AFRICAN UNION UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

COUR AFRICAINE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DES PEUPLES

THE MATTER OF

GODFRED ANTHONY AND IFUNDA KISITE

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

APPLICATION No. 015 /2015

RULING
(JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY)

26 SEPTEMBER 2019
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS…………….…………………….……………....…………………....
i
I. THE PARTIES............................................................................................................2
II. SUBJECT MATTER OF THE APPLICATION............................................................3
A. Facts of the Matter.........................................................................................................3

B. Alleged violations...........................................................................................................4

III. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT.............................................4

IV. PRAYERS OF THE PARTIES....................................................................................5
V. JURISDICTION...........................................................................................................6
A. Objection to material jurisdiction........................................................................................6

B. Other aspects of jurisdiction..............................................................................................8

VI. ADMISSIBILITY..........................................................................................................9
A. Objection based on the non-exhaustion of local remedies........................................................10

B. Objection based on failure to file the Application within a reasonable time ...................................12

VII. COSTS......................................................................................................................16
VIII. OPERATIVE PART...................................................................................................17

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The Court composed of: Sylvain ORÉ, President; Ben KIOKO, Vice-President; Rafaâ
BEN ACHOUR, Ângelo V. MATUSSE, Suzanne MENGUE, M-Thérèse MUKAMULISA,
Tujilane R. CHIZUMILA, Chafika BENSAOULA, Blaise TCHIKAYA, Stella I. ANUKAM, -
Judges; and Robert ENO, Registrar.

In accordance with Article 22 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights (hereinafter referred to as “the Protocol”) and Rule 8(2) of the Rules of Court
(hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"), Justice Imani D. ABOUD, member of the Court
and a national of Tanzania, did not hear the Application.

In the Matter of:

Godfred ANTHONY and Ifunda KISITE

Self- represented

versus

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA,

represented by:

i. Dr. Clement J. MASHAMBA, Solicitor General, Office of the Solicitor General

ii. Ms. Sarah D. MWAIPOPO, Director, Division of Constitutional Affairs and

Human Rights, Attorney General's Chambers;

iii. Mr. Baraka LUVANDA, Ambassador, Head of the Legal Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, East Africa, Regional and International Cooperation;

iv. Ms. Nkasori SARAKIKYA, Assistant Director, Human Rights; Principal State
Attorney, Attorney General’s Chambers;

1
 v. Mr. Elisha E. SUKA, Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, East
African, Regional and International Cooperation;

vi. Mr. Mark MULWAMBO, Principal State Attorney, Attorney General’s Chambers

vii. Ms. Sylvia MATIKU, Principal State Attorney, Attorney General’s Chambers

after deliberation,
renders the following Judgment:

A. THE PARTIES

1. Messrs Godfred Anthony and Mr. Ifunda Kisite, (hereinafter referred to as

“the Applicants”) are nationals of the United Republic of Tanzania, each
currently serving thirty (30) years’ prison sentence following their
conviction of conspiracy to commit a felony and for armed robbery.

2. The Respondent State, the United Republic of Tanzania, became a Party

to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter referred
to as “the Charter”) on 21 October 1986, and to the Protocol on 10
February 2006. Furthermore, on 29 March 2010, the Respondent State
deposited the Declaration required under Article 34 (6) of the Protocol, by
which it accepted the jurisdiction of the Court to receive cases from
individuals and Non-Governmental Organisations.

2
B. SUBJECT MATTER OF THE APPLICATION

C. Facts of the Matter

3. It emerges from the file that the Applicants were charged before the
Songea District Court on 7 May 1999 in Zanzibar Street, Songea
Municipality, with one count of conspiracy to commit a crime and one
count of armed robbery for threatening the cashier named Sophie
Mwalango with a pistol, before snatching a box containing twenty
thousand Tanzanian Shillings (TZS 20,000) and 5 receipt booklets
belonging to Steven Martin. The crimes are provided for and punishable
under Articles 384 and 285 as read together with 286 of the Penal Code of
the Respondent State respectively.

4. The District Court found the first Applicant guilty and sentenced him to
three years' imprisonment for conspiracy to commit a crime and 15 years'
imprisonment for armed robbery, to be served concurrently. The second
Applicant was acquitted on the ground that the evidence against him was
mere suspicion.

5. The first Applicant appealed against his conviction and the 15-year
sentence, while the Prosecution appealed against the acquittal of the
second Applicant to the High Court of Tanzania at Songea. By a single
Judgement rendered on 19 May 2003, the first Applicant’s appeal was
dismissed and his sentence was instead increased from 15 to 30 years in
accordance with the amended Minimum Sentences Act of 1972. In respect
of the second Applicant, the Judge granted the Prosecution's appeal and
sentenced him to 30 years for armed robbery, a sentence to be served
concurrently with the three years' imprisonment for conspiracy to commit a
crime.

3
 6. Dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court, the Second Applicant
appealed to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania sitting at Mbeya. On 21 May
2004, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court. Although
it found that the consolidation of the cases by the High Court at the
judgment stage after they were heard separately was procedurally wrong,
it noted, that this error did not prejudice the Applicants’ rights.

D. Alleged violations

7. The Applicants allege that the Respondent State violated their rights under
the Respondent State’s Constitution and the Charter as follows:

a) The conviction and the sentence imposed on them was non-

existent and unconstitutional and therefore contravenes Article 13
(b) (c) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania.

b) The Respondent State violated their right under Article 7 (1) of the
Charter as they did not benefit from free legal assistance.

c) They were not equally protected within the law by the Respondent
State and this violates Article 3 of the Charter.

d) The Respondent State inflicted upon them mental and physical

suffering by imposing on them a sentence which is excessive and
illegal thereby violating the Charter.

E. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT

8. The Application was filed on 13 July 2015 and was served on the
Respondent State on 29 October 2015.

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 9. The Parties filed their pleadings within the time limits stipulated by the
Court and these were duly exchanged.

10. On 25 March 2019, the Parties were notified that written pleadings were
closed.

F. PRAYERS OF THE PARTIES

11. The Applicants pray the Court to:

“i. Make a declaration that the Respondent State violated their rights
as guaranteed under Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (1) (c) and (2) of
the Charter.
ii. Issue an order compelling the Respondent State to release them
from prison.
iii. Order reparations should the Court find merit in the Application.
iv. Supervise implementation of the Court`s orders and any other
decisions that the Court may make in their favour.”

12. With regard to jurisdiction and admissibility, the Respondent State prays
the Court to grant the following orders:

“1. That the Application has not invoked the jurisdiction of the
Honourable African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights

2. That the application has not met the admissibility requirements

stipulated under Rule 40(5) and (6) of the Rules of Court, be
declared inadmissible and duly dismissed.

5
 3. That the costs of this Application be borne by the Applicants.”

13. With regard to merits, the Respondent State prays the Court to find that it
has not violated Articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 7(1) (c) and 7(2) of the Charter.
Moreover, it prays that the Court should deny the Applicants prayer for
reparations and order them to pay costs.

G. JURISDICTION

14. Pursuant to Article 3 (1) of the Protocol, the jurisdiction of the Court
extends to “all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation
and application of the Charter, the Protocol and other relevant human rights
instruments ratified by the State concerned ”. In terms of Rule 39 (1) of its
Rules, “the Court shall conduct preliminary examination of its jurisdiction…”.

15. The Respondent State raises an objection to the material jurisdiction of

the Court.

A. Objection to material jurisdiction

16. The Respondent State asserts that Article 3 (1) of the Protocol and Rule
26 of the Rules only affords the Court jurisdiction to “deal with cases or
disputes concerning the application and interpretation of the Charter, the
Protocol and any other human rights instruments ratified by the concerned
State.”

17. Accordingly, the Respondent State submits that “the Court is not afforded
unlimited jurisdiction to sit as a court of first instance or an appellate court
and reanalyse the evidence already analysed by the highest domestic
court.”

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 18. The Applicants contend that their Application is in conformity with Article 3
of the Protocol and Rule 26 of the Rules concerning the interpretation and
application of the Charter, the Protocol and any relevant human rights
instrument ratified by the Respondent State. The Applicants argue
therefore, that, the Court should exercise its jurisdiction and consider the
Application.
***

19. The Court has held that Article 3 of the Protocol gives it the power to
examine an Application submitted before it as long as the subject matter
of the Application involves alleged violations of rights protected by the
Charter, the Protocol or any other international human rights instruments
ratified by a Respondent State.1

20. The Court reiterates its well established jurisprudence that it is not an
appellate body with respect to decisions of national courts. 2 However, the
Court also emphasised, that, “[t]his does not preclude it from examining
relevant proceedings in the national courts in order to determine whether
they are in accordance with the standards set out in the Charter or any
other human rights instruments ratified by the State concerned.” 3

1
Application No. 003/2012. Ruling of 28/03/2014 (Admissibility), Peter Joseph Chacha v United Republic
of Tanzania, § 114, Application No. 005/2013. Judgment of 20/11/2015 (Merits), Alex Thomas v. United
Republic of Tanzania, (hereinafter referred to as “Alex Thomas v Tanzania (Merits)”), § 45, Application
No. 053/2016. Judgment of 28/03/2019 (Merits). Oscar Josiah v United Republic Tanzania (hereinafter
“Oscar Josiah v United Republic of Tanzania (Merits)”), § 24.
2
Application No. 001/2013. Decision of 15/03/2013 (Jurisdiction), Ernest Francis Mtingwi v Republic of
Malawi, § 14. Application No. 025/2016. Judgment of 28/03/2019 (Merits and Reparations), Kenedy Ivan
v United Republic of Tanzania (hereinafter referred to as “Kenedy Ivan v Tanzania”) § 26; Application No.
024/2015. Judgment of 07/11/18 (Merits and Reparations), Armand Guehi v. United Republic of Tanzania
§ 33; Application No. 006/2015. Judgment of 23/03/18 (Merits), Nguza Viking (Babu Seya) and Johnson
Nguza (Papi Kocha) v. United Republic of Tanzania § 35.
3
Alex Thomas v Tanzania (Merits), § 130. See also Application No. 011/2015, Judgment of 28/09/2017
(Merits), Christopher Jonas v. United Republic of Tanzania (hereinafter referred to as “Christopher Jonas
v Tanzania (Merits)”), § 28, Application No. 003/2014, Judgment of 24/11/2017 (Merits), Ingabire Victoire
Umuhoza v. Republic of Rwanda (hereinafter referred to as “Ingabire Umuhoza v Rwanda (Merits)”), § 52,
Application No. 007/2013, Judgment of 03/06/2013 (Merits), Mohamed Abubakari v. United Republic of
Tanzania, (hereinafter referred to as “Mohamed Abubakari v Tanzania (Merits)”), § 29.

7
 21. The Court notes that the instant Application raises allegations of human
rights violations protected under Articles 2, 3 and 7 of the Charter and by
considering them in light of international instruments, it does not arrogate
to itself the status of an appellate court or court of first instance.
Accordingly, the Respondent State’s objection in this regard is dismissed.
The court will not discuss the limits of its jurisdiction here contrary to the
Respondent State’s submission. The terms of Article 3 of the Protocol,
reproduced by Rule 26 of the Rules, amply explain the extent of the
Court’s jurisdiction.

22. In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that it has material jurisdiction.

B. Other aspects of jurisdiction

23. The Court notes that the personal, temporal and territorial aspects of its
jurisdiction are not disputed by the Respondent State and that nothing on
the record indicates that the Court lacks such jurisdiction. The Court
accordingly holds that:

(i) It has personal jurisdiction given that the Respondent State is a

Party to the Protocol and has made the Declaration prescribed
under Article 34 (6) of the Protocol, which enabled the Applicant to
file this Application directly before this Court, pursuant to Article 5
(3) of the Protocol;

(ii) that it has temporal jurisdiction on the basis that the alleged
violations are continuous in nature, in that the Applicants remain
convicted and are serving a sentence of thirty (30) years’
imprisonment on grounds which they consider are wrong and
indefensible.4
4
See Application No. 013/2011. Ruling of 21/06/2013 (Preliminary Objections), Beneficiaries of the Late
Norbert Zongo, Abdoulaye Nikiema alias Abiasse, Ernest Zongo and Blaise Ilboudo and the Burkinabe

8
 (iii) It has territorial jurisdiction given that the facts of the case occurred
in the Respondent State’s territory.

24. In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that it has jurisdiction to consider
the Application.

C. ADMISSIBILITY

25. Pursuant to Article 6(2) of the Protocol, “the Court shall rule on the
admissibility of cases taking into account the provisions of Article 56 of the
Charter.” In addition Rule 39 (1) of the Rules provides that “ the Court shall
conduct preliminary examination of its jurisdiction and the admissibility of the
application in accordance with articles 50 and 56 of the Charter and Rule 40 of
these Rules”.

26. Under Rule 40 of the Rules, which in essence restates the provisions of
Article 56 of the Charter, Applications filed before the Court shall be
admissible if they fulfil the following conditions:

“1. disclose the identity of the Applicant notwithstanding the latter’s request
for
anonymity;
2. comply with the Constitutive Act of the Union and the Charter;
3. not contain any disparaging or insulting language;
4. not be based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media;
5. be filed after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that
this procedure is unduly prolonged;
6. be filed within a reasonable time from the date local remedies were
exhausted or from the date set by the Court as being the commencement
of the time limit within which it shall be seized with the matter; and
Movement on Human and Peoples' Rights v. Burkina Faso, (hereinafter referred to as, “Zongo and Others
judgment (Preliminary Objections)”), § § 71 - 77.

9
 7. not raise any matter or issues previously settled by the parties in
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Constitutive Act of the African union, the provisions of the Charter or of
any legal instrument of the African Union”.

27. The Respondent State raises two objections to the admissibility of the
Application; the first one relates to the requirement of exhaustion of local
remedies and second, the filing of the Application within a reasonable time
under sub-Rules 40 (5) and (6), of the Rules, respectively.

A. Objection based on the non-exhaustion of local remedies

28. The Respondent State contends that the Applicants should have sought
redress at the High Court of Tanzania for their alleged human rights
violations by filing a constitutional petition in accordance with its
Constitution and its Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act 5.

29. The Respondent State also asserts that the first Applicant, Mr Godfred
Anthony, never appealed against the decision of the High Court even
though he had the opportunity to seize the Court of Appeal. The
Respondent State further argues that the second Applicant, Mr Ifunda
Kisite, could have applied for a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeal as provided by law. It therefore concludes that the Applicants filed
the Application before this Court without exhausting the available local
remedies.

30. The Applicants aver that the first Applicant appealed against his conviction
and sentence to the High Court, while the Prosecutor also appealed
against the second Applicant’s acquittal to the same court; with both
appeals going in favour of the Prosecutor. Subsequently, the second
Applicant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeal which while
5
Chapter 3 of the laws of Tanzania

10
 dismissing it, the Court of Appeal referred to the first Applicant as well.
Therefore, The Applicants concluded therefore that they exhausted local
remedies.

***

31. The Court notes that pursuant to Article 56 (5) of the Charter and Rule 40
(5) of the Rules, in order for an application before the Court to be
admissible, local remedies must have been exhausted, unless the
procedure to pursue them is unduly prolonged.

32. In its jurisprudence, the Court has underscored that an applicant is only
required to exhaust ordinary judicial remedies. 6 In relation to applications
against the Respondent State, the Court has determined that the
constitutional petition procedure in the High Court and the use of the
review procedure at the Court of Appeal are extraordinary remedies in the
Tanzanian judicial system, which are not required to be exhausted prior to
filing an application before this Court. 7

33. In the instant case, the Court notes from the record that the second
Applicant, Mr. Ifunda Kisite appealed to the highest court in the
Respondent State, that is, the Court of Appeal, which upheld his
conviction and sentence.

34. The first Applicant, Mr Godfred Anthony appealed only to the High Court
following his conviction by the District Court. However, while considering
the appeal of the second Applicant, the Court of Appeal observed that all

6
Alex Thomas v Tanzania Judgment (Merits), § 64. See also Application No. 006/2013. Judgment
18/03/2016 (Merits), Wilfred Onyango Nganyi and 9 Others v. United Republic of Tanzania, § 95, Oscar
Josiah v United Republic of Tanzania (Merits)”, § 38, Application No. 016/2016. Ruling of 07/12/2018
(Merits and Reparations). Diocles William v United Republic of Tanzania, § 42.
7
Alex Thomas v Tanzania Judgment (Merits), §§ 63- 65.

11
 the three co-accused persons, including the two Applicants, committed the
crimes in concert and deserved the same sentence.

35. Consequently, the Court is of the view that, despite the fact that the first
Applicant did not appeal to the Court of Appeal, his matter was addressed
by the Court of Appeal, albeit incidentally, and any appeal he could have
filed would have been unlikely to result in a different outcome.

36. In this regard, the Court recalls its position in African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights v Kenya, where it held that for purpose of
ascertaining exhaustion of local remedies, the most pertinent issue that
should be considered is whether a State against which an application is
filed, has been accorded the opportunity to rectify alleged human rights
violations prior to the filing of an application before the Court. 8

37. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Respondent State’s objection that
the Applicants did not exhaust local remedies.

B. Objection based on failure to file the Application within a reasonable

time

38. The Respondent State argues that the Application was not filed within a
reasonable time after local remedies were exhausted because the first
Applicant’s case at the High Court was concluded on 19 May 2003 and
the second Applicant’s case in the Court of Appeal was concluded on 27
February 2006.

39. The Respondent State avers that despite the fact that it deposited the
Declaration required under Article 34 (6) of the Protocol in 2010, it took the
Applicant five (5) years to seize the Court, that is, in 2015.
8
Application No. 006/2012. Judgment 26/05/2017 (Merits). African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights v Republic of Kenya , § 94

12
 40. It further submits that even though Rule 40 (6) of the Rules does not
prescribe a time limit for filing an application before the Court, international
human rights jurisprudence has established six (6) months as a
reasonable time-limit after domestic remedies are exhausted for filing such
applications. The Respondent State contends that the Applicants failed to
seize the Court within six (6) months without having been hindered from
doing so.

41. The Applicants did not address this objection specifically but submit that
their Application meets the admissibility requirement specified under
Article 56 of the Charter, and Rule 40 of the Rules.

***

42. The Court notes that Article 56(6) of the Charter does not specify any time
frame within which a case must be filed before this Court. Rule 40 (6) of
the Rules, which in substance restates Article 56(6) of the Charter, simply
mentions “a reasonable time from the date local remedies were exhausted or
from the date set by the Court as being the commencement of the time limit
within which it shall be seized with the matter.”

43. In the matter of Norbert Zongo and Others v. Burkina Faso, the Court held
that “the reasonableness of a time limit of seizure will depend on the
particular circumstances of each case and should be determined on a
case-by-case basis.”9 Some of the circumstances that the Court has
taken into consideration include: imprisonment, being lay without the
benefit of legal assistance10, indigence, illiteracy, lack of awareness of the

9
Zongo and Others judgment (Preliminary Objections)”, § 92. See also Application No.
023/2015.Judgment of 23/03/2018 (Merits), Kijiji Isiaga v United Republic of Tanzania, (hereinafter
referred to as Kijiji Isiaga v Tanzania (Merits)), §. 56
10
Alex Thomas v Tanzania (Merits), § 73, Christopher Jonas v Tanzania (Merits), § 54, Application No.
010/2015. Judgment of 11/05/2018 (Merits), Amiri Ramadhani v. United Republic of Tanzania, § 83

13
 existence of the Court, intimidation and fear of reprisal 11 and the use of
extra-ordinary remedies.12

44. In the instant Application, the Court observes that the judgment of the
Court of Appeal in Criminal Appeal No. 47 of 2003 was delivered on 21
May 2004. However, the Applicants were able to file their Application
before this Court only after 29 March 2010, the date that the Respondent
State deposited the Declaration required under Article 36 (4) of the
Protocol for individuals to have direct access to the Court. Nearly five (5)
years and four (4) months elapsed between 29 March 2010 and 13 July
2015 when the Applicants filed their Application before this Court. The
issue for determination is whether the five (5) years and four (4) months
that the Applicants took to file their Application before the Court is
reasonable.

45. The Court recalls its jurisprudence in the matter of the Beneficiaries of
Late Norbert Zongo, Abdoulaye Nikiema alias Ablasse, Ernest Zongo,
Blaise Ilboudo and mouvement burkinabe des droit de l’homme where it
held that the purpose of Rule 40(6) of the Rules is to guarantee “[j]udicial
security by avoiding a situation where authorities and other concerned
persons are kept in a situation of uncertainty for a long time”. 13 Also, “to
provide the Applicant with sufficient time for reflection to enable him
appreciate the opportunity of bringing a matter to court if necessary” and
finally, to enable the Court to establish the relevant facts relating to the
matter.”14

11
Application No. 046/2016. Judgment of 11/05/2018 (Merits), Association Pour le progress et la Defense
des droit des Femme Maliennes v. Republic of Mali, § 54.
12
Armand Guehi v. Tanzania (Merits and Reparations), § 56; Application No. 024/2015. Judgment of
7/12/18, Werema Wangoko v United Republic of Tanzania (Merits and Reparations), § 49, Application
No. 001/2017. Judgment of 28/06/19, Alfred Agbes Woyome v Republic of Ghana (Merits and
Reparations), § § 83-86.
13
Zongo and others supra note 4, § 107.
14
Ibid.

14
 46. Further in Amiri Ramadhani v Tanzania 15 and Christopher Jonas v
Tanzania16 the Court decided that the period of five (5) years and one
month was reasonable owing to the circumstances of the Applicants. In
these two cases the Court took into consideration the fact that the
Applicants were imprisoned, restricted in their movements and with limited
access to information; they were lay, indigent, did not have assistance of a
lawyer in their trials at the domestic court, were illiterate and were not
aware of the existence of the Court.

47. Moreover in Werema Wangoko and another v. United Republic of

Tanzania17, the Court decided that the Applicants having used the review
procedure, were entitled to wait for the review judgment to be delivered
and that this justified the filing of their Application five (5) years, five (5)
months after exhaustion of local remedies.

48. In the instant case, the Court notes that although the Applicants are also
incarcerated and thus restricted in their movement, they have not asserted
or provided any proof that they are illiterate, lay, or had no knowledge of
the existence of the Court. The Applicants have simply described
themselves as “indigent”.

49. The Court further notes that the Applicants were represented by legal
counsel in their trial and appeals at the domestic level but they did not file
for review of their final judgments. Overall, while the Court has always
considered the personal circumstances of applicants in determining the
lapse of reasonable time taken before being seized of a matter, the
present Applicants have not provided the Court with any material evidence
on the basis of which the Court can conclude that the period of five (5)
years and four (4) months was a reasonable period of time taken to file

15
Amiri Ramadhani v. Tanzania (Merits) § 50.
16
Christopher Jonas v. Tanzania (Merits) § 54.
17
Werema Wangoko v. Tanzania (Merits and Reparations) § 49.

15
 their application before this Court. In the circumstances, the Court finds
that the Application does not comply with the requirement under Rule
40(6) of the Rules.

50. In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Applicants have failed to
comply with Rule 40(6) of the Rules and upholds the Respondent State’s
objection in this regard.

51. Having concluded that the Application was not filed within a reasonable
time, the Court does not have to pronounce itself on whether other
conditions of admissibility enumerated in Rule 40 of the Rules have been
met, in as much as the conditions of admissibility are cumulative.18

52. Based on the above, the Court declares the Application inadmissible.

C. COSTS

53. Rule 30 of the Rules provides that: "Unless otherwise decided by the Court,
each party shall bear its own costs."

54. The Applicants have not made any submissions on costs. However, the
Respondent State has prayed the Court to order that the Applicants to
bear the costs of the Application.

55. In the instant case, the Court decides that each Party shall bear its own
costs.

18
See Application No. 02402016. Judgment of 21/3/2018 (Admissibility), Mariam Kouma and Ousmane
Diabaté v. Republic du Mali, § 63; Application No. 022/2015. Judgment of 11/5/2018 (Admissibility),
Rutabingwa Chrysanthe v. Republic of Rwanda, § 48.

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 D. OPERATIVE PART

56. For these reasons:

THE COURT,

Unanimously:

On jurisdiction
i. Dismisses the objections to its jurisdiction;

ii. Declares that it has jurisdiction.

On admissibility
iii. Dismisses the objection to the admissibility of the Application based on the
lack of exhaustion of local remedies;

iv. Declares that the Application was not filed within a reasonable time;

v. Declares that the Application is inadmissible.

On costs
vi. Decides that each Party shall bear its own costs.

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Signed:

Sylvain ORÉ, President;

Ben KIOKO, Vice-President;

Rafaâ BEN ACHOUR, Judge;

Ângelo V. MATUSSE, Judge;

Suzanne MENGUE, Judge;

M-Thérèse MUKAMULISA, Judge;

Tujilane R. CHIZUMILA, Judge;

Chafika BENSAOULA, Judge;

Blaise TCHIKAYA, Judge;

Stella I. ANUKAM, Judge;

and Robert ENO, Registrar.

Done at Arusha, this Twenty Sixth Day of the Month of September, in the year Two
Thousand and Nineteen, in English and French, the English text being authoritative.

18