's psychological incapacity consisted mainly of testimony on
Mario's personality structure and how it was formed primarily through his childhood and adult
experiences, well before he married Rosanna. In addition to Rosanna's testimony, Dr. Garcia recounted
how Mario developed traits exhibiting chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse,
lack of empathy, and sense of entitlement—behaviors manifesting his inherent psychological incapacity
to comply with his essential marital obligations. Dr. Garcia diagnosed Mario with Partner Relational
Problem and Narcissistic-antisocial personality disorder.

25. The Court of Appeals erred in discounting wholesale Dr. Garcia's expert opinion because her
methodology was allegedly “unscientific and unreliable.' Unlike ordinary witnesses who must have
personal knowledge of the matters they testify on, expert witnesses do not testify in court because they
have personal knowledge of the facts of the case. The credibility of expert witnesses does not inhere in
their person, rather, their testimony is sought because of their special knowledge, skill, experience, or
training that ordinary persons and judges do not have.

26. Standards for admitting expert opinion were discussed in Tortona v. Gregorio. Applying Tortona here,
we find that Dr. Garcia was sufficiently qualified as an expert in psychiatry. She possesses the special
knowledge to practice her profession, holding degrees in medicine and special education. She has been
practicing her profession as a physician- psychiatrist since 1990, including working at the Philippine
Mental Health Association as a psychiatrist for 11 years.
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27. On the principles and methodology Dr. Garcia applied in evaluating Rosanna and Mario, she
conducted a psychiatric clinical interview and mental status examination of Rosanna. She likewise
interviewed Ma. Samantha and Jocelyn Genevieve, Rosanna's sister. The psychiatric clinical interview
and mental status examination remain to be the principal techniques in diagnosing psychiatric disorders.
While ideally, the person to be diagnosed should be personally interviewed, it is accepted practice in
psychiatry to base a person's psychiatric history on collateral information, or information from sources
aside from the person evaluated. This is usually done if the patient is not available, incapable, or
otherwise refuses to cooperate, as in this case.

28. It cannot be said that the psychiatric evaluation of Mario was exclusively based on collateral
information. Dr. Garcia likewise based her diagnosis on a personal history handwritten by Mario himself
while staying at Seagulls, an “independent evidence.” Further, this Court said in Marcos that personal
examination of the allegedly psychologically incapacitated spouse is “not required so long as the totality
of evidence sufficiently proves the psychological incapacity.

29. That drug addiction is a ground for legal separation will not prevent this Court from voiding the
marriage in this case. A decree of legal separation entitles spouses to live separately from each other
without severing their marriage bond, but no legal conclusion is made as to whether the marriage is valid.
Therefore, it is possible that the marriage is attended by psychological incapacity of one or both spouses,
with the incapacity manifested in ways that can be considered as grounds for legal separation. At any
rate, so long as a party can demonstrate that the drug abuse is a manifestation of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of the marriage, this should be enough to render the marriage void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

30. The totality of evidence presented by Rosanna clearly and convincingly proved that Mario’s drug
abuse was of sufficient durability that antedates the marriage. Admittedly, part of marriage is accepting a
person for who they are, including their addictions. However, in Mario’s case, his persistent failure to
have himself rehabilitated, even bringing his child into a room where he did drugs, indicates a level of
dysfunctionality that shows utter disregard of his obligations not only to his wife, but to his child.

Property relations of the spouses (Mario has no share in the lot nor the duplex)

31. Mario and Rosanna are parties to a void marriage due to psychological incapacity. Being capacitated
to marry each other and having lived exclusively with each other albeit under a void marriage, Article 147
of the Family Code governs their property relations. Under Article 147, wages and salaries earned by the
parties during their cohabitation shall be equally divided between them. This is regardless of who worked
to earn the wage or salary.

32. With respect to properties acquired during their cohabitation, the rules on co-ownership under the
Civil Code govern.[329] Therefore, a property acquired during the parties’ cohabitation shall be
presumed to have been acquired through the parties’ joint efforts. For purposes of Article 147, joint
efforts” includes a party's care and maintenance of the family and of the household. With this
presumption, the parties are deemed to own the property in equal shares.

33. However, if a piece of property was obtained through only one party's effort, work, or industry, and
there is proof that the other did not contribute through the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household, the property acquired during the cohabitation shall be solely owned by the party who actually
worked to acquire the property.

34. In this case, there is proof that the Parañaque lot was not obtained by Mario and Rosanna's joint
efforts, work, or industry. Rita M. Tan, Rosanna's aunt, donated the 315-square meter lot to Rosanna
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and her father, Rodolfo M. Tan. Thus, Rosanna exclusively owns half of the 315-square meter
Parañaque lot. Mario has no share in this property because he did not care for and maintain the family
and the household. As for the half of the duplex house that served as the parties’ family home, the funds
to construct the house were obtained solely through Rosanna and her father's efforts, and Mario did not
care for and maintain the household, thus, he has no share in the duplex.

Custody of Ma. Samantha awarded to Rosanna, without prejudice to Mario’s right to visit his
daughter

35. In resolving issues of custody of minors whose parents have separated, Article 213 of the Family
Code governs. In Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto, this Court held that the “separation of parents”
contemplated in Article 213 may either be legal separation or separation in fact. In deciding cases
involving custody of a minor, the courts must consider, among others, “the previous care and devotion
shown by each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and
time availability; and the child's emotional and educational needs.

36. Mario and Rosanna have been separated in fact since 2000. Between them, Rosanna showed
greater care and devotion to Ma. Samantha. Even when they still lived together, Rosanna had been
more available to her child. She raised Ma. Samantha on her own since she and Mario separated. Mario
has not supported both mother and child since he separated from Rosanna, even after he had claimed
that he has been living “drug-free.” With these considerations, the trial court did not err in awarding Ma.
Samantha's custody to Rosanna, without prejudice to Mario’s right to visit his daughter.

37. Nonetheless, Rosanna's parental authority over Ma. Samantha was already terminated in 2014 when
the child reached the age of majority. Ma. Samantha is now qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life and, therefore, is at liberty to choose how to relate with her father.

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