Uddhism As A Tronghold of Free Hinking
Uddhism As A Tronghold of Free Hinking
Uddhism As A Tronghold of Free Hinking
BUDDHISM AS A STRONGHOLD
OF FREE THINKING?
Edited by
Siegfried C.A. Fay and Ilse Maria Bruckner
edition ubuntu
€ 2011
All rights reserved.
Copyright for the whole volume rests with the publisher while
copyright for each article remains with their individual authors.
First published: September 2011
Part I
Buddhist Approaches in Eastern and Western Societies
‘Women in Between’: Bhikkhun‚ Ordination Debates,
‘bare life’, and the Mae Chi in Thailand
Barbara Kameniar 33
Abstract 33
Introduction 33
Entry of Women into the Order 35
Who are the mae chi? 38
BhikkhunÄ Ordination 41
Women in Between 43
Problematics of Employing a Western,
Masculine Framing 45
Homo Sacer and Bare Life 47
The mae chi, homo sacer and the Hope of the Refugee 49
References 52
Part II
A Re-Definition of the Relationship between
Economics and Spirituality
Money: The Global Power of an Illusion. A Buddhist
Perspective
Karl-Heinz Brodbeck 119
Abstract 119
Introduction 119
The Three Poisons 121
Madhyamaka Logic 123
Economic Explanations of Money 125
The Reason for the Failure of the Explanation of Money 129
The Monetary Form of the Three Poisons 133
The Reality of Economic Illusion: the Suffering
of the Many 137
The Challenges of Engaged Buddhism 140
Bibliography 144
Part III
Aspects of Buddhist Philosophy
Rational Argumentation in Early Buddhism
Guang Xing 183
Abstract 183
Introduction 183
The Role of Faith in Early Buddhism 186
The Omniscience of the Buddha 190
The Concept of nirvÅÇa 192
The Concept of Karma and Rebirth 197
Conclusion 199
References 200
Living in Seclusion and Facing Fear – The Ekottarika-Ägama
Counterpart to the Bhayabherava-sutta
An‚layo 203
Abstract 203
Introduction 203
Translation 208
Comparison 220
Abbreviations 225
References 225
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
*
Due to circumstances for which the editors are not responsible, this vol-
ume could not be printed and published as planned by Aditya Prakashan
editors, but another solution had to be found. Though this delayed the
publishing date, we hope that we have arrived at a satisfactory result. The
editors, end of August 2011.
10 Buddhism as a stronghold of free thinking?
Contributors
Bhikkhu AnÄlayo was born in Germany and ordained in Sri
Lanka in 1995. In the year 2000 he completed a Ph.D. thesis on
the Satipa€€h•na-sutta at the University of Peradeniya (published
by Windhorse in the UK). In the year 2007 he completed a ha-
bilitation research at the University of Marburg, in which he
compared the Majjhima-nik€ya discourses with their Chinese,
Sanskrit, and Tibetan counterparts. At present, he is a member
of the Centre for Buddhist Studies, University of Hamburg, as a
Privatdozent (the German equivalent to an associate professor-
ship), and works as a researcher at Dharma Drum Buddhist Col-
lege, Taiwan. Besides his academic activities, he regularly
teaches meditation in Sri Lanka.
Guang Xing received his Ph.D. from the School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London, in 2003. He is an assist-
ant professor at the Centre of Buddhist Studies, University of
Hong Kong, and Tung Lin Kok Yuen Canada Foundation visit-
ing professor in Buddhism and Contemporary Society at the
University of British Columbia. His publications include The
Concept of the Buddha: Its Evolution from Early Buddhism to
the Trikaya Theory (Routledge 2005) and The Historical
Buddha (Beijing Religious Culture Publication 2005) together
with many academic papers. He is currently working on the is-
sue of filial piety in Chinese Buddhism and has already pub-
lished several papers on the topic.
Editors
Ilse Maria Bruckner is a state examined translator of English
and German and a member of the German Federal Association
of Interpreters and Translators (BD…). Having worked as a
freelancer for over twenty years, she has done translations
mainly in the fields of business and law, specializing on devel-
opment projects, the Humanities with a focus on education, re-
14 Buddhism as a stronghold of free thinking?
Preface
It is both the authors’ and the editors’ wish that this volume be
read by a wider public so that not only experts in Indology and
Buddhist Studies, but also readers from various different back-
grounds may take an interest in the subjects discussed. This is
why we have taken an interdisciplinary approach when compil-
ing the contributions to this collection of articles, ensuring that
specialist knowledge of register and terminology is not required
in order to understand them.
This volume is the outcome of international and even
transcontinental cooperation involving expert authors from
Asia, Australia, Europe and the U.S.A. Its editors work in
central Europe, printing and publishing took place in India, and
distribution of the book is worldwide.
Generally, we have spelled P•li and Sanskrit words using dia-
critical marks, but wherever they have been used as loan words
by the authors as, for example, ‘nirvana’ or ‘sangha’, we have
dropped the diacritics.
To conclude, we hope that our anthology will provide ma-
terials which might inspire the reader to look at some questions
of global concern from a new angle and that, in this context,
this will provide a stimulus for developing a freethinking atti-
tude.
The Editors.
16 Buddhism as a stronghold of free thinking?
1
See e.g., Globale Trends 2010. Frieden – Entwicklung – Umwelt. Ed.
by Tobias Debiel et al. (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden / Institut f€r
Entwicklung und Frieden). Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2010; Peter
Meyns (ed.), Handbuch Eine Welt. Entwicklung im globalen Wandel.
Wuppertal: Peter Hammer, 2009; Claus Leggewie / Harald Welzer,
Das Ende der Welt, wie wir sie kannten. Klima, Zukunft und die
Chancen der Demokratie, Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2009.
Introduction 17
30
For example, rejection of the body in some religious and philosoph-
ical systems. (Editors’ note).
31
Cf. Bhikkhu Bodhi, A comprehensive manual of Abhidhamma – The
Abhidhammattha Sangaha of ‰cariya Anuruddha. BPS: Kandy, 1993, 90.
Introduction 25
parallel to the situation in Sri Lanka around 100 C.E. when Buddhism
divided into the ‘vocation of books’ and the ‘vocation of meditation’
(see contribution by Prebish).
Introduction 27
33
Cf., for example, Upton Sinclair’s novel Jungle, 1906, and Bertolt
Brecht’s play Im Dickicht der StŠdte [In the Jungle of Cities],
1921/1927.
30 Buddhism as a stronghold of free thinking?
General Abbreviations
AN AŽguttara-nikƒya
Be Burmese edition
BPS Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy
CBETA Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association
Ce Ceylonese edition
Cv Cullavagga (C••avagga)
DĀ D…rgha-ƒgama (T 1)
Dhp Dhammapada
DN D…gha-nikƒya
E‘ Ekottarika-ƒgama (T 125)
Ee PTS edition
M‘ Madhyama-ƒgama (T 26)
MN Majjhima-nikƒya
Mv Mahƒvagga
Ps Papa’casƒdan…
PTS Pali Text Society
S‘ Sa“yukta-ƒgama (T 99)
SĀ2 ‘other’ Sa“yukta-ƒgama (T 100)
Se Siamese edition
SHT Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden
SN Sa“yutta-nikƒya
Sn Sutta-nipƒta
T TaishŒ (CBETA)
trans. translator, translated
Ud Udƒna
Vin Vinaya
Vism Visuddhimagga
PART I
Barbara Kameniar
Abstract
The mae chi represent a peculiarly Thai response to what it
means to be a Buddhist woman in Thai society. They fall
outside of the traditional Buddhist categories of ordained or lay
persons and are excluded by both Religious and State law. In
effect, they are ‘women in between’ (Lindberg Falk 2007) who
have been refused, and who have refused, assimilation and
submission to a biopolitical state and the official sa€gha. This
chapter is an examination of how debates around women’s
ordination in Buddhism, the low status of women in Thailand
and Thai mae chi can illuminate other possibilities for person-
hood and collective lives. It is the aim in this chapter to
illustrate how the ambiguous position of the mae chi opens up
what it means to walk and live ‘in between’. Like the figure of
the refugee, the mae chi provide an example of how it might be
possible to sever the connection between personhood and a
territorializing nation-state to provide a space in which protean
notions of ‘self’ and ‘community’ might be negotiated.
Introduction
Feminist Buddhist scholar Rita Gross has argued that ‘the
dharma [Pƒli: dhamma] is neither male nor female’ and that
‘[w]ithout exception, Buddhist teachings and teachers are insist-
ent and consistent that at the ultimate level, gender is irrelevant’
(Gross 2008, 294). Through careful reference to the notion of
an ‘ultimate level’ Gross articulates a form of transcendental
and originary ‘presence’ (Derrida 1976) that acts as an organ-
ising principle for her appeal to an idealised and ‘pure’
34 Barbara Kameniar
There she was seen by the Buddha’s friend and disciple, the
kind and gentle …nanda who is said to have been shocked by
the way she looked. After all, Mah‚paj‚patƒ and many of the
women who were following her were members of the rich and
powerful Sakya clan and their dishevelled appearance would
1
I give the most popular version here.
36 Barbara Kameniar
years but because they were allowed to enter it would now last
for only five hundred years. However, in foreseeing the danger
the Buddha laid down Eight Chief Rules for the bhikkhunƒs.
Cornelia Church (1975) and others have noted the ambival-
ence evident in first allowing women to enter the sa€gha
because they are ‘capable’ of arahantship, and then stating that
the sa€gha’s lifespan will be halved because of women’s entry.
Numerous scholars and Buddhist teachers have queried what it
is the text is actually stating. While there remains debate about
whether the ‘hand of some ancient misogynist editor(s)’
(Church 1975, 54) might have been at work in the text or
whether the Buddha meant what he appears to be meaning
about the impending doom to the sa€gha because of women’s
entry into it, the fact remains that this story has resonated
throughout history and across different cultures to structure the
lives of Buddhist women in general and Buddhist renunciant
women in particular.
The story of Mahƒpajƒpat… and the eight rules provides a
powerful backdrop to contemporary gender relations and gen-
dered practices in Buddhism. It is a story with which the mae
chi and laity I interviewed 18 years ago were familiar and it is
almost always the first story mae chi and the laity tell me today
when asked about the position of women in Thai Buddhism. It
is also a story that haunts all contemporary debates surrounding
the ordination of women in Buddhism. The story simultan-
eously signals a place for women within the Buddhist sa€gha
and the danger, impropriety, and additional burden, of that
place.
The eight chief rules accepted by Mahƒpajƒpat…, as descriptors
of those burdens, circumscribed gender relations within the
sa€gha and did so on terms that subordinated even the most
senior bhikkhunƒ to the most junior bhikkhu. In doing so the
rules broke with the established ‘monastic norm of geronto-
cracy and conform[ed] instead to the social norm of female
38 Barbara Kameniar
2
Also known as dasa-silm‚t‚, das-sil mǟniy…, meaning literally: ‘the
mother(s) keeping the ten precepts’.
3
For information about developments after the congress see:
http://www.congress-on-buddhist-women.org.
Women in Between 41
BhikkhunÄ Ordination
In a microethnographic study undertaken during December
1990 and January 1991 at a wat outside of Hua Hin I inter-
viewed fourteen mae chi and two chi phraam about a range of
issues affecting their lives including their ideas about bhikkhunƒ
ordination (Kameniar 1993).4 While such a small number of
mae chi cannot be seen as representative, their views and ideas
can be understood as illustrative of those present amongst other
groups of mae chi. Certainly other studies have found similar
views expressed (see for example Lindberg Falk 2000, 2007). In
4
Other than a mae chi, a chi phraam (cf. ji brahmin) is a woman who
takes the vows to ordain for a short time only, for example for a medi-
tation retreat, and does not shave her head.
42 Barbara Kameniar
Women in Between
The mae chi have an ambiguous religious and legal status within
Thailand, and State policies relevant to them, when they do
exist, are inconsistent (Muecke 2004, 225). For example, the
Interior Ministry bars them from voting because they are cat-
5
Chatsumarn Kabilsingh’s name after ordination.
44 Barbara Kameniar
egorised as clerics for that purpose. But other State agencies le-
gally regard them as lay women.
Monica Lindberg Falk describes their situation well:
Ideas for a number of different Bills that relate to the legal and
religious status of the mae chi have been proposed over the last
twelve years. The late Mae Chii Khunying Kanitha lobbied for
‘a Mae Chii’s Bill, which would give them legal status and
entitle them to financial assistance from the government’ (Lind-
berg Falk 2007, 228). However, this Bill failed for a number of
reasons which included resistance to change amongst members
of the official saÄgha and amongst some high profile mae chi, as
well as problems in communicating the Bill to mae chi through-
out the country (Lindberg Falk 2007, 231). The latest move to
incorporate the mae chi into the broader saÄgha is the 2008
‘Support and Protection for Buddhism’ draft Bill wherein the
mae chi are mentioned in only one of the 43 articles. Satisuda
Ekachai, notes that that one article defines them as
The mae chi, homo sacer and the Hope of the Refugee
This is materially and spatially evident through the presence of
the mae chi within various wat where their exclusion is pro-
duced through their very inclusion in the wat complex. Locat-
ing where the mae chi reside in different wat is not difficult
when one understands the inclusive exclusion the mae chi live
under. While mae chi reside in wat their residences are usually
located in the least public and least desirable part of it. The
block where the majority of the mae chi lived at the wat, which
was the site of my research in 1990/1991, was separated from
the wat proper by what could only be described as a garbage
dump. It was the area into which all the wat’s refuse was
thrown and then burned. The dump served as a barrier, mark-
ing a boundary that separated the central part of the wat and
the area where the bhikkhus lived, from the area in which the
mae chi lived. While the geography of inclusive exclusion of
most of the wat I have visited more recently have not been as
stark, the mae chi are almost always located in places of sym-
bolic and material abandonment. The one exception was a wat
outside Ayutthya in which the mae chi played an active role in
teaching meditation. However, this was also the only wat in
which the residence of the bhikkhus was accessed through
splendidly carved gates and their living quarters were highly
elaborate. So while the geographies of inclusion and exclusion
appeared different as far as the mae chi were concerned, they
were still in operation. According to Geraldine Pratt, ‘geograph-
ies do more than contain or localize bare life. Geographies are
part of the process by which certain individuals and groups are
reduced to bare life’ (Pratt 2005, 1055). The geographies of the
50 Barbara Kameniar
wat produce the mae chi as homo sacer and abandon them
through an inclusive exclusion.
The mae chi’s ambiguous relationship to religious and social
law and the various recent attempts to find a place in law for
them also signal something of their category as homo sacer.
Monica Lindberg Falk who, to date, has provided the most
comprehensive overview of the mae chi’s struggles for legal
recognition argues that from a doctrinal perspective, it would
If the way forward for the mae chi is through the figure of the
refugee who refuses assimilation then what might that figure
look like? According to Agamben, Hannah Arendt, herself a
refugee, turned the condition of the countryless refugee on its
head. She argued that
Refugees who have lost all rights and who, however, no longer
want to be assimilated at all costs in a new national identity, but
want instead to contemplate lucidly their condition, receive in
exchange for assured unpopularity a priceless advantage: ‘History is
no longer a closed book to them and politics [full participation in
the saintly life as defined by Buddhism] is no longer the privilege of
the Gentiles [bhikkhu-sa€gha] … Refugees driven from country to
country represent the vanguard of their peoples’. (Agamben 2000,
14-15)
References
Agamben, Giorgio, 2000. Means without End: Notes on
Politics. Translated by V. Binetti and C. Casarino.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Agamben, Giorgio, 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and
Bare Life. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Butler, Judith, 2004. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning
and Violence. London: Verso.
Church, Cornelia, 1975. Temptress, Housewife, Nun:
Women’s Role in Early Buddhism. Anima: an experimental
journal of celebration, Vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 52-58.
Cook, Nerida, 1981. The Position of Nuns in Thai Buddhism:
the parameter or religious recognition. Unpublished Master’s
thesis. Canberra: Australian National University.
Cv = Cullavagga IV-XII, repr. 1974. Vinaya Texts – Part III.
Ed. by F. Max Muller [= Friedrich Max MŠller].
Women in Between 53
Ashby Butnor
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the cultivation of moral perception is
necessary to increase our performance as moral agents. Often-
times, our moral shortcomings are the result of prior failures to
see features of particular situations as morally salient. However,
moral perception involves more than simply opening our eyes.
It is developed through heightened attention to our embodied
and situated existence. I demonstrate this in two interrelated
ways – from the inside out. First, I turn to the Zen Buddhist trad-
ition (especially the work of D•gen) and its emphasis on em-
bodied meditation practice – a somatic activity wherein one’s
perceptual capacities are enhanced in and through the body.
Second, I turn to a contemporary feminist analysis to show how
embeddedness within particular social contexts affects our em-
bodied capacities. By more carefully examining these facets of
embodied, situated existence, we can enhance our perceptual
capabilities and be more attentive to the suffering and oppres-
sion that exist all around us.
Introduction
The cultivation of moral perception – the ability to see, recog-
nize, and attend to the morally salient features of the world
around us – is a necessary precondition for morally appropriate
action. In order to respond ethically, we must be able to per-
ceive particular situations as containing moral features that call
for our direct attention. Moral perception is that which enables
Cultivating Self, Transforming Society 57
[The essential activity of all the Buddhas and the active essence of all
the ancestors] illumines without facing objects. This ‘illumination’
means neither illumining the outer world nor illumining the inner
world; ‘without facing objects’ is, as such, ‘illumination.’ Illumina-
tion is not transformed into objects, because the objects are the illu-
mination. ‘Without facing’ means: ‘Nothing in the whole world is
ever concealed,’ or ‘Nothing issues forth when you uncover the
Cultivating Self, Transforming Society 61
world.’ Its meaning is subtle and mysterious, at once interrelated
and not interrelated. (Kim 2007, 14)
others and their weal and woe, is experienced with the whole
body.
The activity metaphor highlights enlightenment as a form of
practice and stresses the practitioner’s active participation in
enacting the Way. D•gen emphasizes the actualization of Bud-
dhist practice rather than the ultimate disclosure of reality in a
single satori experience. By comparison, the seeing metaphor of
enlightenment appears static and stale. For D•gen, active exer-
tion in each and every moment is a requirement of enlightened
existence. Practice and enlightenment are co-constitutive. D•gen
identifies practice most typically with seated meditation (zazen),
though other activities may qualify. Zazen is considered a
whole-body event in which attachments to self and views are
relinquished and body and mind come into harmony with one
another. ‘Seeing’ is no longer prescribed by one’s dispositions to
perceive in narrow ways. On the contrary, by harmonizing
body-and-mind, the capacity to experience one’s environment is
distributed throughout the body.
The role of the body in D•gen’s Zen should not be underes-
timated. As Kim explains, ‘D•gen claimed that we search with
the body, practice with the body, attain enlightenment with the
body, and understand with the body. This was epitomized in his
statement ‘The Way is surely attained with the body”’ (Kim
2004, 101). In Shinjin Gakud€, D•gen writes, ‘To study the
way with the body means to study the way with your own
body. It is the study of the way using this lump of red flesh’
(Tanahashi 1985, 91). But why is this ‘lump of red flesh’ so
important? In Zazengi, D•gen goes to great lengths to detail the
proper positioning of the body in zazen practice – from the
proper half lotus and full lotus positions, the correct place for
the cushion ‘only under the buttocks’, the location of the right
and left hands, the right and left thumbs ‘lightly touching at the
navel’, leaning not to the left nor to the right, robes loose but
orderly, ears in line with shoulders, nose in line with navel, lips
Cultivating Self, Transforming Society 63
and teeth closed, eyes open ‘neither too wide nor too narrow’,
sitting erect and breathing fully (Tanahashi 2004, 7-8). Finally,
D•gen reminds us to ‘think not-thinking’ through nonthinking.
Note the order in which these instructions are given: the body,
then the breath, and then the mind. To lose sight of the
significant role of the body in the practice of ‘just sitting’
meditation is to lose sight of D•gen’s philosophy.
In the following passage from the Sh€b€genz€ Zuimonki,
D•gen places primary importance on the role of the body in
practice:
Hence, individuals are not free to pick just any moral objects they
would like. Perception does not start from scratch; it is guided,
channeled, given a specific horizon, direction, and target by society.
Society, not the single individual, selects the appropriate objects of
Cultivating Self, Transforming Society 67
moral concern and the like, other objects it rules out, conceals from
view, demanding that the individual do so as well. (Vetlesen 1994,
194)
Our daily activities are infused with social meanings. Such crit-
ical reflection on what we take to be ‘natural’ things to do or
given parts of a daily routine is a daunting task. The perform-
ativity of gender norms provides ready examples of such incorp-
oration. Feminine gendered practices range from manners of
movement and posture (demure and constricted behavior), the
disciplinary practices of daily beauty regimens (shaving, cosmet-
ics, etc.), continuous dieting (sometimes taking the form of eat-
ing disorders) to more extreme forms of body modification
(such as plastic surgery and Botox injections).2 Because we have
incorporated these habits and sedimented them into our very
bodily subjectivity, we become heavily invested in them and, in
turn, in the social norms and expectations that give them mean-
ing. These incorporated practices (in addition to many others)
can be examined to reveal the tacit embodiment of values that
run counter to our moral and political commitments.
The problem with social know-how is that the cultural stand-
ard for the appropriate expression of a given practice or iden-
tity is infused with power. As such, social norms and expecta-
tions will (a) exclude or marginalize individuals who cannot
properly perform their assigned roles well, and (b) work to fur-
ther cement oppressive and subordinating practices into our
very bodily subjectivity. The cause of exclusion and margin-
alization is the naturalization of a particular subset of accepted
behaviors and practices. Those who perform the accepted
behaviors well are socially comfortable and at ease with their
embodied subjectivities and social know-how. In Mason-Grant’s
words, ‘Privilege enables persons to live their lives as socially
unproblematic – as morally neutral, normal, average, unremark-
able – and to experience their agency as a “natural” attribute
2
Two excellent resources on the incorporation of gendered practices
include: Body and Flesh: A Philosophical Reader edited by Donn
Welton (1998) and Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery &
Women’s Agency by Diana Tietjens Meyers (2002).
Cultivating Self, Transforming Society 71
3
Also see Diana Meyers on the role of ‘outlaw emotions’ for acquiring
insightful and revealing perspectives on oppressive social systems.
Being Yourself: Essays on Identity, Action, and Social Life. 2004. See
Chapter 7: ‘Emotion and Heterodox Moral Perceptions: An Essay in
Moral Social Psychology.’
72 Ashby Butnor
(3) a keen insight into the ways that oppression and injustice are
inscribed upon variously positioned social bodies. It is through
this process of accentuating our way of seeing the world that
suffering – in all its forms – can be addressed most effectively.
References
Blum, L., 1991. Moral Perception and Particularity. Ethics 101
(July 1991), pp. 701-725.
Carter, R., 2001. Encounter with Enlightenment: A Study in
Japanese Ethics. Albany, NY: SUNY.
DesAutels, P., 2004. Moral Mindfulness. In Moral Psychology:
Feminist Ethics and Social Theory. Ed. by P. DesAutels and
M. Urban Walker. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
69-82.
D•gen Zenji, 1975 (Vol. 1). Sh€b€genz€. (The Eye and
Treasury of the True Law) Volume I, transl. by K.
Nishiyama and J. Stevens. Sendai, Japan: Daihokkaikaku.
D•gen Zenji, 1977 (Vol. 2). Sh€b€genz€. (The Eye and
Treasury of the True Law) Volume II, transl. by K.
Nishiyama and J. Stevens. Tokyo, Japan: Nakayama Shob•.
D•gen Zenji, 1983 (Vol. 3, Vol. 4) Sh€b€genz€. (The Eye and
Treasury of the True Law) Volume III and Volume IV,
transl. by K. Nishiyama with J. Stevens, S. Powell, I. Reader,
and S. Wick. Tokyo, Japan: Nakayama Shob•.
Dumoulin, H., 1979. Zen Enlightenment: Origins and Meaning.
Transl. by J. C. Maraldo. New York: Weatherhill.
Kim, H.-J., 2004. Eihei D€gen: Mystical Realist. Boston:
Wisdom Publications.
Kim, H.-J., 2007. D€gen on Meditation and Thinking: A
Reflection on his View of Zen. Albany, NY: SUNY.
74 Ashby Butnor
Sallie B. King
Abstract
Buddhism contains an important thread of teaching and prac-
tice supportive of free thinking. Teachings encouraging free
thinking are examined in the work of the Buddha as well as
some contemporary Engaged Buddhists, namely, Buddhad•sa
Bhikkhu, Thich Nhat Hanh and Roshi Bernie Glassman. A dis-
tinctive Buddhist understanding of free thinking is examined.
Introduction
The topic of the present volume, ‘Buddhism as a stronghold of
free thinking?’ simultaneously points to the reputation which
Buddhism enjoys as a stronghold of free thinking and raises a
question as to whether that reputation is deserved. Of course,
like any major religion that has been in existence for two and a
half millennia and spread around the world, one can find
among Buddhist teachers a wide spectrum of expressed teach-
ings and practices on virtually any important religious subject.
There is, however, in Buddhism an important thread of teach-
ings and practices relevant to free thinking that is quite distinct-
ive of its approach, rooted in the teachings of the Buddha and
very much alive in the teaching and practice of contemporary
socially and politically activist ‘Engaged Buddhists’. It is this
thread encouraging of free thinking that the present essay will
examine.
76 Sallie B. King
ing and can serve as a foundation for freeing oneself from the
entire realm of such suffering, samsara. For example, if I were to
kill or steal, that would, of course, cause direct suffering to anoth-
er, but due to the law of karma it would also cause suffering for
me. The natural law of karma is a law of cause and effect; the
consequences of a person’s actions bear fruit in the form of some-
thing that happens to that person, either immediately, later in this
life, or in a future life. An act of violence plants a karmic ‘seed’
that will bear ‘fruit’ in the form of some violence that strikes that
person in the future, whether in this life or in a future life; steal-
ing will result in one’s being in want. These are laws of nature
which the Buddha knows and teaches others. He points out that it
is skillful to act in such a way that one will not suffer in the
future; it is up to others to choose whether they will act upon that
guidance and advice. Thus there is no external compulsion
involved in observing precepts, just the sharing of information
and an act of choice. The five lay precepts, then, are self-chosen
principles of training.
In addition, the precepts are fundamentally developmental.
They function as external guides only for those in the very earliest
stage of moral development, those who need someone else to tell
them these things, who have not yet seen for themselves the
necessity of protecting themselves by exercising this kind of
restraint. The second most elementary stage of development is
found in those persons who have understood for themselves the
link between their actions and the consequences that follow from
their actions but who are so self-centered that the only motivation
guiding their behavior is the effort to gain pleasure and avoid
pain. More advanced than them are those who are motivated by
the intention to avoid causing pain not only to themselves but also
to others. There is, then, a continuum of attitudes and motiva-
tions involved in working with the precepts that is based upon the
development of each individual’s moral insight. This continuum
also can be seen in the fact that each precept conceived in the
82 Sallie B. King
with minds relatively free of the defilements are in the second cat-
egory. It is critical to realize that from a Buddhist perspective
those whose minds are in the thrall of the defilements think that
they are free, but they are not free. They are the very opposite of
free; they are puppets dancing to the whim of the puppetmaster.
The puppetmaster is the defilements; they are the ones who are
pulling on the puppets’ strings. From this Buddhist perspective,
thinking or acting over and over on the basis of the ego and its
wants is not freedom; it is compulsion. Thinking always of how I
can maximize my pleasure without worrying about others, think-
ing always of my rights and never of my responsibilities – these
are not examples of free thinking; they are examples of thinking
driven by the defilements. Buddhism is all about freedom, but it is
not this kind of freedom. Free thinking, as we have seen, is
essential in the living of a life lived towards the realization of
freedom, but it is not this kind of thinking. So free thinking is
essential but we need further investigation in order to become
clearer as to what free thinking is, as understood from a Buddhist
perspective.
A second Engaged Buddhist who has strongly promoted a spirit
of inquiry and free thinking is Thich Nhat Hanh. During the war
in Vietnam, Thich Nhat Hanh formed a new Buddhist practice
community made up of both monastics and laypeople called the
Tiep Hien (loosely translated as ‘Interbeing’) Order. He com-
posed new precepts (in addition to the already existing precepts,
not instead of them) to guide order members. These precepts rep-
resent ideals that the group wanted to live up to. The first three
are quite pertinent to the subject of free thinking. Let us examine
them one at a time.
The first Tiep Hien precept states: ‘First: Do not be idolatrous
about or bound to any doctrine, theory, or ideology, even
Buddhist ones. All systems of thought are guiding means; they are
not absolute truth.’ It is of course significant that the very first pre-
cept emphasizes the importance of free thinking. The rootedness
The Buddha and the Engaged Buddhists on Free Thinking 89
new in every moment, whatever views one holds (on the basis of
past experience) may get in the way of seeing reality as it is in the
present moment. Tenacious clinging to views, on the one hand,
and mindfulness – deep looking and deep listening to the present
moment – on the other, are opposites. Mindfulness is to be as
aware, as awake, as alert and curious, and as alive as possible to
the contents of the present moment in the present moment,
where life is lived, where reality is found. That is free thinking, as
understood in Buddhism.
‘Third: Do not force others, including children, by any means
whatsoever, to adopt your views, whether by authority, threat,
money, propaganda, or even education. However, through com-
passionate dialogue, help others renounce fanaticism and narrow-
ness’ (Nhat Hanh 1987, 91). One can see a certain rootedness of
this precept, again, in the advice given by the Buddha to the
K€l€mas, as well as in the previous two Tiep Hien precepts. In his
commentary, Nhat Hanh says that this precept ‘is the spirit of free
inquiry’. Just as one should not blindly accept the views or teach-
ings even of revered or authoritative others, the other side of that
same coin is that one should not be the kind of teacher, parent or
authority figure who tries to mold disciples, students or children
into people whose views reproduce one’s own. What one teaches,
in fact, should be open-mindedness, that is, no particular content,
but a spirit of inquiry. Seeking to make others agree with ‘me’ is
just another of the ego’s many wants, a form of grasping and self-
aggrandizement. Therefore, being open-minded is, in itself, both
an expression of freedom from ego-domination and a practice
helping to engender freedom from ego-domination. This is why
free thinking, or open-mindedness, is so strongly emphasized by
many great Buddhist teachers.
A final Engaged Buddhist whose work we should consider is
American Zen Master Roshi Bernie Glassman. In 1994 Glassman
founded the Zen Peacemaker Order as a training community for
spiritual social activists. It is founded upon three principles: ‘(1)
The Buddha and the Engaged Buddhists on Free Thinking 91
new teacher and activist and met with a group of Catholic nuns.
These nuns had many years experience working with the poor
and also had engaged in personal meditation practices for many
years. As they sat talking together, the nuns talked about God.
Glassman says, ‘as I listened to them talk I shook my head,
thinking to myself, ‘They’ve been meditating for so long, and they
still believe in God!”’ Immediately, he says, he caught himself.
‘Here I was, Bernie Glassman, and I knew that meditation had
nothing to do with God. I was a young, relatively inexperienced
Zen teacher, and already I knew that these nuns, who had prac-
ticed their rich vocation for so many years, were wrong to talk
about God’ (Glassman 1998, 69). What is particularly striking
about this statement is that Glassman is not just saying that he
should be more open-minded; he seems to be actively open to
learning what he can from people whose meditation practice is a
practice of experiencing God, that is, whose spirituality – at least
in the way it is expressed – is diametrically opposed to his own.
This has its risks – to do this is to consciously open one’s
spirituality to development in an unpredictable direction, possibly
one that would require one to stop being a Buddhist. But that risk
is smaller than the risk involved in staying in the mind that knew
that the nuns were wrong to talk about God. That kind of mind
puts a full stop to the spiritual life, which is based upon open-
ended inquiry into the unknown, with no ability to predict or
control where the inquiry will take one. That is Buddhist not-
knowing, Buddhist free thinking.
That is why, though there is no God in Zen, one often sees Zen
masters talking about God when speaking to Western audiences.
For example, Shunryu Suzuki writes, ‘Usually everyone forgets
about zazen. Everyone forgets about God’ (Suzuki 1973, 67). As
part of an undergraduate educational experience, this writer once
attended a weekend Zen retreat with a Japanese Zen master who
assigned the entire group of students a koan to meditate on that
he had invented: ‘When the plane flies overhead, where is God?’
The Buddha and the Engaged Buddhists on Free Thinking 93
This does not mean that either of these Zen masters ‘believed in
God’. After his wake-up call with the Catholic nuns, Glassman
began having occasional Passover seders, Sabbath celebrations and
Catholic masses celebrated in his Zen center, and he has happily
sent his own Zen students down the road to the local mosque to
do zikr. That is Buddhist free thinking, Buddhist open-minded-
ness.
Glassman’s second principle, bearing witness, is essentially
mindfulness, being as fully as possible present and alert in the
present moment. Not-knowing and bearing witness mutually rein-
force each other because we cannot be aware and present to the
present moment in the present moment if our mind is already full
of what it knows. The practice of bearing witness has led Glass-
man to develop some innovative and challenging practices for his
students. One of these is ‘street retreats’. Challenged by homeless-
ness in New York City and its New Jersey suburbs, Glassman
developed a program that took students into the streets of the
Bowery, where they live as the homeless do for several days. They
walk the streets all day without money, panhandling, growing
progressively dirtier, receiving looks of uneasiness and aversion
from passers-by. At night, without a roof over their heads, they
look for a way to stay warm and catch a little sleep. Glassman
readily acknowledges that this practice does not yield the same
experience as that of the truly homeless. Nevertheless, it plunges
those who do it into not-knowing and bearing witness. Many par-
ticipants say it is the most profound experience of their lives.
Thich Nhat Hanh advocates much the same thing as Glassman’s
combination of not-knowing and bearing witness leading to
actions of peacemaking. When asked by students what they
should do about one problem or another, Nhat Hanh replies that
there is no blueprint. You should simply go to where there is suf-
fering, he says, and be with that suffering; don’t turn away from
it. Out of that experience, he says, something will occur to you to
do and you should do that thing. In this way, Glassman’s third
94 Sallie B. King
This is not to say that Buddhism is always free thinking and cre-
ative. Buddhist institutions, like all human institutions, experience
the constant pull towards preserving the status quo, as the Thai
example shows. Fortunately, there is in Buddhism a strong thread
of teaching and practice based upon free thinking that is able,
from time to time, to subvert this pull.
References
Bodhi, Bhikkhu (ed.), 2005. In the Buddha’s Words: An Antho-
logy of Discourses from the P•li Canon. Somerville, MA:
Wisdom.
Buddhad€sa, Bhikkhu / Donald K. Swearer (ed.), 1989. Me and
Mine: Selected Essays of Bhikkhu Buddhad•sa. Albany, NY:
SUNY Press.
Glassman, Bernie, 1998. Bearing Witness: A Zen Master’s
Lessons in Making Peace. New York: Bell Tower.
…€†amoli, Bhikkhu / Bhikkhu Bodhi (editors and translators),
1995. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New
Translation of the Majjhima Nik•ya. Somerville, MA:
Wisdom.
Nhat Hanh, Thich, Being Peace, 1987. Berkeley, CA: Parallax
Press.
Payutto, Phra Prayudh / Grant A. Olson (translator), 1995.
Buddhadhamma: Natural Laws and Values for Life. Albany,
NY: SUNY Press.
Suzuki, Shunryu, 1973. Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind. New York:
Weatherhill.
96
Charles S. Prebish
Abstract
Today it is rather ordinary for individuals teaching Buddhist
Studies in universities throughout the world to be ‘scholar-prac-
titioners’, involved in the practice and training associated with
various Buddhist traditions and sects. Nonetheless, it has not
always been easy for these academics to reveal their religious
orientation in an environment that is not uniformly supportive
of such choices. Thus this paper will serve the dual purpose of
describing not only the development of the academic study of
Buddhism in America, but also some of the ways in which that
development has affected the personal lives of those scholars
who have made formal religious commitments to the Buddhist
tradition.
Introduction
There can be little doubt that both the practice and study of
Buddhism in the Western world have grown enormously in the
last quarter-century. Fueled by a dramatic increase in ethnic Asian
Buddhist communities in Western countries since 1965, and the
continued expansion of various convert Buddhist communities,
many million Buddhist practitioners now reside in the Western
world. Although the expansion of the Western Buddhist move-
ment is likely not surprising to observers of the modern religious
landscape, the surge of scholarly interest in Buddhism in general
was surely unexpected. In the years between 1900 and 1971
(when I received my Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies from the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin), there were just under 100 Ph.D./Th.D degrees
The Silent Sangha 97
1
See Williams 1999a, Williams 1999b.
2
Both the original volume and the translation were published by the
Institut Orientaliste of the UniversitÅ de Louvain, see Lamotte 1958
and 1988.
98 Charles S. Prebish
affiliation and the fact that he earned the monastic Geshe degree
following fifteen years of study in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries
in India.3 Robert A. F. Thurman, holder of the Jey Tsong Khapa
Chair of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Studies at Columbia University, is
routinely cited at the first Westerner ordained as a Buddhist monk
by the Dalai Lama. Adorning the entire back page of the book-
jacket of Robert Buswell’s volume The Zen Monastic Experience is
a picture of Buswell as a monk in a Korean Zen temple in 1975.
Peter Gregory has been a longtime student of Taizan Maezumi
R‡shi, as well as director of the Kuroda Institute, associated with
the Zen Center of Los Angeles. Christopher Queen, Dean of
Students in Continuing Education at Harvard University, and Lec-
turer in Buddhist Studies, has for many years been a practitioner
of Vipassan…. And numerous other citations could be posted.
Nonetheless, it has not always been easy for these academics to
reveal their religious orientation in an environment that is not
uniformly supportive of such choices. Thus this paper will serve
the dual purpose of describing not only the development of the
academic study of Buddhism in America, but also some of the
ways in which that development has affected the personal lives of
those scholars who have made formal religious commitments to
the Buddhist tradition.
3
See Dreyfus 1997. It is interesting to note that Dreyfus lists his Geshe
Lharampa degree (earned in 1985) on his curriculum vitae along with
his M.A. (1987) and Ph.D. (1991) from the University of Virginia.
100 Charles S. Prebish
job done with the assistance of his loyal Oriental servant’,4 was
not an accidental choice on my part; that Buddhist Studies in
America was just as erratic as poor Clouseau.
Lately, as noted above, Buddhist Studies in America has begun
to engage in the useful process of self-reflection, and the results of
that inquiry are fruitful and inspiring. Following David Seyfort
Ruegg’s insightful ‘Some Observations on the Present and Future
of Buddhist Studies’,5 the Journal of the International Association
of Buddhist Studies devoted an entire issue (Winter 1995) to the
topic entitled ‘On Method’, providing the occasion for scholars to
reflect on various aspects of the discipline. One must be aware
that there is a vast chasm between Buddhist Studies and other dis-
ciplinary studies in religion, such as Christian Studies. Luis G„mez
notes,
American department head did not live long enough to see the
development of what he considered a non-entity.
In an interesting article entitled ‘The Ghost at the Table: On
the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion’, Malcolm
David Eckel writes in his conclusion:
It is not just students who are attracted to religious studies because they
“want to know what it is to be human and humane, and intuit that reli-
gion deals with such things.” There are at least a few scholars of
Buddhism who feel the same way. For me the biggest unsettled ques-
tion in the study of Buddhism is not whether Buddhism is religious or
even whether the study of Buddhism is religious; it is whether scholars
in this field can find a voice that does justice to their own religious
concerns and can demonstrate to the academy why their kind of know-
ledge is worth having. (Eckel 1994, 1107-1108)
One of the best entries into the identification of the variant kinds of
scholarship is not through their sympathetic depiction, but through
their caricature in stereotypes. These stereotypes are associated with
specific racial/ethnic, national, religious and gender characteristics. Like
all stereotypes, they are falsehoods: racist, sexist, and generally exhibit-
ing the type of intolerance to which we as human beings are unfortu-
nately heir. But exist they do. (Cabez„n 1995, 243)
7
To his credit, Cabez„n cites Jacques May’s alternative view in
“€tudes Bouddhiques: Domaine, Disciplines, Perspectives”, „tudes de
Lettres (Lausanne), Serie III. Tome 6, no. 4 (1973), p. 18.
The Silent Sangha 105
Conclusions
In the years between 1972 and 1978, while I was doing fieldwork
for my book American Buddhism, I visited more American Bud-
dhist groups than I can now remember, and although such educa-
tional enterprises as Nyingma Institute (founded in 1973) and
Naropa Institute (now Naropa University, founded in 1974) were
still young and sparse on the American Buddhist landscape, there
was scarcely a group I visited that didn’t aggressively emphasize
the relationship between, and need for, both study and practice.
In an experiential age, with religious antinomianism of virtually
all kinds rampant, this insistence on study along with practice
startled me.
Stories reflecting the study/practice dichotomy are abundant in
both the primary and secondary literature on the subject. Walpola
Rahula’s History of Buddhism in Ceylon provides a good sum-
mary of the issue.8 During the first century BCE, in the midst of
potential foreign invasion and a severe famine, Sri Lankan monks
feared that the Buddhist Tripi„aka, preserved only in oral trad-
ition, might be lost. Thus the scriptures were committed to
writing for the first time. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the
entire dilemma, a new question arose: What is the basis of the
‘Teaching’ (i.e., S•sana), learning or practice? A clear difference
of opinion resulted in the development of two groups: the
Dhammakathikas, who claimed that learning was the basis of the
S•sana, and the Pa‰sukˆlikas, who argued for practice as the
basis. The Dhammakathikas apparently won out, as attested to by
several commentarial statements quoted by Rahula.9
8
See Rahula 1966, 157-163.
9
Rahula 1966, 158-159: “Even if there be a hundred thousand bhik-
khus practicing vipassan… (meditation), there will be no realization of
the Noble Path if there is no learning (doctrine, pariyatti)” (from the
Commentary on the AŠguttara Nik…ya). Commentaries from the D‹gha
Nik…ya, Majjhima Nik…ya, and VibhaŠga echo the same sentiment.
The Silent Sangha 107
The Sangha has also been active in education. In the lands of Southern
and Northern Buddhism, monasteries were the major, or sole, source
of education until modern times. This is reflected in the fact that the
most common Burmese term for a monastery, kyaung, means
“school.” (Harvey 1990, 242)
uals, one of whom holds the Ph.D. degree from the University of
Chicago with specialization in Buddhism, were authorized to take
on enhanced teaching and leadership roles in their community
and beyond. In the words of one of the nine:
11
See, for example, Metraux 1988, 126-128.
110 Charles S. Prebish
of any kind seems to dissolve in the face of such cultural and reli-
gious diversity. And yet it does seem safe to suggest that lay prac-
tice is the real heart and koan of American Buddhism’ (Fields
1992, 371). In the absence of the traditional ‘scholar-monks’ so
prevalent in Asia, it may well be that the ‘scholar-practitioners’ of
today’s American Buddhism will fulfill the role of ‘quasi-monast-
ics’, or at least treasure-troves of Buddhist literacy and informa-
tion, functioning as guides through whom one’s understanding of
the Dharma may be sharpened. In this way, individual practice
might once again be balanced with individual study so that
Buddhist study deepens one’s practice, while Buddhist practice
informs one’s study. Obviously, such a suggestion spawns two fur-
ther questions: (1) Are there sufficient scholar-practitioners cur-
rently active in American Buddhism to make such an impact? and
(2) Are they actually making that impact?
With regard to the former question, much of the information
reported above is necessarily anecdotal. By simply making mental
notes at the various conferences attended by American Buddholo-
gists, based on discussions of individual practice, one can develop
a roster of scholar-practitioners who are openly Buddhist; and
while such a roster is not publishable in a survey which guarantees
anonymity, the number is quite clearly at least 25 percent. I first
became aware of ways in which personal study and practice inter-
penetrated during my initial summer at Naropa Institute in 1974,
when at least one individual showed me the arrangement of his
academic study and personal shrine, side by side in the same
room. And it was not unusual for Buddhologists to teach their
academic classes immediately preceding or following a shared ses-
sion of meditation practice. When the American Academy of Reli-
gion last held its annual meeting in Kansas City, I attended a din-
ner with seven other academic Buddhologists, all of whom were
Buddhists. One of my favorite memories of Calgary, where I held
the Numata Chair of Buddhist Studies in Fall 1993, revolves
around my first visit to the home of Professor A.W. Barber. Not
The Silent Sangha 111
only was his hospitality superb, but his Buddhist shrine was ele-
gant, and it was the first thing he showed me in his home. To be
sure, the descriptions that might be offered are very plentiful. My
best estimate is that another factor of at least 25 percent is almost
certainly Buddhist, but very careful not to make public expressions
of its religiosity, for fear of professional reprisal, keenly felt or
perceived.
The second question is perhaps not so difficult to assess as the
first. As one surveys the vast corpus of literature that surrounds
the academic programs sponsored by numerous American
Buddhist groups, the names of academic scholars of Buddhism
have begun to dominate the roster of invited presenters, and
these individuals are almost exclusively Buddhists. At a recent
conference on Buddhism in America, held in Boston in January
1997, one practitioner playfully confided that he wondered if
such occasions as this might be thought of as a ‘Pro Tour for
Buddhologists’, as he clamored off to hear Professor Robert
Thurman deliver a Keynote Address titled ‘Toward American
Buddhism’. In other words, many American Buddhist masters
have come to acknowledge and incorporate the professional
contributions of these American Buddhist scholar-practitioners
into the religious life of their communities, recognizing the
unique and vital role they fulfill. Even a casual perusal of the
seminar-retreat schedule at an important American Buddhist
center like Zen Mountain Monastery, for example, reveals a
more than ample sprinkling of scholar-practitioners as pre-
senters. Similar results can be found in virtually all the Buddhist
traditions and centers operative on the North American
continent.
This is a new and emerging phenomenon as well. In 1977, I
attended a well-planned and carefully executed conference at
Syracuse University, devoted to the ambitious theme of ‘The
Flowering of Buddhism in America’. Despite the academic-
sounding titles of many of the presentations, nearly all of the
112 Charles S. Prebish
If there are difficulties here, they are not with the keen and self-
critical eye with which Lopez reflects on his own experience as a stu-
dent of Buddhism but with the degree to which he generalizes from
that experience to characterize prevailing attitudes in the Buddhist
Studies field at large. (Nattier 1997, 480)
Bibliography
CabezÄn, JosÅ, 1995. Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the
Role of Theory. Journal of the International Association of
Buddhist Studies 18, 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 231-268.
Conze, Edward, 1979. The Memoirs of a Modern Gnostic. Part
II. Sherborne, England: The Samizdat Publishing Company.
Dreyfus, Georges B.J., 1997. Recognizing Reality: Dharmak€rti’s
Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press.
Eckel, Malcolm David, 1994. The Ghost at the Table: On the
Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion. Journal of the
American Academy of Religion 62, 4 (Winter 1994), pp.
1085-1110.
Fields, Rick, 1992. How the Swans Came to the Lake: A
Narrative History of Buddhist in America. Boston:
Shambhala (3rd ed., revised and updated).
GÄmez, Luis, 1995. Unspoken Paradigms: Meanderings
through the Metaphors of a Field. Journal of the Interna-
tional Association of Buddhist Studies 18, 2 (Winter 1995),
pp. 183-227.
Hart, Ray L., 1991. Religious and Theological Studies in Ameri-
can Higher Education: A Pilot Study. Journal of the Ameri-
can Academy of Religion 59, 4 (Winter 1991), pp. 715-828.
Harvey, Peter, 1990. An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings,
History and Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hayward, Jeremy, 1997. Acharyas Define Teaching Role.
Shambhala Sun 5, 4 (March 1997), Shambhala News Sec-
tion, p. 1.
Lamotte, Çtienne, 1958. Historie du Bouddhisme Indien. Des
origines € l’‚re ‚aka. Louvain: UniversitÅ catholique de Lou-
The Silent Sangha 115
Karl-Heinz Brodbeck
Abstract
The global power of money cannot be overlooked. Neverthe-
less, economic sciences explain the phenomenon of money only
insufficiently. The illusions that are inherent to money cannot
be accounted for within the framework of Western ideas of sub-
stance. In contrast to that, Buddhist logic explains illusions as
circular structures without any separate identity. This is system-
atically elaborated by means of the concept of money. At the
same time it is shown how the three poisons (‘greed, anger, igno-
rance’) can be reconstructed in the greed for money, in com-
petition, and in the belief in notional values of money as an
economic reality. Interdependence, the heart of Buddhist philo-
sophy, over and again asserts itself against egoistic dissociation
and rivalry. From a subjective perspective, this process is equi-
valent to the practice of compassion, the fundament of Buddhist
business ethics.
Introduction
In Buddhist ethics, priority is given to the qualities of non-vio-
lence and compassion: ‘All those who suffer in the world do so
because of their desire for their own happiness. All those happy
in the world are so because of their desire for the happiness of
others.’1 In this, it directly opposes the prevailing economic
1
‚ƒntideva 1996, 99.
120 Karl-Heinz Brodbeck
8
Alexandrin 1993; Loy 1991; Brodbeck 2001, 2002, 2006.
122 Karl-Heinz Brodbeck
Madhyamaka Logic
Admittedly, so far this general diagnosis remains a mere asser-
tion unless we systematically and rationally explain it on the
basis of its subject: economics. Thus, in the present text, I will
select one central subject – namely money and connected phe-
nomena – to test validity of the Buddhist critique. To do so, I
will discuss those forms of thought where the science of eco-
nomics describes money and the markets. If Buddhist analysis is
factually veridical, an assumption that has never been doubted
by the tradition, we ought to see this work out in practice. For
this, substantial support is provided by Buddhist logic and
Madhyamaka’s critique of knowledge.
Madhyamaka logic is peculiar in that it is, at the same time,
an ontological critique. Ontology is about the definition of
being: what is the meaning of words like ‘really’ or ‘it is’? The
general critique of Madhyamaka philosophy is that this ontolo-
gical definition gives us an illusion of ‘being a self’ (svabh€va):
in everyday life, objects are interpreted in such a way as if they
had a cause, a being, a core or a mainstay in themselves. In this
context, Madhyamaka dialectics has the demystifying function
of demonstrating that this implicit assumption about the nature
of objects is an illusion. The Madhyamaka critique operates to
uncover this illusion in all of its various manifestations.
The specific logic of this form of thought, however, has been
heatedly discussed by the different Buddhist schools already.
Yet, it would go beyond the scope of this essay to consider in
any detail the special features and different opinions brought
124 Karl-Heinz Brodbeck
On one hand, the gold standard has long been gone; on the
other hand, the value of gold obviously depends on the amount
available, as for instance its decline in price after the discovery
of the gold sources in South America in the 15th and 16th
centuries, which resulted in a general inflation. Presently, the
more ambitious approaches explain money essentially by two
more theories: (1) by the thesis that money is only a (special)
commodity which was generated by an evolutionary process
from isolated barter to general exchange. Accordingly, real
money must always derive its value from some metal
(metalism). (2) From an alternative perspective, money is
regarded as an indicator standardised by the state (nominalism).
The first one of these theses, developed by Carl Menger, is a
mere exchange theory. Here, the argument is as follows: the
division of labour is at the same time a division of needs. Every-
one has many needs, but produces only a few products, in con-
trast to peasant cultures that were, essentially, self-supporting.
Consequently, everyone has to barter his products against other
products that satisfy his needs. Here, however, an insurmount-
able problem exists: Whoever has grown a certain sort of vege-
tables and is in need of shoes will have to find a bartering
partner who, symmetrically, has produced shoes and needs
exactly this sort of vegetables. For many products, the probabil-
ity that this will coincide is close to zero. Yet, Menger solves
this problem by the following consideration: by and by, people
discovered that barter could also be made indirectly and so
become a general exchange economy. At first, a vegetable is
bartered against salt, for example, which in comparison is a
widely needed good, and then barters this salt against shoes.
Carl Menger recognises the incentive for this in the egoism of
the economic man: by indirect exchange, a speculative ex-
change profit can be gained in addition, namely by the ‘exploit-
ation of existing opportunities of exchange’19.
19
Menger 1892.
128 Karl-Heinz Brodbeck
20
This is also true for the naˆve idea that money is an ‘invention’,
which also presumes the very thing for which money is said to have
been invented: exchange society. More about this problem in Brod-
beck 2009a.
21
Knapp 1921, 1.
Money: The Global Power of an Illusion 129
22
Marx 1967, 63: ‘For instance, one man is king only because other
men stand in the relation of subject to him. They, on the contrary,
imagine that they are subjects because he is king.’
132 Karl-Heinz Brodbeck
27
Hobbes 1962, Part I, Chapter 1, Œ 2.
28
Cf. Leonardo 2003.
29
Brodbeck 2009, 146 sqq and 220 sqq; 2009a, part 5.
136 Karl-Heinz Brodbeck
36
SIPRI 2008.
Money: The Global Power of an Illusion 141
Bibliography
Alexandrin, G., 1993. Elements of Buddhist Economics. Inter-
national Journal of Social Economics 20.2, pp. 3-11.
A…guttara Nikƒya, Numerical Discourses of the Buddha.
Selected and translated by Nyƒnaponika Thera and Bhikkhu
Bodhi. Maryland 1999 = New Delhi: Vistaar Publications,
second printing 2001.
Brodbeck, K.-H., 2001. Die Jagd nach dem Schein. Ethik Letter
2, pp. 2-9.
Brodbeck, K.-H., 2002. Buddhistische Wirtschaftsethik. Aachen:
Shaker.
Money: The Global Power of an Illusion 145
Silja Graupe1
Abstract
The economic principles of utility and rationality are among the
most pervasive ideals dominating our modern everyday life.
They even threaten to reduce the world’s spiritual traditions to
more or less useful ‘goods’ competing against each other in the
‘market of religions’. My paper redefines this relationship
between economics and spirituality in a radically different way.
In the light of the Japanese Buddhist philosophy of Nishitani
Keiji it shows that Buddhist spirituality is not to blindly accept
the ideals of economics as its pre-given foundation. Rather, it is
to confront us with the existential question why we have come
to believe in those ideals in the first place. Entering into the
spiritual path thus is to self-reflectively step back into the hid-
den ground beneath our very own feet, i.e. to critically elucid-
ate the hidden foundations of our modern obsession with utility
and rationality. It is to explore into the ‘abyss’ which lies hid-
den at the ground of our economic lives, with the aim, in
Nishitani’s words, ‘of delving into the ground of human exist-
ence and, at the same time, searching anew for the wellsprings
of reality.’
1
Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Alanus Univer-
sity of Art and Social Sciences, Germany. The research for this article
was generously funded by Fritz Thyssen Foundation, Germany.
150 Silja Graupe
Introduction
In the 1950s and 60s, sociologists like Peter Berger propounded
the theory that modernization inevitably led to secularization.
The history of the last thirty years, however, has not been kind
to this prediction. Even Berger himself, in 1998, called his own
thesis a ‘big mistake’ (Berger 1998). Instead of religion silently
retreating into the private spheres of our lives, it has returned
to take up space once again on the social and political agenda.
Thus, questions about what role it should play in our contem-
porary societies have regained their pertinence. My paper
attempts to present one tentative answer to these questions
from the perspective of Zen Buddhism, as expounded by Japan-
ese philosophers of the Ky‚to School.2 My choice here is by no
means arbitrary. When Japan opened up its economic system to
the West, with all the technological and political consequences
that this entailed, the Ky‚to School philosophers wanted Zen to
confront the newly arising reality head on. Rather than escaping
from the often painful process of modernization and retreating
into the security of monastic life, they sought to transpose the
living and enlightened experience of Zen into the present. Spe-
cifically, they set out to critically and creatively examine the
sources that lie at the root of modernity as well as the conflicts
it created: Western philosophy, science and technology.
Through this project, the Ky‚to School philosophers aimed to
2
The Ky‚to School was founded by NISHIDA Kitar‚ in the beginning of
the last century. Nishida was born in Unoke, Japan on May 19, 1870.
After studying Western philosophy at Tokyo University, teaching
German and engaging in intense Zen meditation practice, Nishida
received the appointment of assistant professor in Ethics at the Imperi-
al University of Ky‚to in 1910. In the same year, he published his first
work, ‘Study of the Good’. In 1913, Nishida became a professor of the
history of religion, and, in 1914, of the history of philosophy at
Ky‚to. Among his successors have been TANABE Hajime, NISHITANI Keiji,
ABE Masao and HISIMATSU Shinichi.
Economics and Zen 151
To say that we need religion, for example, for the sake of social
order, or human welfare, or public morals is a mistake, or at least a
confusion of priorities. Religion must not be considered from the
154 Silja Graupe
viewpoint of utility, any more than life should. A religion concerned
primarily with its own utility bears witness to its own degeneration.
One can ask about the utility of things like eating for the natural life,
or of things like learning and the arts of culture. In fact, in such
matters the question of utility should be of constant concern. Our
ordinary mode of being is restricted to these levels of natural or
cultural life. But it is in breaking through that ordinary mode of
being and overturning it from the ground up … that religion becomes
something we need – a must for life (Nishitani 1983, 2, my em-
phasis).
The point of this story is that that which is sought is simply that
which is seeking … Our real head … is by no means something to be
sought for in front of us, but is something that always exists for each
of us here and now. Being at the center of one’s searching, it can
never be objectified (66).
Present-day science does not feel the need to concern itself with the
limits of its own standpoint. … Science thus seems to regard its own
scientific standpoint as a position of unquestionable truth from
which it can assert itself in all directions. Hence the air of absolute-
ness that always accompanies scientific knowledge (Nishitani 1983,
78).
Where ratio is pushed to its true extreme, the ‘irrational’ shows up.
Where meaning is pushed to the extreme, ‘meaninglessness’ shows
up. And yet what thus appears as paradox, irrationality, or meaning-
lessness, is truly absolute reality. It is the living vitality of ‘life’ itself.
To say here that life as such is meaningless is to say that life is truly
living itself. It is, in other words, a point where life transcends all
meaning, albeit a point where all meaning is able to be constituted as
‘meaning’ only in relationship to that point (Nishitani 1984, 180).
3
Flanagan here refers to ‘method’ as being expounded by Bernard J.
F. Lonergan. See Lonergan’s Method of Theology (1973) for more
164 Silja Graupe
4
I have done so in: Graupe 2007, 81-95.
168 Silja Graupe
and the world exterior to us. While Zen would surely agree that
this expresses an important characteristic of our modern obses-
sion with individuality, it nevertheless sees through this obses-
sion itself as an abstraction, a truncated version of our true self.
This is because it fails to account for the real character of our
self-consciousness, which is not something to be known or
objectified but the one who is, as well, ‘doing the knowing’.
Zen wants us to truly know ourselves by further inquiring into
the ‘ultimate given’ within us. We are to search into the true
ground out of which all objectified self-knowledge arises, rather
than simply supposing such ground to exist.
Once we really give ourselves to this task, we might find that
we are incapable of expressing this ground under the sign of the
individualistic methodology. We cannot grasp at any substratum
upon which we could securely ground our ego. At least this is
the lesson the history of economic thought could teach us if we
read it critically. That history is replete with economists who
have tried to pinpoint an ultimate reality within our individual
consciousness as the ground of all certainty. However, invari-
ably, another economist would query this, showing that doubt-
ing at this ontological level was indeed possible. In this sequence
of assertion and falsification, the trend was for one economist
or a school to insist on some vital, defining feature of the self,
and its successor to show that the account was insufficient and
incomplete in as much as it could not account for all we can,
and in fact do know about ourselves. Even when taking all
efforts of economics together, there is still no final answer to
our fundamental quest, ‘What on earth is this man who is him-
self, among other abilities, endowed with the capability to
inquire in so scientific a way into the mechanisms of nature, the
mechanisms of society, and human consciousness? To this ques-
tion, the sciences are unable to provide an answer’ (Nishitani
2004b, 132).
170 Silja Graupe
Outlook
Let me, at this point of our discussion, suggest that for Zen to
develop into a true stronghold of free thinking in our time, it
will have to put itself to the task of bearing yet clearer witness
to that ‘deeper reality’ we just encountered. We are in ‘need for
a more elemental mode of reflection’ (Nishitani 1983, 69). Cer-
Economics and Zen 173
Just as a fist can only form out of the neutral basis of an open hand,
the grasping of ego can only assert itself out of non-ego, out of non-
grasping awareness. Without this neutral nongrasping ground to
arise from and return to, ego’s activity could not occur. This neutral
ground is what is known in Buddhism as egolessness, open nondual
awareness, the ground against which the figure of ego’s grasping
stands out (Welwood and Wilber in: Stambaugh 1999, 93).
Thirdly, Zen will have to find ways of expressing the ‘true real-
ity’ of such nongrasping awareness without assuming it to be a
substratum in and for itself. This, at least, is the trap in which,
apparently, many scientists have fallen, who have explicitly
thought that this world lies entirely ‘beyond’ our egos (Graupe
2006, 78-99). Thus, evolutionary economists such as Hayek
have considered our individuality as being unconsciously
shaped against the background of given market institutions. We
appear to be dominated by unconscious action and blind adher-
Economics and Zen 175
Zen does not stop short at the point of view that our lives have
been determined by the historical formation of market institu-
tions once and for all. The true formless self of Zen ‘realizes
itself in wondrous, free activity, but does not remain confined
to history. It is free to go in and out of history, now actualising
itself, now retreating to the root-source’ (Stambaugh 1999,
142). Our selves are determined, this is true, but it is ourselves,
together with all sentient beings, who are doing the determin-
ing. Thus we find the foundationalist approach of economics, in
all its variations, to be in error as such. This approach is, in a
final account, nothing but an illusion, a truncated abstraction of
Economics and Zen 177
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178 Silja Graupe
Guang Xing
Abstract
In this article I will put forward several arguments to show that
Buddhism, and especially Early Buddhism, has a rational
approach as its basis. My arguments will be backed up by rele-
vant passages from the P€li scriptures, citing the Buddha’s words.
In particular I will argue that the teachings of Early Buddhism
are founded on the Buddha’s own experience, and that the
Buddha is a teacher who has directly known and seen the
Dhamma [Sanskrit: Dharma] himself. It is recommended to
investigate a teacher personally before placing one’s trust and
confidence in him. In general, one should find out the truth
oneself and then unravel what is false and what is true, as
knowledge is better than faith.
Faith is only considered useful in the first step, but the aim is to
raise wisdom in order to dispel ignorance, the root cause of suf-
fering. There is even an utterly rational approach to concepts
like nirv€•a or karma [P€li: nibb€na, kamma].
Introduction
Buddhism is considered to be rational for various reasons, for
example by some early scholars such as Vidhushekhara
Bhattacharya and Nathmal Tatia because the Buddha based his
teaching on strong grounds of reason and by other scholars
such as Louis de La VallÄe-Poussin because it was non-mystical,
while still others consider Buddhism to be rational since it is
184 Guang Xing
1
See Jayatilleke 2004, 402 with fn. 1, where Jayatilleke refers to
authors and sources as follows: Louis de La VallÄe Poussin, The Way
to Nirvana: Six Lectures on Ancient Buddhism as a Discipline of Salva-
tion. London: Cambridge University Press, 1917, 30 ff.; Vidhu-
shekhara Bhattacharya, The Basic Conception of Buddhism. Calcutta:
University of Calcutta, 1934, 9 ff.; Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Indian
Philosophy, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1941, Vol. 1, 359;
Arthur Berriedale Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923, 14; Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina
Philosophy. Varanasi: P.V. Research Institute, 1951, 7; J.G. Jennings
(ed., trans.), The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha: A Collection of
Historical Texts. London: Oxford University Press, 1947, xxiv.
Rational Argumentation in Early Buddhism 185
After having said this, the Buddha told the Brahmin student that
he was a teacher of the third group. In other words, the Buddha
is a teacher who has directly known, seen and experienced the
Dhamma himself and so distinguishes himself from the other
two groups of teachers. The first group of teachers were the tra-
ditionalists who based their teachings on revelation, so they
relied on faith in the Supreme Being for knowledge, while the
second group of teachers were the reasoners and investigators
who based their teachings on logic and inference for know-
ledge.
Although reasoning and logic or inference are also used in
Early Buddhism, they are used for organizing knowledge and
presenting ideas, but not as a means of gaining knowledge.
Therefore the well-known K€l€ma Sutta lists ten ways of know-
ing as unsatisfactory which include these two ways. They are as
follows:
2
„€…amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 820 (= MN 100, PTS II 211). The
numbers have been added by me.
3
AN 3.65 [Thai: 3.66], PTS I 188. The rendering is based on Thanis-
saro Bhikkhu’s translation of the K€l€ma Sutta (Thanissaro
1994/2010) with changes referring to translations of the sutta from
Woodward (trans.) 2000, 171; Rahula 1974, 2-3 and Soma Thera’s
web version (Soma 1994/2010).
186 Guang Xing
There are five things (…) that may turn out in two different ways
here and now. What five? Faith, approval, oral tradition, reasoned
cognition, and reflective acceptance of a view. These five things may
4
Jayatilleke 2004, 396. The Bhadd€li Sutta of the Majjhima Nik€ya
(MN 65, PTS I 444) states this clearly.
Rational Argumentation in Early Buddhism 187
turn out in two different ways here and now. Now, something may
be fully accepted out of faith, yet it may be empty, hollow, and false;
but something else may not be fully accepted out of faith, it may be
factual, true, and unmistaken.5
13
Jayatilleke 2004, 398 (cf. SN 41.8, PTS IV 297-300).
14
Rahula 1974, 9.
190 Guang Xing
15
„€…amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 587 (= MN 71, PTS I 482). It
seems that this kind of omniscience was claimed by other ascetic teach-
ers of the Buddha’s time such as the leader of the Jainas. The
C‡ˆadukkhakkhandha Sutta of the Majjhima Nik€ya reports that
Niga…ˆha N€taputta claimed omniscience and all-seeing and complete
knowledge thus: ‘Whether I am walking or standing or asleep or
awake, knowledge and vision are continuously and uninterruptedly
present in me.’ (trans. „€…amoli / Bodhi 1995, 187-188 = MN 14,
PTS I 92-93).
16
„€…amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 587-588. (= MN 71, PTS I 482).
17
„€…amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 735 (= MN 90, PTS II 127).
Rational Argumentation in Early Buddhism 191
Monks, whatever in the world with its gods, M€ras and Brahmas,
among the progeny consisting of recluses and Brahmins, gods and
men – whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought
after and pondered over by the mind – all that do I know. Monks,
whatever in the world … … by the mind – that I have fully under-
stood; all that is known to the Tath€gata, but the Tath€gata has not
taken his stand upon it.18
The same passage with the same idea is also found in the Loka
Sutta of the A„guttara Nik€ya and the Itivuttaka and also in the
Chinese translation of the Madhyama ‰gama.19 So what is ‘all’
in the word ‘knowing-all’? The Sabba Sutta of the Saƒyutta
Nik€ya informs us that ‘The eye and forms, the ear and sounds,
the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile
objects and the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the
all’.20 The Buddha declares that ‘without directly knowing and
fully understanding the all, without developing dispassion
towards it and abandoning it, one is incapable of destroying
suffering’.21 A detailed description of it is found in the Pa…ham€-
parij€nana Sutta of the Saƒyutta Nik€ya as follows:
18
Nanananda (trans.) 1997, 8 (= AN 4.24, PTS II 25).
19
AN 4.23, PTS II 23; It 112; CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 645, b9-c13.
20
Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 1140 (= SN 35.23, PTS IV 15).
21
Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 1141 (= SN 35.26, PTS IV 17).
192 Guang Xing
Without directly knowing and fully understanding the eye, without
developing dispassion towards it and abandoning it, one is incapable
of destroying suffering.
Without directly knowing and fully understanding forms … eye-
consciousness … eye-contact … and whatever feeling arises with
eye-contact as condition … without developing dispassion towards it
and abandoning it, one is incapable of destroying suffering.
Without directly knowing and fully understanding the ear … the
mind … and whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as condition
… without developing dispassion towards it and abandoning it, one
is incapable of destroying suffering.
This, bhikkhus, is the all without directly knowing and fully understand-
ing which … one is incapable of destroying suffering.22
24
„€…amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 234 (= MN 22, PTS I 140). Its
counterpart is found in the Chinese translation of the Madhyama
‰gama, SŒtra No. 200 and the Ekottara ‰gama, SŒtra No. 43.5. The
well-known statement is also found in the Saƒyutta Nik€ya 22.86 (=
PTS III 119; trans. Bodhi 2000, 938). This idea is also found in other
places in the canon such as the Saƒyutta Nik€ya 12.15 (= PTS II 17;
trans. Bodhi 2000, 544).
25
Karunadasa 1994, 55.
26
Karunadasa 1994.
194 Guang Xing
Therefore the Buddha says, ‘It is, friend, in just this fathom long
body endowed with apperception and mind that I make known
the world, the origin of the world, the cessation of the world
and the path leading to cessation of the world.’34 So the attain-
ment of Nibb€na is described as ‘the destruction of lust, the
31
Hare (trans.), PTS IV 289 (= AN 9.38, PTS IV 428). A similar pas-
sage is also found in the Palokadhamma Sutta of the Saƒyutta Nik€ya
(SN 35.84, PTS IV 53) as follows: ‘Whatever is subject to disintegra-
tion, ƒnanda, is called the world in the Noble One’s Discipline. And
what is subject to disintegration? The eye, ƒnanda, is subject to disin-
tegration, forms … eye-consciousness … eye-contact … whatever feel-
ing arises with eye-contact as condition … that too is subject to disin-
tegration. The ear is subject to disintegration … The mind is subject to
disintegration … Whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as condi-
tion … that too is subject to disintegration. Whatever is subject to dis-
integration, ƒnanda, is called the world in the Noble One’s Discip-
line.’ (trans. Bodhi, 2000, 1163).
32
Karunadasa 1994, 58.
33
Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 1153 (= SN 35.68, PTS IV 39-40).
34
Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 157 (= SN 2.26: Rohitassa Sutta, PTS I 62).
196 Guang Xing
35
Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 1294 (= SN 38.1, PTS IV 251). The same is
also found in the Chinese translation of the Ekottara ‰gama, CBETA,
T02, no. 99, p. 126, b2-7.
36
Bodhi (trans., 2000), 1844 (= SN 56.11, PTS V 421). The same is
also found in the Chinese translation of the Ekottara ‰gama, CBETA,
T02, no. 125, p. 619, a15-17, as well as in the Saƒyutta Nik€ya (SN
2.29, PTS I 64); the Chinese translation of the Saƒyukta ‰gama,
CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 264, b4-17; CBETA, T02, no. 100, p. 459,
b20-c3.
37
MN 72: Aggivacchagotta Sutta, PTS I 487-488.
38
„€…amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 593 (= MN 72, PTS I 487-488).
Rational Argumentation in Early Buddhism 197
42
Parsons 1951, 9.
43
Dhp, verses No. 1-2. The same idea is also found in the Ummagga
Sutta of the A„guttara Nik€ya (AN 4.186, PTS II 177; trans. Wood-
ward, PTS II 185): ‘The world is led by mind. By mind it is drawn
along. When mind has arisen, it goes under its sway.’ It is also found
in the Saƒyutta Nik€ya (SN 1.62, PTS I 39; trans. Bodhi 2000, 130),
and in the Chinese translation of the Saƒyukta ‰gama, SŒtra
No.1009.
44
AN 3.101, PTS I 249-250.
Rational Argumentation in Early Buddhism 199
Conclusion
After an analysis of the seemingly mystical and metaphysical
concepts in Buddhism, we may come to the conclusion that
Early Buddhism is rational because it places emphasis on know-
ing and seeing rather than belief. Just like a physician, the
Buddha wanted to cure the illness of suffering so that he is
practical and direct. Therefore, in the Mah€ta•h€sankhaya
Sutta of the Majjhima Nik€ya the Buddha says, ‘Good,
bhikkhus. So you have been guided by me with this Dhamma,
which is visible here and now, immediately effective, inviting
inspection, onward leading, to be experienced by the wise for
themselves.’46
45
CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 438, b13-p. 439, c22. The same idea is also
found in the Apa••aka Sutta of the Majjhima Nik€ya, MN 60, PTS I
403-404.
46
„€…amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 358 (= MN 38, PTS I 265).
200 Guang Xing
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Rational Argumentation in Early Buddhism 201
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203
An‚layo
Abstract
The present paper provides an annotated translation of a dis-
course from the Chinese Ekottarika-€gama that parallels the
Bhayabherava-sutta of the Majjhima-nik€ya. Central themes
taken up in the two discourses are the difficulties of dwelling in
seclusion and how to face the arising of fear.
Introduction
Judging from the picture that emerges from a perusal of the
early discourses, dwelling in seclusion appears to have been a
highly esteemed practice in the thought-world of early Bud-
*
I am indebted to Rod Bucknell, Ken Su and Giuliana Martini for
comments on a draft of this paper.
1
Dhp 205, rendered into Latin by Fausbƒll 1855/1974, 37; for an
English translation see the end of the article.
204 An€layo
company, “dwells alone apart from company”, tshogs las gcig pu logs
shig na gnas pa.
5
AN 8.30 at AN IV 229,1: “this Dharma is for one who is secluded,
this Dharma is not for one who takes pleasure in socializing”,
pavivittass€yaƒ dhammo, n€yaƒ dhammo sa†ga•ik€r€massa. M• 74
at T I 540c24: “the path [manifests] from being secluded, not by
delighting in congregation, not by staying in congregation, [the path]
is not attained by those who associate with congregations”, 道從遠離,
非樂聚會, 非住聚會, 非合聚會得. T 46 at T I 835c17: “the path of the
Dharma is [to stay] in hidden away areas, delight in company is not
the path”, 道法隱處, 樂眾非道. E• 42.6 at T II 754a21: “this Dharma
is reached by one who properly dwells in seclusion, it is not reached
by one who stays among the crowds”, 此法應閑居者之所行, 非在憒閙
之所行. A similarly emphatic statement can be found in AN 8.53 at
AN IV 280,26 (cf. also Vin II 259,3), according to which whatever
leads to seclusion instead of company should categorically be con-
sidered as the teaching and discipline taught by the Buddha, ime
dhamm€ ... pavivek€ya saƒvattanti no sa†ga•ik€ya ... ekaƒsena ...
dh€reyy€si: ‘eso dhammo, eso vinayo etaƒ satthu s€sanan’ti. Hudson
1976, 103 sums up: “only by solitude ... can one truly approach the
Dhamma in its immediacy”; cf. also An‚layo 2009b on various aspects
of seclusion, viveka.
6
SN 6.13 at SN I 154,15: “resort to remote lodgings, move towards
freedom from the fetters; [but] if one does not find satisfaction
therein, [then] dwell in the community, protected and mindful”,
sevetha pant€ni sen€san€ni (Se: sayan€san€ni), careyya saƒyojana-
vippamokkh€ (Ce: sa‚‚yojana…), sa ce ratiƒ n€dhigacchaye (Be, Ce and
Se: n€dhigaccheyya) tattha, sa†ghe (Be: saƒghe) vase rakkhitatto satim€
(Be and Ce: satŒm€). S• 1191 at T II 322c24: “practice approaching
remote lodgings, eradicate and discard all defilements; [but] if one
does not delight in forest dwellings, [then] join the community,
206 An‚layo
The discourses indicate that the Buddha not only enjoyed being
by himself, but also practiced seclusion as a way of setting an
example for others. The role of the Buddha in this respect is
highlighted in the Bhayabherava-sutta and its Ekottarika-€gama
parallel, in which the theme of seclusion and the example set by
the Buddha form a recurrent theme.10
The Bhayabherava-sutta, found as the fourth discourse in the
Majjhima-nik€ya,11 has as its counterpart the first discourse in
the thirty-first chapter of the Ekottarika-€gama.12 The
Ekottarika-€gama extant in Chinese appears to be the result of a
translation undertaken during the period 384-385 of the
present era by Zhu Fonian ( 竺 佛 念 ), based on what probably
was a Prakrit original of so far undetermined school affiliation
transmitted by Dharmanandin.13 Besides this complete parallel
in Chinese translation, sections of a version of this discourse
have also been preserved in the form of Sanskrit fragments.14
Translation15
On the Higher [Mind]16
1. [I] heard like this. At one time the Buddha was staying at
S€vatth• in Jeta’s Grove, the park [given by] An€thapiƒ„ika.
2. At that time, the Brahmin J€ƒussoƒi approached the
Blessed One, exchanged greetings and sat down to one side.
Then the Brahmin J€ƒussoƒi said to the Blessed One: “To stay
in secluded dwellings, caves and [solitary] places [can] be very
unpleasant, going by oneself to stay alone and apply the mind is
very difficult.”17
The Blessed One said: “It is like this, Brahmin, as you said,
[to stay in] secluded dwellings, caves and [solitary] places [can]
18
Adopting the variant 居 instead of 靜, in accordance with the two
earlier instances of this phrase.
19
The second part of this passage, beginning with “since on seeing
me ...”, is without a counterpart in MN 4. The point this passage
makes appears to be the arousing of saƒvega in the disciples on seeing
the example set by the Buddha; on saƒvega cf. also Coomaraswamy
1943.
20
MN 4 at MN I 17,14 only mentions the manifestation of unwhole-
some fear and dread as a consequence of withdrawing into seclusion
210 An‚layo
16. Any recluses or Brahmins, whose minds are lazy, will not
be energetic [when] frequenting secluded and quiet places. That
is not found in me. Thus I now have a mind full of vigour.
Therefore among noble ones who are not lazy, who have a
mind full of vigour, I act as a superior leader. Having seen this
benefit in myself, I [experience] increasing joy.
17. At the time [when I was still a bodhisattva], I moreover
had the following reflection: ‘Any recluses or Brahmins who are
often forgetful and who dwell in secluded places,31 even though
they practice like this, yet, they will be possessed of evil and
unwholesome states. But I now am free from forgetfulness.
Again, Brahmin, to be one who is forgetful, that is not found in
me. For those noble ones who are not forgetful, I act as a
superior leader.’ Having now seen this benefit, I [experience]
increasing joy when staying in secluded dwelling places.
18. At the time [when I was still a bodhisattva], I moreover
had the following reflection: ‘Any recluses or Brahmins whose
mind is scattered and not concentrated, they will then be pos-
sessed of evil and unwholesome states and take part in evil prac-
tices. But my mind now is totally free from being scattered, [I]
am constantly with a one-pointed mind. Any scattered mind
and lack of concentration is not found in me. Thus I have con-
stantly a one-pointed mind. For noble ones with unified and
concentrated mind, I act as a superior leader.’ Having now seen
this benefit,32 if I dwell in secluded quiet places I [experience]
increasing joy.
19. At the time [when I was still a bodhisattva] I moreover
had the following reflection: ‘Any recluses or Brahmins who are
ignorant and dull, like a herd of sheep,33 those men will then be
possessed of evil and unwholesome states. That is not found in
31
MN 4 at MN I 20,1 mentions being “forgetful”, mu‰‰hassati, and
“without clear comprehension”, asampaj€na.
32
Adopting a variant that adds 義 after 此.
33
The comparison with a herd of sheep is not found in MN 4.
214 An‚layo
38
MN 4 at MN I 21,20 instead speaks of recluses and Brahmins who
mistake night for day and day for night (cf. also SHT IV 32 folio 37
V2 in Sander 1980, 131), for a discussion of this difference cf.
An‚layo 2005, 2-3.
39
Adopting the variant 待 instead of 持.
40
MN 4 at MN I 21,35 qualifies the happiness and rapture experi-
enced with the first absorption as “born of seclusion”, vivekaja.
41
This specification, which relates the development of absorption to
the recurrent theme of dwelling in joy (as a result of withdrawing into
seclusion), is without a counterpart in MN 4. A recurrent reference in
the Sanskrit fragments to spar•avih€ra suggests that the Sanskrit ver-
sion had a specification similar to E• 31.1, cf. SHT IV 165 folio 15
V8 and R1 in Sander 1980, 190 and SHT IX 2401 Vd in Bechert
2004, 195.
42
MN 4 at MN I 21,ult. qualifies the second absorption as a mental
condition of “inner confidence/serenity”, ajjhatta sampas€da.
216 An‚layo
47
E• 31.1 at T II 666c16: 知此苦如實不虛, whereas MN 4 at MN I
23,14 applies the full scheme of the four noble truths to dukkha and to
the influxes (€sava). Nakamura 2000, 211 holds that the lack of a ref-
erence to the four noble truths indicates that their occurrence in MN 4
“must be a later addition”. In view of the centrality in the early teach-
ings of the scheme of the four noble truths this seems less probable (on
the epithet “noble” in this context cf. Norman 1984, Norman
1990/1993 and An‚layo 2006). A more plausible explanation would
be to assume that the passage in E• 31.1 is an abbreviation of the full
statement and thus has only preserved the first part corresponding to
idaƒ dukkhan’ti yath€bhˆtaƒ abbha‚‚€siƒ.
48
Adopting a variant that adds 二 after 此.
Living in Seclusion and Facing Fear 219
49
See above note 10.
50
A reference to delivering all beings is not found in MN 4.
51
Adopting the variant 伸 instead of 申.
52
The image of a blind person regaining eye-sight is not found in MN 4.
53
MN 4 at MN I 24,7 also reports that he took refuge, though notably
SHT IV 32 folio 41 R3-4 in Sander 1980, 134 gives the impression as
if the Sanskrit version did not record his taking of refuge (in fact the
editors ibid. remark that “damit endet, abweichend vom P‚li, wo
J‚ˆussoˆi LaienanhŽnger wird, das Bhayabhairavas•tra”). A number of
other P‚li discourses also report that the Brahmin J‚ˆussoˆi took
refuge, cf. MN 27 at MN I 184,16; SN 12.47 at SN II 77,1; AN 2.2.7
at AN I 57,15; AN 3.55 at AN I 159,21; AN 3.59 at AN I 168,7; AN
4.184 at AN II 176,5; AN 6.52 at AN III 364,3; AN 7.47 at AN IV
56,18; AN 10.119 at AN V 236,1; AN 10.167 at AN V 251,24; and
AN 10.177 at AN V 273,13. Tsuchida 1991, 77 comments that this
“warns us against using the canonical narratives as ... historical sources
without due critical considerations”.
220 An‚layo
Comparison
From the perspective of the main theme of the Bhayabherava-
sutta and its Ekottarika-€gama parallel, a noteworthy difference
can be found in the respective introductory sections.54 Though
the parallel versions agree on the two main points made by the
Brahmin J‚ˆussoˆi, they differ on the sequence in which he
presents them.
According to the Bhayabherava-sutta, J‚ˆussoˆi begins by
referring to the Buddha’s role as a guide for his disciples, after
which the Brahmin takes up the topic of the difficulties when
living in seclusion. On reading the P‚li account, these two
points appear like two separate ideas.
In the Ekottarika-€gama account, however, J‚ˆussoˆi first
turns to the difficulties of living in seclusion and then proceeds
to the Buddha’s role in providing guidance and encouragement
to his disciples. In reply, the Buddha then explains that it is pre-
cisely due to seeing his secluded lifestyle that his disciples get
inspired to resort to secluded dwellings themselves. In this way,
in the Ekottarika-€gama version a relationship between the two
statements emerges: The disciples face the difficulties of living
in seclusion because they are inspired by the example set for
them by the Buddha.55
The perspective that the Ekottarika-€gama version provides
in this way suits the remainder of both discourses well, where
the autobiographical account of the Buddha’s own practice of
seclusion and consequent attainment of absorption and libera-
54
Lack of space does not allow a more detailed study of differences
between the two versions, some of which will be examined in my
forthcoming comparative study of the Majjhima-nik€ya, scheduled for
publication in 2011.
55
That fear was indeed considered a problem can be deduced from the
Žka†kheyya-sutta and its parallels, where absence of fear occurs
among a range of wishes a monk might have, MN 6 at MN I 33,26,
AN 10.71 at AN V 132,17 and M• 105 at T I 596a3.
Living in Seclusion and Facing Fear 221
tion fills out in detail what makes him a guide and inspiration
for his disciples.
Another difference germane to the same theme occurs in rela-
tion to the contrast made in both versions between recluses or
Brahmins who retire into seclusion without having established
the required level of purity, compared to the Buddha’s way of
dwelling in solitude. While the Bhayabherava-sutta keeps reiter-
ating that lack of purity or the presence of mental defilements
will result in the experience of unwholesome fear and dread,
the Ekottarika-€gama version is less consistent in this respect.
Here the P‚li version brings out a central theme with more clar-
ity, namely the fearfulness of seclusion.56
Yet another difference can be found in relation to the
Buddha’s attainment of the four absorptions, which the
Ekottarika-€gama version presents as his experience of happi-
ness here and now, thus linking them more closely to the main
theme of the joy that can result from dwelling in seclusion.57
The same difference recurs in relation to the three higher know-
ledges, where the Ekottarika-€gama discourse again makes a
point of indicating that their attainment comes about in a mind
that has reached fearlessness and that delights in dwelling in
seclusion.58
Keeping in mind the complementary perspectives provided by
the parallel versions in each of these instances helps to get a
clearer grasp of the central message of the discourse. Following
the Ekottarika-€gama version’s introductory account, the topic
the Brahmin J‚ˆussoˆi had on his mind would have been the
fearfulness of dwelling in seclusion. The continuity of the dis-
course then reveals the Buddha’s role as a source of guidance
56
To appreciate the significance of this topic, it needs to be kept in
mind that from an ancient Indian perspective – as reflected in early
Buddhist texts – nature is often seen as dangerous and threatening, cf.
Boucher 2008, 54 and Schmithausen 1991, 29 and 1997, 24.
57
See above note 41.
58
See above note 46.
222 An‚layo
59
The role of recollecting the Buddha as a source of fearlessness is also
prominent in the Dhajagga-sutta and its parallels: SN 11.3 at SN I
219,27; S• 980 at T II 254c19; S• 981 at T II 255a26; E• 24.1 at T
II 615a17; for Sanskrit parallels cf. Waldschmidt 1932, 47, Wald-
schmidt 1959/1967, 379, Sander 1987, 137, SHT VII 1687A in Bech-
ert 1995, 96; Wille 2006, 118; for Tibetan parallels cf. Skilling 1994,
268,7 and 292,1, for parallels found as sˆtra quotations cf. the survey
in Skilling 1997, 403f. Harrison 1992/1993, 218 comments that the
Dhajagga-sutta shows that “as a specific remedy against fear when
meditating in wild and solitary places ... the practice of buddh€nussati
must have assumed quite early on the nature of an apotropaic tech-
nique”.
60
The importance of a foundation in proper conduct for being able to
dwell in seclusion is highlighted in the Bhadd€li-sutta and its parallel,
MN 65 at MN I 440,17 and M• 194 at T I 747c6.
61
For a survey of these cf. Weerasinghe 1997, 615f. Though this does
indicate the need for a certain degree of maturity in order to be able to
withdraw into seclusion (cf. also AN 10.99 at AN V 202,4 and Ud 4.1
at Ud 35,18), it is noteworthy that in AN 5.114 at AN III 138,27
already new monks (nava acirapabbajita) are encouraged to withdraw
into seclusion in forests. In fact Vin I 92,22 makes a special allowance
for a newly ordained monk to be exempted from the otherwise oblig-
atory need to live in dependence on a teacher if he finds solace in liv-
ing in seclusion in a remote forest dwelling. Thus the need for some
degree of maturity before withdrawing into seclusion does not appear
to imply that dwelling in seclusion is only meant for the few whose
task has nearly been completed.
Living in Seclusion and Facing Fear 223
Abbreviations
AN A†guttara-nik€ya
Be Burmese edition
Ce Ceylonese edition
CBETA Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association
D• DŒrgha-€gama (T 1)
Dhp Dhammapada
DN DŒgha-nik€ya
Ee PTS edition
E• Ekottarika-€gama (T 125)
M• Madhyama-€gama (T 26)
MN Majjhima-nik€ya
Ps Papa‚casˆdanŒ
Se Siamese edition
S• Saƒyukta-€gama (T 99)
S•2 ‘other’ Saƒyukta-€gama (T 100)
SHT Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden
SN Saƒyutta-nik€ya
Sn Sutta-nip€ta
T Taish• (CBETA)
Ud Ud€na
Vin Vinaya
Vism Visuddhimagga
References
An‚layo, 2005. Some P‚li Discourses in the Light of Their
Chinese Parallels. Buddhist Studies Review, Vol. 22 (1), pp.
1-14.
http://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-
hamburg.de/fileadmin/pdf/analayo/SomePaliDis1.pdf
226 An‚layo