Samuel A. Medina 19-50458 Block B 19-24
Samuel A. Medina 19-50458 Block B 19-24
Samuel A. Medina 19-50458 Block B 19-24
PARAS, J.:
Petitioner’s Argument:
Petitioner claims that since her lease agreement had already expired, she is not liable
for payment of separation pay. Neither could she reinstate the complainants in the
farm as this is a complete cessation or closure of a business operation, a just cause for
employment termination under Article 272 of the Labor Code.
Respondent’s Argument:
On the other hand, the legal basis of the Labor Arbiter in granting separation pay to
the private respondents is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending the Labor Code,
Section 15
Instruction Learned:
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Article 284 as amended refers to
employment benefits to farm hands who were not parties to petitioner’s lease contract
with the owner of Hacienda Danao-Ramona. That contract cannot have the effect of
annulling subsequent legislation designed to protect the interest of the working class.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the July
16, 1982 Decision of the Labor Arbiter and the April 8, 1985 Resolution of the
Ministry of Labor and Employment are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
"Art. 284. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a written notice on the workers
and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended
date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to
one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1)
whole year."cralaw virtua1aw library
Issue:The issue is whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be
included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their
separation pay.
Petitioner’s Argument:Petitioners' position was that in arriving at the correct and legal
amount of separation pay due them, whether under the Labor Code or the CBA, their
basic salary, earned sales commissions and allowances should be added together.
Respondent’s Argument:Zuellig argues that if it were really the intention of the Labor
Code as well as its implementing rules to include commission in the computation of
separation pay, it could have explicitly said so in clear and unequivocal terms.
Furthermore, in the definition of the term "wage", "commission" is used only as one
of the features or designations attached to the word remuneration or earnings.
Instruction Learned:
the logical conclusion, therefore, is, in the computation of the separation pay of
petitioners, their salary base should include also their earned sales commissions.
Since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual market transactions
attributable to petitioners, these should be included in their separation pay. In the
computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the average commissions
earned during their last year of employment.
SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
The final consideration is, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's
provisions and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning
and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in
Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor
G.R. No. 184397, September 09, 2015
PERALTA, J.:
Petitioner’s argument:That the CA ruled against labor when it resolved the factual
issues of the case.
Instruction Learned:This Court finds that the CA did not violate the Constitution, the
law and jurisprudence. Hence, the resolution of the doubt as to whether petitioner
voluntarily resigned or was constructively dismissed based on the evidence on record
was proper and was not against labor.
SO ORDERED.chanro
Ratio:
We held that the law and jurisprudence guarantee security of tenure to every
employee. However, in protecting the rights of the workers, the law does not
authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer. Social justice does not
mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor. Thus,
the Constitution and the law equally recognize the employer's right and prerogative to
manage its operation according to reasonable standards and norms of fair play.65
It is settled that the law serves to equalize the unequal. The labor force is a special
class that is constitutionally protected because of the inequality between capital and
labor.
We cannot subscribe to petitioner's allegation that the CA ruled against labor when it
resolved the factual issues of the case. As discussed, it is well within the powers and
jurisdiction of the CA to evaluate the evidence alleged to have been capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, or as in the present case, for
considering petitioner's bare allegations without support of substantial evidence.
G.R. No. 221493, August 02, 2017
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner’s Argument:
Sterling argues that Esponga's utterance of foul and abusive language against his
supervisor, demonstrating a dirty finger, and defiance to perform his duties
undeniably constitute serious misconduct. It added that Esponga's acts were not only
serious, but they also related to the performance of his duties. Further, Sterling asserts
that he was motivated by wrongful intent.
Respondent’s Argument:
Esponga replied that Sterling failed to establish the validity of his dismissal by clear
and convincing evidence. He insisted that if doubts exist between the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in
favor of the latter because the employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate
evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.
Instruction Learned:
Primarily, in a number of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that the utterance of
obscene, insulting or offensive words against a superior is not only destructive of the
morale of his co-employees and a violation of the company rules and regulations, but
also constitutes gross misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 22, 2014 Decision and the
October 27, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124596 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November 15, 2011 Decision and the
March 2, 2012 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
Under Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code, serious misconduct by the employee
justifies the employer in terminating his or her employment.
The right of an employer to exercise its management prerogative in dealing with its
affairs including the right to dismiss its erring employees. It is a general principle of
labor law to discourage interference with an employer's judgment in the conduct of
his business. As already noted, even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the
employees, it also recognizes the employer's exercise of management prerogatives. As
long as the company's exercise of judgment is in good faith to advance its interest and
not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the
laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.
[G. R. No. 46853. January 30, 1940.]
LAUREL, J.:
Issue : Wheter or not the Court of Industrial Relations to order the readmission of a
laborer who, it is admitted, had been found derelict in the performance of his duties
towards his employer.
Petitioner’s Argument:
Instruction Learned:
We concede that the right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees,
is subject to regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police
power. (Commonwealth Acts Nos. 103 and 213.)
The writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted, and the order of the Court of
Industrial Relations appealed from, reversed, without pronouncement regarding costs.
So ordered.
Ratio:
Issue:
1.Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
private respondent Dolina was entitled to his salaries from 1 April 1979 "until this
case is finally resolved.
Petitioner’s Argument: PAL argues that the arbitration of the case is limited to and
comprises merely the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter such that when the latter
renders a decision, arbitration of the dispute is terminated .
Respondent’s Argument: Public respondent NLRC on the other hand contends that
arbitration is a continuing process from the time the case is referred by the Secretary
of Labor to the Arbitration Branch until the final judgment is had on appeal
Instruction Learned:
1. In entering into the agreement, the parties could not have intended to include in the
clause "final resolution of the case by arbitration" the whole adjudicatory process,
including appeal.
Neither can proceedings on appeal before the NLRC en banc be considered as part of
the arbitration proceeding. In its broad sense, arbitration is the reference of a dispute
to an impartial third person, chosen by the parties or appointed by statutory authority
to hear and decide the case in controversy
2. Dismissal was sufficiently grounded, we are not persuaded that the respondent
[herein petitioner PAL] is under obligation to employ him as regular employee simply
because he was certified physically fit and technically to proficient by the CAA.
This is understandable for it concerns the safety of its properties, and above all, the
safety of the lives and properties of its passengers, which by law it is committed to
transport safely. In the absence, therefore, of any showing that its standards are
unreasonable and discriminatory, which we do not find here, We cannot disturb them.
We can only say that for exercising extraordinary diligence in the selection of its
pilots, We join the public in commending it.
WHEREFORE, that part of the dispositive portion of the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CASE NO. RB-IV-9319-77 requiring
petitioner to restore private respondent to its payroll and ordering the payment of his
salaries from 1 April 1979 until the case is finally resolved is hereby declared NULL
and VOID and SET ASIDE. The temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on
10 October 1980 is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED
Ratio:
1. When the consent of one of the parties is enforced by statutory provisions, the
proceeding is referred to as compulsory arbitration. In labor cases, compulsory
arbitration is the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency
which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all
the parties
Under the Labor Code, it is the Labor Arbiter who is clothed with the authority to
conduct compulsory arbitration on cases involving termination disputes [Article 217,
Pres. Decree No. 442, as amended]. When the Labor Arbiter renders his decision,
compulsory arbitration is deemed terminated because by then the hearing and
determination of the controversy has ended. Any appeal raised by an aggrieved party
from the Labor Arbiter's decision is already beyond the scope of arbitration since in
the appeal stage, the NLRC en banc merely reviews the Labor Arbiter's decision for
errors of fact or law and no longer duplicates the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
Thus, the clause "pending final resolution of the case by arbitration" should be
understood to be limited only to the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, such that
when the latter rendered his decision, the case was finally resolved by arbitration.
2. In the first place, backwages in general are granted on grounds of equity for
earnings which a worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal
Where, as in this case, the dismissal was for a just cause, there is no factual or legal
basis for ordering the payment of backwages. The order of the NLRC for the
continued payment of Dolina's salaries would allow the latter to unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of the petitioner. This Court has reiterated time and again that
the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor
self-destruction of the employer
Note: Contents of my digests are taken directly from the case. I have no intention of
owning it