Bultmann's Project of Demythologization and the Problem of Theology and Philosophy

Author(s): Schubert M. Ogden

Source: The Journal of Religion , Jul., 1957, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 1957), pp. 156-173
Published by: The University of Chicago Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1199889

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 BULTMANN'S PROJECT OF DEMYTHOLOGIZATION AND THE
PROBLEM OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

SCHUBERT M. OGDEN*

I be said is that it is difficult, if not impos-

IN ONE of the first English contribu- sible, to challenge its central contention.
tions to the now ecumenical Ent- For if the question of theology and phi-
losophy
mythologisierungsdebatte, Professor is not the basic issue in the con-
Ian Henderson, of the Universitytinuing
of conversation concerning Bult-
mann's work, it is certainly one of the
Glasgow, ventured the following analysis
of the debate's essential character: basic issues raised by the latter. That
this is so is evident not only from the fact
One finds it increasingly hard to believe
that the central issue of the controversy isthat it is precisely to this point that
Bultmann's critics have turned again and
whether Christianity can be made relevant to
again
modern man by the re-interpretation of certain in attempting to understand and
elements in it which modern science has made it
evaluate his thought but also from the
impossible for him to believe. That is undoubt- fact that Bultmann himself has devoted
edly one aspect of the controversy and an im-
portant one at that. But the basic issue lies
special attention to it.2 It is not without
elsewhere. It cannot be appreciated until one significance, for example, that the largest
realises that to some extent, though on a single section in the programatic essay
smaller scale, Bultmann is doing something which originally initiated the controver-
analogous to what St. Thomas Aquinas did sy is given over to an extended discussion
in his day and generation. Just as Aquinas
worked out a rapprochement between Chris- of just this issue.3 It is undoubtedly true,
tianity and Aristotelianism, so Bultmann is of course, that Bultmann was led to un-
at any rate outlining the possibility-and the dertake such a detailed consideration of
limits--of a rapprochement between Christian- this problem in his 1941 essay by reason
ity and existentialism. The basic question at
of the criticisms of his theology that had
stake in the Entmythologisierung controversy
is whether such a rapprochement is either pos-
already been made prior to the more re-
sible or desirable.' cent concern with his work.4 But, so far
from qualifying Henderson's thesis, this
Now whatever else may be said about admission seems only further to confirm
this statement, the one thing which must
it. The pervasive preoccupation with the
question of theology and philosophy that
* Mr. Ogden is instructor of philosophical the-
ology at Perkins School of Theology, Southern has thus far been so characteristic of the
Methodist University. He received his education at
Ohio Wesleyan University (A.B.) and at the Uni- demythologization debate is not due
versity of Chicago (B.D.). He was a student in merely to a quirk of Bultmann's critics
philosophy at Johns Hopkins University underora to some accident which is to be ex-
first-year fellowship of the American Council of
plained solely by the peculiar mood of
Learned Societies. Mr. Ogden is at present a Ph.D.
candidate at the University of Chicago. He has the time. On the contrary, as is con-
been a member of the National Council on Religion
firmed by the anticipations of the present
in Higher Education since 1951, and he read this
discussion which are already to be found
paper at the council's Week of Work in August,
1956. in the earlier literature dealing with Bult-
156

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 BULTMANN'S PROJECT OF DEMYTHOLOGIZATION 157

mann's thought, it is a concern which among his more responsible critics, that
ultimately grows out of and therefore hisisview on this issue is at best ambigu-
justified by the very nature of Bult- ous and at worst hopelessly self-contra-
mann's theological undertaking. This has
dictory. While it is commonly recognized
recently been clearly seen and well ex-
that he at least intends to distinguish be-
pressed by one of Bultmann's most per-tween theology and philosophy, it is also
ceptive European critics. Speaking of generally
the held that there must be real
section in the programatic essay to which
doubt as to whether he actually does dis-
we have just referred, Heinrich Ott has
tinguish them-at any rate, in a clear
written: and consistent manner. Thus the course
This line of thought is indeed the "most of the demythologization controversy is
dramatic" place in Bultmann's theology. One characterized not only by a persistent
receives the clear impression that a position is
concern with the problem of theology
being fought for here with the utmost serious-
and philosophy but also by the growing
ness and intensity. Bultmann employs all his
powers to defend the legitimate New Testa- recognition that a really tenable solution
ment basis of his thought. One receives to thethis problem can be reached only by
further impression, however, that Bultmann'sdeclining to accept one or more of Bult-
struggle is strained and that it is by no means
mann's fundamental principles.
successful in really securing the embattled
Now it is my own belief that this basic
position. His argument frequently seems forced
and unclear.5
recognition is completely correct. How-
ever inadequate the previous criticisms
The reference to this "further impres-
of Bultmann's theology may be-and, in
my judgment, even the more substantial
sion" moves, of course, beyond a simple
statement of the centrality of the prob-
among them are open to important ob-
lem of theology and philosophy in Bult-
jections6-there is no gainsaying their
mann's thought to at least an impliedessential contention that this thought is
criticism of the way in which Bultmann
intrinsically problematic. It has been es-
himself has sought to solve the problem.
tablished beyond peradventure by the
And, as becomes clear from the remain-
last fifteen years of discussion that Bult-
der of Ott's argument, he does indeed
mann's theology is shot through with
share the judgment of a considerable
an inconsistency which is ultimately
number of Bultmann's critics that there structural in character and that this
really is something intrinsically problem- probably nowhere becomes more appar-
atic about Bultmann's position on thisent than in the way in which he actually
question. The impression which Ott him-deals with the issue of theology and phi-
self has received-but which, appropri-losophy. What is considerably less cer-
ately enough, he does not ascribe to him-tain, however, is whether the majority of
self but to the anonymous and ubiqui-the attempts which have been made to
tous Man-has been repeatedly corrobo- state a consistent alternative to Bult-
rated by numerous other analyses ofmann's position on this issue are them-
Bultmann's theology. So much is this theselves tenable positions; for, even where
case, in fact, that one may well be led tothese attempts are successful in avoiding
speak of an emerging consensus of critical the formal difficulties of Bultmann's own
opinion with respect to Bultmann's at- view, it would appear that they are-
tempted solution of this ancient problem;with one or two notable exceptions7-
for there is virtual unanimity, at least open to criticism on material grounds

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158 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

which Bultmann himself,his perhaps

more recentmore
reply to his critics, the
than any other, has clearly
world recognized
picture which is presupposed by
and expressed. What I amthe New Testament-and
suggesting, in which in his
other words, is that, while it is undoubt-
terminology is a "mythical" or "mytho-
edly true that Bultmann's logical"
own world
positionpicture-has become in-
is inconsistent and must therefore be re- credible and irrelevant to modern man.
jected, it is also true that he himself has Cutting across all the various possibili-
provided the principal resources for ar- ties which man today has for under-
riving at a genuinely tenable answer to standing himself and his world, there is a
this question. It is my conviction that it certain "common basis" which renders
is only when one accepts his project of the New Testament's picture of the
demythologization in both its negative world untenable.8 Thus Bultmann speaks
and its positive aspects and does so con- of a criticism of the New Testament
sistently and without qualification that which "arises with necessity out of the
it is possible to reach a solution to the situation of modern man."' It is not be-
problem of theology and philosophy cause contemporary man is an idealist or
which is at once formally coherent and a naturalist or, as we may also suppose,
materially defensible in our contempo- a pragmatist or an existentialist that the
rary situation. This implies, of course, New Testament's world picture is un-
that I am also convinced that Bult- acceptable to him; he cannot accept it,
mann himself-contrary to his express rather, for reasons which are considera-
intention--does not unqualifiedly accept bly more fundamental than any of the
his hermeneutical project and that the
particular tenets of the different philo-
fact that he does not do so is completely sophical schools. In particular, Bult-
of a piece with his inconsistent solutionmann argues, there are two basic charac-
to this problem. teristics of the modern situation as such
What I shall seek to do in the remain- which together constitute the grounds for
der of this paper is to indicate the justi-a definitive criticism of the New Testa-
fication for these two fundamental con- ment's mythological presuppositions. We
victions. I shall attempt, first of all, andmay briefly examine these two funda-
on the basis of a general analysis of Bult-mental characteristics.
mann's thought, to exhibit the incon- There is, in the first place, what Bult-
sistency of his own solution and then, mann refers to as "the scientific world
second, to comment summarily on the picture." Now, contrary to a widespread
alternative position which seems to me misunderstanding which unfortunately
to be involved in a consistent acceptance continues to find expression in spite of
of his demythologization project. Bultmann's explicit rejection of it,"o what
is denoted by this concept is not the par-
II
ticular picture of the world which hap-
The primary condition for under-pens to be prevalent as a consequence of
standing Bultmann's proposal for a de- the researches of some epoch of investi-
mythologization of the New Testament gation. Bultmann has made it perfectly
is to be clear concerning the problemclear that the defining characteristic of
which this proposal is intended to solve. "the scientific world picture" is not the
According to the argument stated both particular body of factual judgments
in his original programatic essay and inconcerning the world which may at any

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 BULTMANN'S PROJECT OF DEMYTHOLOGIZATION 159

which we today can no longer believe. In

given time he accepted as true but rather
the method whereby such judgments addition
are to the many judgments which
arrived at and the general picture of the
the New Testament authors make that
world which is the necessary correlateweofcan accept-i.e., by reason of the fact
this method. Thus, however much that the they are susceptible of experimental
particular hypotheses of one epoch mayverification-there are numerous other
be abandoned in favor of new ones sug-judgments in their writings which we
gested by the ever continuing processhave
of no alternative but to reject. Includ-
ed among these, Bultmann maintains,
research, so long as this process is con-
ducted experimentally, "the scientificare not only the Old Testament-Jewish
world picture," as Bultmann under- narratives of a primordial act of creation
stands the term, remains intact." For and of a final eschatological consumma-
tion but also the whole complex of the
what ultimately distinguishes our modern
understanding of the world is not gnostic
the myth of redemption in which the
view of it that we may now or then hap- men of the New Testament characteris-
pen to hold but the insistence that every tically portray the incarnation and exal-
proposition pretending to a place in such tation of Jesus Christ.14 Thus, from the
a view must meet the general demandstandpoint
of of our modern scientific pic-
experimental verification. ture of the world, the entire contents of
the traditional Christian conception of
But it is precisely this insistence, Bult-
mann argues, which constitutes the fun- Heilsgeschichte are open to criticism. In
damental difference between our modern so far as the propositions which go to
way of thinking and the mythologicalmake up this redemptive history purport
mode of thought characteristic of the New to be objective statements about the
Testament writers; for the distinguishingreal, they have simply become incredible
feature of the mythical mind is just its to us.
capacity for making and accepting judg- It is not only because of the scientific
ments about the world in a completely world picture that the New Testament is
uncritical way.12 This does not mean, of subject to criticism, however; there is
course, that the myth-believing man is also the fact, according to Bultmann,
consciously uncritical in the statements that modern man understands himself in
which he makes with respect to the real. such a way as to be unable to make or
On the contrary, it is the very naivete of accept many of its assertions.15 For
his lack of criticism which is also charac- whether man today understands himself
teristic of his mentality. As he looks out completely as nature or, in the general
upon his experience, the limits between framework of idealism, distinguishes his
the possible and the impossible, the real true self from nature, the one thing which
and the fanciful, are only very hazily de- he does not and cannot do is to under-
fined; and, as Bultmann expresses it, the stand himself in the manner of the New
world in which he lives is "open" in a Testament myths. That is, he cannot
way in which our world is not.13 Conse- understand himself as "open" to seizure
quently, in attempting to represent the by strange and supernatural powers. On
ultimate or transcendent reality which he the contrary, Bultmann insists, he views
experiences as the ground and limit of his himself as a unified being and attributes
existcnce, it is possible for him to make his experience, thought, and volition to
and accept a whole body of statements his own agency rather than to that of

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160 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

divine or demonic causes.'6 that

If,inas
his amind
natu-there is no very sharp
ralist, he understands himself distinction
asbetween
in the these two terms.
highest degree dependent, Nevertheless,
he neverthe- one can say with an evi
less does not look upon this dentdependence
appropriateness that if the general
as a subjection to strange effect powers of thewhich
scientific world picture is to
he distinguishes from himself. render theHe traditional
con-notion of Heils-
ceives it, rather, as his true nature
geschichte which
incredible, the general effect of
can be understood and therefore also modern man's understanding of himself
rationally organized and controlled. is If,to make it irrelevant.
on the other hand, he understands him- In any case, what is important for us
self as spirit, then he knows of his own to recognize is Bultmann's central argu-
freedom and responsibility, and, even ment that the New Testament is open to
though he recognizes that he is con- criticism on two grounds and that the
stantly conditioned by natural forces, elements
he in it which must necessarily
distinguishes his true being from them."7 give way under the weight of such criti-
In either case, Bultmann points out, cism the include (1) everything which cannot
salvation occurrence which is proclaimed have happened because it cannot be veri-
by the New Testament must seem irrele- fied in accordance with the general rules
vant to him: of science and (2) everything which vio-
For he could see God's act only in an occur-
lates the unity of man's personal life by
rence which took hold of the reality of his own representing him as standing at the mer-
cy of divine or demonic powers whose
true life and transformed him himself. A miracu-
lous natural even such as the resuscitation of
efficacy is functionally independent of
a dead man, however-quite apart from his its own responsible decisions.20 More-
general incredibility-he cannot understand
over, because the ground for this criti-
as an act of God which is of any concern to
him.18 cism do not arise simply from principles
peculiar to some particular school or
Elsewhere Bultmann takes up this same schools but, on the contrary, are deter-
theme in a slightly different way: mined by conditions characteristic of
modern man's historical situation as
[Modern man] can understand himself in
his relation to God only as a person who is such, Bultmann insists that the theolo-
addressed by God precisely in his being as a gian has no alternative but to acknowl-
person. This means that the only divine speak- edge and accept them. "If the New Tes-
ing and acting which he can understand as im-
tament proclamation is to maintain its
portant and of concern to him are such as
encounter him in his own personal existence- validity," he writes, "then there is noth-
and, in fact, adhere precisely to it. A satis- ing else to do but to demythologize it."21
faction theory which describes God's act as a In saying this, Bultmann does make it
cultic or juristic act and a Christ occurrence clear, to be sure, that this process of criti-
which cannot be understood as occurring to
cal interpretation cannot be undertaken
his own personal existence are simply incredible
to him.19
merely on the basis of the postulate that
the New Testament's message must at
The statement of the last sentence that all costs be rendered relevant to the pres-
the mythological salvation occurrence isent. Rather, he maintains, "it simply has
not-as one might have expected Bult-to be asked whether it really is nothing
mann to say-irrelevant to modern man but myth, or whether the very attempt
but rather incredible to him indicates to understand it in its true intention

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 BULTMANN'S PROJECT OF DEMYTHOLOGIZATION 161

leads to the elimination of myth."22 The

interpreted in terms of its particular ob-
jective statements but rather "existen-
question which must be asked, in other
words, is whether there can be "a de- i.e., from the standpoint of the
tially,"
mythologizing interpretation which existentiell
dis- self-understanding to which
these statements give expression.
closes the truth of the kerygma as keryg-
The second consideration which Bult-
ma for the man who no longer thinks
mythologically."23 mann adduces in support of his convic-
tion is that the New Testament itself in-
Bultmann's own answer to this ques-
tion, of course, is an emphatic andvites
un-just such an existential interpreta-
ambiguous affirmative. It is his convic-
tion of its mythological assertions. Not
only do the differences and even incon-
tion that the problem which is constitut-
ed by the conflict between the mythical
sistencies in its various objective state-
and the modern modes of thoughtments is so suggest the presence of an inten-
tion in relation to which these differences
far from being an impasse as to present
are ultimately irrelevant; even the New
an unparallelled opportunity for reappre-
hending the true meaning of the Chris-
Testament authors themselves frequent-
tian message and for finding a really
ly ade-
bring this intention to expression by
implicitly
quate form in which to express it.24 As he or explicitly criticizing the
generally expounds the matter, there ap-
mythological conceptuality which they
pear to be three basic considerations
perforce employ."7 Moreover, Bultmann
which support this conviction. observes, critical interpretation is espe-
In the first place. there is the fact cially
that demanded by the fact that the
"the true meaning of myth is not to Newpre-Testament's underlying view of
sent an objective world-picture" but man toas a free and responsible person who
express "how man understands himself can win or lose himself in decision cannot
in his world."25 While, as we have be previ-
adequately expressed in its mythologi-
ously seen, the mythical mind is able, by of thought. For, so long as he is
cal mode
reason of its capacity for thinking un-
thought of mythologically, man cannot
critically, to represent its experience reallyofbe understood as a "historical" be-
the transcendent in objective mythologi-ing who has alternative "ways" or "pos-
cal statements, it is also true that thesibilities"
real of existing but only as a "natu-
intention of such statements does not lie ral" being who is composed of certain
in their objective representational con- "substances.'"28
tents but in the understanding of exist- Finally, there is the fact that myth is
ence which the latter express only more by no means the only vehicle by which
or less inadequately. Therefore, Bult- human existence may be expressed. On
mann argues, "there is contained in the contrary, Bultmann maintains,
myth itself the motive for criticizing it,thanks to the patient researches of mod-
i.e., for criticizing its objective represen-ern philosophy, there is also a non-
tations; for its true intention to speak ofmythological conceptuality in which man
a transcendent power to which man andand his different existentiell possibilities
the world are subject is hampered andmay be appropriately described.29 If it is
obscured by the objectifying character ofreally true that the New Testament and
its own assertions."26 If this is true, how- the proclamation which is based on it
ever, then it follows that the mythologyspeak out of existence and to existence or,
of the New Testament also is not to be in other words, that the faith to which

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 162 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

they summon men is a specificnon-objective

existentiellterms is now seen to be the
self-understanding, then not conditio
only is sinethere
qua non of their adequate in-
the possibility of restating terpretation.
the faithIn in a
Bultmann's view it is pre-
demythologized form, but cisely
there whenis one
also
approaches the kerygma
the possibility that faith willnot with the
finally theoretical or objective
have
question, "What
been brought to its really adequate ex-is?" but rather on the
pression. For what has beenbasis provided,
of the practical or existentiell ques-
Bultmann believes, especially by ought
tion, "What the to be?" that it dis-
closes
philosophical work of Martin its inmost meaning and at the
Heidegger,
is nothing less than a comprehensive
same time exhibits its essential independ-
phenomenology of man's ence
personal and
of the New Testament's mythical
interpersonal life and a scientific termi-
form of expression.
nology in which the various But, phenomena
now, how exactly does Bultmann
that go to make up this lifecarry may outbe rele-
this project of an existential
vantly expressed and communicated. interpretation? To what sort of restate-
Therefore, the interpreter ment has of available
the Christian message is he ac-
to him a precise conceptuality tually led which
in when he approaches the New
the fundamental intention of the New Testament in terms of the existentiell
Testament to speak to existence may be question of existence and the non-mytho-
realized without the impediments which logical conceptuality of Heidegger's ex-
are necessarily imposed by the mytho- istential analytic?31 It will suffice for our
logical form of expression. The scientific present purpose if we can merely become
task of interpretation which properly clear about the general answer which
begins in the historical and philological must be given to these questions.
work prescribed by the so-called "her- According to Bultmann, what is dis-
meneutical rules" may thus be brought closed by an existential interpretation of
to its appropriate completion in a genu- the New Testament's mythological con-
inely understandable translation of the ceptuality is an understanding of human
New Testament's exotic mythology.30 existence in which the good of life is
It is in this way, then, that the ap- found to consist in an existentiell attitude
parently grim necessity imposed upon of detachment from the past and open-
the theologian by the modern historical ness for the future. When the New Testa-
situation is transformed by Bultmann ment writers speak mythologically of life
into a positive virtue; for, as soon as it is "in faith" or "according to the Spirit," it
recognized that the New Testament does is this original mode of historical exist-
not intend to be an objective reportorial ence to which they fundamentally intend
statement but, on the contrary, seeks to to refer.32 Whereas in their view man "be-
speak to existence as an imperative call fore" or "outside of" faith is character-
to decision, the impossibility of any long- ized by a self-understanding in which he
er approaching its mythology as so many anxiously seeks to secure his existence by
objective statements clearly appears in a means of the various objective things
very different light. So far from seeming that he is or has or does, the believer un-
to be a handicap which is simply inflicted derstands himself in terms of the tran-
upon us by the exigencies of our contem- scendent reality which is the ultimate
porary situation, the necessity of under- ground and limit of this objective world.
standing the New Testament myths in To be "of the world," then, or, in the

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 BULTMANN'S PROJECT OF DEMYTHOLOGIZATION 163

language of Paul, to live "accordingunderstanding

to of existence; and faith
the flesh" does not mean to be impris- affirms this truth, even though it may
oned in an alien material body or to benot
at be bound by the New Testament's
the mercy of certain "lower" impulses;world
it of representations.""36
means, rather, to surrender one's self toIt is just at this point, however, that
Bultmann's projected demythologization
the "world," to the sphere of what is ob-
jectively visible and manageable, of bythe New Testament by way of an ex-
istential interpretation of its mythologi-
making it, instead of the ever transcend-
ent future, the ground and aim of one'scal conceptuality is confronted with an
existence.33 Thus, unlike gnosticism, important and far-reaching question. We
may recall from our previous discussion
with which in certain respects it appears
to have so much in common, the New
that Bultmann is convinced not only
Testament knows of no destiny whichthat is the New Testament can be de-
not at the same time the product of hu- mythologized but that this can be done
man freedom. In its view, man's plightin insuch a way as to disclose "the truth of
the world is due not to some primordial the kerygma as kerygma for the man
cosmic fate which is functionally inde- who no longer thinks mythologically."
pendent of his own responsible decision In fact, he is insistent that it is only be-
but to the fact that he freely elects tocause the kerygma itself demands, or at
understand himself in terms of the worldleast permits, such a critical interpreta-
tion that the theologian has any warrant
and thereby gives himself over to a fate-
ful dependence upon it.34 By the same for undertaking it at all."3 The question
token, Bultmann points out, the new lifewhich arises, however, is whether an ex-
in faith is not some static "nature" or istential interpretation of the type that
condition but, on the contrary, aswe a have just been considering can legiti-
specific way of existing historically,
mately lay claim to such a kerygmatic
stands under the imperative as wellsanction.
as Is the truth of the kerygma as
the indicative and therefore can be main- kerygma really disclosed when it is inter-
tained only by constantly being re- preted in abstraction from God's once-for-
affirmed anew in decision.35 all act in Jesus Christ and is presented
It is this understanding of human ex- simply as a particular understanding of
istence, then, in accordance with which human existence? Does the fundamental
man has these two fundamental possi- intention of the New Testament really
bilities of understanding himself in his come to expression when its proclama-
world, that the New Testament actually tion of a unique salvation occurrence is
intends to express. More specifically, reduced to a demand for a new self-
Bultmann argues, what is really at stake understanding?
in all its various mythological assertions Not only is Bultmann well aware of
is an imperative appeal addressed to the pertinence of such questions; he is
man's existentiell self-understanding to apparently also willing to concede the
give up his anxious preoccupation with validity of a negative answer to them.
the world and to understand himself For he clearly seems to acknowledge
henceforward solely in terms of the fu-
frankly that his existential interpretation
ture which is God's grace. As Bultmannof the Christian understanding of exist-
himself expresses it: "What is at issue is is an abstraction so long as it is con-
ence
sidered in itself and without regard for
the question concerning the truth of this

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164 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

the New Testament's assertion of God's ment to a brief consideration of its fun-
decisive act in Christ.38 While he insists damental character. And in this connec-
that there is nothing "mysterious" ortion two observations are especially
"supernatural" about Christian exist-pertinent.
ence and that it is an original possibility In the first place, it should be noted
of man as such, he also maintains that itthat Bultmann clearly intends to give a
is only as a consequence of the savingnegative answer to this question. The
work of God in Christ that this possi-notion that he ultimately "calls a halt to
bility is factually capable of realization.39the process of demythologising"42 or that
Until the circulus vitiosus of sin is broken he "himself seems to concede that we can
by God's deed of redemptive love, man speak of God's actions [sic!] only in
has no other destiny than the ever re- mythical terms"43 is certainly a miscon-
peated attempt to acquire and maintain ception. For it is obvious not only from
his own existence and the despair to the programatic essay itself but also from
which this attempt must inevitably lead.his subsequent replies to his critics that
What first makes it possible for him tohe at least does not intend to admit of
understand himself as he should-and any limit to the demythologization proc-
ess.44 However true it may be-and it
therefore, at least in principle, can--un-
derstand himself is God's eschatologicalundoubtedly is true-that such a limit
act of redemption in the person andactually
des- is involved in his appeal to
tiny of Jesus of Nazareth.40 God's once-for-all act in Christ, it is not
No sooner has Bultmann thus avoided true that he himself understands this
the first difficulty with which he is con- appeal as constituting a qualification of
fronted, however, than he is immediatelyhis hermeneutical project. The really
faced with yet another one. For the ques-conclusive evidence for this, of course, is
tion naturally arises as to whether this the way in which he proceeds to de-
appeal to a unique salvation occurrencemythologize the Christ occurrence itself.
does not constitute an important qualifi- The second observation which must be
cation of his original demand for a radi-made, however, is that the implementa-
cal demythologization of the New Testa-tion of this intention or, in other words,
ment. Can one really make such an the actual demythologization of the
appeal without setting a limit to de-Christ event involves a dehistoricization
mythologization? Or, to raise the same of the latter which completely undercuts
question in a slightly different way, is itthe appeal to an einmalig salvation oc-
not precisely this kind of appeal which,currence. We have previously seen how,
on Bultmann's own showing, has beenwhen faced with the objection that the
rendered incredible and irrelevant bykerygma is more than a particular under-
modern man's understanding of himselfstanding of human existence, Bultmann
and his world? Bultmann fully recog-appears to concede the validity of the
nizes the difficulty presented by thisobjection and appeals to the once-for-all
question and endeavors to overcome itact of God in Christ as the historical
in the concluding pages of his programat- ground of the Christian self-understand-
ic essay. Since, however, the details ofing. What we are saying now, however,
the argument which he sets forth thereis that this appeal is utterly deprived of
do not presently concern us, we may con- its force by the way in which he then
fine our attempt to understand his argu-proceeds to demythologize this unique

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 BULTMANN'S PROJECT OF DEMYTHOLOGIZATION 165

salvation event; for, in order to avoid a

words, nothing happens in the historical
event Jesus of Nazareth-at least so far
mythological interpretation of this event
as our salvation is concerned-which at
-and, as we have just seen, this is clear-
ly what he wants to do-Bultmannany
is given moment of time has not al-
ready happened and laid its claim upon
compelled so to interpret it as to collapse
us. If, as Bultmann says, "the possibility
it into the very self-understanding which
of the word's being understood coincides
it is allegedly supposed to ground. Thus,
as he actually expounds the matter,with to the possibility of man's understand-
ing himself,"49 then the conclusion can-
believe in Jesus as the Christ and to un-
derstand one's self henceforth solelynotin be avoided that the historical event
terms of the future are not two acts which this word proclaims is utterly
which are related to each other as ground transparent to, or logically independent
and consequent but, on the contrary,of, are
the primordial event of God's creative
one and the same thing.45 Bultmann and redemptive love. OnBultmann's own
writes: showing, the proclamation of God's deci-
Genuine proclamation proclaims [Christ] as
sive eschatological act in Christ is indis-
the end of the world when it proclaims him tinguishable
as from the original demand to
the Lord. "Jesus Christ is Lord"-that is understand
the one's self as a genuinely his-
oldest Christian confession. What does this con-
torical being and is therefore deprived of
fession mean? It means to allow the same paradox
and strictly independent validity.
to apply to one's own life and, although one
lives within the world .. to be already freed III
from it.46
We are now finally coming into posi-
It is evident not only from the innumer- tion to attack directly the way in which
able statements such as this to be found Bultmann deals with the problem of the-
throughout Bultmann's writings47 but ology and philosophy. What we have at-
also from the way in which he demythol- tempted to do in the previous discussion
ogizes the Cross and the Resurrection in is to analyze the basic structure and
the locus classicus in the programaticmovement of his thought and to exhibit
essay48 that the only meaning which he the fundamental Problematik in which
finally understands the New Testament's the latter is involved. Thus, on the one
hand, we have seen how he calls for and
christological assertions to have is a pure-
ly soteriological or existential meaning.actually carries out a radical demytholo-
So far from being statements concerning gization of the New Testament which, in
an actual historical occurrence, theseboth its negative and its positive aspects,
christological assertions turn out to be involves the complete dissolution of a
merely the mythological symbols of unique a salvation occurrence in history.
specific understanding of human exist-In so far as Bultmann is consistent in im-
ence; for, if Bultmann's existential inter-
plementing his hermeneutical project,
pretation of them is correct, then it clear-the historical event Jesus of Nazareth
ly follows that the event to which theyand the kerygma which derives from it
properly refer is not an event in time butare clearly deprived of any really inde-
one which primordially impinges uponpendence significance; for they are con-
time as its ground and limit and as such strued as merely the transparent means
is already constraining each of us at allfor expressing an original understanding
times to existentiell decision. In other of human existence and the primordial

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166 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

event of God's love one

which is can
the also say schematicall
objective
correlate of such a both denies and affirms the
self-understanding.
On the other hand, however, we have
identity of also
theology and philo
seen how Bultmann explicitly rejects
reason this
for stating the matter i
implication and insists upon the
is to be inde-
found in the nature of h
pendent validity of the proclamation of
itself; for, while he does not
God's unique act in Christ. However
deny un-
that unqualified demyth
relenting he may be in prosecuting
is possible, his
he does explicitly
claim for radical demythologization-
theology and philosophy are,
and, as we have indicated, analysis,
he exhibits no
identical. Precisely b
willingness whatsoever to makes
compromise it
this latter denial, howev
-he is equally uncompromising in qualifies
implicitly in- his herm
sisting that God has actedproject.
decisively inby the same toke
And,
Jesus of Nazareth and that it is this once-
plication of his explicit affirmat
possibility of demythologizati
for-all event to which the kerygma prop-
erly bears witness. The difficulty,
theology and ofphilosophy are f
course, is that both these distinguishable.
claims cannot In other wo
be true; for it is obvious that
makeswhen they
it possible for Bultmann
are taken together, they involve nothing theology and p
guish between
less than a logical self-contradiction.
is the very Ifthing which make
demythologization is possible
sary and, fur-
for him to set limits to the
thermore, is possible without qualifica-
demythologization. It is only
tion, then it demonstrably follows that
appeals-contrary to his expr
the kerygma can be nothing more what
tion-to than is
a obviously a m
specific understanding ofcal human exist- that he can avoi
occurrence
ence which is logically independent
implication of of his demand f
any particular historical occurrence. If,
demythologization that the
on the other hand, the kerygma
philosophyhasareafinally identica
logically necessary connection with
now seek a
to show the precis
particular historical event,
whichthen
this de-
is so.
mythologization or, at any We rate, unquali-
may begin by focusing mor
fied demythologization is than
clearlyhasimpos-
yet been done the ex
sible. It is this fundamental
ofinconsisten-
philosophy as Bultmann un
cy, which I have previously it. spoken of asto the usage cha
According
being ultimately structural in character,
of his writings, the word "philo
that stands at the very center
fers to of that
Bult-discipline which
mann's theology and completely condi-
primary object of concern th
tions its essential form and
man dynamics.
as an existing self or person
What we must attempt toasdo now
the is to natural and soci
various
show how his proposed solution of
approach man theexternally and
problem of theology and philosophy
merely as a "what" or an "obje
gives particularly pointedproperties
expression to be more or less
may
this inner Problematik.
ly described by a sufficiently
If one can say in a schematic way that
observer, philosophy attempts
Bultmann both affirms and denies
stand him thefrom the inside,
possibility of radical demythologization,
tempts to understand him as a

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 BULTMANN'S PROJECT OF DEMYTHOLOGIZATION 167

a "subject." What is presupposed by thisas to remain open to these possibilities

attempt is that man not only is butand thereby preserve his original relation
knows that he is and that, furthermore, to himself. Only in the latter case, how-
he is "disclosed" (erschlossen) to himselfever, is his existence "authentic" (eigent-
lich) human existence. It is in this sense,
as a being who has such a self-relation. In
this sense, then, Bultmann can speak of then, that one can say that there is given
philosophy as an undertaking which en- in and with the very nature of human life
itself the norm in terms of which it is to
deavors "to develop in an appropriate
conceptuality the understanding of exist- be judged. In so far, therefore, as philoso-
ence which is given with human exist- phy consists in the phenomenological
ence."50 What the philosopher attempts analysis of human existence, it also in-
to do is to explicate in a disciplined way cludes at least an "indirect" proclama-
the understanding which man always al-tion of this existential norm. That is, so
ready has of himself as a being who is far from having a purely theoretical or
self-related and is therefore constantlydescriptive import, the work of philoso-
concerned with the question of his exist- phy is, if only implicitly, an imperative
ence. In short, the philosopher's primary call to decision.53
task is that of a phenomenological or Now what first makes the problem of
descriptive analysis of the uniquely hu-theology and philosophy a pressing prob-
man type of being."' lem is the fact that it is precisely this un-
It is also clear from Bultmann's writ- derstanding of human existence which is
ings, however, that philosophy is by no explicated and proclaimed by philosophy
means restricted to this purely theoreti-that also finds expression in the New Tes-
cal function.52 On the contrary, in addi-tament. According to Bultmann, the ex-
tion to its formal or descriptive aspect, it istential analysis of man's being which
also has a material or normative side. has been developed by the researches of
That is, it not only analyzes what human modern philosophy, and particularly by
existence is but also indicates what it the work of Heidegger, is nothing more
really ought to be. Perhaps a more accu- than a conceptually precise restatement
rate way of expressing this would beoftothe New Testament understanding of
say that already implicit in philosophy's human existence.54 It is because this is
descriptive analysis of man as an existing so, of course, that the theologian has
self is a normative understanding of what available to him a non-mythological con-
human existence ideally should be. ceptuality For for interpreting the New Tes-
if it is true that man is the uniquely self- tament proclamation. While Bultmann
related being who is continually faced recognizes that contemporary philosophy
with the question of his existence, it is is
undoubtedly nourished by the theo-
also true that he has two fundamental logical tradition and, indeed, cannot be
possibilities for answering this question explained apart from it, he also insists
and that only one of these is congruent that the validity of its understanding of
with his essential nature. In other words, existence is not dependent upon this his-
either man can understand himself in torical connection.55 What validates phi-
such a way as in effect to deny the fact losophy's analysis in so far as it is vali-
dated is the fact that man actually is the
of his self-relation, i.e., by closing himself
against his infinite future possibilities; or sort of being that it describes. Bultmann
he can understand himself in such a way also points out that this is thoroughly in

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168 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

keeping with the understanding of existence

Christian the is a possibi
New Testament itself; for, in its to
belongs view,
man as such and at
"Christian existence is not
timesomething
go on to say that it first
mysterious or supernatural" but rather
possibility as the result of a c
historical
"the attitude of genuine occurrence? That Bultmann is
humanity"
which is an original possibility of man
by no means unaware asof the difficulty
such and which he therefore disclosed by suchal-
always questions is evident
ready knows.56 What distinguishes
from the fact that the-
he clearly attempts to
ology and philosophy, then, remove cannot be
it by introducing a distinction
between "a possibility
the fact that the latter is incapable of in- in principle" and
dependently discovering man's true
"a possibility na-
in fact."''9 Thus he argues
ture.57 On the contrary, that, while manar-
Bultmann does indeed have the
gues, the philosopher canpossibility
very well dis- of understanding
in principle
cover the nature of human existence
himself and, he does not have
authentically,
moreover, can express it suchfara more
possibilityade-
in fact; for, as he actu-
ally exists,writers
quately than the New Testament he has always already lost
possibly could. this possibility and therefore can only
If this is so, however, then
recovertheit in ques-
consequence of God's deci-
tion as to what it is that does
sive actdistinguish
in Jesus Christ. But does this dis-
tinction really
theology from philosophy becomes all do
theany more than merely
more pressing. Are theology and
restate the philoso-
difficulty? Is the notion of "a
phy really indistinguishable?possibility inIs the i.e., of a possi-
principle,"
Christian life of faith and bility
lovewhich, by definition, cannot be
merely
another way of talking about man's
realized, nat- notion?
a meaningful
ural self-understanding?The Bultmann's
truth is that Bultmann's proposed
summary answer to these questions
solution is of theology and
of the problem
unambiguous. He writes: philosophy is hopelessly self-contradic-
tory. If which
This, then, is the decisive thing it is true,dis-
as he says, that theolo-
gy and from
tinguishes the New Testament philosophy are by no means to be
phi-
losophy and the Christian faith from
identified a on
but, "natu-
the contrary, are clear-
ral" understanding of existence: the
ly to New Testa-then it cannot also
be distinguished,
ment speaks about and Christian
be true faith
that the knows
datum with which each
about a deed of God which first makes possible
of them
man's self-surrender [Hingabe], hisdeals is an identical
faith, his datum. If, on
the
other hand, one refuses, as Bultmann
love-in short, his authentic life.5s
in effect does, to accept this implication
and insists, theolo-
In other words, what distinguishes rather, that Christian exist-
gy from philosophy in Bultmann's view
ence is not something mysterious or su-
is the fact that it speaks pernatural
about abut unique
is one and the same with
act of God in the person man's
and original
destiny possibility
of of authentic
Jesus of Nazareth, which, as he
historical says,
existence, this can mean only
"first makes possible" thethat
authentic hu-
the distinction between theology
man existence that philosophy
and philosophy is also
once again dissolved.
knows about and proclaims
To try toas man's
avoid this contradiction by
original possibility. means of the specious distinction be-
But now will this answer really
tween bear in principle" and "a
"a possibility
examination? Can one really
possibilitysay that
in fact" is plainly an impos-

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 BULTMANN'S PROJECT OF DEMYTHOLOGIZATION 169

such
sible procedure. For to say that man an occurrence would not be of the
has
a possibility which cannot be realized- slightest moment to me as an existing
and this is all that a possibility inself who must win or lose himself in deci-
prin-
ciple means-is simply to deny that he and now. Nor can the attempt
sion here
has any such possibility at all. (which In theis perhaps the key to Bultmann's
same way it is obvious that one cannot entire theology) to avoid this conclusion
construe a possibility which becomes pos- of the mediating concept of the
by means
sible only in consequence of a particularkerygma actually be sustained. For, even
contingent occurrence as an essential though the kerygma is an event which
possibility of man as such-unless, does of
occur to me here and now, the fact
course, he is prepared to deny that all the
still remains that it is either an objective
men who lived before that event, statement
as well concerning certain more or less
as the vast majority of those whoextraordinary
have historical events, in which
lived after it, were really men. case it must undoubtedly be rejected as
No, the only way in which Bultmann mythology, or it is an imperative call to
can maintain a distinction between the- existentiell decision, in which case it is
ology and philosophy is to abandon com-demonstrably independent of any partic-
pletely his project of demythologization ular historical event. The only condition
and appeal to an event which is absolute-under which the demand to believe that
ly unamenable to existential interpreta-God has acted in Christ can coincide with
tion. For as soon as one assumes that the demand to understand myself anew
existential interpretation may be appliedas a genuinely historical being is that the
to such an event-and this is, of course,former demand be simply one way of ex-
precisely what Bultmann himself goes on pressing the latter. In that case, however,
to assume-the alleged distinction be- it is evident that the distinction between
tween theology and philosophy immedi-theology and philosophy has really dis-
appeared.
ately threatens to dissolve. On the other
hand, however, not to make this as- This, then, is the ultimate inconsisten-
sumption or, more accurately, not to cy of Bultmann's position. He affirms a
distinction between theology and philos-
apply existential interpretation leads to
a no less serious predicament. For it ophy
is which he can maintain only by ap-
obvious on Bultmann's own showingpealing to an event that he himself not
only in effect negatively rejects but also
that, as long as one does not interpret it
positively
existentially, the statement that God has is incapable of expressing. The
acted decisively in Jesus Christ is only
a conclusion, therefore, which may be
drawn from an analysis of his thought is
mythological statement. That is to say,
it is a statement which is at once in- that if theology and philosophy are to be
clearly and consistently distinguished, it
credible and irrelevant from the stand-
is necessary to reject his project of a radi-
point of our modern understanding of cal demythologization of the New Testa-
ourselves and our world. There is not the
ment. By the same token, however, it
slightest evidence that God has acted inmust also be concluded that, if such a re-
Christ in any way different from the wayjection is no longer really possible in our
in which he primordially acts in every contemporary situation, the attempt to
other event; and even if it could be es- distinguish theology from philosophy
tablished that he had, it is clear thatmust be abandoned.

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170 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION
IV unqualified acceptance of his propo
What remains to be done now in this
That there are, indeed, conditions u
which
concluding section is to make a few very a solution along these lines m
general comments with respect to the would appear to be evide
be effected
constructive implications of the consistent
preced- supernaturalism, for exam
ing analysis. I have previously which
stated sharply
my distinguishes betwee
conviction that it is only when ture
oneand
ac- grace might well be sai
achieve precisely this kind of solutio
cepts Bultmann's project of demytholo-
gization and does so consistently we haveandalready seen, however, the
without qualification that it is ficulty with any such solution-a
possible to
reach a genuinely tenable solution from tothe
thefact that it by no means
problem of theology and philosophy. clear kerygmatic sanction-is that i
That this conviction is not without jus-
been definitively discredited by our m
tification will, I trust, alreadyern understanding
have be- of ourselves and
come apparent from the course of the
world. For from the standpoint of
foregoing discussion. For if the analysis
contemporary historical situation, e
of Bultmann's thought presented attempt
here isto reject or to qualify B
correct, then it is clear that it ismann's
not any-demand for demythologiz
must appear to be nothing less tha
thing about the program of demythologi-
zation as such which accounts for the in-
attempt to evade conditions whic
necessarily
consistency of his solution but rather the imposed by the very na
fact that he, malgr" lui, does notof that situation itself and must th
unquali-
fiedly abide by that program.fore unquestionably be rejected.
If, how-
traditional notion of a unique salva
ever, one does accept his demythologiza-
eventthere
tion project without qualification, in history which is unamenab
would seem to be no reason whatsoever
demythologization and is therefore
pable self-
why one may not take up a logically of establishing a distinction
consistent position on the issue. What-
tween theology and philosophy sim
ever other objections may cannot be urged be maintained. Apart from
against such a course, it cannot cial
be pleading
seri- and specious argum
ously maintained, I think, that it must
a posse ad esse, it is impossible to estab
be discredited on purely formal the sort of event which would be
grounds.
quired
The really important question, how- in order to make such a dist
ever, is whether there is not also another
tion.60 The abiding lesson which is t
and equally consistent alternative
learned to from Bultmann's own attem
Bultmann's untenable position.distinguish
Is it not theology from philosoph
possible frankly to reject, or atthatleast
suchto attempts can be sustained
qualify, his demand for demythologiza-
by contradicting the understanding
tion and thereby to arrive at mana solution
and his world that necessarily a
of the problem of theology and out of our modern historical situat
philoso-
Even in cases, therefore, where the
phy which is also formally consistent?
And would not such a solutionmal have the
difficulties of Bultmann's posit
additional advantage of preserving
might bea avoided, i.e., where this un
standing
clear distinction between theology and of man and the world would
philosophy-a possibility which admit-
be explicitly affirmed to obtain, the
tedly cannot be realized on the basis of an
deavor to distinguish between theol

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 BULTMANN'S PROJECT OF DEMYTHOLOGIZATION 171

and philosophy by appealing to an demandein- which has already been laid

malig salvation occurrence wouldupon havemen by their Creator at all times
to be rejected as invalid on material and which, therefore, a truly adequate
grounds. philosophy also properly knows and
The only alternative, then, which is proclaims.
really open to contemporary theology is It is only on the basis of this funda-
to abandon completely the attempt to dis- mental recognition and the other con-
tinguish itself in any final way from phi- structive implications which follow from
losophy. If the theology of today is to it that theology can continue to secure a
face responsibly the situation in which hearing for itself in the present situation
it actually finds itself and, at the same and-so at least I should also want to
time, is to avoid intolerable inconsisten- argue-actually do justice to the task
cies, it has no other choice than frankly which has been committed to it. For the
to acknowledge its ultimate identity with real justification for insisting that theolo-
the "right philosophy," i.e., with the gy and philosophy are, in the last analy-
object of man's disciplined efforts to ex- sis, indistinguishable is not to be sought
plicate the understanding of existence in the exigencies of a particular apologet-
that is given with his existence itself. ic situation but in the very nature of the
Theology must recognize that what dis- Christian faith itself. If the God whom
tinguishes it from philosophy-in so far, we have been summoned to serve really
namely, as there is a distinction at all- is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus
is not the fact that it is based in a unique Christ and if what separates us from him
salvation occurrence of which philosophy is not some trick of fate but our own wil-
as such knows nothing but rather the fact ful refusal to submit to his holy will of
that the one understanding of existence love, then the possibility of any real dis-
to which philosophy and it alike bear tinction between theology and philoso-
witness has also been disclosed to it phy is excluded. Faith's own insistence
through the particular historical eventupon the freedom and transcendence of
from which it takes its rise. It must rec-
God and the freedom and responsibility
ognize, in other words, that the summons
of man requires precisely the identity of
to accept Jesus Christ as Lord, which is
theology and philosophy which is the
and must remain its proper concern, is a imperative of our contemporary
clear
demand that is utterly transparent to situation.
the

NOTES

1. Ian Henderson, Myth in the New Testament Kirche, N.F., X (1929), 28-57, and Bultmann's
(London, SCM Press, Ltd., 1952), p. 22. subsequent reply to it in the succeeding volume of
2. Cf., e.g., his comprehensive reply to his the
critics
same journal, "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins
in the second volume of Kerygma und Mythos, und der Glaube: Antwort an Gerhardt Kuhlmann,"
ed. H. W. Bartsch (Hamburg: Herbert Reich-
pp. 339-64. Practically all the arguments and
Evangelischer Verlag, 1952), pp. 179-208; herein-
counterarguments which are to be found in Bult-
after this work is referred to as "KM, II." mann's more recent interchange with Thielicke,
3. Cf. Kerygma und Mythos, I, ed. H.Schumann,
W. and others are already prefigured in this
Bartsch (2d ed.; Hamburg: Herbert Reich-Evan-
early debate.
gelischer Verlag, 1951), 31-40; hereinafter this
5. Heinrich Ott, Geschichte und Heilsgeschichte
work is referred to as "KM, I." in der Theologie Rudolf Bultmanns (Tiibingen:
4. Cf. especially Gerhardt Kuhlmann,J. "Zum
C. B. Mohr, 1955), pp. 89 f.
theologischen Problem der Existenz: Fragen an lieu of a complete documentation of this
6. In
Rudolf Bultmann," Zeitschrift fuir Theologie und
judgment which cannot, naturally, be presented

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 172 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION
be finally
here, reference may be made to the valid. The
criticism of decisive
Bult- thing, however, is not
the results of scientific
mann which has recently been developed by John thinking, but its method."
12. Cf. ibid.,
Macquarrie in his book, An Existentialist n. 1, where Bult nann quotes ap-
Theology
provingly
(London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1955). While theit
statement
is evi- of Hartlich and Sachs
that the
dent that Macquarrie's is one of "the unbridgeable
most sub- difference between modern
and mythical
stantial analyses of Bultmann's theology thinkinghave
which lies in the distinction between
a type criticism
yet appeared and that his concluding of judgment which
of it is consciously critical and
one which is unconsciously
(cf. esp. pp. 242 ff.) is incontrovertible, it is also uncritical." This state-
clear that he tends to give onlyment is quoted
a very by Bultmann from an extended dis-
inadequate
cussion of his Thus,
basis on which to make such a criticism. view of science
to and myth which
appears onillustration,
give but one particularly conspicuous pp. 117-23 of this same volume.
the reader who takes seriously his 13.emphatic
Ibid. asser-
tion that the view of F. H. Bradley 14. Cf.
is KM, I, 17 apart
"poles f.
from Bultmann's position" (p. 191) 15. Ibid.,
canpp. 18 f.
hardly be
16. Ibid., p. 19; that
prepared to accept his concluding argument cf. KM,itII, 181 f.
is precisely to "something similar 17. Ibid.to the view
sketched by Bradley" that Bultmann's approach
18. Ibid., p. 20.
19. KM,
ultimately leads (p. 243). In general, one II, must
182. say
that, although Macquarrie finally 20. Cf. the statement of
recognizes Hartlich and Sachs to
the
which Bultmann
"inconsistency" in Bultmann's position (cf.himself refers in summarizing his
p. 243),
position
his tendency both to overdraw the (KM, II, 182, n. 2).
differences be-
tween Bultmann and Heidegger (cf., 21. KM,e.g.,
I, 22. pp. 130
and 136) and to underestimate the 22. importance
Ibid. of
demythologization in Bultmann's 23. view Ibid. (cf. esp. pp.
25 f.) betrays him into presenting24. a Cf. esp. KM,
picture II,the
of 207.
25. KM,
latter which scarcely seems to justify suchI, 22.
a recog-
nition. 26. Ibid., p. 23.
27. Ibid.of the Swiss
7. Cf. especially the following essays
freisinnige Theologe, Fritz Buri: "Das 28. Cf., Problem
e.g., Das Urchristentumn
der im Rahmen der
ausgebliebenen Parusie," Schweizerische anliken Religionen (Zurich: Artemis Verlag, 1949),
theologische
Umschau, XVI (1946), 97-120; "Theologie und p. 186, where Bultmann presents a brief but im-
Philosophie," Theologische Zeitschrift, VIII (1952), portant discussion of the difference between gnosti-
116-34; and "Entmythologisierung oder Ent- cism's "naturalist" or "substantialist" understand-
kerygmatisierung der Theologie," KM, II, 85-101. ing of man and the "historical" or "existential
In general, i.e., with respect to the fundamental view which is presupposed by the New Testament
question of method, the point of view of the present (hereinafter this work is referred to as "Urchr.").
paper, in its critical as well as its constructive as- 29. Cf. KM, II, 187.
pects, is in substantial agreement with the views 30. Cf. ibid., p. 188; cf. also "Das Problem der
which have been so very ably defended on the conti- Hermeneutik," Glauben und Verstehen, II (Tiibin-
nent by Buri. I do hope to show elsewhere, however, gen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1952), 211-35.
that Buri's criticism of Bultmann, no less than that 31. Cf. KM, II, 191 ff.
of Macquarrie, Karl Barth, and others, requires to 32. Cf. KM, I, 29.
be corrected in important details before it can be 33. Cf. ibid., p. 28.
fully accepted. 34. Cf. ibid., p. 27; cf. also Urchr., pp. 212 ff.
8. Cf. KM, I, 19. 35. Cf. KM, I, 30 f.
9. Ibid. 36. Ibid., p. 23.
10. Cf., e.g., Macquarrie, op. cit., p. 168. Al-37. This does not mean, of course, as some of
though he nowhere explicitly discusses Bultmann's Bultmann's more friendly critics occasionally appear
concept of a "scientific world picture," Macquarrie to assume, that the kerygma is the only reason for
nevertheless assumes that it is to be equated with demythologization (cf., e.g., Ott, op. cit., pp. 94 f.).
"the pseudo scientific view of a closed universe thatWhile it is true that in his view demythologization
was popular half a century ago." may be relevantly undertaken only because (or
11. Cf. KM, II, 181: "Has the natural science in so far as) the kerygma itself also permits or re-
of today renounced experimentation [Bultmann quires it, it is not true that the validity of the de-
asks]? As long as it does not, it stands in the tradi-
mand for demythologization is contingent upon the
tion of thinking which goes back to the Greeks kerygma's concurrence. On the contrary, it is clear
with their question concerning the arche and their that the conclusion which would have to be drawn
demand for the logon didonai. Whoever stands inin
the absence of such a concurrence is not that this
this tradition also knows that all of the results of demand is invalid but that the kerygma itself (as
science are relative and that the particular world- well as its mythological form of expression) has now
become untenable.
picture of yesterday, today, or tomorrow can never

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 BULTMANN'S PROJECT OF DEMYTHOLOGIZATION 173
38. Cf. KM, I, 31. 51. Cf. ibid., pp. 192 ff.
39. Cf. ibid., pp. 34 f. 52. This seems to me to be unquestionably true,
40. Cf. ibid., pp. 38 ff. in spite of the fact that Bultmann occasionally
41. It may be useful at this point to call atten-affirms precisely the opposite. In his summary
tion to an error in the present text of the programaticreply to his critics, for example, he explicitly denies
essay which to some extent obscures the guiding
that philosophy has any other than a "purely
concern of its concluding pages. After having
formal" character (cf. ibid., pp. 192 f.). If this were
struggled for some time to understand the final
actually true, however, the problem of theology
paragraph in Section II, B, 1 (ibid., p. 40), I resolved
and philosophy with which he struggles so earnestly
to inquire of Professor Bultmann whether there on pp. 31-40 of his programatic essay would never
might not possibly be some mistake in the lastarise. It is not philosophy in the sense of a "purely
sentence as it is presently formulated. He has sub- formal" analysis which threatens to supplant
sequently assured me that this is indeed the case theology but rather a philosophy which "calls man
and that my conjecture as to what he actually in-back to himself from his lostness in the 'one' "
tended to say is correct. Accordingly, the sentence(KM, I, 35).
in question should be changed to read as follows: 53. Cf., e.g., "Echte und sikularisierte Verkiindi-
"Aber es bleibt die Frage, ob die Behauptung, dassgung im 20. Jahrhundert," p. 699, where Bultmann
der Uebergang aus jener in diese Existenz, die speaks of philosophical doctrines as being "genuine,"
Befreiung des Menschen von sich selbst zu seinem albeit "indirect" proclamation.
eigentlichen Leben, nur als eine Tat Gottes be- 54. Cf. KM, I, 33.
greiflich sei, der Glaube nur als Glaube an die in
55. Cf. ibid., pp. 34 f.
Christus offenbare Liebe Gottes wirklich sein
56. Ibid., pp. 35 and 34; cf. also pp. 36 and 38 f.
k6nne, eine mythologische Behauptung ist."
42. Henderson, op. cit., p. 17. 57. Cf. ibid., pp. 34 f.
43. Macquarrie, op. cit., p. 174. 58. Ibid., p. 40.
44. Cf. esp. KM, I, 48, 124; KM, II, 185 ff. 59. Cf. ibid., p. 37.
45. Cf. esp. Bultmann's reply to the criticism 60.of
A particularly notable example of this kind
Edward Schweitzer in KM, II, 202, n. 2; cf. also
of illegitimate argumentation is to be found in the
Theology of the New Testament, I, trans. Kendrick attempt to sketch a constructive alternative to
Grobel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), Bultmann which has been made by Macquarrie
300 f. (hereinafter this work is referred to as(op. cit.), who points out that the danger in Bult-
"TNT,
I."). mann's view of detaching theology from any re-
46. "Echte und sdikularisierte Verkiindigung imligious basis in the activity of God "can only be
20. Jahrhundert," Universitas: Zeitschrift fuirguarded against by the frank acknowledgement
Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literatur, X (1955), 705;that theology is concerned not only with statements
my italics. about human existence but with statements about
47. Cf., e.g., the statement in TNT, I, 191, that God and his activity as well" (ibid., pp. 243 f.). It
"Paul's christology is simultaneously soteriology" at once becomes evident, however, that the only
or the very similar assertion in a much earlier essay way in which Macquarrie can establish these latter
that the doctrine of justification is Paul's "true so-called "transcendent statements" is by means
christology" (Glauben und Verstehen, I [2d ed.; which are completely fallacious. Thus, in his argu-
Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1954], 262; hereinafter ment for the objective historicity of the Resurrec-
this work is "referred to as "GV, I"). tion, he writes: "The question is to be decided not
48. Cf. KM, I, 41-48. on general grounds of probability--for, after all, we
49. GV, I, 284; cf. also KM, I, 46, and Kerygma remember that these were unique events in which
und Mythos, III, ed. H. W. Bartsch (Hamburg: God was at work-but on the historical evidence
Herbert Reich-Evangelischer Verlag, 1954), 57 f. available" (ibid., p. 187). Not only is it clearly im-
50. KM, II, 192. Cf. the similar definition of it possible thus to oppose "general grounds of probabil-
as "a science which is nothing more than the clear ity" and available "historical evidence"; it is also
and methodical explication of the understanding of manifestly illicit to beg the very question which is at
existence that is given with existence itself" (ibid., p. issue by appealing in this way to God's alleged
189). activity.

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