Cryptography

The language of cryptography

Alice’s Bob’s
K encryption
A K decryption
key B key

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

algorithm algorithm

symmetric key crypto: sender, receiver keys identical

public-key crypto: encryption key public, decryption key secret
(private)

8: Network Security 8-2

 Symmetric key cryptography
substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another
– monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another
plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz

ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq

E.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice

ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc

Q: How hard to break this simple cipher?:

q brute force (how hard?)
q other?

8: Network Security 8-3

 Symmetric key cryptography

K K
A-B A-B

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

message, m algorithm algorithm
K (m) m=K (K (m))
A-B A-B A-B

symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share know same

(symmetric) key: K
A-B
• e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic
substitution cipher
• Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

8: Network Security 8-4

 Symmetric key crypto: DES
DES: Data Encryption Standard
• US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
• 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input
• How secure is DES?
– DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase (“Strong
cryptography makes the world a safer place”)
decrypted (brute force) in 4 months
– no known “backdoor” decryption approach
• making DES more secure:
– use three keys sequentially (3-DES) on each datum
– use cipher-block chaining

8: Network Security 8-5

 Symmetric key
crypto: DES

DES operation

initial permutation
16 identical “rounds” of
function application,
each using different 48
bits of key
final permutation

8: Network Security 8-6

 AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

• new (Nov. 2001) symmetric-key NIST standard,

replacing DES
• processes data in 128 bit blocks
• 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
• brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1
sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES

8: Network Security 8-7

 Block Cipher
64-bit input

8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits

loop for
n rounds
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8

8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits

• one pass
64-bit scrambler
through: one
input bit affects
eight output bits 64-bit output

r multiple passes: each input bit afects all output bits

r block ciphers: DES, 3DES, AES

8: Network Security 8-8

 Cipher Block Chaining
• cipher block: if input m(1) = “HTTP/1.1” c(1) = “k329aM02”
t=1 block
block repeated, will …
cipher
produce same cipher m(17) = “HTTP/1.1” c(17) = “k329aM02”
t=17 block
text: cipher

r cipher block chaining: XOR

ith input block, m(i), with
previous block of cipher m(i)
text, c(i-1)
m c(0) transmitted to c(i-1) +
receiver in clear
m what happens in block
“HTTP/1.1” scenario cipher
from above?
c(i)
8: Network Security 8-9
 Public key cryptography

symmetric key crypto public key cryptography

r radically different approach
• requires sender, receiver [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
know shared secret key r sender, receiver do not
• Q: how to agree on key in share secret key
r public encryption key known
first place (particularly if
to all
never “met”)? r private decryption key known
only to receiver

8-10
8: Network Security
 Public key cryptography
+ Bob’s public
K
B key

- Bob’s private
K
B key

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

message, m algorithm + algorithm message
K (m)
B m = K -(K +(m))
B B

8: Network Security 8-11

 Public key encryption algorithms
Requirements:

(.) and K ( .) such that

+ -
1 need KB B
- +
K B (KB (m)) = m
+
2 given public key KB , it should be
impossible to- compute
private key KB

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adleman algorithm

8: Network Security 8-12
 RSA: Choosing keys
1. Choose two large prime numbers p, q.
(e.g., 1024 bits each)

2. Compute n = pq, z = phi(n)=(p-1)(q-1)

3. Choose e (with b<n) that has no common factors

with z. (e, z are “relatively prime”).

4. Choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z.

(in other words: ed mod z = 1 ).

5. Public key is (n,e). Private key is (n,d).

K+ K-
B B
8-13
 RSA: Encryption, decryption
0. Given (n,b) and (n,a) as computed above

1. To encrypt bit pattern, m, compute

e e
x = m mod n (i.e., remainder when m is divided by n)

2. To decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute

d n d
m = x mod (i.e., remainder when c is divided by n)

Magic e d
happens! m = (m mod n) mod n

8: Network Security 8-14

 RSA example:
Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24.
e=5 (so e, z relatively prime).
d=29 (so ed-1 exactly divisible by z.

e e
letter m m c = m mod n
encrypt:
l 12 1524832 17

d d
c c m = c mod n letter
decrypt:
17 481968572106750915091411825223071697 12 l

8: Network Security 8-15

RSA: Why is that e
m = (m mod n)
d
mod n

Useful number theory result: If p,q prime and

n = pq, then:
y y mod (p-1)(q-1)
x mod n = x mod n

e d ed
(m mod n) mod n = m mod n

ed mod (p-1)(q-1)
= m mod n
(using number theory result above)
1
= m mod n

(since we chose ed to be divisible by

(p-1)(q-1) with remainder 1 )
= m
8: Network Security 8-16
 RSA: another important property
The following property will be very useful later:

- + + -
K B (KB (m)) = m = K B (K B (m))

use public key use private key

first, followed first, followed
by private key by public key

Result is the same!

8: Network Security 8-17

 Message Integrity
Bob receives msg from Alice, wants to ensure:
• message originally came from Alice
• message not changed since sent by Alice

Cryptographic Hash:
• takes input m, produces fixed length value, H(m)
– e.g., as in Internet checksum
• computationally infeasible to find two different messages, x,
y such that H(x) = H(y)
– equivalently: given m = H(x), (x unknown), can not determine x.
– note: Internet checksum fails this requirement!

8: Network Security 8-18

 Internet checksum: poor crypto hash
function
Internet checksum has some properties of hash function:
ü produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of message
ü is many-to-one
But given message with given hash value, it is easy to find another message
with same hash value:

message ASCII format message ASCII format

I O U 1 49 4F 55 31 I O U 9 49 4F 55 39
0 0 . 9 30 30 2E 39 0 0 . 1 30 30 2E 31
9 B O B 39 42 4F 42 9 B O B 39 42 4F 42
B2 C1 D2 AC different messages B2 C1 D2 AC
but identical checksums!
8: Network Security 8-19
 Message Authentication Code
(shared secret)
s
H(m+s)

H(.)
(message)
m H(m+s) m
public
m append compare
Internet
H(m+s)

H(.) H(m+s)

s
(shared secret)

8: Network Security 8-20

 MACs in practice
• MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321)
– computes 128-bit MAC in 4-step process.
– arbitrary 128-bit string x, appears difficult to construct
msg m whose MD5 hash is equal to x
• recent (2005) attacks on MD5
• SHA-1 is also used
– US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1]
– 160-bit MAC

8: Network Security 8-21

 Digital Signatures

cryptographic technique analogous to hand-written

signatures.
• sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is
document owner/creator.
• verifiable, nonforgeable: recipient (Alice) can prove to
someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice),
must have signed document

8: Network Security 8-22

 Digital Signatures
simple digital signature for message m:
-
• Bob “signs” m by encrypting with his private key KB,
creating “signed” message, KB-(m)
-
Bob’s message, m K B Bob’s private -
K B(m)
key
!"#$%&'()"
*+,-.%/"..#0"1%
!"#$"%&$'$"()*$+,--*.$ public key /1%.(02"3%
/%01$'$2",34$%5$/%0$(66$2"*$
2,+*7$89:6("$:6("$:6("; encryption 4"2)$567"38%9(7:%
algorithm :(.%6$(;#7"%<"5
*+,

8: Network Security 8-23

 Digital Signatures (more)
>
• suppose Alice receives msg m, digital signature KB(m)
• Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob’s public key KB=
> = >
to KB(m) then checks KB(KB(m) ) = m.
= >
• if KB(KB(m) ) = m, whoever signed m must have used Bob’s
private key.
Alice thus verifies that:
ü Bob signed m.
ü No one else signed m.
ü Bob signed m and not m’.
non-repudiation: >
ü Alice can take m, and signature KB(m) to court and prove
that Bob signed m.

8: Network Security 8-24

Digital signature = signed MAC
Alice verifies signature and integrity
Bob sends digitally signed of digitally signed message:
message:
large
message H: hash encrypted
m function H(m)
msg digest
-
KB(H(m))
Bob’s digital large
private signature message
- Bob’s
key KB (encrypt) m digital
public
+ signature
key KB
encrypted H: hash (decrypt)
msg digest function
-
+ KB(H(m))
H(m) H(m)
equal
?
8-25
8: Network Security
 Public Key Certification
public key problem:
• When Alice obtains Bob’s public key (from web site, e-mail,
diskette), how does she know it is Bob’s public key, not
Trudy’s?
solution:
• trusted certification authority (CA)

8: Network Security 8-26

 Certification Authorities
• Certification Authority (CA): binds public key to particular
entity, E.
• E registers its public key with CA.
– E provides “proof of identity” to CA.
– CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.
– certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA: CA says
“This is E’s public key.”
- +
K CA(KB )
Bob’s digital
+
public +
signature KB
key KB (encrypt)
CA
private - certificate for
Bob’s K CA
identifying key Bob’s public key,
information signed by CA
8-27
8: Network Security
 Certification Authorities
• when Alice wants Bob’s public key:
– gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere).
– apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate, get
Bob’s public key
- +
+ K CA(KB ) digital Bob’s
KB signature public
+
(decrypt) KB key

CA
public +
K CA
key

8-28
8: Network Security
 A certificate contains:
• Serial number (unique to issuer)
• info about certificate owner, including algorithm and key
value itself (not shown)
r info about
certificate
issuer
r valid dates
r digital signature
by issuer

8: Network Security 8-29

 Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to
him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

“I am Alice”
Failure scenario??

8: Network Security 8-30

 Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to
him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

in a network,
Bob can not “see” Alice, so
Trudy simply declares
herself to be Alice
“I am Alice”

8: Network Security 8-31

 Authentication: another try
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet
containing her source IP address

Alice’s
IP address
“I am Alice”

Failure scenario??

8: Network Security 8-32

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet
containing her source IP address

Trudy can create

a packet “spoofing”
Alice’s address
Alice’s
IP address
“I am Alice”

8: Network Security 8-33

 Authentication: another try
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

Failure scenario??
Alice’s
OK
IP addr

8: Network Security 8-34

 Authentication: another try
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password
playback attack: Trudy
Alice’s records Alice’s packet
OK
IP addr and later
plays it back to Bob

Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

8: Network Security 8-35

 Authentication: yet another try
Protocol ap3.1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
encrypted secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

Failure scenario??
Alice’s
OK
IP addr

8: Network Security 8-36

 Authentication: another try
Protocol ap3.1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
encrypted secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice” record
IP addr password
and
playback
Alice’s
OK still works!
IP addr

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

8: Network Security 8-37

 Authentication: yet another try
Goal: avoid playback attack

Nonce: number (R) used only once –in-a-lifetime

ap4.0: to prove Alice “live”, Bob sends Alice nonce, R. Alice

must return R, encrypted with shared secret key

“I am Alice”

K (R) Alice is live, and

A-B only Alice knows
key to encrypt
nonce, so it must
Failures, drawbacks? be Alice!
8: Network Security 8-38
 Authentication: ap5.0
ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key
• can we authenticate using public key techniques?
ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography

“I am Alice”
Bob computes
R + -
K (K (R)) = R
K - (R) A A
A and knows only Alice
“send me your public key”
could have the private
+ key, that encrypted R
K such that
A + -
K (K (R)) = R
A A

8: Network Security 8-39

 ap5.0: security hole
Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to
Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

I am Alice I am Alice
R -
K (R)
T
R - Send me your public key
K (R) +
A K
T
Send me your public key
+
K
A +
K (m)
Trudy gets T
- +
+ m = K (K (m))
K (m)
A sends T
m toTAlice
- + encrypted with
m = K (K (m))
A A Alice’s public key
8-40
8: Network Security
 ap5.0: security hole
Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to
Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

Difficult to detect:
q Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice
versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet one week later and
recall conversation)
q problem is that Trudy receives all messages as well!

8-41
8: Network Security
 Secure e-mail
q Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.

KS

m K ( .)
S
KS(m ) KS(m )
KS ( ) . m

+ Internet - KS

KS
+ .
KB ( ) + +
-
KB ( ) .
KB(KS ) KB(KS )
K+
B KB-

Alice:
q generates random symmetric private key, KS.
q encrypts message with KS (for efficiency)
q also encrypts KS with Bob’s public key.
q sends both KS(m) and KB(KS) to Bob.
8: Network Security 8-42
 Secure e-mail
q Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.

KS

m K ( .)
S
KS(m ) KS(m )
KS ( ) . m

+ Internet - KS

KS
+ .
KB ( ) + +
-
KB ( ) .
KB(KS ) KB(KS )
K+
B KB-

Bob:
q uses his private key to decrypt and recover KS
q uses KS to decrypt KS(m) to recover m

8: Network Security 8-43

 Secure e-mail (continued)
• Alice wants to provide sender authentication message integrity.

KA- KA+
- -
m H(.)
-
KA( ). KA(H(m)) KA(H(m)) +
KA( ). H(m )

+ Internet - compare

m H( ). H(m )
m

• Alice digitally signs message.

• sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature.

8: Network Security 8-44

 Secure e-mail (continued)
• Alice wants to provide secrecy, sender authentication,
message integrity.
KA-
-
m .
H( )
-
KA( ). KA(H(m))
KS

+ KS ( ).
m + Internet

KS
+
KB ( ). +
KB(KS )
K+
B

Alice uses three keys: her private key, Bob’s public key, newly
created symmetric key

8: Network Security 8-45

 Pretty good privacy (PGP)
• Internet e-mail encryption A PGP signed message:
scheme, de-facto standard.
---BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE---
• uses symmetric key cryptography, Hash: SHA1
public key cryptography, hash
function, and digital signature as Bob:My husband is out of town
tonight.Passionately yours,
described. Alice
• provides secrecy, sender
authentication, integrity. ---BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE---
Version: PGP 5.0
• inventor, Phil Zimmerman, was Charset: noconv
target of 3-year federal yhHJRHhGJGhgg/12EpJ+lo8gE4vB3mqJ
investigation. hFEvZP9t6n7G6m5Gw2
---END PGP SIGNATURE---

8: Network Security 8-46