Property Case Navy Officer's Village Ass'n V Republic

G.R. No. 177168. August 3, 2015.
*

NAVY OFFICERS’ VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOVAI), petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; “Question of Law” and “Question of Fact,”
Distinguished.—Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a party desiring to appeal from a
judgment or final order of the CA shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. A
question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence on a certain state of facts. The issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood
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* SECOND DIVISION.

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Navy Officers' Village Association, Inc. (NOVAI)vs. Republic
of the facts being admitted. In contrast, a question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites the calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses; the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole; and the probability of the situation.
The rule that only questions of law may be the subject of a Rule 45 Petition before this Court, however,
has exceptions. Among these exceptions is when there is conflict between the factual findings of the
RTC and that of the CA.
Same; Same; Intervention; Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is
permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining the plaintiff or defendant, or demanding
something adverse to both of them.—Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third
person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining the plaintiff or defendant, or
demanding something adverse to both of them. Its purpose is to enable such third party to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by the proceeding, such interest being actual, material,
direct and immediate, not simply contingent and expectant. As a general rule, intervention cannot be made
at the appeal stage. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, governing interventions, provides that “the
motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.” This rule
notwithstanding, intervention may be allowed after judgment where it is necessary to protect some interest
which cannot otherwise be protected, and may be allowed for the purpose of preserving the intervenor’s
right to appeal. “The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to make the powers
of the Court fully and completely available for justice x x x and aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.”
Civil Law; Land Registration; Public Land Act; Under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
141, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, from time to time, classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands, and transfer these lands from one class to another for
purposes of their administration and disposition.—The classification and

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526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
disposition of lands of the public domain are governed by Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the
Public Land Act, the country’s primary law on the matter. Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, the President
of the Republic of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, may, from time to time, classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands, and transfer these lands from one class to another for purposes of their administration
and disposition. Under Section 7 of C.A. No. 141, the President may, from time to time, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and for purposes of the
administration and disposition of alienable and disposable public lands, declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under the Acts’ provisions. Section 8 of C.A. No. 141 sets out the public lands
open to disposition or concession and the requirement that they have been officially delimited and
classified, and when practicable, surveyed. Section 8 excludes (by implication) from disposition or
concession, public lands which have been reserved for public or quasi-public uses; appropriated by the
Government; or in any manner have become private property, or those on which a private right authorized
and recognized by the Act or any other valid law may be claimed. Further, Section 8 authorizes the
President to suspend the concession or disposition of lands previously declared open to disposition, until
again declared open to disposition by his proclamation or by act of Congress. Lands of the public domain
classified as alienable and disposable are further classified, under Section 9 of C.A. No. 141, according to
their use or purpose into: (1) agricultural; (2) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes; (3) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and (4) reservations for townsites and for
public and quasi-public uses. Section 9 also authorizes the President to make the classifications and, at any
time, transfer lands from one class to another.
Same; Same; Same; Public Domain; Words and Phrases; Section 83 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
No. 141 defines public domain lands classified as reservations for public and quasi-public uses as “any
tract or tracts of land of the public domain” which the President, by proclamation and upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may designate “as reservations
for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof” or “for
quasi-public uses or purposes when the

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public interest requires it.”—Section 83 of C.A. No. 141 defines public domain lands classified as
reservations for public and quasi-public uses as “any tract or tracts of land of the public domain”
which the President, by proclamation and upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, may designate “as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of
its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof” or “for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest
requires it.” Under Section 88 of the same Act, these “reserved tract or tracts of lands shall be non-
alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease or other disposition until again
declared alienable under the provisions of [CA No. 141] or by proclamation of the President.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Within the class of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, the President may further classify public domain lands, according
to the use or purpose to which they are destined, as agricultural: residential, commercial, industrial, etc.;
educational, charitable, etc.; and reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses; and, he
may transfer such lands from one class to the other at any time.—Within the class of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, the President may further classify public domain lands, according to
the use or purpose to which they are destined, as agricultural: residential, commercial, industrial, etc.;
educational, charitable, etc.; and reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses; and, he
may transfer such lands from one class to the other at any time. Thus, the President may, for example,
transfer a certain parcel of land from its classification as agricultural (under Section 9[a]), to residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar purposes (under Section 9[b]) and declare it available for disposition
under any of the modes of disposition of alienable and disposable public lands available under C.A. No.
141, as amended.
Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Modes of Disposition of Alienable and Disposable
Lands.—The modes of disposition of alienable and disposable lands available under C.A. No. 141 include:
(1) by homestead settlement (Chapter IV), by sale (Chapter V), by lease (Chapter VI) and by confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles (Chapters VII and VIII) for agricultural lands under Title

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II of C.A. No. 141 as amended; (2) by sale or by lease for residential, commercial, or industrial lands
under Title III of C.A. No. 141, as amended; (3) by donation, sale, lease, exchange or any other form for
educational and charitable lands under Title IV of C.A. No. 141, as amended; and (4) by sale by public
auction for townsite reservations under Chapter XI, Title V of C.A. No. 141, as amended. Once these
parcels of lands are actually acquired by private persons, either by sale, grant, or other modes of
disposition, they are removed from the mass of land of the public domain and become, by operation of law,
their private property.
Same; Same; Same; Public Domain; Until the parcels of land are actually granted to, acquired, or
purchased by private persons, they remain lands of the public domain which the President, under Section 9
of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, may classify again as reservations for public and quasi-public uses.
The President may also, under Section 8 of C.A. No. 141, suspend their concession or disposition .—Until
the parcels of land are actually granted to, acquired, or purchased by private persons, they remain lands of
the public domain which the President, under Section 9 of C.A. No. 141, may classify again as reservations
for public and quasi-public uses. The President may also, under Section 8 of C.A. No. 141, suspend their
concession or disposition. If these parcels of land are reclassified as reservations before they are actually
acquired by private persons, or if the President suspends their concession or disposition, they shall not be
subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared open for disposition by
proclamation of the President pursuant to Section 88 in relation with Section 8 of C.A. No. 141. Thus, in a
limited sense, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses under Section 9(d)
of C.A. No. 141 are still non-alienable and non-disposable, even though they are, by the general
classification under Section 6, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. By specific declaration
under Section 88, in relation with Section 8, these lands classified as reservations are non-alienable and
non-disposable. In short, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses: (1) are
non-alienable and non-disposable in view of Section 88 (in relation with Section 8) of CA No. 141
specifically declaring them as non-alienable and not subject to disposition; and (2) they remain public
domain lands until they are actually disposed of in favor of private persons.

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Same; Same; “Property of Public Dominion” and “Patrimonial Property,” Defined.—Article
419 of the Civil Code classifies property as either of public dominion or of private ownership.
Article 420 defines property of the public dominion as those which are intended for public use or,
while not intended for public use, belong to the State and are intended for some public service.
Article 421, on the other hand, defines patrimonial property as all other property of the State
which is not of the character stated in Article 420. While Article 422 states that public dominion
property which is no longer intended for public use or service shall form part of the State’s
patrimonial property. Thus, from the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on
Property, lands which are intended for public use or public service such as reservations for public
or quasi-public uses are property of the public dominion and remain to be so as long as they
remain reserved. As property of the public dominion, public lands reserved for public or quasi-
public uses are outside the commerce of man. They cannot be subject to sale, disposition or
encumbrance; any sale, disposition or encumbrance of such property of the public dominion is
void for being contrary to law and public policy.
Same; Same; Public Domain; To be subject to sale, occupation or other disposition, lands of
the public domain designated as reservations must first be withdrawn, by act of Congress or by
proclamation of the President, from the public or quasi-public use for which it has been reserved
or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial property, pursuant to
Sections 8 and 88 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 and Article 422 of the Civil Code.—To
be subject to sale, occupation or other disposition, lands of the public domain designated as
reservations must first be withdrawn, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, from
the public or quasi-public use for which it has been reserved or otherwise positively declared to
have been converted to patrimonial property, pursuant to Sections 8 and 88 of C.A. No. 141 and
Article 422 of the Civil Code. Without such express declaration or positive governmental act, the
reserved public domain lands remain to be public dominion property of the State.
Same; Same; Same; While Proclamation No. 461 withdrew a certain area or parcel of land
from the Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) and made the covered area
available for disposition in favor of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Officers’ Village

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Association, Inc. (AFPOVAI), Proclamation No. 478 subsequently withdrew the property from the
total disposable portion and reserved it for the use of the Veterans Rehabilitation and Medical Training
Center (VRMTC).—We agree with the respondents that while Proclamation No. 461, issued in September
1965, removed from the FBMR a certain parcel of land that includes the property, Proclamation No. 478,
issued in October 1965, in turn segregated the property from the area made available for disposition under
Proclamation No. 461, and reserved it for the use of the VRMTC. We find it clear that Proclamation No.
478 was issued after, not before, Proclamation No. 461. Hence, while Proclamation No. 461 withdrew a
certain area or parcel of land from the FBMR and made the covered area available for disposition in favor
of the AFPOVAI, Proclamation No. 478 subsequently withdrew the property from the total disposable
portion and reserved it for the use of the VRMTC. With the issuance of Proclamation No. 478, the property
was transferred back to that class of public domain land reserved for public or quasi-public use or purpose
which, consistent with Article 420 of the Civil Code, is property of the public dominion, not patrimonial
property of the State.
Same; Same; Same; Public Dominion; Consistent with Section 88, in relation with Section 8, of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 and Article 420 of the Civil Code, the property which was classified
again as reservation for public or quasi-public use or purpose is non-alienable and not subject to
disposition; it also remains property of the public dominion; hence, non-alienable and non-disposable
land of the public domain.—As Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist and therefore could not have
validly revoked Proclamation No. 478, we find, as the CA also correctly did, that Proclamation No. 478
stands as the most recent manifestation of the State’s intention to reserve the property anew for some
public or quasi-public use or purpose. Thus, consistent with Section 88, in relation with Section 8, of C.A.
No. 141 and Article 420 of the Civil Code, as discussed above, the property which was classified again as
reservation for public or quasi-public use or purpose is non-alienable and not subject to disposition; it also
remains property of the public dominion; hence, non-alienable and non-disposable land of the public
domain. As a consequence, when R.A. No. 7227 took effect in 1992, the property subject of this case,
which does not fall among the areas specifically designated as exempt from the law’s operation was, by
legal fiat, transferred to the BCDA’s authority.

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Same; Same; Public Dominion; Property which are intended for public or quasi-public use or for
some public purpose are public dominion property of the State and are outside the commerce of man.—As
the property remains a reserved public domain land, it is outside the commerce of man. Property which are
intended for public or quasi-public use or for some public purpose are public dominion property of the
State and are outside the commerce of man. NOVAI, therefore, could not have validly purchased the
property in 1991. We reiterate and emphasize that property which has been reserved for public or quasi-
public use or purpose are non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again
declared alienable by law or by proclamation of the President. Any sale or disposition of property of the
public dominion is void for being contrary to law and public policy. Since the sale of the property, in this
case, is void, the title issued to NOVAI is similarly void ab initio. It is a well-settled doctrine that
registration under the Torrens System does not, by itself, vest title as it is not a mode of acquiring
ownership; that registration under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant’s already existing
title.
Same; Same; Public Domain; Section 1 of Act No. 3038 authorizes the sale or lease only: (i) of land
of the private domain, not land of the public domain; and (ii) by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, not by the Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director.—Section 1 of Act No. 3038 authorizes
the sale or lease only: (i) of land of the private domain, not land of the public domain; and (ii) by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, not by the LMB Director. Section 2 of the said Act, in
fact, specifically exempts from its coverage “land necessary for the public service.” As the sale was
executed by the LMB Director covering the property that was reserved for the use of the VRMTC, it,
therefore, clearly violated the provisions of Act No. 3038.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Himerio Jose Ll. Garcia for petitioner.
Cruz-Nery, Sandoval Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.

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Regina Salve R. Lapuz for intervenor BCDA.
BRION, J.:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the December 28, 2006
decision2 and March 28, 2007 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
85179.
The CA reversed and set aside the August 20, 2004 decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 67, Pasig City, that dismissed the complaint filed by the Republic of the Philippines
(respondent or the Republic) for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T--
15387 issued in the name of Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. or NOVAI (petitioner).
The Factual Antecedents

TCT No. T-15387,5 issued in NOVAI’s name, covers a 475,009-square-meter parcel of land
(the property)6 situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) in
Taguig, Metro Manila.
The property previously formed part of a larger 15,812,684-square-meter parcel of land
situated at the former Fort William McKinley, Rizal, which was covered by TCT No. 61524
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
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1 Rollo, pp. 8-45.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and
Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a Member of this Court), id., at pp. 47-88.
3 Id., at p. 90.
4 Civil Case No. 63983, penned by Judge Mariano M. Singzon, Jr., id., at pp. 182-190.
5 Annex “B” of the Records, Vol. I, pp. 9-11.
6 Designated as Lot 3, SWO-13-000183; Rollo, pp. 96-97.

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On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 4237 “reserving
for military purposes certain parcels of the public domain situated in the municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig, Parañaque, province of Rizal, and Pasay City,” which included the 15,812,684-square-
meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 61524.
On September 29, 1965, then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 4618 which
excluded from Fort McKinley “a certain portion of land embraced therein, situated in the
municipalities of Taguig and Parañaque, Province of Rizal, and Pasay City,” with an area of
2,455,310 square meters, and declared the excluded area as “AFP Officers’ Village” to be
disposed of under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2749 and 730.10
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7 Entitled “Reserving for Military Purposes Certain Parcels of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipalities of
Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City.”
8 Entitled “Excluding from the Operation of Proclamation No. 423 Dated July 12, 1957, Which Established the
Military Reservation known as Fort William Mckinley (now Fort Andres Bonifacio) situated in the Municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig and Parañaque, Province of Rizal, and Pasay City, A Certain Portion of Land Embraced Therein, situated in the
Municipalities of Taguig and Parañaque, Province of Rizal, and Pasay City, Island of Luzon, and Declaring the Same as
AFP Officers’ Village to be Disposed of Under the Provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 274 and 730.”
9 Entitled “An Act Authorizing the Director of Lands to Subdivide the Lands Within Military Reservations belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines which are No Longer Needed for Military Purposes, and to Dispose of the Same by Sale
Subject to Certain Conditions, and for Other Purposes,” Approved June 15, 1948.
10 Entitled “An Act to Permit the Sale Without Public Auction of Public Lands of the Republic of the Philippines for
Residential Purposes to Qualified Applicants under Certain Conditions,” approved June 18, 1952.

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Barely a month after, or on October 25, 1965, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation No.
47811 “reserving for the veterans rehabilitation, medicare and training center site purposes” an area
of 537,520 square meters of the land previously declared as AFP Officers’ Village under
Proclamation No. 461, and placed the reserved area under the administration of the Veterans
Federation of the Philippines (VFP).
The property is within the 537,520-square-meter parcel of land reserved in VFP’s favor.
On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Sale 12 between the
Republic of the Philippines, through former Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director
Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. (Dir. Palad) and petitioner NOVAI. The deed of sale was subsequently
registered and from which TCT No. T-15387 was issued in NOVAI’s name.

The Republic’s Complaint
for Cancellation of Title

In its complaint13 filed with the RTC on December 23, 1993, the Republic sought to cancel
NOVAI’s title based on the following grounds: (a) the land covered by NOVAI’s title is part of a
military reservation; (b) the deed of sale conveying the property to NOVAI, which became the
basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15387, is fictitious; (c) the LMB has no records of any
application made by NOVAI for the purchase of the property, and of the NOVAI’s alleged
payment of P14,250,270.00 for the property; and (d) the presidential proc-
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11 Entitled “Reserving for the Veterans Rehabilitation, Medicare and Training Center Site Purposes a Certain Parcel of
Land of the Private Domain Situated in the Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon.”
12 Records, Vol. IV, pp. 682-684.
13 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-5.

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lamation, i.e., Proclamation No. 2487, claimed to have been issued by then President Corazon C.
Aquino in 1991 that authorized the transfer and titling of the property to NOVAI, is fictitious.

NOVAI’s Answer to the Complaint

In its answer (which was later amended) to the Republic’s complaint, NOVAI counter-argued
that the property was no longer part of the public dominion, as the land had long been segregated
from the military reservation pursuant to Proclamation No. 461.
NOVAI claimed that, contrary to the Republic’s contention that there were no records of the
sale, it had actually filed a letter-application for a sales patent over the property with the LMB
which prepared, verified and approved the property’s plan and technical description; and that the
LMB delivered to it a copy of the deed of sale, signed and executed by Dir. Palad, after it had paid
a portion of the P14,250,270.00 purchase price, corresponding taxes, and other charges, with the
balance to be paid in installments.
Also, NOVAI contended that, since any alleged irregularities that may have attended the sale
pertained only to formalities, the proper remedy for the Republic was to file an action for
reformation of instrument, not for cancellation of title. In any event, it added that the Republic’s
cause of action had prescribed because its title to the property had already become indefeasible.

The RTC’s Decision

The RTC narrowed down the issues to: (a) the character of the property in question, i.e.,
whether the property in question was part of the FBMR, and hence, inalienable; and (b) the
validity of the deed of sale conveying the property to NOVAI, i.e., whether the title over the
property was acquired by

536
NOVAI through fraud. The RTC resolved both issues in NOVAI’s favor.
In its decision, the RTC ruled that: (a) the property is alienable and disposable in character, as
the land falls within the area segregated from the FBMR pursuant to Proclamation No. 461; (b)
the subject deed of sale should be presumed valid on its face, as it was executed with all the
formalities of a notarial certification; (c) notwithstanding the claims of forgery, the signature of
Dir. Palad on the deed of sale appeared genuine and authentic; and (d) NOVAI’s title to the
property had attained indefeasibility since the Republic’s action for cancellation of title was filed
close to two (2) years from the issuance of the title.

The CA’s Decision

The CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. It ruled that the property is inalienable
land of the public domain; thus, it cannot be disposed of or be the subject of a sale. It pointed out
that, since NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of Proclamation No.
2487 — the positive governmental act that would have removed the property from the public
domain — the property remained reserved for veterans rehabilitation purposes under
Proclamation No. 478, the latest executive issuance affecting the property.
Since the property is inalienable, the CA held that the incontestability and indefeasibility
generally accorded to a Torrens title cannot apply because the property, as in this case, is
unregistrable land; that a title issued by reason or on account of any sale, alienation, or transfer of
an inalienable property is void and a patent nullity; and that, consequently, the Republic’s action
for the cancellation of NOVAI’s title cannot be barred by prescription.
Also, the CA held that there can be no presumption of regularity in the execution of the subject
deed of sale given the questionable circumstances that surrounded the alleged sale

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of the property to NOVAI,14 e.g., NOVAI’s failure to go through the regular process in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) or the LMB Offices in the filing of
an application for sales patent and in the conduct of survey and investigation; the execution of the
deed of sale without payment of the full purchase price as required by policy; and the appearances
of forgery and falsification of Dir. Palad’s signature on the deed of sale and on the receipts issued
to NOVAI for its installment payments on the property, among others.
Lastly, the CA held that the Court’s observations and ruling in Republic of the Philippines v.
Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. (Southside)15 is applicable to the present case.
In Southside, the Republic similarly sought the cancellation of title — TCT No. 15084 — issued
in favor of Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. (SHAI) over a 39.99-hectare area of land
situated in what was known as the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) housing area
in Fort Bonifacio. The Court cancelled the certificate of title issued to SHAI, as the latter failed to
prove that the JUSMAG area had been withdrawn from the military reservation and had been
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14 See Rollo, pp. 79-80, where the CA enumerated the following circumstances that cast strong doubt on the validity
of the property’s sale in favour of NOVAI: (1) the lack of record with the LMB of NOVAI’s application for sales patent; (2)
the survey return shows that the subdivision survey was requested by NOVAI itself; and (3) the technical description
presented by NOVAI was prepared by the LMB for reference purposes only, and not for registration of title.
15 G.R. No. 156951, September 22, 2006, 502 SCRA 587, cited in Rollo, pp. 80-86. The CA’s December 28, 2006
decision stated the name of the respondent in G.R. No. 156951 as “ Southcom Homeowners Association, Inc.” We believe
the name “Southcom” was a clear typographical error and what the CA was obviously referring to was “Southside” for other
than the word “Southcom,” the quoted portion of the ruling, the G.R. No. and the date all pertains to the case entitled
“Republic of the Philippines v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. and the Register of Deeds, et al.”

538
declared open for disposition. The Court therein ruled that, since the JUSMAG area was still part
of the FBMR, its alleged sale to SHAI is necessarily void and of no effect.
NOVAI sought reconsideration of the CA’s decision, which the CA denied in its March 28,
2007 resolution;16 hence, this petition.

The Petition

NOVAI alleges that the CA erred in declaring that: (a) the property is inalienable land of the
public domain, (b) the deed of sale and Proclamation No. 2487 were void and nonexistent,
respectively, (c) the Republic’s action for cancellation of title was not barred by prescription, and
(d) the ruling in Southside was applicable to the present case.
In support of its petition, NOVAI raises the following arguments:
(a) The property is no longer part of the public domain because, by virtue of Proclamation No.
461, S. of 1965, the property was excluded from the FBMR and made available for disposition to
qualified persons, subject to the provisions of R.A. Nos. 274 and 720 in relation to the Public
Land Act;
(b) The deed of sale was, in all respects, valid and enforceable, as it was shown to have been
officially executed by an authorized public officer under the provisions of the Public Land Act,
and celebrated with all the formalities of a notarial certification;
(c) Proclamation No. 2487 is to be presumed valid until proven otherwise; that the Republic
carried the burden of proving that Proclamation No. 2487 was a forgery, and that it failed to
discharge this burden;
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16 Supra note 3.

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(d) The CA should not have considered as evidence the testimony of Senator Franklin Drilon
on the nonexistence of Proclamation No. 2487 because such testimony was given by Senator
Drilon in another case17 and was not formally offered in evidence by the Republic during the trial
of the present case before the RTC;
(e) The action for cancellation of title filed by the Republic is already barred by prescription
because it was filed only on December 23, 1993, or close to two (2) years from the issuance of
NOVAI’s title on January 9, 1992; and
(f) The case of Southside is not a cognate or companion case to the present case because the
two cases involve completely dissimilar factual and doctrinal bases; thus, the Court’s observations
and ruling in Southside should not be applied to the present case.

The Republic’s Comment to the Petition

Procedurally, the Republic assails the propriety of the issues raised by NOVAI, such
as “whether Proclamation No. 2487 and the signature of LMB Director Palad on the assailed deed
of sale are forged or fictitious,” and “whether the Republic had presented adequate evidence to
establish the spuriousness of the subject proclamation,” which are factual in nature and not
allowed in a Rule 45 petition.
On the petition’s substance, the Republic counters that:
(a) The property is inalienable public land incapable of private appropriation because, while
the property formed part of the area segregated from the FBMR under Proclamation No. 461, it
was subsequently re-
_______________
17 People v. Eduardo Domingo, et al., Criminal Case No. 98-164382; TSN, November 17, 2003; CA Rollo, pp. 172-
201.

540
served for a specific public use or purpose under Proclamation No. 478;
(b) Proclamation No. 2487, which purportedly revoked Proclamation No. 478, does not legally
exist and thus cannot be presumed valid and constitutional unless proven otherwise; the
presumption of validity and constitutionality of a law applies only where there is no dispute as to
the authenticity and due execution of the law in issue;
(c) The deed of sale executed by NOVAI and by Dir. Palad was undeniably forged, as Dir.
Palad categorically denied having signed the deed of sale, and a handwriting expert from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) confirmed that Dir. Palad’s signature was indeed a
forgery;18
(d) NOVAI, a private corporation, is disqualified from purchasing the property because R.A.
Nos. 274 and 730, and the Public Land Act only allow the sale of alienable and disposable public
lands to natural persons, not juridical persons; and
(e) The Court’s decision in Southside applies to the present case because of the strong factual
and evidentiary relationship between the two cases.

BCDA’s Comment-in-Intervention

On December 28, 2007, and while the case was pending before this Court, the Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) filed a motion for leave to file comment-in-
intervention and to admit the attached comment-in-intervention.19
_______________
18 Records, Vol. II, pp. 433-436.

19 Rollo, pp. 660-671. Comment-in-intervention, id., at pp. 672-725.

541
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 541
In a resolution dated February 18, 2008,20 the Court allowed the BCDA’s intervention.
As the Republic has done, the BCDA contends that NOVAI is disqualified from acquiring the
property given the constitutional and statutory provisions that prohibit the acquisition of lands of
the public domain by a corporation or association; that any sale of land in violation of the
Constitution or of the provisions of R.A. Nos. 274 and 730, and the Public Land Act are null and
void; and that any title which may have been issued by mistake or error on the part of a public
official can be cancelled at any time by the State.
The BCDA further contends that NOVAI miserably failed to comply with the legal
requirements for the release of the property from the military reservation. More specifically, (1)
the Director of Lands did not cause the property’s subdivision, including the determination of the
number of prospective applicants and the area of each subdivision lot which should not exceed
one thousand (1,000) square meters for residential purposes; (2) the purchase price for the
property was not fixed by the Director of Lands as approved by the DENR Secretary; (3) NOVAI
did not pay the purchase price or a portion of it to the LMB; and (4) the Deed of Sale was not
signed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines or by the Executive Secretary, but was
signed only by the LMB Director.
Also, the BCDA observed that NOVAI was incorporated only on December 11, 1991, while
the deed of sale was purportedly executed on November 15, 1991, which shows that NOVAI did
not yet legally exist at the time of the property’s purported sale.

Our Ruling

We resolve to DENY NOVAI’s petition for review on certiorari as we find no reversible
error committed by the CA in
_______________
20 Id., insert between pp. 746 and 747.

542
issuing its December 28, 2006 decision and March 28, 2007 resolution.

I. Procedural Objections

A. In the filing of the present
petition before this Court

Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a party desiring to appeal from a judgment or
final order of the CA shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law
or jurisprudence on a certain state of facts. 21 The issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. 22 In
contrast, a question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites the calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses; the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole; and the probability of the situation.23
The rule that only questions of law may be the subject of a Rule 45 Petition before this Court,
however, has exceptions.24
_______________
21 See Altres v. Empleo, 594 Phil. 246, 263; 573 SCRA 583, 598 (2008).
22 Id.
23 Id., at p. 263; p. 598; Republic v. Medida, G.R. No. 195097, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 317, 323-324.
24 In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 171982, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 404,
the Court held:
“The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is limited to reviewing errors of law,
and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Court since it is not the Court’s function

543
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 543
Among these exceptions is when there is conflict between the factual findings of the RTC and
that of the CA.
In this case, the CA totally reversed the RTC on the nature and character of the land in
question, and on the validity of the deed of sale between the parties. Due to the conflicting
findings of the RTC and the CA on these issues, we are allowed to reexamine the facts and the
parties’ evidence in order to finally resolve the present controversy.

B. On BCDA’s Intervention

In its reply25 to the BCDA’s comment-in-intervention, NOVAI primarily objects to the
BCDA’s intervention because it was made too late.
_______________
to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated the exceptions to
the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely
on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or
its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.” (emphasis supplied)
25 Rollo, pp. 783-807.

544
Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court
to make himself a party, either joining the plaintiff or defendant, or demanding something adverse
to both of them.26 Its purpose is to enable such third party to protect or preserve a right or interest
which may be affected by the proceeding, 27 such interest being actual, material, direct and
immediate, not simply contingent and expectant.28
As a general rule, intervention cannot be made at the appeal stage. Section 2, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, governing interventions, provides that “the motion to intervene may be filed at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.” This rule notwithstanding, intervention
may be allowed after judgment where it is necessary to protect some interest which cannot
otherwise be protected, and may be allowed for the purpose of preserving the intervenor’s right to
appeal.29 “The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to make the
powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice x x x and aimed to facilitate a
comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing
thereof.”30
Thus, in exceptional cases, the Court may allow intervention although the trial court has
already rendered judgment. In fact, the Court had allowed intervention in one case even
_______________
26 See GSIS v. Court of Appeals, 251 Phil. 222, 234; 170 SCRA 533, 539 (1989).
27 See First Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, 323 Phil. 36, 47; 253 SCRA 30, 38 (1996).
28 See Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279, 282 (1939); and Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 203 Phil. 652,
688-691; 118 SCRA 273, 315 (1982).
29 See Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, 457 Phil. 527, 534; 410 SCRA 419, 427 (2003).
30 Id.

545
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 545
when the petition for review was already submitted for decision before it.31
In the present case, the BCDA is indisputably the agency specifically created under R.A. No.
722732 to own, hold and/or administer military reservations including, among others, those located
inside the FBMR. If we are to affirm the CA’s decision, the BCDA stands to benefit as a
favorable ruling will enable it to pursue its mandate under R.A. No. 7227. On the other hand, if
we reverse the CA’s decision, it stands to suffer as the contrary ruling will greatly affect the
BCDA’s performance of its legal mandate as it will lose the property without the opportunity to
defend its right in court.
Indeed, the BCDA has such substantial and material interest both in the outcome of the case
and in the disputed property that a final adjudication cannot be made in its absence without
affecting such interest. Clearly, the BCDA’s intervention is necessary; hence, we allow the
BCDA’s intervention although made beyond the period prescribed under Section 2, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court.

II. Substantive Issues

A. The property is non-disposable
land of the public domain re-
served for public or quasi-
public use or purpose

We agree with the CA that the property remains a part of the public domain that could not
have been validly disposed of
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 534-535; p. 425, citing Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 181 Phil. 432; 93 SCRA 238 (1979).
32 Entitled “An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into Other Productive Uses, Creating the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds therefor and for other Purposes” or
otherwise known as the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992”; approved on March 13, 1992.

546
in NOVAI’s favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving that the property was
withdrawn from the intended public or quasi-public use or purpose.
While the parties disagree on the character and nature of the property at the time of the
questioned sale, they agree, however, that the property formed part of the FBMR — a military
reservation belonging to the public domain. We note that the FBMR has been the subject of
several presidential proclamations and statues issued subsequent to Proclamation No. 423, which
either removed or reserved for specific public or quasi-public use or purpose certain of its
portions.
On the one hand, NOVAI argues that Proclamation No. 461 had already transferred the
property from the State’s “public domain” to its “private domain.” On the other hand, the
respondents argue that Proclamation No. 478, in relation with RA 7227 and EO No. 40, had
reverted the property to the inalienable property of the “public domain.”
The classification and disposition of lands of the public domain are governed by
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, the country’s primary law on the
matter.
Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, from time to
time, classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands,
and transfer these lands from one class to another for purposes of their administration and
disposition.
Under Section 7 of C.A. No. 141, the President may, from time to time, upon recommendation
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and for purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable and disposable public lands, declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under the Acts’ provisions.33
_______________
33 See Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

547
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 547
Section 8 of C.A. No. 141 sets out the public lands open to disposition or concession and the
requirement that they have been officially delimited and classified, and when practicable,
surveyed. Section 8 excludes (by implication) from disposition or concession, public lands which
have been reserved for public or quasi-public uses; appropriated by the Government; or in any
manner have become private property, or those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by the Act or any other valid law may be claimed. Further, Section 8 authorizes the
President to suspend the concession or disposition of lands previously declared open to
disposition, until again declared open to disposition by his proclamation or by act of Congress.
Lands of the public domain classified as alienable and disposable are further classified, under
Section 9 of C.A. No. 141, according to their use or purpose into: (1) agricultural; (2) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (3) educational, charitable, or other
similar purposes; and (4) reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses. Section
9 also authorizes the President to make the classifications and, at any time, transfer lands from
one class to another.
Section 83 of C.A. No. 141 defines public domain lands classified as reservations for
public and quasi-public uses as “any tract or tracts of land of the public domain” which the
President, by proclamation and upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, may designate “as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of
its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof” or “for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public
interest requires it.”34 Under Section 88 of the same Act,
_______________
34 Section 83, C.A. No. 141 reads in full:

SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the President may
designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public do-

548
these “reserved tract or tracts of lands shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to
occupation, entry, sale, lease or other disposition until again declared alienable under the
provisions of [CA No. 141] or by proclamation of the President.”35
As these provisions operate, the President may classify lands of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, mineral or timber land, and transfer such lands from one class to another at any
time.
Within the class of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the President may
further classify public domain lands, according to the use or purpose to which they are destined,
as agricultural: residential, commercial, industrial, etc.; educational, charitable, etc.; and
reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses; and, he may transfer such lands
from one class to the other at any time.
Thus, the President may, for example, transfer a certain parcel of land from its classification as
agricultural (under Section 9[a]), to residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar purposes
(under Section 9[b]) and declare it available for disposition under any of the modes of disposition
of alien-
_______________
main as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purposes, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the
public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites,
irrigation systems, communal pastures or lequas communales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, working
men’s village and other improvements for the public benefit. (emphasis supplied)
35 Section 88, C.A. No. 141 provides in full:
SECTION 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of Section eighty-three shall be non-
alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared
alienable under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the President. (emphasis supplied)

549
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 549
able and disposable public lands available under C.A. No. 141, as amended.
The modes of disposition of alienable and disposable lands available under C.A. No. 141
include: (1) by homestead settlement (Chapter IV), by sale (Chapter V), by lease (Chapter VI) and
by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles (Chapters VII and VIII) for agricultural lands
under Title II of C.A. No. 141 as amended; (2) by sale or by lease for residential, commercial, or
industrial lands under Title III of C.A. No. 141, as amended; (3) by donation, sale, lease,
exchange or any other form for educational and charitable lands under Title IV of C.A. No. 141,
as amended; and (4) by sale by public auction for townsite reservations under Chapter XI, Title V
of C.A. No. 141, as amended.
Once these parcels of lands are actually acquired by private persons, either by sale, grant, or
other modes of disposition, they are removed from the mass of land of the public domain and
become, by operation of law, their private property.
With particular regard, however, to parcels of land classified as reservations for public and
quasi-public uses (under Section 9[d]), when the President transfers them to the class of alienable
and disposable public domain lands destined for residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
purposes (under Section 9[b]), or some other class under Section 9, these reserved public domain
lands become available for disposition under any of the available modes of disposition under C.A.
No. 141, as provided above. Once these reclassified lands (to residential purposes from
reservation for public and quasi-public uses) are actually acquired by private persons, they
become private property.
In the meantime, however, and until the parcels of land are actually granted to, acquired, or
purchased by private persons, they remain lands of the public domain which the President, under
Section 9 of C.A. No. 141, may classify again as reservations for public and quasi-public uses.
The President

550
may also, under Section 8 of C.A. No. 141, suspend their concession or disposition.
If these parcels of land are reclassified as reservations before they are actually acquired by
private persons, or if the President suspends their concession or disposition, they shall not be
subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared open for
disposition by proclamation of the President pursuant to Section 88 in relation with Section 8 of
C.A. No. 141.
Thus, in a limited sense, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public
uses under Section 9(d) of C.A. No. 141 are still non-alienable and non-disposable, even though
they are, by the general classification under Section 6, alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. By specific declaration under Section 88, in relation with Section 8, these lands classified
as reservations are non-alienable and non-disposable.
In short, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses: (1) are non-
alienable and non-disposable in view of Section 88 (in relation with Section 8) of C.A. No. 141
specifically declaring them as non-alienable and not subject to disposition; and (2) they remain
public domain lands until they are actually disposed of in favor of private persons.
Complementing and reinforcing this interpretation — that lands designated as reservations for
public and quasi-public uses are non-alienable and non-disposable and retain their character as
land of the public domain — is the Civil Code with its provisions on Property that deal with lands
in general. We find these provisions significant to our discussion and interpretation as lands are
property, whether they are public lands or private lands.36
_______________
36 See J. Brion Dissent in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 605 Phil. 244; 587 SCRA 172 (2009).

551
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 551
In this regard, Article 419 of the Civil Code classifies property as either of public dominion or
of private ownership. Article 42037 defines property of the public dominion as those which are
intended for public use or, while not intended for public use, belong to the State and are intended
for some public service. Article 421, on the other hand, defines patrimonial property as all other
property of the State which is not of the character stated in Article 420. While Article 422 states
that public dominion property which is no longer intended for public use or service shall form part
of the State’s patrimonial property.
Thus, from the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on Property, lands which are
intended for public use or public service such as reservations for public or quasi-public uses are
property of the public dominion and remain to be so as long as they remain reserved.
As property of the public dominion, public lands reserved for public or quasi-public uses are
outside the commerce of man.38 They cannot be subject to sale, disposition or encumbrance; any
sale, disposition or encumbrance of such property of the public dominion is void for being
contrary to law and public policy.39
To be subject to sale, occupation or other disposition, lands of the public domain designated as
reservations must first be
_______________
37 Article 420 of the Civil Code reads in full:

Art. 420. The following things are the property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth. (emphasis supplied)
38 See Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, 528 Phil. 181, 218-221; 495 SCRA 591, 623
(2006).
39 Id., at p. 219, p. 624.

552
withdrawn, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, from the public or quasi-
public use for which it has been reserved or otherwise positively declared to have been converted
to patrimonial property, pursuant to Sections 8 and 88 of C.A. No. 141 and Article 422 of the
Civil Code.40 Without such express declaration or positive governmental act, the reserved public
domain lands remain to be public dominion property of the State.41
To summarize our discussion:
(1) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses are
non-alienable and shall not be subject to disposition, although they are, by the general
classification under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, until declared open for disposition by proclamation of the President; and
(2) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations are property of the public
dominion; they remain to be property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the public or
quasi-public use for which they have been reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the
President, or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial property.
Based on these principles, we now examine the various issuances affecting the property in
order to determine the property’s character and nature, i.e., whether the property remains public
domain property of the State or has become its private property.
For easier reference, we reiterate the various presidential proclamations and statutes affecting
the property:
(1) Proclamation No. 423, Series of 1957 — established the FBMR, a military reservation; the
property falls within the FBMR;
_______________
40 Id., at pp. 219-220; p. 622.

41 Id., at pp. 220-221; p. 625.

553
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 553
(2) Proclamation No. 461, Series of (September) 1965 — segregated, from the FBMR, a
portion of Parcel 3, plan Psd-2031, which includes the property, for disposition in favor of the
AFPOVAI;
(3) Proclamation No. 478, Series of (October) 1965 — reserved the property in favor of the
Veterans Rehabilitation and Medical Training Center (VRMTC); and
(4) RA No. 7227 (1992), as implemented by EO No. 40, Series of 1992 — subject to certain
specified exemptions, transferred the military camps within Metro Manila, among others, to the
BCDA.

1. Proclamation No. 461 was not
the legal basis for the prop-
erty’s sale in favor of NOVAI

We agree with the respondents that while Proclamation No. 461, issued in September 1965,
removed from the FBMR a certain parcel of land that includes the property, Proclamation No.
478, issued in October 1965, in turn segregated the property from the area made available for
disposition under Proclamation No. 461, and reserved it for the use of the VRMTC.
We find it clear that Proclamation No. 478 was issued after, not before, Proclamation No. 461.
Hence, while Proclamation No. 461 withdrew a certain area or parcel of land from the FBMR and
made the covered area available for disposition in favor of the AFPOVAI, Proclamation No. 478
subsequently withdrew the property from the total disposable portion and reserved it for the use of
the VRMTC. With the issuance of Proclamation No. 478, the property was transferred back to
that class of public domain land reserved for public or quasi-public use or purpose which,
consistent with Article 420 of the Civil Code, is property of the public dominion, not patrimonial
property of the State.

554
Even under the parties’ deed of sale, Proclamation No. 2487, not Proclamation No. 461, was
used as the authority for the transfer and sale of the property to NOVAI. The subject deed of sale
pertinently reads:
“This DEED OF SALE, made and executed in Manila, Philippines, by the Director of Lands, Pursuant
to Batas Pambansa Blg. 878 and in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, hereinafter referred
to as the Vendor, in favor of THE NAVY OFFICERS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION (NOVA) and residing
in Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila, referred to as the Vendee, WITNESSETH:
x x x x
WHEREAS, pursuant to Presidential proclamation No. 478 as amended by proclamation No.

2487 in relation to the provision of Act No. 3038 and similar Acts supplemented thereto, the Vendee
applied for the purchase of a portion of the above described Property which portion is identical to Lot 3,
Swo-000183 and more particularly described on page two hereof;
x x x x
WHEREAS, the Vendee has complied with all other conditions required by Act No. 3038 in relation to
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and the rules and regulation promulgated thereunder.
x x x x. (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the legal basis of the property’s sale could not have been Proclamation No. 461.

2. Proclamation No. 2487 which
purportedly revoked Proclama-
tion No. 478 does not legally
exist; hence, it did not with-
draw the property from the res-
ervation or from the public
dominion

Neither can Proclamation No. 2487 serve as legal basis for the property’s sale in NOVAI’s
favor. Proclamation No. 2487 purportedly revoked Proclamation No. 478 and declared the
property open for disposition in favor of NOVAI.
The Republic and the BCDA (now respondents) argue that Proclamation No. 2487 does not
legally exist; it could not have served to release the property from the mass of the non-alienable
property of the State. Hence, even if NOVAI relies on Proclamation No. 2487 — on which it did
not as it relied on Proclamation No. 461 — the sale and NOVAI’s title are still void. NOVAI, on
the other hand, claims in defense that Proclamation No. 2487 is presumed valid and constitutional,
and the burden of proving otherwise rests on the respondents.
In insisting on the presumptive validity of law, NOVAI obviously failed to grasp and
appreciate the thrust of the respondents’ arguments, including the impact of the evidence which
they presented to support the question they raised regarding the authenticity of Proclamation No.
2487.
Rather than the validity or constitutionality of Proclamation No. 2487, what the respondents
assailed was its legal existence, not whether it was constitutional or not. Put differently, they
claimed that Proclamation No. 2487 was never issued by former Pres. Aquino; hence, the
presumptive validity and constitutionality of laws cannot apply.
Accordingly, after the respondents presented their evidence, it was NOVAI’s turn to present its
own evidence sufficient to rebut that of the respondents. On this point, we find the Republic’s
evidence sufficiently convincing to show that Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist. These
pieces of evidence include:

556
First, the October 26, 1993 letter of the Solicitor General to the Office of the President
inquiring about the existence of Proclamation No. 2487.42
Second, the November 12, 1993 letter-reply of the Office of the President informing the
Solicitor General that Proclamation No. 2487 “is not among the alleged documents on file with
[its] Office.”43
Third, the testimony of the Assistant Director of the Records Office in Malacañan confirming
that indeed, after verifying their records or of the different implementing agencies,
_______________
42 The October 26, 1999 letter of then Solicitor General Raul I. Goco to Director Aurora T. Aquino of the Office of the
President inquiring about the existence of Proclamation No. 2487, Records, Vol. II, pp. 205-206. It pertinently reads :
“Dear Director Aquino,
The President, in Memorandum Order No. 173, directed the Solicitor General, in coordination with the Administrator of
the Land Authority, to file an action for the cancellation of x x x (ii) TCT No. 15387 in the name of Navy Officers’ Village
Association, covering Lot 3, SWO-13-000183 with an area of 47.5009 hectares, otherwise known as the NOVA area.
Also, please furnish us with a copy of Proclamation No. 2487 which purportedly excluded from Proclamation No. 478
{reservation for the Veterans Rehabilitation, Medicare and Training Center} that portion known as NOVA area for
disposition.”
43 The November 12, 1993 reply-letter of Director Aurora T. Aquino to Solicitor General Drilon, Records, Vol. II, pp.
208-206. It reads in part:
“This has reference to your letter dated October 20, 1993 x x x
It is further informed that the alleged Proclamation No. 2487 excluding from the Proclamation No. 478 dated October
25, 1965, {reservation for the Veterans Rehabilitation, Medicare and Training Center site purposes} the NOVA AREA for
disposition, is not among the signed documents on file with this Office x x x.”

557
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 557
“[t]here is no existing document(s) in [their] possession regarding that alleged Proclamation
No. 2487”;44 and
Fourth and last, the October 11, 1993 Memorandum of then Department of Justice Secretary
Franklin M. Drilon (DOJ Secretary Drilon) to the NBI to investigate, among others, the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of Proclamation No. 2487.45 Notably, this October 11,
1993 Memorandum of DOJ Secretary Drilon stated that: “Proclamation No. 2487 is null and void
x x x [It] does not exist in the official records of the Office of the President x x x [and] could not
have been issued by the former President since the last Proclamation issued during her term was
proclamation No. 932 dated 19 June 1992.”46
In this regard, we quote with approval the CA’s observations in its December 28, 2006
decision:
Cast against this backdrop, it stands to reason enough that the defendant-appellee NOVAI was
inevitably duty bound to prove and establish the very existence, as well as the genuineness or authenticity,
of this Presidential Proclamation No. 2487. For certain inexplicable reasons, however, the defendant-
appellee did not do so, but opted to build up and erect its case upon Presidential Proclamation No. 461.
To be sure, the existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 2487 could be easily proved, and
established, by its publication in the Official Gazette. But the defendant-appellee could not, as it did
not, submit or present any copy or issue of the Official Gazette mentioning or referring to this
Presidential Proclamation No. 2487, this even in the face of the
_______________
44 Testimony of Marianito Dimaandal, Assistant Director of the Records Office of Malacañan, Records, Vol. II, pp.
208-211.
45 Records, Vol. II, pp. 361-364.
46 Id., at p. 364.

558
Government’s determined and unrelenting claim that it does not exist at all. (emphasis supplied)
47

A final point, we did not fail to notice the all too obvious and significant difference between
the proclamation number of Proclamation No. 2487 and the numbers of the proclamations
actually issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino on or about that time.
We take judicial notice that on September 25, 1991 — the very day when Proclamation No.
2487 was supposedly issued — former Pres. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 800 48 and
Proclamation No. 801.49 Previously, on September 20, 1991, Pres. Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 799;50 and thereafter, on September 27, 1991, she issued Proclamation No. 802.51
Other proclamations issued around or close to September 25, 1991, included the following:
_______________
47 Rollo, unnumbered page between pp. 74 and 75.

48 “Declaring Friday, September 27, 1991, as a Special Day in the Province of Batangas and the Cities of Batangas
and Lipa”; www.gov.ph/1991/09/25/proclamation-no-800-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).
49 “Reserving for School Site Purposes a Certain Parcel of Land of the Public Domain Situated in Barangay Madaum,
Municipality of Tagum, Province of Davao Del Norte Island of Mindanao”; www.gov.ph/1991/09/25/proclamation-no-801-
s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).
50 “Declaring the Period from November 3 to 9, 1991 as ‘Civil Engineering
Week’”; www.gov.ph/1991/09/20/proclamation-no-799-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).
51 “Revoking Proclamation No. 207, Series of 1950, Which Reserved for Presidencia Site Purposes a Certain Parcel of
Land Situated in the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela, Island of Luzon, and Reserving the Lot Embraced Therein for
Market Expansion and Other Commercial Site Purposes of the Municipality of Santiago,
Isabela’”; www.gov.ph/1991/09/27/proclamation-no-802-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).

559
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 559
1. Proclamation No. 750 issued on July 1, 1991; 52
2. Proclamation No. 760 issued on July 18, 1991; 53
3. Proclamation No. 770 issued on August 12, 1991; 54
4. Proclamation No. 780 issued on August 26, 1991; 55
5. Proclamation No. 790 issued on September 3, 1991; 56
_______________
52 “Declaring the Month of July, 1991 and Every Year Thereafter, as ‘Kabisig Housing
Month’”; www.gov.ph/1991/07/01/proclamation-no-750-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).
53 “Declaring Monday, July 22, 1991, A Day of Ecumenical Prayer for National Unity and a Non-Working Day in
Metro Manila”; www.gov.ph/1991/07/18/proclamation-no-760-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).
54 “Declaring September 1991 as ‘World Quiz Bee Month;’” www.gov.ph/1991/08/26/proclamation-no-780-s-
1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).
55 “Declaring Friday, September 6, 1991, as a ‘Special Day’ in the Province of
Bukidnon”; www.gov.ph/1991/07/01/proclamation-no-750-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).
56 “Amending Proclamation No. 770 Dated August 12, 1991 to Declare November 1991 as ‘World Quiz Bee Month,’
instead of September 1991”; www.gov.ph/1991/09/03/proclamation-no-790-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).
57 “Converting a Portion of the Prison Site of the New Bilibid Prison to Patrimonial Property of the Government and
Declaring the Same Open to Disposition as the Site of the Department of Justice Housing Project in accordance with the
Provisions of Act Numbered Three Thousand and Thirty-Eight”; http://www.gov.ph/1991/09/05/proclamation-no-792-s-
58 “Declaring Saturday, October 12, 1991, as a Special Day in Zamboanga City”;
www.gov.ph/1991/09/11/proclamation-no-797-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).
59 “Declaring the Month of October of Every Year as Museums and Galleries
Month”; www.gov.ph/1991/09/12/proclamation-no-798-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).

560
11. Proclamation No. 806 issued on October 2, 1991; 62
14. Proclamation No. 834 issued on November 13, 1991; and 65
_______________
60 “Reserving for School Site Purposes of the Koronadal Central Elementary School a Certain Parcel of Land of the
Public Domain Situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Koronadal, Province of South Cotabato, Island of
Mindanao”; www.gov.ph/1991/09/30/proclamation-no-804-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).
61 “Further Extending the National Membership, Educational and Fund Campaign Period of the Philippine Mental
Health Association up to September 30, 1992”; www.gov.ph/1991/
09/30/proclamation-no-805-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).
62 “Authorizing the Federation of Senior Citizens Association of the Philippines, Inc. to Conduct a National Fund
Campaign for a Period of One Year”; www.gov.ph/1991/10/02/proclamation-no-806-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).
63 “Reserving for Zamboanga City Government Center Site Purposes a Certain Parcel of Land of the Public Domain
Situated in the Poblacion, City of Zamboanga, Island of Mindanao”; www.gov.ph/1991/10/07/proclamation-no-810-s-
64 “Establishing as Kabankalan Watershed Forest Reserve for Purposes of Protecting, Maintaining or Improving its
Water Yield and Providing Restraining Mechanism for Inappropriate Forest Exploitation and Disruptive Land-Use a Parcel
of Land of the Public Domain located in the Municipality of Kabankalan, Province of Negros Occidental, Island of Negros,
Philippines”; www.gov.ph/1991/10/25/proclamation-no-820-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).
65 “Establishing as Cabadbaran River Watershed Forest Reserve for Purposes of Protecting, Maintaining and
Improving its Water Yield and to Provide Restraining Mechanism for Inappropriate Forest Exploitation and Disruptive
Land-Use, a Certain Parcel of Land of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipalities of Cabadbaran and Santiago,
Province of Agusan Del Norte,

561
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 561
15. Proclamation No. 840 issued on November 26, 1991. 66

This list shows that the proclamations issued by former Pres. Aquino followed a series or
sequential pattern with each succeeding issuance bearing a proclamation number one count higher
than the proclamation number of the preceding Presidential Proclamation. It also shows that on or
about the time Proclamation No. 2487 was purportedly issued, the proclamation numbers of the
proclamations issued by President Aquino did not go beyond the hundreds series.
It is highly implausible that Proclamation No. 2487 was issued on September 25, 1991, or on
any day close to September 25, 1991, when the proclamations issued for the same period were
sequentially numbered and bore three-digit proclamation numbers.
As Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist and therefore could not have validly revoked
Proclamation No. 478, we find, as the CA also correctly did, that Proclamation No. 478 stands as
the most recent manifestation of the State’s intention to reserve the property anew for some public
or quasi-public use or purpose. Thus, consistent with Section 88, in relation with Section 8, of
C.A. No. 141 and Article 420 of the Civil Code, as discussed above, the property which was
classified again as reservation for public or quasi-public use or purpose is non-alienable and not
subject to disposition; it also remains property of the public dominion; hence, non-alienable and
non-disposable land of the public domain.
_______________
Island of Mindanao, Philippines”; www.gov.ph/1991/11/13/proclamation-no-834-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).

66 “Reserving for Provincial Government Center Site Purposes a Certain Parcel of Land of the Public Domain Situated
in the Barangay of Bulanao, Municipality of Tabuk, Province of Kalinga-Apayao, Island of
Luzon”; www.gov.ph/1991/11/26/proclamation-no-840-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).

562
As a consequence, when R.A. No. 7227 took effect in 1992, the property subject of this case,
which does not fall among the areas specifically designated as exempt from the law’s
operation67 was, by legal fiat, transferred to the BCDA’s authority.
_______________
67 The areas specifically exempted from sale, as enumerated under Section 8 of RA 7227, are:
(a) Approximately 148.80 hectares in Fort Bonifacio for the National Capital Region (NCR) Security Brigade,
Philippine Army (PA) officers’ housing area, and Philippine National Police (PNP) jails and support services (presently
Camp Bagong Diwa);
(b) Approximately 99.91 hectares in Villamor Air Base for the Presidential Airlift Wing, one squadron of helicopters
for the NCR and respective security units;
(c) The following areas segregated by Proclamation Nos.:
(1) 461, Series of 1965; (AFP Officers Village)
(2) 462, Series of 1965; (AFP Enlisted Men’s Village)
(3) 192, Series of 1967; (Veterans Center)
(4) 208, Series of 1967; (National Shrines)
(5) 469, Series of 1969; (Philippine College of Commerce)
(6) 653, Series of 1970; (National Manpower and Youth Council)
(7) 684, Series of 1970; (University Center)
(8) 1041, Series of 1972; (Open Lease Concession)
(9) 1160, Series of 1973; (Manila Technical Institute)
(10) 1217, Series of 1970; (Maharlika Village)
(11) 682, Series of 1970; (Civil Aviation Purposes)
(12) 1048, Series of 1975; (Civil Aviation Purposes)
(13) 1453, Series of 1975; (National Police Commission)
(14) 1633, Series of 1977; (Housing and Urban Development)
(15) 2219, Series of 1982; (Ministry of Human Settlements, BLISS)
(16) 172, Series of 1987; (Upper, Lower and Western Bicutan and Signal Housing)

563
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 563
B. As the property remains a reserved
public domain land, its sale and
the title issued pursuant to the sale
are void

As the property remains a reserved public domain land, it is outside the commerce of man.
Property which are intended for public or quasi-public use or for some public purpose are public
dominion property of the State68 and are outside the commerce of man. NOVAI, therefore, could
not have validly purchased the property in 1991.
We reiterate and emphasize that property which has been reserved for public or quasi-public
use or purpose are non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again
declared alienable by law or by proclamation of the President. 69 Any sale or disposition of
property of the public dominion is void for being contrary to law and public policy.70
_______________
(17) 389, Series of 1989; (National Mapping and Resource Information Authority)
(18) 518, Series of 1990; (CEMBO, SO CEMBO, W REMBO, E REMBO, COMEMBO, PEMBO, PITOGO)
(19) 467, Series of 1968; (General Manila Terminal Food Market Site)
(20) 347, Series of 1968; (Greater Manila Food Market Site)
(21) 376, Series of 1968; (National Development Board and Science Community)
(d) A proposal of 15 hectares as relocation site for families to be affected by circumferential road 5 and radial road 4
construction; Provided, further, That the boundaries and technical description of these crumpet areas shall be determined by
an actual group survey.
68 See Article 420 of the Civil Code.
69 See Section 88, C.A. No. 141.
70 Supra note 38 at pp. 218-219; p. 624.

564
Since the sale of the property, in this case, is void, the title issued to NOVAI is similarly
void ab initio. It is a well-settled doctrine that registration under the Torrens System does not, by
itself, vest title as it is not a mode of acquiring ownership;71 that registration under the Torrens
System merely confirms the registrant’s already existing title.72
Accordingly, the indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply in this case and does not
attach to NOVAI’s title. The principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the sale of the
property and the title based thereon are null and void. Hence, the Republic’s action to declare the
nullity of NOVAI’s void title has not prescribed.
NOVAI insists that the deed of sale carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties as it bears all the earmarks of a valid deed of sale and is duly notarized.
While we agree that duly notarized deeds of sale carry the legal presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties,73 the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties, like all other disputable legal presumptions, applies only in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence establishing the contrary.74
When, as in this case, the evidence on record shows not only that the property was reserved for
public use or purpose, and thus, non-disposable — a fact that on its own defeats all the evidence
which the petitioner may have had to support the validity of the sale — but also shows that the
sale and the
_______________
71 See Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr., G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA 38, 51, citing Republic v. Heirs of
Felipe Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656; 393 SCRA 361 (2002).
72 Id., at p. 51. See also Torbela v. Rosario, G.R. No. 140553, December 7, 2011, 661 SCRA 633, 659.
73 See Section 3(k), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
74 See Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. See also Delfin v. Billones, 519 Phil. 720, 732; 485 SCRA 38, 52-53
(2006).

565
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 565
circumstances leading to it are void in form and in substance, the disputable presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties certainly cannot apply.

C. Even assuming that Proclamation
No. 2487 legally exists, the sale of
the property to NOVAI is illegal.

1. Dir. Palad did not have the authority to sell
and convey the property.

The subject deed of sale points to Proclamation No. 2487, purportedly amending Proclamation
No. 478, in relation with Act No. 3038,75 as legal basis for authorizing the sale.
Section 176 of Act No. 3038 authorizes the sale or lease only: (i) of land of the private domain,
not land of the public domain; and (ii) by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, not
by the LMB Director. Section 277 of the said Act, in fact, specifically exempts from its coverage
“land necessary for the public service.” As the sale was executed by the
_______________
75 Approved on March 9, 1922, entitled “An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
Sell or Lease Land of the Private Domain of the Government of the Philippine Islands.”
76 “Section 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is hereby authorized to sell or lease land of the
private domain of the Government of the Philippines Islands, or any part thereof, to such persons, corporations or
associations as are, under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and seventy-four, known as the Public
Land Act, entitled to apply for the purchase or lease of agricultural public land.”
77 “Sec. 2. The sale or lease of the land referred to in the preceding section shall, if such land is agricultural, be
made in the manner and subject to the limitations prescribed in chapters five and six, respectively, of said Public Land Act,
and if it be classified differently in conformity with the provisions of chapter nine of said Act: Provided, however, That the
land necessary for the public service shall be exempt from the provision of this Act.”

566
LMB Director covering the property that was reserved for the use of the VRMTC, it, therefore,
clearly violated the provisions of Act No. 3038.

2. The area subject of the sale far exceeded the area that the Director of Lands is authorized
to convey.

Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 87878 which, per the Deed of Sale, purportedly authorized the
Director of Lands, representing the Republic, to sell the property in favor of NOVAI, limits the
authority of the Director of Lands to sign patents or certificates covering lands to ten (10)
hectares.
In this case, the subject deed of sale covers a total area of 475,009 square meters or 47.5009
hectares. Obviously, the area covered by the deed of sale and which NOVAI purportedly
purchased, far exceeds the area that the Director of Lands is authorized to convey under B.P. Blg.
878.

3. The evidence on record and the highly suspect circumstances surrounding the sale fully
supports the conclusion that the property’s sale to NOVAI is fictitious, thus, void.

We note the following irregularities that attended the sale of the property to NOVAI:
a. The absence, on file with the LMB, of any request for approval of any survey plan or of an
approved survey plan in NOVAI’s name covering the property.79 The approved survey plan
relating to Lot 3, SWO-13-
_______________
78 Entitled “An Act Further Amending Section One Hundred Seven of Commonwealth Act Number One Hundred
Forty-One, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as Amended.” It was enacted on July 9, 1985.
79 See testimony of Ernesto Erive, then Chief of Surveys Division of the National Capital Region, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-NCR), TSN, September 16, 1996,pp. 18-25.

567
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 567
000183 subject of NOVAI’s TCT No. 15387 pertains to the AFPOVAI under Proclamation No.
461;80
b. The technical description, which the DENR prepared for the property as covered by TCT
No. T-15387, was issued upon NOVAI’s request only for purposes of reference, not for
registration of title, and was based on the approved survey plan of the AFPOVAI;81
c. There is no record of any public land application filed by NOVAI with the LMB or with the
DENR Office for the purchase of the property or of any parcel of land in Metro Manila;82
See also TSN of the testimonies of Armando B. Bangayan, then Chief of the LMB Records
Management Division, January 10, 1996; Jose Parayno, Records Officer I of the DENR-NCR
South CENRO, September 16, 1996, pp. 3-7; and of Ernesto Erive, Chief of Surveys Division,
DENR-NCR, July 13, 1996, pp. 3-10.
d. LMB Dir. Palad categorically denied signing and executing the deed of sale;83
e. The findings of the NBI handwriting expert, detailed in the Questioned Documents Report
No. 815-1093 dated October 29, 1993,84 revealed that the, signature of LMB Director Palad as it
appeared on the Deed of Sale and his standard/sample signature as they appeared on the
_______________
80 See testimony of Ernesto Erive, then Chief of Surveys Division, DENR-NCR, TSN, April 22, 1996, pp. 2-24.
81 See testimony of Ernesto Erive, then Chief of Surveys Division, DENR-NCR, TSN, August 26, 1996, pp. 2-3.
82 Certification of Jose Mariano, Chief of the LMB Records Management Division, dated September 24, 1993,
Records, Vol. II, p. 347.
83 See October 4, 1993 letter of LMB Director Palad to Captain Nilo Rosario Villarta, Office of the Naval Judge
Advocate, Records, Vol. II, pp. 343-344; and TSN, February 12, 1997.
84 Submitted by Eliodoro M. Constantino NBI Document Examiner III, Records, Vol. II, pp. 433 -436. See also TSNs
dated July 25, 1997 and December 2, 1997 where NBI Document Examiner Constantino confirmed his findings in the
October 29, 1993 Questioned Documents Report.

568
submitted comparison documents “were not written by one and the same person,” 85 and concluded
that “[t]he questioned signature of ‘ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR.’ x x x is a TRACED
FORGERY by carbon process”;86 and
f. Lastly, the LMB Cashier’s Office did not receive the amount of P14,250,270.00 allegedly
paid by NOVAI as consideration for the property. The receipts 87 — O.R. No. 8282851 dated
November 28, 1991, for P160,000.00 and O.R. No. 317024 dated December 23, 1992, for
P200,000.00 — which NOVAI presented as evidence of its alleged payment bore official receipt
numbers which were not among the series of official receipts issued by the National Printing
Office to the LMB, and in fact, were not among the series used by the LMB on the pertinent
dates.88
In sum, we find — based on the facts, the law, and jurisprudence — that the property, at the
time of the sale, was a reserved public domain land. Its sale, therefore, and the corresponding title
issued in favor of petitioner NOVAI, is void.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the present petition for review on certiorari. No reversible
error attended the decision dated December 28, 2006, and the resolution dated March 28, 2007, of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 85179.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
85 Records, Vol. II, p. 436.

86 Id.
87 Records, Vol. I, p. 163.
88 See November 22, 1994 Certification issued by the LMB Cash Section, signed by Cash Section OIC Lilibeth Sloan,
Records, Vol. II, p. 348.
LMB Cashier Lilibeth Sloan testified that the official receipts which the LMB used on November 28, 1991, started from
No. 4195501 S up to 4195550 S; while those which it used on December 23, 1992, started with 4195699 S up to 4195709 S,
TSN, September 3, 2002, pp. 7-9.

569
VOL. 764, AUGUST 3, 2015 569
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—The Court finds that the conclusion that the lands to be reclaimed by National
Housing Authority (NHA) are classified as alienable and disposable is derived and implicit from
the authority given to the National Housing Authority (NHA) to transfer the reclaimed lands to
qualified beneficiaries. (Chavez vs. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235 [2007])
Intervention is not an absolute right as it can be secured only in accordance with the terms of
the applicable statute or rule. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Samaniego, 564 SCRA 567 [2008])

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G.R. No. 177168. August 3, 2015.

The Factual Antecedents

18 Records, Vol. II, pp. 433-436.

20 Id., insert between pp. 746 and 747.

33 See Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

34 Section 83, C.A. No. 141 reads in full:

37 Article 420 of the Civil Code reads in full:

40 Id., at pp. 219-220; p. 622.

WHEREAS, pursuant to Presidential proclamation No. 478 as amended by proclamation No.

47 Rollo, unnumbered page between pp. 74 and 75.

2. Proclamation No. 760 issued on July 18, 1991; 53

3. Proclamation No. 770 issued on August 12, 1991; 54

4. Proclamation No. 780 issued on August 26, 1991; 55

5. Proclamation No. 790 issued on September 3, 1991; 56

6. Proclamation No. 792 issued on September 5, 1991; 57

7. Proclamation No. 797 issued on September 11, 1991; 58

8. Proclamation No. 798 issued on September 12, 1991; 59

10. Proclamation No. 805 issued on September 30, 1991; 61

11. Proclamation No. 806 issued on October 2, 1991; 62

12. Proclamation No. 810 issued on October 7, 1991; 63

13. Proclamation No. 820 issued on October 25, 1991; 64

14. Proclamation No. 834 issued on November 13, 1991; and 65

Island of Mindanao, Philippines”; www.gov.ph/1991/11/13/proclamation-no-834-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).

85 Records, Vol. II, p. 436.

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