A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT

MODELS IN MALAWI: THE CASE OF BUA AND KAOMBE WATER

USERS’ ASSOCIATIONS

Oliver M. Mkandawire

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Engineering, University of Malawi, The Polytechnic, in

partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Master of Science Degree in Infrastructure
Development and Management (IDM)

October 2015

ii
 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT
MODELS IN MALAWI: THE CASE OF BUA AND KAOMBE WATER
USERS’ ASSOCIATIONS

Oliver M. Mkandawire

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Engineering, University of Malawi, The Polytechnic, in

partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Master of Science Degree in Infrastructure
Development and Management (IDM)

October 2015

iii
 DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the Master of Science Degree in Infrastructure Development and
Management at the Polytechnic, University of Malawi. It has not been submitted for any
degree or examination to any university or college.

SIGNATURE :

DATE :

iv
 CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that they have read and approve for acceptance by the University of
Malawi, Polytechnic this thesis entitled ‘Comparative Study of Irrigation Management
Models in Malawi: The Case Study of Bua and Kaombe Water Users’ Associations.

Name of Main Supervisor : .................................................

Signature : .................................................

Date : .................................................

Name of Co-Supervisor : ................................................

Signature : ...............................................

Date : ...............................................

Head of Department : ..............................................

Signature : ..............................................

Date : ..............................................

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 DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to all the people who inspired, supported and encouraged me as
follows:

 My late father Gomani David Mkandawire for making me what I am today. Glory to the
good Lord and may his soul continue to rest in eternal peace.

 My wife Walunji for giving me hope that I can do it and her love, support and
encouragement.

 My mother Ivy Nyasulu for her inexhaustible encouragement.

 To my children Collen and Lorraine that still go to school, it is my sincere hope that this
will inspire them to pursue their education further and live successful lives.

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I express my sincere gratitude to my research supervisors for the valuable support, coaching,
advice, suggestions and commitment throughout the duration of this study.

Special vote of thanks is extended to the irrigation users and managers of Bua and Kaombe
WUAs for responding to the survey questionnaire on time.

I also extend my gratitude to Mathews Gonapo Mlenga, my very considerate friend for his
unwavering material support, patience and love throughout the study period.

vii
 ABSTRACT

Malawi relies on rain-fed agriculture to meet food security and economic needs. However,
heavy reliance on rain-fed agriculture is characterised by persistent food shortfalls often
caused by natural and economic disasters. Consequently, the Government of Malawi, donors
and NGOs poured resources into small-scale irrigation projects focussing on food security. In
Malawi, since 1960’s irrigation schemes were being managed by central government with the
assistance from bilateral donors like the Taiwanese and the Chinese governments. In 1999,
the Government of Malawi initiated a transfer of irrigation management from Government to
organized farmers groups in order to improve accountability of irrigation services, motivate
farmers to invest more in maintenance of irrigation schemes and to save government funds on
operations. This far, despite GoM adoption of the new irrigation policy and assuming a
coordination role in participatory irrigation development, the sustainability of farmer
organisations in Malawi seems to vary from scheme to scheme and is still questionable as no
initiative has been done to understand which of the IM models are suitable and practical to
irrigation users. Further, comparative explorations of user perspectives on different irrigation
models have been lacking since the advent of IMT and PIM. This study focused on
investigating whether irrigation management is better or worse now with PIM than during the
State-managed irrigation system model. Forty-seven irrigation management attributes were
identified. Bua and Kaombe WUAs in Nkhotakota District of Malawi were chosen as study
sites. A questionnaire was administered to irrigation users and agricultural managers to
evaluate the relative preference of the identified attributes. A Paired Means t-Test was used to
determine whether differences in preferences were statistically different. The study reveals
that on the overall no significant or substantial changes have taken place to signify
improvement in the irrigation management. However, the State Model was better than the
WUA Model in financial, technical and environmental aspects, while the WUA Model is
better than the State Model in governance and gender aspects. It is recommended that another
study be done on a larger scale to include fourteen WUAs excluded in this study. Further,
additional factors such as production, maintenance, marketing and others may be further
explored for more information since this particular study was based on few factors.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION .................................................................................................................... IV

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL ............................................................................................. V

DEDICATION ........................................................................................................................ VI

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ..................................................................................................... VII

ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................... VIII

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ IX

CHAPTER 1 ..............................................................................................................................1

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................1

1.1 BACKGROUND OF IRRIGATION IN MALAWI .....................................................................1

1.1.1 Broad Irrigation Characteristics in Malawi ............................................................1
1.1.2 Irrigation Development in Malawi .........................................................................2
1.1.3 Legal Framework of Irrigation in Malawi .............................................................3
1.2 GLOBAL STATUS OF IRRIGATION .....................................................................................4
1.3 IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT TRANSFER ...........................................................................5
1.4 IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT.............................................................................................5
1.4.1 Approaches of Irrigation Management ..................................................................6
1.4.2 Models of Irrigation Management Systems (IMS) ................................................9
1.5 RESEARCH PROBLEM .....................................................................................................10
1.5.2 Research Hypotheses ...........................................................................................11
1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................11
1.6.1 Main Objective .....................................................................................................11

CHAPTER 2 ............................................................................................................................12

LITERATURE REVIEW.........................................................................................................12

2.1 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................12
2.2 SUSTAINABILITY OF IRRIGATION SYSTEMS ...................................................................12
2.2.1 Sustainable Irrigation Practices and Irrigation Management ...............................13
2.3 SUCCESS OF AN IRRIGATION ORGANIZATION ................................................................13
2.4 REVIEW OF THE IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT FACTORS..................................................14
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 2.4.1 Financial Factors ..................................................................................................14
2.4.2 Technical Factors .................................................................................................16
2.4.3 Social/Cultural Factors .........................................................................................22
2.4.4 Environmental Factors .........................................................................................24
2.4.5 Governance Factors ..............................................................................................26
2.4.7 Gender Factors .....................................................................................................34
2.4.8 Agronomic Factors ...............................................................................................35
2.5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................35

CHAPTER 3 ............................................................................................................................37

METHODOLOGY...................................................................................................................37

3.1 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................37
3.2 WATER USERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN MALAWI ..................................................................37
3.2.1 Research Study Sites ............................................................................................37
3.2.2 Basic Data for the Water Users’ Associations ....................................................38
3.3 RESEARCH SAMPLING PROCEDURE ...............................................................................39
3.3.1 Target Population .................................................................................................39
3.3.2 Sampling Method .................................................................................................39
3.3.3 Sample Size ..........................................................................................................40
3.4 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN...............................................................................................42
3.4.1 Data Collection.....................................................................................................43
3.4.2 Pilot Study ............................................................................................................44
3.4.3 Participation Arrangements..................................................................................44
3.4.4 Time Duration for Responses...............................................................................44
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS ...........................................................................................................45
3.5.1 The Relative Importance Index (RII) ...................................................................47
3.5.2 The Paired Sample t-Test .....................................................................................47
3.6 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS ...............................................................................................48
3.7 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................48

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CHAPTER 4 ............................................................................................................................49

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS ............................................................................................49

4.1 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................49
4.2 RESPONSE RATE ............................................................................................................49
4.3 PART 1: RESPONDENT’S GENERAL INFORMATION ........................................................50
4.3.1 Respondent Positions ...........................................................................................50
4.3.2 Respondent Gender ..............................................................................................51
4.3.3 Respondent Educational Qualifications ...............................................................51
4.4 PART 2: EVALUATION OF THE IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT FACTORS ...........................52
4.4.1 Study Outcomes ...................................................................................................52
4.4.2 Study Factors ........................................................................................................52
4.4.3. Analysis of the Study Factors ............................................................................54
4.5.1 Financial Factors ..................................................................................................84
4.5.2 Technical Factors .................................................................................................85
4.5.3. Social or Cultural Factors ....................................................................................86
4.5.5 Governance Factors ..............................................................................................88
4.5.7 Agronomic Factors ...............................................................................................89
4.5.8 Overall Irrigation Management Factors ...............................................................90

CHAPTER 5 ............................................................................................................................91

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................91

5.1 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................91
5.2 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................91
5.3 RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................92
5.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ...................................................................92
REFERENCES.....................................................................................................................93

APPENDICES .......................................................................................................................111

7.1 APPENDIX 1: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE .......................................................................111

7.1.1 Questionnaire for Agricultural Managers (English Version) .............................111
7.2 APPENDIX 2: RAW DATA ...........................................................................................127

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 LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 : Summary of the Irrigation Management (IM) Sub-Factors ......................................36

Table 2 : Ordinal Scale for Data Rating ...................................................................................42
Table 3: List of Irrigation Management Sub-Factors and Codes ............................................46
Table 4 : Response Rate ...........................................................................................................49
Table 5: Respondent Positions ................................................................................................50
Table 6 : Respondent Gender ...................................................................................................51
Table 7 : Respondent Educational Qualifications ....................................................................51
Table 8 : Summary of Irrigation Management (IM) Factors ...................................................53
Table 9 : Summary of the Relative Preference Indices ............................................................55
Table 10:Financial RPIs ...........................................................................................................57
Table 11:Technical RPIs ..........................................................................................................59
Table 12:Social/Cultural RPIs .................................................................................................61
Table 13:Environmental RPIs ..................................................................................................63
Table 14:Governance RPIs ......................................................................................................65
Table 15:Gender RPIs ..............................................................................................................67
Table 16:Agronomic RPIs .......................................................................................................69
Table 17:Overall Factor RPI’s by Model .................................................................................70
Table 18:Overall Factor RPIs by Rank ....................................................................................71
Table 19:Paired Financial Samples Statistics (8 sub-factors) ..................................................72
Table 20:Paired Financial Samples Test ..................................................................................73
Table 21:Paired Technical Samples Statistics (8 sub-factors) .................................................74
Table 22:Paired Technical Samples Test .................................................................................74
Table 23:Paired Social/Cultural Samples Statistics (4 sub-factors) .........................................75
Table 24:Paired Social/Cultural Samples Test .........................................................................76
Table 25:Paired Environmental Samples Statistics (7 sub-factors) .........................................77
Table 26:Paired Environmental Samples Test .........................................................................77
Table 27:Paired Governance Samples Statistics (15 sub-factors)............................................78
Table 28:Paired Governance Samples Test..............................................................................79
Table 29:Paired Gender Samples Statistics (3 sub-factors) .....................................................80
Table 30:Paired Gender Samples Test .....................................................................................80
Table 31:Paired Agronomic Samples Statistics (2 sub-factors) ...............................................81

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Table 32: Paired Agronomic Samples Test ..............................................................................82
Table 33: Paired IM Sample Statistics .....................................................................................83
Table 34: Paired IM Samples Test ...........................................................................................84
Table 35: Raw Data for Bua Irrigation Users’ Ratings on State Model ................................128
Table 36: Raw Data for Bua Irrigation Users Ratings on WUA Model ...............................129
Table 37: List of Irrigation Users for Bua WUA ..................................................................130
Table 38: Raw Data for Bua Managers on State Model .......................................................131
Table 39: Raw Data for Bua Managers on WUA Model ......................................................132
Table 40 : List for Bua Managers ..........................................................................................133
Table 41 : Raw Data for Kaombe Irrigation Users on State Model .......................................134
Table 42 : Raw Data for Kaombe Irrigation Users on WUA Model .....................................135
Table 43 : List for Kaombe Users ..........................................................................................136
Table 44 : Raw Data for Kaombe Managers on State Model ................................................137
Table 45 : Raw Data for Kaombe Managers on WUA Model ...............................................138
Table 46 : List for Kaombe Managers ...................................................................................139

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB Asia Development Bank

BoT Board of Trustees

DCGL Dwangwa Cane Growers Limited

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FMIS Farmer-Managed Irrigation System

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GoM Government of Malawi

IA Irrigation Agency

IC Irrigation Cooperative

IIMI International Irrigation Management Institute

IM Irrigation Management

IMT Irrigation Management Transfer

IRLAD Irrigation Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Development

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

JMIS Jointly-Managed Irrigation System

KCGL Kasinthula Cane Growers Limited

MGDS Malawi Growth and Development Strategy

NIPDS National Irrigation Policy Development and Strategy

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

N-PIM Non-Participatory Irrigation Management

RPI Relative Preference Index

SCPMP Smallholder Crop Production and Marketing Project

SM State Management

SMIS State-Managed Irrigation System

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USDA United States Department of Agriculture

WRMPS Water Resources Management Policy and Strategy

WUA Water Users’ Association

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 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of Irrigation in Malawi

Malawi relies on rain-fed agriculture to meet food security and economic needs. However,
heavy reliance on rain-fed agriculture is constrained by persistent food shortfalls often caused
by natural and economic disasters. Although abundant freshwater resources exist (thirteen
perennial rivers and three lakes cover almost 20 per cent of the area of Malawi), only a small
proportion of agricultural land is irrigated (Kilpatrick, 2011). Irrigated agriculture has great
promise to alleviate the food deficit problems that usually occur yearly in Malawi
(Lauterbach & Matenje, 2013) and is being promoted not only as a way of fostering rural
development, but also a means of reducing rural poverty, malnutrition, and disease, and
stemming the growing social and economic inequalities between rural and urban areas
(Nkhoma & Mulwafu, 2003).

The Government of Malawi, donors and NGOs have poured resources into small-scale
irrigation projects focussing on food security because irrigation is considered a solution to the
problem of over-reliance on rain-fed agriculture. Numerous irrigation technologies such as
treadle pumps, sprinklers, motorized, river diversion, canalization, drip kits have been used to
combat food insecurity (Wiyo & Mthethiwa, 2008). Malawi thus endeavours to shift its
approach from the traditionally continued reliance on rain-fed agriculture, characterised by
unreliable rainfall, floods and persistent droughts to a more reliable irrigated agriculture
(Lauterbach & Matenje, 2013; Mangisoni, 2006).

1.1.1 Broad Irrigation Characteristics in Malawi

The oldest traditional irrigation method used in the country is the watering can. It is probably
the cheapest and simplest technology and most widely used by smallholder farmers in self-
help schemes (Njoloma et al., 2009). Irrigation schemes may be formal, semi-formal, or
informal depending on the management structure. Informal schemes are developed by the
farmers themselves with limited or no technical design input whereas in semi-formal schemes
farmers receive technical support along with formal establishment of a management
organization. Formal schemes encompass all schemes planned, designed and built by trained
1
professionals according to technical standards. The Department of Irrigation (DoI) in Malawi
classifies irrigation schemes into three, namely: small schemes with a gross area of less than
50 ha; medium schemes with 50 to 500 ha; and large schemes which include those over 500
ha in size.

Irrigated land in Malawi includes formal irrigation schemes operated by government and
private estate owners, as well as land along stream banks, in low-lying areas of residual
moisture, and in wetlands cultivated by small-scale farmers in the dry season. Malawi’s total
irrigated land is estimated to be as little as 28,000 hectares up to 680,000 hectares. These
estimates group formal, semi-formal, and informal schemes together to varying degrees.
Estimates of informal schemes range as low as 6,500 up to 480,000 hectares whereas formal
or semi-formal schemes range as low as 28,000 hectares up to 200,000 hectares. The
common estimate for the potential irrigated area (not limited to wetlands) is between 250,000
and 500,000 hectares. Most of the potentially irrigable land lies in the plains along the shores
of Lake Malawi, the Lake Chilwa Plain, the Lower Shire Valley and the flood plain of the
Limphasa River in Nkhata Bay (Ferguson & Mulwafu, 2005).

1.1.2 Irrigation Development in Malawi

Irrigation is the abstraction of water from a source, conveyance and distribution through
conduits, and application by furrows, borders, sprinklers or in drips to a plant growing in the
soil. Irrigation development on the other hand is a case of agricultural development in which
technology intervenes to provide control for the soil moisture regimes in the crop root zone to
achieve a high standard of continuous cropping through flooding, furrowing, sprinkling or
spraying and dripping. With respect to the area irrigated, scale of operation and type of
control or management, irrigation is further categorized as small, medium or large scale.
Irrigation is also categorized using by ownership, economic objective or modernity (Gum’ a,
2004).

The evolution of irrigation development can be divided into four distinct eras: the
government initiated scheme era; the self-help era; the scheme management transfer era and
the irrigation for food security era (Wiyo & Mthethiwa, 2008). The government initiated
scheme era dates back to the 1940s with the development of the Limphasa irrigation scheme
in the Nkhata Bay District (Njoloma et al., 2008) followed by the Sugar Corporation of
2
Malawi (SUCOMA) established in 1965 (Njoloma et al., 2009). A total of 16 schemes were
thus developed by government between 1967-1982 along the shores of Lake Malawi, and
around Lake Chilwa and in the Lower Shire. These large bureaucratic irrigation schemes
were funded by donors and were settled by farmers from all over Malawi. These were river
diversion schemes and included: Hara, Wovwe, and Lufilya in Karonga; Lweya and
Limphasa in Nkhata Bay; Bua, Kasito and Kaombe in Nkhota Kota; Khanda, Likangala and
Domasi in Zomba; Kasinthula and Nkhate in Chikwawa and Muona in Nsanje. Kasinthula
Scheme later turned into an out-grower sugarcane scheme for Illovo (Nchalo) Sugar Estate
and is under the management of Kasinthula Cane Growers Limited (KCGL). The schemes
focussed on rice production. As the large bureaucratic irrigation schemes in Malawi became
expensive to run, donors moved out of agricultural water development projects. This left
GoM to develop irrigation alone (Wiyo & Mthethiwa, 2008).

1.1.3 Legal Framework of Irrigation in Malawi

The main pieces of legislation concerned with issues of water resources and irrigation in
Malawi are the Water Resources Act of 1969 and the Irrigation Act of 2001. The Water
Resources Act of 1969 regulates the control, apportionment and use of all water resources in
Malawi. All abstractions greater than 1000 Litres/day except municipal use must have a
permit. The Irrigation Act of 2001 provides for sustainable development and management of
irrigation schemes, protection of the environment from irrigation related degradations, and
the establishment of a National Irrigation Board.

The main policies are the National Irrigation Policy and Development Strategy (NIPDS) and
the Water Resources Management Policy and Strategy (WRMPS) both developed by the
Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development. There have been multiple editions of these
policies, but overall the NIPDS strives to manage and develop water and land resources in an
economically sound and sustainable manner. It also calls for the transfer of smallholder
irrigation schemes previously operated by the GoM, to newly formed farmers’ associations,
water-user groups, or other local institutional structures.

According to the NIPDS (2010), GoM shall facilitate the irrigation development process
sustainably using participatory approaches to increase agricultural production; and encourage
rural communities to manage and operate irrigation schemes based on principles of cost
3
sharing and cost recovery; and promote the spirit of a business culture in small-scale irrigated
agriculture (Amadou et al., 2006). Before the new irrigation policy came into effect there was
no existing irrigation policy and GoM directly implemented irrigation development, owned
and managed all public irrigation schemes.

1.2 Global Status of Irrigation

The irrigation sector was in the 1950’s and 1960’s globally dominated by centralized
planning, development and management. Discovery of farmer-managed irrigation systems in
the 1970’s, disillusion towards poor-performing State-led interventions and controversies
around large-scale irrigation projects led to a paradigm shift towards participatory
development approaches. The adoption of the 1992 “Dublin Principles,” along with a number
of other key international agreements, led to notable shifts in water management, such as: (i)
engaging users more and fully through devolution of irrigation management; (ii) increasing
focus on women as water users and managers; and (iii) institutionalization of market reforms
in water management, by privatizing and/or commodifying water governance (Harris &
Gantt, 2007).

Participatory approaches generate success stories, particularly in commercial farming but

with variable outcomes and impacts (Mukherji et al., 2009), for instance, users become
empowered, irrigation infrastructure is well maintained, governments spend less on scheme
management, water management improves and irrigated agriculture becomes more profitable
(ADB, 2012). The recognition of irrigation farming as an important source of livelihood is
reflected in the growing demand of water for dry season farming in the communities.
Estimates are that if sustainable irrigation water management strategies are not implemented,
an estimated loss of agricultural production of 7.8% by 2080 will be incurred (Michalidis et
al., 2011; Cline, 2007).

4
1.3 Irrigation Management Transfer

Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) is a process in which the responsibility and authority
of managing state irrigation schemes are relocated into the hands of non-governmental
organizations such as water users’ associations, cooperatives or other private-sector entities
(Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). IMT was the major thrust of the era for the large irrigation
schemes whereby scheme operation and maintenance were decentralized from government to
communities. It included the transfer of ownership, water rights, and management of
irrigation systems to farmers in their localities. The purpose of IMT was to reduce public
expenditures, improve irrigation performance, enhance sustainability of irrigation facilities,
conserve water resources and reduce resource consumption, and to empower farmers. The
IMT process was widely expected to increase agricultural productivity amongst the other
benefits through irrigation. This would in turn improve users’ living standards (Zuka, 2013;
Nkhoma, 2011). GoM’s role was now restricted to provision of extension services and
facilitation. For this, the users had to pay for the irrigation costs (Nkhoma & Mulwafu, 2004).
GoM had to rehabilitate the schemes before the transfer process, through donor project
funding. However, IMT has had mixed success in Malawi as many farmers struggled to run
and maintain the schemes (Zuka, 2013; Nkhoma, 2011).

1.4 Irrigation Management

Irrigation management (IM) is defined as:

The process by which institutions or individuals set objectives for irrigation systems,
establish appropriate conditions; identify, mobilize and use resources so as to attain these
objectives while ensuring that all activities are performed without causing adverse effects
(Zwarteveen, 1995); or

The undertaking of all irrigation activities from planning through design and construction to
maintenance, and system evaluation at all levels (tertiary, secondary, and main system)
consisting of five elements (infrastructure, human resources and institution, legal, financial
and economic affairs), and the environment (Burton, 2010); or the three interlocking sets of
activities, each different but with complementary focus, namely: the water used in irrigation;
the physical structures that control water, and the organization, both system-level and farm-
level, controlling these structures, which also control water (Uphoff, 2006).
5
1.4.1 Approaches of Irrigation Management

An approach is a road or path leading to something (Turnbull & Phillip, 2010; Hornby et al,
1963). An approach of Irrigation Management (IM) approach is thus a road or path for
attainment of irrigated crop productivity while also sustaining the irrigation systems. There
are two IM approaches in Malawi, and these are: participatory and non-participatory
approaches.

1.4.1.1 Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM)

Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) refers to the involvement of farmers in all

irrigation development activities from irrigation scheme planning to operation and
maintenance and at all levels of IM (Hamada & Samad, 2011; Huang et al., 2010; Van Vuren
et al., 2002). Under PIM, farmers are expected to participate in three main but different ways:
water management, maintenance, and financial cost recovery (Ghazouani et al., 2012). Water
Users’ Associations and Irrigation Cooperatives are good examples of PIM arrangements. In
Malawi, PIM is implemented through various arrangements such as WUAs, ICs and farmer
groups such as irrigation clubs, water user groups.

1.4.1.1.1 Water Users’ Association

A Water Users’ Association (WUA) is a service-oriented water user group that abides by an
agreed upon constitution and is entrusted with water management duties, i.e. irrigation
system operation and maintenance, and fee collection (Zuka, 2013; Xei, 2007). WUAs are
farmer-run, participatory institutions introduced to increase water management efficiency
(Wang et al., 2010). They also act as communication conduits between the public sector and
irrigation users in managing irrigation schemes and promote local participation for
accountability of irrigation services. A WUA is composed of a management structure with an
elected executive board, a general assembly (all irrigation users) and a board of trustees
(BoT). WUAs also represent irrigation users in a command area; be legalised for contractual
agreements; authorised to manage, operate and maintain irrigation infrastructure; and have
the administrative and financial autonomy (Xei, 2007).

6
All the sixteen (16) former State-constructed and owned irrigation schemes in Malawi now
operate as full WUAs and have the legal mandate to undertake such irrigation operations
independently.

1.4.1.1.2 Irrigation Cooperative

An Irrigation Cooperative (IC) is a business-oriented irrigation or farmer organisation, owned

and controlled by people who use its irrigation services, and whose benefits are shared by the
irrigation users based on their use. It is based on three key principles, namely; it is member-
owned; it is member-controlled, and member-benefits. Cooperatives are different from other
businesses in that they are owned by members and operate for the benefit of members, rather
than earn profits for investors (Torgerson, 2002; USDA, 1995). Just like other businesses,
most cooperatives are incorporated under state law. Cooperatives provide market access,
competitive returns, technological innovations, democracy in decision-making and
leadership, and may be used as tools for improving the economic well-being of the farming
community to boost the rural quality of life (Chibanda et al., 2009; Torgerson, 2002; USDA,
1995). Bwanje Valley Irrigation Scheme in Dedza District of Malawi is a good example of
such a cooperative.

1.4.1.2 Non-Participatory Irrigation Management

Non-Participatory Irrigation Management (N-PIM) is defined as the non-involvement of

farmers in selected irrigation development activities such as scheme financing, management
and maintenance in IM. Under this approach irrigation schemes are owned and managed by
the State. The State is only fully involved in major scheme activities and irrigation users are
involved in minor scheme development operations such as crop production and paid-up
maintenance work. Under this approach most irrigation schemes may have a fully fledged
management unit in agronomy and engineering responsible for daily scheme management
implemented either by the state or a contracted authority such as an irrigation agency. N-PIM
may be implemented through State institutions or irrigation agencies.

7
1.4.1.2.1 State Institutions

Under the State Institutions (SI) ownership, operation and maintenance of the irrigation
schemes, and other major irrigation works are the States’ responsibility. State institutional
management of irrigation schemes in Malawi has been considered unsuccessful since the
beginning of the democratic era. The State management was characterised by limited
financial resources and management inconsistencies due to changes of governance systems
from autocracy to democracy (Zuka, 2013). Under autocracy, irrigation schemes were
operated and maintained by GoM using ground workers and sometimes prisoners. Farmers
only cultivated in the plots and government would provide them with markets for the crops. It
may therefore be argued that farmers not fully and locally owned the schemes (Ghazouani et
al., 2012).

1.4.1.2.2 Irrigation Agency

Under the Irrigation Agency (IA) arrangement, an organisation with autonomy (in finances
and management) from the state or dependency on state may be contracted to manage and
own irrigation facilities or infrastructure on behalf of the state (Aheeyar, 2002). A WUA may
be responsible for scheme management only (and not property ownership) of tertiary and
below canal levels of irrigation infrastructure. An irrigation agency may be responsible for
managing main and up to secondary irrigation canals and structures and owns irrigation
infrastructure property. The IA also supervises and assists a WUA in managing tertiary and
lower level canal structures (Xei, 2007). On most occasions the IA is only responsible for and
only interested in the management of water down to the intake of the tertiary canal, after
which farmers dependent on a particular intake have to share water, and maintain the tertiary
infrastructure (Ghazouani et al., 2012). Practical examples of irrigation agencies in Malawi
are Kasinthula Cane Growers Limited (KCGL) in Chikwawa and Dwangwa Cane Growers
Limited (DCGL) in Nkhotakota.

8
1.4.2 Models of Irrigation Management Systems (IMS)

A model is defined as a design or structure of something from which many copies can be
reproduced (Hornby et al., 1963). An irrigation management model is thus a design of a
management arrangement on which irrigation users’ base to successfully implement various
irrigation functions. An irrigation system refers to the physical and social infrastructure (rules
and procedures) that ensures the operation of the technology involved and the delivery of
water (Gillingham, 1999), or as a human intervention to modify the water resource spatially
and temporarily in order to support crop growth and improve agricultural production (Small
& Svensen, 1992). Three models of IM systems exist globally (Aheeyar, 2002), namely; the
farmer-managed, state-managed and jointly-managed irrigation systems.

1.4.2.1 Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems

The Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems (FMIS) are systems that are entirely operated and
maintained by the irrigation users without external assistance, for example, both indigenous
(self-help or farmer initiated) systems and the systems which are turned over by the State to
the farmers (Aheeyar, 2002). FMIS are endowed with social capital-the features of social
organization such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation
amongst communities for their mutual benefit (Ghazouani et al., 2010)

1.4.2.2 State-Managed Irrigation Systems

The State-Managed Irrigation Systems (SMIS) are systems that are constructed, owned and
managed by the State or agency. Generally, State-controlled irrigation systems are relatively
large and technically complex compared to FMIS. The governing agency is financially and
organizationally autonomous from the central government or dependent on government
control. However, the performance of FMIS in terms of cropping intensity, technical efficacy
of infrastructure and water availability is higher than SMIS (Aheeyar, 2002).

9
1.4.2.3 Jointly-Managed Irrigation Systems

The Jointly-Managed Irrigation Systems (JMIS) involve participation of different

stakeholders in IM and this varies from place to place. Generally, management responsibility
at primary level of irrigation schemes (head works and main canal) lies on State/line agency
and the operation and maintenance of secondary and tertiary level is the responsibility of
irrigation users. WUAs have been formed at users’ level to perform this task. Under the
concept of joint or participatory management, WUAs have to be involved actively in system
management (Aheeyar, 2002).

This research study focuses on two models using two different implementation arrangements,
i.e. the WUA arrangement under FMIS and the State arrangement under SMIS in two
smallholder irrigation schemes in Malawi.

1.5 Research Problem

Although the Government of Malawi has adopted the new irrigation policy and assumes a
coordinating role in participatory irrigation development to locally sustain smallholder
irrigation schemes and save public money, sustainability of the WUAs in Malawi may vary
from scheme to scheme and still be questionable as no initiative has been done to understand
which of the irrigation management models using different implementation arrangements is
suitable and practical to irrigation users, and, that comparative explorations of user
perspectives on different irrigation models have been lacking since the advent of IMT and
PIM.

1.5.1 Research Questions

A comparative study of the two irrigation management models in Malawi focuses on

answering the following general research question: How do stakeholders rate differences in
irrigation management between the State and WUA models of irrigation management
following a national policy shift from centralized to decentralized management of the
smallholder irrigation schemes?

10
1.5.2 Research Hypotheses

The 'null hypothesis', HN: There is no difference in irrigation management aspects between
the State and WUA Models?

The 'alternative hypothesis', HA: There is a difference in irrigation management aspects

between the State and WUA Models?

1.6 Research Objectives

1.6.1 Main Objective

The main objective of the study was to investigate whether irrigation management is better or
worse now with Participatory Irrigation Management than during the State-Managed
Irrigation System model.

1.6.2 Specific Objectives

The specific study objectives were:

(i). To identify the factors of irrigation management.

(ii). To rank the factors based on preferences of irrigation management stakeholders.

(iii). To determine whether differences in stakeholder preferences between factors of the

two irrigation management models are significant.

1.7 Outline of the Remainder of Thesis

The remainder of the thesis includes literature review, methodology, conceptualization,

variables, issues of measurement, design, sample size and sampling methods, data collection
methods, capturing and analysis; results, presentation and discussions, presentation of results,
theme discussion of results; recommendations, discussion of gaps, anomalies and/or
deviations in the data, making larger significance of the research results explicit, policy and
other recommendations.

11
 CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the sustainability concept for irrigation systems, followed by the
identified irrigation management factors with focus on farmer and state based approaches. It
generally explores the available factors of irrigation management by identifying a set of sub-
factors essential for sustainability of smallholder irrigation systems in Malawi. Finally, it
further summarises the selected sub-factors for each factor.

2.2 Sustainability of Irrigation Systems

Sustainability of irrigation systems is defined as their ability to withstand collapse while

maintaining satisfactory irrigated agricultural production (Oster & Wichelns, 2003; Conway,
1975). Sustainability of irrigation systems may be looked at in terms of irrigation
management and sustainable irrigation practices (Gutu et al., 2014). The concept of
sustainable development recognizes that development can be damaging; and that it must
happen, and prosper considering the population growth and rising human goals. It then relates
the physical artefacts of development with the socio-economic and biological environments
in which they are placed. It is thus threatened by physical, socio-economic, financial,
environmental and political threats. Irrigation systems may therefore become unsustainable in
three major ways, namely: (i) By no longer being able to deliver their benefits; (ii) By losing
sustainability because, although they are performing well internally, they are injuring other
interests; and (iii) By losing sustainability because people no longer want to devote necessary
efforts to key activities (Abernethy, 1994). Batchelor (1999) suggested improving the
irrigation management efficiency at farm level either agronomically, technically,
managerially or institutionally. Harris and Gantt (2007) recommended engaging users more
and fully through devolution of irrigation management, increasing focus on women as water
users and managers, and institutionalization of market reforms in water management towards
sustainable irrigation management.

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2.2.1 Sustainable Irrigation Practices and Irrigation Management

Irrigation practices are often related to both irrigation use and management. But, among the
common pool resources in the irrigation systems, the resource base itself is complex, as it is
linked to land, to system infrastructure, and to water itself when it comes to the issue of use
and management. Many institutions affect these irrigation practices; and so over the years,
local actors have established their own institutional frameworks, and government and other
external organizations regulate these irrigation practices from the outside to make them more
sustainable (Gutu et al., 2014).

Institutional arrangements are often regarded as a major dimension of sustainability in water

resources management. For example, Ostrom and Walker (2003) proposed eight institutional
principles for effective and sustainable management of common pool resources, namely:
clarity of boundaries, correspondence between appropriation and provision of rules and local
conditions, participation, democracy, sanctions, conflict resolution mechanism, recognition of
rights to organize, and nested enterprises. Participation promotes sustainable and equitable
natural resource management since local communities are better placed to improve resources
management than distant actors because of their own traditional knowledge, combined with
the existing skills, resources and a deep understanding of the local context (Child & Lyman,
2005).

2.3 Success of an Irrigation Organization

Success of an irrigation organization is the efficiency of water distribution, the good quality
of irrigation infrastructure, improvement of local livelihoods, increased level of awareness in
local participation, the absence of water conflicts, and the increased level of local
participation (Marothia, 2002). However, Cooke-Davis (2002) defines success as those inputs
to the management system that lead directly to the well doing of the business. Irrigation
farming must be taken as a business and as such it may have its own successes and failures.
Ros (2010) identified some of the irrigation management success factors as scheme
governance, irrigation benefits, and quality of irrigation infrastructure. For farmer
organizations to succeed and be sustainable they need to do better in some of these aspects.

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2.4 Review of the Irrigation Management Factors

The study identifies agronomical, managerial or institutional (governance), physical

(technical), socio-economic, financial, environmental, gender and political as some of the
factors that affect sustainability of irrigation schemes in Malawi. These factors are adopted
in the study for further review and analysis in the following sections in order to identify sub-
factors and provide further insight into how they relate to irrigation management through the
different implementation arrangements in Malawi. It is possible that additional factors may
exist and can further be explored.

2.4.1 Financial Factors

Financial factors refer to accounting, audit and social audit, revenue generation, levy
assessment, and cost recovery operations aimed at reducing irrigation costs and increasing
irrigation fee income (Vuren et al., 2004). Farmer organizations in Malawi are rocked by
financial management problems due to a lack of financial management and resource
mobilization skills; absence of lending institutions and lack of operational funds which has
affected irrigated agriculture productivity (Banda, 2005). In IM recovering costs in large
scale irrigation schemes may be an uphill battle. There is hardly any example of a developing
country where full cost-recovery is observed (Molle & Berkoff, 2008; Cornish et al., 2004).
Financial shortfalls may occur because of the low fees to cover actual costs, and low rate of
recovery/payment. Some of the financial sub-factors used in the study are: Market
availability, grants, rehabilitation of irrigation structures, inclusion of non-members in the
WUAs, transparency and accountability in financial transactions, payment of fees, access to
institutional loan facilities, and activity diversification.

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2.4.1.1 Incentives

Incentives are defined as things that motivate farmers to participate in irrigation management.
Several factors may incentivize farmers to participate in irrigation management. For example,
benefits flowing from the irrigation schemes, costs of irrigation services relative to the
benefits and costs of alternative water sources, farmer’s trust in the leadership, farmer’s
awareness of the importance of participation in fee payment, and peer pressure, market
availability, a stable and adequate water supply system (Ros, 2010). Pant (2007) reported that
in India the farmers get incentives from the State such as grants, concessions, provision of
water on a volumetric basis, no crop restriction, rehabilitation of the irrigation structures to its
designed level or at least to a workable operation level, and inclusion of non-members but
charging them say 30% more than members’ water charges. Incentives offset substantial
participation costs in terms of increased fees, time and transactions costs. Increased yields
and incomes arising from better water delivery services and better maintenance are,
ultimately, the most compelling reasons for farmers to take on expanded responsibilities in
irrigation system management (Meinzen-Dick, 1997).

2.4.1.2 Resource Mobilization

This is described as the process of generating additional resources in the form of funds or
goods which may be invested in scheme development activities. Resources may be mobilized
through payment of fees (irrigation and membership), diversification of irrigation activities,
credit facilities, associations lending funds to members and even non-members at fixed
interest rates, and payment of penalty fees by rule breakers or defaulters. The more the
members participate in irrigation the more the fees and the more the financial resources raised
hence the more viable the organizational financial status (Ros, 2010, Aziz & Zamani, 2008).

Abdullayev et al. (2008) found that one of the many problems WUAs face in Uzbekistan is
non-payment of membership fees. Part of the fees may allow regular scheme maintenance,
repairs and new infrastructure developments which in turn leads to efficiency, reliability and
adequacy of water supply (FAO, 2008; Renwick, 2007; Van Koppel et al., 2006). Funds
raised through sources such as fees further enable organizations to become self-dependent
and less-reliant from governments. In other circumstances financial resources may be
important for paying local leaders for their input to the schemes (Brelle & Dressayre, 2013).
15
2.4.1.3 Transparency and Accountability

Transparency refers to openness and degree of accessibility to view, while accountability

refers to the status of being liable to render an account for your actions (Turnbull & Phillips,
2010). In this case irrigation leaders must be transparent and accountable to the general
assembly on financial transactions. Mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability of
leaders and employees to members on financial transactions and records become increasingly
important as roles become more specialized. Successful and sustainable WUAs need to keep
transparent and accountable records of irrigation service fees. This is crucial for the
legitimacy of the WUA and to ensure farmers’ willingness to pay for services (Rzayev,
2007). For instance, in Kazakhstan the irrigation fee system is not transparent and that
irrigation tariffs vary from farmer to farmer. Subramanian et al. (1997) observed failure of
members, leaders and officials in management accounting systems.

2.4.2 Technical Factors

Technical factors refer to those characteristics intended to keep irrigation infrastructure in

good condition for effective and efficient water supply, delivery and drainage in irrigation
systems (Garces-Restrepo, 2007).

Decentralized IM is necessary for communities to maintain the resource over time, invest in
maintenance, or more effectively incorporate local knowledge into management decisions
(Wang et al., 2010; Harris & Gantt, 2007). Wang et al., (2010) highlighted the following
principles for efficient and decentralized water management: (i) Adequate and reliable water
supply, (ii) Legal status and participation, an association to have a legal entity and leadership
elected by members, (iii) Water users associations organized within hydraulic boundaries,
(iv) Water deliveries measured volumetrically, and (v) Equitable collection of water charges
from members. Some of the technical sub-factors to be used in the study are: Quality of
irrigation infrastructure, adequacy, reliability, equity and timeliness of water supply and
delivery, volumetric water measurement, knowledge and skills, and external support.

16
2.4.2.1 Quality of Irrigation Infrastructure

Quality refers to the state of goodness or badness of something (Turnbull and Phillips, 2010).
Quality of irrigation infrastructure in this case may therefore be defined as the goodness of
badness of the irrigation structures. Infrastructure is an essential component of irrigation
schemes as irrigation is essentially a product of infrastructure. It links the various elements
together. For instance, through infrastructure water is collected and transported to the crops
or farms. The level and sophistication of irrigation infrastructure determines how much water
can be collected and maintained overtime, the effectiveness of regulating water use, and the
efficiency of water use among other things (Akudugu, 2006).

Quality of irrigation infrastructure such as reservoirs, canals, sub-canals, and control gates
may impact on farmer organizations through the well-built canals, and control gates;
adequate capacity of water storage infrastructure to meet farmers’ needs during stressful
times (Ros, 2010; Regmi, 2008; Maleza & Nishimura, 2007). Good infrastructure makes it
easy for scheme leaders to equitably, adequately and timely distribute water to their members
thereby preventing water scrambles (Salman et al., 2008). When farmers fail to access water
due to a poor state of irrigation infrastructure, anarchy ensues leading to several water
malpractices for example, by enlarging outlets/canals, destroying control structures or
constructing barriers on their farmland (Garces-Restrepo, 2007).

17
2.4.2.2 Water Supply and Delivery

A physical irrigation system comprises of three major processes, namely: acquisition

(abstraction); distribution (conveyance and application); and drainage. The abstraction
process takes water from the environment and inputs it into the distribution process. The
distribution process then transports water throughout the entire irrigation scheme to be used
by farmers. Excess water is directed to the drainage system which outputs it back to the
surrounding environment (Johnstone, 2011). Once water is abstracted, treatment of the input
water is performed in order to remove excess sediment from the water. Settling basins are
normally used to trap sediment, which is then settled out of the water stream and outputted
back to the environment (Laycock, 2007). Once sediment is removed, water is conveyed to
the distribution (conveyance and application) structures by canals or pipes. Canals or pipes
distribute water throughout the irrigation system. The distribution system delivers water
directly to the farmer’s fields where it is used to produce agricultural crops. Finally, water
must be delivered directly to the fields for application to the crops. Control of water flow
within the distribution system of an irrigation scheme is possible via a system of gates which
can be manual, motorized or both depending on system design (Laycock, 2007). All excess
water must be drained from the irrigation system in order to prevent ponding and water-
logging. Drainage can either be natural or artificial.

Hydraulic infrastructure must always be in fair condition for an affordable and reliable water
supply at all times to farms in sufficient amounts to satisfy crop water needs (Vuren et al.,
2004). A system with a reliable but inadequate water supply is more desirable than a system
with an adequate supply but predictable way. Predictability of water supply is therefore
essential in irrigation management for planning purposes. Failure to supply and delivery
required water quantities to farmer plots dissatisfies farmers and therefore affects their active
participation in irrigation activities which then leads to reduced cultivable areas and so
reduced crop productivity.

The quality of water supply from the point of view of the users includes adequacy (accessing
a quantity of water that is sufficient to meet one’s needs) and timeliness (getting the amount
of water at the right time). Adequate timing and/or predictability of water supply are crucial
in irrigated agriculture, and often more important than adequacy itself.

18
From a system or social point of view equity (no user gets an excess of water to the detriment
of others), water savings (supply is adequate but not in excess of needs, and losses are
limited), and conflict resolution are additional important objectives. Water adequacy alone is
not enough to guarantee good water productivity (Bekheit & Depeweg, 1997). For example,
Aziz-Khalkheili and Zamani (2008) reported that unequal water distribution among famers
affects IM in Iran. Fu et al. (2010) further found that poor supply and delivery systems,
unfairness in water distribution and contribution to system maintenance were a result of bad
infrastructure in Nigeria.

2.4.2.3 Water Measurement

Water measurement is defined as determination of quantities of water in volume or flow rate

required passing through a particular point of the irrigation system for delivery in the plots
through water measurement devices that are strategically located. It is important in order to
determine exactly how much water each plot holder requires at a particular time, and to
identify system faults assuming less water is being made available for use to the users due to
leakages. Wang et al. (2010) recommends volumetric water measurement and deliveries for
efficient water management in farmer organizations. Similarly, the absence of technical
devices like water gauges makes it difficult for the estimation of the volume of water
available for use in irrigation schemes leading to inequitable water supply and deliveries.
This affects planning in terms of water usage and management and can easily lead to the
depletion of the water storage facilities by users (Oakerson, 1992).

2.4.2.4 External Support

External support is the assistance or aid to farmer organizations from outsiders (Ros, 2010).
External support includes adjudication of water rights, rule design, technical and
organizational skills, finance for major construction of irrigation infrastructure, extension
services, water management, credit facilities, and improvement of marketing systems i.e.,
roads and markets (Maleza & Nishimura, 2007).

19
External support especially from central government should be an on-going practice despite
communities being given control over irrigation management as outsiders may promote
cooperation among farmers when leaders fail to accomplish this on their own (Subramanian
et al., 1997).

20
External support impacts on irrigation management through improved irrigation
infrastructure leading to adequate and timely water supplies to farmers which leads to better
crop productivity and an improvement in local livelihoods (Maleza & Nishimura, 2007;
Perera, 2006; Tewari & Khanna, 2005). For instance, in Nigeria while investigating
characteristics of farmer-managed irrigation systems. Fu et al. (2010) also noted that
irrigation users are able to mobilize resources locally without any form of external support,
but also observed unfairness in water distribution and contribution to system maintenance in
the absence of external support.

2.4.2.5 Knowledge and Skills

Knowledge refers to a familiarity of a particular skill or branch of learning (Turnbull &

Phillips, 2010), in this case, irrigation; while skill refers to the capacity or technique to do
something well (Turnbull & Phillips, 2010), in this case, the ability to carry out irrigation
operations. Knowledge and skills influence IM relative to quality of leadership; firstly, by
those skills required in an organizational role and secondly, those skills required in a
technical role. Leaders can take either of these roles depending on how they are organized.
The technical skills and knowledge include water distribution, repairs of gates, canals, and
dam, geographical location of the farmland, topography, scheme infrastructure, and water
routes, while, the organizational skills include farmer motivation, leading, explain things,
solving problems, managing budgets, organizing meetings, completing paper work and
communicating with external actors (Ros, 2010).

Knowledge and skills impact on irrigation management through development of trust by

members in their leadership which then enhances farmer participation in irrigation
management. It also helps to improve water distribution in the scheme, ensure external
support from government and motivate farmers more to participate in irrigation management.
Technical knowledge and skills may be obtained through training and capacity building
(Maleza & Nishimura, 2007; Perera, 2006) and workshops (Tewari & Khanna, 2005).

21
2.4.3 Social/Cultural Factors

Social or cultural factors are characteristics in which demands are created by irrigation
technologies on the management structure (Gum’a, 2004). Some of the social/cultural issues
affecting the irrigation management include land tenure, labour, credit services, marketing
and conflicts. Modern agricultural development often ignores the local knowledge by getting
rid of traditional irrigation infrastructure through new construction works. This allows
traditionally managed irrigation systems to be replaced by state management systems thereby
undervaluing productive and sustainable systems (Billib et al, 2009). For instance, at Bwanje
Valley Irrigation Scheme (BVIS) in Dedza District, Malawi the existing traditional irrigation
scheme was upgraded to a modern one but without consulting the beneficiaries for their input
into design. Using this scheme as an example of the effects of social and cultural factors on
success or failure of irrigation management, it is reported that historically all land at the BVIS
was customary so local leaders were responsible for regulating appropriation and provision in
their respective areas and after upgrading the farmers abandoned the scheme (Johnstone,
2011).

Malunga (2009) in his study on BVIS further reported that before upgrading local farmers
had been growing rice in the rainy season by trapping flood water. Using residual moisture in
dry season, they grew upland crops with less water requirement than rice. The whole set-up
was farmer-managed, without any intervention from the government and that this system had
been going on for many years. GoM interference by constructing new irrigation structures at
BVIS brought mixed feelings among the local farmers who originally had their own setup on
how to run the scheme. What was thought to be an improvement of irrigation structures at
BVIS now became a weapon for destruction of the scheme. Further, the introduction of the
government personnel to manage the activities of the scheme worsened the situation. In the
end, the scheme became less productive than it was before the so called upgrading of
structures. Therefore investment in unwanted infrastructure interferes with existing social and
cultural practices, thereby reducing land productivity.

Finally, according to Veldwisch et al. (2009) on ‘‘Sand in the engine: The travails of an
irrigated rice scheme in Bwanje Valley, Malawi,’’ introduction of new technologies through
new construction or upgrading of irrigation structures without consulting the beneficiaries
may result in social problems such as conflicts, and inadequate water supply, hence
abandonment of the technology by most farmers leading to decreased land productivity.
22
It is therefore recommended that these indigenous irrigation systems be intelligently assisted
rather than mindlessly replaced (Billib et al., 2009); and that their traditional knowledge be
further captured for propagation of cultural production methods and associated technologies
(Gillespie et al., 2004).

Some of the social/cultural sub-factors used in the study are: Land disputes, land
documentation, and family/hired labour.

2.4.3.1 Land Tenure

Land tenure is the mode in which land is owned. In Malawi customary law governs land
allocation, land use, land transfers, inheritance, and land-dispute resolution related to
Malawi’s customary land. The Malawi Land Policy (2002) recognizes the authority of
customary law and traditional authorities and calls for incorporation of the traditional
authorities into the land-administration structure. Three types of land tenure systems are used
in Malawi, namely: freehold, leasehold, and customary tenure (Chirwa, 2008; GoM, 2002).

Freehold tenure involves private land and private land can be held in freehold tenure, which
carries rights of exclusivity, use, and alienation. Most freehold rural land consists of large-
scale commercial plantations or estates (Holden et al., 2006). Leasehold tenure involves
private, public, and customary land that is leased. Lease terms vary by use, including 21-year
leases on agricultural land and 22 to 99 year leases for property and infrastructure
development (Lunduka et al., 2009). Land disputes commonly occur over land transactions,
land access, and inheritance rights in Malawi. Most land disputes are handled by traditional
leaders (Peters & Kambewa, 2007; Holden et al., 2006). Irrigation schemes in Malawi are no
exception to this. Insecure land tenure hinders farmers from taking part in the effective
management of irrigation schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kadigi et. al, 2012).

Irrigation users with land use rights always have suspicion of the rights by some users and
may not care for improvement of productivity of their lands resulting in land underutilization
and hence low productivity. Perception of scheme ownership may affect users’ commitment
to maintenance of irrigation infrastructure. This compromises success and sustainability of
irrigation management in that as others lose out or lease out land crop productivity decreases
leading to reduced participation and increased non-payment of the irrigation fees which
further affects the financial viability of the organizations.
23
In absence of land rights it is also difficult for a user to access credit facilities without
collateral (Gum’a, 2004). Nkambule and Dlamini (2013) identified land tenure issues as
critically challenging irrigation scheme sustainability in the Maplothini Irrigation Scheme of
Swaziland while in Nigeria, Fu et al. (2010) found FMIS as being highly linked to the land
tenure system and involvement of landlords in irrigation community activities which greatly
affected irrigation management.

2.4.3.2 Labour

Labour refers to work, usually of a hard; physical done by using hands or may also refer to
the workers, when thought of as a group (Turnbull & Phillips, 2010). In this case labour
refers to irrigation users. Labour affects user's irrigation practice in relation to gender with
respect to household head. It may be in form of family or hired labour. Many of the female-
headed households lack male labour, which is culturally decisive for practicing irrigation.
Many female-headed households lacking man labour have to quit irrigation practices, and
lease out their plots in a form of contract payment or sharecropping; hence they are forced to
give up some part of benefit from irrigation (Gum’a, 2004).

2.4.4 Environmental Factors

The environment is the natural world, for example, land, air and water in which people,
animals and plants live (Turnbull & Phillips, 2010). In this study the natural world is where
irrigated crops grow. Environmental factors are therefore defined as the attributes that affect
the natural world in which irrigated crops thrive. Irrigation development, while contributing
to the economic well being of many countries, affects the environment negatively, leading to
detrimental effects of rising water tables and soil salinity, inefficient water delivery systems
and poor on-farm irrigation techniques, for example, detrimental effects of a rise in water
tables and soil salinity, inefficiency in water delivery systems, and poor on-farm irrigation
techniques (Fernandez-Cirelli et al, 2009).

24
Agricultural developments often cause deforestation, overgrazing, pollution by various
chemicals (fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides), and decreased biodiversity (Chel &
Kaushik, 2011; Lichtfouse et al., 2009; Dantsis et al., 2009; Jordan & Constance, 2008). Chel
and Kaushik (2011) argued that it is the choice of irrigation that may cause loss of soil
through erosion, and loss of the soil biotic capacity to nurture plant growth, structural
deterioration, compaction and hard setting, nutrient imbalance and leaching, salinity, and
diminution of root zone moisture characteristics. Irrigation may also create unhealthy
conditions through occurrence of water-related diseases, and the depletion of ground water
resources and floods (Fernandez-Cirelli et al., 2009).

Poor irrigation scheme designs, deteriorating irrigation infrastructure or poor technical and
management skills of the users cause poor drainage making arable land unusable. Apart from
this irrigation can make fields swampy and weedy making it difficult to mechanize. Swamps
and weeds, water-logging and salinity render most of the area covered by the irrigation
infrastructure unproductive causing a reduction in crop productivity as users may not grow in
these areas. Hence, sustainable agriculture must be capable of maintaining its productivity
and usefulness to the society over the long run and must be environmentally friendly (Dantsis
et al., 2009). Irrigation development is also heavily affected by climate change effects.
Climate change now recognized as the major environmental problem facing the globe
potentially impacts water resources, such as irrigation systems, through an increase in
extreme hydrological conditions, which may lead to system specific vulnerabilities
(Johnstone, 2011). For instance, Nkambule and Dlamini (2013) observed excessive water
depletion, water quality reduction, water-logging, and salinity as recurring environmental
problems in the Maplothini Irrigation Scheme in Swaziland despite the huge irrigation
investments by the State.

The environment threatens irrigation management in several ways, namely: multiplication of

water-borne diseases that sicken users and further reduce irrigation labour which then
decreases crop productivity; saline conditions that cause osmotic in crops; water logging
conditions that cause soil erosion leading to loss of fertile soils and applied fertilizers; weedy
conditions that affect crops in terms of competition for space and food nutrient absorption.

25
Deforestation affects irrigation management by causing disturbances to the water catchment
areas for irrigation systems thereby either exposing soil to excessive heat leading to water
losses through evapo-transpiration and lowering of water tables. Drought affects irrigation
management by damaging poorly designed and constructed irrigation infrastructure through
cracks, floods and crop failure and therefore loss in irrigated agricultural productivity which
affects the users’ livelihoods.

2.4.5 Governance Factors

Governance is defined as the exercise of authority through formal and informal traditions and
institutions for the common good (Keremane, 2008; Thomas et al., 2000). Governance
includes three processes, namely: (i) the process by which those in authority are selected,
monitored and replaced; (ii) the capacity to effectively manage resources and implement
sound policies; (iii) the respect of citizens for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions among them (Keremane, 2008; Thomas et al., 2000). It includes establishment of
rules, responsibilities, operating mechanisms, policies, user and official accountability
systems. The governance system of an irrigation scheme comprises the organizations,
processes, actors, and regulations that are humanly designed in order to govern, manage,
operate and maintain the physical and social structures of any system (Johnstone, 2011).
Improved water governance leads to equitable water resources development and access for all
(Kjorven & Davey, 2006). A good water governance system should be participatory,
transparent and accountable, equitable, responsive, integrative, ethical, communicative,
efficient, and predictable of the water resource (Tollefson et al., 2013; Keremane, 2008).

Governance influences irrigation management through the development and maintenance of

irrigation infrastructure, timely and adequate water supply to farmers, rule enforcement,
workable rights, increased membership, better conflict management, farmer’s trust and
respect for leaders (Regner et al., 2010; Ros, 2010). It further influences success through the
structures and processes involved. Such structures include decision-making and leadership
capacity.

26
The decision-making structure impacts on the farmer organizations in two ways: (i) users’
responsibility to manage and maintain the scheme infrastructure leading to local participation,
and (ii) division of farmers into small groups and sub-groups leading to increased
coordination and efficiency.

Leadership capacity contributes to success of farmer organizations through positive attitudes,

advanced knowledge and skills, and authority (Ros, 2010). Some of the governance sub-
factors used in the study and described below are: Working roles, rules, rights, charter, and
MoU; decision-making, governance transparency and accountability, water access through
corruption or bribery and theft; knowledge and skills in explaining things to others, planning
and budgeting, organizing meetings/general assemblies, and record-keeping; communication
to members, conflict management.

2.4.5.1 Organization

An organization refers to a social entity that is goal directed and deliberately structured
(Johnstone, 2011). Social entity means ‘being made up of two or more people’. Goal directed
means ‘designed to achieve some outcome’.

2.4.5.2 Governance Regimes

A regime is a mode of rule or management (Turnbull & Phillips, 2010); in this case a
governance regime is defined as a mode of governing the irrigation users. Governance
regimes can be characterized as public, private, communal, or open access. Public regimes
are run by government; private regimes are controlled by citizens for profit, while communal
regimes are controlled through complex community norms, and open access implies no
regime being present. Kiser and Ostrom (1982) distinguish three levels that cumulatively
affect the actions and outcomes in a governance regime. These three levels are operational,
collective-choice, and constitutional.

27
The operational level-where the day-to-day decisions of farmers are made regarding
operation and maintenance; The collective-choice level-where decisions are made regarding
management of an irrigation scheme, which directly affect how farmers make their decisions
regarding operation and maintenance; The constitutional level-where decisions are made
regarding governance, which directly affects the collective-choice level in terms of how the
organization is formed, how members are elected and broad policy initiatives. All levels
contain various roles, rights, and rules and these are discussed in the next section.

2.4.5.3 Institutional Mechanisms

Institutions are formally defined as humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction
and consist of different mechanisms that persist over time and inform action (Svendsen,
2005). The three different types of institutional mechanisms are roles, rights, and rules. When
institutions are well crafted, opportunism is substantially reduced although temptations
involved in free riding, rent seeking and corruption may never be totally purged, but
institutions can be devised in order to hold those factors under control (Bravo & Marelli,
2008). Ounvichit and Satoh (2002) noted that irrigation institutions are characterised by roles,
rules, and rights.

2.4.5.3.1 Roles

Roles are sets of expectations and tasks assigned to a particular actor (Svendsen, 2005).
Actors are individuals or organizations who take actions in the governance, management, and
operation of a system. In the context of the irrigation scheme, roles can be farmer,
maintenance worker, cooperative president, or scheme manager depending on how functions
or activities are divided for a given organizational structure.

28
2.4.5.3.2 Rights

Rights are defined as particular actions that are authorized (Johnstone, 2011). More generally
they may be thought of as responsibilities or entitlements that roles are assigned or granted.

Rights may be formal or informal with formal rights given lawful recognition by government
whereas informal rights are customary. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) further define rights
according to the level of operation, which coincide with the multiple levels in governance
regimes. Operational rights are access and withdrawal rights, which define the right of an
individual to enter a defined common pool resource system and the right to obtain products of
that resource system respectively. Constitutional and collective choice rights are not just
entitlements but responsibilities in regulating how resources are used and how access rights
are defined. Rights are both privileges and responsibilities that are authorized by rules.
Property rights comprise of: (i) the right to use the resource (e.g., getting access to and
withdrawing the resource), (ii) the right to manage the resource (e.g., modifying or
transforming the resource, (iii) the right to exclude (e.g., determining who else may use the
resource, and (iv) the right to alienate (e.g., transferring the resource by inheritance, sale or
gift. Each right therefore provides a different level of authority to local leaders (Gum’a,
2004).

As irrigation schemes devolve to local authorities, local leaders get the authority to organize
and are able to lead communities under the schemes. Ros (2010) related authority in
leadership capacity to property rights. It is further claimed that community leaders become
authoritative if they hold property rights. Some local communities hold both kinds of rights
while others do not. Local communities holding only de-facto rights have to enforce these
rights among their own members (Gum’a, 2004). Authority gained through rights in resource
management allows leaders to earn revenue, either from irrigation service fees or charges, or
other sources for cost recovery, and that the leaders gain exclusion rights such that in case of
encroachment and other illegal activities such as water theft and corruption can be prevented
(Vermillion, 2001).

29
2.4.5.3.3 Rules

Rules are defined as generally agreed-upon and enforced prescriptions that require, forbid, or
permit specific actions (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992).

Rules aim to achieve particular actions or outcomes in a system. Depending on the level of a
rule, it may affect all, some or one situation(s) in a system. When rules prescribe actions for a
particular event, sanctions may be brought against those individuals that do not follow the
rule. Rules limit the actions of actors in order to achieve specific outcomes (Ostrom, 2005).

An organized farmer group should have rules or constitution bound to everyone and guiding
implementation of the operations of the irrigation scheme. Keremane et. al (2006) confirmed
the need for such rules but that rules can be internally or externally crafted. Internally crafted
rules by local people more often result in better outcomes than those externally imposed
because such rules reflect local needs, and that local people may more likely comply with
established rules of their own making (Baskakoti & Shivakoti, 2012; Easterly, 2008;
Mahapatra, 2007). As local people craft their own rules they also need resource people for
consultations for effectiveness and workability (Ballabh et al., 2002). Presence of rules is
important to farmer groups to enhance farmer contributions in task implementation within the
organization such as water allocation and distribution to farmers, collection of irrigation fees
from members, regular maintenance and monitoring of the irrigation infrastructure,
conducting of community meetings, and effective conflict management (Menzies, 2004).

For example, Abdullayev et al. (2008) in a study on water management system in Uzbekistan
found that WUAs encounter inability to install clear water management rules; and according
to Wotie and Hanaraj (2013) absence of rule enforcement on WUA members has resulted in
lost fees for irrigation schemes in Ethiopia. External support further enhances management of
the irrigation schemes through assistance provided during formation of farmer committees,
rule enforcement, and conflict resolution (Tewari & Khanna, 2005; Maleza & Nishimura,
2007). It leads to farmer organizations attaining self-reliance and self-dependence overtime
(Jain, 2002).

30
Weak rules and failure to enforce them give rise to irrigation corruption traits in form of
bribery and water theft. Corrupt practices, absence of transparency and accountability, and
responsiveness in the delivery of irrigation services are regular in irrigation management. For
example, Lipton (2007) observed that the release of irrigation water into and out of secondary
canals normally involve corrupt payments or bribes.

31
Though, usually small as a proportion of production costs, these payments may be damaging
and harmful to the poor by favouring those with connections and capacity to bribe; worsen
water distribution between “head and tail-end” of the system; and discourage production and
risk-taking to suit the interests of the corrupt, and by creating uncertainty about when, where
and how much water will arrive.

Johnstone (2011) reported that several irrigation malpractices exist at Bwanje Valley
Irrigation Scheme (BVIS) in Malawi as a result of bad governance structures, namely, access
to water through bribery. Johnstone (2011) defines bribery as farmers practice to buy water
from water distribution officials at a time when it is not their scheduled turn. The bribery
process may be described as: the farmer buying water and the water distribution official
meeting at the tertiary canal of the farmer and money would be exchanged and the water
distribution official would allow the farmer to irrigate their crop. Farmers buy water from
water distribution officials at a time when it is not their scheduled turn. It is further observed
that this behaviour usually occurs at night when no other farmers are around. Theft of
irrigation water is another malpractice common in the BVIS. Theft, defined as stealing
irrigation water in absence of scheduling and management processes, occurs entirely without
the permission of water distribution officials (Johnstone, 2011).

2.4.5.3.4 Charter

A charter is a written statement of the rights, beliefs and purposes of an organization or a

particular group of people (Oxford Dictionary, 2008). It may also be said to be the legal
framework of the organization. The legal framework is a key factor determining the success
of WUA development (McCornick & Merrey, 2005; Hodgson, 2007). This framework has to
clearly define procedures for creating WUAs, their membership, financial autonomy, right to
open a bank account, the manner in which activities should be regulated, the rights and duties
of each party, the rights to water, the ownership of irrigation facilities, whether economic
diversification and revenue generation is possible. WUA membership may sometimes be
restricted to landowners. Simple and transparent operating rules that everyone knows,
understands and accepts are believed to be the key to a successful framework (Murray-Rust
& Svendsen, 2001).

32
It is thus always disastrous to proceed with the physical technology to get the water flowing
with only vague notions about what joint agreements should be devised for rehabilitation,
allocation, maintenance, and conflict resolution. The reason for this is that when water flows,
some farmers are in better initial positions than others to take advantage of the resource.
Users quickly employ their good fortune to consolidate disproportionate advantages, and then
oppose later attempts to reform the situation usually with success because of their hold on
critical resources. Also the organization of an irrigation system must provide for a local
council or water court capable of adjudicating the interests of members and managers. This
judicial council must interpret and apply organizational rules in specific cases of conflict and
then pass on its interpretations to organizational executives for implementation. WUAs are
usually responsible for matters related with water allocation, water distribution, maintenance,
and conflict management (Gum’a, 2004).

2.4.5.3.5 Memorandum of Understanding

A memorandum of understanding (MoU) is a document outlining the legal and factual

premises believed by the parties, in this case, the irrigation users and the executive to have
been agreed to be between them (Turnbull & Phillips, 2010).

Other organizations may go for a memorandum of understanding. It may be signed between

the WUA and the government, or any other organization based on the needs. A memorandum
of understanding must provide for two important points reflected; Firstly, farmers getting
rights in water allocation through the agreement and an assurance in getting a predetermined
quantity of water at a predetermined time; and Secondly, farmers getting right of information
and thereby hope to get, on demand, the information related to water availability. A
memorandum of understanding is the instrument, which secures provision of water quota to
the WUA season-wise. This quota varies from one WUA to another. However, when the
quantity of water is below normal, the water quota of the WUA can be accordingly reduced.
This reduction in abnormal circumstances is provided for in the memorandum of
understanding of all WUAs (Pant, 2007).

33
2.4.7 Gender Factors

Gender is defined as the socially constructed rather than biologically determined roles of men
and women as well as the relationships between them in a given society at a specific time and
place. These roles are usually unequal in terms of power, freedom, agency and status as well
as access to and control over entitlements, resource and assets (Deribe, 2008). Gender is an
important variable in irrigation management as women also play crucial roles in water
management issues although still underrepresented in decision-making processes (Deribe,
2008; Harris & Gantt, 2007). The different positions of women and men may also be
influenced by history, religion, economics and culture (Kjorven & Davey, 2006).

Involvement of women in water resources management is important because (i) it increases

scheme sustainability, (ii) enhances maximum crop yield from infrastructure development,
and, finally, (iii) advances progress on the Millennium Development Goals. Women
participation in irrigation may occur at three different levels: (i) farm (field) level (e.g. water
equity and access, encompassing both water rights, irrigated land and associated obligations),
(ii) association (forum) level (e.g., farmer associations enhance equal participation in forums
or networks for collective water management arrangements), and (iii) leadership level in the
associations e.g., equality at leadership level (Deribe, 2008). Gender issues in IM include:
women and land ownership (access to irrigated land); land tenure and decision-making
power; labour contribution and decision-making power, and active participation in water
users associations, social norms, multiple women roles, farm distances, literacy, men
militating against women, and inconvenient times for meetings (World Bank, 2008).

Women have different priorities, demands and knowledge on water management than men
and may not be widely consulted as their priorities and requirements are not given much
attention due to their limited control and access to land and water. Control over and access to
certain resources determines decision-making over resources as land ownership is often
linked to water access. Therefore, women’s limited participation in decision making may lead
to loss of valuable knowledge and expertise, and a failure of policies and programs which
then affect irrigation management as maintenance becomes irregular, water distribution is no
longer timely and adequate, and there is low labour availability leading to low irrigated crop
yields which further affects the overall scheme revenues.

34
Women’s lack of title deeds further limits their opportunities to access credit, technical
inputs, grazing rights, and training; for example, their exclusion from contract farming due to
lack of statutory land rights, and limited access to irrigation and infrastructure due to lack of
control over resources (Dolan, 2001; Fontana & Paciello, 2009). Increased women
participation also strengthens the bargaining position as resource users within households and
communities. It strengthens the effectiveness of the organization through improved
compliance with the rules and maintenance contributions.

The gender sub-factors used in the study are: Women involvement in decision-making,
women access to irrigation resources, and women participation in forums/networks.

2.4.8 Agronomic Factors

The agronomic factors defined as the basic crop management principles aim at crop
improvement for good quality and quantity to achieve high productivity. Some of the
important agronomic factors for irrigated corn production include crop rotation, moisture
conservation, soil drainage, fertilizer application and crop variety (Nielsen, 2010).

Nkambule and Dlamini (2013) observed inadequate knowledge and skills in agriculture
production practices as one of the major sustainability challenges in the Maplothini Irrigation
Scheme of Swaziland while in a study to establish current agronomic practices of smallholder
farmers in semi-arid areas for crops such as maize, pearl millet, sorghum and groundnuts,
variety of crop, method and frequency of weeding, technologies such as water conservation
and use of adequate soil ameliorants, and crop rotation may improve crop productivity and
are some of the agronomic practices that are employed to improve efficiency and crop
productivity in semi-arid areas of Central and Western Zimbabwe (Makuvaro et al., 2011).

The agronomic sub-factors used in the study are: Use of improved irrigation crop varieties,
and availability of knowledge and skills in crop management

2.5 Conclusion

The study identified forty-seven (47) sub-factors for each irrigation management factor.
These were further used to investigate two irrigation management models most applicable in
Malawi context. See Table 1 below for summary:
35
 Table 1 : Summary of the Irrigation Management (IM) Sub-Factors

No. IM Factors Sub-Factors

Markets, Grants, Rehabilitation of irrigation structures, Inclusion

Financial of non-members in irrigation operations, Financial transparency
1
(8 factors) and accountability, Payment of fees, Access to institutional loan
facilities, Activity diversification

Quality of irrigation infrastructure, Water flow control structures,

Adequacy of water supply & delivery, Reliability of water supply
2 Technical
& delivery, Equity of water supply & delivery, Timeliness of
(8 factors)
water supply & delivery, Volumetric water measurement and
delivery, External support

Social/cultural
Land disputes, land lease documents, family labour, hired labour
3 (4 factors)

Environmental Growth of weeds, Swampy conditions, Water-logging conditions,

4 (7 factors) Siltation, Soil erosion, Good agricultural/forestry practices

Working roles, rules, rights, charter, and memorandum of

understanding, Decision-making, Governance transparency &
5
Accountability, Water access through corruption or bribery, Water
Governance
access, Knowledge/skills in explaining things to others,
(15 factors) Knowledge/skills in planning and budgeting, Skills in organizing
meetings/general assemblies, Knowledge and skills in record-
keeping, Communication to members, Conflict management

Gender Women involvement in decision-making, Women access to

6 (3 factors) irrigation resources, Women participation in forums/networks,

Agronomic Use of improved crop varieties, knowledge/skills in crop

7
(2 factors) management

36
 CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology used for the study. A quantitative methodology
approach was employed to investigate the factors/sub-factors identified in the literature
review. The sampling procedure is described first followed by methods of data collection and
analysis, and research limitations.

3.2 Water Users’ Associations in Malawi

Some of the sixteen WUAs now under PIM are: Wovwe, Lufilya, and Hara in Karonga
District; Limphasa and Luweya in Nkhata Bay District; Bua, Kaombe and Kasito in Nkhota
Kota District; Domasi, Likangala and Khanda in Zomba District; Kasinthula and Nkhate in
Chikwawa District; and Muona in Nsanje District. A case study approach was chosen in the
study due to financial and time constraints. Some of these WUAs were officially handed over
to farmers by the State.

3.2.1 Research Study Sites

Out of the sixteen WUAs in Malawi only two were chosen for the study, namely; Bua and
Kaombe WUAs in Nkhotakota District. Closeness of the sites to the researcher’s place of
residence in Kasungu ensured the project to be undertaken within the limited financial
resources and short time frame, and facilitated effective administration of the data collection
tools.

37
3.2.2 Basic Data for the Water Users’ Associations

3.2.2.1 Bua WUA

Bua WUA has a membership of 790 users (540 men and 250 women), and a potential
irrigable area of 300 hectares. BUA irrigation scheme is located in Kambizi Village, in
Ngalatete Section and in Mphonde EPA under Traditional Authority Mphonde. The scheme
is 25 kilometres to the North of Nkhotakota Trading Centre and about 0.3 km to the East off
the main road to Dwangwa Trading Centre. The actual irrigated area is 65 hectares but at the
time of the survey there was no irrigation at the scheme. The main crop grown is rice. Plot
sizes for the users range from 0.2ha; 0.4ha to 0.6ha.

The scheme started irrigation operations in 1979. Unofficially farmers took over scheme
ownership and management on 12th September, 2004. Bua scheme was officially handed over
to farmers on 28th May, 2014. Its main water source is Bua River. The river used to be
perennial but due to degradation of its catchment area activities it dries up in the months of
October, November and December. The WUA uses the river-diversion technology through
gravity to let water flow from the water source to farming plots through canals. The greatest
challenge for Bua WUA is that Bua River dries out during the peak irrigation months of
October, November and December forcing the irrigation users to temporarily suspend
farming.

3.2.2.2 Kaombe WUA

Kaombe WUA has a membership of 287 (187 men and 200 women), and a potential irrigable
area of 80 hectares. Kaombe Scheme is located in Mchambwe Village, Kakasi Section and in
Mphonde EPA to the North East about 5 kilometres from Nkhotakota Trading Centre. At the
time of the survey there were minor irrigation activities due to rehabilitation and land
levelling works by IRLAD project. Plot sizes are 0.2 hectares on average. The main crops
grown at the scheme are rice and maize. The water source for Kaombe Scheme is Kaombe
River. The river is a perennial river. Kaombe Scheme started irrigation operations in 2000.
Unofficially farmers took over scheme ownership and management on 14th June, 2005.
Official scheme handover for Kaombe WUA is yet to be done. Kaombe WUA uses an
electrified motorised water pump and canalization technology to lift water from the water
source to the buried conveyance pipe from where water flows by gravity to the scheme.
38
The main challenge for Kaombe WUA is the high electricity bills incurred due to water
pumping. Irrigation operations at Kaombe were invisible at the time of the survey as scheme
rehabilitation and land levelling works were in session facilitated by GoM through IRLAD
project.

3.3 Research Sampling Procedure

3.3.1 Target Population

The target population in this case consisted of a mixture of irrigation users (WUA members
with leadership positions, and those others who are just ordinary members) and the
agricultural managers with different positions from Nkhotakota District Agricultural Office.
The managers from the agriculture office were requested to complete the same questionnaire
designed for users. The positions of the managers involved in the study include: Assistant
District Agricultural Development Officer (ADADO), Extension Methodologies Officer
(EMO), Agribusiness Officer (ABO), Crop Production Officer (CO), Land Resources
Conservation Officer (LRCO), District Irrigation Officer (DIO), Irrigation Officer (IO),
Agricultural Extension Development Coordinator (AEDC) previously the Development
Officer, and the Agricultural Extension Development Officer (AEDO) previously the
Assistant Development Officer.

3.3.2 Sampling Method

Due to the absence of a sampling frame, the purposive sampling technique was used to select
respondents for the study. The executive committee (leaders) for each WUA was entrusted
with the selection of eligible respondents based on the following criteria; respondent’s ability
to read and write and their knowledge in irrigation management.

39
3.3.3 Sample Size

The sample size for the target population was calculated using the following formula and
95% confidence level was used as adopted from Enshanssi, Mohamed and Abushabani
(2009):

Where:

 N is the target population; n is the sample size from a finite population; n' is the sample
size from infinite population = S²/V², S² is the variance of the population elements and, V
is a standard error of sampling population; and S = 0.5 representing 50% response rate,
and V=1-0.95=0.05.

Bua WUA[NBua Users] with a population of 790 users; Kaombe WUA[NKaombe Users] with a

population of 287 users and the District Agricultural Office[NManagers] with a population of
15 managers (sometimes called Subject Matter Specialists) give the total study respondent
population as follows:

NTotal=NBua Users + NKaombe Users + NManagers= 790+287+30=1107 respondents

Hence, n’ = (0.5)2/ (0.05)2 = 100; And, n = 100/[1+(100/1107)]= 91.7 ≈ 92 respondents. In

this case a minimum of 92 responses were to be obtained from a population of 1107 to
achieve a 95% confidence level at 50% response rate.

40
However, to ensure that adequate responses were obtained within the time limits for the study
the sample size was conveniently increased to 106 respondents for irrigation users.

*The statistics to determine the sample size is really based on the assumption (that produces
the largest sample size) that 50% would perceive that State management produced better
results than the other 50% for WUA management. Such an assessment could be made for
each sub factor. One also needs to note that no statistical confidence has been determined for
the “preference” when analyzed for each irrigation scheme (with 48 and 58 respondents
each). The statistical confidence for the preference by each scheme is as follows:

With a sample size, n of 106 respondents (58 Bua respondents and 48 Kaombe respondents)
the sample proportion, p is given by the following formula;

p= Succesful Respondents
Expected or Total Respondents

= 58 respondents/106 respondents

= 0.547

Calculating standard deviation, σ is given by:

=
√[p(1-p)/n]

=
√[0.547(1-0.547)/106]
= 0.048

Setting the hypotheses leads to the following:

The Null Hypothesis is: Bua respondent perceptions on State Management equal those of
Kaombe on WUA Management = 0.5 or 50%

The Alternative Hypothesis is: Bua respondent perceptions on State Management are greater
than Kaombe respondent perceptions i.e., > 0.5 0r 50%

41
In order to determine the Confidence Interval (CI) at 95% the following formula is used;

= p ± 1.95σ

= p – 1.95σ< z < p + 1.95σ

= 0.547 – 1.95*0.048< z < 0.547 + 1.95*0.048

= 0.453< z <0.641, i.e. [0.453, 0.641]

Conclusion: Since 0.5>0.453 but <0.641, i.e. the Null Hypothesis is rejected and the
Alternative Hypothesis accepted meaning that Bua respondent perceptions on State
Management are greater than Kaombe respondent perceptions.

3.4 Questionnaire Design

The questionnaire was designed to allow both respondents to easily complete it in two parts
i.e. 1 and 2. Part 1 of the questionnaire captured general respondent information (name,
contact telephone number, position, gender, academic qualification). Part 2 of the
questionnaire collected respondent perspectives on irrigation management sub-factors. In this
part, respondents were requested to rate each of the forty-seven (47) irrigation management
sub-factors identified in the literature review. The ordinal scales were used to rate such levels
for each sub-facto based on the Likert Scale shown in Table 2 below:

Table 2 : Ordinal Scale for Data Rating

Item Don’t Know Very Bad Bad Fair Good Very Good

Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

42
3.4.1 Data Collection

Data collection was done using a survey questionnaire in three phases. Phase 1 involved a
pilot study in which 30 users (15 irrigation users per WUA). Phase 2 involved 15 more
questionnaires to 15 irrigation users per WUA and 8 questionnaires to district agricultural
managers per WUA. Phase 3 involved 20 more questionnaires to 20 Bua irrigation users and
10 more to 10 Kaombe irrigation users. In total, 106 questionnaires were administered to 106
respondents. The questionnaires were self-administered and upon completion by respondents
the questionnaires were collected the same day.

43
3.4.2 Pilot Study

The questionnaire was tested in Phase 1 for precision of expression, question duplication,
objectivity, suitability to problem situation and probability of favourable reception and return.
A pilot questionnaire was administered to 15 irrigation users per site to obtain their comments
regarding any items that they found difficult to understand, and to determine the time it takes
to complete the questionnaire. Through the pilot study the users observed that there was no
provision for ‘‘not Sure or ‘‘don’t know’’ option in the Likert Scale and hence an inclusion of
the “not sure” or ‘‘don’t know’’ option in all the Likert Scales after a careful review of the
pilot survey. This option would be denoted by a ‘‘Zero Score’’ in the scale. Only a small part
of the questionnaire was changed that included the provision for the “I don’t know option” in
the scores

3.4.3 Participation Arrangements

Participants were formally informed in advance of the research exercise through the
Department of Irrigation at the District Agricultural Office by telephone and text messages.
Further meetings were pre-arranged through the WUA offices for users and the Irrigation
Office for agricultural managers. Subsequent contacts were made directly through the WUA
leadership especially the President to fix dates, times and venues of meetings for
questionnaire administration. Most of the respondents had contact telephone numbers. Three
meetings were arranged for each WUA.

3.4.4 Time Duration for Responses

The respondents were requested to complete the questionnaires within a day. This was
possible because on average it was taking about half an hour to an hour minutes for most
users to complete filling the questionnaire. The pilot study indicated that the users took on
average forty-five (45) to sixty (60) minutes to complete the questionnaire, while the
managers took about twenty-five (25) to thirty (30) minutes to complete the questionnaire.

44
3.5 Data Analysis

Different conclusions were derived on whether irrigation management by the State or by

WUA is: Better or worse across both irrigation schemes; better or worse for each irrigation
scheme; and/or better or worse for of the seven irrigation management factors. Data analysis
covered the general respondent’s information from Part 1 and the Likert Scores for
respondents on State and WUA Models from Part 2 of the questionnaire. IBM SPSS Version
20.0 was used to summarise the general respondent’s information using the frequencies and
percentages. Analysis of ordinal scale scores was done in two ways: (i) Firstly, by the
Relative Preference Index (RPI), and (ii) Secondly, the Paired t-Test Method. This study
adopted the RPI method in data analysis on sub-factor and factor basis. For ease of
presentation of the analyzed data, identified sub-factors were coded as presented in Table 3
below:

45
 Table 3: List of Irrigation Management Sub-Factors and Codes

No. Code Factors/ Sub Factors

Financial Aspects
1 S1 Irrigation incentives such as markets
2 S2 Irrigation incentives such as government grants
3 S3 Incentives such as rehabilitation of irrigation structures
4 S4 Inclusion of non-members in irrigation scheme operations
5 S5 Financial management transparency and accountability
6 S6 Resources mobilisation through payment of fees
7 S7 Resources mobilisation through access to loan facilities
8 S8 Resources mobilisation through functional diversification
Technical Aspects
9 S9 Quality of irrigation infrastructure
10 S10 Working water flow control structures
11 S11 Adequacy of water supply and delivery
12 S12 Reliability of water supply and delivery
13 S13 Equity of water supply and delivery
14 S14 Timeliness of water supply and delivery
15 S15 Volumetric water measurement and delivery
16 S16 Availability of external support
Social/Cultural Aspects
17 S17 Irrigation land disputes associated
18 S18 Land lease documents such as title deeds
19 S19 Family labour
20 S20 Hired labour
Environmental Aspects
21 S21 Difficult weeds
22 S22 Swampy conditions
23 S23 Water-logging conditions
24 S24 Siltation along canals and in plots
25 S25 Soil erosion along canal banks and in plots
26 S26 Catchment area protection through tree planting, etc
27 S27 Catchment protection through good agricultural/forestry practices
Governance Aspects
28 S28 Availability of working roles
29 S29 Availability of working rules
30 S30 Availability of working rights
31 S31 Availability of working charter
32 S32 Availability of working memorandum of understandings
33 S33 Scheme leadership through decision-making
37 S37 Explaining things to other members
38 S38 Planning and budgeting
39 S39 Calling for general assembly or meetings
42 S42 Management of scheme conflicts
Gender Aspects
43 S43 Participation of women in decision-making
44 S44 Participation of women in irrigation forums/networks
45 S45 Women access to irrigation resources
Agronomic Aspects
46 S46 Use of improved crop varieties
47 S47 Knowledge and skills in crop management

46
3.5.1 The Relative Importance Index (RII)

The Relative Importance Index (RII) is a statistical method adopted in various studies to
determine the importance and ranking of different success factors in development sectors
such as the construction industry. Most of the studies reviewed under literature review section
such as those by Fugar and Agyakwah‐Baah (2010); and Enshanssi, Mohamed and
Abushabani (2009) used RII to rate the importance of success factors in construction projects.
As the nature of the study was to get respondent’s perspectives on irrigation management
models, the Relative Preference Index (RPI) was adopted instead of the RII to reflect
respondent preferences.

RPI =

Where:

 W is the weight given to each success factor by the respondents ranging from 0 to 5; A is
the highest weight (equal to 5 in this case); and N is the total number of respondents. For
this study RPI has a value ranging from 0 to 1. This means that the higher the value of the
RPI the more important is the success factor.

3.5.2 The Paired Sample t-Test

The Paired t-Test is a statistical analysis technique commonly used for comparing the means
of data from two related samples such as when making observations before and after an
intervention on the same participant; or comparison of measurements from the same
participant using two measurement techniques. It is used for analysing continuous
(scale/interval/ratio) variables. For example, Field (2009) used the paired t-test technique to
determine differences in student marks following a teaching intervention. In this study, the
paired t-test method was adopted to analyse the means because the study intended to compare
respondent perspectives on irrigation management before and after IMT and PIM. Although
other appropriate procedures for analysis of interval scale data exist such as ANOVA, and
regression, the paired t-test analysis has been found to be more useful and practical for the
study. Data were first entered into SPSS and then analyzed (means compared and then paired
samples t-test conducted).

47
3.6 Research Limitations

This study only covered WUAs that are based in Nkhotakota District in the Central Region of
Malawi. Those WUAs based in the Eastern, Southern and Northern Regions were not
included in the survey because of financial and time constraints. In this study Bua and
Kaombe WUAs represent only 12.5% of the total number of WUAs previously under State
management. To some extent the results may be representative of the WUAs in Malawi
considering the current irrigation environment. Thus, care must be taken in generalizing the
results from these case studies as they may be internally but not externally generalizable.

3.7 Conclusion

As the study follows a quantitative empirical research approach, extensive literature reviews
were undertaken to identify the IM factors and sub-factors applicable to Malawi. A pilot
survey of fifteen (15) irrigation users was undertaken. From the target population of one
thousand one hundred-seven (1107) respondents, the study settled for a sample size of one
hundred-six (106) respondents with the ability to read and write because this would have
ensured that adequate responses were obtained within the study time limits. Primary data
were analysed statistically using the techniques discussed earlier in order to assist in the
interpretation of the results.

48
 CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the response rate, general information about the
respondents, relative preference and rankings of the factors, and paired t-tests for the mean
relative preference indices of respondent’s perspectives of the State and WUA irrigation
management models.

4.2 Response Rate

Table 4 presents the frequencies and percentages of the copies of the questionnaire that were
distributed and those that were filled and received.

Table 4 : Response Rate

Number of Percentage
Study No. of
Category of Copies of Responses
Target Responses
Respondent Questionnaire Received
Population Received
Distributed (%)

Bua Users 790 50 50 100

Kaombe Users 287 40 40 100

Agricultural Managers 30 30 16 53

Total 1107 120 106 88

One hundred (120) copies of the questionnaire were distributed out of which one hundred six
(106) were filled and received. This represents 88% response rate. This response rate is above
the 50% response rate discussed in the methodology section in the determination of the
sample size. Therefore, it may be said that overall it is 95% certain that the results of this
study represent more than 50% of the responses of the target population.

49
In terms of the breakdown of the responses for each respondent category 100%, 100% and
53% response rates for Bua and Kaombe users, and managers categories respectively that
were targeted for the investigations. Hence the responses represent more than 50% of the
target population in each category. Since statistically the responses only represent the target
population, caution should be taken not to generalise the results.

4.3 Part 1: Respondent’s General Information

4.3.1 Respondent Positions

Table 5 presents frequencies and percentages of the positions of respondents in the survey.

Table 5: Respondent Positions

Position of Respondent Frequency (No.) Percentages (%)

Executive 10 9
Sub Committees 27 26
Trustees 1 1
Ordinary Members 52 49
Managers 16 15
Total 106 100

The frequencies in the table above indicate that fifty two (52) of the one hundred six (106)
respondents in the survey were ordinary members representing forty nine percent (49%).
These are followed by twenty seven (27) respondents who had various positions in different
sub-committees of the WUAs represented by twenty six percent (26%). Sixteen (16)
respondents were agricultural managers representing fifteen percent (15%) of the total
respondent population. Ten (10) respondents had different positions in the WUA executive
committee representing nine percent (9%) of the total population while only one (1)
respondent had a position in the board of trustees (BoT) representing approximately 1 percent
(1%) of the total respondent population. Thus, ninety (90) respondents (representing 85%) of
the total population who participated in the survey were WUA members while sixteen (16)
respondents were managers representing 15% of the respondent population

50
4.3.2 Respondent Gender

Table 6 presents frequencies and percentages of the gender of the respondents.

Table 6 : Respondent Gender

Category of Respondent Gender Frequency (No.) Percentages (%)

Irrigation User Male 60 57
Female 30 28
Agricultural Manager Male 13 12
Female 3 3
Total 106 100

The frequencies in the table above indicate that sixty (60) of the 106 respondents in the
survey were male irrigation users representing fifty seven percent (57%) of the entire
respondent population while thirty (30) respondents were female irrigation users representing
twenty eight percent (28%) of the entire respondent population. Thirteen (13) respondents
were male agricultural managers representing twelve percent (12%) while three (3)
respondents were female agricultural managers representing three percent (3%) of the total
population. Thus, seventy three (73) respondents were males representing sixty-nine percent
(69%) while thirty-three (33) respondents were females representing thirty one percent (31%)
of the respondent population.

4.3.3 Respondent Educational Qualifications

Table 7 presents frequencies and percentages of the gender of the respondents.

Table 7 : Respondent Educational Qualifications

Educational Qualification Frequency (No.) Percentage (%)

Primary School Certificate of Education 72 67.9
Junior Certificate of Education 13 12.3
Malawi School Certificate of Education 7 6.6
Diploma 2 1.9
Bachelor's Degree 12 11.3
Total 106 100
51
The frequencies in the table above indicate that seventy-two (72) out of the one hundred six
(106) total responses were from respondents that hold Primary School Leaving Certificate of
Education. These respondents represent 67.9% of the total responses followed by those
holding Junior Certificate of Education comprising 12.3% which is thirteen (13) respondents.
There were 7 respondents with Malawi School Certificate of Education representing 6.6% of
the total respondents. 11.3% represent those with Bachelor’s Degrees. More than half of the
total respondents had at least a Primary School Leaving of Education at the time the survey
was undertaken. Thus, with such qualifications the respondents especially irrigation users
could read, understand and duly respond to the translated (Chichewa Version) research
questions.

4.4 Part 2: Evaluation of the Irrigation Management Factors

4.4.1 Study Outcomes

The research study outcomes were as follows:

(i). Identification of factors that may affect sustainability of irrigation management.

(ii). Ranking of factors based on preferences of irrigation management stakeholders.

(iii). Determination of whether differences in stakeholder preferences between factors of

the two irrigation management models are significant or not.

4.4.2 Study Factors

Literature review identified a number of key IM factors from which only seven (7) factors
were considered in this study, namely: financial, technical, social or cultural, environmental,
governance, gender and agronomic factors. For each factor, corresponding sub-factors were
further identified. Forty-seven (47) sub-factors were identified for the study. Table 8 below
summarizes sub-attributes per factor:

52
 Table 8 : Summary of Irrigation Management (IM) Factors

No. Irrigation Management Factors Number of Sub-Factors

1 Financial 8
2 Technical 8
3 Social/Cultural 4
4 Environmental 7
5 Governance 15
6 Gender 3
7 Agronomic 2
Total 47

53
4.4.3. Analysis of the Study Factors

A four-step procedure was adopted to analyze the data as follows: Compilation of

primary data in to a score spreadsheet; Conversion of Likert Scores into mean RPIs;
Ranking of sub-factors and factors and Statistical analysis of mean score differences
using the IBM SPSS Version 20.0 and the Paired Sample t-Test.

The study factors were analyzed by firstly using the RPI method by respondent
category per WUA. Mean RPI scores were then determined. The means were further
summarized as overall factor RPIs for the models respectively factor by factor and
then ranked. Table 9 shows a summary of the derived RPIs by sub-factor from primary
data and according to the study sites, respondents and model. Further mean RPI values
for each sub-factor are shown. Primary data is detailed in appendix 2 at the end of this
document.

54
 Table 9 : Summary of the Relative Preference Indices

Relative Preference Indices & Mean Scores

Bua Kaombe
Sub-
Factor Users Managers Users Managers
No IM Factor Code State WUA State WUA State WUA State WUA
S1 0.66 0.696 0.725 0.725 0.45 0.925 0.65 0.625
S2 0.544 0.56 0.7 0.525 0.57 0.755 0.675 0.45
S3 0.76 0.616 0.8 0.525 0.455 0.825 0.75 0.425
S4 0.568 0.456 0.55 0.575 0.305 0.595 0.625 0.475
S5 0.476 0.848 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.955 0.375 0.8
S6 0.528 0.912 0.4 0.875 0.375 0.945 0.425 0.95
S7 0.592 0.848 0.58 0.6 0.52 0.885 0.6 0.65
S8 0.436 0.828 0.625 0.6 0.445 0.845 0.625 0.575
1 Financial Mean 0.571 0.721 0.61 0.653 0.44 0.841 0.584 0.619
S9 0.72 0.56 0.775 0.525 0.495 0.875 0.75 0.425
S10 0.656 0.484 0.925 0.45 0.71 0.665 0.775 0.45
S11 0.652 0.504 0.825 0.55 0.665 0.76 0.775 0.45
S12 0.752 0.564 0.85 0.525 0.51 0.795 0.875 0.475
S13 0.74 0.584 0.85 0.65 0.525 0.84 0.8 0.575
S14 0.704 0.536 0.8 0.5 0.56 0.835 0.725 0.525
S15 0.7 0.468 0.825 0.725 0.52 0.765 0.75 0.38
S16 0.568 0.708 0.7 0.675 0.655 0.82 0.65 0.78
2 Technical Mean 0.687 0.551 0.819 0.575 0.58 0.794 0.763 0.508
S17 0.684 0.744 0.65 0.675 0.565 0.91 0.7 0.63
S18 0.572 0.9 0.725 0.75 0.445 0.885 0.675 0.875
S19 0.656 0.912 0.5 0.7 0.61 0.92 0.45 0.85
S20 0.688 0.844 0.7 0.625 0.69 0.89 0.725 0.35
3 Social/Cultural Mean 0.65 0.85 0.644 0.688 0.578 0.901 0.638 0.676
S21 0.604 0.564 0.725 0.55 0.61 0.84 0.675 0.475
S22 0.66 0.632 0.775 0.6 0.62 0.755 0.7 0.575
S23 0.68 0.572 0.8 0.6 0.595 0.715 0.675 0.45
S24 0.636 0.46 0.75 0.525 0.6 0.71 0.675 0.55
S25 0.624 0.476 0.75 0.525 0.665 0.77 0.675 0.5
S26 0.544 0.444 0.85 0.625 0.58 0.855 0.725 0.475
S27 0.636 0.704 0.875 0.65 0.595 0.875 0.85 0.55
4 Environmental Mean 0.626 0.55 0.789 0.582 0.609 0.789 0.711 0.511
S28 0.52 0.852 0.675 0.625 0.435 0.965 0.65 0.7
S29 0.612 0.928 0.825 0.78 0.47 0.93 0.8 0.825
S30 0.668 0.876 0.625 0.775 0.47 0.935 0.575 0.65
S31 0.572 0.88 0.5 0.5 0.505 0.87 0.55 0.525
S32 0.612 0.888 0.7 0.725 0.545 0.865 0.7 0.65
S33 0.56 0.84 0.55 0.75 0.45 0.935 0.6 0.725
S34 0.68 0.856 0.65 0.75 0.42 0.93 0.575 0.725
S35 0.512 0.6 0.65 0.65 0.535 0.805 0.75 0.45
S36 0.544 0.676 0.85 0.575 0.565 0.735 0.775 0.6
S37 0.596 0.904 0.675 0.75 0.53 0.92 0.725 0.675
S38 0.536 0.9 0.725 0.75 0.47 0.93 0.775 0.675
S39 0.62 0.932 0.525 0.8 0.515 0.98 0.55 0.775
S40 0.612 0.908 0.85 0.75 0.5 0.955 0.85 0.8
S41 0.676 0.964 0.6 0.825 0.455 0.93 0.625 0.825
S42 0.7 0.876 0.75 0.725 0.45 0.945 0.65 0.675
5 Governance Mean 0.601 0.859 0.677 0.715 0.488 0.909 0.677 0.685
S43 0.536 0.932 0.45 0.825 0.365 0.93 0.45 0.775
S44 0.5 0.892 0.45 0.775 0.45 0.93 0.5 0.75
S45 0.772 0.884 0.475 0.825 0.54 0.88 0.5 0.75
6 Gender Mean 0.603 0.903 0.458 0.808 0.452 0.913 0.483 0.758
S46 0.628 0.856 0.75 0.85 0.51 0.895 0.725 0.9
S47 0.74 0.868 0.65 0.825 0.535 0.925 0.7 0.7
7 Agronomic Mean 0.684 0.862 0.7 0.838 0.553 0.91 0.713 0.8

55
4.4.3.1 The Relative Preference Index (RPI) Results

The relative preference index results for each category of the irrigation management factors
are outlined below. Note that RK stands for Rank in the tables below;

56
4.4.3.1.1 Financial Sub-Factors

The relative preference indices (RPIs) for financial sub-factors by rank, code, model and respondent are tabulated below (Table 10).

Table 10 : Financial RPIs

Bua Respondents Kaombe Respondents

Users Managers Users Managers
State WUA State WUA State WUA State WUA
Code Sub-Factors (1-7) RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk
S1 Markets incentives 0.66 2 0.696 4 0.725 2 0.725 3 0.45 4 0.925 3 0.65 3 0.625 4
S2 Govt grant incentives 0.544 5 0.56 6 0.7 3 0.525 6 0.57 1 0.755 7 0.675 2 0.45 7
S3 Rehabilitation of irrigation structures 0.76 1 0.616 5 0.8 1 0.525 6 0.455 3 0.825 6 0.75 1 0.425 8
S4 Inclusion of non-members 0.568 4 0.456 7 0.55 6 0.525 5 0.305 8 0.595 8 0.625 4 0.475 6
S5 Transparency & accountability 0.476 7 0.848 2 0.5 7 0.8 2 0.4 6 0.955 1 0.375 7 0.8 2
S6 Payment of fees 0.528 6 0.912 1 0.4 8 0.875 1 0.375 7 0.945 2 0.425 6 0.95 1
S7 Access to institutional loan facilities 0.592 3 0.848 2 0.58 5 0.6 4 0.52 2 0.885 4 0.6 5 0.65 3
S8 Functional diversification 0.436 8 0.828 3 0.625 4 0.6 4 0.445 5 0.845 5 0.625 4 0.575 5
Average 0.571 0.721 0.61 0.653 0.44 0.841 0.591 0.619

57
Interpretation

From Table 10 the mean financial scores for both irrigation users and agricultural managers
ranked differently. For example, Bua users have a mean score of 0.721 for the WUA Model
which is higher than 0.571 for State Model; Bua managers rate have 0.653 for a WUA Model
which is higher than 0.61 for a State Model. Kaombe users have a mean score of 0.841 for a
WUA Model which is higher than 0.44 for a State Model. According to the agricultural
managers, Kaombe had financial aspects rated at a mean score of 0.619 for a WUA Model
which is higher than 0.591 for a State Model. Overall the mean scores are `higher for a WUA
Model than the State Model.

58
4.4.3.1.2 Technical Sub-Factors

The relative preference indices (RPIs) for technical sub-factors by rank, code, model and respondent are tabulated below (Table 11).

Table 11 : Technical RPIs

Bua Respondents Kaombe Respondents

Users Managers Users Managers
State WUA State WUA State WUA State WUA
Code Sub-Factors (9-16) RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk
S9 Quality of irrigation infrastructure 0.72 3 0.56 4 0.78 5 0.53 4 0.5 7 0.88 1 0.75 4 0.425 6
S10 Working water flow control structures 0.656 6 0.48 7 0.93 1 0.45 6 0.71 1 0.67 8 0.78 3 0.45 5
S11 Adequacy of water supply and delivery 0.652 7 0.5 6 0.83 3 0.55 3 0.57 3 0.76 7 0.78 3 0.45 5
S12 Reliability of water supply and delivery 0.752 1 0.56 3 0.85 2 0.53 4 0.51 5 0.8 5 0.88 1 0.475 4
S13 Equity of water supply and delivery 0.74 2 0.58 2 0.85 2 0.65 2 525 6 0.84 2 0.8 2 0.575 2
S14 Timeliness of water supply and delivery 0.704 4 0.54 5 0.8 4 0.65 2 0.56 4 0.84 3 0.73 5 0.525 3
S15 Volumetric water measurement/delivery 0.7 5 0.47 8 0.83 3 0.5 5 0.66 2 0.77 6 0.75 4 0.375 7
S16 Availability of external support 0.568 8 0.71 1 0.7 6 0.52 1 0.57 3 0.82 4 0.65 6 0.775 1
Average 0.687 0.55 0.82 0.55 0.57 0.79 0.76 0.506

59
Interpretation

From Table 11 the mean technical score for Bua users is 0.687 for a State Model which is
higher than 0.55 for a WUA Model; for Bua managers the RPI value is 0.82 for a State Model
higher than 0.55 for WUA Model while Kaombe managers rated it at 0.76 for a State
Management which is higher than 0.506 for a WUA Model. Kaombe users have a mean RPI
value of 0.79 for a WUA Model which is higher than 0.57 for a State Model. The results
indicate that technical aspects were rated higher under a State than WUA Management.

60
4.4.3.1.3 Social/Cultural Sub-Factors

The relative preference indices (RPIs) for social/cultural sub-factors by rank, code, model and respondent are tabulated below (Table 12).

Table 12 : Social/Cultural RPIs

Bua Respondents Kaombe Respondents

Users Managers Users Managers
State WUA State WUA State WUA State WUA
Code Sub-Factors (17-20) RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk
S17 Irrigation land disputes 0.684 2 0.744 4 0.65 3 0.675 3 0.45 3 0.91 2 0.7 2 0.625 3
S18 Land lease documents 0.572 4 0.9 2 0.725 1 0.75 1 0.61 2 0.885 4 0.675 3 0.875 1
S19 Family labour 0.656 3 0.912 1 0.5 4 0.7 2 0.69 1 0.92 1 0.45 4 0.85 2
S20 Hired labour 0.688 1 0.844 3 0.7 2 0.625 4 0.61 2 0.89 3 0.725 1 0.35 4
Average 0.65 0.85 0.644 0.688 0.59 0.9 0.64 0.68

61
Interpretation

From Table 12 the mean social/cultural score for Bua users is 0.65 for a State Model lower
than 0.85 for a WUA Model; For managers, the mean score for Bua is 0.644 for State
Management which is lower than 0.688 for WUA Management while Kaombe managers
have the mean score of 0.64 for a State Model which is still lower than 0.68 for a WUA
Model. Kaombe users have an average scores of 0.9 for a WUA Model which is higher than
0.589 for a State Model. Therefore, overall social/cultural aspects scored higher under WUA
Management than State Management.

62
4.4.3.1.4 Environmental Sub-Factors

The relative preference indices (RPIs) for environmental sub-factors by rank, code, model and respondent are tabulated below (Table 13).

Table 13 : Environmental RPIs

Bua Respondents Kaombe Respondents

Users Managers Users Managers
State WUA State WUA State WUA State WUA
Code Sub-Factors (21-27) RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk
S21 Difficult weeds 0.604 5 0.564 4 0.725 6 0.55 4 0.62 3 0.84 3 0.675 4 0.48 4
S22 Swampy conditions 0.66 2 0.632 2 0.775 4 0.6 3 0.695 1 0.755 5 0.7 3 0.58 1
S23 Water-logging conditions 0.68 1 0.572 3 0.8 3 0.6 3 0.6 4 0.715 6 0.675 4 0.45 5
S24 Siltation in canals & plots 0.636 3 0.46 6 0.75 5 0.53 5 0.665 2 0.71 7 0.675 4 0.5 2
S25 Soil erosion in canal banks & plots 0.624 4 0.476 5 0.75 5 0.53 5 0.58 6 0.77 4 0.675 4 0.5 3
S26 Tree planting 0.544 5 0.444 7 0.85 2 0.62 2 0.595 5 0.855 2 0.725 2 0.48 4
S27 Good agricultural/forestry practices 0.636 3 0.4 1 0.875 1 0.65 1 0.435 7 0.875 1 0.85 1 0.55 2
Average 0.626 0.55 0.789 0.58 0.599 0.79 0.711 0.51

63
Interpretation

From Table 13 the mean environmental score for Bua users is 0.626 for a State Model which
is higher than 0.55 for a WUA Model; the managers rated Bua at 0.789 for a State Model
which is also higher than 0.582 for a WUA Model while Kaombe managers rated it 0.711 for
a State Model which is also higher than 0.511 for a WUA Model. Kaombe users had a score
of 0.79 for a WUA Model which was higher than 0.599 for a State Model. The results
indicate that overall environmental aspects had a higher average score under the State Model
than the WUA Model. Thus, environmental aspects were rated higher under the State Model
compared to the WUA Model.

64
4.4.3.1.5 Governance Sub-Factors

The relative preference indices (RPIs) for governance sub-factors by rank, code, model and respondent are tabulated below (Table 14).

Table 14 : Governance RPIs

Bua Respondents Kaombe Respondents

Users Managers Users Managers
State WUA State WUA State WUA State WUA
Code Sub-Factors (28-42) RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk
S28 Availability of workable roles 0.52 10 0.852 11 0.675 6 0.625 7 0.44 12 0.97 2 0.65 8 0.7 5
S29 Availability of workable rules 0.612 5 0.928 3 0.825 1 0.775 3 0.47 9 0.93 6 0.8 2 0.825 1
S30 Availability of workable rights 0.668 4 0.876 9 0.625 8 0.775 3 0.47 9 0.94 5 0.575 11 0.65 7
S31 Availability of workable charter 0.572 8 0.888 7 0.5 11 0.5 9 0.51 6 0.87 8 0.55 12 0.525 9
S32 Availability of workable MoU's 0.612 6 0.888 7 0.7 5 0.725 5 0.55 2 0.87 9 0.7 7 0.65 7
S33 Leadership through decision-making 0.56 9 0.84 8 0.55 10 0.75 4 0.45 11 0.94 5 0.6 10 0.725 4
S34 Leadership by being responsible 0.68 2 0.856 10 0.65 7 0.75 4 0.42 12 0.93 6 0.575 9 0.725 4
S35 Water access by corrupting officials 0.512 13 0.6 13 0.65 7 0.65 6 0.54 3 0.81 10 0.75 4 0.45 10
S36 Water access through theft at night 0.544 11 0.676 12 0.85 2 0.575 8 0.57 1 0.74 11 0.775 3 0.6 8
S37 Explaining things to other members 0.596 7 0.904 5 0.675 6 0.75 4 0.53 4 0.92 7 0.725 5 0.675 6
S38 Planning and budgeting 0.536 12 0.9 6 0.725 3 0.75 4 0.47 9 0.93 6 0.775 3 0.675 6
S39 Holding general assembly meetings 0.62 5 0.2 2 0.5 9 0.8 2 0.5 8 0.98 1 0.55 12 0.775 3
S40 Record-keeping 0.612 6 0.908 4 0.85 2 0.75 0.5 7 0.96 3 0.85 1 0.8 2
S41 Communication to members 0.676 3 0.964 1 0.6 9 0.825 1 0.46 10 0.93 6 0.625 9 0.825 1
S42 Management of scheme conflicts 0.7 1 0.876 9 0.75 4 0.725 5 0.45 11 0.95 4 0.65 8 0.675 6
Average 0.601 0.859 0.677 0.715 0.49 0.91 0.677 0.685

65
Interpretation

From Table 14 the mean governance scores for Bua users is 0.601 for State Management and
0.859 for a WUA Management. Bua managers rated it at 0.677 for State Management and
0.715 for a WUA Management. Kaombe users rated it at 0.488 for a State Management and
0.909 for WUA Management while managers rate Kaombe at 0.677 for State Management to
0.685 for WUA Management. Overall governance aspects in both sites have a higher mean
score under WUA than State Management.

66
4.4.3.1.6 Gender Sub-Factors

The relative preference indices (RPIs) for gender sub-factors by rank, code, model and respondent are tabulated below (Table 15).

Table 15 : Gender RPIs

Bua Respondents Kaombe Respondents

Users Managers Users Managers
State WUA State WUA State WUA State WUA
Code Sub-Factors (43-45) RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk
S43 Participation of women in decision-making 0.536 2 0.932 1 0.45 2 0.825 1 0.365 3 0.93 1 0.45 2 0.76 1
S44 Participation of women in irrigation forums 0.5 3 0.892 2 0.45 2 0.775 2 0.415 2 0.93 1 0.5 1 0.75 2
S45 Women access to irrigation resources 0.772 1 0.884 3 0.475 1 0.825 1 0.54 1 0.88 1 0.5 1 0.75 2
Average 0.603 0.903 0.458 0.808 0.44 0.91 0.48 0.76

67
Interpretation

From Table 15 the mean gender score for Bua users is 0.603 for a State Model compared to
0.903 for a WUA Model; Managers rated Bua at 0.458 for a State Model compared to 0.808
for a WUA Model. Kaombe users rated it at 0.44 for a State Model compared to 0.913 for a
WUA model while Kaombe managers rated it at 0.483 for a State Model compared to 0.758
for a WUA Model. Overall gender aspects in both the WUAs have a higher mean score under
the WUA Model than the State Model.

68
4.4.3.1.7 Agronomic Sub-Factors

The relative preference indices (RPIs) for agronomic sub-factors by rank, code, model and by respondent are tabulated below (Table 16).

Table 16 : Agronomic RPIs

Bua Respondents Kaombe Respondents

Users Managers Users Managers
State WUA State WUA State WUA State WUA
Code Sub-Factors (46-47) RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk RPI Rk
S46 Use of improved crop varieties 0.628 2 0.856 2 0.75 1 0.85 1 0.51 2 0.895 2 0.725 1 0.9 1
S47 Knowledge & skills in crop management 0.74 1 0.868 1 0.65 2 0.83 2 0.54 1 0.925 1 0.7 2 0.7 2
Average 0.684 0.862 0.7 0.84 0.52 0.91 0.713 0.8

69
Interpretation

From Table 16 the mean agronomic score for Bua users is 0.684 for State Management and
0.862 for WUA Management. Bua Managers have rated it at 0.7 for State Management and
0.838 for WUA Management. Kaombe users have a rating of 0.523 for State Management
and 0.91 for WUA Management while Kaombe managers have a rating of 0.713 for State
Management and 0.8 for WUA Management. Overall the agronomic aspects in both sites
have higher scores under the WUA than State Management.

4.4.3.1.8 The Overall Factor Relative Preference Indices

The Overall Factor RPI is the weighted average RPI given by the following formula: OFR is
given by [n*Bua user value+n*Bua manager value+n*Kaombe user value +n* Kaombe
manager value]/106. Therefore, Overall Factor RPI = [50*Bua user value+8*Bua manager
value+40*Kaombe user value +8* Kaombe manager value]/106. Overall IM Factor RPIs
across the irrigation schemes are presented below(Table 19).

Table 17 : Overall Factor RPI’s by Model

IM Factor Model Overall Factor RPI

State 0.526
Financial WUA 0.753
State 0.66
Technical WUA 0.639
State 0.626
Social/Cultural WUA 0.844
State 0.635
Environmental WUA 0.64
State 0.57
Governance WUA 0.854
State 0.889
Gender WUA 0.526
State 0.627
Agronomic WUA 0.874

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4.4.3.1.9 Overall Factor RPI’s by Rank

The overall relative preference indices for all irrigation management factors by model and
rank are tabulated below (Table 18).

Table 18 : Overall Factor RPIs by Rank

Model
IM Factor State Rank WUA Rank
Financial 0.526 7 0.753* 4
Technical 0.66* 2 0.639 6
Social 0.626 5 0.844* 3
Environmental 0.635 3 0.64* 5
Governance 0.570 6 0.854* 2
Gender 0.889* 1 0.526 7
Agronomic 0.627 4 0.874* 1
Mean 0.648 0.733

Interpretation

From Table 18 above the weighted Overall Factor RPI for each irrigation management factor
is as shown. The weighted Overall Factor RPI for State Management is 0.648 and 0.733 for
WUA Management. Overall WUA Model agronomic aspects are come on first position while
under State Model come fourth; Governance aspects are ranked second under WUA Model
compared to State Model on sixth; Social aspects are ranked third under WUA Model
compared to State Model on fifth; Financial aspects are ranked fourth under WUA Model
compared to State Model on seventh; Environmental aspects are ranked fifth under WUA
Model compared to State Model on third; Technical aspects are ranked sixth under WUA
Model compared to State Model on second, and lastly, gender aspects are ranked seventh
under WUA Model compared to State Model on first position.

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4.4.3.2 Paired t-Test Results on Sub-Factors

The Paired t-Test analysis results and conclusions were then drawn using a three-step
procedure adopted from Field (2009), namely: Formulation of a general research question for
each mean RPI factor; Setting up research hypotheses, i.e. null and alternative hypotheses for
each mean RPI factor; and either rejecting or accepting the Null Hypothesis at p-value < 0.05.

The general research question and corresponding hypotheses are as follows;

General Research Question: Is there a difference in mean factor scores for State and WUA
Models?

Research Hypotheses:

The 'null hypothesis', H0 is: There is no difference in the mean factor scores for State and
WUA Models?

The 'alternative hypothesis', H1 is: There is a difference in the mean factor scores for State
and WUA Models?

4.4.3.2.1 Financial Sub-Factors

The paired t-test results for financial sub-factors are respectively tabulated as paired samples
statistics (Table 19) and paired samples test (Table 20) below.

Table 19 : Paired Financial Samples Statistics (8 sub-factors)

No of Std. Std. Error

Samples. Deviation Mean
Respondents Model Mean
State 0.57 8 0.103 0.036
Bua Users WUA 0.721 8 0.164 0.058
State 0.44 8 0.083 0.029
Kaombe Users WUA 0.841 8 0.12 0.042
State 0.61 8 0.13 0.046
Bua Managers WUA 0.653 8 0.131 0.047
State 0.591 8 0.127 0.045
Kaombe Managers WUA 0.619 8 0.182 0.065

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 Table 20 : Paired Financial Samples Test

Paired Differences
Respondents 95% CI of the
Difference t df Sig.
Mean Std. Std.
Dev Error (2-tailed)
Mean Lower Upper
Bua Users -0.15 0.227 0.08 -0.34 0.04 -2 7 0.104
Kaombe Users -0.401 0.13 0.046 -0.51 -0.292 -9 7 0
Bua Managers -0.043 0.242 -0.25 0.159 0.159 -1 7 0.629
Kaombe Managers -0.028 0.301 0.106 -0.28 0.224 0 7 0.799

Interpretation

From Table 20 the t-statistics, t, for each of the paired samples are: -1.87, -8.71, -0.505 and -
0.264 respectively and the p-values as; 0.104, 0.000, 0.629 and 0.799 respectively. Since a p-
value of 0.104 is greater than 0.05, the null hypothesis for the mean State and WUA mean
financial score for Bua is accepted implying that no significant differences exist between the
means. Thus, financial aspects at Bua have not remained worse.

For Kaombe, since a p-value of 0.000 is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected
implying significant differences exist between the means for State and WUA Models. Bua
and Kaombe managers have p-values of 0.629 and 0.799 respectively. The null hypotheses
are accepted implying that no significant differences exist between the mean State and WUA
Model and therefore there is no strong evidence to suggest financial aspects have changed. So
under State Management financial aspects were much worse than under WUA Management.

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4.4.3.2.2 Technical Sub-Factors

The paired t-test results for technical sub-factors are respectively tabulated as paired samples
statistics (Table 21) and paired samples test (Table 22) below.

Table 21 : Paired Technical Samples Statistics (8 sub-factors)

Respondents Model Mean No. of Std. Std. Error

Samples Deviation Mean
State 0.819 8 0.065 0.023
Bua Users WUA 0.575 8 0.096 0.034
State 0.58 8 0.084 0.03
Kaombe Users WUA 0.794 8 0.065 0.023
State 0.819 8 0.065 0.023
Bua Managers WUA 0.575 8 0.096 0.034
State 0.58 8 0.084 0.03
Kaombe Managers WUA 0.794 8 0.065 0.023

Table 22 : Paired Technical Samples Test

Paired Differences
Respondents Std. 95% CI of the
Error Difference t df Sig.
Mean Std.
Mean (2-tailed)
Dev
Lower Upper
Bua Users 0.24 0.139 0.049 0.13 0.36 5 7 0.002
Kaombe Users -0.21 0.137 0.04 -0.33 -0.1 -4 7 0.003
Bua Managers 0.24 0.139 0.04 0.13 0.36 5 7 0.002
Kaombe Managers -0.21 0.137 0.04 -0.33 -0.1 -4 7 0.003

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Interpretation

From Table 22 the t-statistics, t, for each of the paired samples are: 1.97, -4.43, -4.94 and -
4.43 respectively. The p-values are; 0.002, 0.003, 0.002 and 0.003 respectively. Since p-
values of 0.002 and 0.003 are respectively less than 0.05, the null hypothesis for mean
technical scores is rejected implying that significant differences in the means exist between
State and WUA Models. Thus, strong evidence exists to suggest that significant differences
exist between the mean technical scores. Technical aspects under WUA Management in the
schemes have drastically worsened compared to State Management.

4.4.3.2.3 Social or Cultural Sub-Factors

The paired t-test results for social or cultural sub-factors are respectively tabulated as paired
samples statistics (Table 23) and paired samples test (Table 24) below.

Table 23 : Paired Social/Cultural Samples Statistics (4 sub-factors)

Respondents Model Mean No. of Std. Std. Error

Samples Deviation Mean
State 0.65 4 0.054 0.027
Bua Users WUA 0.85 4 0.077 0.038
State 0.58 4 0.084 0.03
Kaombe Users WUA 0.794 4 0.065 0.023
State 0.644 4 0.101 0.05
Bua Managers WUA 0.688 4 0.052 0.026
State 0.638 4 0.127 0.063
Kaombe Managers WUA 0.676 4 0.244 0.122

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 Table 24 : Paired Social/Cultural Samples Test

Paired Differences

Respondents Mean Std. Std. 95% CI of the t df Sig.

Dev Error Difference (2-tailed)
Mean
Lower Upper
Bua Users -0.2 0.12 0.058 0.058 -0.01 -3 3 0.042
Kaombe Users -0.32 0.1 0.05 0.481 -0.17 -7 3 0.007
Bua Managers -0.04 0.11 0.057 -0.23 0.14 -1 3 0
Kaombe Managers -0.04 0.34 0.168 0.574 0.5 0 3 0.833

Interpretation
From Table 24 the t-statistics, t for each of the samples are: -3.4, -6.5, -0.8 and -0.2
respectively and p-values as; 0.042, 0.007, 0.5 and 0.833 respectively. Since the p-values of
0.042 and 0.007 are each less than 0.05, the null hypothesis for mean State and WUA Model
social/cultural scores is rejected for the WUAs; implying that there are significant differences
in the mean scores for State and WUA Models. Thus, strong evidence exists to suggest that
the social/cultural aspects across all the WUAs have improved. Social/cultural aspects have
improved under WUA Management than the State Management in both the study sites as per
irrigation users.

However, p-values of 0.5 and 0.833 are each more than 0.05. In this case, the null hypothesis
for the mean State and WUA Model social/cultural scores is also accepted for all the WUAs
based on perspectives of the managers implying that no significant differences exist in the
means for State and WUA Models. Thus, no strong evidence exists to suggest that the
social/cultural aspects under WUA Management have worsened. According to agricultural
managers social/cultural aspects in both study sites have not improved under WUA
Management compared to State Management.

76
4.4.3.2.4 Environmental Sub-Factors

The paired t-test results for technical sub-factors are respectively tabulated as paired samples
statistics (Table 25) and paired samples test (Table 26) below.

Table 25 : Paired Environmental Samples Statistics (7 sub-factors)

Model Mean No. of Std. Std. Error

Respondent Samples Deviation Mean
State 0.626 7 0.044 0.017
Bua Users WUA 0.55 7 0.097 0.037
State 0.609 7 0.028 0.01
Kaombe Users WUA 0.789 7 0.068 0.026
State 0.789 7 0.056 0.021
Bua Managers WUA 0.582 7 0.049 0.019
State 0.711 7 0.064 0.024
Kaombe Managers WUA 0.511 7 0.048 0.018

Table 26 : Paired Environmental Samples Test

Paired Differences
95% CI of the
Respondent Difference t df Sig.
Mean Std. Std.
Dev Error Lower Upper (2-tailed)
Mean
Bua Users 0.08 0.08 0.031 0 0.153 2 6 0.051
Kaombe Users -0.18 0.08 0.03 -0.25 -0.106 -6 6 0.001
Bua Managers 0.21 0.02 0.009 0.185 0.229 23 6 0
Kaombe Managers 0.2 0.07 0.024 0.14 0.6 8 6 0

77
Interpretation

From Table 26 the t-statistics, t for each of the samples are: 2.43, -5.97, -23.1 and 8.2
respectively and the p-values as; 0.051, 0.001, 0.0 and 0.0, respectively. Since the p-value of
0.051 is more than 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted implying that for Bua no significant
differences exist in mean environmental scores. Thus, no strong evidence exists to support
the argument. According to Bua users, Bua and Kaombe managers, environmental aspects
were better under State Management than under WUA Management. Kaombe users,
however, had it that environmental aspects are better under WUA Management than State
Management.

4.4.3.2.5 Governance Sub-Factors

The paired t-test results for governance sub-factors are respectively tabulated as paired
samples statistics (Table 27) and paired samples test (Table 28) below.

Table 27 : Paired Governance Samples Statistics (15 sub-factors)

No. of Std. Std. Error

Samples Deviation Mean
Respondents Model Mean
State 0.601 15 0.061 0.016
Bua Users WUA 0.858 15 0.096 0.025
State 0.488 15 0.044 0.011
Kaombe Users WUA 0.909 15 0.065 0.017
State 0.677 15 0.11 0.029
Bua Managers WUA 0.715 15 0.089 0.023
State 0.677 15 0.098 0.025
Kaombe Managers WUA 0.685 15 0.105 0.027

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 Table 28: Paired Governance Samples Test

Paired Differences
95% CI of the
Respondents Difference t df Sig.
Mean Std. Std.
Dev Error Lower Upper (2-tailed)
Mean
Bua Users -0.23 0.08 0.021 -0.3 0.21 12 14 0
Kaombe Users -0.42 0.1 0.026 -0.48 -0.37 -16 14 0
Bua Managers -0.04 0.14 0.036 -0.12 0.04 -1 14 0.302
Kaombe Managers -0.01 0.14 0.036 -0.09 0.07 -0 14 0.821

Interpretation

From Table 28 the t-statistics, t, for each of the samples are: -12.3, -16.3, -1.1 and -0.2
respectively and the p-values as; 0.0, 0.0, 0.302 and 0.821 respectively. Since a p-value of 0.0
is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected for both Bua and Kaombe users implying that
no significant differences in mean governance scores exist. Thus, no strong evidence exists to
suggest governance aspects have improved in the WUAs. However, according to the
managers since the p-values of 0.302 and 0.821 are each more than 0.05, the null hypothesis
is accepted implying that strong evidence exists to suggest that governance aspects have
improved. Governance aspects are worse under WUA Management than WUA Management.
Thus, governance aspects are better under WUA Management than State Management.

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4.4.3.2.6 Gender Sub-Factors

The paired t-test results for technical sub-factors are respectively tabulated as paired samples
statistics (Table 29) and paired samples test (Table 30) below.

Table 29 : Paired Gender Samples Statistics (3 sub-factors)

Respondents Mean No. of Std. Std. Error

Samples Deviation Mean
0.603 3 0.148 0.085
Bua Users 0.903 3 0.026 0.015
0.452 3 0.088 0.051
Kaombe Users 0.913 3 0.029 0.017
0.458 3 0.014 0.008
Bua Managers 0.808 3 0.029 0.017
0.483 3 0.029 0.017
Kaombe Managers 0.758 3 0.014 0.008

Table 30 : Paired Gender Samples Test

Paired Differences
95% CI of the
Respondents Difference t df Sig.
Mean Std Std.
Dev Error (2-tailed)
Mean Lower Upper

Bua Users -0.3 0.16 0.1 0.704 0.104 3 2 0.086

Kaombe Users -0.46 0.11 0.07 -0.744 -0.179 -7 2 0.02
Bua Managers -0.35 0.03 0.01 -0.412 -0.288 -24 2 0.002
Kaombe Managers -0.28 0.04 0.03 -0.383 -0.167 -11 2 0.008

80
Interpretation

From Table 30 the gender t-statistics, t, results for each of the samples are: -3.19, -7.04, -24.3
and -11 respectively and the p-values as; 0.086, 0.02, 0.002 and 0.008 respectively. For Bua
users since the p-value of 0.086 is more than 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted implying
that no significant differences exist in mean gender scores and thus no strong evidence to
suggest gender aspects are better or worse under WUA Management than State Management.
However, the p-values of 0.02, 0.002 and 0.008 for Kaombe users, Bua managers and
Kaombe managers respectively are each less than 0.05. The null hypothesis is rejected
implying significant differences exist in means for State and WUA Models.

Thus, strong evidence exists to suggest there has been a change in gender aspects between the
models. Gender aspects are better under WUA Management than the State Management.

4.4.3.2.7 Agronomic Sub-Factors

The paired t-test results for technical sub-factors are respectively tabulated as paired samples
statistics (Table 31) and paired samples test (Table 32) below.

Table 31 : Paired Agronomic Samples Statistics (2 sub-factors)

Mean No. of Std. Std. Error

Samples Deviation Mean
Respondents
0.684 2 0.079 0.056
Bua Users 0.859 2 0.004 0.003
0.523 2 0.018 0.0125
Kaombe Users 0.91 2 0.021 0.015
0.7 2 0.071 0.05
Bua Managers 0.838 2 0.018 0.0125
0.713 2 0.018 0.0125
Kaombe Managers 0.8 2 0.141 0.1

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 Table 32 : Paired Agronomic Samples Test

Paired Differences
95% CI of the
Difference
Std.
Std. Error Sig.
Respondents Mean Dev Mean Lower Upper t df (2-tailed)
Bua Users -0.18 0.07 0.05 -0.81 0.46 -3.6 1 0.174
Kaombe Users -0.36 0.05 0.033 -0.77 0.06 -11 1 0.058
Bua Managers -0.14 0.05 0.038 -0.61 0.34 -3.7 1 0.17
Kaombe Managers -0.09 0.12 0.088 -1.2 1.02 -1 1 0.5

82
Interpretation

From Table 32 the agronomic t-test statistics, t for each sample are: -3.56, -11, -3.67 and -1
respectively and the p-values as; 0.174, 0.058, 0.17 and 0.5 respectively. Since the p-values
of 0.174, 0.058, 0.17 and 0.5 are each more than 0.05, the null hypotheses are accepted
implying no significant differences exist in the mean agronomic scores. Thus, there is no
sufficient evidence to suggest that agronomic aspects have changed for the better under the
State Management compared to WUA Management.

4.4.3.1 Paired t-Test Results on IM Scores

The research question and hypotheses for the overall irrigation management RPI scores were
outlined as shown below:

Research Question: Is there a difference in the overall mean irrigation management factor
scores between State and WUA Models?

Research Hypotheses:

The 'null hypothesis', H0: There is no difference in mean IM factor scores for State and WUA
Models?

The 'alternative hypothesis', H1: There is a difference in mean IM factor scores for State and
WUA Models?

The overall irrigation management paired t-test results are respectively tabulated as paired IM
samples statistics (Table 33) and paired IM samples test (Table 34) below.

Table 33 : Paired IM Sample Statistics

Model Mean N Std. Dev Std. Error

Mean
State 0.648 7 0.116 0.044
WUA 0.733 7 0.134 0.051

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 Table 34 : Paired IM Samples Test

Model Paired Differences t df Sig.

Mean Std. Std. 95% CI of the (2-
Dev Error Lower Upper tailed)
Mean
State - WUA -0.085 0.232 0.088 -0.300 0.129 -0.974 6 0.368

Interpretation

From Table 34 the mean irrigation management factor RPI score t-statistic, t, is -0.974, and
p-value as 0.368. Since 0.368 is greater than 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted, meaning
that there are no significant differences in the overall factor RPIs between the IM models. On
the overall this implies that no strong evidence exists to suggest a good performance in the
irrigation aspects under WUA Management.

4.5. DISCUSSIONS

4.5.1 Financial Factors

Although irrigation users and the agricultural managers rated financial aspects differently
across WUAs, the financial scores for under WUA Management were rated higher than under
State Management. However, t-test analysis shows no significant differences existing
between the two models of IM. Thus, financial aspects remain worse under WUA
Management just like under State Management. For example, WUAs cannot manage, operate
and maintain the schemes due to limited funds as prices of produce remain poor, there are no
already secured markets, and resources are poorly mobilised. This finding is in line with
results of a study by Banda (2005) who observed that farmer organizations in Malawi remain
characterised by poor financial management due to lack of financial management abilities in
the leaders, resource mobilisation and continued mentality for over-reliance on donor
support. This view is further supported by Molle and Berkoff (2008) and Cornish et al.
(2004) who also argue that there is hardly any example of a developing country where full
cost-recovery of irrigation costs in large scale irrigation schemes is achieved. The views of
these authors validate the findings on financial aspects for Bua and Kaombe WUAs.

84
Ros (2010) and Aziz and Zamani (2008) observed that the more the users participate in
irrigation the more the financial resources may be raised and therefore the more viable the
organizational financial status. Abdullayev et al. (2008) on the other hand observed that one
of the problems associated with WUAs is non-payment of membership fees and this is
dependent on user participation. These views contradict the study results in the sense that
while users in the WUAs pay membership fees, say for example, the collected funds are
insufficient to make WUAs more viable and sustainable. The situation varies from one farmer
organization to the other but in this study the generated funds under WUA Management do
not suffice despite generation of financial resources on their own. Therefore neither State
Management nor WUA Management has a better performance in financial aspects.

4.5.2 Technical Factors

Based on the mean scores technical aspects were rated higher under the State Management
than the WUA Management. The t-test analysis shows that significant differences exist in the
means for the technical scores. Thus, strong evidence exists to suggest that technical aspects
under WUA Management are worse than under State Management. Also note that during the
IMT process most of the irrigation scheme infrastructure was fully rehabilitated to almost
new condition before the WUAs took over through donor project funding (Nkhoma, 2011).

At the time WUAs assumed scheme management responsibilities, irrigation facilities were
therefore in good condition and hence technically every aspect was better. To date no new
irrigation infrastructure has been added to each of these schemes by the WUAs themselves
rather the same structures they inherited are being used. GoM however, provides technical
support to the WUAs in form of land levelling and flood protection works from time to time.
As technical aspects depend on condition of irrigation infrastructure, the notable changes in
the technical aspects must relate to deterioration of infrastructure and facilities as most of the
WUAs are unable to keep irrigation infrastructure in good condition. For example, irrigation
infrastructure such as canals remain in bad condition due to irregular maintenance schedules;
water control structures such as gates are non-functional due to:

85
lack of replacement; adequacy, reliability, equity, and timeliness of water supply and delivery
have been compromised; the users are only able to measure water volumes at the abstraction
point and not further down the irrigation system; and that despite the availability of technical
support from government extension staff in terms of knowledge and skills the technical
aspects of the schemes and users remain poor.

These findings are against the views of Wang et al. (2010) and Harris and Gantt (2007) who
recommend decentralized IM for communities as necessary for maintaining the resource
overtime, and investing in system maintenance. Wang et al. (2010) highlighted the following
principles as essential: an adequate and reliable water supply; a farmer organization within
hydraulic boundaries, and the volumetric water measurement.

4.5.3. Social or Cultural Factors

Based on the mean scores social/cultural aspects had a higher score under WUA Management
than the State Management. The t-test analysis reveals that significant differences exist
between the mean social/cultural scores suggesting that an improvement in the social aspects
under the WUA Management compared to State Management. These social or cultural
aspects are mostly related to land issues in terms of conflicts resulting from land transactions,
access and inheritance rights for irrigation purposes. The users reported no problems with
regard to existence of land conflicts related to access and inheritance particularly because all
scheme land is leased and it belongs to the WUA and so nobody owns it. Only members can
have access to this land for irrigation purposes.

Studies by Nkambule and Dlamini (2013) and Kadigi et. al (2012) reveal that land tenure
issues critically challenge sustainability of irrigation schemes in the Sub-Saharan Africa, e.g.
in Swaziland. In the absence of land rights, it is also difficult for a user to access credit
facilities without collateral (Gum’a, 2004). However, views by Guma’a (2004) contradict the
current situation at Bua and Kaombe as all scheme land belongs to the WUAs and that for a
user to access land, they have to apply. In this way a user becomes a plot holder and an
irrigator.

86
The land tenure system in the WUAs is in such a way that it causes no disruption to irrigation
activities for individual plot holders. Land is owned by the WUAs and that land documents to
validate the ownership status exist. Under State ownership land documents were also
available, the users were poorly organized and hence land conflicts ensued. In this case it
does not exist at Bua and Kaombe WUAs. Reviews by Groenfeldt (2005) found that
indigenous irrigation systems should be intelligently assisted, rather than mindlessly replaced
to keep the indigenous knowledge, to aid in propagation of cultural methods of production
and associated technologies (Gillespie et al., 2004). With respect to Bua and Kaombe WUAs
State upgrading of the irrigation schemes did not affect the indigenous knowledge of the
users.

4.5.4. Environmental Factors

The mean environmental scores indicate that overall environmental aspects have a higher
score under the State Management than the WUA Management. The t-test analysis indicates
significant differences in the means exist. Thus, strong evidence exists to suggest there is a
change. Therefore, environmental aspects are worse under State Management compared to
WUA Management. This is evident at Bua where it was off-season for irrigation activities as
there was no water for irrigation in Bua River. Bua River normally dries up every year during
dry periods but at the point of survey the dry-out was severe compared to other years. Under
State Management there was adequate water in the river throughout the irrigation seasons.

Poor environmental management practices in catchment the catchment area upstream and
even around the scheme have caused this problem. For instance, certain problematic weeds
affect the crops during the season and are difficult to wipe out. Swamps have also developed
in several parts of the scheme caused by floods or heavy rains. The main water source to Bua
WUA is Bua River and at the time of the survey the river had dried to the worst making full
irrigation impossible in most parts of the scheme. WUAs reported cases of silt deposits either
along water conduits or in the field plots that deteriorate the soil structure further. Cases of
soil erosion have also been observed especially in the plots specifically in the unlined field
canals. Erosion along lined canal sides weakens the lining of the canal eventually leading to
further canal damage.

87
As the catchment areas of both rivers, Bua (all the river course) and Kaombe (downstream
river course) are fast being degraded the users reported rarely undertake catchment
protection/environmental mitigation measures such as planting of exotic tree during the rainy
season and vetiver grass to control erosion. These observations agree with studies by Chel
and Kaushik (2011), Lichtfouse et al. (2009), Dantsis et al. (2009), Jordan and Constance
(2008) who reported that agricultural developments cause deforestation, erosion, floods,
weeds and swamps.

4.5.5 Governance Factors

The overall governance aspects in both WUAs have a higher score under WUA Management
than State Management. Thus, governance aspects have are better under WUA Management
compared to State Management. The t-test analysis reveals that significant differences exist
in the governance means between the State and WUA Models. Thus, strong evidence exists
to suggest that governance aspects are better under the WUA Model than the State Model.

Governance also influences irrigation management through the development and

maintenance of irrigation infrastructure, timely and adequate water supply to farmers, rule
enforcement, workable rights, increased membership, better conflict management, farmer’s
trust and respect for leaders (Regner et al., 2010; Ros, 2010). These reviews agree with the
findings from the two WUAs as the following improvements can be noted in the WUAs
under the WUA Model compared to the State Model: users have become more participatory,
transparent and accountable, responsive, integrative, ethical, and communicative.

The water resource supply and delivery is more equitable, timely but unpredictable at times
although at the time of the survey Bua Scheme was not fully operational due to lack of water
in the source while Kaombe Scheme was also not fully operational due to rehabilitation and
land levelling works around the scheme. The users also highlighted rule enforcement,
workable rights, membership, conflict management, farmer’s trust and respect for leaders as
some of the other merits derived from improved water governance.

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Under State Management illegal irrigation practices such as water access by theft at night or
bribery of officials were rampant but under WUA Management they no longer exist. There
has also been an improvement in availability of knowledge and skills to users as they are now
able to plan and budget for operations, holding general assemblies, record-keeping,
communication and conflict management.

4.5.6 Gender Factors

The mean gender score is higher under the WUA Management than the State Management.
The paired t-test analysis reveals significant differences in gender means between State and
WUA Models suggesting therefore that strong evidence exists to validate this change. This
change is an improvement in gender aspects under the WUA Management and entails
increased women involvement in forums, increased women involvement in decision-making
processes and increased women access to irrigation resources under WUA Management. This
finding is in line with views of Deribe (2008) who found out that women involvement in
water resources management improves scheme sustainability, enhances maximum crop yield
from infrastructure development, and, improves women access to water rights, irrigated land
and associated obligations; participation in associations, networks (forums) and leadership
level positions.

4.5.7 Agronomic Factors

The mean agronomic scores are higher under the WUA Management than the State
Management. The paired t-test analysis reveals that no significant differences exist in mean
agronomic scores, implying that strong evidence exists to validate a positive change in the
agronomic aspects under WUA Management than State Management.

Users in both WUAs use improved crop varieties and employ better crop management
practices in the schemes. Skills such as modern weeding methods and frequencies, crop
rotation (although in irrigation schemes this is rarely practiced), use of both organic and
inorganic fertilizers, moisture conservation and soil drainage technologies have also been
well adopted by the irrigation users in the Water Users Associations.

89
It can further be observed that under both models users have been able to acquire knowledge
and skills in various agriculture production practices. Adequate skills and knowledge are vital
in sustainability of irrigation schemes according to Nkambule and Dlamini (2013) in his
observation that inadequate knowledge and skills in agriculture production practices
challenge sustainability of irrigation schemes in Swaziland.

4.5.8 Overall Irrigation Management Factors

Based on Table 18 it can be noted that under the State Model all respondents generally
ranked the agronomic aspects on number one, seconded by the technical aspects, thirdly the
environmental aspects while gender aspects were ranked the last. However, under the WUA
Model the respondents also ranked agronomic aspects on number one, seconded by the
gender aspects, followed by governance aspects while financial, environmental and technical
aspects are ranked the last. The paired t-test analysis reveals that no significant differences
exist between the mean irrigation management scores for all seven factors by model. From
Table 36 the t-statistic, t, is -0.974, and p-value is 0.368. Since 0.368 is greater than 0.05, the
null hypothesis is accepted, meaning that there are no significant differences in the overall
mean RPI between the irrigation management models. From a broader perspective
considering all the seven factors, the t-test reveals no significant differences in the overall
means for irrigation management and therefore generally this means no significant change
between the State and WUA Models to signify positive improvements in irrigation
management across these WUAs.

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 CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

According to the comparative study results, the identified seven IM factors are financial,
technical, social/cultural, environmental, governance, gender and agronomic. The differences
in significance levels based on stakeholder preferences on the factors or attributes between
the two IM models were finally determined. The literature review identified forty seven IM
sub-factors based on the seven factors outlined above.

A survey was conducted to investigate the relative preference of the identified irrigation IM
factors at Bua and Kaombe WUAs in Nkhotakota District. A questionnaire was prepared for
the irrigation users and managers. The research survey method was used to gather data on the
identified irrigation management factors that affect sustainability of the WUAs. A pilot
survey was undertaken to confirm the relevance of the issues under investigation to the
respondents. Respondents with knowledge in IM rated the relative preference of the IM
factors. Only literate irrigation users were selected to participate in the survey. The IM scores
were determined first, followed by mean RPIs. The mean RPIs for State and WUA
Management were then analysed by paired t-tests to determine levels of significance for each
pair. Finally, the overall factor scores for State and WUA Management were then determined
and ranked.

5.2 Research Conclusions

Although overall no significant changes may have taken place to signify either positive or
negative improvement in the irrigation aspects across these WUAs, on a factor by factor basis
some negative trends can be noted as being critical. For example, out of the seven key
irrigation management factors identified, three aspects, i.e. the financial, the technical and the
environmental aspects were much better under the State Model than the WUA Model and
these being very critical factors affect the sustainability of the smallholder irrigation schemes.
Similarly, two other factors, i.e. the governance aspects and gender aspects are found to be
better under WUA Management than under State Management.

91
However, the social aspects and the agronomic aspects have neither improved for the better
nor the worse. Therefore, overall it may be concluded that State Management was better in
financial, technical and environmental aspects while the WUA Management is better in
governance and gender aspects.

5.3 Research Recommendations

From the results of the study the following recommendations are suggested:

(i). The study may be redone but on a larger scale to include the other fourteen WUAs
excluded in this one.

(ii). This particular study is based on a few selected factors. Exploring additional key
factors for further studies may add more value to the findings. Such other factors may
include production, maintenance, marketing and others that have a direct bearing on
sustainability of WUAs.

5.4 Suggestions for Further Research

Future studies are suggested as follows:

(i). Further comparative studies of the same may be done but now trying other
arrangements such as WUA versus WUA, WUA versus Irrigation Cooperative or
WUA versus Irrigation Agency.

(ii). This study focussed mainly on FMIS that were once centralized. Since the irrigation
policy caters for all smallholder farmers (including self-help schemes, irrigation
clubs) further research in comparative terms could be extended to such groups.

(iii). In averaging the relative preference indices across IM sub-factors and across IM
factors it assumed that all the sub-factors and factors are equally important. This fact
was not investigated in the study and could also be the subject of future research.

92
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110
 APPENDICES

7.1 Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire

7.1.1 Questionnaire for Agricultural Managers (English Version)

PART 1: General Respondent’s Information

Name of organization:
Name of respondent: Phone number:
Position of respondent in the organization:
Position Tick
DADO
ADADO
DIO
EMO
ABO
CO
LRCO
AEDC
AEDO

5.0 Sex:
Sex Tick
Male
Female

6.0 Education:
Qualification Tick
PSLCE
JCE
MSCE
Diploma
Degree

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 PART 2: Evaluation Of Irrigation Management
Malawi’s Irrigation Policy empowers smallholder irrigation farmers to own and manage
irrigation schemes formerly under state management through establishment of WUAs. Based
on your irrigation experience how do you rate management of the irrigation schemes by
WUAs compared to State? Answer the following questions by choosing only one answer
using the scale below: [Very Bad=1; Bad=2; Fair=3; Good=4; Very Good=5; I don’t
know=0]

Financial Factors
Availability of irrigation incentives;
1. Markets
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

2. Government grants
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

3. Rehabilitation of irrigation structures

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

4. Inclusion of non-members in irrigation scheme operations

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

5. Transparency and accountability of scheme leaders in financial management

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Resource mobilization, i.e., fees, loans, diversification of activities;

6. Payment of fees in terms of membership and water use
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

112
7. Access to loan facilities from institutions
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

8. Activity diversification
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Technical Factors
Quality of scheme irrigation infrastructure, i.e., cracking;
9. Cracking of structures causing leakages
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

10. Existence of water flow control structures i.e., gates

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Effectiveness of scheme irrigation infrastructure;

11. Adequacy of water supply and delivery
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

12. Reliability of water supply and delivery

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

13. Equity of water supply and delivery amongst the users

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

113
14. Timeliness of water supply and delivery
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

15. Volumetric water measurement and deliveries, i.e., use of gauges such as weirs,
flumes, meters;
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

16. Availability of external support, i.e., in terms of knowledge & skills, constructions or
rehabilitations;
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Social/Cultural Factors
17. Existence of land disputes associated with transactions, access and inheritance rights
for irrigation purposes
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

18. Availability of scheme land lease documents such as title deeds

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Availability of labour for irrigation purposes;

19. Family labour
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

20. Hired labour

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

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Environmental Factors
Occurrence of environmental problems, i.e., weeds, swamps, water-logging, siltation,
erosion;
21. Growth of weeds
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

22. Swampy conditions

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

23. Water-logging conditions

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

24. Siltation
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

25. Soil erosion

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Protection of the water catchment area;

26. Tree planting
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

27. Promotion of good agricultural/forestry practices

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

115
Governance Factors
Availability of workable institutional mechanisms;
28. Roles
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

29. Rules
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

30. Rights
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

31. Charter
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

32. Memorandum of Understandings

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Scheme leadership;
33. Decision-making
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

34. Accepting responsibility for their actions

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

116
Illegal irrigation practices in terms of water access;
35. Through corruption or bribery of officials
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

36. Theft especially at night

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Availability of knowledge & skills;

37. Explaining things to members
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

38. Planning and budgeting

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

39. Holding farmer meetings or general assembly

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

40. Record-keeping (minutes of meetings, finances, crop & water flow data)
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

41. Communication to members

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

117
42. Ability to manage scheme level conflicts;
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

GENDER FACTORS
43. Participation of women in decision-making
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

44. Participation of women in irrigation forums/networks

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

45. Women access to irrigation resources

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

AGRONOMIC FACTORS
46. Use of improved crop varieties for irrigation
STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

47. Availability of knowledge and skills in crop management;

STATE WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

THE END

118
7.1.2 Questionnaire for Irrigation Users (Chichewa Version)

GAWO LOYAMBA: Kudziwa Mlimi Woyankha Mafunso

Dzina la bungwe:
Dzina la membala: Nambala ya foni ya membala:
Udindo wa membala mu bungwe:
Wachiwiri Wachiwiri Membala
kwa kwa wa Membala
Mtsogoleri Mtsogoleri Mlembi mlembi Msungichuma komiti chabe

Chibadidwe (Sex):
Chibadidwe Chongani
Mwamuna
Mkazi

Maphunziro:
Setifiketi Chongani
PSLCE
JCE
MSCE
Diploma
Degree

GAWO LACHIWIRI: Myeso Wa Ntchito Za Ulimi Wothilira

Malamulo a Boma pa ntchito za ulimi wothilira mu masikimu akupereka mphamvu kwa alimi
ang’onoang’ono za umwini komanso kuyendetsa ntchito zonse za mu masikimu onse omwe
kale amayendetsedwa ndi Boma kudzera mu mabungwe a WUA. Kodi pakati pa WUA ndi
BOMA kale mungasiyanitse bwanji mayendetsedwe a ntchito za ulimi wothilira? Yankhani
funsoli potsatira ndondomeko yili munsimu posankha yankho limodzi mwa mayankho asanu
awa: [Very Bad =1; Bad =2; Fair =3; Good =4; Very Good =5; I don’t know=0]

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Kapezedwe ka Ndalama
Zokopa alimi kuchita nawo ulimi wothilira monga izi;
1. Misika ya zokolola
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

2. Thandizo la ndalama la ulere kuchokela ku BOMA

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

3. Kakonzedwe ka njila zobweletsa madzi mu sikimu

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

4. Kulola alimi ena omwe simamembala a bungwe kuchita nawo ulimi wothilira
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

5. Chilungamo pa zokhudzana ndi momwe ndalama za sikimu zikuyendela

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Kapezedwe ka zipangizo za ulimi wothilira mu sikimu monga izi;

6. Kulipila ndalama ya umembala komanso chilolezo chogwiritsa ntchito madzi
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

7. Kapezedwe ka ngongole ya gulu kuchokela ku mabungwe opeleka ngongole

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

120
8. Njila zina zopezela ndalama zothandizila pantchito zina za musikimu
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Upangili Wothilira
Kaonekedwe and kagwilidwe ntchito ka njila zobweletsa madzi mu sikimu;
9. M’ming’alu mu njila zobweletsa madzi chifukwa chokhalitsa/chosakonzedwa
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

10. Kupezeka kwa zipangizo zoyesela mlingo wa madzi mu sikimu

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Mafikidwe a madzi kuminda ya alimi motere;

11. Kulandila madzi okwanira
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

12. Chiyembekezo choti kupezeka madzi othilila mbewu

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

13. Kugawana madzi mofanana polingana ndi kukula kwa munda

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

14. Kubwera kwa madzi pa nthawi yoyenela

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

121
15. Kuyesa kwa kuchuluka kwa madzi
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

16.0 Kupezeka kwa chithandizo chapadela kuchokela kunja

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Chikhalidwe ndi Miyambo

17. Mikangano ya malo mu sikimu monga kapezedwe ndi umwini wa malo
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

18. Kupezeka kwa mapepala a umwini wa malo a sikimu

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Kupezeka kwa anthu ogwira ntchito za ulimi wothilira monga aganyu, eni ake;
19. Eni ake
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

20. Aganyu
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Zachilengedwe
Kupezeka kwa mavuto a zachilengedwe mu sikimu motere;
21. Kumela kwa tchire losafunika mu minda ya ulimi wothilira
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

122
22. Kupezeka kwa tchire lina longa mabango ndi mitengo mu zithaphwi za madzi
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

23. Kupezeka kwa madzi osayenda mu minda ya ulimi wothilila

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

24. Kukwililika/kuwonongeka kwa nthaka ndi mchenga wochokela kutali ndi madzi
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

25. Kukokoloka kwa nthaka ndi madzi mu sikimu

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Kuteteza malo osunga and ochokela madzi motere;

26.0 Kubzala mitengo
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

27.0 Kutsatila njira za makono za ulimi wa mbewu ndi mitengo

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Kayendetsedwe Ka Gulu
Kupezeka kwa ndondomeko zomanga mgwirizano wa alimi motere;
28. Zoyenela kuchita membala aliyense
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

123
29. Malamulo oyendetsela bungwe la sikimu
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

30. Ufulu wogwiritsa ntchito katundu wa bungwe monga madzi, malo ndi zina
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

31. Mgwirizano wosiyanitsa ntchito za bungwe ndi ntchito za ma membala a

bungwe pachiyambi penipeni
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

32. Mgwirizano wachithandizo pakati pa ma bungwe pokutukula ulimi wothilira mu

Masikmu
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Kutsogolera anthu pokugwila ntchito za sikimu mopanda chinyengo;

33. Kupanga mfundo zotsatidwa ndi ma membala
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

34. Kutsogolera anthu podziwitsa mamembala zofunika kudziwa

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Kupezeka kwa ntchito zina mu sikimu kudzera mu ziphuphu motere;

35. Kupeza madzi munjira ya kolapushoni popeleka ziphuphu kwa oyang’anila za
Madzi
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

124
36. Kuba madzi mungalande usiku
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Kupezeka kwa upangili wofunika wosiyanasiyana monga motere;

37. Kuwafotokozela ma membala za nthilira
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

38. Dongosolo lokonza ndondomeko and ndalama zogwilira ntchito za bungwe mu

sikimu
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

39. Kupangitsa misonkhano ya gulu

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

40. Kusunga mabuku pa chilli chonse chochitika mu sikimu

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

41. Kutumiza ma uthenga kwa ma membala

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

42. Kulongosola ndi kuthetsa mikangano ya musikimu pakati pa alimi

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

125
Jenda
43. Akazi kutenga nawo gawo mu utsogoleri patchito za ulimi wothilira
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

44. Akazi kutenga nawo gawo mu misonkhano yokambilana za ulimi wothilira ndi
ma bungwe ena
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

45. Kupeza zipangizo zoyenela kupangila ulimi wothilira monga madzi, ngongole,
mbewu, feteleza, ngalande za madzi ndi zina;
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

Zosamala Mbewu M’munda

46. Kagwiritsidwe ntchito ka mbewu za makono zoyenela mu ulimi wothilira
BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

47. Kupezeka kwa upangili wa chisamaliro chambewu mu ulimi wothilira

BOMA WUA
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5

THE END

126
7.2 Appendix 2: Raw Data

This data includes general aggregated respondent information based on Likert scores per
WUA (Refer to Bua WUA data for irrigation users’ scores on State Model compared to
WUA Model in Tables 35, 36 and 37; and Bua WUA manager’s scores on State Model
compared to WUA Model in Tables 38, 39 and 40). Also refer to Kaombe WUA data for
Kaombe irrigation users’ scores on State Model compared to WUA Model in Tables 41, 42
and 43; and Kaombe WUA manager’s scores on State Model compared to WUA Model in
Tables 44, 45 and 46).

127
 BUA WATER USERS ASSOCIATION

Table 35 : Raw Data for Bua Irrigation Users’ Ratings on State Model
SCORES
Re spon
Position in WUA Se x Education Financial Te chnical Social/Cultural Environme ntal Gove rnance Ge nde r Agronomic
de nt
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 S29 S30 S31 S32 S33 S34 S35 S36 S37 S38 S39 S40 S41 S42 S43 S44 S45 S46 S47
1 Member Female PSLCE 4 4 2 5 5 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 0 4 3 5 4 4 4 5 3 3 2 1 1 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 0 0 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5
2 Member Male PSLCE 4 5 2 4 5 5 4 4 5 1 2 3 1 2 0 4 4 4 5 5 2 5 5 4 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 0 2 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
3 Member Male PSLCE 4 4 4 2 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 4 2 4 3 3 3 5 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 5
4 Member Male PSLCE 5 2 5 5 2 2 2 3 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 2 5 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 4 2 3 4 1 4 5 2 4 5 2 5 2 1 5 5 5 3 5 3 5
5 Member Male PSLCE 2 2 3 5 1 2 2 0 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 0 5 4 4 4 5 0 2 4 4 5 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
6 Member Male PSLCE 4 3 4 0 4 4 5 4 4 4 3 5 5 3 4 0 5 4 4 4 5 0 2 5 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 2 4 3 5 4 4 5 3 2 5 4 5
7 President Male PSLCE 2 3 3 0 0 0 4 0 4 2 0 0 0 4 0 5 4 4 4 4 0 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 3 4 3 3 4 5 5 3 2 4 4 5
8 Vice Secretary Male PSLCE 2 3 3 0 0 0 4 0 3 4 2 0 0 0 4 0 5 4 4 4 4 0 2 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 3 4 3 3 4 5 5 3 2 4 4 5
9 Committee Member Female PSLCE 5 5 4 5 5 4 0 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 5 5 2 5 5 2 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 0 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 5 4 5
10 Member Female PSLCE 0 0 5 4 5 5 4 0 1 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 3 5 5 2 5 5 2 4 3 4 5 5 4 5 3 5 5 0 1 4 4 2 4 4 4 3 2 5 2 5
11 Vice President Male PSLCE 2 3 4 4 3 0 4 3 4 0 2 4 4 3 0 3 4 4 4 5 5 2 5 2 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 3 2 5 4 5
12 Member Male PSLCE 2 2 4 5 1 2 2 2 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 0 5 4 4 4 5 0 2 4 4 5 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 5 4 5
13 Member Male PSLCE 4 3 4 0 4 4 5 4 4 4 3 5 5 3 5 0 5 4 4 4 4 5 0 2 5 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 5 2 4 3 5 4 4 5 3 2 5 4 5
14 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 0 1 4 4 3 2 2 0 3 3 5 4 4 5 5 5 2 3 3 2 3 5 2 2 3 4 3 3 2 3 5 3 4 4 4 3 2 3 5 4
15 Committee Member Male PSLCE 5 5 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 2 4 4 3 3 2 3 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
16 Member Male PSLCE 5 3 3 5 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 4 4 5 5 4 5 0 4 3 4 5 5 4 4 3 3 4 5 5 3 1 2 5 0 3 3 0 3 4 3 5 3 3 4 5 2
17 Member Male PSLCE 5 5 5 0 0 5 4 0 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 0 3 0 5 5 5 5 2 5 5 3 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 3 3 0 3 0 3 3 2 2 2 2 3
18 Member Male PSLCE 5 5 4 0 5 5 0 0 5 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 4 0 5 0 5 0 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 5 5 0 5 5 0 5 5 0 0
19 Member Male PSLCE 2 2 3 3 5 4 4 3 2 1 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 2 3 1 2 5 3 3 5 2 5 5 5 3 3 5 4 4 2 2 5 2 4 5 5 4 3 3 4 4 5
20 Trustee Board Chair Male MSCE 1 1 4 1 1 1 3 1 3 5 1 1 2 2 5 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 5 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
21 Committee Member Male PSLCE 5 3 5 3 2 3 5 3 5 3 2 2 3 2 5 5 5 4 2 3 2 5 5 5 2 5 2 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 5 2 1 3 1 2 3 2 1
22 Member Male PSLCE 3 0 3 1 0 1 3 0 2 3 2 4 3 3 3 0 3 0 3 3 3 5 2 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 2 2 5 2 2
23 Member Male JCE 1 0 1 5 1 1 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5
24 Committee Member Male PSLCE 5 1 5 0 1 1 1 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 0 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 5
25 Committee Member Male JCE 4 4 5 1 3 2 3 3 5 5 4 4 2 5 1 5 1 4 1 1 1 3 1 1 5 5 5 1 1 1 4 5 1 4 2 2 4 4 1 3 3 2 3 4 1 1 5
26 Member Male PSLCE 5 2 5 4 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 2 3 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 2 3 4 5 5
27 Treasurer Male MSCE 5 4 3 0 0 0 5 3 0 2 3 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
28 Member Male PSLCE 5 3 3 0 0 0 5 0 4 5 2 4 3 5 5 0 0 0 5 5 2 2 2 5 5 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 3 5 0 5 5 5 5 2 2 3 5 5
29 Member Male PSLCE 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 2 5 2 1 1 2 1 2 5 5 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
30 Member Female PSLCE 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
31 Member Male PSLCE 2 3 5 5 3 3 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 2 2 1 4 1 5 5 1 3 5 4 1 5 3 3 4 4
32 Member Male PSLCE 2 1 5 5 3 2 5 3 2 1 2 3 5 1 2 5 2 1 3 4 1 3 2 1 2 4 5 4 5 3 1 5 3 5 4 5 4 3 5 3 5 3 5 2 5 3 2
33 Member Male PSLCE 2 1 5 0 4 5 4 4 3 2 3 5 4 4 5 1 3 5 5 5 0 4 5 1 1 2 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 5 1 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 1 1 3 5 3
34 Member Male PSLCE 4 1 1 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 3 3 1 1 2 4 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 2 3 4 1 2
35 Committee Member Male JCE 5 5 5 4 0 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 4 5 0 2 2 3 4 2 5 5 4 5 5 4 1 5 0 5 0 0 0 1 5 4 4 5 0 5 5 3 5 5 5
36 Member Male PSLCE 4 4 5 5 2 1 1 3 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 3 4 3 4 5 3 4 5 4 0 2 0 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 5 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 5 2 3
37 Member Male PSLCE 2 3 2 4 4 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 4 2 2 4 5 3 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4
38 Committee Member Female PSLCE 5 5 5 5 0 5 3 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 3 0 4 5 5 5 1 0 5 5 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 4 0 1
39 Committee Member Male PSLCE 3 1 5 1 3 5 1 3 5 1 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 3 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 1 2 5 1 5 5 2 5 1 5 2 5 3 5 5 5 5
40 Committee Member Female
Vice Chair PSLCE 1 2 1 1 1 5 1 5 5 2 1 3 4 0 1 1 1 3 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 3 4 4 2 5 5 1 2 5 5 5 2 3 1 3 2 5 1 4 1 5 2
41 Operations Male PSLCE 3 4 5 5 2 3 2 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 3 4 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 2 3 3 4 2 3 0 4 4 3 4 0 0 3 4 3 2 5 3 5
42 Committee Member Male MSCE 2 2 3 5 4 2 2 1 4 5 2 5 5 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 4 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 5 1 2
43 Member Male JCE 2 4 1 5 5 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 1 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 4 2 3 5 5 5 2 5 4
44 Chair Maintenance Male PSLCE 5 0 5 5 5 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 5 3 5 1 1 1 5 5 5 1 5 1 5
45 Committee Member Male JCE 0 5 5 5 0 1 2 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 2 3 3 5 3 4 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0
46 Vice Treasurer Female PSLCE 5 5 5 5 0 0 3 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 0 5 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 5
47 Committee Member Male PSLCE 1 1 5 4 1 3 1 1 5 3 5 4 4 4 4 3 5 0 1 1 5 5 5 4 5 5 2 1 2 1 1 5 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3
48 Secretary Operations Male PSLCE 4 0 5 0 0 0 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 0 4 5 5 0 0 0 5 3 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5
49 Committee Member Male PSLCE 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 0 4 5 4 5 0 5 5 4 5 5 1 4 1 0 1 4 1 4 5 5 4 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 1 5 5 4
50 Member Female PSLCE 2 1 5 1 4 5 3 4 3 5 3 5 3 5 5 5 2 5 5 5 0 4 5 1 1 1 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 5 1 1 4 4 5 5 5 4 1 1 3 5 3
RPI 0.66 0.544 0.76 0.568 0.476 0.528 0.592 0.436 0.72 0.656 0.652 0.752 0.74 0.704 0.7 0.568 0.684 0.572 0.656 0.688 0.604 0.66 0.68 0.636 0.624 0.544 0.636 0.52 0.612 0.668 0.572 0.612 0.56 0.68 0.512 0.544 0.596 0.536 0.62 0.612 0.676 0.7 0.536 0.5 0.772 0.628 0.74
RPI MEAN SCORE 0.571 0.687 0.65 0.626 0.601 0.603 0.684
S=Sub Attribute

128
 Table 36 : Raw Data for Bua Irrigation Users Ratings on WUA Model
SCORES
Respon Position in
Sex Education Financial Technical Social/Cultural Environmental Governance Gender Agronomic
dents WUA
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 S29 S30 S31 S32 S33 S34 S35 S36 S37 S38 S39 S40 S41 S42 S43 S44 S45 S46 S47
1 Member Female PSLCE 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 2 1 2 3 2 2 0 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 3 2 2 1 1 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5
2 Member Male PSLCE 4 5 3 5 4 5 5 3 4 2 2 3 2 2 0 4 4 4 5 5 2 5 5 4 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
3 Member Male PSLCE 2 2 3 5 4 5 5 5 2 5 1 3 3 3 4 5 3 5 4 4 3 4 3 2 3 2 3 3 5 4 5 3 4 5 5 4 4 4 1 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5
4 Member Male PSLCE 3 5 1 1 4 5 5 4 2 4 3 4 4 2 2 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 1 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 Member Male PSLCE 4 5 3 0 5 5 5 5 4 1 0 1 2 2 2 0 4 5 5 5 4 4 3 4 2 2 2 1 2 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 4 5 1 5 5 5 5 5
6 Member Male PSLCE 3 5 3 0 5 5 5 4 3 1 2 3 2 2 0 4 5 5 5 5 3 4 2 2 1 1 2 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 1 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5
7 President Male PSLCE 4 0 0 0 5 5 4 4 0 0 2 0 3 3 0 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 3 1 1 1 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5
8 Vice Secretary Male PSLCE 4 0 0 0 5 5 4 4 0 0 2 3 3 3 0 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 2 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5
9 Committee Member Female PSLCE 5 5 4 0 3 5 5 5 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 4 3 5 5 2 1 1 2 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5
10 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 4 0 3 5 5 5 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 4 3 5 5 2 1 1 2 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
11 Vice President Male PSLCE 3 0 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 0 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 2 3 2 2 1 2 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5
12 Member Male PSLCE 4 3 4 3 5 5 5 4 2 0 1 2 2 2 0 4 5 5 4 4 3 4 2 2 1 2 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 3 4 4 5 2 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5
13 Member Male PSLCE 3 5 3 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 0 2 3 2 2 0 5 5 5 5 3 4 2 2 1 1 2 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 1 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5
14 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 4 0 3 5 5 5 2 3 2 3 3 2 0 4 4 5 4 4 2 3 5 2 3 0 2 3 4 3 3 4 2 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
15 Committee Member Male PSLCE 2 0 4 3 3 4 5 4 2 3 4 2 3 1 4 5 5 4 4 3 5 3 4 4 2 3 5 5 4 3 5 5 2 2 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5
16 Member Male PSLCE 4 3 2 5 4 5 3 2 5 1 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 5 5 4 4 2 2 1 3 3 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 0 3 5 4 4 4 4 3 5 5 5 4 4
17 Member Male PSLCE 4 4 4 0 5 5 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 5 5 5 5 3 4 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 3 3 5 3 5 3 4 4 4 4 3
18 Member Male PSLCE 5 5 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 0 2 5 4 2 0 4 0 5 5 5 5 4 3 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
19 Member Male PSLCE 4 4 2 2 5 5 5 3 2 1 4 3 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 3 4 5 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4
20 Trustee Board Chair Male MSCE 5 1 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
21 Committee Member Male PSLCE 4 3 3 5 4 5 3 5 3 1 4 4 2 3 5 4 3 5 5 5 5 3 1 2 5 2 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
22 Member Male PSLCE 4 0 3 1 5 5 3 4 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 5
23 Member Male JCE 3 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
24 Committee Member Male PSLCE 0 1 5 1 5 5 5 5 1 5 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
25 Committee Member Male JCE 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 4 3 2 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 1
26 Member Male PSLCE 2 1 2 3 4 5 4 5 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 5 3 5 5 4 2 4 3 2 2 1 1 4 5 4 5 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 2 3 3 4 4 5 4 3
27 Treasurer Male MSCE 3 3 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 5 2 5 0 5 5 5 3 4 3 4 3 2 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 5 4 4
28 Member Male PSLCE 3 4 2 0 5 5 5 5 3 5 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5
29 Member Male PSLCE 5 1 5 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
30 Member Female PSLCE 3 1 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 1 3 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
31 Member Male PSLCE 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 3 1 4 1 1 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5
32 Member Male PSLCE 2 0 5 5 3 2 5 3 2 1 2 3 5 1 4 5 2 1 3 4 1 3 2 1 2 4 5 4 5 0 1 5 3 5 4 5 4 3 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 2
33 Member Male PSLCE 1 1 5 1 4 5 4 4 3 2 3 5 4 4 0 1 3 5 5 5 0 4 5 1 1 2 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 5 1 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 3
34 Member Male PSLCE 4 1 1 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 3 3 1 1 2 4 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 2 3 4 1 2
35 Committee Member Male JCE 4 5 4 0 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 5 5 4 5 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 5 4 3 3 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 3 4 3 4 5
36 Member Male PSLCE 4 5 0 5 5 5 4 5 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 5 5 4 5 0 2 1 3 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5
37 Member Male PSLCE 4 5 4 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 5 4 4 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 1 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
38 Committee Member Female PSLCE 3 3 3 0 3 5 0 4 2 0 2 3 2 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 1 0 5 1 0 2 5 4 4 5 4 4 0 3 3 3 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
39 Committee Member Male PSLCE 4 5 2 5 5 1 5 5 1 5 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 5 5 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 5 1 2 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 4 5 2 5 1 5 2 1 2 1
40 Committee Member Female
Vice Chair PSLCE 5 5 3 1 5 2 5 2 1 5 5 4 2 0 2 1 5 4 4 4 1 4 5 4 4 5 5 1 5 1 3 5 5 1 2 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 4 1 5
41 Operations Male PSLCE 5 3 4 3 5 5 5 5 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 4 3 5 4 3 4 5 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5
42 Committee Member Male MSCE 3 4 0 4 5 4 4 2 4 5 2 1 2 2 1 5 4 4 5 4 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 4 4 4 5 4 5 1 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 2 5 4
43 Member Male JCE 2 2 3 1 1 5 4 1 2 1 3 1 4 5 1 1 3 4 5 5 3 3 3 2 3 1 2 3 3 2 4 2 2 2 5 5 2 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 4 3
44 Chair Maintenance Male PSLCE 3 1 4 0 3 4 5 5 1 0 2 2 2 3 1 4 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
45 Committee Member Male JCE 5 1 2 0 5 5 3 3 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 5 4 5 3 1 2 1 2 4 0 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 0 1 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5
46 Treasurer Female PSLCE 2 1 2 0 4 5 4 5 3 0 1 3 2 2 0 0 1 0 2 3 0 0 3 3 4 0 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5
47 Committee Member Male PSLCE 4 5 2 0 5 5 4 4 1 0 1 2 2 2 1 5 2 5 5 5 2 2 2 1 2 1 4 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5
48 Secretary Operations Male PSLCE 2 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 1 0 1 1 2 0 1 5 2 5 5 5 1 1 0 1 3 1 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 1 1 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 5
49 Committee Member Male PSLCE 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 0 4 5 4 3 0 5 5 4 5 5 4 3 1 0 1 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
50 Member Female PSLCE 1 1 4 1 4 5 5 5 3 2 3 5 4 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 1 1 3 3 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 3
RPI 0.696 0.56 0.616 0.456 0.848 0.912 0.848 0.828 0.56 0.484 0.504 0.564 0.584 0.536 0.468 0.708 0.744 0.9 0.912 0.844 0.564 0.632 0.572 0.46 0.476 0.444 0.704 0.852 0.928 0.876 0.888 0.888 0.84 0.856 0.6 0.676 0.904 0.9 0.932 0.908 0.964 0.876 0.932 0.892 0.884 0.856 0.868
MEAN RPI SCORE 0.721 0.551 0.85 0.55 0.859 0.903 0.862
S=Sub Attribute

129
 Table 37 : List of Irrigation Users for Bua WUA

Respondent No Name Contact Phone No

1 Eunice Nyirenda
2 Christopher Mgomezulu
3 Isaac Makonde
4 Dickson Khongo
5 Umali Usufu 994782276
6 Flywel Kayange 998845470
7 Cassim Kachikopa 997497574
8 Smart Phiri 994123133
9 Edness Msukwa 995934351
10 Rosemary Chaponda 996255290
11 Joseph Nyirenda 993028554
12 John Kanjele 995243074
13 Zuliani Ngwata 998828077
14 Christina Nyirenda 993028554
15 Fillipo Mulalo
16 Charles Mbamba 994735838
17 S. Kachikopa 992493494
18 Kenson Simwayi 999236244
19 Yunusu Gama 997497573
20 Cyril Mangochi 999250771
21 Rodrick Grant 995704709
22 William Haji
23 Faston Tembo 994848085
24 Nickson Sikana 996390013
25 Comrad Mtafya 999101463
26 Brighton Mzama 995582562
27 Ernest Chipala 995644183
28 Charles Mandolo 992878528
29 Joyce Kaotcha 881149067
30 Aisha Yusufu 996667099
31 Ronex Matemba 0991029855/0993033909
32 Clifford Mphozongo
33 Petro
34 Kondwani Mbewe 998746981
35 Salimu Haji 997769045
36 Mwazeni Chagizoka 998298578
37 Jackson Gama 997497573
38 Mary Chaponda
39 Madalitso Grant 995704709
40 Emelina Mbuzi 998828807
41 Andwell Kamondokwa 995950005
42 Bester Chisale 991352066
43 Harold Chunga 992195785
44 Ndazionba Mulalo
45 James Chakutola 999301206
46 Fyless Kanjeli 995949839
47 James Moyo 993412041
48 John Kamele 996384838
49 Joseph Tade 994288590
50 Kwini Sikana

130
 Table 38 : Raw Data for Bua Managers on State Model
SCORES
Respon Position in
Sex Education Financial Technical Social/Cultural Environmental Governance Gender Agronomic
dents Institution
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 S29 S30 S31 S32 S33 S34 S35 S36 S37 S38 S39 S40 S41 S42 S43 S44 S45 S46 S47
1 ADADO Male Degree 4 5 5 2 4 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 1 5 1 4 4 5 4 4 6 6 2 4 3 3 3 2 2 4 4 3 3 2 4 3 5 3 2 2 3 2
2 LRCO Male MSCE 4 3 4 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 1 1 5 3 3 3 4 4 3 5 3 5 3 1 3 1 4 3 5 3 3 2 4 3 4 2 3 3 5 5
3 ABO Male Degree 5 4 4 5 3 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 1 3 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 3 1 3
4 EMO Male Degree 3 3 4 1 1 1 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 1 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 3 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 1 2 3 5 5
5 CO Female Degree 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 3
6 IO Male Degree 2 3 4 2 1 1 1 3 4 5 3 5 5 2 4 4 2 5 1 5 2 3 4 2 3 5 4 3 3 1 1 4 1 2 3 5 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 5
7 DIO Male Degree 4 2 4 3 5 1 1 3 2 5 4 3 4 5 5 1 1 3 4 5 4 5 4 3 3 3 4 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 3 3 2 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 4 1
8 AEDO Female Diploma 4 4 3 3 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 2 2 5 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 3 4 5 5 4 5 1 5 2 2 2 1 2 5 2
RPI 0.725 0.7 0.8 0.55 0.5 0.4 0.58 0.625 0.775 0.925 0.825 0.85 0.85 0.8 0.825 0.7 0.65 0.725 0.5 0.7 0.725 0.775 0.8 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.875 0.675 0.825 0.625 0.5 0.7 0.55 0.65 0.65 0.85 0.675 0.725 0.525 0.85 0.6 0.75 0.45 0.45 0.475 0.75 0.65
MEAN RPI SCORE 0.61 0.818 0.644 0.789 0.677 0.458 0.7

131
 Table 39: Raw Data for Bua Managers on WUA Model
SCORES
Respon Position at
Sex Education Financial Technical Social/Cultural Environmental Governance Gender Agronomic
dents Institution
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 S29 S30 S31 S32 S33 S34 S35 S36 S37 S38 S39 S40 S41 S42 S43 S44 S45 S46 S47
1 ADADO Male Degree 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 5 3 4 2 1 4 4 3 3 4 5 3 5 1 3 2 2 4 5 3 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 3 4 4 4 4 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 5
2 LRCO Male MSCE 3 2 3 2 4 4 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 4 5 5 4 1 5 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
3 ABO Male Degree 3 1 3 4 5 5 4 2 3 2 3 3 4 4 2 3 3 5 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 1 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 4
4 EMO Male Degree 4 1 1 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 3 4 2
5 CO Female Degree 4 4 3 3 4 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4
6 IO Male Degree 3 2 4 1 4 5 5 4 2 2 3 2 4 4 1 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 5 3 5 5 4 5 5 3 5 3 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
7 DIO Male Degree 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 4 5 2 5 5 4 5 2 5 4 5 2 3 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 1 4 5 5 2 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 3 5
8 AEDO Female Diploma 4 3 2 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 5 5 3 2 3 4 3 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 5 3 4
RPI 0.725 0.525 0.525 0.575 0.8 0.875 0.6 0.6 0.525 0.45 0.55 0.525 0.65 0.65 0.5 0.725 0.675 0.75 0.7 0.625 0.55 0.6 0.6 0.525 0.525 0.625 0.65 0.625 0.775 0.775 0.5 0.725 0.75 0.75 0.65 0.575 0.75 0.75 0.8 0.75 0.825 0.725 0.825 0.775 0.825 0.85 0.825
MEAN RPI SCORE 0.653 0.575 0.688 0.582 0.715 0.808 0.838

132
 Table 40 : List for Bua Managers

Respondent
No Name of Respondent Position at Institution Contact Phone No

1 Hastings Nyirongo Assistant District Agricultural Development Officer (ADADO) 999327382

2 H.E. Wakhalira Land Resources Conservation Officer (LRCO) 999359504
3 Potipher Mphepo Agribusiness Officer (ABO) 881303656
4 Franceton Chamanza Extension Methodologies Officer (EMO) 884419292
5 S. Mandoloma Crops Officer (CO) 999571350
6 Arab Msume Irrigation Officer (IO) 888731284
7 Vincent Phiri Divisional Irrigation Officer (DIO) 999662299
8 Tionge Mbewe Agricultural Extension Development Officer (AEDO) 999943710

133
 KAOMBE WATER USERS ASSOCIATION

Table 41 : Raw Data for Kaombe Irrigation Users on State Model

SCORES
Respondents Position in WUA Sex Education Financial Technical Social/Cultural Environmental Governance Gender Agronomic
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 S29 S30 S31 S32 S33 S34 S35 S36 S37 S38 S39 S40 S41 S42 S43 S44 S45 S46 S47
1 Member Female PSLCE 1 2 5 0 3 5 1 1 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5
2 Member Female JCE 4 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 3 1 1 2 1 5 1 5 3 2 1 3 1 5 5 2 5 1 4 5 5 3 5 3 4 4 4 2 3 3 1 1 2 1 5 5 4
3 Committee Member Female PSLCE 3 5 4 0 2 5 5 5 2 4 1 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 1 2 5 2 5 2 2 3 3 2 2 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 Secretary Male MSCE 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 5 4 5 3 5 3 4 2 2 1 4 2 1 1 1 4 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2
5 Committee Member Male JCE 2 5 5 2 3 1 1 1 2 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 1 1 5 1 5 1 5 5 2 2 3 2 2 3 5 1 1 3 5 5 2 2 3 2 3 1 4 4 2 3
6 Committee Member Male JCE 0 5 0 0 3 1 1 1 2 5 4 5 5 5 2 5 2 1 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 3 2 3 5 1 1 3 5 5 2 2 3 3 3 1 4 5 2 3
7 Committee Member Male JCE 2 4 1 0 0 0 1 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 0 3 2 3 1 1 3 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 5 3 1
8 Committee Member Male PSLCE 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 2 3 3 5 1 1 2 5 5 4 3 3 2 1 4 5 2 3 1
9 Vice Secretary Female PSLCE 1 2 5 0 4 1 4 1 4 5 5 5 5 4 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 1 3 2 5 1 4 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 4 5
10 President Male JCE 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 2 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 5 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 4 2 2
11 Water Jury Chair Male PSLCE 3 2 2 2 2 3 5 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 2 3 2 2 3 3 4 2 2 3 2 3 5 3 2 3 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 3
12 Committee Member Female MSCE 1 5 5 0 0 5 5 1 2 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 5
13 Committee Member Female PSLCE 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 5
14 Member Female PSLCE 1 2 1 1 1 1 5 3 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 5 5 5 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 5 4 1 4 1 1 3 1 3
15 Vice President Male PSLCE 5 4 2 1 3 0 5 5 0 3 5 1 5 5 2 1 2 4 3 2 4 3 2 3 2 1 4 4 3 3 5 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 5 2 3 2 3 1 3 3 3
16 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 2 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 2 2 2 5 4 2 2 2 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
17 Treasurer Female PSLCE 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 0 3 0 0 0 5 5 5 0 5 5 2 5 3 2 0 0 2 5 0 5 5 0 0 5 0 0 0
18 Member Female PSLCE 2 2 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
19 Committee Member Male PSLCE 2 0 5 0 0 1 1 1 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 3 1 0 4 3 4 1 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
20 Member Male PSLCE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
21 Member Male PSLCE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
22 Member Female PSLCE 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 5 5 4 1 1 4 4 5 5 0 1 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 4 5 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 5
23 Member Female PSLCE 2 2 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 Member Male PSLCE 2 2 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
25 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 2 0
26 Member Male JCE 3 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 1 2 4 2 3 2 3 3 4 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 1 3 3 2 3 3 3
27 Committee Member Male PSLCE 5 5 5 0 2 1 5 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 1 2 5 2 5 3 5 4 1 1 1 4 5
28 Member Female PSLCE 0 0 0 5 1 1 0 0 5 5 1 1 1 1 5 5 2 1 2 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2
29 Member Female PSLCE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
30 Committee Member Male JCE 5 3 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 5 0 4 4 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 2 2 3 3 5 3 2 2 5 4 4 4 4
31 Member Female PSLCE 0 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 5 0 5 5 0 4 5 4 5 3 5 5 1 0 2 0 0 0 5 3 4 4 3 1 3 5 0 1 2 1 1 5 1 4
32 Member Male PSLCE 1 1 1 1 2 5 2 5 1 5 1 5 0 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 1 0 5 1 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 1 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 1 5 5 5
33 Member Female JCE 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 1 3 1 0 5 3 5 3 5 3 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 3 3 1 2 5 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 3
34 Member Female PSLCE 1 5 2 0 5 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 2 2 2 0 2 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 4 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
35 Member Female PSLCE 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
36 Member Male PSLCE 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 3 0 0 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 0 1 1 1 1 2 5 5 1 0 0 1 0 5 1 1 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 5 5
37 Member Female PSLCE 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 4 2 2 0 3 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
38 Block Chair Male PSLCE 2 5 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 2 0 2 2 0 4 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 3 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
39 Member Female PSLCE 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 1 3 2 2 2 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
40 Member Female JCE 2 5 2 0 1 0 2 0 4 5 4 4 4 3 5 2 0 0 0 5 2 4 2 0 1 5 4 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 5 1 1 0 1 4 3 1 0 1 4 1 1
RPI 0.45 0.57 0.455 0.305 0.4 0.375 0.52 0.445 0.495 0.71 0.565 0.51 0.525 0.56 0.52 0.655 0.565 0.445 0.61 0.69 0.61 0.62 0.595 0.6 0.665 0.58 0.595 0.435 0.47 0.47 0.505 0.545 0.45 0.42 0.535 0.565 0.53 0.47 0.515 0.5 0.455 0.45 0.365 0.415 0.54 0.51 0.535
MEAN RPI SCORE 0.44 0.58 0.578 0.609 0.488 0.452 0.553
S=Sub Attribute

134
 Table 42 : Raw Data for Kaombe Irrigation Users on WUA Model
SCORES
Respon
Position in WUA Sex Education Financial Technical Social/Cultural Environmental Governance Gender Agronomic
dents
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 S29 S30 S31 S32 S33 S34 S35 S36 S37 S38 S39 S40 S41 S42 S43 S44 S45 S46 S47
1 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 1 4 4 4 3 5 2 1 1 1 1 5 1 3 5 2 4 5 4 1 1 4 1 5 5 5 4 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5
2 Member Female JCE 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 1 2 2 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 1 5
3 Committee Member Female PSLCE 5 4 5 1 5 5 5 5 3 3 2 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 Secretary Male MSCE 5 1 5 4 5 4 5 5 3 1 3 3 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
5 Committee Member Male JCE 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
6 Committee Member Male JCE 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
7 Committee Member Male JCE 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
8 Committee Member Male PSLCE 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 2 5 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
9 Vice Secretary Female PSLCE 5 5 5 1 4 4 3 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 5 2 5 5 5 4 1 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5
10 President Male JCE 1 4 3 0 5 5 5 3 5 2 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 5 5 2 5 5 4 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 1 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 5 5
11 Water Jury Chair Male PSLCE 5 5 5 3 5 5 3 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 3 4 3 4 3 3 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 3
12 Committee Member Female MSCE 5 3 1 5 4 4 3 5 2 1 1 1 1 5 1 3 5 2 4 5 4 1 1 1 4 2 4 5 5 5 3 2 2 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 2 2 2
13 Committee Member Female PSLCE 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 2 3 1 1 3 4 1 1 2 3 3 5 5 4 3 3 2 3 5 5 5 5 4 3 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 5
14 Member Female PSLCE 5 4 5 1 5 5 5 5 4 1 1 4 5 3 4 5 5 5 3 4 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 1 4
15 Vice President Male PSLCE 4 3 3 2 5 5 5 5 5 2 5 3 5 4 1 4 5 4 3 5 4 3 5 3 3 3 2 5 5 2 4 5 5 3 5 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 4 5 5 5 5
16 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5
17 Treasurer Female PSLCE 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
18 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
19 Committee Member Male PSLCE 3 1 5 1 5 5 5 5 3 5 3 5 5 4 5 4 1 5 4 3 4 1 5 5 4 4 3 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
20 Member Male PSLCE 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
21 Member Male PSLCE 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
22 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 4 2 5 5 5 3 3 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 4 2 4 2 5 5
23 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
24 Member Male PSLCE 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
25 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
26 Member Male JCE 5 4 2 1 3 5 4 5 3 4 5 5 4 3 5 2 4 5 5 5 2 1 3 1 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 3 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
27 Committee Member Male PSLCE 2 1 2 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
28 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 2 4 4 2 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 2 0 0 4 2 4 3 4 5 5 5 4 4 5
29 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4
30 Committee Member Male JCE 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 4 2 3 3 5 3 4 5 5 4 4 4 4
31 Member Female PSLCE 4 1 3 1 5 5 0 0 3 0 5 0 5 3 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 0 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 5
32 Member Male PSLCE 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 0 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 1 5 5
33 Member Female JCE 5 3 5 2 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 0 4 0 3 5 3 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 5 5 4 5 3 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 4
34 Member Female PSLCE 5 1 5 0 3 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5
35 Member Female PSLCE 5 5 5 2 5 5 0 3 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 3 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
36 Member Male PSLCE 5 0 3 0 5 5 5 1 5 2 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 2 1 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
37 Member Female PSLCE 5 4 4 2 4 4 5 5 5 4 3 4 5 3 4 2 5 4 4 5 5 0 3 0 0 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5
38 Block Chair Male PSLCE 5 1 1 5 5 5 2 2 5 3 3 5 1 2 5 2 2 2 5 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
39 Member Female PSLCE 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4
40 Member Female PSLCE 5 3 4 5 5 4 5 0 4 3 3 4 4 5 2 5 5 5 4 1 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5
RPI 0.925 0.755 0.825 0.595 0.955 0.945 0.885 0.845 0.875 0.665 0.76 0.795 0.84 0.835 0.765 0.82 0.91 0.885 0.92 0.89 0.84 0.755 0.715 0.71 0.77 0.855 0.875 0.965 0.93 0.935 0.87 0.865 0.935 0.93 0.805 0.735 0.92 0.93 0.98 0.955 0.93 0.945 0.93 0.93 0.88 0.895 0.925
MEAN RPI SCORE 0.841 0.794 0.901 0.789 0.909 0.913 0.91
S=Sub Attribute

135
 Table 43 : List for Kaombe Users

Respondent No Name Contact Phone No.

1 Sophia 888309743
2 Snolia Phiri
3 Malita M'bwana 994456516
4 Maulana Chipatango 998460035
5 Jafali Banda 884225613
6 Umali Funani 999179581
7 John Smith 99914996
8 Ahmad Mussa 999936533
9 Constance Mbowani 993694970
10 Esau Chikope 991851629
11 John Mtaya 995568215
12 Babra Kakota 991677765
13 Dalitso Mc Dadi 995823013
14 Lester Mwanawasa 0997499951/0882393856
15 M. Chiwoza 994288895
16 Nelly Chitete
17 Christina Mtambo 991343684
18 Jennifer Kabula
19 Ayisa Bunaya
20 Jeremiah Soko 994872593
21 Patrick Chinang'a 993660754
22 Lusungu Rashid
23 Rabecca Kavumbula
24 Abasi Lunda 997623292
25 Malinda Chifomboti
26 Austin Mwale
27 Mankhala Banda 996609307
28 Ida Ipweteka 996255330
29 Maria Banda
30 Samson Manda 991786744
31 Nelia Saidi 992491127
32 R.Banda
33 Litness Chimavu 997128322
34 Egnant Phiri
35 Mercy Chagunda
36 Bazo 995519583
37 Catherine Banda
38 G.Phiri 996384398
39 Fatuma Bunaya
40 Mary Chindamisa 997608551

136
 Table 44 : Raw Data for Kaombe Managers on State Model

SCORES
Respon Position in
Sex Education Financial Technical Social/Cultural Environmental Governance Gender Agronomic
dents Institution
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 S29 S30 S31 S32 S33 S34 S35 S36 S37 S38 S39 S40 S41 S42 S43 S44 S45 S46 S47
1 ADADO Male Degree 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 2 3 2 4 1 4 1 2 4 3 3 3 4 5 3 3 2 1 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 3
2 LRCO Male MSCE 3 3 4 3 1 2 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 1 1 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 4 2 4 2 1 3 1 3 4 4 3 5 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 5 4
3 ABO Male Degree 5 4 4 5 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 5 5 4 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 3 1 3 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 2 2 1 3
4 EMO Male Degree 3 3 4 1 1 1 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 1 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 3 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 1 2 3 5 5
5 CO Female Degree 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 3
6 IO Male Degree 4 4 4 5 2 3 2 2 3 1 4 4 4 3 3 4 2 4 2 5 3 2 5 3 2 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 3 3 4 3 4
7 DIO Male Degree 2 3 4 2 1 1 1 3 4 5 3 5 5 3 5 3 3 2 1 5 2 2 1 2 3 5 5 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 5 1 1 2 3 1 4 4
8 AEDC Male Diploma 4 4 4 3 1 1 3 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 5 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 0 5 2 2 2 2 2 5 2
RPI 0.65 0.675 0.75 0.625 0.375 0.425 0.6 0.625 0.75 0.775 0.775 0.875 0.8 0.725 0.75 0.65 0.7 0.675 0.45 0.725 0.675 0.7 0.675 0.675 0.675 0.725 0.85 0.65 0.8 0.575 0.55 0.7 0.6 0.575 0.75 0.775 0.725 0.775 0.55 0.85 0.625 0.65 0.45 0.5 0.5 0.725 0.7
MEAN RPI SCORE 0.584 0.763 0.634 0.711 0.677 0.483 0.713

137
 Table 45 : Raw Data for Kaombe Managers on WUA Model
SCORES
Respon Position in
Sex Education Financial Technical Social/Cultural Environmental Governance Gender Agronomic
dents Institution
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 S29 S30 S31 S32 S33 S34 S35 S36 S37 S38 S39 S40 S41 S42 S43 S44 S45 S46 S47
1 ADADO Male Sex 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 2 4 4 1 3 4 3 3 3 2 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4
2 LRCO Male MSCE 1 1 1 1 3 5 3 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 1 3 4 3 5 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 2 3 5 3 1 4 5 4 1 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 4 3
3 ABO Male Degree 2 1 3 3 5 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 5 3 5 4 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 5 5 5 1 4 5 5 1 4 4 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 4 5 4
4 EMO Male Degree 4 1 1 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 3 4 2
5 CO Female Degree 4 4 3 3 4 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4
6 IO Male Degree 5 2 1 3 4 5 4 4 2 1 3 3 3 4 2 4 3 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 4 2 3 4 3 2 2 3 3 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 3
7 DIO Male Degree 3 2 1 1 4 5 5 4 2 2 3 2 5 3 1 5 4 5 4 3 3 3 1 5 4 4 5 5 5 1 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 4
8 AEDC Male Diploma 3 3 3 1 5 5 3 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 5 0 2 2 1 1 1 2 0 4 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 2 4 5 3 3 4 3 4 4
RPI 0.625 0.45 0.425 0.475 0.8 0.95 0.65 0.575 0.425 0.45 0.45 0.475 0.575 0.525 0.375 0.775 0.625 0.875 0.85 0.35 0.475 0.575 0.45 0.55 0.5 0.475 0.55 0.7 0.825 0.65 0.525 0.65 0.725 0.725 0.45 0.6 0.675 0.675 0.775 0.8 0.825 0.675 0.775 0.75 0.75 0.9 0.7
MEAN RPI SCORE 0.619 0.508 0.676 0.511 0.685 0.758 0.8
S=Sub Attribute

138
 Table 46 : List for Kaombe Managers

No Name of Respondent Position at Institution Contact Phone No

1 Hastings Nyirongo Assistant District Agricultural Development Officer (ADADO) 999327382
2 H.E. Wakhalira Land Resources Conservation Officer (LRCO) 999359504
3 Potipher Mphepo Agribusiness Officer (ABO) 881303656
4 Franceton Chamanza Extension Methodologies Officer (EMO) 884419292
5 S. Mandoloma Crops Officer (CO) 999571350
6 Arab Msume Irrigation Officer (IO) 888731284
7 Vincent Phiri Divisional Irrigation Officer (DIO) 999662299
8 Wildon Mchina Agricultural Extension Development Coordinator (AEDC) 999305530/884008529

139