What Prospects For Justice in The Central African Republic? FIDH

What prospects for justice in the
Central African Republic?

Complementarity between national
and international mechanisms: status and challenges
October 2022 / N° 799a

Cover photo: Photo taken at the opening of the first trial of the Special Criminal Court of the Central African Republic in Bangui on
25 April 2022. © Barbara DEBOUT/AFP
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of acronyms....................................................................................................................................4
I. Introduction.........................................................................................................................................5
II. Methodology......................................................................................................................................7
III. Background.......................................................................................................................................8
IV. Who are the main actors involved in justice in CAR?.........................................................................12

A) Ordinary courts: landmark cases despite a lack of capacity and independence .................................12
1. Structure of the ordinary justice system.............................................................................................................. 12
2. Cases: several emblematic prosecutions often tainted by irregularities..................................................... 13
3. Advantages and disadvantages of ordinary courts........................................................................................... 15
B) Special Criminal Court (SCC): a long-awaited hybrid court that has yet to prove its worth...............16
1. SCC origins and mandate......................................................................................................................................... 16
2. SCC organs and their functions.............................................................................................................................. 18
3. Cases: from the delays of the early years to the opening of the first trial in 2022.................................... 22
4. Advantages and disadvantages of the Special Criminal Court...................................................................... 24
C) The International Criminal Court (ICC): a distant institution that has disappointed but still offers hope..... 25
1. Mandate and jurisdiction of the ICC...................................................................................................................... 25
2. Cases: from the fiasco of the Bemba case to a stronger involvement in the CAR II situation.........26
•“CAR I” situation......................................................................................................................................................... 26
•“CAR II” situation....................................................................................................................................................... 27
3. Advantages and disadvantages of the International Criminal Court............................................................ 29
D) Other actors involved in justice..................................................................................................................................... 30
1. The Commission Vérité, Justice, Réparation et Réconciliation (Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Reconciliation Commission - CVJRR)....................................................................................................................... 30
2. Informal or traditional justice................................................................................................................................... 32
3. Military courts.............................................................................................................................................................. 33
4. Foreign courts and the principle of universal jurisdiction................................................................................ 34
V. Analysis of complementarity...................................................................................................................38
A) Complementarity as specified in the mandates...................................................................................................... 38
1. Ordinary courts ........................................................................................................................................................... 38
2. Special Criminal Court............................................................................................................................................... 38
3. International Criminal Court..................................................................................................................................... 39
4. CVJRR............................................................................................................................................................................ 41
B) Complementarity in practice......................................................................................................................................... 41
1. Interaction between the ICC and the SCC: a relationship under construction........................................... 41
2. Multiplicity of actors involved in the fight against impunity: need for effective complementarity and
cooperation....................................................................................................................................................................... 43
•Ensuring more equitable consideration of national courts........................................................................... 43
•Ensuring clarification of roles and greater cooperation between truth-telling mechanisms, criminal
courts and national authorities.............................................................................................................................. 44
•Ensuring a victim-centred approach in efforts to achieve justice and close interaction with civil
society........................................................................................................................................................................... 45
3. Victim protection and reparation measures: the need for a comprehensive and harmonised
approach............................................................................................................................................................................ 45
Recommendations............................................................................................................................................48
FIDH/LCDH/OCDH - What prospects for justice in the Central African Republic? Complementarity between national 3
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Accord Politique pour la Paix et la Réconciliation en République centrafricaine

APPR-RCA
(Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African
Republic)
CAR Central African Republic
Commission Vérité, Justice, Réparation et Réconciliation (Truth, Justice, Repara-
CVJRR
tion and Reconciliation Commission)
FACA Forces armées centrafricaines (Central African Republic Armed Forces)
FIDH International Federation for Human Rights
ICC International Criminal Court
LCDH Ligue Centrafricaine des Droits de l’Homme (Central African League for Human
Rights)
MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
African Republic
OCDH bservatoire Centrafricain des Droits de l’Homme (Central African Observatory for
O
Human Rights)
SCC Special Criminal Court of the Central African Republic
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
4 FIDH/LCDH/OCDH - What prospects for justice in the Central African Republic? Complementarity between national
I. Introduction
On 19 April 2022, after seven long years of waiting, the people of the Central African Republic (CAR)
and the international community witnessed the opening ceremony of the first trial at the Special
Criminal Court (SCC) of the Central African Republic (CAR). This hybrid court, composed of Central
African and international judges, was created in 2015 to play a central role in the fight against
impunity for crimes under international law and serious human rights violations committed in CAR
since January 2003. The SCC thus joins the ordinary courts of CAR and the International Criminal
Court (ICC), which has opened two investigations into the situation in CAR for crimes under
international law committed in the context of the 2002/2003 conflict and the renewed violence
since 2012.
In a country that has been plagued by conflict and violence for more than 20 years1 and where
impunity reigns, these various avenues of access to justice represent an unprecedented
opportunity. As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, noted in
March 2022, “Impunity for serious human rights violations and other crimes is at the heart of the
violence in the Central African Republic” and “paves the way for further cycles of violence across the
country”.2 A system in which three levels of justice cooperate (domestic, hybrid and international)
could contribute to fighting impunity in the country effectively and lastingly. To do so, it is important
that this system is based on effective cooperation and complementarity at the institutional and
operational levels. As noted in 2017 by various UN entities tasked with mapping human rights
violations in CAR between 2003 and 2015, “Prosecuting alleged perpetrators of serious violations
of human rights law and international humanitarian law committed will involve the ICC, the Special
Criminal Court, regular courts of the Central African Republic and courts of foreign countries […].
This underscores the need for attention […] to complementarity between national courts and the
ICC, jurisdiction-sharing among national courts, and cooperation […]”.3 It is essential to ensure
communication and exchange between the various judicial institutions with jurisdiction.
In 2020, CAR also established the Commission Vérité, Justice, Réparation et Réconciliation (Truth,
Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission - CVJRR), with a highly ambitious mandate.
If given sufficient capacity, the Commission will complement this judicial trio and expand the
possibilities for transitional justice in CAR. The existence of such a body can, in theory, compensate
for the limitations of judicial proceedings, particularly criminal proceedings, by establishing the
truth about the wider context of crimes perpetrated on Central African territory and by recognising
the suffering of victims, survivors and affected communities. It can also play a central role in
reparation and recommend institutional reforms to contribute to guarantees of non-repetition of
past human rights violations.
This report considers the role played by these various institutions, judicial or otherwise, in the fight
against impunity for crimes under international law and serious human rights violations in CAR.
It begins by presenting these different institutions, their mandates, their composition and the key
cases they have dealt with in recent years. This part also includes an analysis of the strengths of
their mandates as well as the obstacles encountered, on the basis of long-term observations by
local and international civil society, in particular the International Federation for Human Rights
(FIDH) and its member organisations, the Ligue Centrafricaine des Droits de l’Homme (LCDH) and the
Observatoire Centrafricain des Droits de l’Homme (OCDH). The report then focuses on an analysis of
the complementarity between these institutions, as provided for in the texts and as implemented
in practice. It ends with a series of recommendations from civil society.
1. S
ee “Background”.
2. S
tatement by Michelle Bachelet at the 49th session of the Human Rights Council on the situation in the Central African Republic,
30 March 2022 (“Michelle Bachelet Statement 2022”), https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/03/bachelet-updates-
human-rights-council-central-african-republic.
3. MINUSCA et al, Report of the Mapping Project documenting serious violations of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Central African Republic between January 2003 and December 2015, May 2017,
p. 320 (“UN Mapping Report 2017”), https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/CF/Mapping2003-
2015/2017CAR_Mapping_Report_EN.pdf.
It is important to note that this analysis attempts to reflect the realities of the specific context of
CAR, a territory marked by continuing instability and daily violence. In such a context, efforts to
achieve justice face a number of obstacles of varying degrees of complexity. They also sometimes
compete with, and are weakened by, other priorities such as peacekeeping, disarmament and the
establishment of political stability. The notion of an ideal justice system has to be set against
the reality of CAR’s capacity to establish, maintain and operate such a system. Nevertheless, the
instability in the country cannot be considered to represent a complete barrier to the prosecution
of those responsible for crimes under international law and serious human rights violations, to the
search for justice, and to the reparation of the thousands of victims who have suffered numerous
attacks over the last 20 years. Even in this context, progress is possible, as the efforts of the last
few years documented in this report have shown. These efforts can and must be strengthened.
Combating impunity is essential in order to end the cycles of violence in CAR and must therefore
complement any other peace-making or peacekeeping efforts.
II. Methodology
The prosecution of perpetrators and reparation for victims of crimes under international law and
serious human rights violations committed in the Central African Republic has been a priority for
FIDH since the early 2000s. FIDH’s actions, in close collaboration with its member organisations,
have resulted in numerous documentation missions, submission of information to various judicial
institutions, including the International Criminal Court, advocacy at the national and international
level, publication of reports on efforts to achieve justice in relation to the situation in CAR, in
particular concerning several high-profile cases, as well as support to victims in judicial proceedings,
particularly before the ordinary courts.4
This study is therefore part of a long-standing commitment to the fight against impunity in CAR.
It is based on the following sources: the work carried out by FIDH and its member organisations
since 2002 (on the situation in CAR specifically and on complementarity between the ICC and
national jurisdictions more generally), including by monitoring the activities of the various judicial
institutions mentioned in the report; the results of an in-depth analysis of relevant data available to
our organisations (e.g. UN and civil society reports, legal texts and court documents, press articles
and academic contributions, unpublished analyses by partners); and a series of consultations
carried out in June and July 2022 by the FIDH International Justice Desk. The main objectives of
this report are to provide some insight into the different institutions involved in the fight against
impunity in CAR; to draw on the expertise of different actors involved at the local and international
level to identify successes, shortcomings and possibilities for improvement; and - most importantly
- to contribute to the overall efforts to achieve justice, aimed at ensuring that victims, who are still
waiting, are heard, recognised and receive reparations for their suffering.
In the course of preparing this report, 21 individuals were consulted, including representatives of local
and international civil society, journalists, academics, lawyers, judges, prosecutors and other staff
of relevant judicial institutions. As a result of practical difficulties linked to the health and security
context, and despite an initial intention to send representatives to CAR, the majority of interviews
were conducted remotely, by telephone or video conference, and in a very limited number of cases
in writing, due to logistical difficulties. Interviews were semi-structured. The information obtained
is reflected throughout this report. For security reasons and in order to facilitate exchanges, the
identities of the interviewees are not disclosed. Interviewees were given the opportunity to read the
recommendations at the end of the report prior to publication.
The report is up to date as of 26 September 2022.
4. T
his report contains numerous references to documents published by FIDH and its member organisations in CAR, including
reports, press releases, statements and other position papers.
III. Background
Central African Republic political map showing all provinces with their capital and capital of the country. © 2014 www.mapsofworld.com
https://www.mapsofworld.com/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-political-map.html
For the past 20 years, the Central African Republic has oscillated between armed conflicts, security
crises and periods of relative calm. Numerous crimes under international law and serious human
rights violations have been and continue to be perpetrated throughout the country by a wide range
of individuals (both local and from neighbouring countries, such as Chad, Sudan, Uganda and
Democratic Republic of Congo). Thousands of people have been subjected to all kinds of abuses
and are waiting for justice.
The first major conflict took place between October 2002 (with General François Bozizé’s attempted
coup against Ange-Félix Patassé’s administration) and March 2003 (when General Bozizé succeeded
in overthrowing the Patassé government,5 despite support from the Mouvement de Libération du
Congo (MLC) and its military leader Jean-Pierre Bemba).6 During this period, numerous abuses
were perpetrated, both between enemy armed groups and against the Central African population,
including rape, murder and pillaging.7 Although General Bozizé won the presidential election in
May 20058 becoming the legitimate President of CAR, the country remained in crisis, particularly
in the northern part, where there were many deaths, as well as several thousand refugees and
internally displaced people.9 After several failed peace initiatives, the signing of the Libreville Peace
Agreement on 21 June 200810 seemed to restore some calm to the country.
The presidential election of 23 January 2011 once again resulted in a strong majority for
François Bozizé at the head of the Central African state.11 Contesting the proper conduct of the
electoral process, the opposition and representatives of armed groups - particularly from the north
of the country - rapidly joined by Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries, formed a coalition, the Séléka
(“Coalition” or “Alliance” in Sango), in August 2012. This politico-military organisation quickly proved
to be very violent and multiple clashes with the government plunged the country into a new armed
conflict and a situation of constant violence against the civilian population.12 After a new, very
short-lived deal, embodied in a new agreement signed in Libreville on 11 January 2013, the Séléka
marched on Bangui and installed its representative Michel Djotodia as President of the Republic.13
5. F
IDH, “FIDH condemns General Bozizé’s military Coup and calls for respect of international humanitarian law”, 17 March 2003,
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/FIDH-condemns-the-General-Bozize-s.
6. F
IDH, “Q&A on the Bemba case at the ICC”, 22 March 2016, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/q-a-
on-the-bemba-case-at-the-icc.
7. S
ee ICC, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 21 March 2016 (“Bemba
Judgement”), paras 621-648. Although Jean-Pierre Bemba was acquitted on appeal of all charges brought against him by
the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber did not question that the crimes of murder, rape and pillaging were
committed by MLC troops. However, the Chamber was not satisfied that he was responsible (as a superior) for the commission
of such acts. See FIDH, “Acquittal of Jean Pierre Bemba on appeal: an affront to thousands of victims”, 8 June 2018, https://
www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/acquittal-of-jean-pierre-bemba-on-appeal-an-affront-to-thousands-
of. See also, on the crimes committed during this period and until 2005, FIDH, Forgotten, stigmatised: the double suffering of
victims of international crimes, October 2006, (“FIDH Report, Forgotten, Stigmatised, 2006”), https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/
RCA457ang-2007.pdf.
8. L
e Monde, “François Bozizé remporte la présidentielle et les législatives en Centrafrique” (François Bozizé wins the presidential
and legislative elections in CAR), 24 May 2005, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2005/05/24/francois-bozize-remporte-
la-presidentielle-et-les-legislatives-en-centrafrique_653511_3212.html.
9. F
IDH, “The civilian population in northern Central African Republic is in great danger”, 27 February 2006, https://www.fidh.
org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/The-Civilian-Population-in; FIDH, “Urgence d’une intervention en République
centrafricaine” (Urgent need for intervention in Central African Republic), 23 November 2006, https://www.fidh.org/fr/regions/
afrique/republique-centrafricaine/Urgence-d-une-intervention-en.
10. A
ccord de paix global entre le Gouvernement de la République centrafricaine et les Mouvements politico-militaires centrafricains
désignés ci-après: Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (APRD), Front democratique du Peuple Centrafricain
(FDPC) et Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) (Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the
Government of the Central African Republic and the following Central African politico-military movements: ARPD, FDPC and
UFDR), 21 June 2008, https://www.justiceinfo.net/media/k2/attachments/RCA/2008-Accord-paix-global.pdf.
11. L
e Monde, “François Bozizé, vainqueur contesté de l’élection présidentielle en Centrafrique” (François Bozizé, disputed winner
of the presidential election in CAR), 2 February 2011, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/02/02/francois-bozize-
vainqueur-conteste-de-la-presidentielle-centrafricaine_1474243_3212.html.
12. F
IDH, République centrafricaine un pays aux mains des criminels de guerre de la Séléka (CAR: a country in the grip of the Séléka
war criminals), September 2013, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_d_enque_te_rca-ld3.pdf.
13. Idem.
The Séléka soon committed numerous abuses (including rape, extra-judicial executions and
looting), particularly in Bangui.14 A few months after coming to power, under pressure from the
international community, Djotodia attempted to disband the Séléka.15 However, this initiative failed
and the various groups that make up the Séléka continued to commit acts of violence and to
exercise control over entire regions of the country, including through the creation of new armed
groups. Observing the powerlessness of the new government to curb insecurity, some of the
population took up arms and formed armed “self-defence” militias, known as the “anti-balaka”
(meaning “anti-machetes” in Sango, or “anti-AK bullets”, according to different interpretations).16
As the country experienced bloody clashes between Séléka and anti-balaka groups, but also often
between armed groups on the same side, President Djotodia was forced to step down.17 After his
resignation in January 2014, Catherine Samba-Panza was elected Head of State by the National
Transitional Council to ensure progress towards future democratic elections.18 Violence continued
throughout the country, with numerous casualties, including among the civilian population,
humanitarian organisations and the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Central African
Republic (MINUSCA).
In early 2016, following fresh elections, Faustin-Archange Touadéra was elected President of
CAR, generating a wave of hope among the population.19 FIDH and other Central African and
international organisations took the opportunity to call on the new President and his government
to make justice a priority.20 Following several failed attempts to reach a peace agreement, on
6 February 2019, the Accord politique pour la paix et la réconciliation en République centrafricaine
(Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in CAR - APPR-RCA) was ratified by 14 armed
groups and the Government.21 This agreement, which was welcomed by our organisations,22 is
based on the commitment of the various parties to a number of pillars, including the establishment
of an inclusive government, integrating members of armed groups, a disarmament, demobilisation,
reintegration and repatriation process, and the establishment of a truth, justice, reparation
and reconciliation commission. The fight against impunity is also, in theory, at the core of the
14. Idem. See also African Union, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in the Central African Republic,
17 June 2013, https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-of-the-chairperson-of-the-commission-on-the-situation-in-the-
central-african-republic-1.
15. B
BC, “Centrafrique: la Séléka dissoute” (Central African Republic: Séléka disbanded), 13 September 2013, https://www.bbc.
com/afrique/region/2013/09/130913_centrafrique_seleka.
16. A
ccording to the International Peace Information Service (IPIS), the term anti-balaka groups together distinct categories of
actors: individuals forming part of the official anti-balaka movement; affiliated/loosely affiliated or unaffiliated local militias;
groups described as “self-defence” groups; and criminal gangs. See IPIS and Danish Institute for International Studies, Central
African Republic: A Conflict Mapping, September 2018, https://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/1809-CAR-
conflict-mapping_web.pdf.
17. L
e Monde, “Centrafrique: démission du Président Michel Djotodia” (Central African Republic: resignation of President Michel
Djotodia), 10 January 2014, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2014/01/10/centrafrique-tractations-sur-le-sort-du-
president-djotodia_4345813_3212.html.
18. L
e Monde, “Catherine Samba-Panza, une femme à la tête de la Centrafrique” (Catherine Samba-Panza, a woman at the head
of the Central African Republic), 20 January 2014, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2014/01/20/centrafrique-un-
nouveau-president-pour-securiser-le-pays_4350807_3212.html; UN Women, Statement by UN Women Executive Director
Phumzile Mlanbo-Ngcuka, 23 January 2014, https://www.unwomen.org/fr/news/stories/2014/1/press-statement-on-central-
african-republic.
19. R
FI, “RCA: le nouveau Président Faustin-Archange Touadéra a prêté serment” (CAR: New President Faustin-Archange Touadéra
is sworn in), 30 March 2016, https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20160330-rca-nouveau-president-faustin-archange-touadera-prete-
serment-bangui.
20. F
IDH, “Make justice a priority”, 21 April 2016, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/central-african-
republic-make-justice-a-priority.
21. P
olitical Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, February 2019 (“APPR-RCA”),
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2019_145_E.pdf.
22. F
IDH, “L’accord de paix de Khartoum constitue une chance pour la paix, la justice et la reconciliation” (The Khartoum peace
agreement is an opportunity for peace, justice and reconciliation), 20 February 2019, https://www.fidh.org/fr/regions/afrique/
republique-centrafricaine/l-accord-de-paix-de-khartoum-constitue-une-chance-pour-la-paix-la.
commitments of the signatories.23 Although this agreement led to some improvement in the
situation in CAR, the country remains plagued by violence and clashes, while efforts to achieve
justice have been limited.
In January 2021, President Touadéra was re-elected with a low turnout.24 Faced with renewed
violence in the country, he declared a unilateral ceasefire in October of that year. However, this
only resulted in a short-lived period of respite, due to “the absence of tangible progress made with
respect to political dialogue and continued violence”.25 Very soon, clashes (between armed groups
and with the national security forces) resumed with even greater intensity.26 According to the final
report of the UN Panel of Experts on the situation in CAR published in June 2022, the civilian
population caught in the middle of the fighting was once again the victim of numerous abuses,
including rape and other forms of sexual violence.27
This situation was further aggravated by the presence of Russian forces on the territory, working
alongside the national security forces and accused of numerous abuses against the civilian
population. These Russian forces, and in particular the so-called Wagner Group (which also
operates in other parts of the world), are reported to be in CAR in accordance with an agreement
signed by the Russian and CAR Ministries of Defence on 21 August 2018 to provide instruction and
training to the national security forces.28 According to the Independent Expert on the situation of
human rights in CAR, Yao Agbetse, the group is reported to have committed “sexual violence, acts
of intimidation, destruction of housing, threats, racketeering”, but also “acts of torture [and] cruel,
humiliating, inhuman and degrading treatment”.29 These abuses were also documented by Human
Rights Watch in findings published on May 2022.30
23. A
PPR-RCA, op. cit. The preamble to the agreement recognises that, “[T]he impunity that reigns has fuelled the infernal cycle
of violence, weakened the judiciary, led to large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and
fomented the people’s mistrust of the State.” However, few articles of the agreement provide for concrete measures to address
this situation. Among the Government’s commitments, it undertakes to “[…] advance the consolidation of the judiciary in order
to strengthen the rule of law throughout the country” (Article 4.p). In the section entitled “justice and national reconciliation”,
there are some brief references to impunity, such as, “The Parties, while rejecting any idea of impunity and recognizing the
principle of presumption of innocence, acknowledge the painful consequences and the wounds left by grave crimes on all
citizens and communities in the Central African Republic” (Article 7). Beyond these provisions, the focus is on reconciliation
and the other priorities of the agreement.
24. L
e Monde, “Centrafrique: le Président Touadéra réélu mais seul un électeur sur trois a voté” (CAR: President Touadéra re-
elected but only one in three voters cast a ballot), 18 January 2021, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/01/18/
centrafrique-les-rebelles-se-retirent-de-bangassou-apres-un-ultimatum-de-l-onu_6066630_3212.html.
25. U
nited Nations Security Council (UNSC), Central African Republic, Report of the Secretary General, S/2022/119, 16 February 2022,
para. 2 (“UNSG Report on CAR, February 2022”).
26. Ibid., para. 21.
27. U
NSC, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2588
(2021), S/2022/527, 29 June 2022, pp. 13 et seq. and 17 et seq. See also Ibid., paras 21-34.
28. M
andates of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the
exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination; the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises; the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances; the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, Statement, 25 March 2021, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/
DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26305.
29. U
nited Nations, “RCA: l’ONU s’insurge des exactions commises par les rebelles et le groupe paramilitaire russe Wagner”
(CAR: UN condemns abuses by rebels and Russian paramilitary group Wagner), 20 March 2022, https://news.un.org/fr/
story/2022/03/1117312.
30. H
uman Rights Watch, Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia-Linked Forces, May 2022,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/03/central-african-republic-abuses-russia-linked-forces.
IV. Who are the main actors involved in justice in CAR?
A) Ordinary courts: landmark cases despite a lack of capacity and independence
1. Structure of the ordinary justice system

Within the Central African judicial system, whose highest court is the Court of Cassation, the
so-called “ordinary” criminal courts deal with criminal offences committed in the country. Under
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Criminal Court has jurisdiction over crimes contained in the
Criminal Code (including war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide), with the
exception of those that come under the jurisdiction of special courts.31 The Criminal Court sits in
Bangui but can conduct hearings or sessions at the seat of each Court of Appeal in the country.32
It is composed of a President, two associate judges and six jurors. It is assisted by a Registrar and
cases are conducted by the Prosecutor-General or a delegated public prosecutor.33
The Criminal Court is a non-permanent court which, under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
should hold one ordinary session per six-month period in the jurisdiction of each Court of Appeal,
i.e., Bangui, Bouar (Western zone) and Bambari (Eastern zone), or more if circumstances so require.34
In practice, owing to various obstacles both internal and external to the judicial administration,
including a significant lack of resources (with an insufficient and ever-decreasing budget for the
justice system) and the continuing insecurity in the country, the number of sessions held each year
is far from the six required by law. No sessions were held between February 2020 and April 2022,
partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, lack of funding and increased insecurity. The lack of regular
sessions of the criminal court is particularly problematic in a country where violence is a daily
occurrence and where the six scheduled sessions are in any case insufficient given the scale of the
crimes committed and the number of perpetrators to be prosecuted. Despite this, the UN Secretary-
General noted in his report on CAR that, as of 1 February 2022, “80 per cent of first instance and
appellate courts were operational”.35 Thus, sessions were to resume in 2022 in Bangui (April) and
Bouar (July).36
In recent years, the Prosecutor-General, Eric Didier Tambo, has been particularly active in
prosecuting those responsible for crimes classified as, or that could be classified as, war crimes
or crimes against humanity. Several cases have led to convictions, mainly on the basis of crimes
under ordinary law but concerning acts likely to be of interest to the international justice system.
In this context, despite the absence of a permanent criminal justice system, the country has made
some notable progress.
31. C
AR, Loi n°10.002 portant Code de procédure pénale (Law No. 10.002 establishing the Code of Criminal Procedure),
6 January 2010, Article 219 (“Code of Criminal Procedure”).
32. Ibid., Article 209.
35. U
NSG report on CAR, February 2022, op. cit., para. 55.
36. M
INUSCA, “La Cour d’appel de Bouar reprend ses sessions criminelles” (The Court of Appeal of Bouar resumes its criminal
sessions), 15 June 2022, https://minusca.unmissions.org/la-cour-d%E2%80%99appel-de-bouar-reprend-ses-sessions-
criminelles.
2. Cases: several emblematic prosecutions often tainted by irregularities
The case of Rodrigue Ngaïbona, a.k.a General Andjilo, a former anti-balaka leader who played
a key role in the massacre of Muslims in Bangui in 2013 and committed other abuses between
October 2014 and January 2015, demonstrated a new commitment on the part of the national
justice system to end impunity in the country. This was the first conviction of an anti-balaka
leader since the events of 2012.37 Andjilo was arrested in 2015 and was tried in the January 2018
criminal court session for murder, illegal possession of military weapons and ammunition,
criminal conspiracy, armed robbery and unlawful detention. FIDH and its member organisations
were involved in the proceedings by supporting the Collectif d’avocats pour la lutte contre l’impunité
(Collective of lawyers against impunity, “the Collective”), composed mainly of Central African
lawyers, who assisted several victims in this case at the Criminal Court of Bangui. At the conclusion
of the criminal session, Andjilo was sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour and ordered
to pay damages to the victims and a symbolic franc to the human rights organisations involved in
the proceedings.38 Although the charges against him were brought under ordinary criminal law, this
case demonstrated a significant commitment by the national justice system.
While FIDH and its member organisations welcomed the “decisive first step” represented by this
decision, they deplored some weaknesses in the proceedings, most of which are inherent to the
Central African justice system. For example, the way in which the prosecution case was framed –
failing to cover all the crimes allegedly committed by General Andjilo - and the lack of protection
for victims and witnesses, some of whom did not testify for fear of reprisals.39 The latter point was
overwhelmingly raised during the consultations conducted for the preparation of this report in June
and July 2022. In a country still facing a situation of ongoing violence where a high level of impunity
reigns, the lack of genuine and effective protection for victims and witnesses constitutes a major
obstacle to justice, as does the inadequate protection of judicial personnel. Depending on the case,
the risks of testifying against, prosecuting or trying certain individuals may be, or may appear to be,
much more significant than the potential outcome of the hearings, including a possible conviction.
In 2019, a further step forward was taken when Colonel Abdoulaye Alkali Said, a senior member
of the Séléka rebellion and member of the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC),
was prosecuted on ten counts, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. During the
September 2019 session, he was sentenced to six years in prison for criminal conspiracy. The
other crimes were dismissed for lack of evidence.40 In that case, the defence lawyer Célestin Nzala
deplored the inadequacy of the procedure, alleging that he had only been allowed one week to study
the case, which was particularly complex given the number of charges and their classification as
international crimes, and two visits to his client before the short trial was held.41 According to
Amnesty International, “there are some serious concerns over due process and fairness of these
proceedings” in this case.42 Concerns about lack of fairness and respect for the rights of the defence
are the subject of other recurring criticisms of the ordinary courts, which remain relevant in 2022.
However, our consultations in June and July 2022 revealed some hope among civil society that
fair trial practices would improve with the involvement of international staff in the Special Criminal
Court. Interviewees considered that this would be likely to influence the practices of the Central
African justice system more generally, including at the level of the ordinary courts, towards greater
respect for international human rights standards.
37. F
IDH, “Conviction of Andjilo: a first warlord trial and a decisive first step”, 22 January 2018 (“FIDH, Conviction of Andjilo”),
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/conviction-of-andjilo-a-first-warlord-trial-and-a-decisive-
first-step; TV5 Monde, “Vidéo – En Centrafrique, prison à vie pour le Général Andjilo, chef anti-balaka”, https://information.
tv5monde.com/afrique/video-en-centrafrique-prison-vie-pour-general-andjilo-chef-anti-balaka-216080.
38. F
IDH, Conviction of Andjilo, op. cit.
39. Idem.
40. R
FI, “Centrafrique: un haut-gradé de l’ex-Séléka condamné à six ans de prison ferme” (CAR: a senior ex-Séléka officer
sentenced to six years in prison), 23 September 2019, https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190923-rca-abdoulaye-alkali-said-
justice-condamnation-seleka-six-ans-prison-ferme.
41. J
usticeinfo.net, “À Bangui, la Cour criminelle double la CPI et la CPS” (In Bangui, the Criminal Court overtakes the ICC and the
SCC), 26 September 2019, https://www.justiceinfo.net/fr/42466-bangui-cour-criminelle-double-cpi-et-cps.html.
42. A
mnesty International, Annual Report 2019, Africa, Central African Republic, 8 April 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/
documents/afr01/1352/2020/en/.
In 2020, another significant case was brought before the Bangui Criminal Court, against anti-
balaka militia leaders Kevin Bere Bere, Crépin Wakanam (a.k.a Pino Pino), Romarci Mandago,
Patrick Gbiako, Yembeline Mbenguia Alpha and 23 militia members under their command. This
case was unprecedented in terms of the number of defendants, the seriousness of the charges
and the length of the trial (in comparison with other cases held before the ordinary courts).43 It
concerned the violence that took place in May 2017 in the town of Bangassou, including killings,
attacks on protected persons and widespread destruction. As in the case of General Andjilo, FIDH
and its member organisations were involved in the proceedings, this time by appointing six lawyers
within the Collective to represent 34 plaintiffs.44 At the conclusion of a trial which lasted three
weeks, the main defendants, who held positions of authority within the anti-balaka movement,
were sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour, including for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, and were ordered to pay damages to the victims and a symbolic franc to the human
rights NGOs involved in the case (notably FIDH, LCDH, OCDH, CEJP and ACAT).45 This was the first
conviction for crimes against humanity by a Central African court.
Despite the significance of the case for the ordinary justice system, our organisations, which
closely followed its progress and hearings, again deplored a number of irregularities or difficulties
in proceedings.46 It seems that genuine adversarial hearings took place, with testimony from
victims and witnesses, time for the defendants to respond, and the presentation of factual and
visual evidence by the civil parties and the defence. However, a lack of fairness in the proceedings
and inadequate protection for victims and witnesses were noted: defence lawyers (who were
court-appointed) only had access to the case file a few days before the start of the trial and to their
clients on the day of the opening of the hearing, considerably limiting the possibility of mounting
a proper defence; defendants were handcuffed in the courtroom, which was criticised by both
defence and civil party lawyers; there were alleged failings in the treatment of defendants during
their detention; and the request made by civil party lawyers for anonymity of statements in order to
limit reprisals against victims and witnesses was rejected. This, a fortiori, resulted in the absence
of closed sessions, leading to a high level of exposure of the civil parties, in a situation where many
combatants remained at large, and a greater risk to their safety and that of their families.47
The “resumed” criminal court session that took place in Bangui between April and June 2022 tried
around fifty defendants, including former ministers and a retired General in the Forces armées
centrafricaines (Central African Republic Armed Forces - FACA). Among the twenty or so cases
analysed, there were charges of criminal conspiracy, undermining state security, possession of
arms and ammunition, murder and, more rarely, sexual violence. At the end of the session, 21 cases
had been tried, six resulted in acquittal (including that of the former FACA General), 14 in fixed-term
sentences of forced labour (between five and 15 years) and one in a prison sentence.48 Several
cases were adjourned to future sessions or referred to other institutions. Among the defendants
concerned, Ibrahim Fofana, a minor at the time of the alleged offences, was referred to the Juvenile
Court. It is interesting to note that he was the only defendant during the session to be charged
with war crimes and crimes against humanity. He was accused of having been involved in the
43. J
usticeinfo.net, “Centrafrique: La justice ordinaire a montré ses dents, pour les crimes de Bangassou” (CAR: The ordinary
justice system has shown its teeth in relation to the crimes in Bangassou), 10 February 2020, https://www.justiceinfo.net/
fr/43745-centrafrique-justice-ordinaire-montre-dents-crimes-bangassou.html.
44. F
IDH, “The Central African justice system strongly condemns those responsible for the Bangassou massacre”, 7 February 2020,
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/the-central-african-justice-system-strongly-condemns-those.
45. O
f the militia members, 19 were sentenced to 15 years of hard labour or 10 years of imprisonment and four were referred to
the Juvenile Court as they were minors at the time of the events. They were all jointly and severally ordered to pay damages.
46. T
hese concerns were also raised by Amnesty International. See in particular Amnesty International, Central African Republic:
“On trial, these warlords lowered their eyes”, 2020, pp. 32-35 (“Amnesty International CAR Report 2020”), https://www.amnesty.
org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR1931852020ENGLISH.pdf.
47. O
bservations made by our organisations and observers of the “Bangassou trial”.
48. A
gence centrafricaine de presse, “Clôture des travaux de la première session criminelle de la Cour d’appel de Bangui” (Closure
of the first criminal session of the Bangui Court of Appeal), 23 June 2022, https://www.acap.cf/Cloture-des-travaux-de-la-
premiere-session-criminelle-de-la-Cour-d-appel-de-Bangui_a11725.html; Africa press, “Première session criminelle de 2022”
(First criminal session of 2022), 25 June 2022, https://www.africa-press.net/centrafricaine/politique/remiere-session-
criminelle-de-2022.
Bangassou massacre alongside Pépin Wakanam a.k.a Pino-Pino.49 However, he was acquitted by
the Juvenile Court.
In addition to the few emblematic cases mentioned above, the ordinary courts have also heard
other cases involving both anti-balaka and Séléka members, including individuals in positions of
responsibility.
3. Advantages and disadvantages of ordinary courts50

In general, cases before the ordinary courts are widely broadcast on the radio, the internet and
sometimes on television, which generates strong interest in the justice system and its appropriation
by the population. According to a study by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative on behalf of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and MINUSCA, these broadcasts also lead to an
increase in confidence in justice, including formal justice.51
While this demonstrates a determination to see justice done and to fight impunity, both among
actors involved in justice and the population as a whole, many difficulties remain. These include
a serious lack of financial, material and human resources and expertise, affecting the capacity of
ordinary courts to fulfil their mandate. According to the consultations carried out for the purposes
of this report in June and July 2022, constant reductions in the budget allocated to the justice
system by the government has a major impact on the possibility of administering justice in
CAR (including in terms of protection of victims and witnesses, as discussed above).52 Another
important factor raised during our consultations is the lack of independence of the ordinary
courts, which are heavily influenced by political alliances. A sectoral justice policy was developed
in 2018-2019 by the Ministry of Justice to address this and the other above-mentioned challenges,
including the protection of victims and witnesses, the need for a permanent justice system, access
to justice - particularly with regard to crimes under international law and sexual and gender-based
crimes - and procedural fairness. In order to ensure the implementation of this policy, a decree was
adopted in January 2020.53 This document, the first of its kind in CAR, was welcomed as a positive
commitment, despite subsequent difficulties in implementation. It remains to be seen how this
policy will be implemented and what its practical impact will be.
49. B
angui.com, “Centrafrique: la Cour criminelle renvoie le dossier d’Ibrahim Fofana devant le Tribunal pour enfants” (CAR:
The Criminal Court refers Ibrahim Fofana’s case to the Juvenile Court), 1 June 2022, http://news.abangui.com/h/80070.
html; Agence centrafricaine de presse, “La cour se déclare incompétente dans l’affaire contre Ibrahim Fofana” (The court
declares itself without jurisdiction in the case against Ibrahim Fofana), 31 May 2022, https://www.acap.cf/La-cour-se-declare-
incompetente-dans-l-affaire-contre-Ibrahim-Fofana_a11674.html.
50. T
able produced by FIDH and its member organisations in CAR on the basis of the analysis in this report.
51. M
INUSCA, UNDP, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Peace, Justice and Security Polls, Central African Republic – Report 4, May 2019,
p. 4, http://www.peacebuildingdata.org/sites/m/pdf/CAR_Poll4_Engl_Final.pdf; MINUSCA, UNDP, Harvard Humanitarian
Initiative, Brigham and Women’s Physicians Organization, Peace, Justice and Security Polls, Central African Republic – Report 5,
November 2020, p. 31 (“CAR Polls 2020”), http://www.peacebuildingdata.org/sites/m/pdf/CAR_Poll5_ENG.pdf.
52. A
mnesty International CAR Report 2020, op. cit. The report refers to “challenges and obstacles” that “are well documented
and are recognized by the authorities themselves”; See also Avocats sans frontières Belgium (ASF), Coopérer et se coordonner
pour renforcer l’accès à la justice entre acteurs centrafricains: défis et réalités (Cooperating and coordinating to strengthen
access to justice among Central African actors: challenges and realities), March 2019, https://www.asf.be/wp-content/
uploads/2019/11/ASF-Coop%C3%A9erer-et-se-coordonner-pour-renforcer-lacc%C3%A8s-%C3%A0-la-justice-entre-acteurs-
centrafricains.pdf.
53. C
AR, Politique sectorielle de la justice 2020-2024 (Sectoral Justice Policy 2020-2024), approved on 18 September 2019;
CAR, Arrêté n° 005/MJDH/DIRCAB/CMRJMR.20 portant création du dispositif institutionnel de coordination et de mise en œuvre
de la politique sectorielle du ministère de la Justice et des Droits de l’Homme (Administrative Order No. 005/MJDH/DIRCAB/
CMRJMR.20 on the creation of the institutional mechanism for the coordination and implementation of the sectoral policy
of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights), 16 January 2020; Amnesty International CAR Report 2020, op. cit. p. 30. The
sectoral policy identifies five priority areas for the period concerned: “independence, accountability and morality of the judicial
staff and justice system; strengthening the ‘justice offer’ including internal management and communication with public;
strengthening the demand for justice and the access for all to the justice system, including through legal aid and protection
of victims and witnesses; strengthening the criminal judicial system and the prison system, including transitioning to a
permanent criminal justice system and improving security of prisons and conditions for detainees; respect of human rights
and implementation of transitional justice, including fighting against impunity for crimes under international law through
ordinary tribunals and the SCC.”
Advantages Disadvantages
Proximity of justice and improved appropriation Lack of independence of judges and
by the population prosecutors, despite prosecutions of both anti-
balaka and Séléka members
Knowledge of the judicial and social context Lack of financial, material and human
resources and expertise (particularly in the
area of crimes under international law and
the application of international law, which is
currently inconsistent and uneven)
Visibility of cases Lack of fairness in trial proceedings, lack
of respect for the rights of the defence and
inadequate protection of victims and witnesses
Rapidity of proceedings and relatively regular Insufficient sessions to deal with all crimes/
hearings (in theory) cases
B) Special Criminal Court (SCC): a long-awaited hybrid court that has yet to prove
its worth
1. SCC origins and mandate

The SCC is a special court within the Central African judicial system, with its seat in Bangui.54 It
is responsible for investigating serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law committed on the territory of CAR since 1 January 2003, and for prosecuting and trying those
responsible.55 It focuses on the most serious crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity
and genocide, and those who played a key role in their commission. It is a hybrid institution
composed of national and international members.
The creation of the SCC reflects a general resolve, both of the population as a whole and of
individuals particularly involved in local and international justice efforts, to establish an institution
specifically mandated to deal with the most serious violence perpetrated in CAR, to deliver justice
to the thousands of victims who are still waiting and to put an end to the deep-rooted impunity of
those responsible. This institution was envisaged as a complement - more specialised and more
independent - to the ordinary courts, which have limited capacity. By ensuring that justice is done,
this institution is intended to foster the process of national reconciliation and, a fortiori, a return to
lasting peace on the territory.56 This determination was initially demonstrated by the establishment
in April 2014 of a Special Investigation and Prosecution Unit with a mandate very similar to that
of the SCC.57 This was followed by an agreement in August 2014 between the transitional CAR
Government and the United Nations on the creation of a special court.58 The promulgation of the
law on the establishment, organisation and operation of the Special Criminal Court by the Interim
54. C
AR, Loi n° 15.003 portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de la Cour Pénale Spéciale (Law No. 15.003 on the
establishment, organisation and operation of the Special Criminal Court), 3 June 2015, Article 2 (“Law on the establishment
of the SCC”). The seat of the court may, however, “be transferred to any other place in the national territory, where exceptional
circumstances or the requirements of the service so demand.”
55. Ibid., article 3.
56. F
IDH, “What is Central African Republic’s Special Criminal Court?”, 19 July 2017, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/
central-african-republic/what-is-the-special-criminal-court.
57. The Unit was created by presidential decree on 9 April 2014. FIDH and its member organisations had called for the
establishment of such a body. See for example FIDH, OCDH and LCDH, Central African Republic: “They must all leave or die”,
June 2014, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/15618-central-african-republic-they-must-all-
leave-or-die.
58. FIDH, “CAR: UN backed Special Criminal Court set-up to fight impunity”, 17 September 2014, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/
Africa/central-african-republic/16048-car-un-backed-special-criminal-court-css-set-up-to-fight-impunity.
President Catherine Samba Panza on 3 June 201559 confirmed this desire for justice, providing
CAR with a long-awaited specialised court for which many, including FIDH and its member
organisations, had been fighting.60
The SCC was created for a period of five years (from its “effective establishment”, i.e., the inaugural
session of 22 October 2018, until the end of 2023), which may be renewed “if necessary” (six
months before the end of its mandate at the initiative of the Government of CAR, in consultation
with the UN).61 It is supported in the exercise of its mandate by MINUSCA, particularly in operational
security and arrests, and by UNDP in financial and logistical management.62 The SCC’s funding
has been an important issue and a focus of criticism from the outset. It has substantial funds
compared to the ordinary courts but an insufficient budget to fulfil its mandate. To date, it has
been funded primarily through voluntary contributions, mainly from France, the Netherlands, the
United States, the European Union and the United Nations, through MINUSCA and UNDP. This type
of voluntary funding is problematic in that it does not provide the stability required by a judicial
institution and can undermine its independence, as some of the funds provided are earmarked for
a particular type of work, thus preventing a balanced distribution of resources according to actual
needs.
59. F
IDH, “Special Criminal Court officially created”, 10 June 2015, https://www.fidh.org/en/impacts/central-african-republic-
special-criminal-court-officially-created.
60. Idem; FIDH et al, “New Special Criminal Court: A Key Step Toward Justice”, 24 April 2015, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/
Africa/central-african-republic/new-special-criminal-court-a-key-step-toward-justice; FIDH, “Why a Special Criminal Court
for the Central African Republic Deserves Your Support”, 19 February 2015, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-
african-republic/17015-why-a-special-criminal-court-for-the-central-african-republic-deserves.
61. L
aw on the establishment of the SCC, op. cit., Article 70.
62. S
ee for example CAR, MINUSCA, UN Women, UN Volunteers and UNDP, Projet conjoint d’appui à la Cour pénale spéciale de la
République centrafricaine (Joint project to support the CAR Special Criminal Court).
2. SCC organs and their functions
The Chambers
The ProseCuTor’s offiCe invesTigaTion indiCTmenT Trial Chamber aPPeals

Chamber Chamber 1 national judge - Chamber
Special international Prosecutor
1 national judge - 1 national judge President 1 national judge -
M. Toussaint
Muntazini Mukimapa (DRC) President M. Michel Landry M. Aimé Pascal President
Louanga Delimo M. Barthelemy
M. Michel Ngokpou
1 national judge Yamba
2 international
International National judges M. Emile Ndjapou 2 international
CabineT 1 judges
Substitute Deputy Position to be filled 1 international judge
Prosecutor Prosecutor 1 national judge M. Olivier Beauvallet
Mme. Vinciane M. Herizo Rado
M. Michel Ngokpou Boon (Belgium) Andriamanantena (France)
M. Tyabatuoba M. Alain
Jean Alexandre Ouaby-Bekaï (Madagascar) M. Volker Neulich
1 international judge
Tindano (Germany)
(Burkina Faso) Mme. Adelaide Dembele
(Burkina Faso)
CabineT 2
International National 1 national judge
Substitute Substitute
Prosecutor M. Patience
Prosecutor Guerengbo
Position to be M. Alain Tolmo
filled 1 international judge
sPeCial
M. Romaric Mme. Elena Catenazzi
M. Basssem Martinien Criminal
Chawky (Switzerland)
Chrysol PoliCe
(Egypt) Kpangba uniT (uniTé
CabineT 3 sPéCiale
1 national judge de PoliCe
M. Abel Daouda
JudiCiaire)
seCreTariaT of The 1 international judge
ProseCuTor’s offiCe
M. Stefan Waespi
(Switzerland) Officers of the
Special Unit
(Organisation chart based on information collected up to 10 August 2022)
The SCC is chaired by Michel Landry Louanga from CAR.63 It is composed of various organs, including
the Presidency, the Registry, the Prosecutor’s Office and the Chambers.64 Investigations and
prosecutions are carried out by the Prosecutor’s Office, which comprises a Special (international)
Prosecutor, Toussaint Muntazini Mukimapa (Democratic Republic of Congo), and deputy and/or
substitute prosecutors,65 guided by the prosecutorial strategy presented in December 2018.66 The
public prosecutor’s office is supported in its investigative mission by the Unité Spéciale de Police
Judiciaire (Special Criminal Police Unit).67 The judges appointed to the Special Criminal Court
are assigned to the various Chambers: Chambre d’instruction (investigation chamber),68 Chambre
63. H
e was elected by his peers on 22 October 2018, initially for a two-year term. See MINUSCA, “Lancement officiel des activités
de la Cour pénale spéciale, ‘Une percée majeure pour la justice en RCA’” (Official launch of the activities of the Special Criminal
Court, ‘A major breakthrough for justice in CAR’), 24 October 2018, https://minusca.unmissions.org/lancement-officiel-des-
activités-de-la-cour-pénale-spéciale-«-une-percée-majeure-pour-la-justice-en.
64. L
aw on the establishment of the SCC, op. cit., Articles 21 to 23 (on national staff) and 24 to 27 (on international staff).
66. S
CC, Stratégie d’enquêtes, de poursuites et d’instruction (Prosecutorial strategy), presented at a press conference on
4 December 2018 (“SCC prosecutorial strategy”). The video of the press conference is available online. See “La Cour pénale
spéciale lance sa stratégie d’enquête” (The Special Criminal Court launches its prosecutorial strategy), 5 December 2018,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70FN_pAcoVA.
67. L
aw on the establishment of the SCC, op. cit., Articles 8 and 28 to 33.
68. Ibid., Article 11: This chamber is “in charge of the preliminary investigation” and is composed of three offices.
d’accusation spéciale (indictment chamber),69 Chambre d’assises (trial chamber),70 and Chambre
d’appel (appeals chamber)71. The procedure for investigations and prosecutions is set out in the
Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted on 2 July 2018.72
In addition, the Law on the establishment of the SCC provides for the creation of a Corps spécial
d’Avocats, a list of lawyers approved to represent parties to proceedings,73 who may be appointed
by the court in the event of a party’s indigence.74 This Corps spécial is composed of Central
African lawyers (initially numbering 32, admitted by decision of the Joint Body for the admission
of candidates to the Corps spécial d’Avocats on 16 October 2020,75 reduced to 30 at the time of
writing this report) and international lawyers (16, mainly from African and European countries).76
The creation of such an entity not only recognises the central role played by lawyers in court
proceedings, but also strengthens their capacity by making available to Central African lawyers
the expertise of their international colleagues who are often more specialised in crimes under
international law.
However, the consultations conducted during the preparation of this report revealed that the lawyers
admitted to the Corps spécial are not provided with the necessary means to carry out their work.
This problem is said to affect all the lawyers. For victims’ lawyers, the lack of resources affects their
capacity to meet with victims, to talk to them - collectively and/or individually - particularly in the
provinces, and to follow up on the various cases in progress. In the case of defence lawyers, this
was reflected, for example, in a boycott of the opening of the first SCC trial, forcing the judges to
adjourn the hearings. This was a significant move that raised many questions about the resources
available to the Court and how they were allocated. Several interviewees pointed out that while
much emphasis has been placed on operationalising the Court through the appointment of judges
and prosecutors, considerable efforts still need to be made with regard to lawyers.
69. Ibid., Article 12: This chamber “decides on appeals against orders made by the investigating judge’s offices”.
70. Ibid., Article 13: This chamber is responsible for “deciding on the merits of cases referred to it by the Investigation Chamber
and, in the event of an appeal against the orders of the latter, by the Indictment Chamber”.
71. Ibid., Article 14: This chamber is responsible for “ruling on appeals against decisions of the Assize Chamber and the Special
Indictment Chamber”.
72. C
AR, Loi n° 18.010 portant règlement de procédure et de preuve devant la Cour pénale spéciale de la République centrafricaine (Law
No. 18.010 on the rules of procedure and evidence of the CAR Special Criminal Court), 2 July 2018, Part IV “Rules of Procedure”
(“Law on the rules of procedure and evidence”).
73. L
aw on the establishment of the SCC, op. cit., Article 65.
75. C
AR, Décision (numéro 001/OPCPS/2020) portant admission des Avocats nationaux au Corps Spécial d’Avocats près la CPS
(Decision on the admission of national lawyers to the SCC-approved list of lawyers), 16 October 2020.
76. International staff are involved in “the most sensitive cases, especially those where the safety of national lawyers may be at
risk”. Law on the establishment of the SCC, op. cit., Article 67.
The regisTry
National Chief Registrar
M. Dieudonné Senego
International Deputy Chief

Registrar
National Communications Victims and Victims and Administrative Security

registrars and Outreach unit Defence Unit Witnesses services services
Support and
Protection Unit
(Organisation chart based on information collected up to 10 August 2022)
Finally, the SCC has a Registry. It is headed by the national Chief Registrar, Dieudonné Senego,
assisted by a recently appointed international Deputy Chief Registrar and national registrars,
working under the authority of the President and Vice-President of the Court.77 The Registry is
divided into several sections, including a Victims and Witnesses Support and Protection Unit, a
Communications and Outreach Unit, an Information Management Unit, a Victims and Defence Unit,
and administrative and judicial services, intended to “enable the organs of the Court to exercise
their duties impartially, independently and effectively”.78 All of these services play an important role
in ensuring a more visible, stronger, fairer justice system, which respects human rights.
The Court’s Communications and Outreach unit, for example, is responsible for “defining and
coordinating the Court’s communications policy”; “disseminating information to the public and
media on the roles, operation and activities of the Court”; and “conducting outreach activities with
those affected by the Court and, in particular, victims”.79 This is a key service for the fulfilment of the
SCC’s mandate. Like any judicial institution, in order to operate, the SCC requires the cooperation
of various actors and the participation of victims and witnesses. This can only be achieved if the
Court communicates adequately with the populations concerned and gains their trust. Despite
the development of an outreach plan and undeniable efforts, the Court’s lack of transparency and
communication during its first years of existence has led to criticism from victims, communities,
civil society and actors involved in justice more generally.
While outreach activities have been conducted to explain the Court and its mandate, information
about its judicial activities is very limited or non-existent. The consultations carried out for the
purposes of this report indicated that this has led to a significant decline in confidence and interest
in the Court’s work among a section of the population, particularly outside Bangui. There appear to
be few resources available to improve the publicity and visibility of the work of the Court’s various
organs. For example, although the SCC has a website, it contains little information and requires
regular updating on important decisions affecting its operation, mandate and judicial activities. In
addition, although a great deal of work has been done to produce paper documentation and radio
interventions to raise public awareness of the SCC, there has not been enough focus on judicial
activities. The population concerned therefore has to try to find an internet connection, which can
be very difficult depending on the province, in order to access a website that is incomplete and
77. L
aw on the rules of procedure and evidence, op. cit., Articles 42 and 43.
78. Ibid., Article 42.B.
79. Ibid., Article 45.D.
sometimes difficult to navigate. Yet, adequate communication, including about ongoing cases,
is essential to ensure effective and informed participation of victims who wish to take part in
ongoing justice efforts, including by joining proceedings as civil parties. The lack of information
thus deprives part of the population of the possibility of participating in cases, even though they
have much to contribute.
There is also serious criticism of the lack of information about those held in pre-trial detention
since 2019, including on their conditions of detention and the charges they are facing. Although
the Court is not obliged to make this information public at the investigation stage,80 in particular
on grounds of security (of victims, witnesses and also SCC staff) in a country where armed groups
remain active and present over a large part of the territory,81 and although in principle there is a
system in place to allow detainees to be assisted by a lawyer, the secrecy and opacity in this area
is widely deplored. Civil society organisations, in particular, fear that this opacity could lead to
violations of the rights of detainees.82
In addition to informing victims of their rights in the proceedings, which is handled by the Victims
and Defence Unit,83 the Registry also plays a fundamental role in relation to victims and witnesses
through the Victims and Witnesses Support and Protection Unit. This Unit is responsible for
providing “administrative, logistical, security, medical, psychological and social assistance” to
victims and ensuring “the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy” of
victims and witnesses.84 This is a crucial service within any judicial institution, but even more so
when it operates in a situation of constant conflict, instability and/or insecurity, or with people in
such situations. In CAR, any effort to achieve justice can only succeed if this reality is understood
and results in concrete actions by all actors involved. The very existence of such a unit within the
SCC Registry is a major step forward, as the lack of protection for victims and witnesses remains
an obstacle before the ordinary courts. At the end of March 2022, the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights announced that at least 305 victims and witnesses had benefited from protection
measures85, a significant figure. However, the consultations carried out by FIDH in June and
July 2022 revealed that there are still gaps in the implementation of protection measures and
that there is a pressing need for improvement. To this end, it is essential that sufficient resources
be made available to the Registry and to the various actors involved with victims and affected
communities, such as civil society organisations and other victim support groups.
80. Ibid., Article 71(b): “Without prejudice to the rights of the defence, the investigation shall be confidential.”
81. Julian Elderfield, “The rise and rise of the Special Criminal Court (Part II)”, Opinio Juris, 7 April 2021, http://opiniojuris.
org/2021/04/07/the-rise-and-rise-of-the-special-criminal-court-part-ii/; Justiceinfo.net “Centrafrique: le chemin de croix de la
cour pénale spéciale” (CAR: The uphill struggle of the SCC), 18 April 2022, https://www.justiceinfo.net/fr/90854-centrafrique-
chemin-croix-cour-penale-speciale.html. This article contains a quote from the SCC President: “We are in a situation of crisis,
of conflict situation, we have victims and witnesses that need to be protected. Publicising investigations puts the lives of these
people at risk.”
82. A
mnesty International CAR Report 2020, op. cit., pp. 23-26.
83. L
aw on the rules of procedure and evidence, op. cit., Article 47.B).a) and d).
85. M
ichelle Bachelet Statement 2022, op. cit.
3. Cases: from the delays of the early years to the opening of the first trial in 2022
In August 2021, in response to widespread criticism of the Court’s lack of transparency in relation
to its judicial activities, CAR President Faustin Touadéra and the Minister for Justice, Promotion
of Human Rights and Good Governance, Arnaud Djoubaye-Abazene, met with the SCC’s highest
officials. On this occasion, the President of the SCC provided some details: between 2019 and
August 2021, the Prosecutor’s Office received 237 complaints, one case was at the preliminary
investigation stage and 11 were under analysis, seven cases had been referred to the ordinary
courts, 21 individuals were in custody and 25 arrest warrants had been issued.86 At the end of
March 2022, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights shared similar figures.87
Several developments have shed some light on the activities of the SCC. In September 2021, the
Court announced the arrest and first appearance before the investigating judges of Eugène Barret
Ngaïkosset, or “the butcher of Paoua”,88 accused of crimes against humanity.89 A former captain
in the CAR Armed Forces and a former senior member of former President Bozizé’s presidential
guard, and later an anti-balaka leader, Ngaïkosset had been on the international community’s radar
for several years for his role in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in CAR,
in particular in the Paoua massacres between 2005 and 2007, as well as for his involvement in the
violence that erupted in Bangui in late September 2015.90 He was included on the UN sanctions list on
17 December 2015, for “engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability
or security of the CAR”, and for being “involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that violate
international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute
human rights abuses or violations, in the CAR, including acts involving sexual violence, targeting
of civilians, ethnic- or religious-based attacks, attacks on schools and hospitals, and abduction
and forced displacement;” and for being “involved in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting
attacks against UN missions or international security presences, including MINUSCA, the European
Union Missions and French operations which support them”.91 Ngaïkosset was arrested in 2015,
but escaped from detention before being re-arrested. Although there has been very little information
available since his appearance before the SCC judges, it seems that the case is ongoing.
A few weeks later, on 19 November 2021, Hassane Bouba Ali, former member of the armed
group Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) who became Minister in charge of livestock
and animal health, was arrested as part of an investigation into crimes against humanity and
war crimes.92 He was released several days later and escorted back to his home by the national
gendarmerie, even though he was due to appear before the judges who were to rule on his pre-
trial detention.93 While the SCC, the Central African population and the international community94
86. S
CC, “Audience accordée par le Président de la République Chef de l’État, son Excellence le professeur Faustin Archange
Touadéra, Président du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature à la CPS” (Audience granted by the President of the Republic
Head of State, His Excellency Professor Faustin Archange Touadéra, President of the Higher Council of the Judiciary at the
SCC), 31 August 2021, https://cps-rca.com/detail-evenement.php?evenement=27. In December 2020, the Court provided
the following figures: 146 complaints received, 12 cases under analysis by the SCC Prosecutor’s Office, one case at the
preliminary investigation stage and three cases transferred to the ordinary courts. At the level of the Chambre d’instruction,
the Court reported 22 complaints with civil parties joining proceedings and nine cases under investigation (including three
relating to acts committed in Bangui, six relating to acts committed in prefectures outside Ombella M’poko, and two relating
to acts of sexual violence). See SCC, Bulletin d’information de la Cour pénale spéciale (Newsletter of the Special Criminal Court),
December 2020, p. 10, https://www.cps-rca.com/documents/NEWSLETTER_n_4_DECEMBRE_2020.pdf.
87. M
ichelle Bachelet Statement 2022, op. cit.
88. T
own in north-western CAR, Paoua region, Ouham-Pendé prefecture.
89. S
CC, “Comparution initiale d’Eugène NGAIKOSSET devant la CPS” (First appearance of Eugène NGAIKOSSET before the SCC),
10 September 2021, https://cps-rca.com/detail-evenement.php?evenement=29.
90. F
IDH had also documented the role of Eugène Ngaïkosset in abuses in early 2006. See FIDH Report, Forgotten, Stigmatised,
2006.
91. U
NSC, “Eugène Barret Ngaïkosset”, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/individual/
eugène-barret-ngaïkosset.
92. S
CC, “Communiqué de presse relatif à l’audience de débat contradictoire du 26/11/2021” (Press release on the adversarial
hearing of 26/11/2021), 26 November 2021 [broken link].
93. S
CC, “Communiqué de presse relatif à l’évasion du suspect Ali Bouba Hassan” (Press release on the escape of suspect Ali
Bouba Hassan), 26 November 2021 [broken link].
94. S
ee for example Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Central African authorities must return ex rebel
leader to custody, and under jurisdiction of Special Criminal Court, UN expert says”, 9 December 2021, https://www.ohchr.
org/en/press-releases/2022/01/central-african-authorities-must-return-ex-rebel-leader-custody-and-under; FIDH, Tweet,
1 December 2021, https://twitter.com/fidh_fr/status/1465993940470054914.
were outraged by this open affront to the jurisdiction of the SCC and the independence of its
mandate, Hassane Bouba was honoured by the President of the Republic with the National
Order of Merit.95 This event raised many questions about the capacity of the SCC to prosecute
individuals linked to the government, particularly those in high office. It also reinforced well-
established fears that the state, despite its rhetoric against impunity, only tolerates selective
justice.96 In July 2022, the UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in CAR,
Yao Agbetse, deplored the slow progress made by the Central African authorities in giving
full effect to President Touadéra’s solemn commitment to make the fight against impunity a
government priority.97
At the end of 2021, a public hearing was finally held concerning the Koundjili and Lemouna98
massacres of May 2019. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Chambre d’accusation spéciale
decided to refer the accused, Ousmane Yaouba, Tahir Mahamat and Issa Sallet Adoum (a.k.a
“Bozize”),99 active members of the 3R group (Retour, réclamation, réhabilitation - Return, Reclamation,
Rehabilitation), to the Chambre d’assises for crimes against humanity and war crimes. They were
charged with murder and other inhumane acts committed during an attack by the 3R group on
the villages of Koundjili and Lemouna.100 On 19 April 2022, the date of the official opening of the
trial, the defendants became the first individuals to be tried at the SCC. Although the hearings
were immediately adjourned and did not resume until 16 May 2022,101 FIDH and its member
organisations welcomed this development, as “a significant step […] towards more comprehensive
justice for Central African victims”.102 According to the consultations carried out in preparation for
this report, this view is shared by a section of civil society, who perceive it as confirmation of the
SCC’s capacity to fulfil its mandate. Some of those consulted see it as a key first step towards other
cases concerning even higher-ranking individuals or individuals involved in even more significant
events. Others, while recognising the symbolism of the case, in that the events concerned marked
the first major breach of the February 2019 peace agreement signed by 14 armed groups (including
the 3R group), expressed regret that the court had not begun by trying leaders of armed groups,
which would have had an even greater impact. The hearings in this case ended on 19 August and
a verdict is expected by 31 October 2022.103
95. Corbeaunews, “La cour pénale spéciale peine à appliquer ses mandats d’arrêt” (The SCC struggles to enforce its arrest warrants),
27 December 2021, https://corbeaunews-centrafrique.org/la-cour-penale-speciale-peine-a-appliquer-ses-mandats-darret/.
96. F
or further information on the approach to justice and impunity in CAR, see Amnesty International CAR Report 2020, op. cit.,
p. 16; FIDH Report, Forgotten, Stigmatised, 2006, op. cit., pp. 28-39, in particular concerning pardon sessions.
97. O
ffice of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights Council holds Interactive Dialogue with the Independent
Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in the Central African Republic and begins Interactive Dialogue with the Independent
Fact-Finding Mission on Libya”, 6 July 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/human-rights-council-holds-
interactive-dialogue-independent-expert-situation.
98. V
illages in northwestern CAR, Paoua region, Ouham-Pendé prefecture.
99. S
CC, “Communiqué de presse du Parquet spécial relatif à l’audience publique dans l’affaire des tueries de Koundjili et
Lemouna” (Press release by the SCC Prosecutor’s Office on the public hearing in the case of the Koundjili and Lemouna
killings), 13 December 2021 [broken link]; SCC, “Communiqué de presse relatif à la décision de la chambre d’accusation dans
l’affaire des tueries de Koundjili et Lemouna” (Press release on the decision of the indictment chamber in the Koundjili and
Lemouna killings case), 20 December 2021 [broken link].
100. T
he SCC Prosecutor had announced in 2019 that the case had been referred to him by the Bangui Prosecutor’s Office.
The accused were handed over to the authorities by their leader Sadiki Abass. See SCC, “Communiqué du Bureau du
Procureur près la Cour pénale spéciale” (Statement by the Office of the Prosecutor of the SCC), 6 August 2019 https://cps-
rca.com/actualites/COMMUNIQUE-DU-BUREAU-DU-PROCUREUR-PRES-DE-LA-COUR-PENALE-SPECIALE/20/; For more
information on the events of May 2019, see Human Rights Watch, “Central African Republic: Armed group kills 46 civilians”,
18 July 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/18/central-african-republic-armed-group-kills-46-civilians.
101. T
he adjournments, which were apparently due to a disagreement between the SCC and defence lawyers over their salary
conditions, have been criticised. It is essential that the conditions for a fair trial are respected, and that the working conditions of all
those involved are in line with human rights standards. FIDH, “War crimes in CAR: Special Criminal Court’s first trial”, 15 May 2022,
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/first-trial-war-crimes-court-central-african-republic.
102. Idem.
103. Oubangui Medias, “CPS: le verdict des crimes de Koundjili et Lemouna est prévu au 31 octobre prochain” (SCC: verdict
on the Koundjili and Lemouna crimes to be handed down on 31 October), 24 August 2022, https://oubanguimedias.
com/2022/08/24/cps-le-verdict-des-crimes-de-koundjili-et-lemona-est-prevu-au-31-octobre-prochain/.
4. Advantages and disadvantages of the Special Criminal Court104
These events and the many years of preparation leading up to the first trial in April 2022 have raised
both hopes and some questions and challenges. Our consultations with local and international
civil society revealed a shared perception of the SCC. With the benefit of a little hindsight, some
question the real need for such an institution, in which significant human and financial resources
have been invested, so far with limited results. Others, who followed the opening of the first trial
in April 2022 with interest and optimism, have no doubt that such a need exists. Moreover, while
some people continue to believe that there was real potential in 2015 to achieve the political and
security stability required for the need for justice to be manifested, others consider that it was too
early, too premature to create such an institution given the years of crisis in CAR. Despite the period
of respite, the most sceptical already feared new crises that would affect the capacity of a special
court to fulfil its mandate with sufficient resources and independence.
As the SCC’s first mandate draws to a close, this division - which extends beyond civil society -
is problematic. It could prevent the renewal of its mandate, rather than allow the strengthening
of the capacity of this institution with great potential for the situation in CAR. According to our
consultations, one of the core concerns behind the scepticism relates to the concrete capacity of
the SCC to fulfil its mandate in a volatile and unstable political and security situation, in which some
people seem to be untouchable, as shown by the Bouba case. For some, the SCC’s independence,
partly linked to its hybrid nature, was one of the reasons for its existence, in addition to the expertise
of its staff in investigating and prosecuting crimes under international law. If such independence is
not guaranteed, what makes it different from ordinary courts? If the SCC is to regain the confidence
of the public and donors, it is essential to address these doubts and criticisms by being more
transparent and bolder in future cases.
Proximity of the justice system to the affected Lack of transparency and communication on
communities the Court’s judicial activities
Hybrid system with the potential to be more Persistent lack of resources and dependence on
independent and impartial, bringing specific international financial and technical partners
expertise to cases involving crimes under
international law
Presence of a Registry, including a victim and Political influence undermining justice efforts
witness protection mechanism, albeit with
weaknesses
104. T
able produced by FIDH and its member organisations in CAR on the basis of the analysis in this report.
C) International Criminal Court (ICC): a distant institution that has disappointed but
still offers hope
1. Mandate and jurisdiction of the ICC

The International Criminal Court is a permanent court established to try “those bearing the
greatest responsibility” for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the
crime of aggression.105 It consists of a Presidency, Chambers, an Office of the Prosecutor, which
has the power to investigate and prosecute, and a Registry.106 The latter contains, inter alia, a
Victims Participation and Reparations Section and a Victims and Witnesses Unit, as well as two
independent entities, the Office of Public Counsel for Victims and the Trust Fund for Victims.107 The
Court therefore accords a central role to victims, who can participate in proceedings alongside the
Prosecutor and the Defence,108 and has a number of services aimed at ensuring that their rights are
respected, particularly with regard to participation and reparations. While much remains to be done
to ensure that victims can fully enjoy these rights,109 the ICC is one of the most advanced judicial
systems in this area.
Under its founding treaty, the Rome Statute, which was adopted on 17 July 1998 and entered
into force on 1 July 2002, the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territory of States
Parties to the Statute or by nationals of those States. It can also have jurisdiction if a non-State Party
has accepted its jurisdiction or if a particular situation has been referred to it by the UN Security
Council.110 With its seat in The Hague, the Netherlands,111 the ICC has the potential to exercise
jurisdiction over the entire globe and to deal with crimes committed hundreds of kilometres from
its courtrooms. This distance, which favours its independence, impartiality and the security of its
staff, also creates a number of challenges. Among these, many underline the lack of ownership of
ICC decisions by the populations in the situations concerned; the detachment of ICC staff based
at headquarters from the realities of such situations; practical obstacles to the implementation
of its mandate; and the Court’s dependence on states. As the Court does not have its own police
force, it depends on the cooperation of states and other actors to carry out its investigations, arrest
suspects, bring them before the judges, and to fulfil its mandate to assist victims and witnesses.
CAR ratified the Rome Statute on 3 October 2001, thereby recognising the ICC’s jurisdiction over
crimes that may be committed on its territory or by its nationals from that date. It then referred
the country’s situation to the Court on two occasions, calling on the Office of the Prosecutor to
investigate crimes committed on its territory in different periods. The ICC is therefore currently
considering two situations relating to the Central African Republic, “CAR I” and “CAR II”.
105. U
nited Nations Plenipotentiary Conference, Rome Statute, Doc A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998, entry into force 1 July 2002,
(“Rome Statute”), Article 5.
106. F
or more information on the composition of the ICC and the powers of each organ, see Official Records of the Assembly
of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3 and
Corr.1, New York, 3-10 September 2002 (“Rules of Procedure and Evidence”), https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/
RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf.
107. F
or more information on these different services and on the place and role of victims before the ICC more generally, see ICC,
Victims before the International Criminal Court: A guide for the participation of victims in the proceedings of the ICC, https://www.
icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/itemsDocuments/vprs/abd-al-rahman/VPRS-Victims-booklet_ENG.pdf.
108. R
ome Statute, op. cit., Article 68.
109. F
or an analysis of victims’ rights before the ICC, particularly their application by judges, see FIDH, Whose Court is it? Judicial
handbook on victims’ rights at the International Criminal Court, April 2021, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_whose_court_is_
it_en.pdf; See also the analysis in FIDH and Kenya Human Rights Commission, The victims’ mandate of the International Criminal
Court: disappointments, concerns and options for the way forward - Observations and recommendations for the Independent Expert
Review, June 2020, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/cpiang752.pdf.
110. R
ome Statute, op. cit., Articles 12 and 13; For more information on the International Criminal Court, see ICC, Understanding the
International Criminal Court, 2020, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/Publications/understanding-the-icc.pdf.
111. Rome Statute, Article 3.
2. Cases: from the fiasco of the Bemba case to a stronger involvement in the CAR II
situation
• “CAR I” situation
The CAR I situation was referred to the ICC by the Government of the Central African Republic in
December 2004, concerning war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed since
1 July 2002, in the context of an upsurge of violence on its territory. After a preliminary examination
which lasted approximately two and a half years, the Office of the Prosecutor decided to open an
investigation, on the basis that there were reasonable grounds to believe that numerous crimes had
been committed during this period, particularly rape, murder and pillaging. To date, this investigation
has led to only one case,112 that of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, which resulted in an acquittal.
In 2002-2003, Bemba led the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), an armed group and political
party in DRC, which borders CAR. Following an appeal from CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé, Bemba
and his Movement came to assist the CAR national army to fight the rebellion. During this intervention,
numerous abuses were committed by his troops, leading the ICC Office of the Prosecutor to issue
an arrest warrant (under seal) against him.113 Bemba was immediately arrested on 24 May 2008 by
the authorities in Belgium where he was located114 and a few months later he was surrendered to the
ICC.115 This arrest was particularly significant for three reasons: it was the first in the CAR situation;
the first to target a former high-ranking official, in this case a former Vice-President of a State; and
the arrest warrant mentioned numerous sexual crimes, which at that time were drastically under-
prosecuted before the ICC. The ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, said in a statement that “Mr
Bemba’s arrest is a warning to all those who commit, who encourage, or who tolerate sexual crimes.
There is a new law called the Rome Statute. Under this new law, they will be prosecuted”.116
On 15 June 2009, the judges partially confirmed the charges against Bemba and committed him to
trial.117 A little under seven years later, on 21 March 2016, Jean-Pierre Bemba was found guilty, as a
superior (i.e., for crimes committed by his troops), of the crimes against humanity of murder and rape
and the war crimes of murder, rape and pillaging.118 He was sentenced on 21 June 2016 to 18 years’
imprisonment.119 This was the Court’s first conviction for sexual crimes. However, this victory was
short-lived as Bemba was eventually acquitted on appeal on 8 June 2018.120 FIDH and its member
organisations, who were heavily involved in this case,121 considered this acquittal is an “affront to the
thousands of victims”.122
112. In fact, two cases were opened against the same person. The second case, which is less relevant here, resulted in the
conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba as well as Kilolo Musamba, Mangenda Kabongo, Babala Wandu and Arido for offences
against the administration of justice for the use of false testimonies in the main case against Jean-Pierre Bemba. See
ICC, “Bemba et al. case: ICC Trial Chamber VII finds five accused guilty of offences against the administration of justice”,
19 October 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/bemba-et-al-case-icc-trial-chamber-vii-finds-five-accused-guilty-offences-
against.
113. ICC, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Urgent – Warrant of arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08,
23 May 2008, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2008_03303.PDF.
114. ICC, “ICC arrest Jean-Pierre Bemba – massive sexual crimes in Central African Republic will not go unpunished”, 24 May 2008
(“ICC press release on Bemba’s arrest”), https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-arrest-jean-pierre-bemba-massive-sexual-crimes-
central-african-republic-will-not-go.
115. ICC, “Remise de Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo à la Cour pénale internationale” (Surrender of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo to
the ICC), 3 July 2008, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=surrender%20of%20jean_pierre%20bemba%20to%20
the%20international%20criminal%20court&ln=fr.
116. ICC press release on Bemba’s arrest, op. cit.
117. ICC, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the charges
of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009.
118. ICC, Bemba judgement, op. cit.
119. ICC, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08,
21 June 2016.
120. ICC, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial
Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, ICC-01/05-01/08, 8 June 2018.
121. For more information on FIDH’s work in CAR, see FIDH, Q&A on the Bemba case at the ICC, op. cit., in particular “7. What part
did FIDH play in this case?”; FIDH and LCDH, The ICC verdict in the Jean-Pierre Bemba Case: 15 years of FIDH action: from field
investigations to Prosecutor’s conclusions, March 2016, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/bemba673angbassdefweb.pdf; FIDH,
Report of the FIDH Legal Action Group (LAG), FIDH and the situation in the Central African Republic before the International Criminal
Court: The case of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, July 2008, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/CPIaffbemba502ang2008.pdf.
122. FIDH, “Acquittal of Jean Pierre Bemba on appeal: an affront to thousands of victims”, op. cit.
• “CAR II” situation
In May 2014, the Central African government, overwhelmed by the conflict between the anti-balaka
and Séléka groups devastating its territory, referred the situation to the ICC for the second time.123
Following this referral, and a very quick preliminary examination by the Office of the Prosecutor,
Fatou Bensouda, lasting only a few months, an investigation was officially opened into war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed in CAR from 2012 onwards. In a statement, Prosecutor
Bensouda commented that “The list of atrocities is endless,” and included murder, rape, forced
displacement, persecution, pillaging and other serious crimes covered by the Rome Statute. She
concluded that she “cannot ignore these alleged crimes.”124 Under this investigation, three cases
are currently ongoing.
The first case emerging from the situation in CAR II involves anti-balaka leaders Alfred Yekatom
and Patrice-Édouard Ngaïssona, for whom arrest warrants were issued on 11 November125 and
7 December 2018 respectively.126 Both were arrested less than a week later: Yekatom by the Central
African authorities and Ngaïssona by the French authorities.127 On 20 February 2019, the two cases
were joined, and eight months later, the Court partially confirmed the charges and the defendants
were committed to trial. Trial proceedings began on 16 February 2021.128 At the time of writing, the
trial was underway, and the prosecution was presenting its evidence and witnesses.
Alfred Yekatom held the rank of caporal-chef (Chief Corporal) in the FACA and was a member of
Parliament in CAR. He was placed on the UN sanctions list in August 2015 for his contribution to
“acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the Central African Republic.”129 Patrice-
Édouard Ngaïssona is a former anti-balaka commander. Both are accused of the war crimes
of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, intentionally directing attacks
against buildings dedicated to religion, murder, displacement of the civilian population, torture and
cruel treatment; and the crimes against humanity of murder, deportation or forcible transfer of
population, torture and other inhumane acts, imprisonment or other forms of severe deprivation
of physical liberty and persecution. Yekatom is also charged with the additional war crimes of
conscription and enlistment of children under the age of 15 and their use to participate actively in
hostilities. Ngaïssona is charged with the additional war crimes of destruction of the property of an
adversary, pillaging and rape and the crime against humanity of rape.130
The second case arising from the situation in CAR II involves former Séléka militia leader Mahamat
Said Abdel Kani (Said), who was surrendered to the ICC on 24 January 2021, less than three weeks
after the issuance of an arrest warrant (under seal) against him.131 As a senior member of the
Séléka assigned to the Office central de répression du banditisme (Central Office for the Repression
of Banditry - OCRB) and then to the Comité extraordinaire pour la défense des acquis démocratiques
(Extraordinary Committee for the Defence of Democratic Achievements - CEDAD), Said is alleged
to have participated (directly or through his subordinates) in the commission of crimes against
123. For further details about the conflict, see “Background”.

124. ICC, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on opening a second investigation
in the Central African Republic”, 24 September 2014, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-international-
criminal-court-fatou-bensouda-opening-second-investigation.
125. ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic II, Public Redacted Version of “Warrant of Arrest for Alfred Yekatom”, ICC-01/14-
01/18-1-US-Exp, 11 November 2018 (public redacted version dated 17 November 2018).
126. ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic II, Public Redacted Version of “Warrant of Arrest for Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona”,
ICC-01/14-02/18, 7 December 2018 (public redacted version dated 13 December 2018).
127. ICC, “Situation in Central African Republic II: Alfred Yekatom surrendered to the ICC for crimes against humanity and war
crimes”, 17 November 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-central-african-republic-ii-alfred-yekatom-surrendered-
icc-crimes-against-humanity; FIDH, “Major protagonist of the crisis in the Central African Republic arrested in France following
ICC request”, 12 December 2018, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/major-protagonist-of-the-
crisis-in-the-central-african-republic.
128. For more information on the proceedings and the opening of the trial, see ICC, Questions and Answers - Opening of the trial in
the Yekatom and Ngaïssona case at the ICC, update: 9 February 2021 (“ICC Q&A on Yekatom and Ngaïssona Case”), https://
www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/itemsDocuments/yekatom-ngaissona-q-a-start-trial-eng.pdf.
129. UNSC, “Alfred Yekatom”, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/individual/alfred-
yekatom.
130. ICC Q&A on Yekatom and Ngaïssona Case, op. cit.
131. ICC, Situation in Central African Republic II, Public Redacted Version of “Warrant of Arrest for Mahamat Said Abdel Kani”, ICC-
01/14-01/21-2-US-Exp, 7 January 2019 (public redacted version dated 17 February 2021).
humanity (imprisonment or other forms of severe deprivation of liberty, torture, persecution and
other inhumane acts), and war crimes (torture and cruel treatment), perpetrated in particular
between April and November 2013.132 FIDH and its member organisations, LCDH and OCDH,
welcomed this arrest, stating that “Mr Said is the first ex-Séléka to be held accountable for his acts
before the judges of The Hague, an important first step towards recognising the responsibility of
all sides for the crimes committed in CAR in 2013 and 2014.”133 On 9 December 2021, Pre-Trial
Chamber II partially confirmed the charges against Said, committing him to trial.134 While the judges
considered that the link between the accused and the crimes perpetrated at the CEDAD was not
sufficiently established, thus dismissing related charges,135 Counts 1 to 7 were confirmed, namely
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, other inhumane acts and
persecution, as crimes against humanity; and torture, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal
dignity, as war crimes, perpetrated at the OCRB between 12 April 2013 and 30 August 2013.136 The
trial began on 26 September 2022.137
Finally, Maxime Jeoffroy Mokom Gawaka (Maxime Mokom) is the fourth defendant to appear
before the ICC judges. Arrested in February 2022 by the Chadian authorities under an arrest warrant
issued under seal by the ICC in December 2018, Maxime Mokom was surrendered to The Hague
on 15 March 2022138 and appeared before the judges one month later. Again, our organisations
consider this arrest and transfer a further step forwards in the fight against the impunity of
those considered to bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes committed on Central African
territory.139 Maxime Mokom, alleged former National Coordinator of Operations of the anti-
balaka, who became Minister of Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation in
February 2019, is suspected of having committed, ordered, aided or abetted the commission of
numerous crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, torture, forcible transfer of
population and attacks intentionally directed against the civilian population. These crimes were
allegedly perpetrated against the Muslim civilian population and persons perceived to be linked
to the Séléka group, between at least December 2013 and December 2014, including Bangui,
Bossangoa, Yaloké, Gaga, Bossemptélé, Boda, Carnot, Berberati and Lobaye prefecture.140 The
opening of the confirmation of charges hearing has been scheduled for January 2023.141
132. ICC, The Prosecutor v. Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, Corrected Version of “Public Redacted Version of ‘Document Containing the
Charges, ICC-01/14-01/21-144-Conf’, dated 16 August 2021”, ICC-01/14-01/21-144-Red, dated 17 October 2021, ICC-01/14-01/21,
27 October 2021.
133. FIDH, “An ex-Séléka at the ICC: Towards equal accountability for crimes committed in Central African Republic”, 26 January 2021
(“FIDH Press Release on the arrest of Said”), https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/an-ex-seleka-at-
the-icc-towards-equal-accountability-for-crimes.
134. ICC, The Prosecutor v. Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Mahamat Said Adbel Kani, ICC-
01/14-01/21, 9 December 2021.
135. Ibid., paras 135, 153.
136. Ibid., p. 60-61.
137. ICC, “Said trial opens at International Criminal Court”, 26 September 2022, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/said-trial-opens-
international-criminal-court.
138. ICC, “Situation in Central African Republic II, Maxime Jeoffroy Eli Mokom Gawaka surrendered to the ICC for crimes against
humanity and war crimes”, 14 March 2022, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-central-african-republic-ii-maxime-
jeoffroy-eli-mokom-gawaka-surrendered-icc-crimes.
139. FIDH, “Troisième anti-balaka à la CPI: la lutte contre l’impunité en République centrafricaine continue” (Third anti-balaka at the
ICC: the fight against impunity in the Central African Republic continues), 15 March 2022, https://www.fidh.org/fr/regions/
afrique/republique-centrafricaine/troisieme-anti-balaka-a-la-cpi-la-lutte-contre-l-impunite-en.
140. F
or more information on the Mokom Case, see ICC, “Mokom Case”, https://www.icc-cpi.int/carII/mokom.
141. ICC, “Maxime Jeoffroy Eli Mokom Gawaka makes first appearance before the ICC: confirmation of charges hearing scheduled
for 31 January 2023”, 22 March 2022, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/maxime-jeoffroy-eli-mokom-gawaka-makes-first-
appearance-icc-confirmation-charges-hearing.
3. Advantages and disadvantages of the International Criminal Court142
The ICC Office of the Prosecutor has been particularly active in the situation in the Central African
Republic II. For a number of years, while the activities of the ordinary courts remained limited
and the SCC was not yet operational or was only starting its activities, the ICC played a key role
in the fight against impunity in CAR. The resounding failure of the Bemba case and the lack of
outreach and explanations by the ICC to the victims and affected communities about the case
and the consequences of the acquittal (notably in terms of reparations) left its mark on Central
African victims and significantly impacted the image of the ICC.143 However, despite this and
other factors, including the length of proceedings and the distance between the Court and the
affected communities, the ICC remains a genuine option for justice, complementary to national
courts. According to the consultations conducted for the preparation of this report, the attention
paid by the ICC to the situation continues to have a deterrent effect on certain influential figures,
notwithstanding clear limitations preventing them from being brought to trial in The Hague.
While the ICC enjoys greater independence in terms of investigation and prosecution, it remains
dependent on the cooperation of states to arrest suspects. Accordingly, during our consultations
several interviewees expressed the view that the ICC is as restricted as national courts by the
absence of political will of the Central African government. The arrests of Alfred Yekatom
and Maxime Mokom, for example, are said to be the result of shifting alliances and political
opportunism. Meanwhile, the imbalance in terms of the number of prosecutions of anti-balaka
and Séléka members remains heavily criticised. Our organisations have repeatedly stressed the
need for comprehensive justice covering all those responsible for crimes.144 The prosecution of
one side alone, in any situation,145 inevitably results in impunity for the other parties involved, the
absence of justice for victims who have suffered as a result of their actions, and the impossibility of
establishing the truth about the events and of moving into a phase of reparation and reconciliation.
This situation also undermines the credibility of the ICC in the eyes of the populations concerned
and reduces public confidence in the Court.
142. Table produced by FIDH and its member organisations in CAR on the basis of the analysis in this report.
143. FIDH, “Acquittal of Jean Pierre Bemba on appeal: an affront to thousands of victims”, op. cit. Following his conviction in 2016,
FIDH published a note summarising its 15 years of action in CAR. FIDH and LCDH, 15 years of FIDH action, op. cit.; see also
FIDH, “All I want is reparation” - Views of victims of sexual violence about reparation in the Bemba case before the International
Criminal Court), November 2017 (“FIDH Bemba Reparation Report 2017”), https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rca705ang.pdf.
144. FIDH Press Release on the arrest of Said, op. cit.
145. Our organisations have also raised this issue in relation to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. See FIDH, “Les victimes oubliées
de la Côte d’Ivoire” (The forgotten victims of Côte d’Ivoire), 7 March 2018, https://www.fidh.org/fr/regions/afrique/cote-d-
ivoire/les-victimes-oubliees-de-la-cote-d-ivoire; FIDH, “Towards total impunity for 2010-2011 crimes after acquittal of Laurent
Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé”, 15 January 2019, https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/international-justice/icc-cote-d-ivoire-
towards-total-impunity-for-2010-2011-crimes-after.
Respect for procedural rights and international Distance of justice from the situation and, a
fair trial standards fortiori, the victims and affected communities
Investigation and prosecution of “those bearing Some imbalance in those prosecuted to date
the greatest responsibility” without immunity (in terms of the various parties to the conflict),
before the ICC with the risk of creating a perception of a two-
tiered justice system
Permanent court Length of proceedings
Independence of the institution in selection of Dependency for arrests and other cooperation
proceedings measures
D) Other actors involved in justice

In addition to the ordinary courts, the SCC and the ICC, as the three central institutions in the fight
against impunity in CAR, there are a range of other actors who have played or could play a role in the
pursuit of truth and justice for crimes perpetrated on the territory or by Central African nationals.
1. The Commission Vérité, Justice, Réparation et Réconciliation (Truth, Justice,

Reparation and Reconciliation Commission - CVJRR)
The CVJRR, established in April 2020,146 has a mandate of four years (from the date the
commissioners were sworn in),147 renewable once for a maximum period of 24 months,148 to
“investigate, establish the truth and locate responsibilities for serious national events that have taken
place between 29 March 1959 [...] and 31 December 2019.”149 Its main objectives are to establish
the truth, pursue justice, restore the dignity of victims and contribute to national reconciliation.150
To do so, it has “administrative, financial, legal and technical autonomy, and independence of
action in relation to the other Institutions of the Republic.”151 This highly ambitious mandate is the
result of the emphasis on the need for justice and truth raised in public consultations organised
by the Government in 2015, confirmed at the Bangui Forum which followed,152 and manifested
in the APPR-RCA of 6 February 2019.153 After a series of national consultations, a draft bill on
146. Central African Republic, Loi n°20.009 portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de la Commission Vérité, Justice,
Réparation et Réconciliation (Law No. 20.009 on the establishment, organisation and operation of the Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Reconciliation Commission), 7 April 2020 (“Law establishing the CVJRR”).
147. The 11 commissioners, including five women, were appointed by a selection committee composed of nine prominent figures
from the National Assembly, the Government, civil society, the African Union and the United Nations. See Central African
Republic, Décret 20.435 entérinant la désignation des membres de la Commission Vérité, Justice, Réparation et Réconciliation
(Decree 20.435 approving the appointment of the members of the Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission),
30 December 2020. The commissioners were sworn in on 2 July 2021. See MINUSCA, Rapport Mensuel: Analyse de la situation
des droits de l’Homme (Monthly Report: Analysis of the human rights situation), July 2021, https://minusca.unmissions.org/
sites/default/files/rapport_mensuel_ddh_juillet_21_final.pdf.
148. Law establishing the CVJRR, op. cit., Article 4.
152. Pacte républicain pour la paix, la réconciliation et la reconstruction en République centrafricaine (Republican Pact for Peace,
Reconciliation and Reconstruction in the Central African Republic), May 2015 (“Bangui Forum Pact 2015”), https://hdcentre.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Republican-Pact-May-2015.pdf; Central African Republic, Ministry for Humanitarian
Action and National Reconciliation, “Commission Vérité, Justice, Réparations et Réconciliation” (Truth, Justice, Reparation
and Reconciliation Commission), https://www.reconciliation.gouv.cf/projet/15/cvjrr. For more information on the Bangui
Forum, see Amnesty International, CAR Report 2020, op. cit., p. 14-15.
153. APPR-RCA, op. cit. In the preamble to the agreement, the parties recognise that “[T]he impunity that reigns has fuelled the
infernal cycle of violence, weakened the judiciary, led to large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law, and fomented the people’s mistrust of the State.” Several articles call for the immediate establishment of the CVJRR
(e.g. Articles 4.s and 9).
the establishment of this institution was officially submitted to President Faustin Touadéra in
January 2020,154 before being adopted by a vote in the National Assembly. The law establishing
the CVJRR was promulgated in April 2020.
Although it is not a judicial mechanism,155 this new institution has the potential to join the ordinary
courts, the SCC and the ICC as a key player in CAR’s justice system. In addition to hearings on
specific crimes, the CVJRR is empowered to organise “thematic hearings on the main violations
committed, in order to identify the root causes and the role played by state or private institutions,
such as the Army, the Police, the justice system, education, the financial sector, the media, political
parties and their affiliated movements, religious denominations, associations, armed groups and
other organisations.”156 With a view to promoting reconciliation, it can also organise rituals “in
accordance with the prevailing customs or practices in the region concerned,” facilitate an amicable
reparative process with the consent of both parties, and propose a series of recommendations,
mainly to the Central African state.157 Such recommendations can focus in particular on measures
to “maintain a climate of national reconciliation and tolerance,” “reforms necessary to prevent the
recurrence of the acts denounced,” and “the adoption of a national reparation plan for victims
[...], whether in the form of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction or guarantees of
non-repetition.”158 This last aspect is particularly important and will be developed further below,
in the part focusing on an analysis of the complementarity between the various institutions with
jurisdiction.
To fulfil its mandate, the CVJRR has three main bodies, namely: 1. the Plenary Commission, which
is the “design, guidance and decision-making body,” composed of all the commissioners;159 2. the
Bureau, which is the body “in charge of coordinating the activities of the CVJRR,” composed of the
Chairperson and the two Vice-Chairpersons;160 and 3. the sub-commissions, which are the “working
groups in charge of examining issues related to each of its four pillars,” i.e. truth, justice, reparation
and reconciliation.161 The law establishing the CVJRR also contains a number of provisions on
support to be provided to the Commission, notably through so-called administrative and technical
support services and the recruitment of national and international experts.162 The law also provides
for the establishment of a victim and witness protection and support unit, which is particularly
important for the proper operation of such an institution, comprised of security, legal, gender and
psychosocial support experts.163
At the time of writing, the CVJRR, based in Bangui,164 had not yet started its fact-finding
activities and was still in a preparatory phase. At best, this demonstrates a disengagement by
the government, whose priorities lie elsewhere, and which is not interested in the logistical and
practical establishment of the Commission. At worst, it is a sign of deliberate obstruction of its
mandate. In any case, victims and affected communities, who are aware of the Commission’s
existence, remain in limbo and cannot be heard.
154. Justiceinfo.net, “Central African Republic: Ambitious Truth Commission plans”, 6 February 2020, https://www.justiceinfo.net/
en/43733-central-african-republic-ambitious-truth-commission-plans.html.
155. In practical terms, however, the procedure is fairly similar to that of a judicial body, with the possibility to file a complaint,
the power to act on its own motion, public or closed testimony depending on the circumstances, the possibility to request
searches and to hear “any person likely to facilitate its work aimed at establishing the facts” . Amicable settlements reached
between the parties have the force of res judicata, so that failure to respect or implement them may lead to referral to courts
and tribunals with jurisdiction. Law establishing the CVJRR, op. cit, Articles 44, 54, 51, 55 and 59.
157. Ibid., Articles 61 and 59.
159. Ibid., Article 22. The law establishing the CVJRR provides that commissioners must be “public figures recognised for their
reputation, their commitment to peace, their moral integrity as well as their ability to transcend divisions of any kind. They
must have expertise in the area of human rights protection, conflict resolution, history and anthropology, gender issues and
child protection” or any related area (Article 8). They may have a background in civil society, the Bar Association, academia,
religious associations, victims’ associations, women’s associations and youth representation.
164. Ibid., Article 3. However, the CVJRR seems to have only been provided premises at a very late stage, in August 2022.
These difficulties were widely raised during the consultations conducted for this report, along with
a general reflection about whether such an institution could function in a context of continuing
crisis, with serious security risks for those who speak out, and with limited political commitment.
The scope of the mandate also raises some doubts, with crimes still being perpetrated on a daily
basis. Some also argued that this institution, like the Special Criminal Court, was established too
early, deploring the false hope given to victims by a commission that will, in reality, face significant
difficulties working in the current context. The same interviewees also raised the important question
of whether the Commission was truly the result of the popular will or just one of the international
community’s traditional tools applied to any supposed post-crisis situation, and thus whether there
was any likelihood that Central Africans would have a sense of ownership of the institution.
For others, however, the existence of the CVJRR is viewed as an opportunity and they welcome the
progress made since its establishment in early 2020. In October 2021, a “workshop to approve the
basic texts of the CVJRR” was held in Bangui. Participants in the workshop are reported to have
worked on “finalising and adopting draft 01 of the Rules of Procedure, finalising and adopting the
commission’s organisational chart, proposing and adopting the commissioners’ pay scale, drawing
up and adopting a provisional work plan and approving the framework of the national strategy.”165 In
early 2022, the CVJRR’s Vice-Chairperson shared an overview of the Commission’s recent activities,
including the preparation of various documents such as the intervention strategy handbook, the
annual operating budget, the annual work plan and the activity report covering the period July-
December 2021. He announced that an “immersion trip to South Africa [had been conducted] to
understand the mechanism of transitional justice and the truth commission,” which gave members
of the Commission a better understanding of the benefits, limitations and constraints of transitional
justice.166 The results of our consultations also suggest that, provided its mandate is implemented
in an effective and meaningful way, the CVJRR can contribute to efforts to achieve justice in CAR.
The population is aware that it would be impossible to prosecute all those responsible for crimes
perpetrated in the numerous Central African crises and holds out hope that the Commission will
contribute to establishing the truth and to reconciliation within communities.
2. Informal or traditional justice

In remote areas where the formal justice system is limited and/or dysfunctional, “[t]raditional
justice has played a role in settling cases before, during, and after the conflict.”167 It “brings together
reconciliation, mediation, and arbitration among conflicting parties.”168 Traditional justice is mainly
delivered by village and customary chiefs. It contributes to filling the gaps and offers an option
that is often quicker, cheaper, closer to communities and less complex than formal justice. In this
context, the place and role of traditional justice are themes that often emerge in discussions and
reflections on peace and the fight against impunity in CAR.169
165. Réseau des journalistes pour les droits de l’Homme RJDH – Centrafrique, “Centrafrique: Vers la validation des textes de base
de la CVJRR” (Central African Republic: Progress towards the approval of the basic texts of the CVJRR), 6 October 2021,
https://www.rjdhrca.org/centrafrique-vers-la-validation-des-textes-de-base-de-la-cvjrr/.
166. Oubanguimedias, “Centrafrique: La CVJRR fait un aperçu sur ses récentes activités” (Central African Republic: The CVJRR
outlines its recent activities), 4 February 2022, https://oubanguimedias.com/2022/02/04/centrafrique-la-cvjrr-fait-un-
apercu-sur-ses-recentes-activites/.
167. International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “A drop of water on a hot stone,” Justice for victims in the Central African
Republic, March 2021, p. 26 (“ICTJ, Justice for victims in CAR”), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_Report_CAR_
EN.pdf.
168. Ibid., p. 22.
169. See for example Bangui Forum Pact 2015, op. cit.; CAR, Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, “Étude sur les mécanismes
et les acteurs de la justice informelle en Centrafrique” (Study on the informal justice mechanisms and actors in the Central
African Republic), July 2018; CAR, Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, “La Justice Informelle en République Centrafricaine:
Un Champ qui nécessite un Engagement Prioritaire” (Informal Justice in the Central African Republic: a sector requiring
priority engagement), July 2018; CAR, Sectoral Justice Policy 2020-2024, op. cit.
In practice, however, while it appears that customary chiefs are sometimes called upon to hear
criminal cases (including cases of sexual violence),170 their interventions mainly focus on civil and
family disputes.171 This is due to the lack of skills and resources, but also the insecurity and risk
for those involved in cases concerning armed groups, including victims and witnesses as well as
religious leaders themselves.172 Recently, several initiatives have been developed, aimed at ensuring
improved coordination and complementarity between formal and informal justice mechanisms,
building the capacity of traditional leaders, and setting limits to their interventions.173
3. Military courts
In parallel to the ordinary courts, CAR has military courts that have been operational since July 2020.
Article 1 of the Central African Military Justice Code, adopted in March 2017, provides that “Military
justice is dispensed throughout the national territory by military courts, courts martial, courts of
appeal and the Court of Cassation.”174 In theory, these military courts only have jurisdiction over
offences perpetrated by military personnel or those assimilated to military personnel. Article 22
of the Military Justice Code thus provides that “ordinary courts retain [...] jurisdiction where one of
the co-perpetrators or accomplices is not subject to the jurisdiction of the military courts, including
minors.”175
However, articles on the jurisdiction of military courts in peacetime176 and wartime177 are open to
broad interpretation that could give rise to conflicts of jurisdiction with ordinary courts, including in
relation to crimes perpetrated by and against civilians. In peacetime, military courts can therefore
hear both “purely military” offences, as defined in the Central African Military Justice Code, and
offences under ordinary law “committed by military personnel or persons assimilated to military
personnel during the course of their work.”178 In times of war or siege, these courts have jurisdiction
over “crimes, misdemeanours, offences and hostile acts against any military or assimilated
person,” perpetrated by “any civilian or military person.”179 The list of persons who can be qualified
as “assimilated” includes “any civilian who has taken up arms or who has participated in an armed
organisation against the Republic.”180 These provisions raise the risk of extensive and biased
military justice. These concerns were raised during our consultations, but also in recent reports by
Amnesty International,181 according to which the first sessions of the military courts held in Bangui
in September 2021 concerned crimes against civilians.182
170. A
ccording to a survey conducted in 2020, most victims of sexual violence tend to first approach the village chief. CAR
Surveys 2020, op. cit., p. 26.
171. ICTJ, Justice for victims in CAR, op. cit., p. 26-27, 22. See also Radiondeluka.org, “Centrafrique: la justice traditionnelle,
principal moyen de conciliation du village Ndangala” (CAR: traditional justice, the main tool for conciliation in Ndangala
village), 12 July 2021, https://www.radiondekeluka.org/actualites/societe/37177-centrafrique-la-justice-traditionnelle-
principal-moyen-de-conciliation-au-village-ndangala.html.
172. ICTJ, Justice for victims in CAR, Ibid., p. 12.
173. See for example MINUSCA, “Préfecture de Mbomou: mise en place d’un cadre de concertation sur les mécanismes
informels et formels de la justice” (Prefecture of Mbomou: development of a consultation framework on informal and
formal justice mechanisms), 20 December 2021, https://minusca.unmissions.org/pr%C3%A9fecture-du-mbomou-mise-en-
place-d%E2%80%99un-cadre-de-concertation-sur-les-m%C3%A9canismes-informels-et; MINUSCA, “Rafai: 20 acteurs de la
justice informelle, formés et sensibilisés sur l’accès à la justice” (Rafai: 20 informal justice actors trained and made aware
of access to justice), 19 March 2022, https://minusca.unmissions.org/rafai%C2%A0-20-acteurs-de-la-justice-informelle-
form%C3%A9s-et-sensibilis%C3%A9s-sur-l%E2%80%99acc%C3%A8s-%C3%A0-la-justice.
174. CAR, Loi n° 17.012 portant code de justice militaire centrafricain (Law No. 17.012 establishing the Central African Military Justice
Code), 24 March 2017, Article 1.
181. See in particular Amnesty International, CAR Report 2020, op. cit., p. 35-36; Amnesty International, One step forward, two
steps backwards – Justice in the Central African Republic, 2021, p. 13 (“Amnesty International CAR Report 2021”), https://www.
amnesty.org/en/documents/afr19/5038/2021/en/.
182. Amnesty International CAR Report 2021, Ibid., p. 13.
Such extensive jurisdiction of military courts is contrary to international law, as reflected
in the UN Principles Governing the Administration of Justice Through Military Tribunals, or
“Decaux Principles” after the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights who drafted them.183 Two of these principles are particularly
relevant in this context:
Principle 5 “Military courts should, in principle, have no jurisdiction to try

civilians. In all circumstances, the State shall ensure that civilians accused
of a criminal offence of any nature are tried by civilian courts.”
Principle 9 “In all circumstances, the jurisdiction of military courts should
be set aside in favour of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to conduct
inquiries into serious human rights violations such as extrajudicial
executions, enforced disappearances and torture, and to prosecute and try
persons accused of such crimes.”
The latter principle is also included in the “Updated set of principles for the protection and
promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity”, which states that “The
jurisdiction of military tribunals must be restricted solely to specifically military offences
committed by military personnel, to the exclusion of human rights violations, which shall come
under the jurisdiction of the ordinary domestic courts or, where appropriate, in the case of
serious crimes under international law, of an international or internationalized criminal court.”184
4. Foreign courts and the principle of universal jurisdiction

The principle of universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction provides that a state may try those
responsible for the most serious crimes, irrespective of where the crimes were committed, and
irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or that of the victims. This jurisdiction, which
varies according to the legislation applicable in each state, is often exercised when the person
is present on the territory of the state in question.
There have been few cases in foreign courts concerning the situation in Central African
Republic. In France, a case against anti-balaka militia leader Eric Danboy Bagale, former head of
François Bozizé’s presidential guard, is underway. Bagale was arrested on 15 September 2020
and indicted a few days later. He is accused of torture, enforced disappearances, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and complicity in these crimes committed in CAR between 2007
and 2014.185 The case is ongoing.
183. Commission on Human Rights, Civil and political rights, including the question of independence of the judiciary, administration
of justice, impunity, Issue of the administration of justice through military tribunals, Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur of
the Sub-Commission on the promotion and protection of human rights, Emmanuel Decaux, E/CN.4/2006/58, 13 January 2006,
https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=E/CN.4/2006/58&Lang=E.
184. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the independent expert to update the Set of principles to combat impunity, Diane
Orentlicher, Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity, E/
CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, Principle 29, https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=E/
CN.4/2005/102/Add.1&Lang=E.
185. Trial International et al, Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2022, 2022, p. 39, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/trial_
ujar_25_03_2022_digital.pdf.
Universal jurisdiction, as complementary to national and international courts with direct
jurisdiction to try crimes perpetrated in CAR, can be a useful tool to combat impunity, especially
in cases where those allegedly responsible for serious crimes under international law are
present on the territory of third countries, and are therefore beyond the reach of Central African
justice.
09/04/2014
Creation of the Special Investigation
and Prosecution Unit.
21/03/2016
30/05/2014 Jean-Pierre Bemba is found guilty
The Government of CAR refers the of looting, murder and rape as
situation in its territory to the ICC war crimes and crimes against
for the second time. humanity.
August 2014
The Transitional Government 21/06/2016
of CAR and the United
Nations sign an agreement Jean-Pierre Bemba is sentenced to
10/05/2007 on the creation of a Special 18 years imprisonment.
Court in the country.
The ICC Office of the Prosecutor
opens an investigation (known as
“CAR I”) into war crimes and crimes 24/09/2014
03/10/2001 against humanity committed in The ICC Office of the
CAR ratifies the Rome the context of the conflict in the Prosecutor opens an
Statute. country since 1 July 2002. investigation (known as
“CAR II”) into war crimes
and crimes against
humanity committed
15/06/2009
in the context of the
Decision on the
confirmation of 2014 renewed violence in
the country from 2012 2016
2000 2010
charges against Jean- onwards.
Pierre Bemba.
2015 2018
21/12/2004
The Government Décembre 2018
of CAR refers the
situation in its territory Adoption of the strategy on the
to the ICC. selection and prioritisation of
specific incidents, cases and
offences for investigation and
prosecution.
03/07/2008
Jean-Pierre Bemba is 17/11/2018
surrendered to the ICC (CAR I)
Alfred Yekatom (CAR II) is
following his arrest by the Belgian 03/06/2015 surrendered to the ICC following his
authorities.
Promulgation of the law on the creation, arrest by the CAR authorities.
organisation and operation of the Special
Criminal Court. 22/10/2018
The SCC holds its inaugural session,
marking the official start of its 5-year
mandate.
KEY
02/07/2018
ICC
08/06/2018 Adoption of Law No. 18.010 establishing
SCC Jean-Pierre Bemba is acquitted on the rules of procedure and evidence of
appeal. the Special Criminal Court.
Ordinary courts
23/01/2019 24/01/2021
20 YEARS OF EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE JUSTICE

Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona (CAR II) is Mahamat Said Abdel Kain (Said – CAR II) surrendered to
surrendered to the ICC following his the ICC following his arrest by the CAR authorities.
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

arrest by the French authorities.
16/02/2021
23/09/2019 Opening of the trial against Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-

Édouard Ngaïssona.
Abdoulaye Alkali Said is found guilty of
criminal conspiracy and sentenced by the 10/09/2021
Bangui Criminal Court. The charges filed
Eugène Ngaïkosset appears before the
against him by the Prosecutor-General
Investigating Chamber.
included war crimes and crimes against
humanity.
November 2021
Hassan Bouba, Minister of Livestock, is arrested,
then escorted back to his home a few days later,
in violation of ongoing judicial proceedings.
December 2021
Ousman Yaouba, Tahir Mahamat and Issa Sallet
Adoum are prosecuted before the Chambre
11/ 12/2019 d’assise for their involvement in the May 2019
killings in Koundjili and Lemouna. This case is
Decision partially confirming the SCC’s first trial.
2019 2021
charges against Alfred Yekatom
and Patrice-Édouard Ngaïssona. 09/12/2021
2020
Decision partially confirming charges against
Said.
2020 2022 26/09/2022

Opening of the trial against Mr Said.
13/11/2020
Inauguration of the SCC’s premises.
19/04/2022
Official opening ceremony of the trial against
Ousman Yaouba, Tahir Mahamat and Issa Sallet
Adoum. Proceedings are adjourned immediately
after the opening, with the trial only resuming on 16
May 2022.
07/02/2020
Anti-balaka militia leaders Kevin Bere Bere,
Romaric Mandago, Crépin Wakanam (a.k.a Pino March 2022
Pino), Patrick Gbiako and Yembeline Mbenguia Maxime Jeoffroy Eli Mokom Gawaka (CAR II) is
Alpha, as well as 23 other militia members under surrendered to the ICC following his arrest by the
their command, are convicted by the Bangui Chadian authorities.
Criminal Court, including on counts of war
crimes and crimes against humanity, for events
that took place in Bangassou in May 2017.
V. Analysis of complementarity
In theory, CAR has sufficient tools to fight impunity of those responsible for crimes under
international law and serious human rights violations perpetrated on its territory. Very few other
situations have courts at several levels (national, hybrid, international), in addition to a truth and
reconciliation commission, with the possibility of hearing a large number of cases. In practice,
however, as mentioned above, the various courts face numerous obstacles that weaken the fight
against impunity and the pursuit of truth in the country. It is therefore all the more essential that
they respect the principle of complementarity, in order to cover as many crimes, perpetrators and
cases as possible, in a timely manner, while respecting international human rights standards and
the rights of victims to full participation in proceedings.
A) Complementarity as specified in the mandates
1. Ordinary courts
Complementarity between ordinary courts and the Special Criminal Court is provided for in the
texts governing the SCC (see below).
In relation to complementarity between the ordinary courts and the ICC, Article 344 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure provides that CAR “shall participate in the repression of offences and
cooperate with this Court”.186 The modalities of such cooperation are specified in the subsequent
articles.187 The Code defines procedures governing mutual legal assistance,188 the arrest and
surrender of suspects,189 and the enforcement of sentences (fines, forfeiture and/or imprisonment)
and reparation measures issued by the ICC.190 On this last aspect, the Code of Criminal Procedure
specifies, for example, that following “authorisation by the criminal court to enforce [the ICC’s
request]”, the competent authorities may “transfer the proceeds of fines and forfeited property or
the proceeds of their sale to the Court or to the Trust Fund for Victims” or directly “allocate them to
the victims, if the court so decides and has designated them”.191
2. Special Criminal Court

The issue of complementarity between the SCC and other courts with potential jurisdiction
to prosecute those responsible for crimes falling under its mandate has been raised since the
institution’s inception. In its prosecutorial strategy, the SCC asserts, in general terms, that “[t]he
selection of cases by the SCC must take into account the role of other courts with concurrent
jurisdiction to that of the SCC, and the rules of primacy of jurisdiction and complementarity that
govern them”.192
186. Code of Criminal Procedure, op. cit., Article 344.

187. Ibid., Part XIV, “On cooperation with the International Criminal Court”.
188. Ibid., Articles 345 to 347. The articles on mutual legal assistance are very vague, with the exception of Article 347, which
specifically refers to the implementation of provisional measures, as provided for in the Rome Statute (Article 93(1)(k)),
namely “[t]he identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets and instrumentalities of crimes
for the purpose of eventual forfeiture”.
189. Ibid., Articles 348 to 358. The Code of Criminal Procedure outlines the applicable procedure and time limits and recognises, in
Article 358, that “any person detained in the territory of the Central African Republic may, if he/she consents, be transferred
to the International Criminal Court for the purpose of identification or hearing or in application of any other indictment.”
190. Ibid., Articles 359 to 363.
192. SCC, Stratégie d’enquêtes, de poursuites et d’instruction, op. cit., para. 21.
The law establishing the SCC, as reflected in the prosecutorial strategy, provides for the primacy
of the SCC’s jurisdiction over the ordinary courts “to investigate and prosecute cases under its
mandate”.193 Within this framework, the Special Prosecutor of the SCC, who is responsible for the
initiation of prosecutions,194 determines whether a case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court
or of ordinary criminal courts, and can, on this basis, request the opening of an investigation, the
removal of the case from the Prosecutor’s Office to which it was initially referred in the event that
an investigation has already been opened,195 or the transfer of the case to the ordinary courts.196
Thus, the SCC has primacy of jurisdiction over ordinary courts to conduct investigations and
prosecutions,197 but does not replace them.198 This strategy was adopted on the basis of the SCC’s
temporary status, and therefore the impossibility for it to have sole jurisdiction over the most
serious crimes committed in the country.199
However, the law also provides that the SCC must decline jurisdiction over any case already under
consideration by the ICC Prosecutor,200 thereby establishing the primacy of the ICC’s jurisdiction.
This approach, described by some as reverse complementarity,201 appears to contradict the
principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute (see below).
3. International Criminal Court

The situation in CAR has been referred to the ICC, which may hear further cases against those
suspected of bearing greatest responsibility for the crimes under the Rome Statute which have
been committed in CAR, i.e. those persons “who appear to be the most responsible for the identified
crimes”.202 According to the Preamble and Article 17 of the Rome Statute, however, the ICC only
intervenes as a court of last resort.203 It complements the jurisdiction of national courts, which
retain primacy of prosecution. Thus, CAR has primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute
crimes committed on its territory. It is only in cases where Central African national courts (ordinary
courts and/or the SCC) have not done so, or are unwilling or unable to do so, that the ICC can
intervene and exercise jurisdiction.
Article 17 of the Rome Statute provides that:

1. […] a case is inadmissible where:
a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over
it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution;
b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the
State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted
193. Law establishing the SCC, op. cit., Article 36. See also Articles 3 and 35.
197. SCC, Stratégie d’enquêtes, de poursuites et d’instruction, op. cit., paras 10, 22 and 23.
198. Ibid., para. 24.
199. Ibid., para. 10.
200. Ibid., para. 25; Law establishing the SCC, op. cit., Article 37.
201. S
ee, for example, Patryk Labuda, “The Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic. Failure or Vindication of
Complementarity?,” Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 15, 2017, p. 175-206; Jules Guillaumé, “La Cour pénale
spéciale en République Centrafricaine: un modèle novateur de justice internationale?” (The Special Criminal Court in the
Central African Republic: an innovative model of international justice), in Julian Fernandez (dir.), Justice pénale internationale
(International criminal justice), Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2016, p. 297.
202. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy paper on case selection and prioritisation, 15 September 2016, p. 15, https://www.icc-cpi.
int/sites/default/files/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf.
203. T
he preamble recalls “that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes”, and emphasises that “the International Criminal Court […] shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions”. See Rome Statute, op. cit., Preamble.
from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the
complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under Article 20, paragraph 3 [...].
In relation to the unwillingness and inability of a state, Article 17 provides that:

2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider,
having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether
one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for
the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in Article 5;
b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances
is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially,
and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether,
due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system,
the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
In accordance with these provisions, the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes under the Rome Statute
committed in CAR by individuals bearing the greatest responsibility, where domestic courts have
decided not to investigate or prosecute such crimes. If, on the other hand, the ICC is interested
in a person in relation to whom an investigation or prosecution is already underway in national
courts, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor is required to conduct an analysis of the genuine ability
and willingness of the Central African courts to carry out such investigations and prosecutions
in accordance with international standards. In the event that such analysis shows that national
courts are able and willing to do so, the ICC should declare that it has no jurisdiction to hear the
case. If the contrary is established, the ICC is entitled to exercise jurisdiction.
Based on the Rome Statute and interpretation of its provisions, the ICC has a dual approach to
the principle of complementarity: vigilance and partnership. On the one hand, the Court reminds
states of their obligations and threatens to intervene if they do not fulfil them, or do not do so
“properly”. On the other hand, the Court, and in particular the Office of the Prosecutor, can support
national authorities in their pursuit of justice through various forms of assistance.204 The latter
approach is called “positive complementarity” and involves closer cooperation between the Court
and states, sharing experience and assisting efforts at the national level. In May 2022, at a high-
level conference on cooperation and complementarity organised by the ICC, Deputy Prosecutor
Mame Mandiaye Niang underlined the importance of this approach for the Office of the Prosecutor,
“one where the ICC contributes to building the capacities of national authorities and is in constant
communication with them to reduce as much as possible the impunity gap”.205
204. S
ee for example ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Informal expert paper: The principle of complementarity in practice,
14 September 2006, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RelatedRecords/CR2009_02250.PDF.
205. ICC, “ICC holds high-level regional conference on cooperation and complementarity in Senegal”, 25 May 2022, https://www.
icc-cpi.int/news/icc-holds-high-level-regional-conference-cooperation-and-complementarity-senegal.
4. CVJRR
The law establishing the CVJRR provides that the Commission may “issue recommendations
on the transfer of cases to the Special Criminal Court and other courts with jurisdiction.”206 It
adds that “in the fulfilment of its mandate, the CVJRR shall benefit from the collaboration of all
national and international institutions, as necessary. In its pursuit of truth and justice, the CVJRR
shall collaborate with the SCC and national courts. A formal framework for collaboration shall
be established to ensure the effectiveness of their respective actions”.207 At the time of writing, it
appeared that no such framework for collaboration had been developed.
B) Complementarity in practice
During the consultations held in June and July 2022 for the preparation of this report, the issue
of complementarity between the various institutions with jurisdiction to deal with crimes under
international law and serious human rights violations in CAR was considered central. Interviewees,
members of civil society and staff of the relevant institutions, provided an overview of the
implementation of complementarity in practice and raised many key questions and concerns.
1. Interaction between the ICC and the SCC: a relationship under construction
The issue of complementarity between the ICC and the SCC arose in the case of Alfred Yekatom,
currently on trial before the ICC. Following the confirmation of charges decision committing the
accused to trial, the defence challenged the Court’s jurisdiction in this case on the basis of the
principle of complementarity. Several arguments were put forward, including the assertion that
since the SCC’s inception, the authorities in CAR were now in a position to hear such cases.208
The defence argued that this institution should be given the opportunity to take up the case and, a
fortiori, that the ICC should declare the case inadmissible so as not to impede proceedings at the
national level.209 The judges dismissed the defence request, considering it irrelevant in that case
to consider the willingness or ability of national authorities, where there was inaction at the time
of proceedings when the analysis had to be made.210 The mere existence of a national institution
with jurisdiction does not remove a case from the ICC’s jurisdiction, nor does it render the case
inadmissible before the Court. The institution must be active in relation to the case in question, in
accordance with Article 17 of the Rome Statute.
While this decision provides some insight into the relationship between the ICC and the SCC, the
consultations revealed that understanding the division of cases between the two institutions
remains difficult. At this stage, it is almost impossible to predict which individuals will be tried
by one institution rather than the other and on what basis. It is important to bear in mind the
need to ensure confidentiality of investigations carried out by both institutions, which entails the
impossibility of sharing certain information that would contribute to a better understanding of
the distribution of cases. Yet, confidentiality is not the only reason for the lack of understanding.
In the absence of clear criteria or a written document explaining the procedure for deciding on
the distribution of cases, the basis for these decisions remains unclear. While the mandates
and prosecutorial policy and strategy documents presented above offer some answers, they are
insufficient to explain the reason, for example, that an official considered to bear relatively low
responsibility such as Mahamat Said ended up before the ICC judges in The Hague, rather than the
SCC judges in Bangui.
206. L
aw establishing the CVJRR, op. cit., Article 65.
208. ICC, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Decision on the Yekatom Defence’s Admissibility Challenge,
ICC-01/14-01/18-493, 28 April 2020, para. 5; ICC, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Yekatom
Defence’s Admissibility Challenge – Complementarity, ICC-01/14-01/18-456, 17 March 2020.
209. Ibid., para. 6.
210. Ibid., paras 19-21.
This issue is particularly relevant in the context of the discussions underway on the possibility
of holding some hearings in this case in Bangui, including in SCC’s premises. The consultations
revealed very mixed views about this. While civil society, including FIDH and its Central African
member organisations, are generally in favour of bringing the ICC closer to the situations it deals
with, in order to reduce the distance in relation to victims and affected communities, this case
may not be the best starting point. Several issues were raised, including: the risk of escape; the
security of the staff involved in efforts to achieve justice; the practical difficulties for the SCC (the
SCC has only one courtroom which would therefore be requisitioned) and in terms of resources
(it would entail an investment of financial and human resources, an accompaniment and support
system which would be diverted to the ICC) at a time when the SCC is finally starting its own
hearings, following a long wait. Several members of civil society also raised problems related to the
perception of victims, affected communities and the population as a whole. Why relocate this case
and not another? Why only a case involving a member of the Séléka? If it were to be held outside
SCC’s premises (e.g. in a local hall, according to some rumours), what location would be chosen
and why? If it were to be held at the SCC, how can the fact that the accused is being prosecuted by
the ICC be justified, or at least explained?
Furthermore, given that the ICC has been investigating the situation for longer, it has obviously
already investigated a number of incidents, and even individuals, of interest to the SCC. How, then,
do the institutions avoid duplication of work? As investigations are confidential on both sides, and
each has a mandate that gives primacy to the other, how will a potential conflict be resolved? How
to avoid the duplication of interviews with the same victims and witnesses, potentially leading to
retraumatisation in breach of the “do no harm” principle?211
All these questions were repeatedly raised during consultations. However, answers are limited. It
appears that there has been some dialogue between the different organs of the ICC and the SCC
(in particular the Prosecutors’ Offices, the investigating judges and the Registries), in addition to
several exchange and capacity building workshops and training sessions. According to interviewees,
including from the institutions concerned, informal and formal requests for cooperation have also
been made in both directions, some of which have been successful. This is one aspect of the
“positive complementarity” mentioned above. Despite this, obstacles to fully effective cooperation
remain. Each institution is governed by different internal procedural requirements and an even more
different timeframe, leading to disparities between the expectations of one and the capacities of
the other. During consultations, for example, regrets were expressed by some in the SCC that the
ICC’s responses to requests for cooperation were slow, hindering some investigations and creating
delays that pose serious problems given the SCC’s short mandate. These slow responses also
place SCC investigators in a difficult situation, re-interviewing victims who have already shared
their experience with the ICC, while such victims do not necessarily perceive the difference between
the SCC and the ICC, especially in the provinces. From the ICC’s perspective, concerns focused on
victim and witness protection (see below), which remains an obstacle to information sharing with
the SCC.
Cooperation difficulties between the ICC and national courts, notwithstanding some progress in
recent years, continue to be a source of widespread criticism. Although the Court places a strong
emphasis on so-called positive complementarity, exchanges remain limited, particularly in terms of
sharing information gathered in preliminary examinations and investigations. While it is essential
to ensure that the disclosure of information to other judicial institutions does not put victims
and witnesses at risk, the failure to share information significantly weakens efforts to achieve
justice at the national level, where resources and expertise are often more limited. In general,
such criticisms are mainly related to situations where a preliminary examination has been closed
without investigation or where incidents investigated by the Office of the Prosecutor have not been
included in the charges confirmed for trial. The information and evidence gathered, especially where
it is not used, should be shared with other relevant courts, including, as a matter of priority, those of
211. This principle “is a key ethical principle and obligation that guides any humanitarian, human rights or accountability
interventions. It imposes upon intervening actors the duty to analyse the possible negative impacts of their actions,
particularly on victims, witnesses, and affected populations, and to accordingly put in place measures to prevent or minimise
such harm”. FIDH, Sexual and gender-based violence: A glossary from A to Z, 2020, “Do no harm” principle, pp. 52-53, https://
www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/atoz_en_book_screen.pdf.
the country concerned if they can demonstrate a sufficient degree of independence.212 It emerged
from our consultations, but also from other activities recently conducted by our organisations in
situations under investigation or preliminary examination by the ICC, that there is lack of “two-way”
cooperation between the ICC, which makes cooperation strictly conditional, and national courts,
which more readily pass on information to the Court.
2. Multiplicity of actors involved in the fight against impunity: need for effective
complementarity and cooperation
• Ensuring more equitable consideration of national courts
In theory, ordinary courts have jurisdiction to try those responsible for crimes, including war crimes
and crimes against humanity, and have shown their capacity to do so. In reality, as discussed at
the beginning of this report, such prosecutions are particularly complex and are not necessarily
adapted to the sporadic nature and short duration of criminal sessions in CAR,213 as well as to
the limited capacity of most ordinary courts. Thus, some consider the creation of a specialised
institution to try such crimes, the SCC, as a necessary support to the Central African justice
system, without precluding the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. For others, the significant human and
financial resources allocated to the SCC have diverted efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity
of the ordinary justice system, or at least have deprived it of the resources that are essential to its
proper operation. Several interviewees also reported a certain degree of animosity between judges,
prosecutors and other judicial staff in the ordinary courts and those involved in the SCC, partly due
to differences in working conditions.
In light of these divisions, and in order to build a strong and sustainable justice system, it is essential
to ensure that complementarity, not only between the ICC and the SCC, but between all courts with
jurisdiction, is effective. Consultations revealed that major doubts exist concerning the division
of cases between the SCC and the ordinary courts. The only point about which all interviewees
seemed clear is that the SCC Prosecutor’s Office controls this distribution. Although its status
gives it primacy over ordinary courts, any decision to refer a case must be properly reasoned to
avoid further frustration.
Only a well-established system of complementarity between the various courts will make it possible
to hold accountable a maximum number of perpetrators and to contribute to combating impunity
in CAR. Despite existing obstacles and clear needs for improvement, the central role played by
ordinary courts in CAR should be recognised. At the end of the SCC’s mandate, they will be required
to pursue investigations and prosecutions against those responsible for ordinary crimes, as well
as crimes under international law and serious human rights violations. Thus, it cannot and should
not be the case that all efforts are concentrated on the SCC - an ad hoc justice mechanism for a
crisis situation - to the exclusion of other courts. It is important to develop training programmes,
capacity-building initiatives and sharing of expertise among all individuals involved in efforts to
achieve justice in CAR, particularly in relation to crimes under international law and serious human
rights violations. The appointment of international lawyers to work with the SCC’s Corps spécial
and share their expertise is a good example of a system that could be extended for the benefit of
lawyers practising in ordinary courts.
212. This issue was also raised by the independent experts reviewing the performance of the ICC. See Independent Expert Review
of the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute System, Final Report, ICC-ASP/19/16, 30 September 2020, para. 735.
The experts note that “[s]haring information and evidence could be used to catalyse additional prosecutions, beyond the
limited scope of the OTP”.
213. On the difficulties associated with the sporadic nature of sessions and the need for a permanent justice system, see in
particular Amnesty International, CAR Report 2020, op. cit., p. 27 et seq.
• nsuring clarification of roles and greater cooperation between truth-telling mechanisms,
E
criminal courts and national authorities
Beyond these courts, it is also important for the actors involved in the justice system to consider
the CVJRR, in order to ensure that the Commission can fulfil its mandate. The CVJRR will hear
victims and those responsible for crimes perpetrated during the successive crises in CAR, including
crimes under the jurisdiction of the above-mentioned courts. Given that its mandate provides for
the power to “make recommendations on the measures to be taken [in relation to those responsible
for violations],”214 and even to refer cases to the SCC and other courts with jurisdiction, it is essential
to clarify the procedure and the relationship with the other courts. This is also crucial in order to
ensure that all stakeholders are involved in dialogue. In the absence of clarification of the practical
consequences of testifying, it is highly unlikely, as repeatedly emphasised during consultations,
that those responsible for crimes and other violations will agree to do so, thereby undermining
efforts to establish the truth. On the other hand, it is equally important to ensure that there are
limits on potential agreements, so that these do not allow individuals to escape justice and to
use the Commission as a way out. While the law establishing the CVJRR does not mention
amnesties,215 one of its tasks is to “put in place a programme of actions to promote forgiveness
and reconciliation”.216 In many conflict and post-conflict societies, “forgiveness and reconciliation”
are manifested in a form of impunity. Furthermore, as noted above, amicable settlements can
be reached before the Commission, and these have the force of res judicata.217 Although the law
specifies that such arrangements concern “compensation or settlement”, it is essential to clarify
the interaction between them and potential criminal proceedings.
In order to increase the budget allocated to the justice system, to ensure that increased financial
and human resources are allocated to the fight against impunity, and to guarantee effective state
commitment, Central African authorities, including local political leaders, should be involved in the
various efforts to achieve justice, while respecting the principles of independence and impartiality
of judicial institutions. In this regard, we welcome the initiative shared in June 2022 by the ICC
Office of the Prosecutor to partner with national authorities, the Argentine Forensic Anthropology
Team and the Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic, in order to conduct forensic examination,
including autopsies, the analysis of artefacts and sampling, on the remains of victims in CAR.218
While, as Prosecutor Khan pointed out, this initiative contributes to the ongoing ICC investigation, it
will also help to provide answers to the families and build the capacity of national authorities (police,
medical and judicial) in the area of forensic investigation.219 This is an example of application of
the principle of positive complementarity, whose effects can extend beyond specific courts, and
a good example of cooperation with local authorities. Such initiatives could, in the long term, lead
to the creation of a body of professional experts who could intervene independently in the various
courts in CAR.

215. FIDH and its member organisations underline that amnesties for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and other
serious human rights violations violate international law. Under the main international and regional human rights instruments,
states have an obligation to prosecute those responsible for such crimes and violations and to ensure the respect of victims’
rights to truth, justice and reparation.
216. Idem.
218. ICC, “Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court partners with national authorities and international experts
in the forensic analysis of remains of victims in the Central African Republic”, 23 June 2022, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/
office-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-partners-national-authorities-and-international.
219. Idem.
• nsuring a victim-centred approach in efforts to achieve justice and close interaction with
E
civil society
Civil society plays a central role in efforts to achieve justice, whether at the national, regional or
international level. Its activities should therefore be supported and protected, and it should be
consulted and informed by justice mechanisms, particularly where these organisations work with
victims and affected communities. NGOs take many risks to ensure victims’ access to justice, to
reach communities in provinces to which the authorities and/or personnel of judicial institutions
do not travel, to inform victims and affected communities of existing proceedings in which they
could participate and to support them in the event of participation. Often, they also intervene to
ensure the respect of victims’ rights during proceedings, including by making sure that victims
play a central role at all stages of proceedings. In this way, civil society provides crucial support
to justice mechanisms, which, in some cases, heavily rely on these actors to fulfil their mandate.
Civil society should therefore receive support – particularly financial support – from both national
authorities and the international community.
3. Victim protection and reparation measures: the need for a comprehensive and
harmonised approach
Victim and witness protection during judicial proceedings in CAR (before the ordinary courts
and the SCC) was an issue at the centre of the consultations conducted for the preparation of
this report. This is a core concern in CAR, which needs to be addressed urgently. While there has
been some progress, particularly at the level of the SCC, which has a specific programme and a
Victim and Witness Protection and Support Unit, civil society and several members of the judiciary
interviewed remain concerned by the level of protection offered, which they consider to be highly
inadequate in a crisis situation, such that in CAR.
Since guaranteeing adequate and sustainable protection for victims and witnesses is a primary
necessity of any justice effort, it should be considered as a whole, rather than dealt with separately
by each institution. A discussion should be held with a number of key actors in the fight against
impunity in CAR, on minimum standards of protection, the means at the disposal of each
institution, the obstacles encountered, and other practical issues. This discussion should bring
together representatives of the various judicial institutions (judges/prosecutors and lawyers) but
also CVJRR commissioners, Central African authorities (including local authorities), UN entities
present in the country (in particular UNDP and MINUSCA), representatives of affected communities
and members of civil society. This aspect of complementarity may be less visible, but it is just
as crucial as exchange of information and/or expertise. Victims and witnesses are at the heart
of judicial processes. They testify, provide evidence, inform investigations and fight for justice,
sometimes risking their (physical or mental) health and even their lives. As our organisations
pointed out in 2017, “Threats and reprisals can often lead victims to withdraw their complaints and
to the non-appearance of key witnesses. They can create a climate of fear and discourage other
victims and witnesses from filing complaints and testifying for fear of being the target of similar
actions”.220 Ensuring the protection of victims and witnesses throughout the proceedings, from
preliminary investigations to reparations, is therefore essential.
In the area of reparation, consultations revealed a need for cooperation between the various
actors involved in the fight against impunity in CAR, including a form of complementarity between
reparations ordered in judicial proceedings, granted to victims of crimes where the perpetrators
have been found guilty, and those granted to survivors of crimes and serious human rights
violations more generally, independently of any judicial sentence (non-judicial reparations, which
also allow for other forms of collective and/or non-financial reparation). These discussions are
partially reflected in the findings of an in-depth analysis conducted in 2021 by Enrica Picco, with
the support of UN Women, MINUSCA and UNDP, on “options and modalities for reparations in the
220. F
IDH, LCDH, OCDH and REDRESS, Intégrer les droits des victimes dans les procédures de la Cour pénale spéciale en République
centrafricaine (Integrating victims’ rights in the proceedings of the Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic),
September 2017, p. 16, https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CAR_Paper_Rules_FINAL_FRENCH.pdf.
Central African Republic.”221 Given the impossibility of prosecuting all those responsible for crimes
committed during the successive crises in CAR, it is essential that the relevant actors reflect on the
means of repairing the harm suffered by the thousands of victims who are still waiting, in Bangui
and in the provinces.
The above-mentioned study and the consultations carried out for the preparation of this report raise
the possibility of setting up a fund for victims, as provided for in the law establishing the CVJRR.222
In addition to not being limited to exclusively judicial reparations, such a fund would allow for the
recognition of the responsibility of the state, which would be in charge of its creation (by adopting
a law) and its financing (with a specific item in the state budget and a call for contributions from
international partners, but also by appropriately managing the property forfeited from those found
responsible). At the same time the state would have to ensure that the fund is an independent and
impartial body, free from discrimination and political influence in the allocation of reparations.223
The above-mentioned study proposes three main options to establish a reparations programme
adapted to the CAR context:
- The first option takes into account the harm suffered by each victim and provides
individual reparation, in accordance with the material and human losses declared during
the identification of victims;
-T
he second option also refers to individual harm, but provides reparation on the basis of
a predetermined scale in relation to each type of harm;
- The third option takes into account all the harm suffered by victims of the same event and
provides collective reparation through victims’ associations.224
Whichever option is chosen from among the three identified above or otherwise, the issue of
reparation should be included in all discussions on the fight against impunity, at the earliest possible
stage. Although reparations are awarded, if at all, at an advanced or final stage of any proceedings,
they should be considered from the outset, if possible, at the preliminary stage of proceedings.
While it essential to ensure that unrealistic expectations are not created among victims and
affected communities, this issue cannot be left aside or improvised, at the risk of undermining
its implementation and rationale. As FIDH emphasised in a report published in 2017,225 pending
the determination of reparations following Jean-Pierre Bemba’s conviction at first instance by
the ICC (prior to his acquittal), reparations are essential for victims and must be adapted to their
needs, while respecting international standards (which identify five forms of reparation, namely
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition).226 The
report highlights a number of testimonies collected by FIDH from victims involved in the Bemba
case, reflecting an urgent need for reparation measures to ensure that they effectively recover from
the crimes suffered.
Ideally, these measures should be timely and include both individual and collective benefits.227 Many
of those interviewed at the time, mainly victims of sexual violence, were still suffering from the
physical and psychological consequences of the crimes committed against them. A large majority
stressed the need to address this suffering before considering any other type of more sustainable
and collective reparation. Building a school or training centre for the community is a good idea
only if the people concerned are still alive or if their health allows them to access it.228 Victims also
221. Enrica Picco, Étude sur les options et les modalités de réparations en République Centrafricaine (Study on options and modalities
for reparations in the Central African Republic), July 2021, unpublished (“CAR Reparation Study 2021”).
223. CAR Reparation Study 2021, op. cit., p. 44-45.
224. Ibid., p. 6 and 67-71.
225. FIDH Bemba Reparation Report 2017, op. cit.
226. Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human
rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 60/147,
16 December 2005.
227. FIDH Bemba Reparation Report 2017, op. cit., p. 24-26.
228. Ibid., p. 26, 28-35.
stressed the need to adapt measures to the reality of the situation in CAR. Again, building a hospital
for the community is a good idea if it can be ensured that it will not be looted, destroyed or targeted
by rebel groups in the coming months, if its staff is not threatened and forced to leave, or if the
government does not use this opportunity to charge the population for public services.229 In short,
the FIDH report emphasises that in order for reparations to have a real impact on their beneficiaries,
victims must be properly consulted about their needs and expectations. This is time-consuming
and requires preparation. Consultations highlighted some concerns in this area in relation to the
SCC. As the Court is expected to soon issue its first decision, in the case of Issa Sallet Adoum
(a.k.a Bozize), Yaouba Ousman and Mahamat Tahir, the reparations strategy remains unclear. As
mentioned above, the work carried out with victims by lawyers has been severely limited by the
lack of resources. It is therefore difficult to imagine that any effective consultation has taken place
with victims on this issue, which, at the time, was not considered a priority.
Finally, several interviewees consulted in June and July 2022 highlighted the importance of not
substituting reparations for other measures, such as humanitarian assistance or aid. While all
measures can potentially provide valuable assistance to those affected, their impact and meaning
vary significantly. Reparation measures by their very nature imply a recognition of the crime
suffered and the suffering associated with it, and demonstrate an effort by the justice system or
the authorities to do the right thing in relation to victims and survivors. This symbolism will always
be absent from assistance measures and other humanitarian aid, however useful and welcome
they may be.
229. Ibid., p. 25-26. See also p. 46 on difficulties associated with issuing reparation measures in a context of high insecurity in
which crimes continue to be committed and beneficiaries may be put at risk.
Recommendations

To the Central African authorities:

Independence and cooperation
• espect the independence of national courts, including the SCC, and international courts
R
combating impunity, and any other justice and truth-telling mechanisms, and avoid political
interference in the exercise of their mandate;
• xecute arrest warrants issued by national and international courts and arrest, in
E
accordance with the law, individuals present on Central African territory who are suspected
of having committed or contributed to the commission of crimes under international law
and serious human rights violations;
• nsure the protection of all persons involved in efforts to combat impunity, including staff
E
of judicial institutions and civil society representatives working with victims and affected
communities.
Resources
• Increase the budget allocated to the justice sector; in particular, guarantee the allocation
of sufficient financial and human resources to ensure that annual criminal court sessions
provided for in the Central African Penal Code are effectively held, that the capacities of
ordinary courts are strengthened, that a sustainable system of legal aid is put in place, and
that international standards on the fairness and impartiality of proceedings are respected;
• Facilitate implementation of the CVJRR’s mandate, while respecting its independence;
• Establish or strengthen mechanisms to ensure access to justice throughout the Central
African Republic, particularly in the provinces, and establish a clear procedure following
the filing of a complaint (including practical aspects related to the transportation of the
complaint and/or the victim to Bangui, protection of individuals and/or preservation of
evidence, and follow-up of the case);
• Provide financial support and security guarantees to local civil society for their actions and
initiatives with victims and affected communities throughout the country, in the area of
access to justice and the fight against impunity.
Reform of the justice system

• Establish a task force, composed of independent and expert judicial personnel, to reform
the justice system and establish a permanent criminal justice system, instead of ad
hoc criminal court sessions which are too sporadic to respond to the magnitude of the
offences/to deal with the countless and continuous offences under the jurisdiction of
national courts; alternatively, increase the number of annual criminal court sessions;
• Establish a national framework for the protection of victims and witnesses (and their
families) involved in judicial proceedings at the national, regional and/or international level,
or in any other truth-telling mechanism, ensuring the allocation of an adequate budget and
independent monitoring and implementation mechanisms;
• Adopt a national reparations programme for victims and survivors of serious human rights
violations in CAR, that complements reparations processes linked to national and international
judicial proceedings, with a permanent dedicated budget line; and pay particular attention to
the specific needs of victims and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence;
• Reform the Military Justice Code to exclude the jurisdiction of military courts over offences
committed against and by civilians;
• Renew the mandate of the Special Criminal Court in due course, as provided for in the law
establishing the Special Criminal Court.
To states and the international community
To the UN:
• Promote the gradual transition of the SCC’s technical and financial management from UNDP
to the Registry in order to increase the independence of the institution in the management
of its mandate and the confidentiality of its cases; set up capacity-building workshops for
the bodies involved to ensure an effective transition;
• Cooperate in executing arrest warrants issued by national and international courts and
encourage the relevant authorities to carry out arrests, in accordance with the law, of
individuals present on CAR territory, suspected of having committed or contributed to the
commission of serious human rights violations;
• Call on the CAR Government to renew the SCC’s mandate, as provided for in Article 70 of
the Law establishing the SCC.
To states:
• Provide funding to ensure capacity building of all national courts (the SCC and ordinary
courts) in the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for crimes under
international law and serious human rights violations;
• Establish a mentoring system through the deployment of international experts to national
courts, including the SCC (for the term of its mandate) and ordinary courts (on an ongoing
basis), in line with needs identified by these institutions;
• Provide financial support to the various courts with jurisdiction to prosecute the most
serious crimes perpetrated on Central African territory, in particular the ordinary courts in
CAR, the SCC and the ICC;
• Support the establishment of a national legal framework for the protection of victims and
witnesses, including capacity building and financial contributions;
• Provide sustainable support to local and international civil society for its actions and
initiatives with victims and affected communities in the area of access to justice and the
fight against impunity;
• Fully cooperate with the ICC; including through contributions to the annual budget, the
execution of arrest warrants issued by the Court and the tracing, freezing, seizure and
recovery of assets linked either to the commission of crimes under international law or to
individuals accused of such crimes.
To justice and truth-telling mechanisms

To the ICC:
• React strongly and publicly to any political interference with the independence of judicial
institutions with jurisdiction to deal with crimes under international law and serious human
rights violations in CAR; take such interference into consideration in any analysis of
complementarity in relation to specific cases to determine their admissibility before the ICC;
• Organise joint training and practice-sharing workshops with staff of ordinary courts and
the SCC, including on international standards on the investigation and prosecution of those
responsible for crimes under international law and serious human rights violations;
• Investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction, from
all sides of the conflict, in order to limit the risks of perception of selective justice at the
national level;
• Respond to requests for information and cooperation from national courts in a timely
manner, respecting internal authorisation procedures, but mindful of the limitations of
the SCC’s non-permanent mandate and the impact of a delayed response on ongoing
investigations;
• Facilitate the sharing of information and evidence with the relevant courts demonstrating
a sufficient degree of independence;
• Encourage the sharing of expertise through short-term deployments of staff from the Office
of the Prosecutor to the SCC or the establishment of a medium- to long-term mentoring
system.
To the SCC:
• Adopt and implement an improved, more transparent communication and outreach
strategy around the Court’s judicial activities, including by:
- developing communication tools adapted to populations throughout CAR;
- regularly updating the Court’s website to include information on ongoing cases, relevant
and up-to-date figures and statistics, accessible explanations, in clear language, of the
proceedings to facilitate victims’ access to the Court, initiatives on access to justice
and the fight against impunity, and access to all judicial decisions, even in redacted
form; and
- making public the names of persons in detention, or where security considerations
related to the armed conflict situation make this impossible (necessity of protecting
victims and witnesses from potential reprisals and judicial personnel from intimidation
and influence), inform the population and civil society of the number of persons
detained, the period of detention and the measures and mechanisms in place to
ensure respect for their rights;
• Implement the prosecutorial strategy by prosecuting individuals with a high degree of
responsibility for offences which particularly characterised the conflict (including sexual
and gender-based crimes);
• Ensure that budget distribution among the various court entities adequately reflects
the needs associated with their mandates, including in particular participation and
representation of victims and the defence.
To the various judicial institutions and other justice mechanisms:

• Adopt a clear cooperation and complementarity framework specifying the distribution
of jurisdiction on the basis of the complementarity approach of each institution, the
possibilities for cooperation and the options for conflict resolution; make it publicly
available, in full or in part, to improve understanding of the population concerned, including
victims and witnesses, civil society and donors;
• Define, within this framework of cooperation, minimum standards on the protection of
victims and witnesses and possible joint actions to ensure the safety of individuals involved
in judicial proceedings before the SCC and/or ICC;
• Maintain or develop ongoing communication to strengthen the fight against impunity
for crimes under international law committed in CAR, including through exchange of
information, joint investigations where the situation allows, and sharing of expertise and
human resources;
• Ensure that the issue of reparation is included in all discussions on the fight against impunity
and the establishment of the truth, from the preliminary stages of any proceedings, whether
judicial or otherwise; ensure, in this context, that victims and affected communities are
adequately consulted on their needs and expectations;
• Support the actions and initiatives undertaken by local and international civil society for
victims and affected communities, in relation to situations and cases pending before the
relevant courts.
Observatoire Centrafricain des Droits de l’Homme (Central African
Observatory for Human Rights - OCDH)
OCDH is a national, non-partisan, non-governmental organisation registered

under Central African law, established in Bangui on 29 July 1995. Its
objectives are the promotion and protection of human rights, in particular
through education and dissemination of information on human rights
and fundamental freedoms; observation and monitoring of these rights
and freedoms, including in the context of electoral processes; studies
and research on human rights; humanitarian action and legal and judicial
assistance in favour of victims of armed conflict.
Ligue Centrafricaine des Droits de l’Homme (Central African League for Hu-
man Rights - LCDH)
LCDH is a non-governmental association, established on 11 June 1991

and recognised by the CAR state. Its mission is the promotion, protection
and defence of human rights, including by fighting impunity. With its
headquarters in Bangui, it has committees (at district, prefectoral and sub-
prefectoral level) and focal points throughout a large part of the country,
including in areas still ravaged by conflict. It also strives to ensure that
transparent and violence-free elections are held throughout the country.
This document was produced with the support of the Agence française de développement (AFD) and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The sole responsibility for the content of this publication
lies with FIDH, LCDH and OCDH and it cannot be considered to reflect the views of AFD or the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
Keep your eyes open
Establishing the facts - Investigative and trial observation missions

Director of Supporting civil society - Training and exchange
publication:
Mobilising the international community - Advocacy before intergovernmental bodies
Alice Mogwe
Editor in chief: Informing and reporting - Mobilizing public opinion
Éléonore Morel
Authors:
Dorine Llanta
Coordination: For FIDH, transforming societies relies on the work of local actors.
Delphine Carlens
Design:
FIDH/CB - The Worldwide Movement for Human Rights acts at national, regional and international
Julien Mage levels in support of its member and partner organisations to address human rights abuses
and consolidate democratic processes. Its work is directed at States and those in power,
such as armed opposition groups and multinational corporations.
Its primary beneficiaries are national human rights organisations who are members of the
Movement, and through them, the victims of human rights violations. FIDH also cooperates
with other local partner organisations and actors of change.
CONTACT
FIDH
17, passage de la Main d’Or
75011 Paris - France
Tel: (33-1) 43 55 25 18
www.fidh.org
Twitter: @fidh_en / fidh_fr / fidh_es
Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/FIDH.HumanRights/
FIDH/LCDH/OCDH - What prospects for justice in the Central African Republic? Complementarity between national
Dépôt légal Octobre 2022 - FIDH (Éd. anglaise) ISSN 2225-1804 - Fichier informatique conforme à la loi du 6 janvier 1978 (Déclaration N°330 675) 52
FIDH
is an
international human rights
NGO
federating 192 organisations
from 117 countries
About fidh
FIDH takes action for the protection of victims of human rights violations, for
the prevention of violations and to bring perpetrators to justice.
A broad mandate
FIDH works for the respect of all the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights.
A universal movement
FIDH was established in 1922, and today unites 192 member organisations in
117 countries around the world. FIDH coordinates and supports their activities and
provides them with a voice at the international level.
An independent organisation
Like its member organisations, FIDH is not linked to any party or religion and is inde-
pendent of all governments.
www.fidh.org

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What prospects for justice in the

Central African Republic?

October 2022 / N° 799a

IV. Who are the main actors involved in justice in CAR?.........................................................................12

Accord Politique pour la Paix et la Réconciliation en République centrafricaine

A) Ordinary courts: landmark cases despite a lack of capacity and independence

1. Structure of the ordinary justice system

3. Advantages and disadvantages of ordinary courts50

1. SCC origins and mandate

The ProseCuTor’s offiCe invesTigaTion indiCTmenT Trial Chamber aPPeals

(Organisation chart based on information collected up to 10 August 2022)

International Deputy Chief

National Communications Victims and Victims and Administrative Security

(Organisation chart based on information collected up to 10 August 2022)

1. Mandate and jurisdiction of the ICC

123. For further details about the conflict, see “Background”.

D) Other actors involved in justice

1. The Commission Vérité, Justice, Réparation et Réconciliation (Truth, Justice,

2. Informal or traditional justice

Principle 5 “Military courts should, in principle, have no jurisdiction to try

4. Foreign courts and the principle of universal jurisdiction

20 YEARS OF EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE JUSTICE

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

23/09/2019 Opening of the trial against Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-

2020 2022 26/09/2022

A) Complementarity as specified in the mandates

2. Special Criminal Court

186. Code of Criminal Procedure, op. cit., Article 344.

3. International Criminal Court

Article 17 of the Rome Statute provides that:

In relation to the unwillingness and inability of a state, Article 17 provides that:

214. Law establishing the CVJRR, op. cit., Article 6.

To the Central African authorities:

Reform of the justice system

To justice and truth-telling mechanisms

To the various judicial institutions and other justice mechanisms:

OCDH is a national, non-partisan, non-governmental organisation registered

LCDH is a non-governmental association, established on 11 June 1991

Establishing the facts - Investigative and trial observation missions

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123. For further details about the conflict, see “Background”.

1. The Commission Vérité, Justice, Réparation et Réconciliation (Truth, Justice,

186. Code of Criminal Procedure, op. cit., Article 344.

214. Law establishing the CVJRR, op. cit., Article 6.