Analysis of Russia S Information Campaign Against Ukraine
Analysis of Russia S Information Campaign Against Ukraine
Analysis of Russia S Information Campaign Against Ukraine
Location: Latvia
Author(s): Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili, Jānis Bērziņš, Aivar Jaeski, Mark Laity, Nerijus Maliukevičius,
Aurimas Navys, Gerry Osborne, Robert Pszczel, Stephen Tatham
Title: ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE
ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE
URL: https://www.ceeol.com/search/gray-literature-detail?id=661307
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ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S
INFORMATION CAMPAIGN
AGAINST UKRAINE
Examining non-military aspects of the crisis in Ukraine
from a strategic communications perspectives
Riga | 2015
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ATTRIBUTIONS DISCLAIMER
This report of the NATO StratCom Centre of The information and conclusions contained in the
Excellence (COE) has been prepared by Elina report represent the opinion of the NATO StratCom
Lange-Ionatamišvili analysing open-source Centre of Excellence and not necessarily the North
information and using expert contributions from Atlantic Treaty Organisation or any of its member
discussions held on 8 May and 17 June 2014 with, states.
in particular (in alphabetical order) Jānis Bērziņš,
Aivar Jaeski, Mark Laity, Nerijus Maliukevicius,
Aurimas Navys, Gerry Osborne, Robert Pszczel and
Stephen Tatham, as well as from the findings of
two of the COE’s research initiatives: The thematic
frame analysis of three main Russian TV channels,
conducted in cooperation with the Centre for
East European Policy Studies (http://
eng.appc.lv/) and the Twitter sentiment analysis
conducted in cooperation with the Latvian
Information Agency LETA (http://www.leta.lv/eng).
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It also leads to the explanation of the need to Ukraine’s population; dividing the West by utilising the
sustain the so-called Russian World which implies differing interests of EU member states and positioning
maintenance of a unified Russian-language the USA in opposition to the EU; and using legal and
information sphere beyond the borders of the historic justifications to legitimize Russia’s actions in
Russian Federation (mainly targeting the territory Ukraine (including the Crimea Referendum).
of the former USSR).
The report identifies that Russia’s information
The Russian government’s long-developed control campaign was central to Russia’s operations in Ukraine.
over the mass media has been an important factor The information campaign and related military action
in the effective implementation of the information by Russia corresponds to the characteristics of a new
campaign against Ukraine. Russia’s narrative was form of warfare where the lines between peace and
instrumentalized with the help of concurrent war, foreign military force and local self-defence groups
messaging. For example, the main Russian TV are blurred and the main battle space has moved
channels were actively involved in framing opinions from physical ground to the hearts and minds of the
about the situation in Ukraine from the very populations in question. Crimea may be considered
beginning of the crisis. Control is exerted directly a test-case for Russia in trying out this new form of
by the Presidential Administration, including also warfare where hybrid, asymmetric warfare, combining
government-controlled internet ‘trolling’ which is an intensive information campaign, cyber warfare and
a growing, under-researched phenomenon used the use of highly trained Special Operation Forces,
to support the Russian government’s narrative2. play a key role.
This control over the media has made it difficult for
democratic states with free media to compete with The crisis in Ukraine has provided valuable lessons for
the forceful, synchronized messaging of the Russian the Ukrainian government, the countries neighbouring
government. Russia (whose Russian-speaking communities were
enlarged as a result of Soviet-era policy), and NATO
The Russian narrative includes several dominant and the EU as organisations.
themes: positioning Russian Slavic Orthodox Civilization
in opposition to “decadent” Europe; positioning The following are the general conclusions of the
Ukraine as integral to Eurasianism and the creation of report:
the Eurasian Economic Union; promoting the Russian
World which unites Eastern Slavs, implies that Russians • Russia was prepared to conduct a new form of
and Ukrainians are one nation, and recognizes the warfare in Ukraine where an information campaign
natural supremacy of Russia; portraying Ukrainians as played a central role. The characteristics of the new
a pseudo-nation who are unable to administer their form of warfare which were implemented in Crimea
own country and sustain their statehood; referring to were outlined by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief
the Great Patriotic War thus bringing out the hatred of the Russian General Staff, nearly a year before
of Nazism and relating it to the Euromaidan protesters the crisis in Ukraine. Analysis of the Ukraine conflict
who are labelled as nationalists, Nazis and fascists suggests that NATO and the EU must adapt to
posing a threat to the ethnically Russian part of the new reality where information superiority, as
opposed to military power, is becoming increasingly
2 The findings of research conducted by the NATO StratCom COE in important.
cooperation with the Centre for East European Policy Studies provide facts
supporting this statement.
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• Russia’s narrative is largely based on historical West Ukraine and Kyiv, the populations of NATO and
memory. Russia’s thorough understanding of its EU countries and the USA.
own audiences – including compatriots abroad –
was able to leverage historical memory: the Great • Deception is used by Russia as a tactic to distract
Russian Empire, World War II and Nazi atrocities, and delay. Investigating and disproving the false
and the might and collapse of the USSR. information, different versions of events and even
conspiracy theories rapidly disseminated by Russia
• Crisis in Ukraine is a result of Russia’s long term requires a lot of time, effort and resources on the
strategy. Learning from the Russian information part of international organisations like NATO, the
campaign in Ukraine, it is clear that early detection Ukrainian government, independent media, experts
and analysis of those elements within the Russian and even ordinary citizens.
narrative signalling potential aggressive behaviour
• Disinformation campaigns erode over time.
is critical. The report also demonstrates that Russia’s
state policy documents contain such indications. The evolution of the crisis in Ukraine beyond
Crimea demonstrates that disinformation
• The role of Compatriots Abroad is critical and campaigns erode over time as more and more
should be considered carefully in the future. The factual evidence is revealed to negate lies and
security implications for countries neighbouring falsification.
Russia are particularly serious. The kind of strategy
that Russia has employed in Ukraine is likely to work
best in areas where there are larger communities of
Russia’s Compatriots Abroad. They are the targets
of Russia’s information campaign and potentially
may be ready to provide local support in cases of
Russian aggression. The Ukraine and Georgian cases
demonstrate that such information campaigns,
backed by military means, are easier to carry out in
territories bordering Russia – in particular, in those
countries which are not members of NATO and
therefore not party to the Washington Treaty.
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suggests that Russia’s information campaign is campaign (national policy documents and media-
oriented not only towards regaining influence control mechanisms), analyses the narratives
over post-Soviet territories like Ukraine, but also and strategic frames used by Russia (starting
towards creating a multi-polar world. The latter around the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in
was illustrated by President Putin in his Munich Vilnius), provides examples of the application of
Security Conference speech10, according to which new hybrid warfare against Ukraine, and draws
the USA’s attempts to maintain the unipolar a series of lessons which the NATO countries, in
world order and NATO expansion threaten Russia particular, may wish to consider as the Alliance
rather than ensure security in Europe. evaluates future challenges.
The speech President Putin gave on 18 March Launched in 2009, the EU’s Eastern Partnership
seeks to bolster political and economic relations with
2014 following the annexation of Crimea11 sums
the former Soviet Republics of Ukraine, Moldova,
up the afore-mentioned key points: the historic, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus and Georgia. The 3rd
spiritual and cultural unity of Russia and Ukraine, Eastern Partnership Summit, which took place in
mourning for the collapse of the USSR, and Vilnius on 28-29 November 2013, was supposed
the historic injustice of giving away Crimea to to be a historic moment for Ukraine in signing the
Association Agreement with the EU. However,
Ukraine, alleged abuse of the human rights of
despite rather promising negotiations and previously
Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Crimea, expressed commitment to sign the agreement, the
labelling of the Euromaidan12 as a coup executed (then) President Yanukovich declined to sign it at the
by Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti- last minute. Ukraine’s refusal to sign the Agreement
Semites, and NATO posing a threat by potentially was perceived by the EU as a critical turning point
for Ukraine to fall fully under Russia’s economic and
placing its navy “right there in this city of Russian
political influence. The active, pro-European part of
military glory, and this would create not an Ukraine’s population believed that President Yanukovich
illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole was not acting in Ukraine’s true interests and took the
of southern Russia”. He positioned the regaining decision under the influence of the Kremlin.
of Crimea as a matter of affirming Russia’s power
and ability to defend its geo-political interests
despite threats of sanctions from the EU and USA
by stating “Are we ready to consistently defend
our national interests, or will we forever give in,
retreat to who knows where? (…) We consider
such statements irresponsible and clearly
aggressive in tone, and we will respond to them
accordingly.”
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current global and regional architecture, oriented system. However, the main point of this philosophy
(particularly in the Euro-Atlantic region) towards is that the “Russian World” must be united by
NATO, and likewise the imperfect nature of legal different means. This concept is also actively
instruments and mechanisms, create an ever- promoted via Russian mass media channels. The
increasing threat to international security. (…) existence of a common sphere of information
A determining aspect of relations with NATO is topical in the context of events in Ukraine.
remains the fact that plans to extend the alliance’s It is also important to note that Russian media
military infrastructure to Russia’s borders, and dominate in the Russian-speaking communities
attempts to endow NATO with global functions of Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, the Baltic States
that are counter to the norms of international and also the former USSR republics of Central
law, are unacceptable to Russia.”17 This means Asia. The Latvian and Lithuanian experience in
that Ukraine’s closer integration with NATO (or the context of the crisis in Ukraine shows that it is
the EU, for that matter) structures contradicts complicated to tackle hostile Russian propaganda
Russia’s strategic security interests and must channels and offer alternative, quality sources
be prevented. This is a means for the Russian of information for the local Russian-speaking
government to justify pressure on or even open populations.18
hostility to Ukraine’s choice of Euro-Atlantic
integration. Instrumentalizing and sustaining narratives
through controlled media
The idea of the “Russian World”
The other important factor in the effective
The concept of the “Russian World” allows implementation of the information campaign
Russia to utilize its compatriots as a channel against Ukraine has been the Russian government’s
of communication with Russian-speaking powerful control over the mass media. As the
communities, making them multipliers of desired NATO StratCom COE’s research shows, Russian
information, attitudes and behaviour. The idea of mass media (especially TV channels) have played
the “Russian World” is based on the historical and an important, instrumental role in bringing to life
cultural commonality of the Russian-speaking the key narratives, thematic frames and messages
communities and is successfully executed via the outlined in the strategic policy documents of the
network of Russian diplomatic representations Russian Federation (or channelled via the political
abroad which provide coordination and financial- elite or Kremlin-affiliated experts). Messages
support distribution functions by locally engaging such as “brother nations”, common history, the
NGOs and other actors. The “Russian World” Orthodox religion and common culture have
(derived from “Slavic World”) promotes the idea been used to encourage the inhabitants of East
of different civilizations – namely, the Russian- and South Ukraine to think about a joint future
speaking Orthodox civilization in opposition to destiny with Russia. If at some point during
Western civilization. The concept of the “Russian recent history, one might find different marginal
World” justifies Russia’s capability and rights to ideas expressed by Russian academics or radical
build its own human rights system, legal norms, politicians, it can now be clearly seen that these
and its interpretation of history and the justice authorized narratives are being communicated in
17 The document in English can be found at the following URL: 18 For further references to the Latvian and Lithuanian experience,
http://bit.ly/1r1jgvp see Annex 3.
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a very coherent way by the leading elite, including State-controlled Russian TV as an active opinion
the President, and the Russian mass media. Ideas shaper?
such as Crimea belonging to Russia, Ukraine
uniting with Russia or becoming a federalized Since the very beginning of the crisis in Ukraine,
state, the historic injustices done against Russia the main Russian TV channels have been
or the need to fight the “neo-Nazi threat” are actively involved in forming opinion about the
not new. These narratives have been actively situation in Ukraine. They have used a wide
developed and maintained for many years to range of tools to influence public opinion
prepare the ground for the actions we witnessed about important events such as the signing
in Ukraine. One could argue that Russian of the Association Agreement with the EU,
strategic policy documents are derived from the Euromaidan protests and the subsequent
the afore-mentioned narratives and that, at the change of power in Kyiv, and the Russian
same time, it is the task of these documents to annexation of Crimea. The focus has been on
instrumentalize and sustain these narratives. self-reinforcement, as the result of the masterful
The Russian government’s powerful control understanding of different audiences. Because
over the Russian mass media deserves special of the synchronous execution of messaging on
mention, as without it Russia would not be different media channels, it can be assumed
able to accomplish its influence operations so that the news reports were prepared by
successfully. political technologists – a profession inherited
from the Soviet period.
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It is obvious that a common and robust editorial The role of the Presidential Administration in
policy was constructed, supporting the actions controlling the media
of the Russian government, and deployed across
multiple media outlets which leads to the premise The Russian Presidential Administration exercises
that it was centrally derived. coordinated control over media advertising budgets
and editorial content21 whilst maintaining an illusion
Deliberate falsification as a method of media freedom by letting a small number of
minor independent media outlets operate.22 Those
Whilst reporting on Ukraine events, journalists Russian media outlets conforming to the Kremlin’s
of the Russian state controlled media have propaganda line were officially recognized by
methodically manipulated video and photo President Putin following the annexation of Crimea.
materials in order to produce material visually On 22 April 2014, President Putin signed an executive
supporting the prevailing narrative. This order awarding medals of the Order of Service to
includes the use of photographs from the the Fatherland to 300 journalists including several
Syria, Kosovo and Chechnya wars, as if they editors, directors and television hosts known for
had been taken in East Ukraine, and has proven their Kremlin-friendly coverage. The awards were
particularly effective on social networks. handed out by President Putin himself, just a few
days after the annexation of Crimea, underlining
A noteworthy move against the falsification of facts by the the important role the mass media had played in
Russian media has been the website www.stopfake.org. the information campaign against Ukraine and
proving that the annexation had been planned well
Another falsification trend has been the same in advance.
person being filmed by Russian TV in different
roles and situations. For example, the same
woman was used to play the roles of “Crimean
activist”, “resident of Kyiv”, “soldier’s mother”,
“resident of Odessa”, “resident of Kharkiv”,
“participant of Antimaidan”, and “refugee from 20 Her speech with English subtitles is available to watch at the
Donetsk”.19 It is important to note that in all following URL: http://bit.ly/1r3493j
21 For a reference on media control in Russia, see Annex 4.
those roles she conveyed messages supporting
22 It must be noted that in the context of the information campaign
a particular narrative line. For example, in against Ukraine, additional control measures were implemented against
her latest appearance as a “Crimean activist” independent media or media who tried to maintain an objective line of
19 The list of different roles and video reports where the woman reporting (examples of Dozhd TV, Lenta.ru and the website of Ekho Moskvy
appeared to be found at the following URL: http://bit.ly/1uSMe01 radio).
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Implementing media control in Crimea 1+1 channel by First Channel. A Molotov cocktail
was thrown in the window of Black Sea TV, the
Strict media control was exercised not only within only channel covering the whole Crimea region,
Russia, but also in Crimea. Shortly after the while the webpage of the channel suffered from
appearance of armed groups in Crimean towns, a DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attack.
the unfolding events demonstrated the special Overall, broadcasts of Ukrainian TV stations
role of the Russian TV channels. On 6 March 2014, were replaced by seven Russian TV channels.
ten days before the Crimean referendum, armed The self-proclaimed Minister for Regional
men broke into the building of the Simferopol Information, Dmitriy Polonskiy, explained the
Radio and TV Broadcasting Station. Consequently, suspension of the Ukrainian channels by citing
the broadcasting of various Ukrainian TV channels moral and legal reasons: “We believe that we
was suspended. They were substituted by Russian have a right to defend the inhabitants of Crimea
TV channels – Inter was replaced by NTV, the from the increase of violence, lies and the false
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information flowing from their TV screens”23. The instrument. It should also be noted that the videos
state-controlled message also helped turn Crimea’s broadcast by TV channels also get published on
inhabitants against Ukrainian and foreign media social media, thus amplifying their effect.
crews. Aksyonov, the pro-Russian leader, was shown
on television describing Western media as working Applying the lessons learned
for spy services to foment revolution.
Influence of Russian TV in Ukraine Before Russia got to implement its information
campaign against Ukraine, it learned lessons from
Although a popularity review of various TV its own mistakes during previous years. The first
channels in Ukraine shows that the Ukrainian Chechnya war (1994-1996), the second Chechnya
national channels hold the highest ratings24, it war (1999-2009), the sinking of the Kursk submarine
does not automatically mean that Russian TV has in 2000, the Beslan hostage crisis in 2004 and the
a less important role to play in Ukraine, especially Georgia-Russia war of 2008 were some of the
among the Russian-speaking part of the population important events which formed the Russian power
residing in East Ukraine. Television is the dominant elite’s understanding of how information campaigns
news medium in Ukraine. Almost all Ukrainians should be organised.26
(96.8%) watch TV for news at least weekly, including
95.7% of Crimeans.25 The GALLUP research of April The internal and external dimensions of state-
2014 showed that the most important sources of controlled Russian TV
news and information for Crimeans were four TV
channels owned by the Russian state: Russia 24, In the context of Ukraine events, Russian TV worked
NTV, ORT (Channel One), and RTR (Russia-1) as well in two dimensions. The internal dimension was
as the Russian social media giant VKontakte. This oriented towards the Russian domestic audience
marks an important change since the 2012 survey, to facilitate “political-military upbringing” (as
when the top five news sources for Crimeans were specified in Russia’s State Security Strategy) and
all Ukrainian TV stations. to ensure information support to Russia’s foreign
policy. The external dimension of Russian TV relates
The events in Crimea and the Eastern regions of to the mobilization of compatriots abroad and
Ukraine have demonstrated that even a small information support to Russian state policies (for
number of people who receive wide military and example, during the Crimea operation).
informative support can pose a significant threat
to the security and stability of a state. Also the
rapid replacement of Ukrainian TV channels with
Russian ones in the occupied territory illustrates
the fact that TV is purposefully used as a political
23 The quotation provided by the Moscow times to be found at the
following URL: http://bit.ly/1oZkHG9, Additional information on Polonskiy’s
actions and opinions can be found in the report by The Telegraph: http://bit.
ly/1pj0drh
24 In accordance with data provided by GFK Ukraine and AC Nielsen,
the most popular TV channels in December 2013 were: STV, Inter, 1+1,
Ukraina, ICTV.
25 See more details in the GALLUP research to be found at the
following URL: http://1.usa.gov/ZpdJ7I 26 For a reference on the lessons learned, see Annex 5.
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the official Moscow view, which refers to Ukrainian became very handy for the Russian elite as a way to
nationalists as banderovtsi. The Bandera notion draw a virtual line of cultural differences between
was used by the Russian government in the context the West and the Orthodox civilization of the East.
of Euromaidan in an attempt to denigrate the idea The concept of the clash of civilizations and the
of the Euromaidan as an expression of nationalism dialogue between civilizations appeared often in
and neo-Nazism, simultaneously causing fears in the speeches of the Russian power elite and its
particular audiences of the potential abuse of the collaborating experts in the period 2004-2007.
rights of non-Ukrainians. The culmination of this discourse is the speech by
President Putin delivered in 2007 at the Munich
Cultivating anxiety and fear Security Conference where he criticized the USA for
maintaining a unipolar world order. The Orthodox
Analysis of the Russian narrative leads to the civilization would look incomplete without Ukraine.
conclusion that the Russian media has systematically Kremlin-affiliated political scientist Vyacheslav
cultivated a feeling of fear and anxiety in the Nikonov (head of the Russian World Foundation
ethnically Russian and non-Ukrainian populations and member of the Russian State Duma) reminded
of Ukraine. During the initial phase of the conflict, viewers about the concept of Ukraine and Russia as
the whole of Ukrainian society was encouraged to the centre of a common civilization on the National
feel insecure about its future and to fear Ukraine’s Interest TV programme. This concept is widely
economic instability. Closer association with the EU supported by the Russian Orthodox Church. This
would mean less economic cooperation with Russia narrative is complemented by the anti-European
and the Kremlin repeatedly hinted that the EU was narrative which attempts to either distort European
trying to lead Ukraine into a self-seeking (for the EU) values (for example, identifying tolerance of sexual
deal instead of genuinely planning to help advance diversity as a sign of decadence) or threatens
Ukraine’s economy. As the events on Euromaidan potential economic collapse through closer
escalated, the narrative was adapted to cultivate association with the EU.
fear specifically in the Russian-speaking part of East
Ukraine: nationalist radicals were brought to the “Ukraine is central to Eurasia”. In the context of
front of news reports thus emphasising the possible forming the Eurasian Economic Union, the concept
physical threat (Eastern Ukraine will be attacked, of Eurasianism is experiencing a re-birth. Similarly
properties will be confiscated, the Russian languageto the Orthodox civilization and the Russian World,
will be prohibited, etc). It also helped consolidatethe Eurasian Union also wants to see Ukraine as
the support of the Russian Federation’s population an integral part. The most prominent promoter of
for the government’s policy towards Ukraine and Eurasianism is Aleksandr Dugin who has adapted
Euromaidan. the classical ideas of Eurasianism to contemporary
realities. If the Eurasianists of the 1920s believed that
Dominant themes of the Russian narrative “individualistic and egoistic Europe” was the source of
all evil, then today Dugin assigns this role to the USA
“Clash of Civilisations”. When analysing the and Transatlanticists. According to the Eurasianists,
narratives brought out by Russian propaganda, it Ukraine is a “battlefield of titans” where good and
is important to take into account that this process evil struggle for influence. The Eastern Partnership
started well before 2014. The theory of the clash initiative is viewed as a means for the Transatlanticists
of civilizations proposed by Samuel Huntington (NATO, USA, EU) to steal Ukraine from Eurasia.
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associated with Nazi elements. The application different national interests, the EU is still facing some
of a “war mentality” is not coincidental as it is historic ghosts, including Eastern Europe’s sense of
related to living memory and genuine issues betrayal following the 1945 Yalta Conference. All
surrounding the Great Patriotic War. The appeal of this leaves plenty of narrative lines to utilize in
to Russian-speaking populations’ affections has the attempt to split the West. Russia’s narrative
been made through the fabrication of information, also attempts to break up the transatlantic link
historical narrative feeding into certain cultural and position the USA in opposition to Europe. The
pre-dispositions and then inciting certain actions. narrative where the USA and the EU are discredited
This has eased the task of labelling Euromaidan and weakened appeals to the BRIC28 group and
activists as Nazis, Fascists and anti-Semites as well other emerging economies. It doesn’t necessarily
as creating fears in the Russian-speaking population result in them actively supporting Russian actions,
of Ukraine that the new “Fascist” government but is effective in maintaining their neutrality which
will confiscate properties, resort to violence and works well enough for Russia.
prohibit the Russian language – all of this explained
emotionally on the TV screens of Russian channels “Russia’s actions are legitimate”. The Russian
by “real people”. strategy implies instrumentalizing law as a means
of legitimizing all its actions. This also links back
“The West is divided”. The attempt to divide the to the idea of Russian civilization with its own
West (including NATO and its Partners) by the Russian legal norms and interpretation of international
narrative deserves particular attention. The attempt law. The aspect of legitimacy is very important in
focuses on making the West impotent and risk- supporting the Russian narrative. It helps Russia to
averse when encountering the dishonest Russian appeal to its internal audience, to its compatriots
narrative. For example, the Kremlin is attempting abroad, and even to the international community
to divide Germany and the EU by threatening to by demonstrating that Russia is law-abiding and
damage the former’s economy, dependent as “doing the right thing”. It was important for Russia
it is on imports of Russian gas, and by reminding to instigate “legal” self-determination in Crimea
Germans of recent history. In his public speech and also to encourage similar self-determination
following the annexation of Crimea, President referendums in East Ukraine, thus putting a veil
Putin said “I believe that the Europeans, first and of “legitimacy” on the annexation of Crimea. It
foremost, the Germans, will also understand me”. was also very important that the self-proclaimed
He is playing on the difference in views between leadership of Crimea (and later that in East Ukraine)
New (Eastern) Europe and Old Europe, going on formally requested Russia’s help, intervention or
to remind European leaders about uncomfortable even annexation. This provided “legal” grounds for
historical facts and appealing to a strange logic, the protection of compatriots and the protection
claiming that since Russia fully supported the of human rights, in accordance with the Russian
reunification of East and West Germany, Germany Foreign Policy Review of 2007 and the Russian State
should now support Russia in its reunification Security Strategy of 2009. In addition, the Kremlin
with Crimea. President Putin is well aware of the quickly made legal arrangements to provide for the
different interests EU countries have when it comes easy and quick incorporation of Crimea into the
to cooperation with Russia, including economic Russian Federation.
interests, and also the difficulty the European states
28 BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China which are considered
have in finding a firm common position. Apart from the strongest emerging world economies.
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The supporting Russian information campaign The Ukrainian government is also being accused of
focused on attempts to draw parallels with the breaking the 21 February deal made between former
case of Kosovo and appealed to the historic President Yanukovich and some of the opposition
injustice committed in 1954, when Crimea was representatives, mediated by EU Foreign Ministers.
given to Ukraine by the USSR leadership. In his This was seen by Russia as a good enough reason
address of 18 March 2014, following the Crimea to proclaim the Ukrainian authorities as illegitimate
Referendum, President Putin listed a whole and the Parliament’s vote to remove Yanukovich
spectrum of “legitimate” reasons for what had from power as an attempted coup d’état. There are
happened: the UN Charter which speaks of the also similarities with the Russian-Georgian military
right of nations to self-determination, the well- conflict (2008) which can be observed in Ukraine:
known Kosovo precedent, the outrageous historic attempts to discredit and criminalize the Georgian
injustices committed against Russia (including the government, label Georgian military operations
collapse of the USSR and West-instigated Colour as genocide and artificially create a diaspora of
Revolutions) and the need to protect compatriots Russian citizens in the disputed territories by
abroad from the Ukrainian government’s attempts encouraging, and in some instances forcing, citizens
to “deprive Russians of their historical memory, of the target nation to relinquish their national
even their language and to subject them to forced citizenship in favour of Russian citizenship (so-called
assimilation”. The policy on the protection of “passportisation”).
compatriots may also provide sufficiently legitimate
reasons for Russia to intervene on Ukrainian Through its information campaign, Russia is trying
territory should any proof of humanitarian crisis to prove that its intent is to support the will of the
be identified. There is a continuous narrative line local people, the self-defence groups in Ukraine.
which cultivates stories of human rights’ abuse, war One important aspect of the Russian narrative is
crimes and a worsening humanitarian situation. the notion of the “historic Russian presence” which
The narrative against the Colour Revolutions also is used in an attempt to legitimize Russian interests
appeals to other authoritarian governments who and activity in the territories where Russians have
are willing to support Russia’s line in this regard. been (or still are) historically present for whatever
geo-political reason. Crimea is called a historically
Part of the narrative comprises continuous attempts Russian land and Sevastopol is called a Russian city.
to accuse NATO and the West of breaking all sorts In his aforementioned public address, President
of laws and listing interventions in Yugoslavia, Putin asserted that “In [the Russian] people’s hearts
Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya as obvious examples. and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable
Russia also accuses NATO of breaking a promise, part of Russia. This firm conviction is based on truth
supposedly made to Russia in 1990, that the and justice and was passed on from generation to
Alliance would not expand into Eastern and Central generation. (…)”.
Europe, build military infrastructure near Russia’s
borders or permanently deploy troops there. In the The aforementioned directions in the Russian
information campaign, Russia is projected as sincere narrative were summarized in President Putin’s
and just, and the West is portrayed as adhering to address of 2 July 2014 to Russian ambassadors: if
double standards, being cynical about abuse of Russia had left the people of Crimea – “the land of
human rights and preferring the “rule of the gun” Russian military glory” – at the mercy of Ukrainian
to international law. “nationalist and radical militants” and permitted
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own messages or simply abuse. Social media has Rozovskiy’s profile picture is a photo of a North
also been used for the recruitment of pro-Russian Caucasus dentist used in the advertising brochure
fighters to be sent to East Ukraine (for example, on of the Ust Dzhegmiska Dental Clinic. Shortly after
13 July 2014, RFE/RL published an interview with RFE/RL’s discovery, Rozovskiy’s Facebook account
24-year-old Artur Gasparyan of Armenia who was suddenly carried the announcement that “this
recruited via the Russian-language social networking content is no longer available.”
site Vkontakte).
The English translation of the post reads: “Hello. My name is
An internet troll is a person who foments discord online Igor Rosovskiy. I am 39 years old. I live in the city of Odessa.
by starting arguments or upsetting people, by posting I have worked as an emergency physician for 15 years.
inflammatory, extraneous, or off-topic messages in Yesterday, as you know, there was a terrible tragedy in our city,
an online community with the deliberate intent of some people killed other people. They killed them in a brutal
provoking readers into an emotional response or of way by burning them alive, not in a drunken stupor, not to
otherwise disrupting normal on-topic discussion. get their grandmother’s inheritance, but because they share
Trolls often use fake or anonymous profiles. Sponsored the political views of nationalists. First they brutally beat their
trolls who act on behalf of a grouping, organisation, victims, then burned them alive. As a doctor, I rushed to help
or a state usually maintain multiple fake profiles and those whom I could save, but the fighters stopped me. They
follow specific guidelines for trolling. didn’t let me go to the wounded. One rudely pushed me,
promising that I and other Jews would suffer a similar fate.
I saw a young man I could have saved if I could have taken
Social media used for deception
him to the hospital, but my attempts at persuasion were
met with a blow to the face and lost glasses. In fifteen years
There are several prominent cases which provide I have seen much, but yesterday I wanted to cry, not from
examples of deliberate falsification of information, the blows and humiliation, but from my helplessness in being
usage of false identities and spreading of rumours unable to do anything. In my city, such things did not happen
even during the worst times of Nazi occupation. I wonder why
with the purpose of creating either fear or hatred.
the world is silent.”]
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the needed effect. The doctor called higher of Twitter in Eastern Europe the NATO StratCom
medical authorities, who confirmed there was no COE has analysed the prevailing sentiments on
pregnant woman among the dead. this platform about the situation in Ukraine for
the period 15 April to 15 July 2014. More than
Atrocities by Ukrainian extremists in East Ukraine 26 254 tweets in the Russian language were
analysed, covering Ukraine (Crimea in particular)
Social media was flooded with rumours about and Russia.
atrocities planned by pro-Ukrainian extremists:
stories about poisoned water supplies, concentration Methodology: The tweets were selected on the
basis of specific key words relating to the crisis in
camps being built outside Donetsk, fascist gunmen
Ukraine, utilising automatic social-media monitoring
lurking in the woods and pro-Ukrainian circulars tool WebRadar. The analysis was focused on tweets
with poison absorbed by touch. The most recent in the Russian language originating from Ukraine
story, which was originally produced by the and Russia, as well as any other country, if the
Russian state-run TV Channel One, showed what tweet was in the Russian language (for example,
Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Latvia, etc.). It must
was purported to be an eyewitness account of a
be admitted that statistics on the country of origin
3-year-old boy having been tortured and crucified were based on information provided by Twitter users
by the Ukrainian military in a public square in in their accounts, which does not necessary reflect
Slovyansk.35 In the report, a woman named Galina the real situation. Furthermore, a considerable
Pyshnyak claimed to have witnessed the atrocity proportion of Twitter users do not specify their
country of origin, hence tweets could be placed by
along with the rest of inhabitants of Slovyansk who
anyone who can communicate in Russian.
were forcefully brought to the central square by
Ukrainian military personnel to witness the public The pilot research demonstrated that, although
execution. At the time, she was speaking with the number of neutral sentiment tweets is
Channel One from a refugee camp in Russia’s Rostov quite high, tweets show increasing polarisation
region. The video was widely disseminated on between pro-Ukraine and pro-Russia Twitter
social media and was quickly followed by counter- users. The emotional tension in the Twitter
information from investigative journalists (including environment increased, especially after the
Russia’s independent TV Dozhd) challenging the tragic events in Odessa37 and as military action
report or proving it to be false. Russian journalist escalated.
Yevgeny Feldman of the Novaya Gazeta newspaper
went to the scene of the purported incident to ask Of all the tweets analysed, 12.2% were identified
residents whether they had witnessed or heard of as aggressive. Furthermore, aggressive and
such an atrocity. In the nine-minute video posted provocative comments tended to increase over
on YouTube, local Slovyansk residents consistently the period of the analysis, mostly dominated
denied knowledge of any such incident.36 by pro-Russian stances. The most aggressive
reaction was caused by reports of human
Twitter-sentiment analysis of the crisis casualties, usage of stigmatising appellations
like “fascist - ruscist38”, specific military actions
Taking into account the global reach and popularity 37 On 2 May 2014, following a clash between the pro-Ukraine unity and
35 The full report by Channel One TV in Russian to be found at the pro-Russian separatist camps, the trade union building where pro-Russians were
following URL: http://bit.ly/1r0mKgm based caught fire, resulting in 40 people being burned alive. More information to
36 The full video report in Russian to be found at the following URL: be found at the following URL: http://econ.st/XfQdYZ
http://bit.ly/1qewj7J 38 “Ruscist” is an invented word with an offensive meaning, created
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and conflict escalation. It is possible that some They more often have the last say in discussions.
of the aggressive tweets have been deliberately However, the last month of the analysis shows
released to provoke hatred. that pro-Ukrainian users have become stronger
in countering the pro-Russian messaging
Pro-Russian Twitter users have a dominant by creating new information channels with
influence in the Twitter environment for the considerable Twitter influence (for example,
following reasons: Stop Fake) and expressing opinions more
actively and convincingly.
1) Russia actively involves the Twitter accounts
of mass media to disseminate information Russian public figures receive higher media
about the crisis in Ukraine. The followers of support and hence have larger influence on
these accounts use this information in further Twitter. Of Ukrainian public figures, the only ones
references and this allows the selective with notable positive appraisal are A. Yatsenyuk
distribution of anti-Ukraine information. It is and A. Avakov. Of foreign political figures, the
important to note that the Twitter accounts of only notable ones have been B. Obama and J.
public figures – TV anchors, actors, journalists, Kerry, while the presence of European politicians
opposition leaders – can also be very influential, is hardly noticeable.
having high numbers of followers and being
used to spread information and opinions. Analysis has led to the conclusion that a number
2) The Russian Twitter information environment of fake accounts have been created by a group
shows more homogenous opinions and is of users, each of them having an insignificant
dominated by supporters of President Putin’s amount of followers, but all spreading the same
policy which can be partially explained by the message. It has also identified the networks of
Russian state’s ability to limit the activity of Twitter users with rather high Twitter influence
the opposition and independent media. The who re-tweet and comment on each other’s
opinions originating from Ukraine show more tweets in order to increase visibility. One
division into supporters of Ukrainian territorial such group is formed by anti-Ukrainian users
integrity and supporters of the separatists; (“swarog09”, “tohub”, “simonovkon”) who are
3) The influence of pro-Russian state possibly creating a fictional discussion in order to
institutions, non-government organisations produce more tweets.
and particular public figures is much stronger
than the that of equivalent pro-Ukrainian The pilot research has identified a correlation
parties. among the ideological base, use of traditional
4) Exceptions are representatives of the media and a developed network of Twitter users.
Euromaidan movement whose tweets have The successful coordination between these three
noticeable influence in terms of re-tweets and elements is the key factor to gaining influence in
followers; the Twitter environment. More in-depth analysis
5) Pro-Russian Twitter users more often use is needed to identify and analyse how these
active forms of tweeting – sharing opinions, coordination mechanisms are created and how
commenting, calling for action, using they work in social media.
propaganda, getting involved in discussions.
from a combination of the words “Russian” and “fascist”.
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Deception as a tactic to delay and distract bomb exploded aboard the aircraft; the aircraft was
hit by a Ukrainian missile fired from the ground; a
Deception and “smokescreens” have been important Ukrainian air force fighter pursued and then attacked
instruments in the Russian campaign to confuse the the plane; the US shot down the aircraft in order to
central government in Kyiv, delay response actions, damage Russia’s reputation; Ukrainian forces shot
and, by disseminating an abundance of falsified down the plane in an assassination attempt as they
facts and different theories, provoking the Ukrainian mistook it for the plane used by President Putin; no
government, its allies and independent media into living people were aboard the plane as it flew on
spending large amounts of time and effort refuting autopilot from Amsterdam where it had been pre-
the Kremlin’s propaganda. An interesting case to loaded with rotting corpses. These versions of events
illustrate this deception tactic is the recent Malaysia flooded the information space, including the English
Airlines flight MH17 tragedy. On 17 July 2014, the language RT TV channel and social media, and
passenger aircraft was shot down in the skies over created extra work for independent media outlets,
the pro-Russian separatist controlled region of experts, the Ukrainian government and its allies to
Donetsk, killing all 283 passengers and 15 crew prove these versions fake or absurd. However, as the
members. Suspicion on who downed the aircraft recent opinion poll by the Levada Centre42 shows,
fell on pro-Russian separatists as some evidence 82% of Russians blame Ukrainian forces for downing
emerged immediately after the incident. The the plane which shows that the media propaganda in
Ukrainian intelligence service published intercepted Russia has been very successful.
phone conversations between separatists which
confirmed that the aircraft was shot down because Within hours of the crash, Russia’s second largest news
agency, RIA Novosti, announced that the Boeing 777
it was mistaken for a Ukrainian military air carrier.
was shot down by the Ukrainian military. Citing the self-
In addition, less than 20 minutes after the crash, proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic press service as
Igor Girkin (a.k.a. Strelkov), leader of the Donbass their source, RIA informed that “eyewitnesses reported
separatists, was reported to have posted on that the Malaysian jet was attacked by a Ukrainian fighter
social media network VKontakte, taking credit for plane, after which the plane broke into two sections
in mid-air and crashed on the territory of the Donetsk
downing a Ukrainian military aircraft. The post was
People’s Republic. After the attack the Ukrainian fighter
quickly removed as events unfolded and it became jet was shot down and crashed”. More information to be
obvious that the separatists had committed a grave found at the following URL: http://bit.ly/1qexc06.
error.40 The Russian mass media reacted quickly by
putting out several versions of what had happened,
blaming the Ukrainian side as well as speculating on Psychological pressure
a US conspiracy against Russia. The Moscow Times
published an article on the subject called “’Putin’s The war in Crimea was never announced.
Media Lives in an Alternate Reality”41 which gives During what was officially peacetime, military
a comprehensive overview of the most popular action, started by groups of Russian troops
versions promoted by the Russian media: the aircraft swiftly occupying Crimea, eventually forced the
was not shot down but crashed of its own accord; a Ukrainian army either to switch sides or leave
40 Yulia Latinina of Echo Moskvi lists facts and provides a detailed their posts.
analysis on the topic a few days after the tragedy (in Russian): http://bit.
ly/1m9S1ij
41 The article in English can be found at the following URL: http://bit. 42 More information on the opinion poll can be found at the
ly/1qexc06 following URL: http://bit.ly/YRkWgS
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The silent, polite, unidentified men, wearing fresh Russian military personnel of the Black Sea Fleet were
unmarked uniforms and armed with sophisticated in their deployment sites, implying that the armed
weapons first appeared at Simferopol airport in the early
men in uniforms without insignia were members of
hours of 28 February. By the end of the next day, they
had already surrounded the key government buildings in Crimean self-defence units, i.e. local civilians.43 The
the city centre, had blockaded Ukrainian border troops ability to mobilize and effectively use civilians was
at Balaklava Bay and Belbek airport near Sebastopol, crucial to achieving Russia’s goals in Crimea and
and established checkpoints on roads across the Crimea. later on in East Ukraine. Although mercenaries were
Journalists’ interest in the origins of the armed men
widely used for the formation of self-defence groups
was high and they even got some of them talking on
camera. The message from all of them was surprisingly (especially in the East Ukraine), Russia’s pro-active
coordinated: we are here to protect, to help, to guard, information campaign has also made it possible
to prevent violence. Their guns were the same as those to draw on the support and active involvement
used by the Russian army, their trucks had Russian of certain groups within society susceptible to
number plates and they spoke Russian without accent,
Russian propaganda, including former members of
admitting that they had arrived from Russia and held
Russian citizenship. By mid-March, most of the Ukrainian law-enforcement or military bodies (both local to
government and military installations had either been Ukraine and from Russia and the former USSR where
seized or blockaded with little resistance from the Russian-speaking information channels are widely
Ukrainian side. During the operation, President Putin and consumed).
Foreign Minister Lavrov denied any relationship between
these non-uniformed, armed men and the Russian
army. Although a month after the annexation of Crimea, The role of the Special Operations Forces
President Putin admitted that Russian forces had indeed
been deployed to Crimea to support local self-defence The Crimea operation showed that the nature of
groups, it already didn’t matter. The term “polite men”, the Russian Special Operations Forces (SPETSNAZ;
invented by Kremlin spin-doctors, remains a way of
in Russian: спецназ is abbreviated from Войска
referring to the Russian army’s intervention in Crimea.
специального назначения) has significantly
It is important to note that there were no clashes changed over the last years. Compared to the wars in
between Russian and Ukrainian military forces. The Chechnya and Georgia, there has been a noticeable
Russian troops (more specifically – Special Forces) improvement in their performance as well as
exerted psychological pressure on the Ukrainian army equipment. In Crimea, they conducted subversive
by besieging military posts, holding Ukrainian soldiers actions in a silent and speedy manner, supporting
hostage without proper access to information, the propaganda-driven partition of the community
and relying on directions from the fragile interim and the disruption of central government in a well-
government in Kyiv. Additional pressure on Ukraine coordinated manner. The SPETSNAZ also excelled in
was exerted by the short-notice military exercises by their cooperation with the local pro-Russian population
Russian armed forces near the Ukrainian border and to smuggle arms, create separatist formations and
their combat-readiness checks. conduct a sophisticated Information Operations
campaign. They engaged in urban warfare which was
Use of armed civilians defined by guerrilla and covert operations on the
43 Latvia’s Ambassador to Ukraine, H.E. Argita Daudze personally
approached several of the men in unmarked uniforms and received verbal
The use of armed civilians in the conflict was achieved confirmation that they were Russian soldiers from the base in Sevastopol.
Ukrainian journalists also did many on-the- spot interviews with the
by forming self-defence groups in Crimea to support
unmarked armed men, receiving confirmation that they were Russian
Russian troops in military action. Russian Foreign soldiers. One such video with English subtitles to be found at the following
Minister Lavrov divulged false information that the URL: http://bit.ly/1pj0Cdp
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enemy’s territory. The operations were conducted using this laid out a comfortable environment for taking
irregular forces in support of the separatist movement, over the territory.
insurgency and also conventional military force.
The so-called Cyber Berkut (КиберБеркут) was an
The cyber domain as part of the new form of warfare important player in the cyber war during the crisis in
Ukraine.
It is worth discussing what happened in the cyber
domain as part of the utilisation of asymmetric or This voluntary anonymous group appeared after the
indirect methods to complement actions in the dissolution of the infamous Berkut security force in
Ukraine at the end of February. The targets of the group
information battle field or military actions on the
are not only the Ukrainian government but also foreign
ground. Experts and media correspondents have governments supporting it. Hence it was Cyber Berkut
stated that the crisis in Ukraine was the largest cyber- who published the phone discussion between Ms. Ashton
war battlefield since Russia’s cyber-attacks on Estonia and Mr. Paet and also attacked the websites of the
in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. Such actions as the
44 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
(NATO CCDCOE) and NATO itself. The Cyber Berkut has an
leak of the recorded phone conversations between
opponent – the Cyber Hundred (Киберсотня) which is
US State Department official Victoria Nuland and the a pro-Ukrainian group whose main task was to fight the
US ambassador to Ukraine and EU foreign affairs chief information war to protect the interests of Euromaidan.
Catherine Ashton and Estonian foreign minister Urmas Its best-known activities have been hacking the website
Paet were attempts not only to prove the weak security of the RT TV channel (formerly known as Russia Today)
and the government newspaper Russkaya Gazeta.
of the Western governmental communication lines,
but also to discredit Western leaders and divide them.
The group declared that it would fight against the
Additionally, the provision of confusing information is
current government of Ukraine which – as they
an example of reflexive control.
stated, matching the Russian narrative – glorified
neo-fascism and nationalism. The attack on the NATO
In preparing to take over Crimea, Russia had
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence by
managed to hit almost all Ukrainian government
Cyber Berkut is particularly interesting. The Cyber
websites and to disrupt important communication
Berkut had declared that the Centre was helping the
systems of the Ukrainian forces based in Crimea.
Ukrainian government to “exert active propaganda on
Some attacks also harmed news-outlet and social-
the population via mass media and social networks,
network websites. Ukraine’s Security Service reported
block objective sources of information, and cover up
an attack on the mobile communication systems of
the criminal actions of the government”. This also
Ukrainian government members with the purpose
supports the wider Russian narrative that the West
of disrupting communication between government
and NATO are plotting against Russia and developing
agencies. Numerous cyber-attacks against Ukrainian
various capabilities like the Centres of Excellence to
military groups have also been reported, meant to
attack and harm Russia.
discredit their actions and create tensions between
cooperation partners. Ukrainian company Ukrtelecom
What plays to the Russian advantage is the fact that
announced that unmarked gunmen had penetrated
there are few international legal constraints that
its infrastructure facilities causing the collapse of all
regulate information interventions, information
communication. In combination with the disruption
or cyber warfare used to penetrate and destroy
of broadcasts by the Ukrainian mass media in Crimea,
44 For a further reference, see the article in Defence Update at information systems, financial and military
http://bit.ly/1u5ZXzL and Channel 4 report at http://bit.ly/1wCcyQ7 institutions and civil society assets.
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The new government in Ukraine faced a very difficult The UK StratCom community defines Target Audience
task, in a time of crisis, to operate with speed, Analysis (TAA) as the process of profiling an audience
decisiveness and high level of professionalism whilst to understand what motivates it & assess under what
circumstances it will exhibit a specific behaviour. In its
facing economic pressure, the flow of new staff into
most detailed form TAA is a multi-source, scientifically
government structures (including disorganised law- verified, diagnostic methodology undertaken in-country
enforcement bodies), a new majority in Parliament and in the host language used to identify specific
and the state being headed by an acting president with motivations for behaviour. Its output information is
limited powers. Apart from facing external aggression, deduced from methodically gathered data and tested
against a scientifically derived hypothesis.
the government had to prepare for a Presidential
election and demonstrate willingness to implement
urgent reforms. Knowledge of people’s beliefs and the ability to
predict their actions has been critical to the success
Ukraine’s government, fearing Russian military of Russia’s information campaign on the one hand
invasion from the South-East where Russia had and Ukraine’s failure on the other. Russia was able
stationed large numbers of troops on the border, thus to get the support for its actions within the Russian-
exerting significant psychological pressure, did not speaking population in Ukraine because it knew
order armed resistance in Crimea. However, the failure its target audience, was able to predict its likely
to withdraw Ukrainian military equipment and issue behaviour and use the right channels to trigger it.
troops with clear orders gave Russian troops in Crimea
the upper hand to exert psychological pressure. East Ukrainians’ wish for stability
It was very difficult for the unprepared Ukrainian The deployment of a specialist assessment team
government to counter the well-prepared Russian identified the need for a comprehensive TAA which
operation in Crimea in an effective manner. It was not was conducted in parts of the East Ukraine in June
possible to control the situation on the peninsula or,
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2014.45 As it is so often the case, the TAA revealed Kyiv government and certainly keeping well away
counter-intuitive facts. The prevailing view amongst from any attitudinal communications attempting
many western governments was that the entire region to enhance the appeal of the EU. Simultaneously,
was pro-Moscow, or at least pro-separatist. The TAA the TAA indicated that the Ukrainian government
indicated that whilst the central (Kyiv) government’s should challenge the successfully accrued
credibility was low, this did not universally translate to legitimacy of the separatists and where
pro-Moscow, separatist support. The TAA, which was possible attempt to overstretch their ability to
focused not on people’s attitudes or perceptions but govern. Overall, the TAA revealed that the Kyiv
instead upon actual behaviours, identified many government’s ability to influence the population
different groupings of interests. One of the common was weak and conventional communication
strands across all groups was a desire for stability campaigns were unlikely to succeed. Much more
and peace, irrespective of political orientation. personal engagement would be better – person-
Financial stability and job security were important to-person contacts would prove more effective
behavioural motivators. Informal power structures and allow audiences to engage in discussion of
– business networks – were rated as being highly their fears and aspirations.
influential because they related directly to job
security. The key pro-stability social groups are:
Afghanistan veterans, pensioners, miners, public
servants and senior factory workers. They seek
stability in terms of jobs, income and non-violence.
In their view, military action by the Ukrainian
government does not facilitate stability.
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compatriots abroad – was able to leverage support in cases of Russian aggression against
historical memory: the Great Russian Empire, the respective country. The Ukraine case, along
World War II and Nazi atrocities, and the might with the case of Georgia, demonstrates that such
and collapse of the USSR. Russia’s information information campaigns supported by military
campaign brought out the lingering fear and means are easier to carry out in territories close
hatred of Nazism, the embarrassment and shame to Russia, allowing intimidation tactics through
over the collapse of the once-great Soviet Union, the drawing up of large military forces near
and simultaneously reminded its audience about respective country’s border and also providing
feelings of greatness and pride related to these for the easy supply of equipment and other
moments in history which can now be applied to resources to the Special Operations Forces and
the idea of a great nation or even civilization re- recruits who have already crossed that border.
emerging. It is this appeal to human emotion, this This is particularly applicable to the countries
hope, and perhaps even this promise of renewed which are not members of NATO and therefore
pride and glory that has made the Russian not parties to the Washington Treaty.
narrative so compelling to its people.
Audience analysis is critical to operational
Crisis in Ukraine is a result of Russia’s long term success. Russia has demonstrated that
strategy. Learning from the Russian information understanding audiences and what motivates
campaign in Ukraine, it is clear that early detection them is critical to operational success that is
and analysis of elements within the Russian enduring – an important lesson for the Alliance
narrative which signal potentially aggressive and one for which the basic tenets of StratCom
behaviour are critical. Russia’s state policy can provide solutions if properly resourced,
documents contain indications which should be integrated into all responses – words and actions
further analysed so as to develop potential future alike – and implemented consistently.
scenarios of Russia’s actions and Allied responses
to those. It is also obvious that, prior to taking There is “another side of the coin” to Russia’s
aggressive action on the ground, the Russian information campaign. Although Russia’s
government works intensively with the public information campaign has been successful in
information space to prepare public opinion for influencing its audiences, it also bears a degree
the steps to be taken. Similar activities in the of counter-productivity as it has radicalized and
information space also took place before the 2nd alienated other audiences – West Ukraine and
Chechen War and the 2008 war with Georgia. Kyiv, the populations of NATO and EU countries,
and the USA. It remains to be seen whether
The role of Compatriots Abroad is critical and Russia has gained a long-term enemy on the part
should be considered carefully for the future. The of Western Ukrainians. It can be assumed with a
security implications for countries neighbouring degree of certainty that as a result of the current
Russia are particularly serious. The kind of conflict, the Kyiv government will completely
strategy that Russia has employed in Ukraine discard the idea of participating in the Eurasian
is likely to work best in areas which have larger Economic Union or other Russian political,
communities of Russia’s Compatriots Abroad who economic or even cultural projects.
are targets of Russia’s information campaigns
and potentially may be ready to provide local Deception is used by Russia as a tactic to
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enable individual member states to protect their owns controlling shareholdings in First Channel
information space from similar types of aggressionand STS TV, as well as majority shareholdings
and illegal activity should the broadcaster be in NTV, Ren-TV, Fifth Channel, also Izvestia and
registered in another country. Life News. In addition to this, Kovalchuk owns
the Video International company which produces
These events were accompanied by a debate on advertising for the leading Russian TV channels.
the need to establish a joint Russian-language Another acquaintance of President Putin – Arkady
channel in the Baltic States as an alternative to Rotenberg – influences the operations of First
the channels being re-broadcast from Russia. Channel – he owns a company Krasnij Kvadrat,
However, financial constraints have prevented which produces TV programmes for it. One of the
this idea from moving forward at this time. mechanisms of media control is allocating the
Recently, current and former media leaders in advertising budgets of the major state-owned
the Baltics and Finland have sent a joint letter companies to the media. There is a condition
to the European Commission asking that body attached: no negative messages about any state-
to consider establishing a Russian-language owned companies. State-owned companies pay
TV channel in Europe, which would be called the media not only for advertisements, but also
Golos Evropy (Voice of Europe). According to the for the placement of articles, which are never
authors, individual countries lack the resources identified as advertising.
to establish and maintain such channels.
Control over the print media is implemented with
Annex 4: Media control in Russia (incl. reference the support of Vyacheslav Volodin, First Deputy
to trolling) Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of
Russia. V. Volodin takes part in the creation of press
Every week, the Presidential Administration materials for certain media campaigns. News that
holds a meeting with representatives of the is directly related to President Putin is controlled
three largest TV channels – First Channel (ORT), by the Press Attaché for the President of the
Rossija and NTV. The Director-General or his Russian Federation, Dmitry Peskov. Synchronized
deputy of all three channels attends these dissemination of propaganda materials (in
meetings. Alexei Gromov, Deputy Chief of Staff Russian – vbros) to the media usually happens via
of the Presidential Administration of Russia the large newspapers – Komsomolskaya Pravda
usually attends these meetings on behalf of and Izvestija – and in loyal internet portals, for
the Presidential Administration. Sometimes, example, Life News. If propaganda campaigns
the administration is represented by staff from require a larger scale, TV channel news and
domestic policy administration. Gromov regularly current affairs programmes are utilised. Loyal
communicates with TV channel management by political scientists play a key role in information
telephone, sometimes asking them to remove campaigns organized by the Russian authorities.
one or another story from broadcasts. This They “correctly” interpret political events in Russia
means that we can consider Gromov to be one and abroad. The political scientists and political
of Russia’s leading controllers of TV channel commentators who regularly communicate with
content. Control over every single message in the Presidential Administration include Sergey
the media is also ensured by an associate of Markov, Dmitry Orlov, Vyacheslav Nikonov,
President Putin – Yuri Kovalchuk. Y. Kovalchuk Sergey Kurginjan, Michail Loeontyev and Alexey
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Administration, through media owners who are opportunities to express their views. State
close to President Putin or to Gazprom. Initially, control of the leading TV channels prevented
President Putin’s motivation to gain control over Chechen militants from addressing wide Russian
the major TV channels was linked to his election and foreign audiences. Despite the fact that the
campaign. In 1999, when President Putin became two Chechen wars did not see a change in the
Prime Minister, there were around ten media location or practice of war, their narratives and
holdings. Some of the most influential media thematic frameworks were significantly different
affecting elections were Vladimir Gusinsky’s and this affected the international position of the
NTV, Boris Berezovsky’s TV6 and Yuri Luzhkov’s two parties involved.
TVC. Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov was turned
from an opponent of President Putin’s into an In 2000, the international and domestic reaction
ally through the process of party consolidation, to the sinking of the Kursk submarine and
giving him an opportunity to become one of the the authorities’ failure to act, substantially
leading politicians in the United Russia party. undermined President Putin’s reputation.
Russian media magnate V. Gusinsky was forced President Putin’s indecision about postponing
to sell his media channels, including NTV, to his vacation and making a public announcement
Gazprom. B. Berezovsky was forced to emigrate. created outrage in the victims’ families. In the
In this way, the Kremlin neutralized its three days before divers finally reached the submarine,
main opponents in the presentation of the war Russian state representatives changed the
in Chechnya and other events. In addition, S. message on the causes of the accident and the
Jastrzembski, a specialist in spin-doctoring, was condition of the crew several times.
appointed presidential adviser and attempted
to control anything that appeared in the Russian The war with Georgia in 2008 showed that
media about the war in Chechnya. After the 2001 Russia had taken into account previous military
terrorist attacks in the USA, Russia made good operations and was willing to participate in
use of the opportunity and began to explain to information warfare. To justify its military
the international community that the military action to the international community, Russia
actions against Chechen fighters were part of the implemented so-called passportisation in
“global war on terror”. Additionally, the “fighters” South Ossetia and Abkhazia, granting Russian
became “terrorists”. It was no longer a nation’s citizenship under simplified conditions. To
fight for freedom, but “terrorist attacks” by radical be able to describe this military operation as
Islamists with one aim – to destabilize Russia. “protective”, Russia needed there to be more
The “Federal group” (Russian – federaljnaya Russian citizens in South Ossetia. Russian TV
grupirovka) was standing up against “groups channels, when broadcasting news about the
of bandits” (Russian – bandformirovaniye). In war in South Ossetia, explained that a solution
the second Chechen war, unlike the first, many had to be found for a “humanitarian crisis” that
more special OMON police units were involved, had been caused by the invasion of the Georgian
not regular army soldiers. This calmed down the army. The audience was misled by stories about
protests by committees of mothers of young civil casualties whose numbers were growing
soldiers which had resonated through the public every hour. Later, independent international
during the first war. The Kremlin not only made its organizations did not confirm the numbers of
message clearer, but also limited the Chechens’ casualties that had been previously reported
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by the Russian media. Although in Western controlled. Narratives are controlled through the
democracies, the Russian activities were not creation of myths and manipulation of the current
considered justified, the Kremlin demonstrated elements of identity. This is a detail also common
to all the post-Soviet countries that NATO and in the use of propaganda, which is created in
other international organizations will not be able line with one or several elements of the target
to keep Russia from acting in its own interests. group’s identity. In the framework of narrative
control, it is possible to “insert” a particular
All these examples show that Kremlin officials political or military leader, the government of
have changed their opinion about the importance some country, or the country itself in a positive
of the information component in politics and in or negative context. Control of narratives is seen
military operations. The centralization of state as a more powerful tool than setting the media
power and control over media content has given agenda, because recipients of the information
Russia the opportunity to implement targeted reject those stories that contradict their “base
communication projects. narrative” or “strategic narrative”. Narrative
The differences in the media coverage of the two control means control over the process of
Chechen wars were connected to the changes in interpreting information. If an authoritarian
effective narratives and frames, and the exclusion state practices narrative control long enough,
of the Chechens from the communication the proportion of its society that does not think
process. This demonstrates the nature of the critically perceives information in a hyperbolic
Russian state’s control over communication – form and uses a specific interpretation even if
any media competitors will be neutralized by any this does not correspond to real events.
means possible.
Annex 7: Controlled internet trolling
Annex 6: Narrative Control
Although the Internet environment in Russia is much
To understand the narratives and thematic more open than that of TV, the state administration
communication frames in the context of the is also trying to influence processes in the World
Ukraine crisis, it is important to consider narrative Wide Web. As the Russian analytical portal The
control. A narrative can be considered an oral Insider points out, the Domestic Policy Department
or written story setting out the author’s ideas of the Presidential Administration controls the work
about an object, person or process in a specific of so-called trolls and bloggers, who have three
order. Narratives induce people to evaluate tasks:
things in a particular context, through a prism 1) publication and distribution of ordered
of specific values or myths. Narratives usually materials;
offer a clear distinction between the good and 2) creation of fake accounts on social networks
the bad. If individual narratives are a way in and distributing the ordered information on
which a person communicates their personal these accounts;
experience, collective narratives are based on 3) sending out of spam messages, persecution
collective experience and values and one of their of opponents on the Internet. Many people are
tasks is to strengthen the collective identity. Thus involved in the organization of these activities;
collective narratives are always seen as a resource one of the most important could be the director
for political communication, which has to be of the Konkord holding Evgeny Prihozhin, who
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