AFRICAN UNION UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

COUR AFRICAINE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DES PEUPLES

THE MATTER OF

AMINI JUMA

V.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

APPLICATION NO. 024/2016

JUDGMENT

30 SEPTEMBER 2021

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ i
I. THE PARTIES -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
II. SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION------------------------------------------------------------ 3
A. Facts of the matter --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
B. Alleged violations ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
III. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT --------------------------- 4
IV. PRAYERS OF THE PARTIES ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4
V. JURISDICTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
A. Objection to material jurisdiction --------------------------------------------------------------- 6
B. Other aspects of jurisdiction --------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
VI. ADMISSIBILITY------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
A. Objections to the Admissibility of the Application ---------------------------------------- 10
i. Objection based on non-compliance with the Constitutive Act of the African
Union and the Charter ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
ii. Objection based on the nature of the language used in the Application-------- 11
iii. Objection on non- exhaustion of local remedies -------------------------------------- 12
iv. Objection on failure to file the Application within a reasonable time ------------- 14
B. Other conditions of admissibility ---------------------------------------------------------------- 16
VII. MERITS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17
A. Alleged violation of the right to a fair trial -------------------------------------------------- 17
i. Alleged violation of the right to be presumed innocent ------------------------------ 17
ii. Alleged violation of the right to defence ------------------------------------------------- 20
iii. Alleged violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time ---------------- 24
iv. Alleged violation of the right to be tried by an impartial tribunal ------------------ 26
B. Alleged violation of the right to life ----------------------------------------------------------- 28
C. Alleged violation of the right to dignity ------------------------------------------------------ 32
VIII. REPARATIONS----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33
A. Pecuniary reparations --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35
i. Material Prejudice suffered by the Applicant ------------------------------------------- 35
ii. Material Prejudice suffered by Indirect Victims ---------------------------------------- 36

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 iii. Moral Prejudice suffered by the Applicant ---------------------------------------------- 36
iv. Moral Prejudice suffered by the Indirect Victims -------------------------------------- 37
B. Non-pecuniary reparations--------------------------------------------------------------------- 38
i. Restitution --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38
ii. Guarantees of Non-Repetition ------------------------------------------------------------- 39
IX. COSTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 40
X. OPERATIVE PART ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 40

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The Court composed of: Blaise TCHIKAYA, Vice President; Ben KIOKO, Rafaâ BEN
ACHOUR, Suzanne MENGUE, M-Thérèse MUKAMULISA, Tujilane R. CHIZUMILA,
Chafika BENSAOULA, Stella I. ANUKAM, Dumisa B. NTSEBEZA, Modibo SACKO -
Judges; and Robert ENO – Registrar,

In accordance with Article 22 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(hereinafter referred to as “the Protocol”) and Rule 9(2) of the Rules of Court1 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Rules”), Justice Imani D. ABOUD, President of the Court and a national
of Tanzania, did not hear the Application.

In the Matter of:

Amini JUMA
represented by:
Advocate William ERNEST, Bill and Williams Advocates

Versus

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA,

represented by:

i. Mr Gabriel P. MALATA, Solicitor General, Office of the Solicitor General

ii. Ms Sarah MWAIPOPO, Director, Division of Constitutional Affairs and Human
Rights; Attorney General’s Chambers
iii. Ambassador Baraka LUVANDA, Director, Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
East Africa and International Cooperation
iv. Ms Nkasori SARAKIKYA, Principal State Attorney; Attorney General’s Chambers
v. Mr Mussa Mbura, Director, Civil Litigation, Office of the Solicitor General

1 Formerly Rule 8(2) of the Rules of Court, 2 June 2010.

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 vi. Ms Venossa MKWIZI, Principal State Attorney; Attorney General’s Chambers

after deliberation,

renders the following Judgment:

I. THE PARTIES

1. Mr. Amini Juma (hereinafter referred to as “the Applicant”) is a national of

Tanzania, who at the time of filing of this Application was incarcerated at
Butimba Prison in Mwanza, having been convicted of murder and sentenced to
death by the High Court of Tanzania Sitting at Arusha.

2. The Application is filed against the United Republic of Tanzania (hereinafter

referred to as “the Respondent State”), which became a Party to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter referred to as “the
Charter”) on 21 October 1986 and to the Protocol on 10 February 2006.
Furthermore, the Respondent State, on 29 March 2010, deposited the
Declaration prescribed under Article 34(6) of the Protocol, through which it
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court to receive applications from individuals
and NGOs (hereinafter referred to as “the Declaration”). On 21 November
2019, the Respondent State deposited, with the Chairperson of the African
Union Commission (hereinafter referred to as “AUC”), an instrument
withdrawing its Declaration under Article 34(6) of the Protocol. The Court held
that this withdrawal had no bearing on pending cases and new cases filed
before the withdrawal came into effect, one year after its deposit, that is, on 22
November 2020.2

2Andrew Ambrose Cheusi v. United Republic of Tanzania, ACtHPR, Application No. 004/2015, Judgment
of 26 June 2020 (merits and reparations) §§ 37-39.

2
II. SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION

A. Facts of the matter

3. The record before the Court indicates that on 15 December 2003, the Applicant
was charged with murder before the High Court of Tanzania sitting at Arusha.
He was convicted of the offence, on 18 September 2008 and sentenced to life
imprisonment. On 22 September 2008, the Applicant appealed against the
conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania; likewise, on 29
September 2008, the Respondent State petitioned for review of the sentence.

4. The Applicant’s appeal was dismissed on 17 October 2011 and his life
imprisonment sentence was substituted with a death sentence by hanging, in
respect of the Respondent State’s appeal.

5. The Applicant submits that, on 1 December 2011, he filed a motion for review
of the Court of Appeal’s decision which was set for hearing in 2017.

B. Alleged violations

6. The The Applicant alleges that:

i. His “conviction violated the presumption of innocence” protected under Article
7(1)(b);
ii. The Respondent State failed to properly evaluate the prosecution evidence;
iii. The Respondent State infringed on his right to defence;
iv. The Respondent State failed to provide the Applicant with effective legal
representation;
v. He suffered undue delay between his arrest and trial;
vi. His right to life was violated;
vii. The Respondent State violated his right to dignity

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 III. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT

7. The Application was filed on 13 April 2016 and served on the Respondent State
on 31 May 2016 and on the entities listed under Rule 42(4) of the Rules3 on 26
June 2016.

8. On 3 June 2016, the Court issued, proprio motu, an Order for provisional
measures, having considered the situation of extreme gravity and the risk of
irreparable harm associated with the death penalty. The Court ordered the
Respondent State to “refrain from executing the death penalty against the
Applicant pending the determination of the Application.”4

9. On 16 May 2018, as instructed by the Court, the Registry requested for the
services of Advocate William Kivuyo Ernest, who agreed to represent the
Applicant on pro bono basis.

10. The Parties filed their pleadings within the time limits stipulated by the Court.

11. Pleadings were closed on 1 July 2021 and the Parties were notified thereof.

IV. PRAYERS OF THE PARTIES

12. The Applicant prays the Court to grant the following orders:
a. That the Respondent has violated the Applicant’s rights under Articles 4, 5,
and 7 of the African Charter;
b. That the Respondent take appropriate measures to remedy the violations of
the Applicant’s rights under the African Charter;
c. That the Respondent State set aside the death penalty imposed on the
Applicant and remove the Applicant from prison;
d. That the Respondent release the Applicant from prison;

3 Rule 35(3) of the Rules of Court, 2 June 2010.

4 Amini Juma v. United Republic of Tanzania (provisional measures) (3 June 2016) 1 AfCLR 658 § 18.

4
 e. That the Respondent pay reparations to the Applicant and his family in such
amount as the Court deems fit;
f. That the Respondent amend its penal code and related legislation
concerning the death sentence to render it compliant with Article 4 of the
African Charter.
g. Award reparations of USD 100,000 in moral damages for the Applicant and
USD 5,000 each for the Applicant’s co-parent and son; USD 76,789 for
material loss, USD 715 for material loss suffered by Applicant’s co-parent.

13. The Respondent State prays the Court to grant the following orders:

i) That, the Honourable Court is not vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate the
Application;
ii) That, the Application has not met the admissibility requirements stipulated
under Rule 40(2) of the Rules of Court
iii) That, the Application has not met the admissibility requirements stipulated
under Rule 40(3) of the Rules of Court;
iv) That, the Application has not met the admissibility requirements stipulated
under Rule 40(5) of the Rules of Court;
v) That, the Application has not met the admissibility requirements stipulated
under Rule 40(6) of the Rules of Court;
vi) That, the costs of the Application be borne by the Applicant;
vii) That, the Applicant’s conviction and sentence be maintained;
viii) That, the Application lacks merit;
ix) That, the Applicant’s prayers be dismissed;
x) That, the Application be dismissed with costs;
xi) That, the Applicant not be granted reparations.

V. JURISDICTION

14. The Court observes that Article 3 of the Protocol provides as follows:

1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted
to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol

5
 and any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States
concerned.

2. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court
shall decide.

15. In accordance with Rule 49(1) of the Rules5, “the Court shall conduct
preliminarily examination of its jurisdiction… in accordance with the Charter,
the Protocol and these Rules.”

16. On the basis of the above-cited provisions, the Court must, conduct an
assessment of its jurisdiction and dispose of objections thereto, if any.

17. The Respondent State raises an objection to the material jurisdiction of the
Court.

A. Objection to material jurisdiction

18. The Respondent State submits that the jurisdiction of the Court has not been
properly invoked by the Applicant. It submits that, contrary to Article 3 of the
Protocol and Rule 26(1)(a) of the Rules6, the Applicant “has at no point made
reference to or asked for the interpretation and application of the Charter,
Protocol or any other instrument ratified by the United Republic of Tanzania.”

19. According to the Respondent State, Rule 26 of the Rules7 has stipulated the
ways in which the jurisdiction of the Court may be invoked, but that the
Applicant has not complied with any of the provisions of its sub-Rules (a-e).

5 Formerly Rule 39(1) of the Rules of 2 June 2010.

6 Rule 29(1)(a) of the Rules of Court, 25 September 2020.
7 Ibid.

6
 20. The Applicant, citing the Court’s decision in Kijiji Isiaga v. Tanzania argues that
the Court exercises jurisdiction as long as the subject matter of the Application
involves alleged violations of rights protected by the Charter or any other
international human rights instrument ratified by the State concerned. The
Applicant argues further that his Application alleges specific violations of rights
protected by the Charter, namely, right to life, dignity and fair trial under Articles
4, 5, and 7 respectively.
***

21. The Court recalls that under Article 3(1) of the Protocol, it has jurisdiction to
examine any application submitted to it, provided that, the rights of which a
violation is alleged are protected by the Charter or any other human rights
instrument ratified by the Respondent State.

22. The Court notes that Rule 40(2) of the Rules stipulates that “the Application
shall specify the alleged violation”. However, the Court recounts that, “there is
no insistence with regard to a formal indication of the instrument from which the
provision of the alleged violation is based”.8 Therefore, it suffices that the
instant Application raises allegations of human rights violations protected under
Articles 4, 5 and 7 of the Charter, the consideration of which falls within the
purview of its jurisdiction.

23. Consequently, the Court dismisses the objection and holds that it has material
jurisdiction in the instant case.

B. Other aspects of jurisdiction

24. The Court notes, with respect to its personal jurisdiction that, as earlier stated
in this Judgment, the Respondent State is a party to the Protocol and on 29

8Frank David Omary and others v. Tanzania (admissibility) (28 March 2014) 1 AfCLR 358; Also see, Alex
Thomas v. Tanzania (merits) (20 November 2015) AfCLR 465 § 45.

7
 March 2010, it deposited the Declaration with the AUC. On 21 November 2019,
it deposited, with the AUC, an instrument withdrawing the Declaration.

25. The Court recalls its jurisprudence that, the withdrawal of a Declaration
deposited pursuant to Article 34(6) of the Protocol does not have any
retroactive effect and it also has no bearing on matters pending prior to the
withdrawal of the Declaration, as is the case of the present Application. The
Court has previously held that any withdrawal of the Declaration takes effect
twelve (12) months after the notice of withdrawal is deposited, in this case, on
22 November 2020.9

26. In view of the above, the Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction.

27. With respect to its temporal jurisdiction, the Court notes that the alleged
violations occurred after the Respondent State became a Party to the Charter
and the Protocol. Furthermore, the alleged violations are continuing in nature
since the Applicant remains incarcerated on the basis of what he considers an
unfair process. Consequently, the Court holds that it has temporal jurisdiction
to consider the Application.10

28. The Court also notes that it has territorial jurisdiction given that the alleged
violations occurred in the Respondent State’s territory.

29. In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that it has jurisdiction to hear this
Application.

9Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Rwanda (juridiction) (3 June 2016) 1 AfCLR 540 § 67; Ambrose Cheusi v
Tanzania (merits), §§ 5-39.
10Beneficiaries of late Norbert Zongo, Abdoulaye Nikiema alias Ablasse, Ernest Zongo, Blaise Ilboudo and

Mouvement Burkinabe des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples v. Burkina Faso (preliminary objections) (21
June 2013) 1 AfCLR 197 §§ 71 - 77.

8
VI. ADMISSIBILITY

30. In terms of Article 6(2) of the Protocol, “the Court shall rule on the admissibility
of cases taking into account the provisions of article 56 of the Charter.”

31. Pursuant to Rule 50(1) of the Rules, “the Court shall ascertain the admissibility
of an Application filed before it in accordance with Article 56 of the Charter,
Article 6 (2) of the Protocol and these Rules.”11

32. Rule 50(2) of the Rules, which in substance restates the content of Article 56
of the Charter, provides as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 56 of the Charter to which Article 6(2) of the
Protocol refers, applications to the Court shall comply with the following conditions:
a. disclose the identity of the Applicant notwithstanding the latter’s request for
anonymity;
b. comply with the Constitutive Act of the Union and the Charter;
c. not contain any disparaging or insulting language;
d. not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media;
e. be filed after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this
procedure is unduly prolonged;
f. be filed within a reasonable time from the date local remedies were exhausted
or from the date set by the Court as being the commencement of the time limit
within which it shall be seized with the Matter;
g. not raise any matter or issues previously settled by the parties in accordance
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Constitutive Act of
the African Union, the provisions of the Charter or of any legal instrument of
the African Union.

11 Formerly Rule 40 Rules of Court, 2 June 2010.

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 A. Objections to the Admissibility of the Application

33. The Respondent State submits that the Application does not comply with Rules
40(2), 40(3), 40(5) and 40(6) of the Rules12 on non-compliance with the
Constitutive Act of the African Union (hereinafter referred to as “Constitutive
Act”), the language used in the Application, non-exhaustion of local remedies
and on the requirement to file applications within a reasonable time after
exhaustion of local remedies, respectively.

i. Objection based on non-compliance with the Constitutive Act of the

African Union and the Charter

34. The Respondent State submits that the Application does not comply with Rule
40(2) of the Rules13 as the Applicant has failed to cite provisions of the Charter
or principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
Furthermore, that the Applicant has merely focused on technicalities regarding
his criminal cases at the municipal courts.

35. The Applicant submits that, failure to make explicit reference to enshrined rights
in the Charter does not equate to failure to raise alleged violations. He argues
that the Application implicitly made reference to alleged violations of human
rights.

36. The Applicant citing Peter Joseph Chacha v Tanzania argues that, where only
national law has been cited or relied upon in an Application, the Court is still
empowered to consider such Applications, if the alleged violations are
protected by provisions of the Charter, or any other human rights instrument.

***

12 Rule 50(2)(b), (c), (e) and (f) of the Rules of Court.

13 Rule 50(2)(b) of the Rules of Court.

10
 37. The Court notes that the claims made by the Applicant seek to protect his rights
guaranteed by the Charter. It further notes that, one of the objectives of the
Constitutive Act of the African Union as stipulated under Article 3(h), is to
promote and protect human and peoples' rights. The Court therefore, finds that
the Application is compatible with the Constitutive Act of the African Union and
the Charter, and holds that it meets the requirements of Rule 50 (2)(b) of the
Rules.

ii. Objection based on the nature of the language used in the Application

38. The Respondent State submits that the Application contains “disparaging and
insulting language”. According to the Respondent State, the Applicant’s
submission that: “the Justices of the Court of Appeal failed to inject common
sense” is insulting and uncalled for.

39. The Applicant argues that the remark referred to by the Respondent State was
a fair and objective criticism of the failure of its judges to properly evaluate the
evidence adduced in its national courts.

40. The Applicant, citing the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’
(hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”)14, argues that the expression
“…failed to inject common sense” cannot be perceived as calculated to pollute
the public’s mind against the judiciary.

***

41. .Rule 50(2)(c) of the Rules provides that an Application must not contain “any
disparaging or insulting language”. Article 56(3) of the Charter, further states

14
ACHPR, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights v. Zimbabwe, Communication No. 284/2003 [2009]
ACHPR 97; (3 APRIL 2009).

11
 that the language in question must not be directed against “the State concerned
and its institutions or the OAU”.

42. The Court recounts that in determining whether a remark is insulting or

disparaging, it has to satisfy itself that the objective of the remark was to
unlawfully and intentionally violate the dignity, reputation and intention of a
judicial authority or body. Furthermore, the Court has to be satisfied that the
language is used in a manner calculated to pollute the minds of the public or
any reasonable person to cast aspersions on the administration of justice.15

43. In the instant case, the Court considers that the above impugned remark is
intended merely to criticize the reasoning of the judges, and not to infringe their
right or honour.

44. In light of the foregoing, the Court dismisses the objection relating to the nature
of the language used in this Application.

iii. Objection on non- exhaustion of local remedies

45. The Respondent State, citing the decision of the Commission in Southern
African Human Rights NGO Network and others v Tanzania submits that the
exhaustion of local remedies is an essential principle in international law and
that the principle requires a complainant to “utilise all legal remedies” in the
domestic courts before seizing the International body like the Court.

46. Referring to the Commission’s decision in Article 19 v Eritrea, the Respondent

State submits that the onus is on the Applicant to demonstrate that he took all
the steps to exhaust the domestic remedies and not merely to cast aspersions
on the effectiveness of those remedies. It submits that the legal remedies

15Lohe Issa Konate v. Burkina Faso (merits) (5 December 2014) 1 AfCLR 314 § 70. Sebastien Germain
Ajavon v. Republic of Benin, ACtHPR, Application No. 013/2017, Judgment of 29 March 2019 (merits) §
72.

12
 available to the Applicant which he should have exhausted were never
prolonged and thus he should have pursued them.

47. The Applicant argues that he exhausted local remedies when he appealed to
the Court of Appeal and it rendered its decision. He further argues that he was
not required to exhaust extra-ordinary remedies such as, filing of a
constitutional petition and filing of a motion for review of the Court of Appeal’s
decision.

***

48. The Court recalls that pursuant to Article 56(5) of the Charter, whose
requirements are restated in Rule 50(2)(e) of the Rules, any application filed
before it shall fulfil the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. The rule of
exhaustion of local remedies aims at providing States the opportunity to deal
with human rights violations within their jurisdictions before an international
human rights body is called upon to determine the State’s responsibility for the
same.16

49. The Court notes that, in so far as criminal proceedings against an Applicant
have been determined by the highest appellate court, the Respondent State is
deemed to have had the opportunity to redress the violations alleged by the
Applicant to have arisen from those proceedings.

50. In the instant case, the Court notes from the record that, the Applicant filed an
appeal against his conviction and sentence before the Court of Appeal of
Tanzania, the highest judicial organ of the Respondent State, and on 17
October 2011, the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the High Court. The
Respondent State thus had the opportunity to redress the alleged violations. It

16African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya (merits) (26 May 2017) 2 AfCLR
9 §§ 93-94.

13
 is therefore clear that the Applicant has exhausted the available domestic
remedies.

51. Consequently, the Court dismisses the objection that the Applicant has not
exhausted local remedies.

iv. Objection on failure to file the Application within a reasonable time

52. The Respondent State submits that the Applicant has not complied with the
requirement under Rule 40(6) of the Rules,17 that an application must be filed
before the Court within a reasonable time after the exhaustion of local
remedies. The Respondent State argues that it “…sanctioned the individual
complaints mechanism in March 2010” and since the Applicant seized the
Court on 13 April 2016, the seizure was done after the lapse of six (6) years.

53. Noting that Rule 40(6) of the Rules18 does not prescribe the time limit within
which individuals are required to file an application, the Respondent State
draws this Court’s attention to the fact that the Commission19 has held a period
of six (6) months to be the reasonable time.

54. The Respondent State argues that though the Applicant claims that he filed a
motion for review of the Court of Appeal’s decision, he has not indicated the
date of the application nor given the reference number to assist it “to trace the
said review and compute the period of reasonable time.”

55. The Applicant avers that he has good reasons for filing the case, four (4) and
a half years after exhaustion of local remedies. He submits that he had filed a
motion for review on 1 December 2011 which was only set for hearing in 2017.
56. According to the Applicant, it is the Respondent State’s delay in determining
his review that led to his unintended delay to file his case before the Court.

17 Rule 50(2)(f) of the Rules of Court.

18 Ibid.
19 ACHPR, Michael Majuru v. Zimbabwe (2008) AHRLR 146 (ACHPR 2008).

14
 Furthermore, the fact that he did not have the benefit of legal representation
before the filing the Application, inevitably contributed to the delay in seizure of
the Court because of lack of understanding of the Court’s procedure.

***

57. The Court notes that Rule 50(2)(f) of the Rules which restates the contents of
Article 56(6) of the Charter, requires an Application to be filed within: “a
reasonable time from the date local remedies were exhausted or from the date
set by the Court as being the commencement of the time limit within which it
shall be seized with the matter.”

58. In the instant Application, the Court observes, that the judgment of the Court of
Appeal was delivered on 17 October 2011, while the Application was filed on
13 April 2016. The Court notes that, four (4) years, five (5) months and (27)
days elapsed between the delivery of the judgment of the Court of Appeal and
the filing of the Application before this Court. The issue for determination is
whether the above mentioned period, constitutes a reasonable time.

59. The Court recalls that: “…the reasonableness of the timeframe for seizure
depends on the specific circumstances of the case and should be determined
on a case-by-case basis.”20

60. Furthermore, the Court restates its jurisprudence that delay in filing of an
application can be justified when the applicants demonstrate that they were
imprisoned, restricted in their movements and with limited access to
information; they were lay, indigent, did not have assistance of a lawyer in their
trials at the domestic court, were illiterate and were not aware of the existence
of the Court.21 Moreover, the Court has also decided that when Applicants use

20Norbert Zongo v. Burkina Faso (merits) § 92. See also Alex Thomas v. Tanzania (merits) § 73;
21Amiri Ramadhani v. Tanzania (merits) (11 May 2018) 2 AfCLR 244 § 50; Christopher Jonas v.
Tanzania (merits) ( 28 September 2017) 2 AfCLR 101 § 54.

15
 the review procedure, they are entitled to await the determination of the review
application.22

61. In the instant case, the Court notes that, although the Applicant claims that he
attempted to use the review procedure, he has not presented any evidence of
his attempt. Even so, the Court further notes that, given the Applicant has been
in prison since 2008, which is prior to the Respondent State’s depositing of its
Declaration, and in death row subsequently; he was restricted in his movement
and lacked information about the Court. These circumstances contributed to
his filing the Application, four (4) years, five (5) months and twenty-seven (27)
days after the exhaustion of local remedies.23

62. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the Application was filed within a
reasonable time.

B. Other conditions of admissibility

63. The Court notes that there is no contention regarding the compliance with the
conditions set out in Rule 50(2)(a), (d) and (g) of the Rules. Even so, the Court
must satisfy itself that these conditions have been met.

64. From the record, the Court notes that, the Applicant has been clearly identified
by name in fulfilment of Rule 50(2)(a) of the Rules.

65. The Application is not based exclusively on news disseminated through mass
media as it is founded on court documents from the municipal courts of the
Respondent State in fulfilment with Rule 50(2)(d) of the Rules.

22Werema Wangoko v. Tanzania (merits and reparations) (7 December 2018) 2 AfCLR 520 § 49.
23See, Godfred Anthony and another v. United Republic of Tanzania, ACtHPR, Application No. 015/2015,
Judgment of 26 September 2019 (jurisdiction and admissibility) §§ 48-49.

16
 66. Further, the Application does not concern a case which has already been
settled by the Parties in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the provisions of the
Charter or of any legal instrument of the African Union in fulfilment of Rule
50(2)(g) of the Rules.

67. The Court, therefore, finds that all the admissibility conditions have been met
and that this Application is admissible.

VII. MERITS

68. The Applicant alleges the violation of the right to a fair trial, right to life and
right to dignity which the court will examine below.

A. Alleged violation of the right to a fair trial

69. The alleged violations of the right to a fair trial relate to:
i. Right to be presumed innocent;
ii. Right to defence;
iii. Right to be tried within a reasonable time; and
iv. Right to be tried by an impartial tribunal.

i. Alleged violation of the right to be presumed innocent

70. The Applicant argues that the Respondent State violated his right to be
presumed innocent through its failure to properly assess the evidence tendered
by both the prosecution and defence lawyers. Referring to the Court’s
jurisprudence in Mohamed Abubakari v Tanzania, the Applicant submits that
the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence “requires that the
imposition of a sentence, should be based on strong and credible evidence”.

17
71. The Applicant argues that he was convicted on the basis of evidence “that is
extremely weak, inconsistent and/or struck from record as unreliable”, and the
prosecuting authorities failed to corroborate the identification evidence which
was “general and imprecise”.

72. The Applicant further asserts, that the national courts failed to take proper
account of omissions by the prosecution to disclose relevant and potentially
exculpatory material. The Applicant submits that an “informant” and another
witness to the crime named Saruni should have been called by the prosecution.

73. Moreover, the Applicant avers that the national courts failed to consider the
presumption of innocence when they dismissed his alibi despite it not being
challenged by the prosecution. Also, that the High Court erred by failing to
explain the reasoning behind its decision to dismiss the evidence of “defence
witness 5” who testified about the alibi.

74. On its part, the Respondent State submits that the evidence given by
Prosecution Witnesses (PW 3 and PW 4) was credible as it was direct
evidence. That such evidence according to the case of Waziri Amani v
Republic, proves the case beyond reasonable doubt.

75. According to the Respondent State, Prosecution Witness (PW 1) clearly saw
the Applicant committing the crime as the offence took place in broad daylight
and there was no suggestion that his line of vision was obstructed.

76. Furthermore, the Respondent State refutes the allegations related to the
location where the crime took place and the make of the motorcycle produced
as evidence and puts the Applicant to strict proof.

***

18
 77. Article 7(1)(b) of the Charter provides: “[e]very individual shall have the right
to have his cause heard. This comprises: … b) [t]he right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal”.

78. The Court notes that, the Applicant’s contention relates to the assessment of
evidence in the Respondent State’s Court of Appeal, which he argues, was
flawed. The Applicant asserts that the Court of Appeal did not evaluate the
evidence tendered before it in a fair manner resulting in what he considers an
unfair conviction and sentencing.

79. The Court notes that, a fair trial requires that the imposition of sentence in a
criminal offence and especially a heavy prison sentence, should be based on
strong and credible evidence.24

80. The Court notes from the record that the Court of Appeal in its judgment
considered the identification of the Applicants as the main issue for
determination. The Court of Appeal then undertook a thorough examination of
the issue based on the facts and applicable Tanzanian case-law on
identification.

81. The Court observes that the Court of Appeal examined the nature and quality
of evidence on record. In that respect, the Court of Appeal indicated that the
post-mortem report was wrongly admitted but indicated that the cause of death
of the deceased could also be proved by PW1 and PW3 who provided direct
evidence as they witnessed the killing. The Court of Appeal further held that
the witnesses described the motorcycle that was used in the course of the
murder and indicated that the inconsistency between PW1 and PW2 as to the
make of the motorcycle was negligible. Finally, it found that the defence of alibi
was considered and rightfully rejected. Therefore, the Court of Appeal arrived

24Mohamed Abubakari v. Tanzania (merits) (3 June 2016) 1 AfCLR 599, § 174; Kijiji Isiaga v. Tanzania
(merits) (21 March 2018) 2 AfCLR 218 § 67.

19
 at the conclusion that the Applicant was convicted on the basis of credible
evidence and that the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

82. The Court considers that the manner in which the domestic courts, particularly
the Court of Appeal, assessed the evidence does not reveal any manifest error,
which occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the Applicant requiring its
intervention.

83. As a consequence of the above, the Court holds that the Respondent State has
not violated the Applicant’s right to a fair trial protected under Article 7(1)(b) of
the Charter.

ii. Alleged violation of the right to defence

84. The Applicant argues that the right to legal representation has to be “practical
and effective” as opposed to being abstract or theoretical. Citing Artico v. Italy25,
he submits that the appointment of a legal aid lawyer in itself does not satisfy
the requirement of effective representation. Furthermore, he contends that
Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 7 of the Charter establishes the right “to
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to
communicate with counsel of his own choosing.”

85. Citing the Human Rights Committee’s Communication in the matter of Kelly v
Jamaica26, the Applicant argues that, when deciding what constitutes effective
representation, the Court should consider, “the complexity of the case, the
defendant’s access to evidence, length of time provided by rules of procedure
prior to particular proceedings and prejudice to the defendant.” Also, that it is
critical for the accused to have legal representation at all stages of the
proceedings including the pre-trial stage.

25 ECHR, Artico v. Italy, ECtHR, Judgment of 13 May 1980, Application No. 6694/74.
26 HRC, Kelly v. Jamaica, Communication No. 537/1993, U.N.Doc. A/51/40, Vol II at 98 (HRC, 1996).

20
 86. The Applicant submits that the Respondent State failed to provide him with an
experienced advocate as the advocate he was assigned had only been in
practice for one (1) year. Also, the Applicant argues that the advocate he was
assigned was required to represent him and his co-accused thereby raising
issues of conflict of interest.

87. The Applicant also avers that his advocate failed to properly prepare and
articulate a defence according to his instructions. The Applicant especially
contends that his advocate failed to mention the alibi defence in his closing
statement.

88. Furthermore, the Applicant submits that his advocate failed to adduce
evidence of his good character and failed to object to tainted and prejudicial
evidence, which evidence was subsequently expunged off the record by the
Court of Appeal. In relation to his appellate advocate, the Applicant avers that,
his lawyer failed to undertake adequate preparation and refused to take
instructions from him.

89. The Respondent State did not respond to this submission.

***

90. The Court has interpreted Article 7(1)(c) of the Charter in light of Article 14(3)(d)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)27, and
determined that the right to defence includes the right to be provided with free
legal assistance.28

27The Respondent State became a State Party to ICCPR on on 11 June 1976.

28Alex Thomas v. Tanzania (merits) op.cit § 114; Isiaga v. Tanzania (merits) § 72; Kennedy Onyachi and
Njoka v. Tanzania (merits) (28 September 2017) 2 AfCLR 65 § 104.

21
 91. The Court notes that the right to be defended by counsel of one’s choice
requires that the accused is not only granted a lawyer of their choice but also
that legal representation is effective.

92. The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal assistance
in Africa provide that a legal aid lawyer should:
1. be qualified to represent and defend the accused or a party to a civil case;

2. have the necessary training and experience corresponding to the nature

and seriousness of the matter;

3. be free to exercise his or her professional judgement in a professional

manner free of influence of the State or the judicial body;

4. advocate in favour of the accused or party to a civil case; and

5. be sufficiently compensated to provide an incentive to accord the accused

or party to a civil case adequate and effective representation.29

93. Principle 7 of the United Nations’ Guidelines and Principles on access to legal
aid in Criminal Justice Systems30 establishes the components of legal aid being
effective, as: unhindered access to legal aid providers for detained persons,
confidentiality of communications, access to case files and adequate time and
facilities to prepare their defence. It should also be prompt and available at all
stages of the criminal justice process.

94. The Court notes that in the instant case, the Applicant did not argue that the
legal aid advocate was unduly influenced by the state or not sufficiently
compensated or that he did not advocate in his favour. Rather, the Applicant
firstly, challenges the experience and competence of the legal aid lawyer that

29 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair
Trial and Legal assistance in Africa (2003) H (e)(1-5).
30 United Nations’ Guidelines and Principles on access to legal aid in Criminal Justice Systems, New York

2013. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-

reform/UN_principles_and_guidlines_on_access_to_legal_aid.pdf (accessed on 30 March 2021)

22
 represented him in the High Court. The Court observes though, that the
Applicant did not raise this point on appeal in the Court of Appeal even though
he was represented by another advocate in his appeal. Even so, the Applicant
only refers to the advocate’s years in practice, claiming that the advocate was
inexperienced but did not demonstrate how this impeded the advocate in
representing him. From the record, the Applicant’s advocate actually pointed
out some of the inconsistencies in the evidence adduced that the Applicant
seeks to rely on before this Court and he supported his submissions with case
law.

95. Regarding the Applicant’s contention on conflict of interest, the Court notes
that, joint representation of co-accused, does not automatically result in conflict
of interest. Rather, the Applicant is required to either object to the joint
representation or demonstrate subsequently, that the conflict of interest
actually existed and it affected his own representation.31 In the instant case,
there is nothing on record to show that the Applicant challenged the joint
representation during his trial. Also, the Applicant has not demonstrated the
existence of actual conflict of interest which affected his advocate’s
performance during trial. Therefore, the Court rejects this submission in relation
to ineffective representation.

96. Concerning the Applicant’s submission that his trial advocate did not follow his
instruction regarding the defence of alibi; contrary to the Applicant’s assertion,
it is evident from the record, that the advocate indicated to the High Court that
he would be relying on the defence of alibi. Furthermore, the Applicant relied
on his alibi and gave an in-depth account of it when he testified and Defence
Witness 5 testified on his behalf in relation to the alibi. Accordingly, the Court
dismisses the Applicant’s contention in this regard.

31 Holloway v. Arkansas 435 U.S. 475 (1978).

23
 97. According to the Applicant, his advocate did not present good character
evidence before the High Court nor did he object to “tainted and prejudicial”
evidence. The Court notes, that although, the Court of Appeal expunged the
“tainted and prejudicial” evidence referred to by the Applicant; it still found that
the direct evidence adduced by Prosecution Witnesses 1 and 3 was sufficient
to prove the prosecution’s case beyond a reasonable doubt.

98. In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Respondent State did not
violate the Applicant’s right to defence.

iii. Alleged violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time

99. The Applicant argues that he was held in remand for approximately five (5)
years from his arrest before being tried and convicted; and that he had to wait
for a further three (3) years for his appeal to be concluded. He argues that this
delay was unreasonable and resulted in denial of a fair trial.

100. In this regard, the Applicant states that police investigation was completed
in a matter of days after the offence occurred. He relies on the statement of the
judge that “the investigator and the police in general acted fairly fast”. The
Applicant also argues that the delay is attributable to the Respondent State as
it did not provide any explanation for the delay. Also, that the delay was not
attributable to himself as he had fully cooperated with the police and his
counsel, “…did not make applications to the Court and only called one witness.”

101. Citing Prett and Morgan v Jamaica32, the Applicant alleges that the
unjustified delay resulted in his deprivation of liberty, loss of his business,
separation from his family and losing contact with his “essential alibi witness”.

32 Privy Council, Prett and Morgan v. Jamaica, Privy Council Appeal No. 10 of 1993, 3 WLR 995.

24
 102. The Respondent State did not respond to this claim.

***

103. Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter provides that everyone has “the right to be tried
within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal”.

104. The Court recalls that, as it has held in its earlier judgments, various factors
are considered when assessing whether justice was dispensed within a
reasonable time in the meaning of Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter. These factors
include the complexity of the matter, the behaviour of the parties, and that of
the judicial authorities who bear a duty of due diligence in circumstances where
severe penalties apply.33

105. The Court notes the period of delay complained about is from 8 December
2003 when the Applicant was charged to 18 September 2008, the date of his
sentencing. This amounts to a period of four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten
(10) days. With respect to the complexity of the case, the Court notes that the
trial period of this case was from 17 June 2008 to 18 September 2008, when
the Applicant was sentenced. This amounts to a trial period of three (3) months.
During the trial, the prosecution called five (5) witnesses and the defence also
called five (5) witnesses. Nevertheless, the witnesses were heard from 17 June
2008 to 19 June 2008, that is, a period of two days. The final submissions by
the defence and the prosecution was on 24 June 2008. This means that from
the start of the prosecution case to the close of the case, there was a lapse of
only one week. Therefore, it is clear that the matter was not complex.

33 See Armand Guehi v. Tanzania (merits and reparations) (7 December 2018) 2 AfCLR 477 §§ 122-124.
See also Alex Thomas v. Tanzania (merits) § 104; Wilfred Onyango Nganyi and Others v. United Republic
of Tanzania (merits) (18 March 2016) 1 AfCLR 507, § 155; and Norbert Zongo and Others v. Burkina Faso
(merits) (28 March 2014) 1 AfCLR 219, §§ 92-97, 152.

25
 106. As regards whether the Applicant contributed to the delay; the Court notes
that, nothing on the record shows that he did and the Respondent State did not
challenge this either. The Applicant did not file any motions or seek any
adjournments and the presentation of his defence was concluded within a day.
It is thus clear that the Applicant did not contribute to the delay.

107. As to whether the delay was attributable to the Respondent State, the Court
notes that the Respondent State did not advance any argument as to why it
took close to five (5) years for the Applicant’s case to be completed. The
Respondent State did not explain what happened between 8 December 2003
when the Applicant was charged and 17 June 2008 when the trial commenced,
a period of four (4) years, seven (7) months and nine (9) days. In light of the
foregoing, the Court notes that the time taken to complete the Applicant’s trial
after he was charged, a period of almost five (5) years is unreasonable because
of lack of due diligence on the part of the national authorities.34

108. The Court thus finds that the Respondent State violated Article 7(1)(d) of
the Charter herein.

iv. Alleged violation of the right to be tried by an impartial tribunal

109. The Applicant avers that the assessors who were aiding the magistrate in
the District Court challenged the veracity of his testimony and also questioned
his witness, which he argues is conduct that is proscribed in an adversarial
system. Citing the case of the Tanzania Court of Appeal, Mapuji Mtogwashinge
v. the Republic, the Applicant argues that the duty of the assessors is to ask
the witnesses questions for clarification purposes rather than cross-examining
them. He argues therefore that the cross-examination resulted in “actual or
perceived bias”.

34 Wilfred Onyango Nganyi v. Tanzania (merits) § 155.

26
 110. The Applicant argues that as a result of the above mentioned “actual or
perceived bias”, the Respondent State violated his right under Article 7 of the
Charter by failing to try him by an impartial tribunal.

111. The Respondent State did not respond to this claim.

***

112. Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter provides that everyone has “the right to be tried
within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal”.

113. The Court notes that, to ensure impartiality, any court must offer sufficient
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt.35 However, the Court observes
that the impartiality of a judicial authority is presumed and undisputable
evidence is required to refute this presumption. In this regard, the Court shares
the view that “the presumption of impartiality carries considerable weight, and
the law should not carelessly invoke the possibility of bias in a judge”36 and that
“whenever an allegation of bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias is made,
the adjudicative integrity not only of an individual judge but the entire
administration of justice is called into question. The Court must, therefore,
consider the matter very carefully before making a finding”37

114. The Applicant alleges that the assessors cross-examined him during his
trial resulting in bias. Nevertheless, the Applicant has not demonstrated clearly
with evidence that the assessors did in fact cross-examine him, as opposed to

35 Alfred Agbesi Woyome v. Republic of Ghana, ACtHPR, Application No. 001/2017, Judgment of 28 June
2019 (merits) § 128; Findlay v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 221 § 73. See also Nsongurua J Udombana, ‘The
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Right and the development of fair trial norms in Africa’ 2006
African Human Rights Law Journal Vol 6/2.
36 Woyome v. Ghana (merits) ibid; Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada 2003 231 DLR (4th) 1

(Wewaykum).
37 Woyome v. Ghana (merits); Okpaluba and Juma “The Problems of Proving Actual or Apparent Bias:

An Analysis of Contemporary Developments in South Africa” PELJ 2011 (14) 7 at 261.

27
 seeking for clarification. In any case, from the record, the assessors were
involved in questioning both the prosecution witnesses as well as the defence
witnesses in order to solicit for more information. Thus, the Court does not find
any manifest error in their conduct to require its intervention.

115. Consequently, the Court finds that the Respondent State did not violate
Article 7(1)(d) herein.

B. Alleged violation of the right to life

116. The Applicant submits that the mandatory death sentence does not respect
the right to life rather creates presumption in favour of death. He further argues
that, the Respondent State would not have sentenced the Applicant to death if
it had considered his circumstances.

117. According to the Applicant, the death penalty is a reserve for the most
heinous crimes. The Applicant does not believe that killing of one individual
falls under the category of “most heinous crimes”. Finally, the Applicant submits
that the Respondent State’s response to this allegation is not satisfactory.

118. The Respondent State argues that the death sentence was the right
sentence for the offence of murder according to its laws and the established
jurisprudence of its Court of Appeal. Thus, it was rightfully meted out by the
Court of Appeal.

119. According to the Respondent State, the imposition of the death penalty has
not been abolished by international law. It argues that the ICCPR provides that
life should not be arbitrarily deprived but that the death penalty should be
imposed for the most serious crimes.

***

28
 120. The Court notes that the right to life alleged to have been violated as a result
of the mandatory death sentence, is protected under Article 4 of the Charter.

121. Article 4 of the Charter provides that “Human beings are inviolable. Every
human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his
person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right.”

122. The Court observes that, despite a global trend towards the abolition of the
death penalty, including the adoption of the Second Option Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the death penalty is still
present in the legal system of many states.

123. As regards the substitution of the life sentence for the death penalty by the
Court of Appeal, the Court notes that the Court of Appeal made reference to
Section 197 of the Respondent State’s Penal Code and its own jurisprudence
to decide to “set aside the illegal sentence, and impose the appropriate
sentence of death.” The Court therefore infers that it is the mandatory nature
of the death penalty in the Respondent State’s books that led to the substitution
of the punishment by the Court of Appeal.

124. The Court recalls its jurisprudence:

a system of mandatory capital punishment deprives the complainant of the

most fundamental right, the right to life, without considering whether this
exceptional form of punishment is appropriate in the circumstances of his
or her cause.38

125. The Court restates that, the mandatory imposition of the death penalty as
provided for in Section 197 of the Penal Code of Tanzania does not permit a

38Ally Rajabu v. Tanzania, ACtHPR, Application No. 007/2015, Judgment of 28 November 2019 (merits
and reparations) § 102.

29
 convicted person to present mitigating evidence and therefore applies to all
convicts without regard to the circumstances in which the offence was
committed.

126. Moreover, in all cases of murder, the trial court is left with no other option
but to impose the death sentence. The court is thus deprived of the discretion,
which is inherent in every independent tribunal to consider both the facts and
the applicability of the law, especially how proportionality should apply between
the facts and the penalty to be imposed. In the same vein, the trial court lacks
discretion to take into account specific and crucial circumstances such as the
degree of participation of each individual offender in the crime.39

127. The Court further notes that, the arbitrariness of the mandatory imposition
of the death penalty and breach of fair trial rights, is affirmed by relevant
international case-law.40 The Privy council held41:

In order to be exercised in a rational and non-arbitrary manner, the

sentencing discretion should be guided by legislative or judicially-
prescribed principles and standards, and should be subject to effective
judicial review, all with a view to ensuring that the death penalty is imposed
in only the most exceptional and appropriate circumstances. There should
be a requirement for individualized sentencing in implementing the death
penalty.

128. Furthermore, domestic courts in some African countries, have adopted the
same interpretation in finding the mandatory imposition of the death penalty

39 Ibid, § 109.
40 See Ally Rajabu and others v. Tanzania (merits and reparations) § 110; Thompson, op. cit.; Kennedy v.
Trinidad & Tobago, Comm. No. 845/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999 (2002) (U.N.H.C.R.), 7.3;
Chan v. Guyana, Comm. No. 913/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/913/2000 (2006) (U.N.H.C.R.), 6.5;
Baptiste, op. cit.; McKenzie, op. cit., Hilaire and Others, op. cit.; Boyce and Another, op. cit.
41 Privy Council, Hughes v the Queen (Spence & Hughes) (unreported, 2 April 2001).

30
 arbitrary and in violation of due process.42 To this end, the Supreme Court of
Kenya held43:

Therefore … it is without doubt that the Court ought to take into account
the evidence, the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the case
in order to arrive at an appropriate sentence. It is not lost on us that these
provisions are couched in permissive terms. However, the Court of Appeal
has consistently reiterated on the need for noting down mitigating factors.
Not only because they might affect the sentence but also for futuristic
endeavours such as when the appeal is placed before another body for
clemency.

129. Furthermore, that44:

Section 204 of the (Kenyan) Penal Code deprives the Court of the use of judicial
discretion in a matter of life and death. Such law can only be regarded as harsh,
unjust and unfair. The mandatory nature deprives the Courts of their legitimate
jurisdiction to exercise discretion not to impose the death sentence in appropriate
cases. Where a court listens to mitigating circumstances but has, nonetheless, to
impose a set sentence, the sentence imposed fails to conform to the tenets of fair
trial that accrue to accused persons under Articles 25 of the Constitution; an
absolute right.

130. The Court notes that, the mandatory nature of the death penalty as provided
for under Section 197 of the Penal Code, leaves the national courts with no
choice but to sentence a convict to death, resulting in arbitrary deprivation of
life. Therefore, Section 197 of the Penal Code contravenes the right to life.

42 See Francis Karioko Muruatetu & Another v. Republic [2017] eKLR; Mutiso v. Republic, Crim. App. No.
17 of 2008 at 8, 24, 35 (July 30, 2010) (Kenya Ct. App.); Kafantayeni v. Attorney General, [2007] MWHC 1
(Malawi High Ct.) and Attorney General v. Kigula (SC), [2009] UGSC 6 at 37-45 (Uganda Sup. Ct.).
43 Francis Karioko Muruatetu & Another v. Republic [2017] eKLR § 43.
44 Ibid § 48.

31
 131. In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore finds that the Respondent State
violated Article 4 of the Charter.

C. Alleged violation of the right to dignity

132. The Applicant argues that the Respondent State violated Article 5 of the
Charter by executing the death penalty through a brutal way, that is, by
hanging. Relying on the Commission’s case of Interights and Ditshwanelo v
The Republic of Botswana45, the Applicant submits that the death penalty
should be carried out in a manner that will cause the least amount of physical
and mental suffering.

133. The Respondent State did not respond to this allegation.

***

134. Article 5 of the Charter provides:

Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in
a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of
exploitation and degradation of man, particularly slavery, slave trade,
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be
prohibited.

135. The Court notes that, in the instant case, the Applicant challenges the
execution of the death penalty by hanging. The Court observes that many
methods used to implement the death penalty may amount to torture, as well
as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment given the suffering inherent
thereto.46 In line with the very rationale for prohibiting methods of execution that

45ACHPR, Communication 319/06, Interrights & Ditshwanelo v. Botswana (ACHPR).

46See Ally Rajabu v. Tanzania (merits and reparations) § 118; Jabari v. Turkey, Judgment, merits, App No
40035/98, ECHR 2000-VIII (deporting a woman who risked death by stoning to Iran would violate the
prohibition of torture).

32
 amount to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, the prescription
should therefore be that, in cases where the death penalty is permissible,
methods of execution must exclude suffering or involve the least suffering
possible.47

136. The Court observes that hanging a person is one of such methods and it is
therefore inherently degrading. Furthermore, having found that the mandatory
imposition of the death sentence violates the right to life due to its arbitrary
nature, this Court finds the method of implementation of that sentence, that is,
hanging, inevitably encroaches upon the dignity of a person in respect of the
prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 48

137. As a consequence of the above, the Court finds that the Respondent State
has violated Article 5 of the Charter.

VIII. REPARATIONS

138. The Applicant prays the Court to:

a. Award reparations of USD 100,000 in moral damages for the Applicant and
USD 5,000 each for the Applicant’s co-parent and son; USD 76,789 for material
loss, USD 715 for material loss suffered by Applicant’s co-parent;
b. Order the release of the Applicant;
c. Order that the Respondent State amend its Penal Code and related legislation
concerning the death sentence to render it complaint with Article 4 of the
African Charter.

139. The Respondent State prays the Court to reject the prayer of the Applicant
for reparations.
***

47 See Ally Rajabu v. Tanzania (merits and reparations) ibid; Chitat Ng, op. cit., 16.2.
48 Ally Rajabu v. Tanzania (merits and reparations) § 119.

33
 140. Article 27(1) of the Protocol provides that “If the Court finds that there has
been violation of a human or peoples’ rights, it shall make appropriate orders
to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or
reparation.”

141. The Court considers that, as it has consistently held, for reparations to be
granted, the Respondent State should first be internationally responsible of the
wrongful act. Second, causation should be established between the wrongful
act and the alleged prejudice. Furthermore, and where it is granted, reparation
should cover the full prejudice suffered. Finally, the Applicant bears the onus
to justify the claims made.49

142. As this Court has earlier found, the Respondent State violated the
Applicants’ rights to a fair trial, life and dignity guaranteed under Articles 7, 4
and 5 of the Charter respectively. Based on these findings, the Respondent
State’s responsibility has been established. The prayers for reparation are
therefore being examined against these findings.

143. As stated earlier, applicants must provide evidence to support their claims
for material prejudice. The Court has also held previously that the purpose of
reparations is to place the victim in the situation prior to the violation.50

144. The Court has further held, with respect to moral prejudice, it exercises
judicial discretion in equity.51 In such instances, the Court has adopted the
practice of awarding lump sums.52

49 See Armand Guehi v. Tanzania (merits and reparations) § 157. See also, Norbert Zongo and Others v.
Burkina Faso ((reparations) (5 June 2015) 1 AfCLR 258, §§ 20-31; Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso
(reparations) (3 June 2016) 1 AfCLR 346 §§ 52-59; and Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v. Tanzania
(reparations) §§ 27-29.
50 See Norbert Zongo and Others v. Burkina Faso (reparations) §§ 57-62.
51 See Armand Guehi v. Tanzania (merits and reparations) § 181; and Lucien Ikili Rashidi v. Tanzania,

ACtHPR, Application no. 009/2015, Judgment of 28 March 2019 (merits and reparations) § 119.
52 See Armand Guehi v. Tanzania (merits and reparations) § 177; Norbert Zongo and Others v. Burkina

Faso (reparations) § 62.

34
 A. Pecuniary reparations

i. Material Prejudice suffered by the Applicant

145. The Applicant submits that he suffered financial loss due to his
incarceration. He claims that he was running a successful auto-mechanic
business earning Tanzanian Shillings Twelve million (TZS 12,000,000)
annually. Thus, the Applicant is claiming an amount of Tanzanian Shillings One
Hundred and Eighty million (TZS 180,000,000) as compensation for the fifteen
year period that he has spent in prison.

146. The Respondent State submits that the Court should reject this claim.

***

147. The Court recalls that in order for a claim for material prejudice to be
granted, the Applicant must show a causal link between the violation found and
the loss suffered, as well as demonstrate the loss suffered with evidence.53

148. In the instant case, the Court notes that the Applicant has failed to show the
link between the violations found and the material prejudice which he claims to
have suffered. Furthermore, the Court observes that, the Applicant filed an
affidavit that failed to disclose any evidence of the business he claimed to have
been running. Also, he did not provide documentary evidence such as a
business licence or registration with the revenue authorities as proof of the
existence of business he claimed to have been running before his arrest and
conviction. Consequently, the Court rejects this claim.

53 Supra note 53.

35
 ii. Material Prejudice suffered by Indirect Victims

149. The Applicant submits that his former fiancée, Ms. Abigael Mcharol suffered
financial loss due to his incarceration. He claims that she incurred expenses in
handling their son’s expenses and also by visiting him in prison. Thus, the
Applicant is claiming an amount of Tanzanian Shillings One Million, Six
Hundred and Seventy Five Thousand (TZS 1,675,000) as compensation for the
material prejudice that his former fiancée suffered.

150. The Respondent State submits that the Court should reject this claim.

***

151. Likewise, the Court notes that the Applicant has failed to show the causal
link between the violation found and the alleged prejudice suffered herein. Also,
he has neither provided documentary evidence to show filiation such as birth
certificates for children, attestation of paternity or maternity for parents, and
marriage certificates for spouses or any equivalent proof, nor has he provided
evidence of the material prejudice claimed, such as receipts. The Court thus
dismisses the prayer of the Applicant herein.

iii. Moral Prejudice suffered by the Applicant

152. The Applicant submits that he suffered mental anguish having been on
death row for at least seven (7) years. He further submits that his life plan was
disrupted through his incarceration. The Applicant did not make a specific claim
in this regard.

153. The Respondent State argues that the Applicant’s prayer herein should be
dismissed.
***

36
 154. The Court notes that the disruption of life plan is related to the Applicant’s
incarceration. The Court, having not found that the Applicant’s incarceration
was unlawful, dismisses this claim.

155. The Court however notes that it has found the mandatory imposition of the
death penalty in violation of Articles 4 and 5 of the Charter. The Court recalls
its earlier cited case-law to the effect that, in respect of human rights violations,
moral prejudice is awarded in equity on the basis of the court’s discretion.

156. In the instant case, the Court is cognisant of the fact that the mandatory
nature of the death sentence results in the gravest psychological suffering as
convicted persons have no opportunity to argue for a lesser punishment than
death.

157. The Court notes that it also found that the Applicant’s right to be tried within
a reasonable time was violated and finds that the Applicant suffered emotional
distress due to the prolonged pre-trial detention.54

158. In view of the above, the Court finds that the Applicant endured
psychological suffering due to the violations suffered and awards himmoral
damages to the tune of Tanzanian Shillings Four Million (TZS 4,000,000).

iv. Moral Prejudice suffered by the Indirect Victims

159. The Applicant submits that his former fiancée, Ms. Abigael Mcharol suffered
mental anguish out of concern for the Applicant, the father of her child in relation
to his incarceration. He also submits that his son, Baraka and his elder brother
Nuhu Juma Shoo, also suffered emotional distress in relation to his
imprisonment and incarceration.

54 See Armand Guehi v. Tanzania (merits and reparations) § 181.

37
 160. The Respondent State submits that the Court should reject the Applicant’s
prayer herein.
***

161. The Court considers that as it has held in its earlier judgments55, indirect
victims must prove their filiation to the Applicant to be entitled to pecuniary
reparations. Documents required include birth certificates for children,
attestation of paternity or maternity for parents, and marriage certificates for
spouses or any equivalent proof.56 The Court notes that, in the present case,
while the Applicant filed an affidavit to indicate his relations to the indirect
victims, he has not provided proof of filiation through a marriage certificate, birth
certificate or attestation of paternity.

162. In any event, the alleged prejudice to the Applicants’ family members were
as a result of his incarceration, which this Court did not find unlawful. The
prayers are therefore dismissed.

B. Non-pecuniary reparations

i. Restitution

163. The Applicant prays the Court to order his release.

164. The Respondent State prays the Court to reject the Applicant’s prayer for
release.
***

55 See Alex Thomas v. Tanzania, ACtHPR, Application no 005/2013, Judgment of 4 June 2019 (reparations)
§§. 49-60; Mohamed Abubakari v. Tanzania, ACtHPR, Application no 007/2013, Judgment of 4 June 2019
(reparations) §§. 59-64.
56 See Alex Thomas v. Tanzania (reparations) §. 51; Mohamed Abubakari v. Tanzania (reparations) §. 61.

38
 165. With regard to the Applicant’s release, the Court has established that it
would make such an order, "if an Applicant sufficiently demonstrates or if the
Court by itself establishes from its findings that the Applicant's arrest or
conviction is based entirely on arbitrary considerations and that his continued
detention would occasion a miscarriage of justice”57.

166. In the instant case, the Court finds that the circumstances to order the
release of the Applicant, have not been fulfilled and thus dismisses the
Applicant’s prayer.

ii. Guarantees of Non-Repetition

167. The Applicant prays the Court to Order the Respondent State to amend its
Penal Code and related legislation concerning the death sentence to render it
complaint with Article 4 of the Charter.

168. The Respondent State did not respond to this prayer.

***

169. The Court considers that guarantees of non-repetition are generally aimed
at addressing violations that are systemic and structural in nature rather than
to remedy individual harm.58 The Court has however, also held that non-

57 Jibu Amir Mussa and Another v. Tanzania, ACtHPR, Application no. 014/2015, judgment of 28 November
2019 (merits) §§ 96 and 97; Minani Evarist v Tanzania (merits) § 82; and Mgosi Mwita Makungu v Tanzania
(merits) § 84. See also Del Rio Prada v. Spain, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 10/07/2012,
§ 139; Assanidze v Georgia (GC) - 71503/01, Judgment of 8/04/2004, § 204; Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru,
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 17/09/1987, § 84.
58 See Lucien Ikili Rashidi v. Tanzania, op. cit., §§, 146-149. See also, Armand Guehi v. Tanzania, op. cit.,

§ 191; and Norbert Zongo and Others v. Burkina Faso (reparations), §§ 103-106.

39
 repetition could apply in individual cases where there is a likelihood of
continued or repeated violations.59

170. In the instant case, the Court found that the Respondent State violated
Article 4 of the Charter by providing for the mandatory imposition of the death
penalty in its Penal Code, and Article 5 by providing for its execution by
hanging. The Court orders that the Applicant should be sentenced afresh. The
Court also orders the Respondent State to undertake all necessary measures
to repeal from its laws the provision for the mandatory imposition of the death
sentence.

IX. COSTS

171. The Respondent State prays the Court to order Applicant to bear the costs.
The Applicant did not make any prayer as regards costs.

172. Pursuant to Rule 32(2) of the Rules “unless otherwise decided by the Court,
each party shall bear its own costs.”

173. In light of the foregoing, the Court rules that each party shall bear its own
costs.

X. OPERATIVE PART

174. For these reasons:

The COURT

Unanimously,

59
See Lucien Ikili Rashidi v. Tanzania, op. cit.; See also Armand Guehi v. Tanzania, op. cit.; and Reverend
Christopher R. Mtikila v. Tanzania (reparations) § 43.

40
On jurisdiction
i. Dismisses the objection to its jurisdiction;
ii. Declares that it has jurisdiction.

On admissibility
iii. Dismisses the objections to the admissibility of the Application;
iv. Declares the Application, admissible.

On merits
v. Finds that the Respondent State has not violated the right to be
presumed innocent under Article 7(1)(b) of the Charter;
vi. Finds that the Respondent State has not violated the right to defence
under Article 7(1)(c) of the Charter;
vii. Finds that the Respondent State has not violated the Applicant’s right to
be tried by an impartial tribunal under Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter;
viii. Finds that the Respondent State violated the right to be tried within a
reasonable time protected under Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter.
ix. Finds that the Respondent State violated the right to life under Article 4
of the Charter in relation to the mandatory imposition of the death
penalty;
x. Finds that the Respondent State has violated the right to dignity under
Article 5 of the Charter in relation to method of the execution of the death
penalty.

On reparations

Pecuniary reparations
xi. Rejects the Applicant’s prayer for reparations for material prejudice;
xii. Rejects the prayer for reparations for moral prejudice suffered by the
indirect victims;

41
 xiii. Grants Tanzanian Shillings Four Million (TZS 4,000,000) for moral
prejudice suffered;
xiv. Orders the Respondent State to pay the amount indicated under sub-
paragraph (xiii) free from taxes within six (6) months, effective from the
notification of this Judgment, failing which it will pay interest on arrears
calculated on the basis of the applicable rate of the Bank of Tanzania
throughout the period of delayed payment and until the accrued amount
is fully paid.

Non-pecuniary reparations
xv. Dismisses the prayer for release;
xvi. Orders the Respondent State to take all necessary measures, within one
(1) year from the notification of this Judgment, to remove the mandatory
imposition of the death penalty from its laws;
xvii. Orders the Respondent State to take all necessary measures, through
its internal processes and within one (1) year of the notification of this
Judgment, for the rehearing of the case on the sentencing of the
Applicant through a procedure that does not allow the mandatory
imposition of the death sentence and upholds the discretion of the
judicial officer;

On Implementation and reporting

xviii. Orders the Respondent State to submit to it within six (6) months from
the date of notification of this judgment, a report on the status of
implementation of the decision set forth herein and thereafter, every six
(6) months until the Court considers that there has been full
implementation thereof.

On costs
xix. Orders each party to bear its own costs.

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Signed:

Blaise TCHIKAYA, Vice President;

Ben KIOKO, judge;

Rafaâ BEN ACHOUR, Judge;

Suzanne MENGUE, Judge;

M-Thérèse MUKAMULISA, Judge;

Tujilane R. CHIZUMILA, Judge;

Chafika BENSAOULA, Judge;

Stella I. ANUKAM, Judge;

Dumisa B. Ntsebeza, Judge;

Modibo SACKO, judge;

and Robert ENO, Registrar.

Done at Arusha, this Thirtieth Day of September, in the Year two Thousand and Twenty
One in English and French, the English text being authoritative.

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