FUNERALS

(Art. 305-310)

NATURE OF FUNERAL:

Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased. [Art. 306]

The funeral shall be:

(1) In accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased.

(2) In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites.
(3) In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make
arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the family [Art. 307]

Note: No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the
persons mentioned in articles 294 and 305.

Damages: Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be
liable to the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral [Art. 309]

Funeral Expenses: The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed a part of the funeral
expenses, and shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the
spouses [Art. 310]

GUIDELINES IN MAKING FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS

(1) The persons who are preferred in the right to make funeral arrangements may waive the right
expressly or impliedly in which case the right and duty immediately descend to the person next in the
order.

(2) It must be in keeping with the social position of the deceased.

(3) Law shall prevail over the will of the persons who have the right to control the burial of deceased –
exhumation, evidential purpose, disposition of corpse by deceased, mutilation of corpses and autopsies.

(4) Corpses which are to be buried at public expenses may also be used for scientific purposes under
certain conditions.

(5) Expressed wishes of the deceased is given priority provided that it is not contrary to law and must
not violate the legal and reglementary provisions concerning funerals and disposition of the remains
(time, manner, place or ceremony)

(6) In the absence of expressed wishes, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral
rights.

(7) In case of doubt, the persons in Art. 199 shall decide. (8) Any person who disrespects the dead or
interferes with the funeral shall be liable for material and moral damages.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 651 January 31, 1975

REQUIRING THE REGISTRATION OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS IN THE PHILIPPINES WHICH

OCCURED FROM JANUARY 1, 1974 AND THEREAFTER

WHEREAS, government surveys reveal that every year twenty five to forty per cent of all births and
death occurring in the Philippines are not registered in the office of the local civil registrar as required
by Act 3753;

WHEREAS, this big number of under-registration adversely affects the program of government in
promoting the health and social conditions of the people especially the youth because of difficulty in
gathering complete vital statistics due to the under-registration of births and deaths;

WHEREAS, to provide primary sources of vital statistics for use in various population studies in
order to formulate more effective health and social plan for the country, the immediate registration of
unregistered births and deaths is imperative;

WHEREAS, this will be another landmark in the continuing efforts of the government to improve the
social conditions of the people with the aid of accurate vital statistics, and is in line with the
observance of the 1974 world population year;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree that all births and deaths that
occurred within the period starting January 1, 1974 to the date when this decree becomes effective,
but were not registered, and those that will occur thereafter, shall be registered in accordance with
the following procedures;

Section 1. Registration of births. All babies born in hospitals, maternity clinics, private homes, or
elsewhere within the period starting from January 1, 1974 up to the date when this decree becomes
effective, irrespective of the nationality, race, culture, religion or belief of their parents, whether the
mother is a permanent resident or transient in the Philippines, and whose births have not yet been
registered must be reported for registration in the office of the local civil registrar of the place of birth
by the physician, nurse, midwife, hilot, or hospital or clinic administrator who attended the birth or in
default thereof, by either parent or a responsible member of the family or a relative, or any person
who has knowledge of the birth of the individual child.

The report referred to above shall be accompanied with an affidavit describing the circumstances
surrounding the delayed registration.

Section 2. Period of registration of births. The registration of the birth of babies referred to in the
preceding section must be done within sixty (60) days from the date of effectivity of this decree
without or fee or any kind. Babies born after the effectivity of this decree must be registered in the
office of the local civil registrar of the place of birth within thirty (30) days after birth, by the attending
physician, nurse, midwife, hilot or hospitals or clinic administrator or, in default of the same, by either
parent or a responsible member of the family or any person who has knowledge of the birth.

The parents or the responsible member of the family and the attendant at birth or the hospital or
clinic administrator referred to above shall be jointly liable in case they fail to register the new born
child. If there was no attendant at birth, or if the child was not born in a hospital or maternity clinic,
then the parents or the responsible member of the family alone shall be primarily liable in case of
failure to register the new born child.
Section 3. Proof of birth registration a pre-requisite to school enrolment and allowance of tax
exemption. Henceforth, starting with the year 1975, the presentation of a birth certificate shall be a
pre-requisite to enrolment in the first grade in all public and private schools in the country and
allowance of tax exemption for dependents under the National Internal Revenue Code.

Section 4. Registration of deaths. All persons, irrespective of nationality, race, culture, religion and
belief, whether a permanent resident or a transient in the Philippines, who died in hospitals, clinic,
private homes, or elsewhere, within the period from January 1, 1974 to the date of effectivity of this
decree, whose deaths have not yet been registered, must be reported for registration through the
local health officer to the local civil registrar of the place of death, by the physician who attended the
deceased or in default thereof, by the nearest responsible relative or by any person who has
knowledge of such death.

The report referred to above shall be accompanied by an affidavit describing the circumstances
surrounding the delayed registration.

Section 5. Period of reporting and registration of deaths. The registration of deaths referred to in the
preceding section must be done within sixty (60) days from the date of effectivity of this decree
without fine or fee of any kind. Deaths occurring after the effectivity of this decree must be reported
by the nearest responsible relative or any person who has knowledge of the death within 48 hours
after death to the local health officer of the place of death, who shall then issue the corresponding
certificate of death and order its registration in the office of the local civil registrar within thirty (30)
days after death. In case the deceased was attended to by a physician, the latter must issue the
necessary certificate of death within 48 hours after death and submit the same to the local health
officer of the place of death, who shall order its registration in the office of the local civil registrar
within the said period of thirty (30) days after death.

Section 6. No registration fee. No fees of any kind shall be imposed for the registration of births or
deaths within the prescribed period. However, for the issuance of a certified copy of any birth or
death document, or transcript of the entries from the civil register, upon the request of the interested
party, a certification fee shall be collected in accordance with existing law.

Section 7. Assistance of barrio captain and barangay chairman. All barrio captains and barangay
chairman shall have responsibility for disseminating this decree among their constituents and for
assisting in the registration of births and deaths occurring within their respective jurisdictions to
insure complete coverage of these events.

Section 8. Implementing official. The Civil Registrar General in hereby authorized to issue rules and
regulations, orders or circulars to implement this decree.

Section 9. Penalty. Any person required under this decree to report for registration any fact
concerning the civil status of persons and who fails to do so, or who deliberately makes false
statements in the birth or death form and presents the same for registration, or who violates any rule
or regulation which may be issued pursuant to this decree, and any local public health officer who
fails to perform his duties as provided for in this decree, or violates any rule or regulation which may
be issued pursuant to this decree, shall upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than
P500.00 nor more than P1,000.00 or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months nor more than
six (6) months, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Section 10. Repealing Clause. Any provision of law, ordinance, rules and regulations inconsistent
with the provisions of this decree, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 11. Effectivity. This decree shall take effect forty five (45) days after its approval.

Done in the City of Manila, this 31st day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-five

GR: THE DEATH OF THE PERSON SHALL BE REGISTERED AT THE PLACE WHERE HE DIED.

What are the exceptional cases for the place of registration of death?

The death of a person in a vehicle, airplane or vessel while in transit within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines and where the exact place of death cannot be determined, the Certificate of Death shall be
registered at the Local Civil Registry Office (LCRO) of the city/municipality of the place of
burial/cremation. If the place of burial/cremation is outside the Philippines, the death shall be registered
at the Local Civil Registry Office (LCRO) of Manila.

When a citizen of the Philippines dies aboard a vessel or airplane en route to the Philippines and the
exact place of death cannot be ascertained, the death shall be registered at the Local Civil Registry Office
of the city/municipality where the person habitually resides before his death, if he was a resident of the
Philippines.

If the deceased is a foreigner and a resident of the Philippines, the death shall be registered at the Local
Civil Registry Office where the deceased habitually resides.

If the deceased is a foreigner and not a resident of the Philippines, his death shall be registered at the
Local Civil Registry Office of Manila.

The death of a person in a vehicular accident, airplane crash, or shipwreck within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines and the site of the accident or the place where the victim was found cannot be determined,
a Certificate of Death shall be issued by the health officer of the place of burial and shall be registered at
the Local Civil Registry Office of the said city/municipality.

The death of a person aboard a vessel in the high seas shall be registered at the Local Civil Registry
Office of the place of burial upon presentation of a Certificate of Death issued by the Health Officer of
the said place, or by the ship doctor, if any. Otherwise, the ship captain shall issue and cause the
registration of the death certificate.

If the person is buried or drowned in the high seas, or for any other reason, the body was not recovered-
registration shall be made at the Local Civil Registry Office of the place of last known address of the
deceased in the Philippines.
If the deceased is not a resident of the Philippines, the registration shall be made at the Local Civil
Registry Office of Manila. The ship doctor or the ship captain or the health officer, in the exercise of his
wise discretion, may issue and cause the registration of the death certificate.

In case of mass death where several persons died due to natural calamities, accidents, epidemic, etc.,
the health officer may issue and cause the registration of the death certificates at the Local Civil Registry
Office where the mass death occurred.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 856 December 23, 1975

CODE ON SANITATION

CHAPTER XXI
DISPOSAL OF DEAD PERSONS

Section 89. Definition As used in this Chapter, the following terms shall mean:

(a) Burial grounds cemetery, memorial park of any place duly authorized by law for
permanent disposal of the dead.

(b) Embalming preparing, disinfecting and preserving a dead body for its final disposal.

(c) Embalmer a person who practices embalming.

(d) Undertaking the care, transport and disposal of the body of a deceased person by any
means other than embalming.

(e) Undertaker person who practices undertaking.

(f) Funeral establishment any place used in the preparation and care of the body of a
deceased person for burial.

(g) Remains the body of a dead person.

(h) Burial Interment of remains in a grave, tomb or the sea.

(i) Disinterment the removal or exhumation of remains from places of interment.

Section 90. Burial Grounds Requirements the following requirements shall be applied and enforced:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to bury remains in places other than those legally
authorized in conformity with the provisions of this Chapter.
 (b) A burial ground shall at least be 25 meters distant from any dwelling house and no house
shall be constructed within the same distance from any burial ground.

(c) No burial ground shall be located within 50 meters from either side of a river or within 50
meters from any source of water supply.

Section 91. Burial Requirements The burial remains is subject to the following requirements:

(a) No remains shall be buried without a dead certificate. This certificate shall be issued by
the attending physician. If there has been no physician in attendance, it shall be issued by
the mayor, the secretary of the municipal board, or a councilor of the municipality where the
death occurred. The death certificate shall be forwarded to the local civil register within 48
hours after death.

(b) Shipment of remains abroad shall be governed by the rules and regulations of the Bureau
of Quarantine.

(c) Graves where remains are buried shall be at least one and one-half meters deep and
filled well and firmly.

(d) The cost of burial of a dead person shall be borne by the nearest kin. If the kin is not
financially capable of defraying the expenses or if the deceased had no kin, the cost shall be
borne by the city or municipal government.

(e) The burial of remains in city or municipal burial grounds shall not be prohibited on
account of race, nationality, religion or political persuasion.

(f) If the person who issues a death certificate has reasons to believe or suspect that the
cause of death was due to violence or crime, he shall notify immediately the local authorities
concerned. In this case the deceased shall not be buried until a permission is obtained from
the provincial or city fiscal. If these officials are not available the permission shall be obtained
from any government official authorized by law.

(g) Except when required by legal investigation or when permitted by the local health
authority, no unembalmed remains shall remain unburied longer than 48 hours after death.

(h) When the cause of death is a dangerous communicable disease, the remains shall be
buried within 12 hours after death. They shall not be taken to any place of public assembly.
Only the adult members of the family of the deceased may be permitted to attend the funeral.

Section 92. Disinterment Requirements Disinterment of remains is subject to the following

requirements:

(a) Permission to disinter remains of persons who died of non-dangerous communicable

diseases may be granted after a burial period of three years.

(b) Permission to disinter remains of person who died of dangerous communicable diseases
may be granted after a burial period of five years.
 (c) Disinterment of remains covered in paragraphs "a" and "b" of this Section may be
permitted within a shorter time than that prescribed in special cases, subject to the approval
of the Regional Director concerned or his duly authorized representative.

(d) In all cases of disinterment, the remains shall be disinfected and places in a durable and
sealed container prior to their final disposal.

Section 93. Funeral and Embalming Establishments These establishments are subject to the
following requirements:

(a) Scope of inclusion for the purposes of this Section, requirements prescribed herein shall
be applied and enforced to funeral chapels, embalming establishments and morgues.

(b) Sanitary permit No establishment mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be

operated without a sanitary permit issued by the Secretary or his duly authorized
representative. This permit shall be revoked in case of any violation of the provisions of this
Chapter and the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary.

(c) Classification Funeral establishment shall be classified in three (3) categories which are
described as follows:

1. Category I Establishments with chapels, and embalming facilities and offering

funeral services.

2. Category II Establishments with chapels and offering funeral services but without
embalming facilities.

3. Category III Establishments offering only funeral services from the house of the
deceased to the burial ground.

(d) Sanitary requirements

For funeral chapels The requirements prescribed for places of public assembly in this Code
shall be applied.

For embalming and dressing rooms

1. They should be constructed of concrete or semi-concrete materials with sufficient

space to accommodate five bodies at one time.

2. The floors and walls shall be made of concrete or other durable impervious
materials.

3. Ventilation and lighting should be adequately provided.

4. Embalming shall be performed on a table made of a single marble slab or other

equally impervious materials. It shall be so constructed that all washings and body
fluids shall flow to a drain connected to the waste piping system of the building.

5. Embalming and assistants shall use rubber gloves when working.

 6. Washing facilities with soaps, detergents and germicidal solutions shall be
provided for use of the following personnel.

Section 94. Licensing and Registration Procedures The licensing and registration of undertakers
and embalmers are subject to the following requirements:

(a) Issuance of license to practice

1. Any person who desires to practice undertaking or embalming shall be licensed to

practice only after passing an examination conducted by the Department.

2. Licensed undertakers or embalmers shall practice undertaking or embalming in

accordance with requirements prescribed by the Department.

3. Licensed undertakers or embalmers shall display their licenses conspicuously in

the establishments where they work.

(b) Issuance of certificates of registration

1. An undertaker or embalmer shall apply annually for a registration certificates and

pay an annual registration fee of twenty-five pesos to the Regional Health Office
concerned.

2. The first registration certificate issued shall cover the period from the date of
issuance to the last day of the current year. Subsequent certificates shall bear the
date of January 1 of the year of issue and shall expire December 31 of the same
year.

3. Certificates of registration shall be posed conspicuously in establishments

concerned.

(c) Exemption Government and private physicians may perform embalming without license
and registration certificates as exigencies require.

Section 95. Autopsy and Dissection of Remains The autopsy and dissection of remains are subject
to the following requirements:

(a) Person authorized to perform these are:

1. Health officers;

2. Medical officers of law enforcement agencies; and

3. Members of the medical staff of accredited hospitals.

(b) Autopsies shall be performed in the following cases:

1. Whenever required by special laws;

2. Upon orders of a competent court, a mayor and a provincial or city fiscal;

 3. Upon written request of police authorities;

4. Whenever the Solicitor General, provincial or city fiscal as authorized by existing

laws, shall deem it necessary to disinter and take possession of remains for
examination to determine the cause of death; and

5. Whenever the nearest kin shall request in writing the authorities concerned to
ascertain the cause of death.

(c) Autopsies may be performed on patients who die in accredited hospitals subject to the
following requirements:

1. The Director of the hospital shall notify the next of kin of the death of the deceased
and request permission to perform an autopsy.

2. Autopsy can be performed when the permission is granted or no objection is

raised to such autopsy within 48 hours after death.

3. In cases where the deceased has no next of kin, the permission shall be secured
from the local health authority.

4. Burial of remains after autopsy After an autopsy, the remains shall be interred in
accordance with the provisions in this Chapter.

Section 96. Donation of Human Organs for Medical, Surgical and Scientific purposes Any person
may donate an organ or any part of his body to a person, a physician, a scientist, a hospital or a
scientific institution upon his death for transplant, medical, or research purposes subject to the
following requirements:

(a) The donation shall be authorized in writing by the donor specifying the recipient, the
organ or part of his body to be donated and the specific purpose for which it will be utilized.

(b) A married person may make such donation without the consent of his spouse.

(c) After the death of a person the next of kin may authorize the donation of an organ or any
part of the body of the deceased for similar purposes in accordance with the prescribed
procedure.

(d) If the deceased has no next of kin and his remains are in the custody of an accredited
hospital, the Director of the hospital may donate an organ or any part of the body of the
deceased in accordance with the requirement prescribed in this Section.

(e) A simple written authorization signed by the donor in the presence of two witnesses shall
be deemed sufficient for the donation of organs or parts of the human body required in this
Section, notwithstanding the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on matters of
donation. A copy of the written authorization shall be forwarded to the Secretary.

(f) Any authorization granted in accordance with the requirements of this Section is binding to
the executors, administrators, and members of the family of the deceased.
Section 97. Use of Remains for Medical Studies and Scientific Research Unclaimed remains may
be used by medical schools and scientific institutions for studies and research subject to the rules
and regulations prescribed by the Department.

Section 98. Special Precautions for Safe Handling of Cadavers Containing Radioactive Isotopes

(a) Cadavers containing only traces (very small dose) of radioactive isotope do not require
any special handling precautions.

(b) Cadavers containing large amounts of radioactive isotopes should be labelled properly
identifying the type and amount or radioactive isotopes present and the date of its
administration.

(c) Before autopsy is performed, the Radiation Health Officer or his duly authorized
representative should be notified for proper advice. The pathologist and/or embalmer should
be warned accordingly of the radioactivity of the cadaver so that radiation precautions can be
properly enforced.

(d) Normal burial procedures, rules and regulations may be carried out on the above
mentioned cadavers provided that their amount of radioactivity has decayed to a safe level
which will be determined by the Radiation Health Officer or his authorized representative.

(e) Cremation If cremation is performed without autopsy, there is no handling problem;

otherwise, autopsy precautions should be strictly enforced. Precautions should be taken to
prevent any possible concentration of radioactivity at the base of the stack of the
crematorium.

Section 99. Responsibility of the Regional Director The Regional Director shall:

(a) Act on applications for the establishment of burial grounds; and

(b) Close any burial ground which is a menance to public health.

Section 100. Responsibility of the Local Health Authority The local health authority shall:

(a) Administer city or municipal cemeteries;

(b) Issue permits to inter, disinter or transfer remains;

(d) Apply prescribed measures when cause of death is due to a dangerous communicable
disease;

(e) Keep records of death occurring within his area of jurisdiction; and

(f) Authorize the deliver of unclaimed remains to medical schools and scientific institutions for
purposes specified in this Chapter and in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Department.

Section 101. Responsibility of Local Government Local governments shall:

 (a) Reserve appropriate tracts of land under their jurisdiction, for cemeteries subject to
approval of Regional Directors concerned;

(b) Utilize judiciously grants, gifts, bequests of property or financial donations for the
establishment or improvement of cemeteries; and

(c) Close cemeteries under their jurisdiction subject to approval of the Regional Director.

Section 102. Penal Provisions

(a) The Secretary or his duly authorized representative may revoke or suspend the license of
an undertakers or embalmer who violates any provisions of this Chapter or the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Secretary under this Chapter.

(b) Any person who shall engage in the business of undertaking or embalming in violation of
any provision of this Chapter shall be liable to a penalty of not more than one thousand
pesos for each violation.

(c) Each day or any part thereof during which any prohibited business or practice is
continued shall be deemed a separate violation and subject to the same penalty prescribed
in the preceding paragraph.

Section 103. Penal Provision

(a) Unless otherwise provided in any Chapter or section in this Code, any person who shall
violate, disobey, refuse, omit or neglect to comply with any of the rules and regulations
promulgated under this Code shall be guilty of misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be
punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or by a fine of not
exceeding one thousand pesos or both depending upon the discretion of the court.

(b) Any person who shall interfere with or hinder, or oppose any officer, agent or member of
the Department or of the bureaus and offices under it, in the performance of his duty as such
under this Code, or shall tear down, mutilate, deface or alter any placard, or notice, affixed to
the premises in the enforcement of the Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
punishable upon conviction by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or by a
fine of not exceeding one thousand pesos or both depending upon the discretion of the
Court.

Eugenio vs. Velez, G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

Facts:

FACTS:

On September 27, 1988, unaware of her death, Vitaliana’s brothers and sisters filed for a petition of
habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental, alleging that:

Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence by petitioner Eugenio and brought to petitioner’s
residence where she has held and deprived of her liberty
RTC issued writ but was returned unsatisfied as Eugenio refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana, who
was alleged to have died of heart failure because of toxemia of pregnancy on died August 28, 1988

Petitioner filed for a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the court had a lack of jurisdiction over the nature
of the action; and that habeas corpus was applicable only to illegal confinement or detention of a living
person and not a deceased’s body

Petitioner also claimed to have legal custody of the body by virtue of his being her common law husband

Vitaliana’s brothers and sisters alleged that petitioner was not in any way related to the deceased and
that petitioner was interfering with their duty as the deceased’s siblings to properly bury her body

ISSUE:

1. W/N court had jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus over the deceased; and

2. W/N custody of the deceased’s body should be given to the deceased’s siblings

Held:

The contention of the petitioner that he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the
term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; is misplaced. Philippine Law does not
recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to
be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common
law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him
from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras,
interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of
Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the
legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."

Here, Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters
(the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the
persons hereinbelow specified:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall
devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in
possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.

VALINO vs. ADRIANO G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014

Atty. Adriano is married to Rosario Adriano (Rosario) and they had children. They however separated
and years later, Atty Adriano had a lived-in-partner in the person of Valino.

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States spending
Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to
shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of
her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days
but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of
the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.

Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was
buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents
commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the
family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.

Issue:

Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.

Held:

The law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family
to the exclusion of one’s common law partner As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the
right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty.
Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he
died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or
impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having
been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and
voluntary intent to that end.

With respect to the claim of Valino that it was the wish of the deceased to be buried at their family plot
relying on Art. 307 of the NCC which reads: “ The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed
wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall
determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the
person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.

From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites"
that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the
Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on
which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent
authority on civil law, commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of
the deceased should be established by some form of testamentary disposition. As Article 307 itself
provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly, such as
from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing
once more that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family
plot, no other evidence was presented to corroborate it.

USE OF SURNAMES
What is a name?

Names are labels for one's identity (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO, G.R.
No. 207074, January 17, 2018)

A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by
which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are
known as aliases. (URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996)

A man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and
is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from
other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world
at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. The name of an individual has two parts:
(1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from
parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law. (In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No.
148311, March 31, 2005)

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual
from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a
name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for
good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore,
inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible. (In re Julian
Lim Wang, GR.No.159966, March 30, 2005)

This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle names
have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of
a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and
surname as he has. (In re Julian Lim Wang)

ARTS. 364-380 SURNAMES

(1) Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. [Art. 364]
(2) An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. [Art. 365]

(3) A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If
recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing
parent. [Art 366]

(4) Natural children by legal fiction shall principally employ the surname of the father [Art. 367]

(5) Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother. [Art 368]

Amended by: RA 9255

Republic Act No. 9255             February 24 2004

AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER,

AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:

SECTION 1. Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register,
or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to
prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child."

SECTION 2. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
rules and regulations, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

SECTION 3. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from its publication in
the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

(6) Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname
of the father. [Art. 369]

WIFE AFTER AND DURING MARRIAGE

(1) A married woman may use [Art. 370]:

1. Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
2. Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
 3. Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
[Tolentino:]

The wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband’s surname. She can’t be prevented
from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it.

(2) In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name
and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However,
she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless [Art. 371]:

(a) The court decrees otherwise, or

(b) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
(3) When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname
employed before the legal separation. [Art. 372]

(4) A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with
Article 370. [Art 373]

CONFUSION AND CHANGE OF NAMES

In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional
name or surname as will avoid confusion. [Art. 374]

In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word "Junior" can
be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either [Art. 375]:

(a) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or

(b) Add the Roman Numerals II, III, and so on.

No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. [Art. 376]

Amended by RA 9048 and further amended by Republic Act No. 10172

Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages and other relief. [Art.
377]

ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS HI, V. CA et., al, G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020

Facts:

Anacleto filed a Petition before the Regional Trial Court to change his name. His parents are Mario Alanis
y Cimafranca and Jarmila Imelda Ballaho y Al-Raschid, and that the name on his birth certificate was
"Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III." However, he wished to remove his father's surname "Alanis III," and
instead use his mother's maiden name "Ballaho," as it was what he has been using since childhood and
indicated in his school records from elementary until finishing his law degree. He likewise wished to
change his first name from "Anacleto" to "Abdulhamid" for the same reasons.

The trial court however dismissed the petition saying that to allow him to drop his last name was to
disregard the surname of his natural and legitimate father, in violation of the Family Code and Civil
Code, which provide that legitimate children shall principally use their fathers' surnames.
Is the trial court correct?

Question:

Can a legitimate child choose to use the surname of the mother?

Held:

Yes.

Under the constitution, the rights of the women are equally guaranteed to that of men:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the role of women in nation building and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provide women
rights and opportunities equal to that of men.

SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Thus, the Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it held that legitimate children cannot use their
mothers' surnames. Contrary to the State policy, the trial court treated the surnames of petitioner's
mother and father unequally.

As to the provision in the Family Code pertaining to the use of surname of legitimate child:

ARTICLE 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:

(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on Surnames[.]

In turn, Article 364 of the Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

The Regional Trial Court's application of Article 364 of the Civil Code is incorrect. Indeed, the provision
states that legitimate children shall "principally" use the surname of the father, but "principally" does
not mean "exclusively." This gives ample room to incorporate into Article 364 the State policy of
ensuring the fundamental equality of women and men before the law, and no discernible reason to
ignore it.

As to the change of first name:

Anacleto has been using the name Abdulhamid Ballaho in all his records and transactions. He is also
known to and called by his family and friends by such name. He has never used the name Anacleto
Ballaho Alanis III even once in his life. To have the petitioner suddenly use the name Anacleto Ballaho
Alanis III would cause undue embarrassment to the petitioner since he has never been known by such
name. Petitioner has shown not only some proper or compelling reason but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. A mere correction of his private and public records to
conform to the name stated in his Certificate of Live Birth would create more confusion because
petitioner has been using the name Abdulhamid Ballaho since enrollment in grade school until finishing
his law degree.
Query: If the child had already been using the surname of his father since birth can the mother change
the surname of the child to that of her surname invoking the case of Ballaho?

CIVIL REGISTER
(Arts 407-413)

Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.

Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births;
(2) marriages;
(3) deaths;
(4) legal separations;
(5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
(7) legitimations;
(8) adoptions;
(9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization;
(11) loss, or
(12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name.

Art. 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial orders mentioned in the
preceding article, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain
whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to
the civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is functioning.

Art. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered
public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.

Art. 411. Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any unauthorized alteration made in any civil
register, to any person suffering damage thereby. However, the civil registrar may exempt himself from
such liability if he proves that he has taken every reasonable precaution to prevent the unlawful
alteration.

Art. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.

Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
 RULE 103

Change of Name

Section 1. Venue. — A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of
First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.

Section 2. Contents of petition. — A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the
person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at
least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

Section 3. Order for hearing. — If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an
order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall
direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3)
successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court
shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election
nor within four (4) month after the last publication of the notice.

Section 4. Hearing. — Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The
Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the
Republic.

Section 5. Judgment. — Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such
order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall,
if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such
name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

Section 6. Service of judgment. — Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be
furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated,
who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

RULE 108

Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry

Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Court of First Instance
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births: (b) marriage; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

Section 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.

Section 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Section 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Section 6. Expediting proceedings. — The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

Section 7. Order. — After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting
the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

RA 9048 AS AMENDED BY RA 10172 AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR
CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

General rule: No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order

Exception:

(a) Clerical or typographical errors;

(b) Change of: first name or nickname, day and month in the date of birth, or sex of a person This
exception applies where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in
the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations (RA
10172)

Notes:
(a) Clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous (i.e.
misspelled name, misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the date of birth or
the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records)

(b) Before the amendment by RA 10172, no correction must involve the change of sex, nationality, age
or status of the petitioner. After the amendment, change of sex can now be subjected to correction
without judicial order under the rules of this Act.

(c) Civil Register refers to the various registry books and related certificates and documents kept in the
archives of the local civil registry offices, Philippine Consulates and of the Office of the Civil Registrar
General.

Who may file the petition and where?

(1) Any person having direct personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an
entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register

(2) Verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality

(a) where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept

(b) where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled, if it will be impractical to
submit in the place where record is kept (i.e. when party has migrated to another place in the
country

(c) nearest Philippine Consulates, if the petitioner is presently residing or domiciled in foreign
countries

Note: All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames
may be availed of only once.

Section 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. –

The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce.

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that by that first name or nickname in the community: or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Sec. 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. –

The petition for correction of a clerical or typographical error, or for change of first name or nickname,
as the case may be, shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person
authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the
merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the
matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to
be corrected and/or the change sought to be made.

The petition shall be supported with the following documents:

(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing the
entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed.

(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the
correction or change shall be based; and

(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general
may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.

No petition for correction of erroneous entry concerning the date of birth or the sex of a person shall be
entertained except if the petition is accompanied by earliest school record or earliest school documents
such as, but not limited to, medical records, baptismal certificate and other documents issued by
religious authorities; nor shall any entry involving change of gender corrected except if the petition is
accompanied by a certification issued by an accredited government physician attesting to the fact that
the petitioner has not undergone sex change or sex transplant. The petition for change of first name or
nickname, or for correction of erroneous entry concerning the day and month in the date of birth or the
sex of a person, as the case may be, shall be published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification
from the appropriate law enforcements, agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record. The
petition and its supporting papers shall be filed in three (3) copies to be distributed as follows: first copy
to the concerned city or municipal civil registrar, or the consul general; second copy to the Office of the
Civil Registrar General; and third copy to the petitioner.

CASES
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN
1. Yasin v. Judge Shari's District Court, G.R. No. 94986, February 23, 1995
2. Remo v. Scretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010

USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN

1. In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005
2. In re Julian Lim Wang, GR.No.159966, March 30, 2005
3. In re Change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte, G.R. No. L-51201, May 29,
1980
4. ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS HI, V. CA et., al, G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020

USE OF DIFFERENT NAME

1. People v. Estrada, G.R. No. 164368, April 2, 2009
 2. Ursua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996

AMMENDMENTS/ CORRECTIONS OF ENTRIES

1. Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2012
2. Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001
3. Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
4. Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
5. Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himalayan City, G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009

YASIN vs. JUDGE SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. No. 94986, February 23, 1995
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE

Facts:
Petitioner after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Law of the
Philippines, filed a petition to the respondent court, a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and
surname. The petition was denied by the respondent court on the ground that the petition is substantially
for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103 Rules of Court on change of
name is necessary if the position is to be granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of
petitioners maiden name and surname.

Issue:
Whether or not petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change
of name.

Ruling:
The court rules in the negative. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be
applied to judicial conformation of the right of divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname.
In fact, there is no law requiring a woman to file a case in court for the judicial declaration of her
resumption to her maiden name after divorce. The filing of the case is a superfluity but the nevertheless
the Supreme Court declared her that she may now resume to her maiden name.

REMO vs. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE

Facts:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then
expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries
appears in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as
her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still
subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement
passport.
However, the petitioner’s request has been denied. With this reason, she filed a petition to change her
surname to her middle name in the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Maria Virginia can change her surname “Rallonza” to her middle name “Remo”
in her passport.

Ruling:
 No. The Supreme Court ruled that once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname
in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in
section 5(d) of RA 8239. these instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4)
nullity of marriage. since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden
name in the replacement passport. otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden
name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a
special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of title xiii of the
civil code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a
special law prevails over a general law.

*Republic Act No. 8239 Philippine Passport Act of 1996

* Section 5(d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed or whose marriage
has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court decree of
separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and
authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree,
annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert to the use of her maiden
name: Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under existing laws of the Philippines;

IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA, G.R. No. 148311, March 31,
2005
USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN,
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein among others, that Stephanie was
born on June 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her
mother’s middle name and surname, and that she is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia her mother’s surname and
that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his Surname.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption, however, the trial Court did
not allow the use of her mother’s surname as her middle name. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name.

Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother, as her middle name,
when she subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Ruling:
As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Notably,
the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. The Court ruled that since no law
granting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, as in this case, to use as middle name the
mother’s surname, the Court found no reason why Stephanie should not allowed to use her mother’s
surname Garcia as her middle name.
IN RE JULIAN LIN WANG, GR.No.159966, March 30, 2005
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN
Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Wang a minor represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang filed a petition dated 19
September 2002 for change of name of entry in the civil registry of Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner sought to
drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian
Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would
help him adjust more easily to integrate himself into Singaporean society.

Issue:
Whether or not the law provides for his middle name to be changed.

Ruling:
Petition is denied.

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which
the change is sought. to justify a request for the change of name, the petitioner must show not only some
proper reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among
the grounds for the change of name which have been held valid are:
a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce.
b.) When the change results as a legal consequence
c.) When the change will avoid confusion.
d.) When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was not
aware of the alien parentage.
e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose.

The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping of his middle name is convenience. However,
how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is
not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty
does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice
him in his rights under our laws.
 

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA

VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON, G.R. No. L-51201, May 29, 1980
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN

Facts:
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.

Petitioner was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte On June 15, 1952; she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St.
Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila. Petitioner was being taken care of by her uncle and when
she started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year
high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After
graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in
Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was registered by the name of
Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not
committed any felony or misdemeanor.

Issue:

Whether or not she may be allowed for the change of name and her surname.

Ruling:

In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon
although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from
the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this name; she
finished her course in Nursing in college and graduated and given a diploma under this name; and she
exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant
fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground,
i.e. to avoid confusion. 
 

URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME

Facts:
Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” in the visitor’s logbook and used the same in receiving the copy
of a complaint against him at the Office of the Ombudsman. This was discovered and reported to the
Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that the petitioner be accordingly charged. Trial Court found the
petitioner is guilty of violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as
“An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases“. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with some
modification of sentence.

Issue:
Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of Commonwealth Act
No. 142.

Ruling:
No. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the RTC was reversed and set aside
and petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged.

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually
usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized
the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound
or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but
sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a
fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth
does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus, in construing a statute the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead
to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense
within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142
is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason
for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a
certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.

PEOPLE vs. ESTRADA, G.R. No. 164368, April 2, 2009

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME

President Joseph Estrada was charged aside from his plunder case for illegal use of alias, punished under
Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085. As alleged by the
prosecution, he used the name "Jose Velarde" in signing certain bank documents and his dealings with
Ortaliza and Dichavez.

Issue:
Can President Estrada be held liable for illegal use of alias?

Held:

The People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under Commonwealth
Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals, one can only be guilty under the act if the use of the alias is public
and habitual. In Estrada’s case, the application of the principles was not as simple because of the
complications resulting from the nature of the transaction involved – the alias was used in connection
with the opening of a numbered trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as amended,
and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160.

The intention not to be publicly known by the name "Jose Velarde" is shown by the nature of a numbered
account – a perfectly valid banking transaction at the time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The
opening, too, of a numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not impose on Estrada the
obligation to disclose his real identity – the obligation R.A. No. 6713 imposes is to file under oath a
statement of assets and liabilities. Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together,
Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of his bank deposits, but he
was under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank account (such as the name he
used to open it)

Note:
Third – the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.17 The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute
prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and
all other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our
laws that allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition
was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 – another
confirmation that the opening of a numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was opened on
February 4, 2000.

REPUBLIC vs. COSETENG-MAGPAYO, G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2012

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

Facts:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the
son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s
certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his
parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In
support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that
his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also
submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname
"Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998,
2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District
using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."

Issue:
a) Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be made
through appropriate adversarial proceedings.
b) Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the name
of respondent’s father from his birth certificate.

Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE
OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized
grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court
allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in
order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the
surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that
she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.

The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his
parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant
respondent’s supplication. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati
where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the
petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and
mother were made parties thereto.
Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil
registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case. "A petition for a substantial
correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well
as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby."

Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that
given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to
other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is
validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two
types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last
date of publication). The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should
have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out.

LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001
AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

Facts:
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different
mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife,
Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his
concubine, Tiu Chuan.

The children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, (hereinafter referred to as private
respondents) filed a petition to cancel the certificate of live births of the children of Lee Tek Sheng and
his concubine, Tiu Chuan (hereinafter referred to as petitioners)

It was when the respondent’s mother died on May 9, 1989 when they started to suspect that something is
seemingly irrational when their father, Lee Tek Sheng, insisted that the names of all his children,
including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's death that was to
be published in the newspapers.

Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an investigation into the matter and after investigation, they found out that in the respondents
certificate of live birth, the name of the mother that appeared there is that of their mother, KEH SHIOK
CHENG. Their father made it appear that the mother of the respondents is their mother when in truth and
in fact she is not.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the
ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is
essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has
already prescribed.

Issue:
Is the cancellation proper under rule 108?

Held:
Yes, the petition is covered under Rule 108.

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private
respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that
for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and
given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the
petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to
declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former
are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh
Shiok Cheng and petitioners.

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC, G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

Facts:
Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his birth certificate to
facilitate his marriage with his fiancé. A year before, Silverio has underwent sex re-assignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from “Rommel” to “Mely.”

Issue:
Should the court allow the change of name?

Ruling:
No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the determination of
a person’s sex at the time of birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. It held that “while petitioner
may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. There is no special law in
the country governing sex reassignment and its effect. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.”

The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner “will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences,” i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and
family relations and substantially affect the public policy in relation to women in laws such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code,
etc.

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN G.R. No. 166676, September

12, 2008
AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

Facts:
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of Entries
in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such that, her name
be changed to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”.

She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name “Jennifer
Cagandahan”. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a
condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female characteristics. She was also
diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged
that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
Issue:
Whether or not the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.

Ruling:
Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that where a person
is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent
here thinks of himself as a male considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones. There
is preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009
AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

Facts:
Petitioner, Ma. Cristina’s husband, Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in
Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent
Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her
and Pablo's son. Petitioner thereupon made inquiries with the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental. On the annotation of Patrick’s birth certificate reflects Patrick as having been
acknowledged by Pablo (or Pablito)as son on January 13, 1997, that he was legitimated by virtue of
subsequent marriage of his parents on April 22,1998 at Manila, and that he shall be known as Patrick
Titular Braza. Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and
Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners (her three legitimate children
with Pablo) to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himalayan City, Negros
Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between
Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between
Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record
with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last
name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiations; and 3) the declaration
of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the
declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. TC dismissed the petition, holding that in a
special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the
Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the
legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be
ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.MR was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the court may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy
even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.

Ruling:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiations.
 Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein
may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error
made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. The petitioners’ cause of action is
actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn
Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition
should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that,
doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed
before the court a quo.

Republic vs Court of Appeals 209 SCRA 189, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992

FACTS: Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala Sr. and Segundina Alcala. When he was
two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala Jr. and his sister Margaret Alcala,
was then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents and order of the
court, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.
They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen years if marriage.

Upon reaching the age twenty-two, herein private respondent, filed a petition to change his name
to Maximo Alcala Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the name suggest a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in
fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any
implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese
surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not
oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are
valid, sufficient, and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.

HELD: Yes, the reasons given in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient, and proper to
warrant the granting of said petition.

The change of name is justifiable because of the embarrassment and ridicule his family name
"Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and
living in a Muslim community. Another justifiable cause is his desire to improve his social and
business life.

In granting and denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause
is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the
court and not all best evidence available. Among the grounds for change of name which have
been held valid are;

a. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce.

 b. When the change results as legal consequence, as in legitimation.
c. When change will avoid confusion.
d. Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of
alien parentage.
e. Sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody.
f. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that change of name would prejudice public
interest.

Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its primordial purpose which is to give a person an
opportunity to improve his personality and provide his best interest. Concordantly, the Court held
that a change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in
the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or
citizenship; what is altered is only the name.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO, G.R. No. 207074,
January 17, 2018

Facts:

Michelle filed a case in court for the correction of her live birth due to clerical errors under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. She wants the following relief:

1) Correct her first name from "Michael" to "Michelle";

2) Correct her biological sex from "Male" to "Female";
3) Enter her middle name as "Soriano";
4) Enter the middle name of her mother as "Angangan";
5) Enter the middle name of her father as "Balingao"; and
6) Enter the date of her parents' marriage as "May 23, 1981."

Issue:

Whether or not the corrections sought by petitioner are considered as clerical errors.

Held:

Under Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 9048:

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of
nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
The prayers to change the first name and the change of gender, Gallo's middle name as Soriano,
the middle names of her parents as Angangan for her mother and Balingao for her father, and the
date of her parents' marriage as May 23, 1981 fall under clerical or typographical errors as
mentioned in Republic Act No. 9048.

The correction fall under mere clerical error as this does not affect petitioner’s civil status,
citizenship or nationality.

RAMON CORPUS TAN, vs. OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE CITY
OF MANILA, et., al No. 211435, April 10, 2019

This is a petition for a correction of name under Rule 108 from "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" to
"Ramon CORPUZ Tan.", the last name being consistent with his government-issued
identification cards and other supporting documents he submitted.

In its assailed Order dated December 27, 2011, the RTC dismissed the subject petition for
correction of entry. The RTC ratiocinated that the petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements of an adversarial proceeding noting that the correction sought for, is a substantial
correction and is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which is not summary, but an
adversarial proceeding.

The trial court explained that Section 3, Rule 108, requires all interested persons who may be
affected by the petition to be made parties thereto. The trial court noted that aside from the fact
that in Entry No. 3, petitioner's last name was indicated as "Tan Ko," the name of petitioner's
father was also indicated as "Tan Ko" in Entry No. 7. Moreover, in Entry No. 17, petitioner's
mother, Trinidad Corpuz, signed as "T.C. Tan Ko" over her printed name as informant.

Issue:

WON there was a failure to implead affected parties in the petition

WON there is enough basis to cause to change in the name of the petitioner.

Held:

As aptly observed by the appellate court, the name "Tan Ko" has been consistently used not only
in the entries for petitioner's name, but also for that of his parents. In entry No. 7, the name of
petitioner's father was entered as "Tan Ko," while his mother's name was entered as "Trinidad
Corpus Tan Ko" in entry No. 12. Furthermore, his mother, as the informant for petitioner's birth
certificate, signed as "T.C. Tan Ko" in entry No. 17.

With respect to impleading the interested parties, the petitioner insisted that it was already cured
because there was a publication and it therefore operates a notice to everyone. Both the petitioner
and the SOLGEN mentioned the cases of Barco v. Court of Appeals (Barco) and Republic of the
Philippines v. Kho (Kho). The cases mentioned however is inapplicable in this case because:

In the case of Barco v. Court of Appeals (Barco), 465 Phil. 39 (2004)

In Barco, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entry in order to change the
person named as the father in the birth certificate of her daughter. The LCR, Francisco Maravilla
(Francisco), the person originally named as the father, and Armando Gustilo (Armando), the
person said to be the real father, as well as the SOLGEN were impleaded. Notably, Francisco and
Armando interposed no objection to the correction. Then Milagros Barco filed a petition-in-
intervention before the CA arguing that she and her daughter have legal interest in the annulment
of the RTC Order. She explained that her daughter is also the child and heir of Armando, the
alleged real father in Nadina's petition for correction of entry. As such, she and her daughter
should have been impleaded therein, failing which, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction. In
that case the court said that the failure to implead an indispensable party, such as Milagros, in the
petition for correction of entry was cured by the compliance with the publication requirement
under Section 4 of Rule 108. The Court reasoned that it could not be established whether Nadina
knew of the existence of Milagros' daughter at the time the former filed the petition for
correction. The Court explained that doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under
Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a
petition.

In the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Kho (Kho), 553 Phil. 161 (2007).

On the other hand, in Kho, it was the siblings who filed a petition for correction of the entries in
their respective birth certificates. They prayed, among others, that the word "married" opposite
the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" be deleted because their parents were not legally
married. Private respondent Carlito Kho, one of the siblings, also sought the correction of the
entries in the birth certificates of his children, specifically, the correction of the date of marriage
between him and his wife from "April 27, 1989" to "January 21, 2000," the latter date being the
date appearing in their marriage certificate; and the correction of the name of his wife's first name
from "Maribel" to "Marivel. The Republic opposed the corrections and contended that since the
changes prayed for were substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an adversarial
proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and the private respondents' parents,
should have been notified or impleaded. The Court, however, dismissed the Republic's
contentions ruling that when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with,
the appropriate adversary proceeding is satisfied. The Court stressed that it is highly improbable
that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her children's birth
certificates considering that the notices, orders, and decision of the trial court were all sent to the
residence she shared with Carlito and their children. With respect to the private
respondents' parents, the Court noted that their father died in 1959. On the other hand, their
mother was presented as a witness and testified as to the material allegations of the petition for
correction of entries.

As correctly observed by the appellate court, the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner,
consisting of government-issued identification cards and other public documents, only prove that
he had been using the surname "Tan," but not the fact that his father's surname was indeed "Tan."
Aside from being insufficient for the purpose of rebutting the truth of the entries in his birth
certificate, these identification cards and documents are also immaterial to his cause of action. As
argued by the Republic, the evidence presented by petitioner and his plea on the ground of
reasonable cause and compelling reason, are relevant only to a petition for change of name under
Rule 103, and not under a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108.The
Court agrees with the observations of the appellate court that petitioner's mother would be the
best witness to testify on the alleged errors in her son's birth certificate. In a similar vein, the birth
certificates of petitioner's older siblings showing the surname "Tan" instead of "Tan Ko" would
greatly bolster his claim. However, for reasons known only to petitioner, he refused to present his
mother or the birth certificates of his siblings. Thus, there would be no basis to sustain his claim
that his surname should be "Tan" instead of "Tan Ko." Accordingly, the present petition must
be denied.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and ANDREW BARRETTO, G.R. No. L-
35605 October 11, 1984

This is a petition filed by Andrew Baretto, stating that "he desires to change his name to
ANDREW VELEZ because it is the surname of his step-father Magin V. Velez with whom he is
living at present.

The petitioner presented his baptismal certificate to prove his name.

The title of the petition reads:

"In Re Petition for Change of Name, Andrew Barretto, Petitioner."

Issue:

WON the petition is complete in its form and substance

WON there is a "proper and reasonable cause" for the change of name.

Held:

The petition should be denied on the following grounds:

(1) The petition for change of name and the order of publication and hearing thereon must
contain in its title or caption [a] the applicant's real name, [b] his aliases and other names, if
any, [c] and the name he seeks to adopt (Republic vs. Tafiada, L-31563, Nov. 29, 1971, 42
SCRA 419; Republic vs. Lee Wai Lam, L-22607, 28 SCRA 1043 [July 30, 19691). This was
not complied with because there is no assurance whether Andrew Barreto is the true name of
the petitioner. The certificate of Live Birth from the LCR should have been presented. The
name sought to be adopted likewise does not appear on the title.

(2) With respect to the ground relied upon by the petitioner, the same is cannot be granted
because there is no "proper and reasonable cause" to cause the change. The reason that he
"he desires to change his name to ANDREW VELEZ because it is the surname of his step-
father Magin V. Velez with whom he is living at present is not one of those grounds allowed
under the rules. The change of name is not just compelling enough to warrant the change of
name prayed for.

What should have been the Caption?

Republic of the Philippines

8th Judicial Region
BRANCH 33 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
CALBIGA
CALBIGA, SAMAR

Re: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF ENTRY

IN THE CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH OF ANDREW VELEZ,

ANDREW VELEZ, Spec. Proc. ____________

Petitioner,

-versus- For: CHANGE OF FAMILY NAME IN

THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF
ANDREW BARRETO AS APPEARING
IN THE RECORDS OF THE LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF CEBU AND
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
UNDER REGISTTY NO. 111: FROM
ANDREW BARRETO TO ANDREW
VELEZ

LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF CEBU

PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY
SOLICITOR GENERAL
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF YAP EK SIU, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. L-25437, April 28, 1969

Yap Ek Siu instituted an action t on February 13, 1965 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
seeking to change his name to William Tanchon. His reason is that since his childhood days, his Filipino
playmates called him William; that he also desires to have his family name of Yap changed to Tanchon in
due respect to his father named Pio Tanchon who has been authorized by the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental to use said name. In all of his document and business dealings however, the name Yap
Ek Siu appears.

Issue:

WON the reason of the petitioner is valid to grant him the change of his name.

Held:

The following may be considered, among others, as proper and reasonable causes that may warrant the
grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of
status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary
to avoid confusion (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. I, p. 660)."

In the present case, the herein petitioner has not proven that his name is ridiculous, or tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. Neither has he claimed that he wants to change his
name by reason of a change in his status. And as we have already indicated above, there is nothing in the
record that would show that petitioner's continuous use of his present name would cause confusion. On
the contrary, the change of petitioner's name would give rise to confusion, for his real name, Yap Ek Siu
appears in all his important and personal documents and according to him, he has never used the name
William in all his business dealings .... Besides, since he is a Chinese citizen ..., he should also use a
Chinese name. For a Chinese citizen to use a Filipino name, we submit, will only create embarrassment
and confusion in his social and business dealings on the ground that he might be mistaken to be a Filipino
when in fact and in truth he is a Chinese.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY (CHANGE OF FAMILY

NAME IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA AS APPEARING IN THE
RECORDS OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE), FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA, G.R. No.
211724, August 24. 2016

Facts:

For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela." However, when he
requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the National Statistics Office (NSO), he was surprised to
discover that he was registered as "Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela." Thus, he filed a
Petition for Correction of Entry in his NSO birth certificate.

Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 in Pandan, Catanduanes and is the
acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela (Jorge), former governor of the said province, and
Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both deceased. He averred that while his parents did not marry each
other, he has been known to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using the said
surname in all of his official and legal documents, including his school records from elementary to
college, certificate of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) membership, government service
records, appointment as Provincial General Services Officer, report of rating in the First Grade Entrance
Examination of the Civil Service Commission, Philippine Passport, Marriage Contract, and Certificate of
Compensation Payment/Tax Withheld. In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his birth
certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan, Catanduanes showing that
"Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full name.

The petitioner did not implead the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings in his petition.

Issue:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of substantial changes in the
civil registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding. An adversary proceeding is defined as one
"having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex-parte application, one of which the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it.

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to
give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial
court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to
party and as to the subject matter.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Benguet and PANG CHA QUEN representing the minor, MAY SIA alias
MANMAN HUANG, G.R. No. L-31065 February 15, 1990

This is a petition filed by the mother of the minor. To change the first name and the surname. The mother
wanted to change the surname of the daughter to that of the stepfather whom she already recognized and
loved as a father.

Held:

The petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name, even if it
may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was
filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.

Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the age
of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision to change her name, the reason for the
change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal
decision. No one else may make it for her. The reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she
may not want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chosen for her by her mother. In
Moore vs. Republic, 8 SCRA 282, 284, we held:

Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor who for
the present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to a mature age. Any
way, if the time comes, he may decide the matter for himself and take such action as our law
may permit. For the present we deem the action taken by petitioner premature.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a.

MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE, G.R. No. 160597, July 20, 2006

Facts:

This is a case for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner wants to
change her registered name Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can
remember, she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante. She avers that
this has been the name she was using ever since and that all her records the name she used is
Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.

Held:

In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her registered name in order to
avoid confusion having used a different name all her life. This is a valid ground under the afore-
mentioned enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy presents the less cumbersome and
most convenient way to set her records straight.

Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to prove that the petition is not
resorted to for an illegal purpose due to her inability to present NBI as well as police clearance to
the effect that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements of Rule 103 reveals
that it does not so provide such a quantum of proof to establish the fact that a petitioner has no
derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon the declaration and affirmation of the
petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further fraud but for a legitimate purpose,
coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a
petitioner in a petition for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to prove that the
said petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud. Until such time, we see no urgency to impose
the requirements espoused by oppositor-appellant. (Word in bracket added).

In Republic v. Sali, G.R. No. 206023, April 3, 2017

The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has
been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that
first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either
appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.

BAR QUESTIONS
2019 Question (A.3) Change of surname

Mr. Reyes is legally married to Mrs. Reyes. During the subsistence of their marriage, Mr. Reyes
cohabited with another woman, Ms. Cruz. Out of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz's illicit relationship, a child
named C was born. In C's birth certificate, "Cruz" appears as the child's surname, although Mr. Reyes
expressly acknowledged C as his child.

In 2018, Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz ended their relationship. Mr. Reyes thereafter lodged a petition in court
for parental custody and change or correction of C's surname in the child's birth certificate from "Cruz"
to "Reyes." At that time, C was only ten (10) years old.

(b) Can Mr. Reyes validly compel the change or correction of C's surname from "Cruz" to "Reyes"?
Explain. (2.5%)

Suggested Answer:

No, Mr, Reyes cannot compel the change of C’s surname to that of his surname. The law which grants
the illegitimate children to use the surname of the father is for the benefit of the child. The option
therefore whether or not to use the surname of the father belongs to the child. Since the child is just 10
years old, the consent of the mother likewise is necessary in order that the child may use the surname of
the father.

Change of Name; Under RA 9048 (2006)

Zirxthoussous delos Santos filed a petition for change of name with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong City under the administrative proceeding provided in Republic Act No. 9048. He alleged
that his first name sounds ridiculous and is extremely difficult to spell and pronounce. After complying
with the requirements of the law, the Civil Registrar granted his petition and changed his first name
Zirxthoussous to "Jesus." His full name now reads "Jesus delos Santos."
Jesus delos Santos moved to General Santos City to work in a multi-national company. There, he fell in
love and married Mary Grace delos Santos. She requested him to have his first name changed because
his new name "Jesus delos Santos" is the same name as that of her father who abandoned her family
and became a notorious drug lord. She wanted to forget him. Hence, Jesus filed another petition with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar to change his first name to "Roberto." He claimed that the change
is warranted because it will eradicate all vestiges of the infamy of Mary Grace's father.

Will the petition for change of name of Jesus delos Santos to Roberto delos Santos under Republic Act
No. 9048 prosper? Explain. (10%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, under the law, Jesus may only change his name once. In addition, the petition for change of name
may be denied on the following grounds:

(1) Jesus is neither ridiculous, nor tainted with dishonor nor extremely difficult to write or pronounce.

(2) There is no confusion to be avoided or created with the use of the registered first name or nickname
of the petitioner.

(3) The petition involves the same entry in the same document, which was previously corrected or
changed under this Order

[Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 9048].

Change of Name; Under RA 9048 (2006)

What entries in the Civil Registry may be changed or corrected without a judicial order? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Only clerical or typographical errors and first or nick names may be changed or
corrected without a judicial order under RA 9048. Clerical or typographical errors refer to mistakes
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the
civil register. The mistake is harmless and innocuous, such as errors in spelling, visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
records. Provided, however, that no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex
of the petitioner.

Adoption; Illegitimate Child; Use of Mother’s Surname as Middle Name (2012) No.IV.b)

Honorato filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie, alleging that Stephanie’s
mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanie’s middle name be changed from "Astorga" to "Garcia," which is her mother’s surname and
that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," which is his surname. This the trial court denied.
Was the trial court correct in denying Hororato’s request for Stephanie’s use of her mother’s surname as
her middle name? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the trial court was not correct. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by his
natural father to use as middle name his mother’s surname. The law is silent as to what middle name an
adoptee may use. In case of In re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March
31, 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that the adopted child may use the surname of the natural mother as
his middle name because there is no prohibition in the law against it. Moreover, it will also be for the
benefit of the adopted child who shall preserve his lineage on his mother’s side and reinforce his right to
inherit from his mother and her family. Lastly, it will make the adopted child conform with the time-
honored Filipino tradition of carrying the mother’s surname as the person’s middle name.

Paternity & Filiation; Use of Surname; Illegitimate Child (2009) No.XIV

Rodolfo, married to Sharon, had an illicit affair with his secretary, Nanette, a 19-year old girl, and begot a
baby girl, Rona. Nanette sued Rodolfo for damages: actual, for hospital and other medical expenses in
delivering the child by caesarean section; moral, claiming that Rodolfo promised to marry her,
representing that he was single when, in fact, he was not; and exemplary, to teach a lesson to like-
minded Lotharios.

(B). Suppose Rodolfo later on acknowledges Rona and gives her regular support, can he compel her to
use his surname? Why or why not? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. he has no right to compel Rona to use his surname. The law does not give him
the right simply because he gave her support (RA 9255). Under the Family Code, an illegitimate child was
required to use only the surname of the mother. Under RA 9255, otherwise known as the Revilla law,
however, the illegitimate child is given the option to use the surname of the illegitimate father when the
latter has recognized the former in accordance with law. Since the choice belongs to the illegitimate
child, Rodolfo cannot compel Rona, if already of age, to use the surname against her will. If Rona is still a
minor, to use the surname of Rodolfo will require the consent of Rona's mother who has sole parental
authority over her.

2018 Bar Exam III(a)

Silverio was a woman trapped in a man's body. He was born male and his birth certificate indicated his
gender as male, and his name as Silverio Stalon. When he reached the age of 21, he had a sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, and, from then on, he lived as a female. On the basis of his sex
reassignment, he filed an action to have his first name changed to Shelley, and his gender, to female.
While he was following up his case with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, he met Sharon Stan, who
also filed a similar action to change her first name to Shariff, and her gender, from female to male.
Sharon was registered as a female upon birth. While growing up, she developed male characteristics and
was diagnosed to have congenital adrenal hyperplasia ("CAH") which is a condition where a person
possesses both male and female characteristics. At puberty, tests revealed that her ovarian structures
had greatly minimized, and she had no breast or menstrual development. Alleging that for all intents
and appearances, as well as mind and emotion, she had become a male, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender should be changed from female to male, and that her first
name should be changed from Sharon to Shariff. Silverio and Sharon fell in love and decided to marry.
Realizing that their marriage will be frowned upon in the Philippines, they travelled to Las Vegas, USA
where they got married based on the law of the place of celebration of the marriage. They, however,
kept their Philippine citizenship.
(a) Is there any legal bases for the court to approve Silverio's petition for correction of entries in his birth
certificate?

Suggested answer:

a. In both instances, No. A person’s first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment
since it is not among the grounds stated under R.A 9048. Likewise, with respect to the change of sex
from male to female, there is no law which allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on
the same ground, the determination of a person’s sex is that which appears in his birth certificate.
(SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC)

(b) Will your answer be the same in the case of Sharon's petition?

Suggested Answer:

b. No, where the person is afflicted with CAH or is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. (REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN)

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