Psychology of Human Thought 101

THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF HUMAN THOUGHT
AN INTRODUCTION
EDITED BY
ROBERT J. STERNBERG & JOACHIM FUNKE
HEIDELBERG
UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING
The Psychology of Human Thought:
An Introduction
An Introduction
Robert J. Sternberg & Joachim Funke (Eds.)

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed
bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.
This book is published under the Creative Commons License 4.0 (CC BY-SA 4.0).
The cover is subject to the Creative Commons License CC-BY ND 4.0.
The electronic, open access version of this work is permanently available on Heidelberg University
Publishing’s website: HEIDELBERG UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING (https://heiup.uni-heidelberg.de).
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heiup-book-470-3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17885/heiUP.470
Text © 2019 by the authors.
Cover image: Matthias Ripp, Gentrification (detail),

https://www.flickr.com/photos/56218409@N03/16288222673
ISBN: 978-3-947732-34-0 (Softcover)

ISBN: 978-3-947732-35-7 (Hardcover)
ISBN: 978-3-947732-33-3 (PDF)
List of Contributors
Rakefet Ackerman Joachim Funke

Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management Department of Psychology
Israel Institute of Technology Heidelberg University
Technion City, Haifa 3200003, Israel 69117 Heidelberg, Germany
Andrea Bender Kathleen M. Galotti

Department of Psychosocial Science Cognitive Science Program
University of Bergen Carleton College
5020 Bergen, Norway Northfield, MN 55057, USA
Arndt Bröder David M. Garavito

School of Social Sciences Department of Human Development
Department of Psychology Cornell University
University of Mannheim Ithaca, NY 14850, USA
68131 Mannheim, Germany
Mary Gauvain
Janet Davidson Department of Psychology
Department of Psychology University of California, Riverside
Lewis & Clark University Riverside, CA 92521, USA
Portland, OR 97219, USA
Judith Glück
Jonathan St. B. Evans Institute of Psychology
School of Psychology University of Klagenfurt
University of Plymouth Klagenfurt am Wörthersee, Austria
Devon PL4 8AA, United Kingdom
Arthur C. Graesser
Klaus Fiedler Department of Psychology and
Department of Psychology Institute for Intelligent Systems
Heidelberg University The University of Memphis
69117 Heidelberg, Germany Memphis, TN 38152, USA
Joseph P. Forgas Zach Hambrick

School of Psychology Department of Psychology
University of New South Wales Michigan State University
Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia East Lansing, MI 48824, USA
Kenneth J. Kurtz Ulrich Schroeders
Cognitive and Brain Sciences Department of Psychological Assessment
Psychology Department University of Kassel
Binghamton University 34127 Kassel, Germany
Binghamton, NY 13902, USA
Keith T. Shubeck
Kimery R. Levering
Department of Psychology and
Department of Psychology
Institute for Intelligent Systems
Marist College
The University of Memphis
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601, USA
Memphis, TN 38152, USA
Anne M. Lippert
Department of Psychology and Robert J. Sternberg
Institute for Intelligent Systems Department of Human Development
The University of Memphis Cornell University
Memphis, TN 38152, USA Ithaca, NY 14850, USA
Todd Lubart Branden Thornhill-Miller

Institute of Psychology Institute of Psychology
University of Paris Descartes University of Paris Descartes
(Université Sorbonne Paris Cité) (Université Sorbonne Paris Cité)
Boulogne Billancourt, France Boulogne Billancourt, France
& Department of Philosophy
Julia Nolte University of Oxford
Department of Human Development Oxford, United Kingdom
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14850, USA
Lisa von Stockhausen
Department of Psychology
Valerie Reyna
University of Duisburg-Essen
Department of Human Development
45141 Essen, Germany
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14850, USA
Oliver Wilhelm
Chiara Scarampi Department of Individual Differences
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Psychological Assessment
University College London Ulm University
London, United Kingdom 89069 Ulm, Germany
Contents
Preface 1
1 The Psychology of Human Thought: Introduction

Robert J. Sternberg & Joachim Funke 3
1.1 Goals of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Underlying Themes in the Study of Human Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Seven Themes Applied to Problem Solving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Review Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 History of the Field of the Psychology of Human Thought

Robert J. Sternberg 15
2.1 The Dialectical Development of Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Early Western Antecedents of the Psychology of Human Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Intermediate Periods in the Western History of Understanding Human Thought . . . . . . 17
2.4 The Early Modern Period (1600s to 1800s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 The Modern Period of the Psychology of Human Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 Functionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.7 Pragmatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.8 Associationism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.9 Behaviorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.10 Gestalt Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.11 Cognitivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Methods for Studying Human Thought

Arndt Bröder 27
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 A Natural Science of the Mind? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Why not just Ask People about their Thoughts? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4 Objective Methods for Investigating Thought Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4 Concepts: Structure and Acquisition

Kimery R. Levering & Kenneth J. Kurtz 55
4.1 How Concepts Arise from Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2 Modes of Category Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3 Kinds of Categories and Their Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.4 Future Directions in Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5 Knowledge Representation and Acquisition

Art Graesser, Anne M. Lippert, & Keith T. Shubeck 71
5.1 Knowledge Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2 The Representation of Knowledge Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.3 Knowledge Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4 Associative Representations of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.5 The Body in Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.6 Conversations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.7 Importance of Media and Technology in Knowledge Representation and Learning . . . . . 81
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6 Metacognition: Monitoring and Controlling One’s Own Knowledge, Reasoning and

Decisions
Klaus Fiedler, Rakefet Ackerman & Chiara Scarampi 89
6.1 Introduction: What is Metacognition? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.2 Review of Insights Gained from Metacognition Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.3 Metacognitive Perspectives on Applied Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7 Deductive Reasoning
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans 113
7.1 The Deduction Paradigm: The Main Methods and Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.2 Theoretical Issues in the Psychology of Deduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.3 The New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
8 Inductive Reasoning
Janet E. Davidson 133
8.1 Comparing Inductive Reasoning with Deductive Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
8.2 Inductive Reasoning at Its Best . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8.3 Different Forms of Inductive Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
8.4 How Does Inductive Reasoning Develop? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.5 Development of Forms of Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
9 Problem Solving
Joachim Funke 155
9.1 The Problem Part: What Constitutes a Problem? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
9.2 The Solving Part: What are the Steps to the Solution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
9.3 Problem Solving: What are the Theories? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
9.4 Methods for Assessing and Measuring Problem Solving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
9.5 Paradigms and Illustrating Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
9.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
10 Decision Making
Julia Nolte, David Garavito & Valerie Reyna 177
10.1 Types of Models of Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
10.2 Foundational Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
10.3 Theoretical Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
10.4 Dual Process Theories of Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
10.5 Heuristics and Biases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
10.6 Decision Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
10.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
11 Nature of Language
Lisa von Stockhausen & Joachim Funke 199
11.1 Language Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
11.2 Bi- and Multilingualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
11.3 Language as Embodied Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
11.4 Alignment in Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
11.5 The Role of Language in Representing and Constructing Social Reality . . . . . . . . . . 205
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
12 Language and Thought

Andrea Bender 213
12.1 The Principle of Linguistic Relativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
12.2 Thinking before and after Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
12.3 Thinking with Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
12.4 Language as Tool for Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
13 Expertise
David Z. Hambrick 235
13.1 The Science of Expertise: A Brief History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
13.2 Testing the Deliberate Practice View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
13.3 Beyond the Deliberate Practice View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
13.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
14 Intelligence
Oliver Wilhelm & Ulrich Schroeders 255
14.1 Understanding Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
14.2 Measuring and Using Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
14.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
15 Creativity: An Overview of the 7C’s of Creative Thought

Todd Lubart & Branden Thornhill-Miller 277
15.1 Creators: Person-Centered Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
15.2 Creating: The Creative Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
15.3 Collaboration: Co-Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
15.4 Contexts: Environmental Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
15.5 Creations: The Nature of Creative Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
15.6 Consumption: The Adoption of Creative Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
15.7 Curricula: Developing Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
16 Wisdom
Judith Glück 307
16.1 What is Wisdom? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
16.2 How Can Wisdom Be Measured? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
16.3 Is Wisdom a Stable Personal Characteristic—Or Are We All Wise Sometimes? . . . . . . 315
16.4 Where Does Wisdom Come From? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
Hot Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
17 Development of Human Thought

Kathleen M. Galotti 327
17.1 Defining the Domain: Realms of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
17.2 Infancy and Toddlerhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
17.3 The Preschool Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
17.4 Middle Childhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
17.5 Adolescence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
17.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
18 Affect and Thought: The Relationship Between Feeling and Thinking

Joseph Forgas 341
18.1 Affect Congruence: Affective Influences on the Content of Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
18.2 Affective Influences on Thinking Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
18.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
19 Culture and Thought
Mary Gauvain 363
19.1 A Brief Historical Look at Psychological Research on Culture and Cognition . . . . . . . 364
19.2 Defining the Relation of Culture and Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
19.3 Thinking in Niches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
Hot Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
Subject Index 381
Author Index 387

This book is dedicated to Dietrich Dörner (Bamberg, Germany)
and the late Alexander J. Wearing (Melbourne, Australia),
two research pioneers of human thought
in complex and dynamic situations.
Preface
On a sunny day in summer 2016, the two editors seeing today how even leaders all over the world—
(RJS and JF) were sitting in a café on the Haupt- individuals chosen to help guide whole countries
strasse near the Psychology Department of Heidel- into the future—often show astonishing and some-
berg University. When the discussion moved to the times seemingly inexplicable lapses in their critical
topic of textbooks, RJS asked JF if he would be in- thinking. We all need to understand how such lapses
terested in coediting a textbook on the psychology can occur, especially when people are under stress,
of human thought. There are not many recent com- and how they can be corrected. We hope, therefore,
petitors, RJS noted. JF agreed that contemporary that you profit as much from this course as we both
textbooks in the field of human thought are truly did, taking similar courses, when we were younger.
hard to find.
Soon the idea emerged to produce an “open- The Content
access” textbook that could be used, free of charge,
by students all over the world. The newly founded This idea for an edited textbook, The Psychology of
publishing house, “Heidelberg University Publish- Human Thought: An Introduction, is motivated by
ing” (HeiUP), seemed to be a perfect platform for our view that much of the “action” in psychological
this idea. We wrote a proposal for the Editorial science today involves the study of human thought
Board of HeiUP, which accepted our idea and soon (as witnessed by the success of books such as Daniel
gave us the go-ahead. We then looked for potential Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow, 2011, and of
contributors for our chapters and obtained commit- Steven Pinker’s The Stuff of Thought, 2007, both
ments from some of the world’s leading experts in of which became best sellers). The excitement of
the field. the field notwithstanding, we were able to find only
Although not every college or university teaches two textbooks on the topic of human thought (Mank-
such a course, we believe that it is an extremely telow, 2012; Minda, 2015). Yet, a course on “Think-
important course for any psychology major—or, ar- ing” (or any of its related course names) is one of
guably, anyone at all—to take. First, we know that the most exciting in psychology. Such a course,
even a high IQ does not guarantee that a person will taught at the undergraduate level by the late Profes-
think well in his or her everyday life. People commit sor Alexander Wearing, was part of what motivated
cognitive fallacies, such as the sunk-cost fallacy (oth- RJS to enter the field of complex cognition. Be-
erwise known as “throwing good money after bad”), cause of the scarcity of recent textbooks covering
every day. It is important for students to understand the broad range of this field, it seemed timely to
their lapses in thinking and to have ways of correct- present a new one edited and authored by experts in
ing them. Second, standard cognitive-psychology or the field of human thought.
cognitive-science courses only scratch the surface
of the field of human thought. Such courses need to For Whom This Book is Written
include a wide variety of other topics, such as per-
ception, learning, and memory, so that they cannot This volume is intended as a primary or secondary
possibly go into any true depth on complex thought textbook for courses on what we call “The Psychol-
processes. Our textbook fills this gap. Third, we are ogy of Human Thought”, which can take a number
https://doi.org/10.17885/heiup.470.c6663 Psychology of Human Thought • 1

Preface
of different names, such as The Psychology of Hu- representations of information help students
man Thought, Thinking, Reasoning, Problem Solv- understand the material better.
ing, Decision Making, Complex Processes, Higher
Processes, Complex Cognition, Higher Cognition, 4. Glossary. The book contains a glossary at
or similar titles. the end of each chapter that defines key terms.
The course is usually taught at the third (col- These key terms are bolded in the text.
lege junior) undergraduate level, or one level higher 5. Hot topics. This box discusses current re-
than courses on Cognitive Psychology. Many stu- search as seen by the chapter author(s), with
dents with an interest in cognition take the cognitive- some references and also a photograph of the
psychology or cognitive-science course first, fol- author(s).
lowed by the more advanced course on human
thought.
Conclusion
How to Use This Book We hope that you enjoy this overview of the
psychology of human thought. If you have
The chapters describe the specific topics of the field any comments or suggestions, please send them
in terms of theories, research, and applications. The to the editors at [email protected] or
pedagogical elements in the book include: [email protected]
The editors thank the very supportive team from
1. Chapter summaries. Each chapter has a
Heidelberg University Publishing, especially Maria
summary of the main points at the end.
Effinger, Daniela Jakob, Anja Konopka and Frank
2. Questions for comprehension and reflec- Krabbes. Claire Holfelder and David Westley did a
tion. Five or so questions, at the end of each wonderful job in checking language from non-native
chapter, assess both comprehension of and re- authors. Also, we had the luck to have one of the
flection on the material of the chapter. These best (and fastest!) copyeditors we could think of:
questions are thought-based rather than sim- Julia Karl. Thanks a lot for your invaluable help,
ple factual-recall questions. Julia! It was fun to work with you!
3. Tables and figures. The use, where relevant, R.J.S. & J.F.
of tables and figures to illustrate and clarify Ithaca, NY, USA & Heidelberg, Germany
material is based on the idea that multiple Summer 2019
References
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Minda, J. P. (2015). The psychology of thinking: Rea-
Farrar, Straus, & Giroux. soning, decision-making, and problem solving. Los
Manktelow, K. (2012). Thinking and reasoning: An in- Angeles, CA: Sage.
troduction to the psychology of reason, judgment, and Pinker, S. (2007). The stuff of thought. Language as
decision making. London: Psychology Press. a window into human nature. New York: Penguin
Books.
2 • Psychology of Human Thought

Chapter 1

Introduction
ROBERT J. S TERNBERG & J OACHIM F UNKE
Cornell University & Heidelberg University
The psychology of human thought deals with how form. We will illustrate this form with regard to the
people mentally represent and process complex in- purchase of a new bicycle.
formation. For example, if you imagine an object Suppose you are trying to figure out how people
rotating in space, you might represent the rotating decide on a brand of bicycle (or anything else!) they
object as an image of the object, or as a series of would like to buy. How do they think about this
propositions that specify the characteristics of the ob- problem? As a psychological scientist, you might
ject and its successive positions in space. A psycho- start thinking about the issue by informally consid-
logical scientist who studies human thought might ering some of the ways in which people might make
investigate how people solve complex problems, or such a decision (see, e.g., Gigerenzer, 2015; Kahne-
make decisions, or learn language, or use reasoning man, 2013; Reyna, Chapman, Dougherty, & Con-
to decide whether the claims of a politician are true. frey, 2011). Here are some strategies that a potential
Why do people find it easier to reason when the bicycle-buyer might use:
content of what they are reasoning about is familiar
1. Weigh all the features of each bicycle (e.g.,
than unfamiliar, but why, at the same time, are they
price, appearance, sturdiness, reputation, ease
more likely to make an error in reasoning when the
of use of gears, etc.) and decide which bicycle
content is familiar? Why are people more afraid to
does best, considering all of those features.
travel in airplanes than in cars, even though, statis-
tically, riding in a car is far more dangerous than 2. Decide what features of a bicycle are most im-
riding in an airplane? Why do people view a robin portant to you—ignoring the rest—and decide
or a bluebird as more “like a bird” than an ostrich on the basis of those features.
or a penguin, even though all are birds? These are
3. Decide what single feature of a bicycle is most
the kinds of questions that psychological scientists
important to you, and decide on the basis of
address when they study the psychology of human
that feature.
thought.
Of course, there are other possibilities, but sup-
pose, for the purposes of this chapter, you consider
1.1 Goals of Research just these three possibilities. You might then create
a theory—an organized body of general explana-
Research in the psychology of human thought takes tory principles regarding a phenomenon. For exam-
many forms, but it generally follows a particular ple, your theory might be that, in the end, people
https://doi.org/10.17885/heiup.470.c6664 Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1 • 3

Sternberg & Funke Introduction
avoid complication and make their decisions only on plementary rather than contradictory. For example,
the basis of the most important factor in a decision almost all behavior will result from an interaction of
(see Gigerenzer, 2015). Then you might propose an genetic and environmental factors, rather than result-
hypothesis—a tentative proposal of expected em- ing solely from one or the other. For consistency, we
pirical consequences of the theory, such as of the will show how seven themes arise in a single area of
outcome of research. So here, your hypothesis is research, human intelligence.
that if you offer people a series of bicycles, and
know their preferences regarding aspects of a bicy-
1.2.1 Nature and Nurture
cle, their decision as to which one to buy will depend
only on the single feature that is most important to One major issue in the study of human thought is the
them. Now you might design an experiment—a set respective influences on human cognition of nature,
of procedures to test your hypothesis (or hypothe- on the one hand, and nurture, on the other. Scien-
ses). In the experiment, you might ask people about tists who believe that innate characteristics of human
the features that matter to them, how important each cognition, those due to nature, are more important
feature is, and then, which of several bicycles they may focus their research on innate characteristics;
would choose, assuming they had a choice. You then those who believe in the greater importance of the
would do data analysis—statistically investigating environment, attributes due to nurture, may choose
your data to determine whether they support your to focus on acquired characteristics.
hypothesis. You then could draw at least tentative Perhaps nowhere has this issue played out more
conclusions as to whether your theory was correct. than in the study of human intelligence (see, e.g.,
One thing to remember is that many scientists Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997). Intelligence re-
believe, following Karl Popper (2002), that you only searchers have argued for many years regarding the
can falsify ideas through experiments, not conclu- respective roles of genes and environment in intel-
sively prove them. That is, even if the results of an ligence, and two researchers with opposing points
experiment are consistent with your theory, it does of view even wrote a book about their opposing
not mean that all possible experiments testing the stances (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981). At the time of
theory would be consistent with the theory. More their book, hereditarian and environmental view-
likely, some would be consistent but others would points were viewed as in opposition to each other.
not be. However, if the results are not consistent with Today, scientists recognize that the picture is more
the theory, then perhaps you would want to move complex than it appeared to be at that time. Most
on to a new theory; or alternatively, you would want likely, genetic effects are not due to some “intelli-
to see whether the theory is true only under limited gence gene”, but rather due to many genes, each
sets of circumstances. having very small effects (Tan & Grigorenko, in
press). The genes that have been identified so far
as possibly contributing to intelligence are of small
1.2 Underlying Themes in the Study effect and their effects are sometimes difficult to
of Human Thought replicate. It appears that environment plays an im-
portant role, often in conjunction with genes (Flynn,
Theories and research in the study of human thought 2016). Some effects may epigenetic, meaning that
tend to recycle through a set of underlying themes. aspects of the environment may turn certain genes
What are some of the main themes that arise again “on” and “off”, either resulting in their commencing
and again in the study of higher cognition, such or ceasing, respectively, to affect development.
as in the exploration of human thought? To under-
stand the psychology of human thought, you need
1.2.2 Rationalism and Empiricism
to understand how these themes recur, over and over
again (see Table 1.1). In the text and table, we refer Rationalist investigators tend to believe that one
to the two aspects of the themes as potentially com- can learn a lot about human behavior through reflec-
4 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1

Structures and Processes Sternberg & Funke
Table 1.1: Major Themes in the Study of Human Thought.
Number One Emphasis Other Emphasis

1 Nature Nurture
2 Rationalism Empiricism
3 Structures Processes
4 Domain Generality Domain Specificity
5 Validity of Causal Inferences Ecological Validity
6 Basic Research Applied Research
7 Biological Methods Behavioral Methods
tion and self-introspection. Empiricist investigators by a man who saw that the moon has a bright
believe in the necessity of data collection. The ratio- side always turned towards the sun, and quickly
nalist tradition dates back to the Greek philosopher grasped the cause of this, namely that she bor-
Plato, whose ideas are discussed further in Chap- rows her light from him; or observes somebody
ter 2,“History of the Field of the Psychology of in conversation with a man of wealth and defined
Human Thought”. that he was borrowing money, or that the friend-
In The Theaetetus, one of the Platonic dialogues, ship of these people sprang from a common en-
Theaetetus imagines that there exists in the mind of mity. In all these instances he has seen the major
man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in and minor terms and then grasped the causes,
different men. The blocks of wax can also differ in the middle terms. (Hutchins: Great Books of the
hardness, moistness, and purity. Socrates, a famous Western World, 1952, Vol. 8, p. 122).
Greek philosopher, suggests that when the wax is
pure and clear and sufficiently deep, the mind will Although in Aristotle’s times, no one did formal
easily learn and retain and will not be subject to experiments, notice that Aristotle gives a genuine
confusion. It only will think things that are true, and real-world example, presumably derived from his
because the impressions in the wax are clear, they past experiences, whereas Plato’s discussion in The
will be quickly distributed into their proper places Theaetetus was obviously hypothetically derived (or
on the block of wax. But when the wax is muddy contrived).
or impure or very soft or very hard, there will be Today, psychological scientists studying intelli-
defects of the intellect (Great Books of the Western gence use an empirical approach. But rationalism
World, 1987, 7, 540). still plays an important part. Many theories, when
Plato’s view of intelligence in terms of a originally posed, are derived largely from the think-
metaphorical ball of wax is the product of a rational- ing processes of scientists. After the theories are
ist approach: Obviously, he did not do any kind of proposed, they then are tested empirically, usually
formal experimentation to derive or test this point of on human subjects, but sometimes by computer sim-
view. Aristotle, another early Greek philosopher, in ulations or by other means. In the modern-day study
contrast, took a more empirical approach to under- of human thought, both rationalism and empiricism
standing intelligence: have a place.
In the Posterior Analytics Book I, Aristotle con-
ceived of intelligence in terms of “quick wit”: 1.2.3 Structures and Processes
Quick wit is a faculty of hitting upon the middle Structures here refer to the contents, attributes, and
term instantaneously. It would be exemplified relations between parts of the human mind. Pro-
Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1 • 5

cesses refer to the actual operations of the human appear on intelligence tests, such as analogies or
mind. Much of early research on human intelligence syllogistic reasoning.
was structural. Theorists of intelligence argued, and Today, many of the discussions regarding pro-
to some extent, still argue about structural models of cesses underlying intelligence concern working
intelligence. For example, Charles Spearman (1927) memory (Conway & Kovacs, 2013; Ellingsen &
believed that human intelligence can be character- Engle, in press; Kane et al., 2004). Working mem-
ized structurally by one general factor of the mind ory appears to play an important part in processes
permeating our performance on all cognitive tasks, of intelligence, and is highly related to fluid intel-
and then specific factors particular to each cognitive ligence (discussed above). Originally, it appeared
task. Louis Thurstone (1938) believed that there are that working memory is a, or perhaps the crucial
seven primary mental abilities: verbal comprehen- component of fluid intelligence (Kyllonen & Chrys-
sion, verbal fluency, number, spatial visualization, tal, 1990). But in their recent work, Engle and his
inductive reasoning, perceptual speed, and mem- colleagues have argued that working memory and
ory. Today, theorists of intelligence still disagree, to fluid intelligence may in fact work separately but
some extent, about these structures. Two prominent in conjunction—with working memory helping us
models are the CHC (Cattell-Horn-Carroll) model remember what we need to remember but fluid in-
(McGrew, 2005), which argues that there is a gen- telligence helping us forget what we need to forget
eral factor of intelligence at the top of a hierarchy (Ellingsen & Engle, in press).
of abilities, and two strata below it, including fluid By the way, one of the first information-
abilities (ability to deal with novel stimuli) and crys- processing accounts of intelligence was offered by
tallized ability (world knowledge); and the Johnson- the same scholar who offered the theory of general
Bouchard (2005) g-VPR model, arguing instead that intelligence (Spearman, 1923). Charles Spearman
the three main abilities beneath general intelligence certainly was one of the most versatile as well as
are verbal, perceptual, and image rotation. So even brilliant psychologists of the early twentieth cen-
today, there are disagreements today about the struc- tury!
ture of intellectual abilities and the resolution of
these disagreements is an active area of research. 1.2.4 Domain-Generality versus
Many of the issues today, however, revolve Domain-Specificity
around process issues. Are there basic processes
of intelligence, and if so, what are they? The concept of domain-generality refers to the no-
tion that a cognitive skill or set of skills might apply
In the latter part of the twentieth century, Earl across a wide variety of domains. The concept of
Hunt (e.g., Hunt, 1980) proposed what he called a domain-specificity refers to the notion that a cog-
cognitive correlates approach to studying the rela- nitive skills or set of skills might apply only in a
tionship between intelligence and cognition—one specific domain, or at most, a small set of domains.
would study typical cognitive tasks, such as the time Of course, there is no uniformly agreed upon def-
an individual takes in naming a letter, and then look inition of what constitutes a “domain.” Is verbal
at the correlation between that time and scores on processing a single domain, or are reading, writing,
psychometric tests. In this way, Hunt thought, one speaking, and listening separate domains?
could understand the basic cognitive building blocks Spearman (1927) suggested that the aspect of in-
of intelligence. telligence that we know best, general intelligence
Sternberg later proposed an alternative cogni- or what he called “g”, is what matters most to peo-
tive components approach (Sternberg, 1983, 1985), ple’s ability to adapt to the environment. In ex-
whereby intelligence could be understood in terms treme contrast, Howard Gardner (2011) has sug-
of components not of simple tasks, like identify- gested that intelligence is highly domain-specific,
ing whether two letters are the same as each other, indeed, that there are eight distinct and independent
but rather more complex tasks similar to those that “intelligences”—linguistic, logical-mathematical,

Validity of Causal Inferences and Ecological Validity Sternberg & Funke
spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, musical, naturalist, in- others. But Sternberg et al. (2001) found that, un-
terpersonal, and intrapersonal. He believes that any der circumstances, an important adaptive cognitive
general intelligence is merely an artifact of the inde- task (procedural knowledge among rural Kenyan
pendent intelligences being used in conjunction in a children of natural herbal medicines used to com-
multitude of tasks. bat parasitic illnesses) correlated negatively with
An intermediate information-processing perspec- some of the cognitive tasks used in laboratories and
tive is taken by Sternberg (2011), who has argued classrooms to measure general intelligence. The
that the basic information-processing components of point of the research was not that, in general, gen-
intelligence are the same in all tasks—for example, eral intelligence correlates negatively with adaptive
recognizing the existence of a problem, defining the procedural knowledge (i.e., knowledge of how ac-
problem, mentally representing the problem, formu- complish tasks in real-world environments). Rather,
lating a strategy to solve the problem—but that how the point was that the correlation depends on the
well these processes are performed depends on the circumstances—that we may be too quick to draw
domain. That is, how well one can execute a given general conclusions from experimental contexts that
process depends on the domain in which the process are somewhat limited. Because the Sternberg et al.
is exercised. (2001) study was a field experiment conducted under
challenging circumstances in rural Kenya, it would
1.2.5 Validity of Causal Inferences and be difficult if not impossible to draw causal con-
clusions from the research. But the research might
Ecological Validity have a certain kind of ecological validity lacking in
The advantage of laboratory-based research with the more “sterile” environment of the psychologist’s
carefully controlled experimental conditions is that laboratory or even a carefully controlled classroom
they promote validity of causal inferences, that is, administration of a standardized test.
the extent to which scientists can establish causal
bases for scientifically observed phenomena. Be- 1.2.6 Basic Research and Applied
cause scientists in the laboratory often can carefully
Research
control independent as well as confounding vari-
ables (i.e., variables that are not relevant to an ex- Basic research attempts to understand fundamen-
periment but that might affect the results, clouding tal scientific questions, often by testing hypotheses
conclusions to be drawn), the scientists can ensure, derived from theories. It does not concern itself
to the extent possible, that experimental effects are with how the research is used. Applied research,
due to the variables they are supposed to be due to. in contrast, seeks to apply scientific knowledge to
But the potential disadvantage of laboratory experi- problems in the world, often with the goal of solving
ments is that the conditions of testing may be rather those problems to make the world a better or at least
remote from the conditions observed in everyday a different place.
life. One of the most famous scientists to point this Human intelligence is an area that historically
out was Ulric Neisser (1976), who argued that many has had a lively mix of basic and applied research,
of the results obtained in the laboratory do not apply not always with the most admirable of outcomes.
well to real-world phenomena. Ecological valid- The research that has yielded some of the theories
ity refers to the generalizability of conclusions to of intelligence described above, such as g theory
the everyday contexts in which behavior of interest or the CHC theory, is basic. Applied research has
occurs. often been in the form of research on intelligence
Most formal research on intelligence is done in testing, research following in the tradition of Alfred
laboratories. The results tell us, for example, that Binet and Theodore Simon (Binet & Simon, 1916),
most cognitive tasks tend to correlate positively with researchers who invented the first “modern” intel-
each other, meaning that if a person does well on ligence test. The legacy of this research is mixed.
one of them, he or she also will tend to do well on On the one hand, Binet was hopeful that his work

on intelligence could be used to create a kind of chapter. What does biologically-based research look
“mental orthopedics” that would help those who per- like?
formed at lower intellectual levels to improve their Some of the earliest biological research empha-
performance. On the other hand, much of the ap- sized the analysis of hemispheric specialization in
plied research in the early years of the twentieth the brain. This work goes back to a finding of an
century was at least in part pejorative, seeking to obscure country doctor in France, Marc Dax, who
demonstrate that people of some socially defined in 1836 presented a little-noticed paper to a medical
races or ethnicities were inherently more intelligent society meeting in Montpelier. Dax had treated a
than others (see Fancher, 1987; Gould, 1981; for number of patients suffering from loss of speech
reviews), usually according with some prior hypoth- as a result of brain damage. The condition, known
esis about the superiority of the “white race” over today as aphasia, had been reported even in ancient
other groups. Greece. Dax noticed that in all of more than 40
That said, there has also been applied research at- patients with aphasia, there had been damage to
tempting to show that intelligence is at least, in some the left hemisphere of the brain but not the right
measure, modifiable in a positive way. For example, hemisphere. His results suggested that speech and
Feuerstein (1980) presented a program called Instru- perhaps verbal intellectual functioning originated in
mental Enrichment that his data suggested could the left hemisphere of the brain.
help improve the intelligence of those who were in- Perhaps the most well-known figure in the study
tellectually challenged by the kinds of tasks found of hemispheric specialization was Paul Broca. At
on standardized intelligence tests. Sternberg, Kauf- a meeting of the French Society of Anthropology,
man, and Grigorenko (2008) presented a program, Broca claimed that a patient of his who was suffering
based on research originally done in Venezuela, for a loss of speech was shown postmortem to have a le-
helping people improve their intelligence. Jaeggi sion in the left frontal lobe of the brain. At the time,
et al. (2008) showed that at least some aspects of no one paid much attention. But Broca soon became
fluid intelligence might be susceptible to positive associated with a hot controversy over whether func-
modification. tions, particular speech, are indeed localized in the
These various efforts show that applied research brain. The area that Broca identified as involved in
can serve either more or less positive purposes. Ap- speech is today referred to as Broca’s area. By 1864,
plied research is a useful way of putting science into Broca was convinced that the left hemisphere is criti-
practice, but it can either create electric bulbs that cal for speech. Carl Wernicke, a German neurologist
light up the world, or nuclear weapons that poten- of the late nineteenth century, identified language-
tially can destroy that same world. deficient patients who could speak but whose speech
made no sense. He also traced language ability to
the left hemisphere, though to a different precise
1.2.7 Biological and Behavioral location, which now is known as Wernicke’s area.
Methods Nobel Prize-winning physiologist and psychol-
ogist Roger Sperry (1961) later came to suggest
There are many methods through which psychologi- that the two hemispheres behave in many respects
cal scientists can investigate the psychology of hu- like separate brains, with the left hemisphere more
man thought. Two classes of methods are biologi- localized for analytical and verbal processing and
cal, which involves studies of the brain and central the right hemisphere more localized for holistic and
nervous system, using methods such as functional imaginal processing. Today it is known that this
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron view was an oversimplification and that the two
emission tomography (PET) to study the brain; and hemispheres of the brain largely work together (Gaz-
behavioral, which typically presents people with zaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2013).
problems or questions for them to address. We More recently, using positron emission tomogra-
have discussed behavioral research throughout the phy (PET), Richard Haier discovered that people

Seven Themes Applied to Problem Solving Sternberg & Funke
who perform better on conventional tests of intelli- theories, empirists rely more on data. In problem
gence often show less activation in relevant portions solving research, we need both: a strong theory that
of the brain than do those who do not perform as makes predictions about behavior, and good experi-
well (Haier et al., 1992). Presumably, this pattern ments that deliver reliable data.
of results reflects the fact that the better perform- (3) Structures – processes. Problem solving is
ers find the tasks to be easier and, thus, invoke less per definitionem more relevant to processes than to
effort than do the poorer performers. P-FIT (parieto- structures but in fact, most studies using problem
frontal integration) theory, proposed by Rex Jung solving measures (like those used for the world-
and Richard Haier (2007), proposes that general wide PISA problem solving assessment of 15-year
intelligence is associated with communication effi- old students; see Csapó & Funke, 2017) rely on
ciency between the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, performance evaluation in terms of solution qual-
the parietal lobe, the anterior cingulate cortex, and ity. There are not many indicators for processes.
specific temporal and parietal cortex regions. With the advent of computer-based assessments of
Again, it is important to emphasize that biologi- problem solving, log-file analyses have become new
cal and behavioral methods are not opposed to each data sources for process evaluation (Ramalingam &
other. In Haier’s research, as in most contemporary Adams, 2018).
biologically-based research, participants perform (4) Domain-generality – domain-specificity. This
some kind of cognitive task and their behavior is is an important distinction in problem solving re-
recorded. What is different is that, while they per- search. Heuristics (rules of thumb) are differen-
form the task, biological measurements are made, tiated with respect to their generality: there are
for example, by an fMRI machine in which the par- general-purpose strategies like means-ends analy-
ticipants are embedded. So even biological research sis (i.e., considering the obstacles that prevent the
and behavioral research can combine in powerful direct transformation from an initial problem state to
ways to yield insights about human cognition. the goal state; formulating subgoals to overcome the
obstacles) and there exist domain-specific solution
strategies, like finding a bug in a software program
1.3 Seven Themes Applied to Problem that can be used only under certain circumstances.
Solving (5) Lab studies – ecological validity. There is a
group of researchers in the field (see Lipshitz, Klein,
We believe that the seven themes are universal issues Orasanu, & Salas, 2001; summarizing: Klein, 2008)
within a psychology of human thought. We have pre- that uses the label of "naturalistic decision making"
sented these themes in the context of intelligence (NDM). They claim that NDM relies on (1) the im-
but to illustrate the usefulness of these distinctions portance of time pressure, uncertainty, ill-defined
in another exemplary domain, we choose the field of goals, high personal stakes, and other complexities
problem solving (see Chapter 9, “Problem Solving”, that characterize decision making in real-world set-
for more details). We will go through the seven di- tings; (2) the importance of studying people who
chotomies and see if they are useful in that domain have some degree of expertise; (3) the importance of
too. how people size up situations compared to the way
(1) Nature – nurture. This distinction plays not they select between courses of action. They criticize
so important a role as it does in the context of in- lab studies for their missing ecological validity. As
telligence. One reason could be that there are no it turned out recently, the differences between the
controlled twin studies comparing problem solving. two sides seem to be less than thought (Kahneman
The dependent variable of interest was always intel- & Klein, 2009).
ligence, not problem solving. Therefore, a lack of (6) Basic research – applied research. Most of
research data forestalls conclusions. the current research in problem solving is focused
(2) Rationalism – empirism. As has been said on basic issues. But the field for applications is wide
before, rationalists see an advantage in the use of open. Especially with complex problem solving (i.e.,

complicated ill-defined problems), political and eco- 1.4 Conclusion

nomic problems come into the research focus. For
example, Dörner and Güss (2011) did an analysis of
Adolf Hitler’s decision making style and identified a Human thought is a fertile field for investigation.
specific strategy of the dictator for solving political Almost all the problems we solve and decisions we
problems. make depend on human thought. We have argued
(7) Biological methods – behavioral methods. Re- that seven themes pervade much of research on hu-
cently, there have been some studies conducted with man thought. We have used human intelligence and
fMRI methods (Anderson, Albert, & Fincham, 2005; problem solving as examples of how these themes
Anderson et al., 2008). But the use of biological are pervasive.
methods is still lacking in large portions of the re- There is no one “best” method for studying hu-
search arena of problem solving. One reason for man thought. Rather, one wants to use a variety
this lack of research is the complexity of higher of converging operations (Garner, Hake, & Erik-
cognitive processes. sen, 1956)—different methods that converge upon
Summarizing, we can say that the application the same substantive results—to understand human
of the seven themes to the field of problem solv- thought. This book will show you the astonish-
ing research does work. The themes can be found ing number of different ways converging operations
here, too. It is likely that these topics will be found have been used to help us all learn how we think and
throughout the chapters of our book, some of them use that thought to adapt to and shape the world in
more clearly, others of them less so. which we live.
Summary
This chapter introduces the psychology of human thought. It opens by considering what the
field encompasses, and at a general level, how investigations of human thought proceed—through
theories generating hypotheses leading to experiments for which data can be analyzed. The chapter
then considers seven themes that pervade research in the psychology of human thought, giving
as an example, research on human intelligence, where all seven themes have permeated research
ever since the field began. The seven themes are nature and nurture, rationalism and empiricism,
structures and processes, domain generality and domain specificity, validity of causal inferences
and ecological validity, basic and applied research, and biological and behavioral methods. The
chapter concludes that the psychology of human thought is best investigated through a melding
of converging operations, that is, by multiple kinds of methods that one hopes will yield mutually
confirming results.
Review Questions
1. Why is there no single "best" method for studying human thought?

2. Can you explain some of the major underlying themes for studying human thought?
3. How are human intelligence and human problem solving related?

References Sternberg & Funke
References
Anderson, J. R., Albert, M. V., & Fincham, J. M. (2005). Gardner, H. (2011). Frames of mind: The theory of mul-
Tracing problem solving in real time: fMRI anal- tiple intelligences (3th ed.). New York: Basic Books.
ysis of the subject-paced Tower of Hanoi. Jour- doi:10.2307/3332707
nal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17(8), 1261–1274. Garner, W. R., Hake, H. W., & Eriksen, C. W. (1956). Op-
doi:10.1162/0898929055002427 erationism and the concept of perception. Psychologi-
Anderson, J. R., Carter, C. S., Fincham, J. M., cal Review, 63(3), 149–159. doi:10.1037/h0042992
Qin, Y., Ravizza, S. M., & Rosenberg-Lee, M. Gazzaniga, M. S., Ivry, R. B., & Mangun, G. (2013). Cog-
(2008). Using fMRI to test models of complex nitive neuroscience: The biology of the mind (4th ed.).
cognition. Cognitive Science, 32(8), 1323–1348. New York: W. W. Norton. doi:10.1086/393043
doi:10.1080/03640210802451588
Gigerenzer, G. (2015). Risk savvy: How to make good
Binet. A., & Simon, T. (1916). The develop- decisions. New York: Penguin.
ment of intelligence in children. Baltimore, MD:
Gould, S. J. (1981). The mismeasure of man. New York:
Williams & Wilkins. (Reprinted 1973, New York:
W. W. Norton. doi:10.1176/ps.33.4.314
Arno Press; 1983, Salem, NH: Ayer Company).
doi:10.1037/11069-000 Haier, R. J., Siegel, B., Tang, C., Abel, L., & Buchsbaum,
M. S. (1992). Intelligence and changes in regional
Conway, A. R. A., & Kovacs, K. (2013). Individual
cerebral glucose metabolic-rate following learning.
differences in intelligence and working memory: A
Intelligence, 16(3–4), 415–426. doi:10.1016/0160-
review of latent variable models. In B. H. Ross
2896(92)90018-m
(Ed.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation (Vol.
58, pp. 233–270). Waltham, MA: Academic Press. Hunt, E. (1980). Intelligence as an information process-
doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-407237-4.00007-4 ing concept. British Journal of Psychology, 71(4),
449–474. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1980.tb01760.x
Csapó, B., & Funke, J. (Eds.). (2017). The na-
ture of problem solving. Using research to inspire Hutchins, R. M. (Ed.) (1952). Great books of the Western
21st century learning. Paris: OECD Publishing. World. Volume 8: Aristotle. Chicago, IL: Encyclope-
doi:10.1787/9789264273955-en dia Britannica.
Dörner, D., & Güss, C. D. (2011). A psychological Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., & Perrig, W.
analysis of Adolf Hitler’s decision making as com- J. (2008). Improving fluid intelligence with train-
mander in chief: Summa confidentia et nimius me- ing on working memory. Proceedings of the Na-
tus. Review of General Psychology, 15(1), 37–49. tional Academy of Sciences, 105(19), 6829–6833.
doi:10.1037/a0022375 doi:10.1073/pnas.0801268105
Ellingsen, V. J., & Engle, R. W. (in press). Cognitive ap- Johnson, W. & Bouchard Jr., T. (2005). The structure of
proaches to intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Hu- human intelligence: It is verbal, perceptual and image
man intelligence: An introduction. New York: Cam- rotation (VPR), not fluid and crystallized. Intelligence,
bridge University Press. 33(4), 393–416. doi:10.1016/j.intell.2004.12.002
Eysenck, H. J., & Kamin, L. J. (1981). The intelligence Jung, R. E., & Haier, R. J. (2007). The Parieto-
controversy. New York: Wiley. doi:10.2307/1422481 Frontal Integration Theory (P-FIT) of intelli-
gence: converging neuroimaging evidence. Be-
Fancher, R. E. (1987). The intelligence men: Makers
havioral and Brain Sciences, 30(2), 135–154.
of the I.Q. controversy. New York: W. W. Norton.
doi:10.1017/s0140525x07001185
doi:10.1016/0191-8869(87)90195-4
Kahneman, D. (2013). Thinking, fast and slow. New York:
Feuerstein, R. (1980). Instrumental enrichment. Balti-
Farrar, Straus, & Giroux. doi:10.1080/13669877.
more, MD: University Park Press.
2013.766389
Flynn, J. R. (2016). Does your family make you
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009). Conditions for in-
smarter? Nature, nurture, and human auton-
tuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. American
omy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Psychologist, 64(6), 515–526. doi:10.1037/a0016755
doi:10.1017/cbo9781316576694

Kane, M. J., Hambrick, D. Z., Tuholski, S. W., Wil- Spearman, C. (1923). The nature of intelligence and
helm, O., Payne, T. W., & Engle, R. W. (2004). The the principles of cognition. New York: Macmillan.
generality of working memory capacity: A latent- doi:10.2307/1413513
variable approach to verbal and visuospatial memory Spearman, C. (1927). The abilities of man. New York:
span and reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychol- Macmillan. doi:10.1017/s0031819100015825
ogy: General, 133(2), 189–217. doi:10.1037/0096-
Sperry, R. W. (1961). Cerebral organization and
3445.133.2.189
behavior: The split brain behaves in many re-
Klein, G. (2008). Naturalistic decision making. Human spects like two separate brains, providing new re-
Factors, 50(3), 456–460. doi:10.1518/001872008 search possibilities. Science, 133(3466), 1749–1757.
X288385 doi:10.1126/science.133.3466.1749
Kyllonen, P. C., & Christal, R. E. (1990). Reasoning abil- Sternberg, R. J. (1983). Components of human intelli-
ity is (little more than) working-memory capacity?! gence. Cognition, 15(1–3), 1–48. doi:10.1016/0010-
Intelligence, 14(4), 389–433. doi:10.1016/s0160- 0277(83)90032-x
2896(05)80012-1
Sternberg, R. J. (1985). Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of
Lipshitz, R., Klein, G., Orasanu, J., & Salas, E. (2001). human intelligence. New York: Cambridge University
Taking stock of naturalistic decision making. Jour- Press. doi:10.1017/s0033291700010485
nal of Behavioral Decision Making, 14(5), 331–352.
Sternberg, R. J. (2011). The theory of successful in-
doi:10.1002/bdm.381
telligence. In R. J. Sternberg & S. B. Kaufman
McGrew, K. S. (2005). The Cattell-Horn-Carroll The- (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of intelligence (pp. 504–
ory of Cognitive Abilities. In D. P. Flanagan & 527). New York: Cambridge University Press.
P. L. Harrison (Eds.). (2012). Contemporary doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977244.026
intellectual assessment: Theories, tests, and is-
Sternberg, R. J., & Grigorenko, E. L. (Eds.)
sues (pp. 151–179). New York: Guilford Press.
(1997). Intelligence, heredity, and environ-
doi:10.1080/02783190802201986
ment. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality. New York: doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174282
W. H. Freeman. doi:10.2307/1421888
Sternberg, R. J., Kaufman, J. C., & Grigorenko, E. L.
Popper, K. (2002). The logic of scientific discovery. (2008). Applied intelligence. New York: Cambridge
New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203994627 University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511611445
Ramalingam, D., & Adams, R. J. (2018). How can the Sternberg, R. J., Nokes, K., Geissler, P. W., Prince, R.,
use of data from computer-delivered assessments im- Okatcha, F., Bundy, D. A., & Grigorenko, E. L. (2001).
prove the measurement of twenty-first century skills? The relationship between academic and practical in-
In E. Care, P. Griffin, & M. Wilson (Eds.), Assess- telligence: A case study in Kenya. Intelligence, 29(5),
ment and teaching of 21st century skills. Research 401–418. doi:10.1016/s0160-2896(01)00065-4
and applications (pp. 225–238). Cham: Springer.
Tan, M., & Grigorenko, E. L. (in press). Genet-
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65368-6
ics/genomics and intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.),
Reyna, V. F., Chapman, S. B., Dougherty, M. R., & Con- Human intelligence: An introduction. New York:
frey, J. (2011). The adolescent brain: Learning, rea- Cambridge University Press.
soning, and decision making. Washington, DC: Amer-
Thurstone, L. M. (1938). Primary mental abili-
ican Psychological Association. doi:10.1037/13493-
ties. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
000
doi:10.1080/21674086.1939.11925404

Glossary Sternberg & Funke
Glossary
data analysis Statistically investigating your data psychology of human thought Deals with how
to determine whether they support your hy- people mentally represent and process com-
pothesis. 4 plex information. 3
experiment A set of procedures to test your hy- theory An organized body of general explanatory
pothesis (or hypotheses). 4 principles regarding a phenomenon. 3
hypothesis A tentative proposal of expected em-
pirical consequences of a theory, such as of
the outcome of research. 4

Chapter 2
History of the Field of the Psychology of

Human Thought
ROBERT J. S TERNBERG
Cornell University
Why should students bother to learn anything at all the history of the field. Put another way, historical
about the history of the field? On the very day I knowledge prevents us from “reinventing the wheel.”
write this chapter, a younger colleague, an assistant Imagine if society had no knowledge of past inven-
professor, told me she is interested in the future of tions, and instead of dreaming up new inventions,
the field, not its past. Yet, there are three major kept reinventing the same things, again and again.
reasons to study the history of psychology in gen- Science is no different. For science to advance, sci-
eral, and of the psychology of human thought, in entists have to be aware of what ideas have already
particular. been proposed.
First, many contemporary ideas can be better un-
Third, we need to know which ideas from the past
derstood if we understand their historical context.
worked well and which worked poorly. Knowledge
For example, when trying to understand ideas about
of the history of a field can prevent us remaking
whether propensities toward language are inborn or
mistakes that others already have made. When one
acquired, it helps to understand the history of ratio-
reads the history of the field, one sometimes feels
nalism and empiricism and how they have influenced
amazement at ideas people once held, such as of the
this and other debates about human propensities. In-
validity of phrenology (studying patterns of bumps
deed, the debate between those who emphasize in-
on the head) for understanding people’s personali-
born traits and those who emphasize environmental
ties. But if we do not learn from these past mistakes,
influences truly cannot be well understood without
what is to stop us from making them again?
understanding the nature of rationalism and empiri-
cism. Moreover, current views on gene x environ-
For example, why bother to read how Jerome
ment interaction are a product of a long and, as it
Bruner and his colleagues studied concepts and con-
happens, largely fruitless debate between those who
cept learning in 1956 (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin,
wanted to understand human behavior as almost en-
1956)? The idea of studying such simplified con-
tirely genetically programmed (some early behavior
cepts was that one could study some kind of “pure”
geneticists) and those who wanted to understand
concept formation, unfettered and unimpeded by in-
it as driven almost entirely by experiences in the
dividual and group differences in prior knowledge.
environment (some early behaviorists).
If different shapes, sizes, color names, and so forth
Second, knowledge of history prevents us from were used, everyone would be at the same level of
claiming original credit for ideas that are steeped in advantage–and disadvantage.

Sternberg History
But later studies revealed that things did not work chology of human thought can be traced to a Greek
that way. Rosch (1975) found that how people form myth of Psyche, whose name conveys the idea of a
concepts about concrete items, such as kinds of an- “breath of life,” or put another way, the soul, believed
imal or plant life, bears little resemblance to how once and still by many to inhabit the body during
people form concepts about abstract items. More- life and then to leave the body upon a person’s death.
over, concepts have a “basic level,” a level at which The Greek term nous (which once was believed to be
we tend to think most easily about them. For exam- a bodily organ responsible for the clear and coherent
ple, people find it easier to think in terms of con- perception of truth) is an uncommon English word
cepts at the level of “bird” than at the higher level of for the mind; nous particularly referred to thinking
“chordata,” even though the latter is a higher level. that involved deep reasoning or even reasoning that
Understanding the evolution of concept-formation was divinely inspired. In the ancient Greek world,
research will help future investigators realize that the body and the mind were viewed as largely dis-
there may be differences in the way more abstract tinct. The mind might cause activity in the body,
and more concrete concepts are conceived, so that but the mind nevertheless was independent of the
they do not again make the mistake of thinking that activity of the body. This dialectic–of the mind and
all concepts are processed in the same way. Simi- body as entirely separated or as unitary continues
larly, there are differences in the way people solve even into the present day.
abstract, structured, IQ-test-like problems and more The origins of the study of the psychology of hu-
concrete, practical, and unstructured problems such man thought can be traced to two distinct approaches
as how to choose a mate (Frensch & Funke, 1995; to the understanding of human behavior: philosophy
Sternberg et al., 2000). Thus, one might wish to and physiology. Today, these two fields of inquiry
study problem solving in contexts that resemble the are viewed almost as dialectically opposed. That
universe of tasks to which one wishes to generalize is, philosophy is often viewed as involving specula-
one’s conclusions. tive methods and physiology as involving empirical,
largely scientific methods. But in ancient Greek
times, many physiologists as well as philosophers
2.1 The Dialectical Development of
believed that truth could be reached without the ben-
Ideas efit of empirical methods.
Many ideas in psychological science, in general, and As time went on, philosophy and physiology di-
in the field of human thought, in particular, proceed verged more and more, with physiologists seeking
in a kind of dialectical progression. The idea of a out empirical methods that never interested philoso-
dialectic was formulated by the philosopher Georg phers. As time went on, several dialectics kept
Hegel (1807/1931), who suggested that people think arising and re-arising in the study of the human
in one way for a while, a thesis; then they move on mind—whether the mind and body are one entity
to a contrasting and sometimes contradictory way or distinct entities; whether the mind is best under-
of seeing things, an antithesis; finally, they move stood through rationalistic or empirical methods;
on to an integrated view, a synthesis, whereby two whether abilities are genetically or environmentally
ideas that had seemed contradictory no longer seem determined. The synthesis stage of each dialectic
that way, but rather seem as though they can be inte- involved the recognition that the two positions are
grated and understood as both being true, perhaps at not necessarily opposed to each other—the ideas
different levels. could be integrated. For example, abilities almost
certainly have both genetically and environmentally
influenced components, as well as a component in-
2.2 Early Western Antecedents of the fluenced by the interaction between genes and envi-
Psychology of Human Thought ronment.
Hippocrates, the ancient Greek physician and
Where did the study of human thought begin, and philosopher (ca. 460–377 B.C.E.) believed in mind-
when did it happen? The mythical origins of the psy- body dualism, or the notion that whereas the body

Intermediate Periods in the Western History of Understanding Human Thought Sternberg
is composed of physical substance, the mind is not. In contrast, Aristotle was fundamentally an em-
Hippocrates proposed that the mind resides in the piricist, believing that the nature of human thought
brain. Although today this idea sounds rather obvi- could be best understood through observation and
ous, many of his predecessors had different ideas experimentation. We learn about reality by observ-
about where the mind resided, ranging from the ing concrete objects, including ourselves. Because
heart to the gods. reality inheres in concrete objects, we learn best
Plato (ca. 428–348 B.C.E), who lived at roughly about them by studying them empirically.
the same time as Hippocrates, agreed that the mind Further, Plato believed that ideas are largely in-
resided in the body, and in particular, in the brain. nate. That is, we are born with virtually all the ideas
In contrast, Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) believed that we have. Experience merely brings them out. In
the mind resided in the heart. These two philoso- the dialogue Meno, Plato claimed to demonstrate
phers set up three important dialectics for the psy- (through Socrates, who generally was the main pro-
chology of human thought—the relationship be- tagonist in the dialogues) that all the ideas about
tween the mind and the body, the use of empirical geometry that a slave boy had in his head were there
observations versus philosophical introspections as at the boy’s birth. Experience merely brought them
a means for discovering the truth, and the original out. In contrast, Aristotle believed that ideas gener-
source for our ideas. ally arise through experience.
Plato believed that reality inheres not in the con- All of these dialectics–whether the mind and body
crete objects that we become aware of through our are one entity or distinct entities; whether the mind
senses, but rather in abstract forms that these objects is best understood through rationalistic or empirical
somehow represent. That is, the reality of you is not methods; whether abilities are genetically or envi-
in your physical substance but rather in the abstract ronmentally determined—are still active in research
ideas you represent. The computer (or other device) today that seeks to understand the human mind. Psy-
on which you are reading this text is not real; rather, chological scientists disagree even today as to the
the abstract idea behind it is real. In contrast, Aris- extent to which mind and body are distinct, on the
totle believed, as you probably do, that the reality of roles of rationalistic and empirical methods, and on
yourself is in your concrete substance and that the the origins of abilities.
reality of your computer (or other device) is in that
concrete device, not in the idea of it. According to
Aristotle, the idea is derivative, rather than primary. 2.3 Intermediate Periods in the
Plato’s ideas led to the philosophy of mind-body Western History of Understanding
dualism, whereas Aristotle’s ideas led to monism, or Human Thought
the idea that the body and mind are of a single kind
of reality, existing in a single plane. In this view, the During the early Christian era (200–450 C.E.) and
mind is a byproduct of anatomical and physiological the Middle Ages (400–1300 C.E.), rationalism and
activity. It has no separate existence apart from this empiricism became subsidiary to the primacy of re-
activity. ligious faith. Neither method was viewed as valid
These different ideas about the nature of reality unless it demonstrated what was already “known”
led Plato and Aristotle to different methodologies to be true on the basis of Christian doctrine. (Other
for investigating the nature of human thought. Plato views evolved in Eastern countries, but because mod-
was a rationalist, believing that introspection and ern psychological science is largely based on the
related philosophical methods of analysis could and Western tradition, that is what will be covered here.)
should be used to arrive at truth. After all, what This kind of logic—which is perhaps as prevalent
purpose would there be to studying empirically the today as in the past, just in different forms—shows
imperfect copies of reality that concrete object repre- the fallacy of confirmation bias, whereby we seek
sent? Rather, one would be better off using reflection out information that is consistent with what we be-
to understand reality in the realm of abstract ideas. lieve and ignore or reject information that is not

Sternberg History
consistent with our beliefs. More and more today, to as reductionism, a view that reduces the role of
through social media and other means, people only the mind to the status of the physical and chemical
read news feeds and websites that present views that processing occurring in the body. Those today who
correspond to those the individual already has. see the mind as nothing more than physiological
Modern views of science were born during the operations of the brain and its accompanying central
period of the Renaissance, roughly from the 1300s nervous system might be viewed as reductionists.
to the 1600s. The focus of psychological thinking Kant provided syntheses to many of the theses
shifted from God to humanity. Strict control of and antitheses that had been proposed before him.
thinking in terms of religious doctrine came under He sought to understand how the mind and the body
attack. Now empirical observation, often guided by are related, rather than looking at one as subservient
underlying theories, came into vogue as a preferred to the other. Kant also allowed roles for both a priori
method for understanding human thought and other (rationally determined) and a posteriori (empirically
human phenomena. determined) knowledge. What is perhaps today most
important about Kant’s contribution is the recogni-
tion that philosophical debates do not have to be
2.4 The Early Modern Period (1600s to “either-or,” but rather can be “both-and,” seeking
1800s) roles, for example, both for inborn knowledge and
for empirically derived knowledge.
Interestingly, the Early Modern Period saw a replay
of some of the dialectics that distinguished Plato
and Aristotle. René Descartes, a philosopher, agreed 2.5 The Modern Period of the
with Plato’s emphasis on rationalism as the best way Psychology of Human Thought
to seek truth, and Descartes, like Plato, was a dual-
ist. Descartes further believed that knowledge was The modern period of the psychology of human
innate. In contrast, John Locke (1632–1704), also a thought can be seen as beginning with structural-
philosopher, sided largely with Aristotle, believing ism, which sought to understand the structure (con-
in the primacy of empirical methods, monism, and figuration of elements) of the mind by analyzing
the idea that all knowledge is acquired from experi- the mind in terms of its constituent components or
ence. Locke took this view to an extreme, arguing contents (see Table 2.1 for a comparison between
that, at birth, the mind is a tabula rasa, or blank slate. this and other modern schools of thought). At the
We acquire knowledge through sensory experience, time structuralism was introduced, scientists in other
and thus the experiences we provide children are fields also were trying to understand constituents,
the keys to what they are able to learn in their lives. such as the periodic table of elements and the bio-
David Hume, another empiricist philosopher, sided chemical constituents of cells. Thus, structuralism
with Locke in the belief that knowledge is acquired. was a part of a large movement in science to break
He further pointed out that all our causal inferences things down into their basic elements.
are indirect. We see one thing happen, and then An important pre-structuralist was the German
quickly and proximally, another, and infer causality. psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1932–1902). Wundt
We can never see causation directly occur—we can argued that the study of cognition should concentrate
only come to believe it is true. on immediate and direct experience, not mediate and
Two important successors to Descartes and Locke indirect experience. For example, if a subject looked
were the philosophers John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) at a tree, what would be important to Wundt, from a
and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Mill saw the psychological point of view, would not be the iden-
mind entirely in mechanistic terms. He believed that tification of the object as a tree or a maple tree, but
the laws of the physical universe could explain ev- rather one’s seeing a large cylinder with a rough
erything, including our lives as human beings. His brown surface jutting out into the air with green
was an extreme form of monism, sometimes referred protrusions (i.e., leaves) attached to smaller cylin-

Functionalism Sternberg
Table 2.1: Main Schools of Thought in the History of the Psychology of Thought.
School of Thought Main Emphasis

Structuralism Analysis of thought into constituent components
Functionalism and pragmatism Understanding “why” of behavior; practical uses of thought and behavior
Associationism Study of mental connections between stimuli and responses
Behaviorism Study of observable behavior and how rewards determine behavior
Gestaltism Study of thought and behavior as holistic, not just as a sum of parts
Cognitivism Understanding the mental processes and representations underlying thought
drical types of objects (i.e., branches) jutting out knowledge about thinking could be gained. More-
from the main cylinder. Wundt suggested that the over, people’s introspections, no matter how much
best way to study immediate experience was through the people are trained, are subject to various kinds
introspection—that is, subjects reporting their direct of biases as a function of their past experiences. Fi-
and immediate experiences. Wundt believed that nally, different people had different introspections,
people could be trained to be experts at introspec- so that it was difficult to gain agreement as to just
tion, so that they would report exactly what they what the basic sensations were.
sensed without the mediation of their knowledge of
concepts and categories (such as tree or maple).
Perhaps the first major structuralist was Edward 2.6 Functionalism
Titchener (1867-1927), whose views were similar to
Wundt’s. Although Titchener started out as a strict Functionalism looks at the functional relationships
structuralist, later in his career he branched out and between specific earlier stimuli and subsequent re-
considered other ways of studying human thought. sponses; in other words, it asked the question of why
Titchener’s change of mindset illustrates an impor- people behave the way they do—how do events in
tant lesson about scientific creativity: Scientists do a person’s life lead the person to behave in certain
not have to get stuck in, or fixated upon, the ideas ways but not others? Thus, functionalists asked a
that characterize their early work. They can “grow different set of questions from structuralists, concen-
on the job,” and themselves think dialectically, with trating less on what people experienced and more
their ideas evolving along with their careers. on why they experienced it.
Structuralism is of interest today primarily in an Again, there is an important lesson to be learned
historical sense, because it was shown to have a from the evolution of psychological thinking from
number of problems associated with it. First, as time structuralism to functionalism. That lesson is that
went on, the number of “elementary sensations” it different schools of, or approaches to psychological
proposed grew too large to be manageable. There thought, differ at least as much in the questions they
seemed to be no limit, and so its role in reducing ex- ask as in the answers they obtain. When psycholog-
perience to a manageable number of elementary sen- ical science moves on, it is often not so much that
sations was lost. Second, to the extent it was useful, the answers change as that the questions change.
it was for understanding simple rather than complex The core beliefs of structuralists—seeking
aspects of human behavior, such as problem solving, elementary sensations through analyses of
reasoning, or language. Third, its heavy reliance on introspection—were pretty well defined. The core
introspection came under attack. While introspec- beliefs of functionalists never cohered quite as well.
tion might be of some use, it scarcely seemed to be Indeed, they used a variety of methods to answer
the only method or even a primary method by which their questions about the “why” of human behavior.

Sternberg History
2.7 Pragmatism of yesterday. Second, the school of thought raises

the question of “useful to whom”? Is it enough for
Pragmatism, an outgrowth of functionalism, holds an education to be useful to just one person? How
that knowledge is validated by its usefulness. The about if it is useful to one person but useless to an-
main question pragmatists are concerned with is that other? Finally, pragmatism, in general, can have
of how knowledge can be used to make some kind a limited notion of usefulness. What is useful to
of a difference. a person at one time, in the short run, may not be
One of the most well-known pragmatists was useful to the person in the long run.
William James (1842–1910), who was not only a
psychologist but also a philosopher and a physician.
His landmark work was Principles of Psychology 2.8 Associationism
(James, 1890/1983). It is rare for a scholar to enter
the pantheon of “most distinguished psychologists” Associationism concerns how ideas and events be-
for just a single work, but James managed to do it come associated with one another in the mind. Thus,
with that one major work. it serves as a basis for a conception of learning—that
James critiqued structuralism’s focus on minute learning happens through the association of ideas in
details of experience. He believed instead that psy- the mind.
chology needs to focus on bigger ideas. He is par- One of the most influential associationists was the
ticularly well known for his theorizing about con- German psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–
sciousness, which he believed was the key to peo- 1909), who was the first empirical investigator to
ple’s adaptation to their environments. apply associationist ideas experimentally. Whereas
John Dewey (1859–1952) applied pragmatism to Wundt was an introspectionist, Ebbinghaus was an
a number of different areas of thought, most notably, experimentalist. To the extent that he used introspec-
education. Dewey emphasized the role of motivation, it was about himself. Ebbinghaus also differed
tion in education (e.g., Dewey, 1910). In order to from Wundt in that his main subject was himself.
learn effectively, a student needs to see the use of Edwin Guthrie (1886–1959) expanded upon
what he or she learns. If the learning is irrelevant to Ebbinghaus’s ideas about associationism, proposing
a student’s life, the student will have little incentive that two observed events (a stimulus and a response)
to process deeply the information that is taught. One became associated with each other through close
way educators can motivate students is by having occurrence in time (temporal contiguity). In this
the students choose their own problems. In that way, view, stimulus and response become associated be-
the students will choose problems that interest them, cause they repeatedly occur at about the same time,
whether or not they interest the teachers. with the response following the stimulus. Guthrie,
Dewey also believed in the value of applied re- however, studied animals rather than himself.
search. Much of the research being done, he thought, Edward Lee Thorndike (1874–1949) developed
had no obvious use and hence was not likely to make these ideas still further, suggesting that what is im-
a long-lasting contribution. Pragmatism would ar- portant is not mere temporal contiguity, but rather
gue for applied or at least life-relevant research that “satisfaction,” or the existence of some reward. Ac-
could be put to some use, even if not immediately. cording to Thorndike’s law of effect, a stimulus tends
Pragmatism remains a school of thought today: to produce a certain response (effect) over time if
One frequently hears politicians argue for educa- an organism is rewarded (satisfaction) for that re-
tional programs that prepare students for careers and sponse.
that focus on knowledge that is readily applicable. Associationism in its original form has not sur-
But the advantages of pragmatism are, in some ways, vived. The idea that complex behavior could be
also its disadvantages. First, it can lead to short- explained just on the basis of simple associations
sightedness. Much of the most important applied has never really worked well. None of the associa-
research of today emanated from the basic research tionists ever gave a persuasive account of problem

Behaviorism Sternberg
solving, reasoning, decision making, or any other about instrumental conditioning (i.e., conditioning
higher process. in which responses are shaped by rewards and non-
rewards of behavior). Because Skinner believed
the environment controls behavior, the idea of the
2.9 Behaviorism Utopia was to create environments that would con-
trol behavior so that it would conform to the ideals
Behaviorism is the view that psychology should of the community.
deal only with observable behavior. It is in a sense
an extreme form of associationism. It originated as
a dialectical reaction against the focus on personally 2.10 Gestalt Psychology
subjective mental states as emphasized both by struc-
turalism and functionalism. Radical behaviorists Gestalt psychology sought to understand behavior
argue that arguments regarding (internal) thought in terms of organized, structured wholes; that is, in-
processes are merely speculations. In their view, stead of breaking down behavior and its underlying
although such speculations may have a place in phi- cognition into constituent parts, Gestalt psychology
losophy, they do not have a place in the science sought to understand behavior holistically. Three
of psychology. The behaviorist view was part of a of the main psychologists behind the movement, all
movement called logical positivism, according to German, were Max Wertheimer (1880–1943), Kurt
which the basis of all knowledge is sensory percep- Koffka (1886–1941), and Wolfgang Köhler (1887–
tion. 1967). The Gestaltists applied their framework to
The father of the radical behaviorist movement many aspects of psychology, and especially to per-
was the American psychologist John Watson (1878– ception and complex problem solving. For example,
1958). Watson believed that psychology should fo- they suggested that insight problems, in which one
cus only on observable behavior. Watson worked is blocked from any kind of solution until one has
primarily with rats in his research, although he be- an “ah-ha” experience, could be understood in terms
came famous, or infamous, for an experiment in of a holistic restructuring of a problem to reach a
which he conditioned a young child, “Little Albert,” solution. An example would be the nine-dot prob-
to fear a white rat, a fear that later generalized to lem, in which one has to connect nine dots, arranged
other animals, such as a white rabbit (Watson & in three rows of three, in four straight lines without
Rayner, 1920). A successor to Watson, Clark Hull taking one’s pencil off the paper. The “insight” for
(1884–1952), believed that it would be possible to solving the problem is that one has to go outside the
synthesize the work of theorists like Watson and implicit periphery of the nine dots in order to solve
Guthrie with the work of Pavlov on involuntary con- the problem.
ditioning. He constructed elaborate mathematical
models to achieve such a synthesis. 2.11 Cognitivism
A famous successor to Hull was B. F. Skinner
(1904–1990), also a radical behaviorist. Skinner The main current paradigm for understanding the
believed that all behavior could be understood by psychology of human thought is cognitivism, which
organisms emitting responses to environmental con- is the belief that much of human behavior is com-
tingencies. Skinner applied his ideas about behavior- prehensible in terms of how people represent and
ism to many different kinds of behavior, at first learn- process information. Cognitivists seek to understand
ing, but then also language and problem solving. His elementary information processes and how they are
views may have had some success in accounting for represented in the mind.
simple learning but did less well in accounting for Early cognitivists, such as Miller, Galanter, and
complex behavior. Pribram (1960), argued that both behaviorist and
Skinner also proposed that it would be possible Gestalt accounts of higher processes are inadequate.
to construct a Utopian society based on his ideas Instead, they suggested that psychologists need to

Sternberg History
understand cognitive processes. The unit they pro- which hypotheses are formulated and compared with
posed was the TOTE (Test-Operate-Test-Exit). The data in the environment until one of the hypotheses
idea behind this unit is that when we need to solve produces a match to the data. In a later book, Cog-
a problem, we first need to test the difference be- nition and Reality Neisser (1976) emphasized the
tween where we are and where we need to be to importance of studying complex human behavior in
reach a solution. We then operate to reduce the dif- its natural contexts. Today, cognitivism thrives, but
ference between our current state and the solution other schools of thought are complementing it. For
state. Then we test to see if we are done. If not, we example, more and more cognitive psychologists are
operate again. And we keep going until we reach a seeking to understand not only the cognitive bases of
solution to the problem, at which point we exit. complex behavior, but also its neuropsychological
Two other pioneers in the study of human thought underpinnings.
were Newell and Simon (1972), whose book Hu-
man Problem Solving showed how a relatively small Acknowledgement
set of elementary information processes could be
used to solve problems of a wide variety of kinds. Parts of this chapter draw on ideas about the his-
Neisser (1967), in his book Cognitive Psychology, tory of the field earlier presented in Chapter 2 of
suggested a process called analysis-by-synthesis, in Sternberg and Ben Zeev (2001).
Summary
The history of the study of human thought can be understood in terms of a dialectical progression
of ideas. Many of these ideas originated with the Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, who,
respectively, believed in the importance of rationalist and empirical methods for understanding
human thought. Plato’s ideas formed the basis for mind-body dualism.
During the Middle Ages, ideas about human thought were seen as deriving from what individuals
thought they knew about their relation to God. In the Renaissance, the scientific method began to
gain ascendancy.
The rationalist and empiricist schools of thought gained exponents in philosophers René Descartes
and John Locke, respectively. Immanuel Kant synthesized many of their ideas, showing that the
methods of both rationalism and empiricism could be important in acquiring new knowledge.
In the early modern era, structuralism argued for the importance of decomposing sensations into
their most elementary constituents. Functionalism, in contrast, emphasized the “why” of behavior
rather than its constituents. An offshoot of functionalism, pragmatism, suggested we look for how
knowledge could be used. Associationism argued for the importance of connections between ideas;
behaviorism, especially in its radical form, suggested that only observable behavior should be
studied by psychologists. Behaviorists were particularly concerned with the role of environmental
rewards in behavior. Gestaltists suggested that behavior be studied as wholes, because the whole is
more than the sum of its part. Cognitivism, an important school even today, suggests the importance
of understanding the mental structures and processes underlying behavior.

Cognitivism Sternberg
Review Questions
1. How do rationalism and empiricism differ?

2. What is a dialectic?
3. What is mind-body dualism?
4. What were some of the limitations of the associationistic way of understanding human thought?
5. What advantages did cognitivism have over behaviorism as a way of understanding human
thought?
Hot Topic
The dialectic plays a role not only across investigators over time but also
within a single investigator over time (Sternberg, 2014, 2015). It is important
for researchers to look not only at how research has evolved over historical
time but also how the researcher’s research program has evolved over the
course of a career. If the researcher finds no evolution, then he or she perhaps
has not been as creative as he or she could have been.
In my own research, I originally proposed an information-processing “al-
ternative” to psychometric approaches to intelligence. At the time, the late
1970s, I saw an approach emphasizing information-processing components
as replacing structural psychometric factors. But I later synthesized what had
been a thesis and antithesis. Components and factors were compatible, with
Robert J. Sternberg factors obtained through analysis of variation between people and components
obtained through analysis of variation across stimuli. In other words, both
components and factors were valid, but as different partitions of variation in a psychological study.
Later this synthesis became a new thesis, as I argued that the approach I had used was too narrow and
failed to take into account creative and practical aspects of intelligence, which complemented the
analytical aspects dealt with in psychometric and cognitive approaches. I thought that I now had “the
answer.” But then I came to view the answer as incomplete, because I realized what mattered more
than one’s particular cognitive or other skills was how one utilized these skills. So I came to argue
that “successful intelligence” is the construction of a life path that makes sense in terms of one’s own
goals and initiatives, by capitalizing on one’s strengths and compensating for or correcting one’s
weaknesses. But later, I came to see even this view as incomplete, because it neglected wisdom, or
using one’s knowledge and skills to help achieve a common good. And in today’s world, I came to
believe, what most is missing is not IQ points—there are lots of smart people, including so many
people in universities—but rather the use of those “smarts” to help others and the world, not just
oneself and one’s loved ones.
In sum, the concept of a dialectic applies not only between but also within researchers. People
need to realize and appreciate how their own ideas evolve and how, through the course of a career,
one becomes not just older, but hopefully, in one’s research and life, wiser.

Sternberg History
References
Sternberg, R. J. (2014). I study what I stink at: Lessons learned from a career in psychology. Annual Review of
Psychology, 65(1), 1–16. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-052913-074851
Sternberg, R. J. (2015). Still searching for the Zipperumpazoo: A reflection after 40 years. Child Development
Perspectives, 9(2), 106–110. doi:10.1111/cdep.12113
References
Bruner, J. S., Goodnow, Jacqueline J., and Austin, G. Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality: Principles and
A. (1956). A study of thinking. New York: Wiley. implications of cognitive psychology. New York: W.
doi:10.2307/1292061 H. Freeman.
Dewey, J. (1910). How we think. Boston: D. C. Heath. Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem
doi:10.1037/10903-000 solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Frensch, P. A., & Funke, J. (Eds.) (1995). Com- Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive representations of seman-
plex problem solving. The European perspective. tic categories. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ 1995. ogy: General, 104(3), 192–233. doi:10.1037//0096-
doi:10.4324/9781315806723 3445.104.3.192
Hegel, G. W. F. (1931). The phenomenology of Sternberg, R. J., & Ben-Zeev, T. (2001). Complex cog-
mind (2nd ed.; J. B. Baille, Trans.). London: nition: The psychology of human thought. New
Allen & Unwin. (Original work published 1807). York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1016/S0160-
doi:10.1192/bjp.78.320.221 2896(03)00026-6
James, W. (1983). Principles of psychology (Vol. 1). Cam- Sternberg, R. J., Forsythe, G. B., Hedlund, J., Horvath,
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work J., Snook, S., Williams, W. M., Wagner, R. K., &
published 1890.) Grigorenko, E. L. (2000). Practical intelligence in ev-
Miller, G. A., Galanter, E. H., & Pribram, K. H. (1960). eryday life. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Plans and the structure of behavior. New York: Holt, Watson, J. R., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emo-
Rinehart, & Winston. doi:10.1037/10039-000 tional reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New 3(1), 1–14. doi:10.1037/h0069608
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. doi:10.4324/
9781315736174

Glossary Sternberg
Glossary
associationism Concerns how ideas and events be- the question of why people behave the way
come associated with one another in the mind. they do–how do events in a person’s life lead
20 the person to behave in certain ways but not
others?. 19
behaviorism The view that psychology should
deal only with observable behavior. It is in a Gestalt psychology Sought to understand behav-
sense an extreme form of associationism. 21 ior in terms of organized, structured wholes;
that is, instead of breaking down behavior and
cognitivism The belief that much of human behav- its underlying cognition into constituent parts,
ior is comprehensible in terms of how people Gestalt psychology sought to understand be-
represent and process information. 21 havior holistically. 21
dialectic The idea that people think in one way
for a while, a thesis; then they move on to a mind-body dualism The notion that whereas the
contrasting and seemingly contradictory way body is composed of physical substance, the
of seeing things, an antithesis; finally, they mind is not. 16
move on to an integrated view, a synthesis,
whereby two ideas that had seemed contradic- pragmatism An outgrowth of functionalism, holds
tory no longer seem that way, but rather seem that knowledge is validated by its usefulness.
as though they can be integrated and under- 20
stood as both being true, perhaps at different
levels. 16
rationalist Believing that introspection and related
philosophical methods of analysis could and
empiricist Believing that the nature of human
should be used to arrive at truth. 17
thought could be best understood through ob-
servation and experimentation. 17 reductionism A view that reduces the role of the
mind to the status of the physical and chemi-
fallacy of confirmation bias We seek out infor- cal processing occurring in the body. 18
mation that is consistent with what we believe
and ignore or reject information that is not
structuralism A school of thought in psychology
consistent with our beliefs. 17
that seeks to understand psychological phe-
functionalism Looks at the functional relation- nomena in terms of their simplest mental el-
ships between specific earlier stimuli and sub- ements and the ways in which these mental
sequent responses; in other words, it asked elements combine. 18

Chapter 3
Methods for Studying Human Thought

A RNDT B RÖDER
University of Mannheim
3.1 Introduction tive psychologists have developed for discovering

insights into thinking. Most methods will be illus-
As the other chapters of this book will reveal, the trated by one or two selected examples, but it should
psychology of thinking is a fascinating research field be kept in mind that the range of possible appli-
which has discovered a lot of surprising insights into cations is much broader. There is no recipe as to
this faculty of the human mind. Overcoming the how to do research on thinking, so psychologists
problems associated with investigating something can still be creative in developing new methods and
“invisible” such as thoughts is an interesting philo- in freshly combining old ones. This methodolog-
sophical problem and a research topic in itself. This ical challenge is one further aspect which makes
chapter will start with the methodological founda- research in cognitive science so intriguing.
tion of cognitive psychology and the question as to
why scientists do not just rely on people’s reports Readers who want to recapitulate a few basics
about their thoughts as data. Then, I will provide on the methods of psychology may want to consult
an overview of the toolbox of methods that cogni- Textbox 3.1 first.
Textbox 3.1: A brief primer of basic methods in empirical psychology

Psychological laws or hypotheses typically claim that one independent variable (IV) has some
influence on another variable called the dependent variable (DV). For example, it may be claimed
that the more “deeply” information is processed, the better it will be remembered later (Craik &
Lockhart, 1972). Here, the depth of processing is the IV, whereas memory performance is the DV.
Theoretical psychological variables are themselves unobservable, but they may be operationalized
by translating them into observable variables which are thought to represent the theoretical ones.
For example, a shallow processing of information could entail counting the letters of written words,
whereas deep processing is based on analyzing the meaning of the words. Likewise, memory
performance may be measured by tallying the words someone can recall in a later test. If the
hypothesis (or law) is true and the operationalization is adequate, both variables must show a
covariation. Empirical tests of psychological hypotheses therefore assess whether such a predicted
correlation exists. In a correlation study, researchers measure or observe both variables of interest
and assess their covariation. However, the correlation in such a study does not allow the conclusion
that the IV variation caused the DV change since they might both be influenced by a third variable.

Bröder Methods
For example, the motivation of a participant might influence both the learning strategy and the
memory performance without a direct causal link between these variables. To test causal hypotheses,
scientists try to run experiments whenever possible. Here, they can actively manipulate the IV (for
example by instructing participants either to count letters or to find a meaningful associate to words).
If participants are randomly assigned to the different experimental conditions (so that there are no
systematic differences between them), an observed change in the DV has probably been caused by
the variation in the IV. Experiments are therefore stricter tests of causal hypotheses than correlation
studies.
3.2 A Natural Science of the Mind? This state of affairs was unfortunate because in
his groundbreaking experimental investigations of
human memory, the German psychologist Hermann
How can thoughts be studied scientifically? When Ebbinghaus (1850–1909) had already shown how
reflecting on the natural sciences, we imagine re- higher cognitive processes can be studied objectively
searchers investigating things that can be observed without using subjective verbal reports as data. In
or even measured in objective and precise ways. principle, the methodological idea behind modern
Thoughts, however, come as beliefs, imaginations, cognitive psychology foreshadowed by Ebbinghaus
intentions, logical inferences, fantasies, insights, (1885) is simple: although cognitive processes like
daydreaming, or plans, to name only a few of the thoughts or memory traces are by themselves unob-
many concepts associated with thinking. These im- servable, they may lead to observable consequences
material “things” do not have a weight or size or in behavior which can be objectively noticed and de-
electric charge that can be measured with physical scribed by different independent observers. Hence,
instruments1 . Furthermore, these thoughts are unob- hypotheses about these hidden or latent processes
servable for outsiders and hence, they seem to evade can be tested by setting up experiments and obser-
an objective description. vations that target these predicted consequences of
Since they considered verbal reports based on so- behavior as objective data. To use an example from
called introspection (self-observation) as unreliable memory research as founded by Ebbinghaus (1885),
sources of data, philosophers and even the founder we may postulate that during the learning of new
of Experimental Psychology, Wilhelm Wundt (1832- materials, these leave a hypothetical “trace” in mem-
1920, see Figure 3.1), were convinced that higher ory which may vary in strength. This trace itself is
cognitive processes like memory and thinking could unobservable, but one can show that it is “there”,
not be studied with the methods of the natural sci- for example, when people are able to reproduce the
ences. Beginning with John B. Watson’s (1913) material in a later memory test or even show faster
“behaviorist manifesto”, all internal psychological responses to these stimuli in comparison to control
processes including thoughts were abandoned from stimuli they had not learned before. The test results
scientific psychology for a few decades because ver- (amount of recall or speed of reaction) are indica-
bal data were considered as subjective and thus not tors of the memory strength, and they can serve as
suited for scientific research (see Chapter 2, “History objective data for testing hypotheses about it. In the
of the Field of the Psychology of Human Thought”). study of thinking, for example, the number of solved
1 Most psychologists including myself believe for good reasons that all thoughts have a material basis since they strictly depend on
processes in the brain. However, a belief or an insight, for example, have a psychological surplus dimension (a meaning) that cannot
hitherto be reduced to electrical and chemical processes in the brain (some say it never will). The psychology of thinking benefits a
lot from knowledge about the brain (see section 4.2.6), but it deals with the semantics (meaning) of thoughts in human behavior
which is exactly this surplus dimension on top of the physical processes.

Why not just Ask People about their Thoughts? Bröder
test items may be an indicator of a certain facet of chologists today (see Massen & Bredenkamp, 2005;
intelligence (see Chapter 14, “Intelligence”), or the Russo, E. J. Johnson & Stephens, 1989):
response to a logical puzzle may indicate whether
1. Instrospection is prone to memory errors,
someone followed the laws of logic or rather an
intuitive sense of credibility of the conclusion’s con- 2. many thoughts cannot easily be verbalized
tent (see Chapter 7, “Deductive Reasoning”, belief (since they are based on images, for exam-
bias).2 ple),
Hence, as in other natural sciences, psychologists
can test hypotheses about unobservable variables 3. some thoughts may even be unconscious (and
by objectively observing or measuring their behav- hence, not detectable by introspection),
ioral consequences. As the American psychologist 4. the observation of thoughts may lead to re-
Edward C. Tolman (1886-1959) argued, this kind activity, meaning that the act of observing
of research strategy (later called methodological changes the thinking process itself, and fi-
behaviorism) allows both (1) to use unobservable nally,
theoretical concepts in a scientific manner and (2) to
do so without recourse to questionable introspective 5. the verbalized observations are subjective,
data. Basically, this view is still the methodological meaning that they cannot be scrutinized by
basis of modern cognitive psychology. independent observers (as is the case in other
natural sciences).
With respect to reactivity, Wundt (1908) even
3.3 Why not just Ask People about doubted that it is logically possible to split one’s con-
their Thoughts? sciousness into two independent parts, the thinker
and the observer. And with respect to subjectiv-
Reading this introduction, you may wonder why psy- ity, Watson (1913) bemoaned that, “There is no
chologists do things in such a complicated way. Why longer any guarantee that we all mean the same thing
don’t we just ask the people about their thoughts to when we use the terms now current in psychology”
investigate thinking? They know best, don’t they? (p. 163 f.).
In fact, one of the first heated methodological In an attempt to vindicate verbal reports, a method
debates in the then young science of Experimental less prone to memory error and reactivity called the
Psychology was between Wilhelm Wundt (1907; thinking-aloud method was later championed by
1908) and Karl Bühler (1908) about the value of in- Ericsson and Simon (1993). Here, test persons are
trospection as a means of investigating thinking. In- encouraged to verbalize everything that comes to
trospection literally means “viewing inside” and was mind in the thinking process without the instruction
used, for example, by psychologists of the Würzburg to explicitly “observe” their thoughts. These verbal
School of Psychology to gain insights into thought protocols are later analyzed qualitatively, and Erics-
processes. Confronted with a thinking problem, the son and Moxley (2019) provide extensive practical
test person was asked to observe her own thinking information on how to set up studies and how to
processes and later report them to the researcher. analyze protocol data. However, this method does
In rare agreement, both Wundt (1907; 1908) and not solve problems 2, 3, and 5 of the above list, and
the founder of behaviorism, John B. Watson (1913), even reactivity has been demonstrated in some stud-
criticized the “interrogation method” as unscientific ies (Russo et al., 1989; Schooler, Ohlsson & Brooks,
for the following reasons, still accepted by most psy- 1993).
2 This “indirect” measurement of theoretical variables is not unique to psychology, but also commonly used in other natural sciences,
for example physics, where the mass of a particle may be inferred from its movement in a magnetic field, or the speed of distant
stars by a shift of their spectral lines.

Bröder Methods
Figure 3.1: Three important methodological forethinkers of experimental cognitive psychology.
In light of the arguments above, are verbal data or duration of a problem solution. The second and
therefore worthless for investigating thought pro- longest section will illustrate several methods that
cesses? This conclusion would be too harsh, espe- claim to more closely mirror the processes taking
cially with respect to thinking-aloud data. These and place during thinking. Finally, we will add very
also classical introspective reports may be worth- brief sections about computer simulations and neu-
while in helping researchers to generate hypotheses roscientific methods in thinking research.
about cognitive processes. In order to test these hy-
potheses empirically, however, one has to rely on
3.4.1 Outcome-based Methods
objective data.
Observable behaviors like finding a problem solu-
tion, choosing an option or accepting a logical con-
3.4 Objective Methods for Investigating clusion are the results of thought processes, but can
Thought Processes they reveal information about the unobservable pro-
cesses themselves? For example, large parts of re-
Psychologists have been quite creative in develop- search on creative problem solving (see Chapter 9,
ing empirical methods for testing hypotheses about “Problem Solving”) are based on a simple dependent
thought processes. The following section describes variable, namely the percentage of participants who
various methods. As we will see, although the meth- solved a problem, typically a hard-to-solve riddle.
ods can sometimes be subsumed under joint cate- Whether this reveals insights into the processes in-
gories like, for example “response time analysis” volved depends on how you set up your study to
(Section 4.2.1), the applications vary considerably test hypotheses. If you vary an independent vari-
depending on the specific task, theory, or hypothesis able which is believed to change certain thinking
under scrutiny. processes that either facilitate or impede successful
We will start with the simple idea that we can problem solving, differences in solving rates be-
test hypotheses about thoughts by simply looking tween conditions in your experiment speak directly
at the outcomes of the process, such as the quality to your hypothesis at test. Next to simple solution

Outcome-based Methods Bröder
Figure 3.2: (a) Example of a matchstick puzzle - you are allowed to move only one matchstick to achieve a valid equation with Roman
numerals, (b) The nine-dot problem: connect all dots with four straight lines without lifting the pen, (c) The ten-coins
problem: turn the triangle upside down by moving only 3 coins.
rates and choices, more sophisticated methods uti- success rates as the main dependent variable, nu-
lizing behavioral outcomes allow conclusions about merous facilitating and impeding factors for creative
underlying processes by designing diagnostic tasks problem solving have been identified (e.g. Bassok &
or even by the model-based disentangling of the pro- Novick, 2012; Funke, 2003; see Chapter 9, “Prob-
cesses involved. We will illustrate the three methods lem Solving”). In a similar vein, large parts of rea-
in turn with selected examples. soning research have used solution rates of logical
arguments to investigate the factors which make log-
Simple Solution Rates. This issue has been con- ical problems easy or difficult (e.g. Johnson-Laird
troversial since Maier’s (1931) anecdotal observa- & Byrne, 1991) or to compare the cognitive abilities
tion that unconscious “hints” can foster a problem of different people.
solution. In more recent studies using matchstick
puzzles (Knoblich & Wartenberg, 1998) or the noto- Diagnostic task selection. Another example of
rious “nine-dots” and “ten-coins” problems (Hattori, how pure outcome measures may reveal information
Sloman & Orita, 2013; see Figure 3.2), researchers about latent processes uses the logic of diagnostic
presented hints to the solution so briefly that they tasks, meaning that you choose tasks in a way that
were not consciously registered by the participants. different processes or strategies predict different so-
Still, in Hattori et al.’s study, solution rates for the lutions or choices for a set of problems. You can
nine-dots and ten-coins problems were tripled and then compare a subject’s pattern of actual choices
increased fivefold, respectively, as compared to a across these tasks with the predictions of the hypo-
control condition without these brief hints. On the thetical strategies you are interested in. The strategy
premise that the hints were truly unconscious,3 the with predictions most “similar” to your actual data
outcome data therefore reveal a lot about the nature is presumably the one the participant used. There
of problem solving processes. By simply registering are different formal ways of assessing this similarity
3 Whether this is the case with “subliminal” priming is still a matter of debate. I assume it to be true for the illustrative purpose of the
example.

Bröder Methods
between predictions and data, and conclusions are provide information on detailed process hypotheses,
subject to statistical error, but we will not deal with given that these hypotheses make sufficiently differ-
these complications here. As a general conclusion, ent predictions for a set of tasks. An example of this
it can be stated that pure outcome data may well research strategy is given in Textbox 3.2.4
Textbox 3.2: Which strategies do people use in memory-based infer-

ences?
Bröder and Schiffer (2003) were interested in which strategies people use when they have to make
decisions from memory. In their task, particpants had to compare different suspects in a hypothetical
murder case and choose the one most likely to be the perpetrator. At the beginning of the experiment,
participants had learned facts about the 10 suspects by heart (e.g., their blood type, their preferred
cigarette and perfume brands, their vehicle). Later, they had received information about the evidence
found at the crime scene. Based on the literature on decision strategies, the authors had identified 4
plausible strategies: the heuristic named Take-the-best (TTB; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) will
look up the most important piece of evidence and base its decision on this evidence if it discriminates,
otherwise, it will use the next most important evidence and so on. A weighted additive rule (WADD),
in contrast, will look up all information and weigh it according to its importance. A tallying rule
(TALLY) will compare the suspects simply on the number of matching pieces of evidence. Finally,
participants might simply guess. The table shows three different task types, with the importance of
the evidence decreasing from top to bottom:
Item type 1 Item type 2 Item type 3

Critical evidence Suspect 1 Suspect 2 Suspect 3 Suspect 4 Suspect 5 Suspect 6
Blood type match - match match match -
Cigarette - match match - match match
Perfume - match match - - match
Vehicle - match - match - -
Across the three item types, TTB would predict the choices of Suspect 1, Suspect 3, and Suspect 5,
whereas a partcipant using WADD would choose Suspects 2, 3, and 5. Someone relying on a pure
tallying strategy would select Suspects 2 and 3, but be indifferent (guess with equal probability)
between Suspect 5 and 6. Finally, pure guessers would select all suspects in equal proportions. Based
on a few assumptions (see Bröder, 2010, for details), the probability of an empirical data pattern
can be assessed for each hypothetical strategy, and the strategy with the highest probability of the
observed data is diagnosed as the participant’s strategy. Bröder and Schiffer (2003, Experiment 1)
found a surprisingly high percentage (64%) of participants presumably using a simple TTB heuristic,
and a later analysis of response times by Bröder and Gaissmaier (2007) fitted well with this
interpretation (see Textbox 3.3).
4 The more the predictions of various strategies differ, the firmer your conclusion about underlying strategies. A method for
maximizing the diagnosticity of tasks is described in Jekel, Fiedler, and Glöckner (2011).

Process-oriented Methods Bröder
Model-based measurement of processes. Finally, Such measurement models have been developed
detailed information about cognitive processes can for various tasks in cognitive psychology, including
be achieved by measurement models that formal- memory, perception, decision making, and logical
ize assumptions as to how latent processes inter- thinking (see Batchelder & Riefer, 1999, and Erd-
act to produce the behavioral outcomes. The pro- felder et al., 2009; for comprehensive overviews).
cesses are represented as parameters in a set of If a measurement model has been validated in thor-
equations, and the values of these parameters are ough experimental tests, it allows the drawing of
estimated from the observed data. This sounds very detailed conclusions about the underlying pro-
quite abstract, so we provide an example depicted cesses of observed behavior.
in Figure 3.3. This model formulated by Klauer, Evaluation: As we have seen, focusing on the out-
Musch, and Naumer (2000) was developed to in- comes of thought processes as objective data may
vestigate belief bias in syllogistic reasoning (see yield much more evidence about the underlying pro-
Chapter 7, “Deductive Reasoning”). Belief bias de- cesses than is evident at first glance. In the case
scribes the phenomenon that people tend to accept of simple success rates as a dependent variable, an
plausible conclusions more readily than implausi- obvious advantage is that these are objectively mea-
ble ones, irrespective of the logical validity of the surable and do not require complex assumptions
argument. For example, the syllogism “All vege- about their validity as measures. Diagnostic task
tarians are peaceable. X is a vegetarian. Therefe- selection and model-based disentanglement of pro-
ore, X is peaceable” is a logically valid argument cesses need more assumptions (which should ideally
since the conclusion follows from the two premises. be validated in systematic studies), but this comes
However, if “X” is replaced by “Mahatma Gandhi”, with the payoff of sometimes quite detailed infor-
people are more ready to accept the argument as mation about the underlying processes. As we will
valid than if X is replaced with “Adolf Hitler”.5 see in the next section, additional process measures
Klauer et al. (2000) formulated a processing tree can often enrich the data by adding valuable infor-
model depicted in Figure 3.3 which decomposes par- mation.
ticipants judgments (“valid” vs “invalid”) of four
different types of syllogisms (valid and invalid ar-
guments with plausible vs. implausible conclusion
3.4.2 Process-oriented Methods
statements) into logical processes and biased guess- As Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al. (2017, p. 446)
ing. Logical processes are represented by the r pa- have argued, “process models deserve process data”.
rameters, and guessing based on plausibility by the Since cognitive theories try to describe the processes
a parameters. Given certain assumptions and experi- that go on in our minds while thinking, it would be
mental procedures, the parameters can be estimated worthwhile eliciting data which more directly re-
from the data, and they allow for diagnosing whether flect these processes instead of just focusing on their
experimentally manipulated variables like time pres- results. Also, pure outcome data are often not di-
sure, working memory load, the percentage of valid agnostic enough to differentiate between different
syllogisms in the task etc. affect logical abilities theoretical models which may make the same predic-
(reflected in r) or rather the readiness to accept con- tions for many tasks (see, for example, item type 2
clusions irrespective of the logical validity (reflected in Textbox 3.2, for which both TTB and WADD
in a). predict the same choice).6 Although there is no con-
5 Both historical persons were vegetarians. Hence, there is obviously something wrong with the first premise, but the conclusion has
to follow from the premises if they were true.
6 Some authors enthusiastic about process data evoke the impression that process data would be necessary to test process models in a
sensible manner. As the preceding section 4.1 has shown, this is not the case, and I have argued elsewhere that outcome data are
sufficient if they are diagnostic and formally linked to the process models under scrutiny (Bröder, 2000). I admit, however, that
process data often increase the diagnosticity of the data and are therefore quite useful for research.

Bröder Methods
Figure 3.3: Multinomial processing tree model by Klauer et al. (2000) to assess logical reasoning and biased guessing in syllogisms.
Each tree depicts processes for all the combinations of invalid vs. valid syllogisms with believable vs. unbelievable
conclusions. Parameters r reflect reasoning, parameters a reflect biased guessing. ©American Psychological Association.
Reprinted with permission.
sensus, yet, as to what a cognitive process actually is realm of measurable natural science. He invented
(see Newen, 2017), a defining feature of any kind of what later became known as the subtraction method:
process is that it evolves over time. Hence, we will for example, using the regular oscillations of a tun-
start with this most general property of cognitive ing fork, he measured the simple reaction time of
processes, reflected in response time data. his colleague repeating a syllable like “ki” when the
hearer knew in advance which syllable he would
hear. In a second set of trials, the test person did
3.4.2.1 Response Time Analysis not know in advance whether he had to repeat “ki”,
“ku”, “ke”, or “ko”. Repeating the stimulus without
Response times are a major workhorse of cogni-
knowledge took on average 46 ms (milliseconds)
tive psychology. They are useful for estimating the
longer. Donders concluded that the difference was
duration of component processes, or they can be
just the time needed to choose between the potential
analyzed as data to estimate cognitive parameters in
responses which was the only additional cognitive
decision models. Finally, they can be used to test
process needed in the second task. Shortly after
cognitive theories.
this revolutionary invention, reaction time measure-
Measuring the duration of cognitive processes.
ment for the analysis of simple processes became a
The first scientist to measure the duration of a simple
fashionable method in the newly established psycho-
cognitive process was presumably Frans C. Donders
logical laboratories which also triggered technical
(1868) at the University of Utrecht in the Nether-
developments for precise time measurement like
lands. We may smile today at his experimental
Hipp’s chronoscope (see Figure 3.4). Although the
setup, but in fact, this was a scientifc revolution
subtraction method is preferably applied to percep-
because it pulled the actions of the mind into the

Figure 3.4: An early experimental setup (c. 1900) for the precise measurement of verbal reaction times. The memory apparatus on the
left displays a stimulus and starts the chronoscope (middle), the verbal reaction is recorded by the voicekey on the right
which closes a circuit and stops the chronoscope (taken from Schulze, 1909).
tual tasks, there have been fruitful applications to larly in research on decision making, various models
processes of language understanding as well (Clark have been developed that assume a process of evi-
& Chase, 1972; 1974), showing that processes of dence accumulation before a decision is made. For
sentence transformation and encoding a negation example, if I want to decide which of two bicycles
need certain amounts of time. Hence, the logic of to buy, I might sample evidence in favor or disfavor
the subtraction method in general is to contrast vari- of each alternative (such as price, color, number of
ants of speeded tasks that include or exclude specific gears, weight etc.) until a certain subjective thresh-
component processes (such as negating a statement) old of confidence favoring one option over the other
and to generate a set of additive equations in order to is reached. Decision situations like these might be
estimate the durations of the component processes explained by accumulation models, like the drift
by simple difference calculations. diffusion model (DDF, Ratcliff, 1978) for simple
perceptual and recognition decisions or the decision
A severe limitation of the method is obviously to
field theory DFT, (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993)
find tasks which can be designed to differ in only
for more complex decisions (which would apply to
one process. To relax this requirement, S. Sternberg
the bicycle example). Figure 3.5 depicts the DDF,
(1969) proposed the widely used additive factors
but the general idea is similar in other models as
method which can do without this specific task con-
well. Donkin and Brown (2018) discuss variants of
struction and merely requires a decomposition of a
accumulation models, their similarities, and their
task into processing stages that can be selectively
differences.
influenced by experimental factors.
Estimating parameters in cognitive models with These models were initially developed to explain
reaction times. Sometimes, the researcher is not the speed-accuracy tradeoff : in many tasks, peo-
interested in the duration of processes per se, but re- ple can sacrifice accuracy for higher speed, or they
action times are used as indicators for other aspects are slower and more accurate which depends both
of cognition, such as ability or motivation. Particu- on their ability and their motivation to be accurate.

Bröder Methods
Figure 3.5: The drift diffusion model. When a stimulus with moving dots is presented, the person starts to sample perceptual evidence
for the options “right” vs. “left” until a subjective evidence threshold is met. The drift rate v, and the distance of thresholds
a, and the starting point z both determine the accuracy and the duration of the process.
Hence, only looking at error (or solution) rates or reflected in the starting point of the sampling process
response times tells only half of the story. Suppose (an unbiased starting point is z = a/2, halfway be-
you have to decide in a perceptual task whether the tween the boundaries). Although the mathematical
majority of dots in a display with many randomly concepts are quite complicated, various computer
moving dots is moving to the right or to the left. Ac- programs exist to estimate the parameters v, a, and
cording to the DDF, you start sampling perceptual z from empirical response time distributions asso-
evidence which, from time to time, may speak for ciated with correct answers and errors. It has been
one or the other direction, but on average, it will shown in validation studies for various tasks that the
favor one of the decision options and approach the parameters v, z, and a indeed primarily reflect task
respective subjective threshold. The average speed ease (or ability), bias, and motivation to be accurate,
of this accumulation process approaching one side respectively (Arnold, Bröder, & Bayen, 2015; Voss,
is called the drift rate v, and it reflects the ease of Rothermund, & Voss, 2004). The model has been
the task (if you compare tasks) or the ability of the successfully applied to various domains of cognitive
decision maker (if you compare people). The accu- research (Ratcliff & Smith, 2015).
racy and the overall duration of the sampling process Testing and validating cognitive models which
both depend on the distance a between the two sub- make response time predictions. Finally, response
jective thresholds which is under the control of the time data are critical whenever a cognitive model ex-
participant who establishes a compromise between plicitly or implicitly predicts certain response time
desired accuracy and speed. Furthermore, there may patterns. The feature comparison model of cate-
be a bias z favoring one of the answers (e.g. a ten- gorization by Smith, Shoben, and Rips (1974) is
dency to respond “right” in the moving dots task), a prominent example (see Figure 3.6). The model

Figure 3.6: A simplified representation of the feature comparison model of categorization by Smith et al. (1974). If the object is
sufficiently similar or dissimilar to the category, Stage 1 suffices for a decision. Medium similarity, however, invokes Stage
2 and hence, requires more time.
assumes that in order to categorize a stimulus, its roborating the feature comparison model (Rips et
various features are compared with the typical or al., 1973).7 A second example of how response time
characteristic features of the category. Hence, in data have been used to validate cognitive models is
deciding whether a robin is a bird, you may quickly described in Textbox 3.3.
find the answer because the characteristic features Evaluation: A precise cognitive theory or model
of birds in general and a robin in particular show a should ideally make predictions about the (relative)
large overlap (can fly, has feathers and a beak, lays duration of processes or tasks. Hence, as the above
eggs, builds nests). examples have shown, response times can yield valu-
However, when asked whether a penguin is a bird, able information to test theories. Some early ap-
the feature overlap is smaller (since penguins do proaches to measure process durations like Donders’
not fly and do not necessarily build nests), and the (1868) and S. Sternberg’s (1966; 1969) methods
model predicts that you focus on the defining fea- rely on strict seriality assumptions which are some-
tures in a second step (e.g. has feathers and a beak, times questioned and hard to justify since processes
lays eggs), excluding the merely typical (but not may operate in parallel (e.g. Ellis & Humphreys,
necessary) features. This second comparison pro- 1999). In addition, the subtraction method often
cess consumes additional time, and hence, positive makes unrealistic demands for task construction. As
instances of a category should be categorized faster the paradigm case of the DDM has shown, response
the more characteristic features they share with the times may also be a good indicator of ability, task
category (because this makes the second step un- ease, bias, and motivation if analyzed in the context
necessary). Negative instances, however, should be of a model (see Donkin & Brown, 2018). Currently,
correctly classified faster the fewer characteristics promising general approaches are being developed
they share with the concept (e.g. “a whale is a bird” that combine outcome-based measurement models
is denied quicker than “a bat is a bird”). These quite (see Section 4.1) with response time data (Heck and
complex predictions have been observed, thus cor- Erdfelder, 2016), and more general approaches try to
7 Corroborating a theory does not “verify” it. There may be even better theories that can explain the same data and make new
predictions beyond the corroborated model.

Bröder Methods
tackle the question as to whether processes operate simply a good indicator of task difficulty in addition
in parallel and whether they are self-terminating or to solution rates. Since they are easy to obtain in
exhaustive. Finally, for many applications in logical computerized experiments, this additional source of
reasoning and problem solving, response times are information should always be recorded.
Textbox 3.3: Validating outcome-based strategy classification with re-

sponse time data
In Textbox 3.2, we described how Bröder and Schiffer (2003) classified people as using the decision
strategies TTB, WADD, TALLY or GUESS based on the decision outcomes in a set of diagnostic
tasks. Bröder and Gaissmaier (2007) reasoned that if the classification really reflected the processes
assumed by the strategies, one should expect a specific response time pattern for each group classified
as using this strategy. Specifically, when people use TTB, they should need more time the more cues
they have to retrieve from memory. Remember that TTB searches cues in the order of decreasing
validity and stops search as soon as a discriminating cue is found. Hence, for TTB, we expect
increasing response times with the position of the most valid discriminating cue. Since WADD and
TALLY retrieve all four cues anyway, they should not show such an increase in response times, at
least a much smaller one. WADD should generally take more time than TALLY since it also weighs
the cue information with validity which TALLY does not require. Finally, GUESSing should be
quickest altogether not showing systematic variations with cue position. As Figure 3.7 shows, the
predictions were largely confirmed. Hence, the response time analysis lent additional credibility to
the classification procedure that was initially based on decision outcomes alone.
Figure 3.8: Results of the response time analysis by Bröder and Gaissmaier (2007). (See Text for details). ©Springer Nature.
Reprinted with permission.

3.4.2.2 Monitoring Solution Steps and helped to diagnose the general strategies people use
Information Search and where these heuristics may lead to impasses, for
example (Thomas, 1974).
With the rise of information processing models of Whereas this research strategy using sequential
thinking, problem solving research shifted to a type tasks with “observable steps” has proven fruitful, it
of sequential tasks that allowed the researcher to is very restricted in scope. A somewhat more gener-
monitor directly the intermediate steps participants ally applicable approach is to monitor the informa-
took to solve the problem. A famous example is the tion search prior to a problem solution or decision.
“Tower of Hanoi” problem in which three (or more) In this paradigm, decision-relevant information is
discs of different sizes are stacked on one of three hidden from the subject’s view and has to be ac-
pegs. The person’s task is to move the discs to the tively uncovered or asked for. We will illustrate both
third peg according to two rules: first, never put a a structured version in an information board and an
larger disc on top of a smaller one, and second, only unstructured open questioning paradigm.
move one disc at a time (see Chapter 9, “Problem Information search board. The first applications
Solving”, Figure 9.5). A second famous example is of this method actually used information cards hid-
the “hobbits-and-orcs” problem where a boat with den in envelopes and laid out on a table or pinned
only two seats can be used to transfer 3 hobbits and to a board (e.g. Payne, 1976). With the advent of
3 orcs across a river following the rule that there computerized experimenting, a so-called “Mouse-
must not be more orcs than hobbits on any side of Lab” version was first published by Payne et al.
the river at any time. Participants’ solution steps (1988) which presents information boxes on a screen
can be filmed, protocoled, or assessed by accompa- that can be uncovered by just clicking it with the
nying think-aloud protocols. These kinds of tasks computer mouse. This methodology is often used
Figure 3.7: Example of a hypothetical MouseLab layout similar to the one used in the study by Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al. (2013)
where participants could choose from two different meal options. All cells of the table were closed, and participants could
acquire information by clicking on the cells. They are opened here only for illustration.

Bröder Methods
to investigate multi-attribute decisions, and it has whether they find them important in the first place.
been developed in the meantime also for use in Web- Huber, Wider, and Huber (1997) therefore developed
based studies (e.g., Willemsen & Johnson, 2019). a technique with quasi-realistic decision scenarios.
Figure 3.8 shows a typical display from Schulte- After reading the scenarios (e.g. about the problem
Mecklenbeck et al. (2013) in which the decision op- of saving an endangered turtle species), participants
tions are arranged in columns, whereas the attributes could ask for any further information they wished,
are arranged in rows. In this study, the participant receiving answers from a large set of predefined in-
had to choose between meals offered in a virtual formation. This procedure has shown repeatedly that
canteen, each of which was described by the same participants tend to ignore probability information
set of attributes (price, calories, different nutrients). (Huber et al., 1997) and that they ask for informa-
You may be familiar with these kinds of matrices tion on how to eliminate risks (Huber, Bär & Huber,
from consumer reports, for example, in which sev- 2009).
eral products are compared on various attributes. In
an information board study, all information is ini- Evaluation: Observing the steps involved in think-
tially hidden, and the decision maker can uncover ing by monitoring corresponding behavior is one
information she desires (sometimes incurring some possibility to more “closely” follow thinking pro-
search costs) and finally make a decision. The infor- cesses. Monitoring stepwise problem solving is re-
mation may remain visible after clicking, or it may stricted to a very specific type of tasks, however.
disappear again if the cursor leaves the respective Another possibility is to register the information
box. The latter procedure more heavily taxes work- search processes prior to a decision or action, for
ing memory. As you can imagine, this procedure example via MouseLab. As we have seen, this can
yields a wealth of information about the search, such yield a wealth of data that may inform us about the
as the search sequence, the amount of information strategies people use. As a caveat, it should be noted
searched, and the time spent inspecting each piece that information search is not necessarily indicative
of information. Payne et al. (1988) have collected of how the information is integrated (see Bröder,
various measures derivable from these data that are 2000), both may be quite different processes gov-
believed to reflect aspects of the decision strategy erned by different rules (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008).
(see Textbox 3.4), in particular if decision making For example, one may look up all relevant informa-
tends to ignore information and focuses on compar- tion (seemingly indicating compensatory decision
ing options on important attributes (“noncompen- making), but decide to ignore most of it (leading to
satory” decision making) or whether the strategy noncompensatory integration). Or one can decide in
tends to use all information and compares overall a compensatory manner without exhaustive search
evaluations of the options (“compensatory” strate- (if the remaining information could not reverse a
gies). Willemsen and Johnson (2019) report new decision anyway). Researchers do not always dis-
developments to visualize aspects of the search pro- tinguish between search and integration, which may
cess in this paradigm. lead to misunderstandings in theory testing (Lohse
Unstructured open questioning formats. The in- & E. J. Johnson, 1996). Hence, to apply the method-
formation board technique described in the previous ology, it must be clear which part of cognition is un-
section contains pre-structured information which der scrutiny. Finally, the active information search
may create some experimental demands in suggest- paradigm by Huber et al. (1997) has the advantage
ing which kinds of information the experimenter of not suggesting experimental demands to the study
deems relevant. This allows the inferring of the rel- participants but it is a rather explorative method for
ative importance people put on attributes but not generating instead of testing cognitive theories.

Textbox 3.4: MouseLab Decision Strategy Indicators

Payne, Bettman, and E. J. Johnson (1988) and Payne (1976) derived various measures from the
search sequences and inspection times of information in MouseLab, for example the strategy
index SI (sometimes also called search index or PATTERN) which codes the relative amount
of option-wise search (i.e. moving within options to new attributes) versus attribute-wise search
(comparing different options on the same attribute). Option-wise search is thought to indicate
so-called compensatory strategies that use all information and compare overall evaluations of the
options (examples are WADD or TALLY in the previous textboxes), whereas attribute-wise search is
believed to reflect noncompensatory strategies that ignore information (such as TTB in the previous
textboxes). If no is the number of search transitions within an option to a different attribute and na
the number of transitions within an attribute to another option (transitions switching both option and
attribute are ignored), the search index can be computed as
no − na
SI = ,
no + na
and it varies from -1 to +1, reflecting pure attribute- and option-wise search respectively. Böckenholt
and Hynan (1994) proposed a modified version of the index for asymmetric options x attributes
tables as in Figure 3.8. The following table contains further measures and their interpretation.
Measure Definition higher values indicate...

Strategy Index SI see text compensatory
ACQ number of acquisitions in trial compensatory
TPERACQ time per acquisition compensatory
PTMI percentage of time spent inspecting most important attribute noncompensatory
VAR-ATTR variance of times spent on different attributes noncompensatory
VAR-ALTER variance of times spent on different options noncompensatory
3.4.2.3 Tracking of Eye Movements (see Ball, 2014, and Russo, 2019, for brief introduc-
tions). Eye-tracking has been used extensively in
A method which has gained popularity in recent
research on reading and language comprehension,
years involves the registration of eye movements
but it is also becoming increasingly popular in deci-
while thinking, based on the assumption that a per-
sion research and research on thinking (see Orquin &
son’s momentary attention and focus of process-
Loose, 2013). For example, by using an open infor-
ing is reflected by his or her fixation on a stimulus.
mation board, tracking the gaze sequence may yield
While early eye tracking devices were expensive
similar information as with a MouseLab procedure.
and intrusive by requiring people to have their head
fixated (for example by biting a board) or to wear The motor activity of the eyes is composed mainly
heavy helmets with cameras and contact lenses, new of saccades, which are quick movements during
(and cheaper) devices allow for the remote moni- which no information is registered, and fixations
toring of eye movements by use of infrared light which are brief resting periods during which the
reflected from the cornea, either in front of a com- viewer registers visual stimulus information (e.g.,
puter screen or even in more natural environments Holmqvist et al., 2011). Consequently, the sequence,

Bröder Methods
number, average duration and cumulative duration free detection of the stimulus a person is looking at
of fixations are of main interest to researchers. a specific moment.
For explorative (hypothesis-generating) research, Often, processing hypotheses can be formulated

several methods for visualizing the gaze behavior in a way that different problem aspects are expected
of participants exist. Heatmaps color-code the fre- to receive more attention than others which can be
quency of fixations to certain parts of the stimulus, tested by comparing the number or duration of fix-
and scanpaths contain additional information about ations at the respective AOIs. I will describe a re-
the sequence and the duration of the fixations (see search example from problem solving research. To
Figure 3.9 for examples of the same data presented test whether people acquire solution knowledge even
as a heatmap or a scanpath). These visualizations before they have a conscious insight into the cor-
are often used in applied research settings like us- rect solution, Ellis, Glaholt, and Reingold (2011)
ability and consumer research in order to optimize used anagram problems like the one depicted in
displays and ads. Figure 3.10 and monitored eye movements during
problem solution. The anagrams consisted of five
In hypothesis-testing research, the stimulus dis- letters, one of which was not part of the four-letter
play is typically arranged in a way that important solution word. Participants were instructed to press
parts are clearly separated into areas of interest a button as soon as they had found the solution word,
(AOI) that contain different aspects of the problem. and in Experiment 1b additionally stated whether the
For example, Figure 3.10 (left) shows a display with solution “popped up” in a sudden “aha” experience.
five letters, four of which build an anagram (= scram- Ellis et al. (2011) tested the hypothesis that partici-
bled word puzzle) with a four-letter solution, the pants would accumulate knowledge prior to finding
fifth letter being a superfluous distractor. The letters the solution even if the solution appeared suddenly
are widely distributed across the screen for an error- in their consciousness. This should be reflected in
Figure 3.9: Heatmap and scanpath representation of the same eye tracking data of a person in a decision trial. In this task, the options
(columns) were card players, and participants had to predict their success based on advice of experts (rows). In this trial,
the participant focuses on the two leftmost options in a predominantly option-wise manner. (Data from Ettlin & Bröder,
2015, Experiment 4).

decreasing attention to the distractor relative to the The latter requires experimental setups with theoret-
solution letters. In fact, there was a significant ten- ically defined AOIs for which gaze durations and
dency to ignore the distractor letter on average 2.5 s frequencies can be compared. Furthermore, impor-
before particpants announced they had found the tant extensions are under development such as the
solution, confirming the hypothesis of knowledge memory indexing method developed by Renkewitz
accumulation before conscious insight. and Jahn (2012). This ingenious idea is based on
the “looking-at-nothing” effect first investigated by
Evaluation: The tracking of eye movements has Richardson and Spivey (2000), demonstrating that
become cheaper, more user-friendly and less intru- during memory retrieval, people tend to look at the
sive in recent years. Holmqvist et al. (2011) give an location (on a computer screen, for instance) where
extensive overview of theory and application. As we they learned that information. Basically, this method
have seen, eye-tracking data can reveal a lot about therefore allows the monitoring of sequences of hid-
the sequence of processing and the allocation of den memory processes by analyzing gaze data! A
attention while thinking, and it can be used both study by Scholz, Krems, and Jahn (2017) on (hy-
in an explorative and a hypothesis-testing fashion.
Figure 3.10: Top left: Anagram setup of Ellis et al. (2011), one letter does not belong to the four-letter solution word. Top right: Areas
of interest (AOIs) from which fixations to the letters are recorded (not visible to participants). Bottom: Mean proportion
of time looked at solution letters and distractor prior to solution in Experiment 1b. ©Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.

Bröder Methods
pothetical) medical diagnoses not only replicated dle at the lower end of the screen (cf. Figure 3.11)
the looking-at-nothing effect but also showed that upon which the decision-critical information is pre-
the gaze behavior reflects the diagnosis currently sented (either immediately, after a delay, or follow-
most active in working memory, and it also allows ing an initial upwards movement; see Scherbaum
the prediction of participants’ final decisions. Also, & Kieslich, 2018, for a discussion about the dif-
new software methods allow to change displays con- ferent starting procedures and their consequences
tingent on gaze behavior “on the fly” (e.g. Franco- for mouse-tracking data). During the (sometimes
Watkins & J. G. Johnson, 2011), thus opening new speeded) response, the participant will then choose
possibilities for experiments. one option by clicking it while her mouse move-
There are a few downsides to the eye-tracking ments are continuously recorded. If the decision
method, however: first, the connection between vi- maker feels a conflict between both options, the
sual attention and gaze direction is not always as mouse path will probably not be totally straight, but
close as assumed since spatial attention can also be it will be “drawn” a bit to the competing alterna-
directed to locations without moving the eyes. Sec- tive. Several measures can be derived to quantify
ond, many other factors (like salience or reading rou- this deviation, the simplest is the “maximum abso-
tines) influence our gaze behavior, thus data are of- lute deviation (MAD)” of the curved trajectory from
ten quite noisy, and it is not always easy to separate the straight line leading to the chosen option. Fig-
meaningful data from the unsystematic variation. ure 3.11 shows a typical display investigating the
Third, depending on the quality of the equipment “Simon effect” along with visualized raw data as
used, often several participants have to be excluded well as average trajectories from data published by
(e.g. those wearing glasses or contact lenses). Fi- Scherbaum et al (2010).
nally, at the moment of writing, explorative rather Although it is quite new, the method has been ap-
than theory-testing applications seem to prevail in plied to a variety of domains, such as categorization
the literature which may of course change in the tasks (animals, gender, race), spoken word recog-
future. nition, risky decision making, word and sentence
comprehension, truth judgments, social cognition
and more (see Freeman et al., 2011; Freeman, 2018).
3.4.2.4 Response Dynamics
It provides a sensitive measure of conflict between
A recent development pioneered by Spivey, Gros- response options. Furthermore, the exact analysis of
jean, and Knoblich (2005) uses the characteristics of the temporal dynamics in the trajectories (including
the motor behavior (specifically, participants’ hand speed and acceleration metrics) can even provide
movements) during a decision response to draw con- information about when the conflict arises, which
clusions about internal thinking processes and their can signify whether a specific piece of information
dynamics. Since most experiments use the com- is processed earlier or later in the decision process
puter mouse as the input device, this methodology (Dshemuchadse, Scherbaum, & Goschke, 2013; Sul-
has been christened mouse-tracking, although other livan, Hutcherson, Harris, & Rangel, 2015). For
devices have been used to record participants’ hand example, Sullivan et al. (2015) had their participants
movements as well (e.g., the Nintendo Wii Remote, choose between food items they had rated before on
a handle, or motion capture systems). One assump- healthiness and taste. Independent of which food
tion is that the decision dynamically evolves during was chosen in a trial, the mouse trajectory was in-
the mouse movement, and its trajectory may there- fluenced by the taste difference earlier than by the
fore reflect the extent to which a decision conflict is healthiness information, indicating that the initial
present (Stillerman & Freeman, 2019). In a typical preference tendency is driven by pleasure, whereas
setup, each trial presents two choice options in the health considerations come into play somewhat later
upper left and right corners of the computer screen. in the decision process.
The participant has to initiate a trial by clicking on a Evaluation: The way in which participants move
start button that is typically placed in the neutral mid- the mouse to choose an option is an unobtrusive

Figure 3.11: Top left: Exemplary mouse-tracking setup of Experiment 2 by Scherbaum et al. (2010) to investigate the Simon effect.
Participants had to click a start button at the bottom center of the screen (dashed lines), when moving the cursor upwards,
a number x appeared, and participants had to click left or right for x<5 and x>5 respectively. The presentation side of the
number varied, creating congruent (x<5 left or x>5 right) vs. incongruent (x<5 right or x>5 left) trials. Top right: The
summary mean absolute deviation of mouse trajectories demonstrates the Simon effect with greater average deviation for
incongruent trials. Bottom: Individual and average (thick lines) mouse trajectories for congruent and incongruent trials
(note that all trajectories were flipped to the left and only correct trials were analyzed).
method for revealing conflicting response tenden- tracking data (Wulff, Haslbeck, Kieslich, Henninger,
cies. As the food choice example shows, even quite & Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 2019). As a relatively
detailed information about the time course of pro- novel method, mouse-tracking faces a number of
cessing can be gathered. Furthermore, easy-to-use challenges. Many aspects of the design of mouse-
implementation and analysis software has been de- tracking studies (e.g. the starting procedure and
veloped, for example, the mousetrap plugin for cre- mouse sensitivity settings) require careful considera-
ating mouse-tracking experiments in the free and tion to reduce the amount of noise in the data and to
open-source graphical experiment builder OpenS- ensure that the decision process takes place during
esame (Kieslich & Henninger, 2017) and the mouse- (and not before) the movement (e.g. Scherbaum &
trap R package for analyzing and visualizing mouse- Kieslich, 2018). Also, averaged trajectories may be

Bröder Methods
misleading and suggest a smooth curve when in fact, ing of cognition will have to include knowledge
they are averaged across different types of trajecto- about these functions. The traditional approach of
ries in different trials (Wulff et al., 2019). Finally, neuropsychology gains many insights into the local-
it is currently unknown whether cognitive conflicts ization of cognitive functions in the human cortex by
always influence response dynamics and therefore carefully assessing cognitive impairments caused by
how to interpret the absence of trajectory effects. specific brain injuries. These investigations have in-
spired the view that the brain’s architecture is largely
modular with certain modules being responsible for
3.4.3 Computer Simulations
specific abilities.
Beginning with Newell, Shaw, and Simon’s (1958) In recent decades, brain imaging methods—
work on a computer program later called the “Gen- mostly functional magnetic resonance imaging
eral Problem Solver” (although it was rather limited (fMRI)—have dramatically increased our knowl-
in its abilities), cognitive scientists have attempted to edge about the brain structures involved in diverse
formulate their theories in precise formal terms and cognitive tasks including thinking, although enthu-
to translate them into computer programs. The aim siastic claims that fMRI can “watch the brain while
is to simulate human performance in cognitive tasks, thinking” are quite overstated (see Satel & Lilien-
including typical errors and fallacies or shortcom- feld, 2013, for a critique). Basically, the standard
ings in memory etc. Computer versions of theories fMRI method can contrast the metabolic activity
are also termed computational models (Farrell & pattern in the brain during a task with the activity
Lewandowsky, 2018). The scope of such models pattern in another (control) task, and the regions
ranges from very specific theories about certain tasks with the greatest activity differences are probably
to broad overarching “cognitive architectures” (e.g. involved in the processes that differ between the
ACT-R by Anderson et al., 2004) that entail many tasks. Hence, the experimental logic is quite sim-
empirically informed constraints for modeling and ilar to Donders’ (1868) subtraction method for re-
predicting human behavior. sponse times, and the better the tasks are chosen, the
The advantages of formalizing theories and cog- more meaningful the interpretation of the activation
nitive processes in such a way are manifold: first, differences. In the last few years, complex statisti-
the precision of the theory typically has to be in- cal methods called connectivity analysis have also
creased. Whereas verbal theories are often quite been developed which give very detailed informa-
vague, an implementation in the computer demands tion about the path and time course of activation that
precise concepts. Second, such a formalization may spreads through the brain during specific tasks (see
reveal inconsistencies in the theory that would have Bastos & Schoffelen, 2016, for a review).
gone unnoticed without formalizing it. Third, in A wealth of knowledge about brain structures
addition to just predicting qualitative “effects” (e.g. involved in various cognitive activities has been ac-
the existence of group differences), precise models cumulated in the meantime, and a deeper treatment
may even give quantitative predictions about effect of neuroscientific methods is beyond the scope of
sizes. Hence, in addition to the experimental tools this chapter. For the interested reader, I highly rec-
researchers use to observe people’s behavior, match- ommend Ward (2015) and Purves et al. (2013), for
ing it with computer simulations can reveal a lot introductions into cognitive neuroscience.
about the validity of cognitive theories. We refer the
interested reader to Farrell and Lewandowsky (2018)
for an excellent introduction to cognitive modeling. 3.5 Conclusion
The behaviorists believed that investigating thoughts

3.4.4 Neuroscientific Methods
and consciousness would require introspection and
Since all our cognitive functions including thinking verbal reports which are subjective and notoriously
depend on brain functions, an ultimate understand- unreliable. Hence, they believed the mind to evade

Conclusion Bröder
serious scientific investigation. As this chapter has it will without doubt help to reveal more fascinating
shown, cognitive psychologists have proven this as- insights into cognition in the future.
pect of behaviorism to be blatantly wrong. Numer-
ous innovative techniques that rely on objective data
Acknowledgements
were developed that shed light on the proverbial
“black box” of the mind. As recent devlopments I would like to thank Pascal Kieslich, Sophie Scharf,
like response dynamics and eye tracking show, this and Yury Shevchenko for helpful comments on a
development of clever methods is still going on, and draft of this chapter.
Summary
How can theories about unobservable events like cognitive processes be tested and evaluated
empirically? Since the method of introspection (self-observation) was criticized very early on for
various reasons, cognitive scientists have developed a large toolbox of other methods that yield more
objective data for testing theories about cognition. The idea behind this is that cognitive processes
like retrieving a memory or solving a logical puzzle lead to observable consequences in behavior.
The easiest methods just measure the outcome of a process, e.g. whether an item is solved or not.
Depending on how precise the theory is, this can provide surprisingly detailed information about
cognition. For example, items may be chosen in a way that different processes predict different
solution patterns across these items which may allow the inferring of a strategy. Another set of
methods tries to tackle the underlying processes more closely, for example by dissecting response
times or by monitoring information uptake with information boards or eye movement analyses.
Also, movements during response generation can reveal conflicting response tendencies. Finally,
theories about thinking and cognition can profit very much from computer simulations and of course
neuroscientific research that investigates the neural underpinnings of the processes.
Review Questions
1. Why is it important to have objective measurements or observations in science, meaning

that in principle, different observers would come to similar conclusions about the observed
phenomena?
2. Explain in your own words how it is possible to draw conclusions about latent cognitive
processes or strategies by observing overt behavior.
3. If you employed an information board setup with an option-by-attributes matrix for a decision
problem, but displayed all information freely from the beginning, which information could
you extract from the scanpath of fixations if you monitor the gaze movements of a person?
4. Looking at Figure 3.11, what problems would you expect with the mouse-tracking procedure,
both theoretically and in practice?

Bröder Methods
Hot Topic: Single or multiple mechanisms in decision making?

My research in the last two decades has been greatly inspired
by research on “adaptive decision making” showing that people
flexibly adapt their decision behavior to changing environmental
demands, such as time pressure, memory retrieval demands, or
payoff structures. The predominant view has been that we can
choose from a large repertoire of qualitatively different strategies
and heuristics that we employ under appropriate circumstances (see
Textboxes 3.3. and 3.4). This idea of a strategy “toolbox” was
especially promoted by Gigerenzer et al. (1999) and stimulated Arndt Bröder
a lot of research. After developing valid methods for diagnosing
these strategies in a valid manner (see Textbox 3.3), my further research investigated under which
circumstances these strategies and simple heuristics are applied (see Bröder, 2012, for an overview).
However, there are also critics of the toolbox metaphor, claiming that we might rather use a single
mechanism for deciding, such as the evidence accumulation model described in Section 3.4.2
(Figure 3.5), and widening or narrowing the gap between decision thresholds may just mimick the
use of different strategies, although people just change a parameter in a universal strategy. Both
views are notoriously hard to differentiate empirically. In a series of elegant studies, my doctoral
student Anke Söllner showed that indeed the evidence accumulation view is more plausible than the
multiple heuristics view to describe information acquisition (Söllner & Bröder, 2016). Recent joint
work with colleagues favoring another “unified strategy” approach based on coherence-maximization
principles also showed that predicions from this theory appear to explain search behavior better
than the multiple strategies view (Jekel, Glöckner & Bröder, 2018). The debate which metaphor
is more appropriate will probably continue for a while (see Marewski, Bröder & Glöckner, 2018),
but I always try to respect Konrad Lorenz’ advice: “It is a good morning exercise for a research
scientist to discard a pet hypothesis every day before breakfast. It keeps him young.” a
References
Bröder, A. (2012). The quest for take-the-best: Insights and outlooks from experimental research. In P. M.
Todd, G. Gigerenzer, & The ABC Research Group (Eds.), Ecological rationality: Intelligence in the world.
(pp. 216–240). New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315448.003.0067
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., & the ABC Research Group. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Jekel, M., Glöckner, A., & Bröder, A. (2018). A new and unique prediction for cue-search in a parallel-
constraint satisfaction network model: The attraction search effect. Psychological Review, 125(5), 744–768.
doi:10.1037/rev0000107
Marewski, J. N., Bröder, A., & Glöckner, A. (2018). Some metatheoretical reflections on adaptive decision
making and the strategy selection problem. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 31(2), 181–198.
doi:10.1002/bdm.2075
Söllner, A., & Bröder, A. (2016). Toolbox or adjustable spanner? A critical comparison of two metaphors for
adaptive decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 42(2),
215–237. doi:10.1037/xlm0000162
a Lorenz, K. (1966/2002). On aggression. London: Routledge. (p. 9)

References Bröder
References
Anderson, J. R., Bothell, D., Byrne, M. D., Douglass, S., Bröder, A., & Schiffer, S. (2003). Take The Best versus si-
Lebiere, C., & Qin, Y. (2004). An Integrated Theory multaneous feature matching: Probabilistic inferences
of the Mind. Psychological Review, 111(4), 1036– from memory and effects of reprensentation format.
1060. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.111.4.1036 Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132(2),
Arnold, N. R., Bröder, A., & Bayen, U. J. (2015). Empiri- 277–293. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.132.2.277
cal validation of the diffusion model for recognition Bühler, K. (1908). Antwort auf die von W. Wundt er-
memory and a comparison of parameter-estimation hobenen Einwände gegen die Methode der Selbst-
methods. Psychological Research, 79(5), 882–898. beobachtung an experimentell erzeugten Erlebnis-
doi:10.1007/s00426-014-0608-y sen [Response to W. Wundt’s Objections against the
Ball, L. J. (2014). Eye-tracking and reasoning: What Method of Self-Observation of Experimentally Cre-
your eyes tell about your inferences. In W. De ated Experiences]. Archiv für die Gesamte Psycholo-
Neys, M. Osman, W. De Neys (Ed), & M. Osman gie, 12, 93–123.
(Ed) (Hrsg.), New approaches in reasoning research. Busemeyer, J. R., & Townsend, J. T. (1993). Decision
(pp. 51–69). New York, NY, US: Psychology Press. field theory: A dynamic-cognitive approach to deci-
doi:10.4324/9781315879857 sion making in an uncertain environment. Psycho-
Bassok, M., & Novick, L. R. (2012). Problem solving. logical Review, 100(3), 432–459. doi:10.1037/0033-
In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison (Hrsg.), The Ox- 295X.100.3.432
ford handbook of thinking and reasoning. (pp. 413– Clark, H. H., & Chase, W. G. (1972). On the pro-
432). New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press. cess of comparing sentences against pictures. Cog-
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.001.0001 nitive Psychology, 3(3), 472–517. doi:10.1016/0010-
Bastos, A. M., & Schoffelen, J.-M. (2016). A tutorial 0285(72)90019-9
review of functional connectivity analysis methods Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of pro-
and their interpretational pitfalls. Frontiers in Systems cessing: A framework for memory research. Journal
Neuroscience, 9. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2015.00175 of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 11(6), 671–
Batchelder, W. H., & Riefer, D. M. (1999). Theoretical 684. doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(72)80001-X
and empirical review of multinomial process tree mod- Donders, F. C. (1868). Die Schnelligkeit psychischer
eling. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6(1), 57–86. Prozesse. Archiv für Anatomie, Physiologie und wis-
doi:10.3758/BF03210812 senschaftliche Medizin, (657–681).
Böckenholt, U., & Hynan, L. S. (1994). Caveats on Donkin, C., & Brown, S. D. (2018). Response
a process-tracing measure and a remedy. Jour- Times and Decision-Making. In J.T. Wixted (Ed.).
nal of Behavioral Decision Making, 7(2), 103–117. Stevens’ Handbook of Experimental Psychology
doi:10.1002/bdm.3960070203 and Cognitive Neuroscience. Wiley online library.
Bröder, A. (2000). A methodological comment on be- doi:10.1002/9781119170174.epcn509
havioral decision research. Psychologische Beiträge, Dshemuchadse, M., Scherbaum, S., & Goschke, T.
42(4), 645–662. (2013). How decisions emerge: Action dynamics
Bröder, A. (2010). Outcome-based strategy classifica- in intertemporal decision making. Journal of Ex-
tion. In A. Glöckner & C. Witteman (Hrsg.), Founda- perimental Psychology: General, 142(1), 93–100.
tions for tracing intuition: Challenges and methods. doi:10.1037/a0028499
(pp. 61–82). New York, NY US: Psychology Press. Ellis, R., & Humphreys, G. W. (1999). Connectionist
doi:10.4324/9780203861936 psychology: A text with readings. Hove, England:
Bröder, A., & Gaissmaier, W. (2007). Sequential pro- Psychology Press.
cessing of cues in memory-based multiattribute deci- Ellis, J. J., Glaholt, M. G., & Reingold, E. M.
sions. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(5), 895– (2011). Eye movements reveal solution knowl-
900. doi:10.3758/bf03194118 edge prior to insight. Consciousness and Cogni-

Bröder Methods
tion: An International Journal, 20(3), 768–776. ing. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(4), 790–797.
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.12.007 doi:10.3758/s13423-013-0389-0
Erdfelder, E., Auer, T.-S., Hilbig, B. E., Aßfalg, A., Heck, D. W., & Erdfelder, E. (2016). Extending multino-
Moshagen, M., & Nadarevic, L. (2009). Multinomial mial processing tree models to measure the relative
processing tree models: A review of the literature. speed of cognitive processes. Psychonomic Bulletin &
Zeitschrift für Psychologie/Journal of Psychology, Review, 23(5), 1440–1465. doi:10.3758/s13423-016-
217(3), 108–124. doi:10.1027/0044-3409.217.3.108 1025-6
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1993). Protocol analysis: Holmqvist, K., Nyström, M., Andersson, R., Dewhurst, R.,
Verbal reports as data., Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA, US: Jarodzka, H., & Van de Weijer, J. (2011). Eye track-
The MIT Press. doi:10.1097/00005053-198511000- ing: A comprehensive guide to methods and measures.
00011 Oxford University Press.
Ericsson, K. A., & Moxley, J. (2019). Thinking aloud dur- Huber, O., Bär, A. S., & Huber, O. W. (2009). Justifica-
ing superior performance on tasks involving decision tion pressure in risky decision making: Search for risk
making. In M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, A. Kühberger & defusing operators. Acta Psychologica, 130(1), 17–24.
J. G. Johnson (Eds.). A Handbook of Process Tracing doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2008.09.009
Methods (2nd Edition). London: Routlege. Huber, O., Wider, R., & Huber, O. W. (1997). Active infor-
Ettlin, F., & Bröder, A. (2015). Perceptual grouping does mation search and complete information presentation
not affect multi-attribute decision making if no pro- in naturalistic risky decision tasks. Acta Psychologica,
cessing costs are involved. Acta Psychologica, 157, 95(1), 15–29. doi:10.1016/S0001-6918(96)00028-5
30–43. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.02.002 Jekel, M., Fiedler, S., & Glöckner, A. (2011). Diagnostic
Farrell, S., & Lewandowsky, S. (2018). Com- task selection for strategy classification in judgment
putational modeling of cognition and behavior. and decision making: Theory, validation, and imple-
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. mentation in R. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(8),
doi:10.1017/9781316272503 782–799.
Franco-Watkins, A. M., & Johnson, J. G. (2011). Deci- Johnson, E. J., Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., & Willem-
sion moving window: Using interactive eye tracking sen, M. C. (2008). Process models deserve process
to examine decision processes. Behavior Research data: Comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Her-
Methods, 43(3), 853–863. doi:10.3758/s13428-011- twig (2006). Psychological Review, 115(1), 263–272.
0083-y doi:10.1037/0033-295X.115.1.263
Freeman, J. B. (2018). Doing psychological science by Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). De-
hand. Current Directions in Psychological Science, duction. Hillsdale, NJ, England: Lawrence Erlbaum
27(5), 315–323. doi:10.1177/0963721417746793 Associates, Inc.
Freeman, J. B., Dale, R., & Farmer, T. A. (2011). Hand in Kieslich, P. J., & Henninger, F. (2017). Mousetrap:
motion reveals mind in motion. Frontiers in Psychol- An integrated, open-source mouse-tracking pack-
ogy, 2, 59. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00059 age. Behavior Research Methods, 49(5), 1652–1667.
Funke, J. (2003). Problemlösendes Denken [Problem- doi:10.3758/s13428-017-0900-z
solving thinking]. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Klauer, K. C., Musch, J., & Naumer, B. (2000). On belief
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reason- bias in syllogistic reasoning. Psychological Review,
ing the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded ra- 107(4), 852–884. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.107.4.852
tionality. Psychological Review, 103(4), 650–669. Knoblich, G., & Wartenberg, F. (1998). Unbemerkte Lö-
doi:10.1037//0033-295x.103.4.650 sungshinweise begünstigen Veränderungen der Prob-
Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2008). Modeling option lemrepräsentation. [Unnoticed hints facilitate repre-
and strategy choices with connectionist networks: To- sentational change in problem solving]. Zeitschrift für
wards an integrative model of automatic and deliber- Psychologie mit Zeitschrift für angewandte Psycholo-
ate decision making. Judgment and Decision Making, gie,
3(3), 215–228. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1090866 Lohse, G. L., & Johnson, E. J. (1996). A comparison of
Hattori, M., Sloman, S. A., & Orita, R. (2013). Ef- two process tracing methods for choice tasks. Orga-
fects of subliminal hints on insight problem solv-

References Bröder
nizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Eidels (Ed) (Hrsg.), The Oxford handbook of com-
68(1), 28–43. doi:10.1006/obhd.1996.0087 putational and mathematical psychology. (pp. 35–
Maier, N. R. F. (1931). Reasoning in humans. II. The solu- 62). New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press.
tion of a problem and its appearance in consciousness. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199957996.001.0001
Journal of Comparative Psychology, 12(2), 181–194. Reisen, N., Hoffrage, U., & Mast, F. W. (2008). Identify-
doi:10.1037/h0071361 ing decision strategies in a consumer choice situation.
Massen, C., & Bredenkamp, J. (2005). Die Wundt-Bühler- Judgment and Decision Making, 3(8), 31–31.
Kontroverse aus der Sicht der heutigen kognitiven Psy- Renkewitz, F., & Jahn, G. (2012). Memory indexing: A
chologie [The Wundt-Bühler-Controversy from the novel method for tracing memory processes in com-
View of Modern Cognitive Psychology]. Zeitschrift plex cognitive tasks. Journal of Experimental Psy-
für Psychologie, 213(2), 109–114. doi:10.1026/0044- chology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38(6),
3409.213.2.109 1622–1639. doi:10.1037/a0028073
Mata, A., Ferreira, M. B., Voss, A., & Kollei, T. (2017). Richardson, D. C., & Spivey, M. J. (2000). Representa-
Seeing the conflict: An attentional account of reason- tion, space and Hollywood Squares: Looking at things
ing errors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(6), that aren’t there anymore. Cognition, 76(3), 269–295.
1980–1986. doi:10.3758/s13423-017-1234-7 doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00084-6
Newell, A., Shaw, J. C., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Elements Rips, L. J., Shoben, E. J., & Smith, E. E. (1973). Seman-
of a theory of human problem solving. Psychological tic distance and the verification of semantic relations.
Review, 65(3), 151–166. doi:10.1037/h0048495 Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 12(1),
Newen, A. (2017). What are cognitive processes? An 1–20. doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(73)80056-8
example-based approach. Synthese, 194(11), 4251– Russo, J. E., Johnson, E. J., & Stephens, D. L. (1989).
4268. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0812-3 The validity of verbal protocols. Memory & Cogni-
Orquin, J. L., & Loose, S. M. (2013). Attention tion, 17(6), 759–769. doi:10.3758/BF03202637
and choice: A review on eye movements in deci- Russo, J. E. (2019). Eye fixations as a process trace. In M.
sion making. Acta Psychologica, 144(1), 190–206. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, A. Kühberger & J. G. Johnson
doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2013.06.003 (Eds.). A Handbook of Process Tracing Methods (2nd
Payne, J. W. (1976). Task complexity and contingent pro- Edition). London: Routlege.
cessing in decision making: An information search Satel, S., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2013). Brainwashed: The
and protocol analysis. Organizational Behavior & Hu- seductive appeal of mindless neuroscience. New York,
man Performance, 16(2), 366–387. doi:10.1016/0030- NY, US: Basic Books.
5073(76)90022-2 Scherbaum, S., & Kieslich, P. J. (2018). Stuck at the
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1988). starting line: How the starting procedure influences
Adaptive strategy selection in decision making. Jour- mouse-tracking data. Behavior Research Methods,
nal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 50(5), 2097–2110. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-
and Cognition, 14(3), 534–552. doi:10.1037//0278- 017-0977-4
7393.14.3.534 Scherbaum, S., Dshemuchadse, M., Fischer, R., &
Purves, D., Cabeza, R., Huettel, S. A., LaBar, K. Goschke, T. (2010). How decisions evolve: The tem-
S., Platt, M. L., Woldorff, M. G., & Brannon, E. poral dynamics of action selection. Cognition, 115(3),
M. (2013). Principles of cognitive neuroscience., 407–416. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.02.004
2nd ed. Sunderland, MA, US: Sinauer Associates. Scholz, A., Krems, J. F., & Jahn, G. (2017). Watch-
doi:10.1086/670558 ing diagnoses develop: Eye movements reveal symp-
Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psy- tom processing during diagnostic reasoning. Psy-
chological Review, 85(2), 59–108. doi:10.1037/0033- chonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(5), 1398–1412.
295X.85.2.59 doi:10.3758/s13423-017-1294-8
Ratcliff, R., & Smith, P. (2015). Modeling simple deci- Schooler, J. W., Ohlsson, S., & Brooks, K. (1993).
sions and applications using a diffusion model. In Thoughts beyond words: When language overshad-
J. R. Busemeyer, Z. Wang, J. T. Townsend, A. Ei- ows insight. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
dels, J. R. Busemeyer (Ed), Z. Wang (Ed), . . . A.

Bröder Methods
ogy: General, 122(2), 166–183. doi:10.1037/0096- Sternberg, S. (1969). The discovery of processing stages:
3445.122.2.166 Extensions of Donders’ method. Acta Psycholog-
Sullivan, N. J., Hutcherson, C., Harris, A., & Rangel, ica, Amsterdam, 30, 276–315. doi:10.1016/0001-
A. (2015). Dietary self-control is related to the 6918(69)90055-9
speed with which health and taste attributes are Stillerman, B. J., & Freeman, J. B. (2019). Mouse-
processed. Psychological Science, 26(2), 122–134. tracking to understand real-time dynamics of social
doi:10.1177/0956797614559543 cognition. In M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, A. Kühberger
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., Johnson, J. G., Böckenholt, & J. G. Johnson (Eds.). A Handbook of Process Trac-
U., Goldstein, D. G., Russo, J. E., Sullivan, N. J., & ing Methods (2nd Edition). London: Routlege.
Willemsen, M. C. (2017). Process-Tracing Methods in Thomas Jr., J. C. (1974). An analysis of behavior in the
Decision Making: On Growing Up in the 70s. Current hobbits-orcs problem. Cognitive Psychology, 6(2),
Directions in Psychological Science, 26(5), 442–450. 257–269. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(74)90013-9
doi:10.1177/0963721417708229 Voss, A., Rothermund, K., & Voss, J. (2004). Interpreting
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., Kühberger, A., & Ranyard, the parameters of the diffusion model: An empirical
R. (2011). A handbook of process tracing methods validation. Memory & Cognition, 32(7), 1206–1220.
for decision research: A critical review and user’s doi:10.3758/BF03196893
guide. (M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, A. Kühberger, & Ward, J. (2015). The student’s guide to cognitive neu-
R. Ranyard, Hrsg.). New York, NY, US: Psychology roscience., 3rd ed. New York, NY, US: Psychology
Press. Press. doi:10.4324/9781315742397
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., Sohn, M., de Bellis, E., Mar- Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist
tin, N., & Hertwig, R. (2013). A lack of ap- views it. Psychological Review, 20(2), 158–177.
petite for information and computation. Simple doi:10.1037/h0074428
heuristics in food choice. Appetite, 71, 242–251.
Willemsen, M. C., & Johnson, E. C. (2019). (Re)Visiting
doi:10.1016/j.appet.2013.08.008
the decision factory: Observing cognition with Mouse-
Schulze, R. (1909). Aus der Werkstatt der experimentellen labWEB. In M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, A. Kühberger
Psychologie und Pädagogik. [From the workshop & J. G. Johnson (Eds.). A Handbook of Process Trac-
of experimental psychology and pedagogy]. Leipzig, ing Methods (2nd Edition). London: Routlege.
Germany: Voigtländer.
Wulff, D. U., Haslbeck, J. M. B., Kieslich, P. J., Henninger,
Smith, E. E., Shoben, E. J., & Rips, L. J. (1974). Structure F., & Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M. (2019). Mouse-
and process in semantic memory: A featural model tracking: Detecting Types in Movement Trajectories.
for semantic decisions. Psychological Review, 81(3), In M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, A. Kühberger & J. G.
214–241. doi:10.1037/h0036351 Johnson (Eds.). A Handbook of Process Tracing
Spivey, M. J., Grosjean, M., & Knoblich, G. (2005). Con- Methods (2nd Edition). London: Routlege.
tinuous attraction toward phonological competitors. Wundt, W. (1907). Über Ausfrageexperimente und über
PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci- die Methoden zur Psychologie des Denkens [About
ences of the United States of America, 102(29), 10393– Interrogation Experiments and about the Methods of
10398. doi:10.1073/pnas.0503903102 a Psychology of Thinking]. Psychologische Studien,
Sternberg, S. (1966). High-speed scanning in hu- 3, 301–360.
man memory. Science, 153(3736), 652–654. Wundt, W. (1908). Kritische Nachlese zur Ausfragemeth-
doi:10.1126/science.153. ode [Critical Gleanings on the Interrogation Method].
3736.652 Archiv für die Gesamte Psychologie, 11, 445–459.

Glossary Bröder
Glossary
area of interest (AOI) Region on a display that indicator An indicator variable ist an observable
is predefined as theoretically interesting when variable (e.g. the number of test items solved)
fixated by a participant during eye tracking. that reflects a theoretically interesting unob-
42 servable variable (e.g. intelligence). 28
computational model A theory or theoretical as- introspection The method of observing one’s own
sumptions about cognitive processes cast in cognitive processes during a task and to report
precise mathematical terms to predict and/or on them. This method has been criticized very
explain empirical phenomena. 46 early as subjective and error-prone. 28
correlation study Empirical study in which vari-
ables that are expected to covary are meaured
methodological behaviorism A methodological
or observed in order to test whether they actu-
position that keeps the behaviorist conviction
ally covary. This typically does not allow for
to base empirical data solely on objectively
causal interpretations of their connection. 27
observable behavior. However, in contrast
dependent variable (DV) The variable of inter- to radical behaviorism, the position does not
est, the value of which we try to explain by deny that unobservable processes (like cog-
other (independent) variables. 27 nitive processes) exist, and hypotheses about
them can be tested by relying objective data.
experiment The independent variable (IV) is ac- 29
tively manipulated by an experimenter to ob-
serve its impact on the dependent variable
(DV). If participants are randomly assigned to neuropsychology Classical method of precisely
different levels of the IV, the effects of the IV documenting cognitive impaiments caused by
on the DV can be interpreted causally. 28 circumscribed bran damage in order to local-
ize brain functions. 46
eye tracking A method for monitoring people’s vi-
sual information intake by recording their eye
movements during the inspection of a display. operationalization The process of translating a la-
41 tent variable (e.g. memory strength) into an
empirically observable variable (e.g. number
fMRI Functional Magnetic resonance Imaging is a of recalled items). 27
non-invasive method to measure the regional
blood flow in the brain during task processing.
Contrasting the activity during different tasks reactivity A problem that may arise if the assess-
allows to infer the brain regions crucially in- ment method of a process changes the process
volved in the processes that differ between itself. 29
tasks. 46
independent variable (IV) The IV is a variable thinking-aloud-method Verbalization of all

that is theoretically assumed to influedce an- thoughts during a problem solution. This
other variable of interest (the dependent vari- method may give a researcher hints on the
able). 27 nature of strategies used. 29

Chapter 4
Concepts: Structure and Acquisition

K IMERY R. L EVERING & K ENNETH J. K URTZ
Marist College & Binghamton University
A good way to begin thinking about the psychology As a result of classifying something we have never
of concepts and categories is by making some con- encountered before (e.g., recognizing an item on dis-
nections to other familiar and foundational elements play in a grocery store as an apple), we do not need
of human cognition. Perception provides organized to figure out everything about it from scratch. We
sensory impressions about the physical world. Mem- can assume that our category knowledge applies
ory contains a record of experience and a storehouse to this instance and a number of important conse-
of what we know about the world. Reasoning is the quences follow. We can access other knowledge that
process of going beyond available information to is connected to the category (e.g. trees, serpents,
generate inferences or conclusions. How do con- gravity, teachers, pies, etc.), we can communicate
cepts and categories fit in? One can convincingly to others about it (e.g., “Hey, pass me that apple!”),
argue that they tie these elements of our cognitive we can reason about and predict characteristics that
system together. may not otherwise have been obvious (e.g., it tastes
Perhaps the most fundamental and universal cog- sweet and offers nutrients), and we can use the cat-
nitive task is matching our perceptions of the envi- egorization toward further explanation (e.g., some-
ronment around us with our knowledge in memory one who orders an apple instead of fries is trying
about the kinds of things that exist and the kinds to be healthy). As Murphy (2002) wrote, concepts
of meaning that characterize scenes and situations. are “the glue that holds our mental world together”
This knowledge is our set of concepts—the tools because of their role in virtually every cognitive
of thought or mental representations we apply to experience we have.
identify and understand a stimulus. From a memory Philosophers and other theorists have long rea-
perspective, it would take a lot of effort and capac- soned about how people learn, represent, and use
ity to remember (and treat as distinct) each of the concepts, but in the latter half of the 20th century,
seemingly infinite number of objects, people, places, psychologists began to collect empirical data from
and ideas in our environment. Instead, our cognitive carefully controlled laboratory experiments to test
system has the remarkable ability to organize our ex- theories grounded in the information-processing
periences in long-term memory, grouping instances framework. As in other areas of the field, research
together into one common concept despite the many has blossomed through the application of interdisci-
ways they might differ. Every apple you encounter plinary approaches such as computational modeling.
is a little different, but the commonalities shared In this chapter, we will review theories, models, and
across the category cognitively outweigh their dif- behavioral data that have helped us to understand
ferences enough to warrant grouping them together how concepts are acquired and structured.
into a concept of apple.

Levering & Kurtz Concepts: Structure and Acquisition
4.1 How Concepts Arise from derstanding that holds across these examples and
Experience supports generalization to new cases. This basis for
category membership can be a set of features or di-
It is understood that we do not come into the world mension values that an item must be similar to—or
as infants knowing what concepts like fork or athlete it can be a rule that specifies exactly what features
are. The rich knowledge we achieve about natural or dimension values are required for membership.
concepts comes about at least in part from experi- There have been various attempts to describe how
encing examples and organizing them into groups concepts arise from experience, and evaluating the
(either on our own or based on what we are told). relative merits of these theories has made up a con-
But what is the organizing basis that causes individ- siderable amount of the work in human category
uals or cultures to divide up the world as we do? learning.
What gives concepts their naturalness, their coher-
ence, and their usefulness?
4.1.1 Concepts as Abstractions from
Most work in the field is consistent with the broad
assumption that concepts emerge because the mem-
the Data
bers of a category are like each other and different Many theories of categorization assume that as you
from other kinds of things. On this view, categories encounter examples from a category, you engage
arise because there are regularities and a natural in a process of abstraction. This means that some
order in the world that can be discovered. It does detail about an example or collection of examples is
not take any special work to invent categories—for lost and only the most important parts make up your
example, apples are intrinsically like one another concept. To understand abstraction, imagine being
and unlike non-apples. The physical properties of asked to draw a picture of your bedroom. Rather
objects as experienced through our senses are the than a precise replica of the room, your picture
grounding basis for categories. This idea of featural would likely be simpler and contain fewer details.
similarity has been defined in a number of ways, The exact number of dresser drawers, the color of
but it often refers to how many properties or features your bedspread, and maybe even the presence of
are shared (e.g., Tversky, 1977). For example, you certain items might not be included in your draw-
would probably say that a dog is more similar to ing because you have either forgotten those details
a wolf than a peacock in part because a dog and a or don’t consider them to be important. This is a
wolf both typically have four legs, paws, fur, etc. gist-like representation of a single instance. To form
while a dog and a peacock share far fewer character- concepts, the gist is formulated across many exam-
istics. Another foundational approach to similarity ples (other people’s bedrooms) or at increased levels
is based on the geometric distance between items of abstraction (different types of rooms, interiors,
represented as points in a multidimensional psycho- physical environments, etc.). There are a number of
logical space (Shepard, 1957, 1987). To understand ways that categories can be formed as abstractions,
this, consider a cube where each interior point repre- depending on the specific basis for what information
sents a value along each of three spatial dimensions to keep or discard.
(length, width, and depth). Shepard proposed that
examples are represented as points in a multidimen-
4.1.1.1 Abstracting Defining
sional space corresponding to their values on the set
Features—Classical View
of psychological dimensions along which examples
vary (for example, apples may be defined in terms The first possibility considered was that concepts
of roundness, redness, crunchiness, size, etc.). are formed by abstracting a fundamentally impor-
When we experience a set of examples that are tant characteristic or set of characteristics that all
importantly alike (or when we are directly told that examples of a category have in common. For ex-
they belong to the same category), this experience ample, you may learn over time that to be a grand-
invites a process of building up a general-level un- mother, someone must (1) be female and (2) have

Concepts as Abstractions from the Data Levering & Kurtz
grandchildren. As long as someone meets those nec- types of categories. If a necessary characteristic of a
essary (they must have these qualities) and sufficient dog is that it has four legs, does an animal stop being
(having just these qualities is enough) conditions for a dog if one of its legs is amputated? Objects not
membership, they are a grandmother. Because all fitting a definition can also sometimes be considered
that is needed is satisfying some criteria, examples members of a category. For example, Lupyan (2013)
are either members of the category or not, and no ex- found that people were willing to call someone a
ample is any better or worse than any other. Acquir- “grandmother” even if they had no grandchildren.
ing a concept then is a process of gradually learning Second, there are many examples that do not seem
the essential properties that something needs to have to fit cleanly into one category or another. Medin
in order to be considered a member. (1989) gives an example of rugs, which could be
This account of essential or defining properties considered members of the category furniture, but
has been around so long and was so popular in phi- do not seem to quite belong. Third, we see evidence
losophy that it is often called the classical view of graded structure, meaning that some examples
(Smith & Medin, 1981). It wasn’t until the mid- of a category are seen as better examples of that
20th century that philosophers and psychologists category than others. If you were asked to rate a list
began to take issue with some of its assumptions. of fruit in terms of how typical they were of the cate-
First, it was argued that there are no perfect defini- gory fruit, you would probably rate a banana as more
tions for categories. Wittgenstein (1953) famously typical than an avocado. This has been found con-
argued that the concept “game” cannot be defined sistently, even for categories thought to be the most
by any set of necessary and sufficient properties. well-defined. For example, Armstrong, Gleitman,
He defended against a number of possible attempts and Gleitman (1983) found that certain examples of
to do so (e.g., must a game involve competition? the category even numbers (e.g., 4) were considered
must a game involve winning/losing?) You may to be better examples than others (e.g., 34). Such
expect these kinds of definitions to be easier for tax- typicality effects are not easily explained by a theory
onomic categories like animal species or chemical that assumes examples to be simply in a category or
compounds, but it has been exceedingly difficult to not.
come up with hard and fast definitions even for these
Figure 4.1: Difference between prototype and exemplar approach to the concept of dog arising from experiencing nine different dogs.
Exemplar theory assumes the concept to be the collection of memories of each instance while prototype theory assumes the
concept to be an abstracted example representing an average on relevant features.

4.1.1.2 Abstracting a Set of Common simply use information about the point at which a
Features—Prototype Approach banana goes from being classified as unripe to ripe
along one or more dimensions. Knowledge of these
In response to criticism of the classical view, a the- partitions can identify examples of a concept with-
ory arose in philosophy (Wittgenstein, 1953) and out having to know anything specific about other
later in psychology (Posner & Keel, 1968; Hamp- examples or common/average features.
ton, 1993; Smith & Minda, 2001; Rosch & Mervis,
1975) that while we do abstract the most common or
central properties among category members, none 4.1.2 Concepts as just the
of these properties are necessary or sufficient. In Data—Exemplar Approach
this set of views, eventually called the prototype More recently, a set of theories has centered on the
approach, an item can be missing some features idea that we do not form abstractions at all but
and still be considered a member of the category. rather store specific information about examples
Proponents of this view often think of concepts as themselves (see Figure 4.1). In other words, your
boiling down to a single example, a prototype, that concept of apple is made up of some version of a
has the most common characteristics (e.g., has four memory of every apple you have encountered (or at
legs) or the most common values along relevant di- least the first or most prominent ones). New apples
mensions (e.g., is 2.5 feet long). In Figure 4.1, the are recognized because they are highly similar to
prototype is the average of the nine dogs experi- examples that have been thought of as apples before.
enced, even though that average is not exactly like In fact, the most successful explanations rely on the
any one of the dogs previously seen. In this view, assumption that only the examples most similar to
we develop prototypes for every concept and then a the new apple have influence on classification.
new instance is classified based on which category’s This exemplar approach (Medin & Schaffer,
prototype it is more similar to. This view is often 1978; Nosofsky, 1984, 1986; Kruschke, 1992) can
thought to better describe natural categories as mem- explain prototype effects related to typicality and
bers often share most but not all features, a property fuzzy boundaries because examples that are dissim-
called family resemblance. This view is also con- ilar to prototypes are also frequently dissimilar to
sidered more successful at explaining experimental other examples in the category. Rug and ostrich
findings such as unclear category membership (rugs would be considered poor examples of their respec-
just don’t have many of the common features of fur- tive categories because they are not highly similar to
niture and are far from the category prototype) and any other piece of furniture or bird. Formal versions
typicality effects (items rated as less typical tend to of exemplar theory have been highly successful at
possess fewer common features). predicting human performance, particularly in cases
where there are not many examples to learn. These
4.1.1.3 Abstracting a Boundary draw upon two main design principles. The first
is that category representations are labeled exem-
Rather than developing a conceptual representation plars that serve as reference points for similarity
that is the center or average of a set of category comparisons. When a new example is experienced,
members, other researchers have proposed that we the model figures out how similar it is to the known
instead update information about the boundaries of a examples it has stored, and bases classification on
category (Ashby, 1992; Ashby & Maddox, 1993). If the category associated with the closest match. The
the goal of concepts is to differentiate between types second has to do with how similarity is computed. In
of things, perhaps the most important consideration the process of looking for particularly close matches,
is the partition line—where one category ends and some dimensions may be treated as more important
another begins. For example, rather than seeing how than others, a property known as dimensional selec-
similar a new banana is to your prototypes for the tive attention. If we learn that size is useful when
concepts ripe banana and unripe banana, we may distinguishing between types of dogs, this feature

Piecing Together Concepts Levering & Kurtz
should be given more influence than something less values are consistent with each category—this in-
useful like number of legs. Selective attention is typ- volves no explicit use of rules or reference to specific
ically thought to happen during encoding (meaning exemplars or prototypes (Kurtz, 2007, 2015; see Hot
the number of legs a dog has does not even register) Topic).
but could also be applied at the point of making a
decision (the number of legs registers but does not
4.1.4 Explaining the Data
contribute to the decision of what type of dog it is).
There is plenty of experimental evidence suggesting The approaches we have considered up to this point
that we use selective attention when we are learning take the data about categories (i.e., the members of a
categories, although this tendency does not seem to category) as the direct basis for psychological repre-
be as central to categorization in infants and young sentations of categories. This is most clearly evident
children. in the exemplar view: the representation of a cate-
gory consists strictly of the stored examples known
to belong to the category. Abstractive accounts are
4.1.3 Piecing Together Concepts
based on finding a summary representation that cap-
Much research in the last 50 years has been directed tures the character of the category members without
at evaluating whether concepts should be thought having to store them all. A rule is a representa-
of as rules, prototypes, or a collection of exemplars, tion that only requires storing the features that are
and evidence has been found in support of each necessary and sufficient for determining category
account to differing degrees. Given that learning membership. Instead of storing every example, the
appears to vary in important ways across people, learner stores the information that must be true of
situations, and content, the category learning system each category member. A prototype is a statistical
could involve multiple processes or systems that in- rather than logical form of summarization—instead
voke different underlying mechanisms. In line with of trying to summarize what is true of each exam-
this, several hybrid models have been developed, ple, the idea is to keep track of the central tendency
each asserting that information from separate sys- among the examples. In this way, the nature of the
tems is either combined, competes, or that a second category is captured by the set of feature values that
system takes over when a primary system fails. One are most representative of its members (i.e., storing
class of hybrid models assumes that concepts are a single canonical example –that could be real or
acquired through a combination of learning rules made-up—instead of storing them all).
for membership and storing individual examples Are there alternatives to category representations
(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Nosofsky, Palmeri, that use the examples or summaries of the examples
& McKinley, 1994). An approach that emphasizes as building blocks? Why might such alternatives
separate neurobiological systems makes a strong dis- be important? One important consideration is that
tinction between an explicit verbal rule induction the present approach assumes that the available data
system and an implicit, procedural system (Ashby (the representations of each example) contains ev-
& Maddox, 2005). Similarity-based models have erything we expect our categories to contain. If that
been developed that allow for both abstraction and is so, where do these item representations that are as
exemplar-like effects by letting the model determine semantically rich as our concepts come from? For
on the fly whether to represent the category with example, if our concept of apple is merely a repre-
many clusters (a unique cluster for each item would sentation of physical features, how can that explain
be the exemplar approach), with one cluster (pro- other information about apples like their role in ap-
totype view), or with an intermediate number of preciating teachers, avoiding doctors, discovering
clusters (having a set of sub-prototypes to capture gravity, worms, cider, pesticides, bobbing, pies, etc.
different aspects of the category; Love, Medin, & This issue becomes more extreme when considering
Gureckis, 2004). Another highly flexible approach categories that are even slightly more abstract (e.g.,
is based on learning what configurations of feature bag) where what makes examples similar is a con-

struction rather than something directly derived from field can be seen as offshoots off the influence of the
physical form. A promising proposal that has re- theory view. For example, an important idea rising
ceived only limited attention distinguishes between in the field takes the perspective that categories are
a core and an identification procedure for concepts best represented as models of the statistical regular-
(Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Smith & Medin, ities that hold among category members; and the
1981). The identification component is perceptually models are applied to categorize examples through
driven, while the core of the concept includes richly a process of fitting the data rather than matching it
constructed semantic elements that arise from world (see Hot Topic). This resonates with a view that cat-
knowledge and the interaction between humans and egories may be best understood in terms of schema
their environment. theory as organized generic knowledge structures
Also in line with criticisms of similarity- or data- that can be activated and instantiated by filling slots
driven approaches is a theory-driven approach with specific values (see Komatsu, 1992; Rumelhart,
which considers categorization to be a process of 1980). Another approach emphasizes the role of
explanation rather than similarity-based matching causal relationships in category learning and repre-
(Murphy & Medin, 1985). In this view, category sentation, for example the presence of wings on a
representations are grounded in knowledge about bird and the bird’s ability to fly (cf., Ahn & Kim,
what makes something a member that is not ex- 2000; Rehder, 2003).
pressed in the same terms as item representation. Murphy and colleagues have extended the impact
In other words, a stimulus is not a chair because of the theory view in a number of ways including
it has features that closely resemble the features a critique of the way category learning is typically
of known chairs (or a summary of the features of studied in the laboratory that reinforces limited psy-
known chairs); instead, the stimulus is a chair be- chological accounts by excluding the critical role of
cause the data (our sensory experience) is best ex- prior knowledge about features, concepts, and gen-
plained in terms of the explanatory principles un- eral semantic memory (e.g., Murphy & Allopenna,
derlying chairs. What might such principles be? 1994; Murphy, 2003; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994).
Researchers have looked to function and origin for Researchers have also been influenced by the the-
such principles: Does it do what a chair should do? ory view in expanding the problem of categoriza-
Was it built to be a chair? Is it used as a chair? tion beyond the ability to classify traditional tax-
The classic example from Murphy and Medin onomic categories. There is a diversity of kinds
(1985) asks how we categorize a fully clothed man of categories and a diversity of ways in which cate-
in a pool. The suggestion is that we explain the gories are learned and used (Markman & Ross, 2003;
available data in terms of the category of drunken- Medin, Lynch, & Solomon, 2000; Kurtz, 2015).
ness by recognizing how explanatory principles like
reduced coordination/judgment accord with what
we see—it is not that we identify a close feature-by- 4.2 Modes of Category Learning
feature resemblance between the man in the water
and our prior experience of drunk people. The the- While the study of human category learning is ulti-
ory view of categorization provides an important mately about real-life concepts like athletes or forks,
critique of standard accounts: matching between it is often difficult to answer questions about how
stimuli and category representations requires solv- natural categories like these are acquired because
ing the problem of identifying the “respects” for they have already been learned in unique and per-
similarity—what are the features to compare upon sonal ways that cannot be easily controlled for. In
and with what weights or importances? order to get around this, cognitive psychologists cre-
In practice, researchers have had little success in ate and teach artificial categories that can be more
translating this viewpoint into a mechanistic account precisely controlled. These artificial categories are
of the processes and representations underlying cat- made up of members that participants have never
egorization ability. Even so, much progress in the seen before but that possess simpler versions of the

Learning Concepts Through Classification Levering & Kurtz
kinds of features that exist in the real world. Exam- rectly assign examples to the appropriate category,
ples are grouped into categories by researchers, of- often with high accuracy. More than just memoriz-
ten according to the same kinds of principles that we ing what category each example is in, learners can
think real categories are grouped by. Participants are pick up on relevant commonalities and differences
then taught which category each example belongs to, between the categories, just like how we learn about
imitating the process by which we learn about cat- what tends to be true of dogs and what distinguishes
egories in the real world. What people learn about dogs from coyotes.
the categories can be assessed by having them de-
cide what category some new item is in or by asking It is not hard to come up with real life instances
them questions about trained examples (How typi- that align with this kind of learning. For exam-
cal is this example of its category?), features (What ple, imagine you see an animal running across your
category is a winged creature most likely to be in?), lawn and think that it is a coyote before your friend
or relationships between features (How likely are informs you that it is in fact your neighbor’s dog,
winged creatures to have webbed feet?). Specific Fluffy. Although we can think of cases fitting this
aspects of the task (the stimuli, which examples are kind of guess-and-correct classification, it is not
in which category, how many categories, etc.) can likely the only or even primary way we learn. Con-
be manipulated to see in what way those changes af- cepts are most likely acquired through a combination
fect how easily categories are learned, what kind of of many modes of learning, in service of particular
information is remembered, or how that knowledge goals. What makes up your concept of dog likely
is applied. comes from times in which you knew something
was a dog before you saw it (e.g., your friend invites
4.2.1 Learning Concepts Through you over to meet her new dog), made inferences
about a dog that ended up being true or not (e.g.,
Classification
you learn whether or not a dog will play catch), or
Most commonly, concept learning is studied through learned about dogs incidentally while focusing on
a supervised category learning (see Figure 4.2), in a specific task (e.g., picking out a pet from a pet
which images are presented one at a time and learn- store). Sometimes you may not even get feedback
ers decide which of usually two categories each about whether your idea of category membership or
belongs to. They are told whether they are right or predicted features are correct (e.g., you never find
wrong (this feedback is what makes the learning con- out whether the animal that ran across the lawn was
sidered supervised) and over time they learn to cor- a coyote or a dog).
Figure 4.2: Example of one trial of a supervised classification task. The participant views an example and decides which of two
categories it is in before receiving feedback.

4.2.2 Learning Concepts Through of music genres (e.g., classical music or hip hop)
Inference, Use, and Observation has probably not come from listening to carefully la-
beled songs and learning the features associated with
Research has provided evidence that differences in each genre. While some experiences may have been
the way a concept is learned are important. Of- labeled for you (e.g., you hear a song while listening
tentimes, when a learning task is changed, differ- to a country radio station), you have largely con-
ent kinds of information are acquired. For exam- structed your own organization based on unlabeled
ple, when participants learn by predicting features examples. Research into purely unsupervised classi-
of labeled examples, they often learn more about fication is often difficult because there are so many
the most common features and the relationships be- ways that a number of items can be organized. One
tween features (Markman & Ross, 2003; Yamauchi common finding emerging from this research is that
& Markman, 1998). The fact that certain features when asked to sort items into categories, people tend
“go together”, or are more typical or central, are as- to focus on forming rules along single dimensions
pects of the internal structure of categories. Knowl- (e.g., Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987). For
edge of internal structure gives us a sense of what is example, you may decide that any song being sung
generally true of a category, sometimes above and with a southern twang is country music and not need
beyond what is necessary to figure out what some- consider any other dimension.
thing is. For example, the fact that silverware is typi- Rather than completely unsupervised, our learn-
cally made of metal may be useful to learn even if it ing is often semi-supervised, meaning that we ex-
does not help you determine if something is a spoon perience a combination of labeled and unlabeled
or a fork. In addition to inference learning, inter- examples. Studies on the role of unlabeled exam-
nal structure is also better learned through indirect ples (relative to completely supervised learning) has
learning tasks where organization into categories been mixed, sometimes showing that they are help-
helps to accomplish some goal like predicting how ful, sometimes hurtful, and sometimes having no
much food animals would eat but categories are not effect. Recent research has suggested that labeled
explicitly learned (Minda & Ross, 2004). It is also cases are important when categories are highly simi-
better learn in observational tasks where category lar and therefore category membership is ambiguous.
labels are provided before the example is shown, For example, it would be useful to have some labeled
and guessing is not necessary (Levering & Kurtz, cases when distinguishing subtle differences in types
2015). In essence, task demands during learning in- of electronic music, but not when learning the broad
fluence what is attended to and what becomes more difference between classical and punk music (Vong,
central to the representation of a category. When a Navarro, & Perfors, 2016).
task focuses the learner on classification, the learner Even when learning about a concept is supervised,
focuses on the information that is necessary for clas- it is sometimes possible for us to decide which exam-
sification but when that focus is removed, more ro- ples we want to learn about and when. For example,
bust knowledge of internal structure can be acquired. on a trip to the zoo, a child may ask a parent to la-
Because categories in the real world are used for bel certain unknown examples (“antelope?”) but not
a multitude of different tasks, developing robust others. This self-directed learning (also known as
categories through multiple modes of learning is active or selective learning) is thought to be more
essential. effective than passive (receptive) learning, particu-
larly when category distinctions are based on simple
4.2.3 Organizing our Own Concepts rules (Bruner, 1961, Markant & Gureckis, 2014).
Differences in how people learn in these modes can
In many cases, we cannot rely on category mem- be simulated in the lab by having one group of par-
bership being explicitly defined for us but rather we ticipants construct or select specific examples to
must organize our observations into categories us- learn about while another group is either given a
ing our own heuristics. For example, your concept random presentation order or a presentation order

Kinds of Categories and Their Uses Levering & Kurtz
that matches a participant in the first group (this As discussed above, the theory view suggests that
is called a yoked design). In these kind of studies, concepts may not be sufficiently grounded by phys-
the participant who made the selection often learns ical similarities (see Goldstone, 1994). This may
the categories better despite being exposed to the or may not apply to ordinary entity concepts like
exact same examples as their yoked counterparts dog and chair, but it has become clear that there are
(Schwartz, 1966). Possible reasons for this could be important kinds of categories that are certainly not
that self-directed learning is more engaging, results subject to traditional similarity (high levels of match
in deeper processing and better memory for exam- between features) as an organizing principle.
ples, or allows for more focused attention oriented
toward testing specific hypotheses about category Barsalou (1983, 1985) demonstrated the existence
membership (see Gureckis & Markant, 2012, for and psychological role of ad-hoc categories that are
more information). generated in the moment (i.e., things to take out
of a house in case of fire) as well as more stable
categories that are goal-derived (i.e., things to eat
on a diet). Critically, the members of these cat-
4.3 Kinds of Categories and Their Uses egories lack any traditional featural similarity to
one another but do cohere systematically around
An important early contribution in the empirical functional ideals or goal-relevant properties (i.e.,
investigation of category structure was the finding zero-calorie). More broadly, the term relational
that categories are organized at different hierarchi- has been proposed (Gentner & Kurtz, 2005; Mark-
cal levels that serve different purposes—and specif- man & Stillwell, 2001) to describe categories based
ically that an intermediate level, known as the ba- on how objects relate to one another within scenes
sic level of categorization, appears to play a fore- or situations. For example, an ‘obstacle’ is a cate-
most role in guiding the way we access and use gory that can take nearly any concrete or abstract
categories (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Very specific form, but that coheres around fulfillment of a re-
categories (waterbuck antelope) capture tightly knit lationship wherein one entity blocks the progress
knowledge reflecting a large overlap in the features of another. Relational categories are grounded in
that each member has. This means that a great structure-mapping theory (Gentner, 1983), which
deal can be inferred with high confidence about a specifies how the alignment of structured representa-
member of such a category. Very broad categories tions (entities organized by filling roles in relations)
(mammal) are based on only a few core common drives psychological similarity. On this view, much
properties that carry a great deal of weight in or- of the meaning that people represent about the world
ganizing knowledge, but do not provide much spe- is more complex than simple objects and requires
cific information about their members. The basic specification of what elements relate to other ele-
level (antelope) provides a compromise of reason- ments in what. A great deal of empirical evidence
ably high resemblance between members of a sin- shows that comparison processes (analogy, similar-
gle category and low resemblance between mem- ity, metaphor) play a major role in human cognition,
bers in different categories. Therefore, the ba- and operate based on a search for identical sets of
sic level of categorization may be our most fluid connected relationships between cases (see Gentner,
and task-general way of making sense of everyday 1983). Researchers are pursuing the study of re-
experience. Interestingly, the level of categoriza- lational categories with an important emphasis on
tion that is privileged may not always be the ba- real-world learning where challenges include mas-
sic level—instead it varies depending on factors in- tering foundational concepts in formal instructional
cluding age, domain expertise, cultural norms, and settings and promoting successful use of acquired
the goals or tasks for which the category is being knowledge when the context or surface-level form
used (see Medin & Atran, 2004; Tanaka & Taylor, is not the same (Goldwater & Schalk, 2016; Kurtz
1991). & Honke, 2017; Loewenstein, 2010).

4.4 Future Directions in Concepts progress in understanding the transitions from in-
fant to child to adult forms of categorization (Carey,
While scientific progress toward an understanding of 2009; Keil, 1989; Sloutsky, 2010), but there is lim-
how people learn, represent, and use categories has ited cross-talk despite the obvious value to be gained.
been considerable, there remain significant frontiers Similarly, a subset of researchers has focused on
and challenges. One is that researchers have found a neurobiologically-oriented accounts of categories
number of explanatory principles that do a good job and concepts with pockets of impact arising between
of accounting for at least some part of the overall the approaches (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Barsa-
problem, but it is not clear whether the categoriza- lou et al., 2003; Tyler & Moss, 2001). In addition, a
tion system is deeply multi-faceted (i.e., variable set of mathematically-formulated accounts of con-
across domains, settings, learners, etc.) or whether cept formation seem to exist as a largely independent
the range of performance characteristics reflects dif- enterprise (Feldman, 2000; Pape, Kurtz, & Sayama,
ferent manifestations of a single universal, highly 2015; Vigo, 2013). We end by noting an emerg-
flexible mechanism. Another major challenge is ing counter-example: the burgeoning field of ma-
unifying our account of real-world, everyday catego- chine learning/data science in which classification
rization with advances made using highly artificial tasks are one of the core problems addressed. In a
tasks in the laboratory. Lastly, there is an important promising development, researchers are increasingly
need for synthesis and integration of data and theory finding value in drawing upon and contributing to
from perspectives outside of the core approach that research on learning and representation of categories
have produced largely siloed progress. For example, in both humans and machines.
developmental psychologists have made important
Summary
1. Concepts emerge from the discovery of fundamental similarities between category members.
They are the building blocks of thought as they connect perception to memory and allow for
reasoning about unknown properties.
2. Some theorists assert that concepts are abstractions of experienced category members, either
in the form of definitional rules for membership (classical view) or sets of commonalities or
averages that hold in most cases (prototype approach).
3. In contrast to abstraction, some theories assume that concepts are simply stored information
about individual examples that have been associated over time with category labels (exemplar
approach).
4. The theory-driven view focuses on the role of concepts in explanation and considers them to
be embedded in rich theoretical systems of knowledge that inform our determination of what
things are above and beyond how similar features are to previous examples.
5. Concept learning is most studied through a classification task in which examples are dis-
played and guesses followed by feedback result in learners developing knowledge of what
differentiates between members of more than one category.
6. Category learning tasks outside of the traditional classification task (observation, inference,
use) often result in more robust knowledge of the internal structure of a concept.
7. Learning concepts based largely on one’s own organization and in a self-directed way can
result in better learning.

Future Directions in Concepts Levering & Kurtz
8. While we can think of categories at many levels, there is evidence of a basic level (e.g., dog)
that is favored over other levels (e.g., mammal or pit bull), perhaps because of its compromise
between generality and specificity.
9. In addition to taxonomic categories, categories can be created on the fly (ad hoc), created
based on relevant tasks (goal-derived), or based on relationships between features (relational
categories).
Review Questions
1. Consider your own everyday concepts of the world introspectively. Which psychological
account of categorization seems most plausible?
2. How would you imagine neuroimaging techniques could be used to address open questions or
debates in the study of categorization?
3. Can you think of a way to resolve the difficulty of studying concept formation in the laboratory
without giving up ecological validity (naturalistic properties of the stimuli, setting, and task)?
4. How do you think concepts change from when examples are first encountered to their mature
state? How do concepts change across the human lifespan?
5. How do you think that changes in how people function in a digital, connected world may alter
the way concepts are learned, represented, and used?
6. What constructs from the psychological study of concepts do you think could be leveraged to
develop artificial intelligence capable of learning and reasoning?
Hot Topic: Categorization as finding the best account of the data

Rather than using similarity to reference points, the theory view suggests that
items are categorized based on how well the item’s features are explained by
a category. This notion of “well-explained” can be realized without departing
the realm of data. For example, one could compute the likelihood of an item
having the features that it does if it were a member of a particular category.
This conditional probability is based on knowing how many category members
have each feature (e.g., having spots) versus not. Following Bayes’ Theorem,
instead of using the features to directly predict the category, one uses the
Kimery Levering
likelihood of dogs having spots (and the other observed features of the target)
to predict how well the category fits the example. If the example has features that occur frequently
among dogs and the category itself is sufficiently common then that is strong evidence of membership.
Anderson (1991) proposed a rational account in which the goal of categorizing is to make the most
accurate possible inferences given the data. In this way, categorization is explained as forming
clusters (neighborhoods) of the items in a domain and then predicting the category based on how
likely each item feature is relative to each cluster combined with the likelihood of the category
within each cluster. Criticisms of this approach include evidence that people make predictions based

on one assigned category rather than by combining likelihoods arising from each possible category,
evidence that people do not treat category labels as just like any other feature to be predicted,
and the issue that the Bayesian foundations underlying this account implausibly assume feature
independence.
Fortunately, there is another way to determine how “well-explained” an item’s
features are relative to a category. Kurtz (2007) proposed that categories
can be understood in terms of: (1) a transformation function instantiated
as a set of synapse-like connection weights between a layer of neuron-like
nodes that encode the input feature values and a “hidden” layer that recodes
the information in an internal learned feature space; and (2) reconstruction
functions that predict what item features are most likely with respect to each
category. The paired functions represent category knowledge in the form of
expectations about what configurations of feature values are consistent with
membership. Error-driven learning adjusts the function pairs to work harmo-
niously for items that belong in each category. When an item is consistent with
Kenneth Kurtz these expectations, it passes through the functions relatively unchanged, but
when input feature(s) are inconsistent, the functions yield reconstructive distortion—the expected
features do not match the observed ones. The amount of such distortion indexes the likelihood of
membership. When a cat is evaluated as a dog, the result is a shift toward category expectations
(i.e., bigger size, barking call, greater sociality) and this degree of distortion indicates poor category
fit. A connectionist model called DIVA (see Figure 4.3) based on these principles provides a better
account of human categorization on some critical tests than reference point models (e.g., Conaway
& Kurtz 2017).
Figure 4.3: The structure of the connectionist model DIVA (Kurtz, 2007). In this example, a stimulus (three input features) is
best reconstructed through the dog channel and so the model would classify it as a dog.
References
Anderson, J. R. (1991). The adaptive nature of human categorization. Psychological Review, 98, 409–429.
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.98.3.409
Conaway, N. & Kurtz, K. J. Similar to the category, but not the exemplars: A study of generalization.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24, 1312–1323. doi:10.3758/s13423-016-1208-1
Kurtz, K. J. (2007). The divergent autoencoder (DIVA) model of category learning. Psychonomic Bulletin &
Review, 14, 560–576. doi:10.3758/BF03196806

References Levering & Kurtz
References
Ahn, W. & Kim, N. S. (2000). The causal sta- Markman, & P. W. Wolff (Eds.), Categorization in-
tus effect in categorization: An overview. In D. side and outside the lab (pp. 151–175), Washington,
Minda (Ed.), The psychology of learning and moti- DC: APA. doi:10.1037/11156-009
vation (pp. 23–65), San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical
doi:10.1006/cogp.2000.0741 framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7, 155–
Armstrong, S. L., Gleitman, L. R., & Gleitman, H. (1983). 170. doi:10.1207/s15516709cog0702_3
What some concepts might not be. Cognition, 13, Goldstone, R. L. (1994). The role of similarity in cate-
263–308. doi:10.1006/cogp.2000.0741 gorization: Providing a groundwork. Cognition, 52,
Ashby, F. G. (1992). Multidimensional models of cat- 125–157. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90065-5
egorization. In F. G. Ashby (Ed.), Muldimensional Goldwater, M. B., & Schalk, L. (2016). Relational cat-
models of perception and cognition (pp. 449–483). egories as a bridge between cognitive and educa-
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. doi:10.4324/9781315807607 tional research. Psychological Bulletin, 142, 729–257.
Ashby, F. G. & Maddox, W. T. (2005). Human category doi:10.1037/bul0000043
learning. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 149–178. Gureckis, T. M., & Markant, D. M. (2012). Self-directed
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070217 learning: A cognitive and computational perspective.
Ashby, F. G., & Maddox, W. T. (1993). Relations between Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 464–481.
prototype, exemplar, and decision bound models of doi:10.1177/1745691612454304
categorization. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Hampton, J. A. (1993). Prototype models of concept rep-
37, 372–4000. doi:10.1006/jmps.1993.1023 resentation. In I. van Mechelen, J. A. Hampton, R. S.
Barsalou, L. W. (1983). Ad hoc categories. Memory and Michalski, & P. Theuns (Eds), Categories and con-
Cognition, 11, 211–227. doi:10.3758/BF03196968 cepts: Theoretical views and inductive data analysis,
Barsalou, L. W. (1985). Ideals, central tendency, and pp. 67–95. London: Academic Press.
frequency of instantiation as determinants of graded Keil, F. C. (1989). Concepts, kinds and cognitive develop-
structure in categories. Journal of Experimental Psy- ment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
chology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 11, 629– Komatsu, L. K. (1992). Recent views of conceptual
654. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.11.1-4.629 structure. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 500–526.
Barsalou, L.W. (2003). Situated simulation doi:10.1037/0033-2909.112.3.500
in the human conceptual system. Lan- Kruschke, J. K. (1992). ALCOVE: An exemplar-based
guage and Cognitive Processes, 18, 513–562. connectionist model of category learning. Psy-
doi:10.1080/01690960344000026 chological Review, 99, 22–44. doi:10.1037/0033-
Bruner, J. (1961). The act of discovery. Harvard Educa- 295X.99.1.22
tional Review, 31, 21–32. Kurtz, K. J., & Honke, G. (Under invited revision).
Carey, S. (2009) The origin of concepts. Oxford: Sorting out the problem of inert knowledge: Cate-
Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/ gory construction to promote spontaneous transfer.
9780195367638.001.0001 doi:10.31234/osf.io/uq42r
Erickson, M. A., & Kruschke, J. K. (1998). Rules Kurtz, K. J. (2015). Human category learning: To-
and exemplars in category learning. Journal of ward a broader explanatory account. Psychol-
Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 107–140. ogy of Learning and Motivation, 63, 77–114.
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.127.2.107 doi:10.1016/bs.plm.2015.03.001
Feldman, J. (2000). Minimization of Boolean complexity Kurtz, K. J. (2007). The divergent autoencoder (DIVA)
in human concept learning. Nature, 407, 630–633. model of category learning. Psychonomic Bulletin &
doi:10.1038/35036586 Review, 14, 560–576. doi:10.3758/BF03196806
Gentner, D., & Kurtz, K. J. (2005). Relational categories. Levering, K. R., & Kurtz, K. J. (2015). Observation versus
In W. K. Ahn, R. L. Goldstone, B. C. Love, A. B. classification in supervised category learning. Mem-

ory & Cognition, 43, 266–282. doi:10.3758/s13421- Minda, J. P. & Ross, B. H. (2004). Learning categories by
014-0458-2 making predictions: An investigation of indirect cate-
Loewenstein, J. (2010). How one’s hook is baited mat- gory learning. Memory & Cognition, 32, 1355–1368.
ters for catching an analogy. Psychology of Learning doi:10.3758/BF03206326
and Motivation, 53, 149–182. doi:10.1016/S0079- Murphy, G. L., & Medin, D. L. (1985). The role of theo-
7421(10)53004-4 ries in conceptual coherence. Psychological Review,
Love, B. C., Medin, D. L., & Gureckis, T. M. (2004). 92, 289–316. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.92.3.289
SUSTAIN: A network model of human category Murphy, G. L. (2002). The big book of concepts.
learning. Psychological Review, 111, 309–332. Cambridge, MA: MIT press. doi:10.7551/mitpress/
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.111.2.309 1602.001.0001
Lupyan, G. (2013). The difficulties of execut- Murphy, G. L. (2003). Ecological validity and the study
ing simple algorithms: Why brains make mis- of concepts. In B. H. Ross (Ed.), The psychology
takes computers don’t. Cognition, 129, 615–636. of learning and motivation, Vol. 43 (pp. 1–41),
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.08.015 San Diego: Academic Press. doi:10.1016/s0079-
Markant, D. B., & Gureckis, T. M. (2014). Is it better to 7421(03)01010-7
select or to receive? Learning via active and passive Murphy, G. L. & Allopenna, P. D. (1994). The locus of
hypothesis testing. Journal of Experimental Psychol- knowledge effects in concept learning. Journal of Ex-
ogy: General, 143, 94–122. doi:10.1037/a0032108 perimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cog-
Markman, A. B. & Ross, B. H. (2003). Category use nition, 20, 904–919. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.20.4.904
and category learning. Psychological Bulletin, 129, Nosofsky, R. M. (1984). Exemplar-based accounts of
592–613. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.4.592 relations between classification, recognition, and
Markman, A.B. & Stilwell, C.H. (2001). Role- typicality. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
governed categories. Journal of Experimental Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14, 700–708.
and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 12, 329–358. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.14.4.700
doi:10.1080/09528130110100252 Nosofsky, R. M. (1986). Attention, similarity, and the
Medin, D. L. (1989). Concepts and conceptual struc- identification-categorization relationship. Journal
ture. American Psychologist, 44, 1469–1481. of Experimental Psychology: General, 115, 39–57.
doi:10.1037/0003-066X.44.12.1469 doi:10.1037/0096-3445.115.1.39
Medin, D. L., Lynch, E. B., & Solomon, K. O. (2000). Are Nosofsky, R. M., Palmeri, T. J., & McKinley, S. C. (1994).
their kinds of concepts? Annual Review of Psychology, Rule-plus-exception model of classification learning.
51, 121–147. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.121 Psychological review, 101, 53–79. doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.101.1.53
Medin, D. L. & Schaffer, M. M. (1978). Context theory
of classification. Psychological Review, 85, 207–238. Pape, A. D., Kurtz, K. J., & Sayama, H. (2015).
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.85.3.207 Complexity measures and concept learning. Jour-
nal of Mathematical Psychology, 64–65, 66–75.
Medin, D. L. & Atran, S. (2004). The native mind: Biolog-
doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2015.01.001
ical categorization and reasoning in development and
across cultures. Psychological Review, 111, 960–983. Posner, M. I., & Keel, S. W. (1968). On the genesis of
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.111.4.960 abstract ideas. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
77, 353–363. doi:10.1037/h0025953
Medin, D. L., Wattenmaker, W. D., & Hampson, S. E.
(1987). Family resemblance, conceptual cohesiveness, Rehder, B. (2003). A causal-model theory of con-
and category construction. Cognitive psychology, ceptual representation and categorization. Journal
19(2), 242–279. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(87)90012- of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
0 and Cognition, 29, 1141–1159. doi:10.1037/0278-
7393.29.6.1141
Miller, G. A., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1976). Language
and perception. Cambridge, MA, England: Belknap Rosch, E. & Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family resemblance:
Press. doi:10.4159/harvard.9780674421288 Studies in the internal structure of categories. Cog-
nitive Psychology, 7, 573–605. doi:10.1016/0010-
0285(75)90024-9

References Levering & Kurtz
Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). On evaluating story of the beholder? Cognitive Psychology, 23, 457–482.
grammars. Cognitive Science, 4, 313–316. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(91)90016-H
doi:10.1207/s15516709cog0403_5 Tversky, A. (1977). Features of similarity. Psycho-
Schwartz, S. H. (1966). Trial-by-trial analysis of pro- logical Review, 84, 327–352. doi:10.1037/0033-
cesses in simple and disjunctive concept-attainment 295X.84.4.327
tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 72, 456– Tyler, L. K., & Moss, H. E. (2001). Towards a dis-
465. doi:10.1037/h0023652 tributed account of conceptual knowledge. Trends
Shepard, R. N. (1957). Stimulus and response general- in Cognitive Science, 5, 244–252. doi:10.1016/S1364-
ization: A stochastic model relating generalization to 6613(00)01651-X
distance in psychological space. Psychometrika, 22, Vigo, R. (2013). The GIST of concepts. Cognition, 129,
325–345. doi:10.1007/BF02288967 138–162. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.05.008
Shepard, R. N. (1987). Toward a universal law of general- Vong, W. K., Navarro, D. J., & Perfors, A. (2016). The
ization for psychological science. Science, 237,1317– helpfulness of category labels in semi-supervised
1323. doi:10.1126/science.3629243 learning depends on category structure. Psychonomic
Sloutsky, V. M. (2010). From perceptual categories to Bulletin & Review, 23, 230–238. doi:10.3758/s13423-
concepts: What develops? Cognitive Science, 34, 015-0857-9
1244–1286. doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01129.x Wisneiwski, E. J., & Medin, D. L. (1994). On
Smith, E. E., & Medin, D. L. (1981). Categories and the interaction of theory and data in concept
concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. learning. Cognitive Science, 18, 221–281.
doi:10.4159/harvard.9780674866270 doi:10.1207/s15516709cog1802_2
Smith, J. D., & Minda, J. P. (2001). Prototypes in category Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations.
learning: The effects of category size, category struc- New York, NY: Macmillan.
ture, and stimulus complexity. Journal of Experimen- Yamauchi, T. & Markman, A. B. (1998). Category
tal Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, learning by inference and classification. Jour-
27, 775–799. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.27.3.775 nal of Memory and Language, 39, 124–148.
Tanaka, J. W., & Taylor, M. (1991). Object cate- doi:10.1006/jmla.1998.2566
gories and expertise: Is the basic level in the eye

Levering & Kurtz Glossary
Glossary
abstraction The process of filtering out irrelevant graded structure When certain members of a cat-
details while preserving the most relevant, egory are thought to be better examples than
common, or significant parts. 56 others. 57
prototype approach Assumes a concept to be an

basic level of categorization Intermediate level
abstracted list or full example consisting of
that provides the most cognitively useful com-
common/average features that members are
promise between being informative (members
likely (but not required) to have. 58
share many common traits) but also generic
(glosses over minor differences). 63
selective attention A focus of resources on char-
acteristics that are relevant for classification.
category Collection of objects, people, events, or 58
ideas in the world that are considered similar
or treated similarly despite differences. 55 similarity The extent to which two or more con-
cepts or examples are alike, either through
classical view Assumes a concept to be the neces- having shared properties or close proximity
sary and sufficient conditions for membership in multidimensional psychological space. 56
in a category. 57
supervised category learning Learning about a
category when examples are labeled with
concept The mental representation of a category
what category they are in either initially or
which can take on different forms depending
after a guess. 61
on which theory is being considered. 55
theory-driven approach Assumes a concept to be
exemplar approach Assumes a concept to be a based on feature similarity but in service of
collection of remembered instances that make and collaboration with knowledge-rich theo-
up a category, with no abstraction. 58 ries about the world. 60

Chapter 5
Knowledge Representation and Acquisition

A RTHUR C. G RAESSER , A NNE M. L IPPERT, & K EITH T. S HUBECK
University of Memphis
This chapter discusses how knowledge is repre- that people construct (Rubin, 1995). Psychologists
sented in our minds when we learn about new topics in the learning sciences investigate the nature of
in school and life. How do we encode and think the representations that we construct when we learn
about subject matters in fields as diverse as psychol- new topics and use the knowledge when performing
ogy, literature, art, history, biology, physics, mathe- tasks.
matics, and computer technology? The knowledge
Mental representations of what we perceive are
representations and reasoning in these fields often
not perfect copies of the world out there. The mental
differ (Goldman et al., 2016). In psychology and
representations we construct about the world are sim-
physics, we think like a scientist. We think about
plifications that often have errors and distortions. As
hypotheses and how to test them by collecting data
an interesting exercise, draw from memory a floor-
in experiments. In mathematics, we puzzle over
plan of your home, with the various doors, windows,
formulas and proofs. In literature, we construct
and pieces of furniture. Then compare the sketch
imaginary worlds in our mind that may or may not
with your actual home and note the differences. Or
correspond to anything in the real world. In com-
if you prefer, sketch your town with the streets and
puter technology, we think about procedures for
landmarks. Although you have experienced your
running programs that perform some practical task.
home and town for hundreds of thousands of days,
The representations and ground rules for thinking
there are still distortions. Psychologists in the cog-
are quite different in these different disciplines.
nitive sciences investigate theories about the prop-
erties of these mental representations and conduct
There are multiple ways to represent experiences
experiments to test the theories.
and topics of interest. Popular music is a great ex-
ample of this. Consider how people represent music This chapter identifies some of the theories of
when they listen to songs such as Hey Jude by the representation that cognitive and learning scientists
Beatles, Crazy in Love by Beyoncé, or Yankee Doo- have developed. Their goal is to explain how chil-
dle. Some have representations that focus on the dren and adults represent knowledge during learn-
melody, others the lyrics, others the emotions, oth- ing. The focus of this chapter is on learning when
ers visual images, and others the rhythm and meter adults acquire subject matters in schools, the work-
that inspire dance or other forms of physical motion. force, and their personal lives. In contrast, Chapter 4
Most of us have mental representations with some (“Concepts: Structure and Acquisition”) and Chap-
combination of these dimensions. There is no right ter 17 (“Development of Human Thought”) take
or wrong representation, but memory for the songs on the development of representations in infants
is influenced by the nature of the representations and children. Our emphasis is also on deeper lev-

Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck Knowledge Representation and Acquisition
els of comprehension and learning (Millis, Long, ponents. A knowledge component is much like
Magliano, & Wiemer, 2019). A recent report by a sentence that expresses a particular idea that is
the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and important to know about a topic. Example knowl-
Medicine on How People Learn (volume 2, 2018) edge components in psychology can be captured
contrasts six basic types of learning: habit forma- in such expressions as “absence makes the heart
tion and conditioning, observational learning, im- grow fonder” (as the opposite to “out of sight, out
plicit pattern learning, perceptual and motor learn- of mind”), “team members in groups may not re-
ing, learning of facts, and learning by making infer- spond because they expect other members to re-
ences from mental models. This chapter emphasizes spond”, or “correlation does not imply causation.”
the learning of facts and making inferences from An example in physics is “force equals mass times
mental models, although the other types of learning acceleration” whereas an example in mathematics
are sometimes very relevant. is “the circumference of a circle is pi times the di-
Instructional media and technology will play an ameter.” Some knowledge components are if-then
important role in this chapter because they dominate rules with contingencies: “If a person has XX chro-
the world we live in today. Media and technology mosomes, they are female; if a person has XY
shape how we think and represent information. For chromosomes, they are male.” The subject matter
example, a few decades ago it would have taken days on a topic may consist of a long list of dozens
to find an answer to a question as people walked to to hundreds of knowledge components. As stu-
libraries, to card catalogues, to stacks of books, and dents learn a subject matter, students and teachers
searched pages and paragraphs for an answer. The do not know how well the performance on these
same question can now be answered in seconds on knowledge components is progressing. However,
the computer. We expect swift answers to questions computers can track this progress for individual
and get irritated by delays. A decade ago students students in intelligent tutoring systems (Graesser,
submitted essays for grading and waited for days 2016; Koedinger, Corbett, & Perfetti, 2012) and
or weeks for a grade. Now essays can be graded for individuals and groups in team learning (von
immediately with validity comparable to experts Davier, Zhu, & Kyllonen, 2017). When the com-
(Foltz, 2016). We now live in a world of intelligent puter determines that enough of the knowledge com-
tutoring systems that tailor learning to the individ- ponents have been learned by the student, the sys-
ual student (Graesser, Hu, & Sottilare, 2018) and tem then decides that the student has mastered the
computer environments where groups of people can topic.
learn and solve problems together (Fiore & Wilt- How does the student, instructor, or computer
shire, 2016). We now live in a world where facts know whether a knowledge component (KC) has
need to be checked for misinformation and contra- been mastered? The answer is debatable. Consider
dictions (Rapp & Braasch, 2014) and technology once again the knowledge component “team mem-
has the only major capacity to do so. We live in bers in groups may not respond because they expect
a world of media, games, and adutainment. These other members to respond.” How would one know
seductions appeal to our motivational and emotional whether this KC has been mastered by a learner?
seductions and run the risk of competing with the There are many possible operational definitions. Can
learning of important subject matter. All of these the learner recite the KC in words that have the same
advances in media and technology influence how we meaning as the KC? Does the learner send impor-
represent and acquire knowledge. tant requests to individuals rather than groups in
social communication systems (knowing that there
may be diffusion of responsibility in groups)? Mas-
5.1 Knowledge Components tery of some KC’s may be reflected in a number
of cognitive measures, such as response times to
This first approach to representing subject matter requests, eye movements, and neuroscience indica-
knowledge consists of a list of knowledge com- tors (see Chapter 3, “Methods for Studying Human

The Representation of Knowledge Components Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck
Thought”). Individual learners may differ in how two sentences have the same or different meanings,
they behaviorally show mastery of a particular KC. but they also do not always agree.
They may exhibit mastery in words, drawing figures, Multiple levels of language and discourse need
gestures, problem solving, or other actions. to be considered when deciding whether two verbal
Mastery of knowledge components improves over expressions have the same meaning (Pickering &
time if there is knowledge acquisition. Computers Garrod, 2004; McNamara, Graesser, McCarthy, &
can track this. Suppose a computer tracks whether Cai, 2014). We need to consider whether the words
or not a student on a KC has a successful response have the same or similar meaning. For example, the
(1) or an unsuccessful response (0) over 8 episodes phrase “team members in groups” is very similar in
of being assessed. The following sequence would re- meaning to “people in groups” in the example KC
flect successful learning on assessment episode num- but not to “sports in groups.” Syntax and word order
ber 4: 00011111. The sequence 01010101 shows matter when interpreting meaning. The meaning
no learning because the number of 1’s is the same of the phrase “team members in groups” is quite
for the first four episodes and the second four. Prob- different in meaning than “to members group in
abilistic learning is reflected in 00101011 because teams” and the nonsensical expression “groups team
there is only one 1 among the first four episodes but in members.” The discourse context also needs to
three 1’s in the last four episodes. Mastery of a topic be considered when deciding whether two sentences
is achieved when many of the KCs are mastered in have the same meaning. The expression “absence
performance assessments. makes the heart grow fonder” makes sense in a psy-
chology class when debating whether a romance will
survive after two lovers part for a few months. It
5.2 The Representation of Knowledge does not make sense when a student tries to explain
to an instructor why an exam was missed.
Components
Mastery of a knowledge component is manifested
The mastery of a knowledge component depends in its meaning rather than the precise surface struc-
how it is represented and how picky one is as to ture (i.e., wording and syntax). People tend to re-
whether it is mastered. A precise standard for a ver- member in long-term memory the meaning of ideas
bal representation would be an exact match between rather than the surface structure (Craik & Lockhart,
the expected knowledge component and the stu- 1972). Surface structure is normally short-lived, a
dent’s language. However, it is important to match minute or less, whereas the semantic meaning lasts
on meaning rather than precise language (Kintsch, a long time. Therefore, verbal memory assessments
1998). There are many ways to articulate “team of how well a student has mastered a subject matter
members in groups may not respond because they need to consider the meaning of the KCs rather than
expect other members to respond” in particular con- the exact wording. An essay test that taps meaning
texts, such as “there is diffusion of responsibility in is superior to a test on reciting texts verbatim.
the group”, “tell John personally because he expects Mastery of a knowledge component is often man-
others on the team to handle the task”, or “the like- ifested nonverbally. Actions, facial expressions,
lihood of a team member completing an assigned eye movements, pointing gestures, and other behav-
task is lower than when an individual is assigned iors can signal mastery. Consider a KC that “some
the task.” How can one determine whether these chemical sprays from groundkeepers cause people
answers match the KC when they are worded so to sneeze.” When someone starts sneezing, this KC
differently? Computers have made major advances is likely to have been mastered if the person gets up
in evaluating the accuracy of semantic matches in and looks out the window, glares in contempt at the
a field called computational linguistics (Jurafsky & groundkeeper, points to the groundkeeper, closes the
Martin, 2008), but they are far from perfect. Expert window, and/or puts on an allergy mask. There is no
human judges have moderate agreement on whether need to articulate the KC in words.

Figure 5.1: Four different types of knowledge structures: Taxonomic, spatial, causal, and goal-action procedures.
5.3 Knowledge Structures ideas that can be expressed in a word, phrase or

sentence. As explained above, however, it is the
Our description of the knowledge component repre- meaning rather than the surface structure that cap-
sentation does not take into consideration the structures the essence of a node. Nodes are sometimes
tural relations between ideas. This section em- assigned to epistemic categories, such as concept,
phasizes these relational connections. Four types state, event, process, goal, or action. An arc is a
of structures are being discussed here to illustrate connection between two nodes. An arc is directed
the importance of relations. These are shown in (forward, backward, or bidirectional) and often as-
Figure 5.1: Taxonomic, spatial, goal-action proce- signed to categories (such as is-a, has-as-parts, prop-
dures, and causal structures. There are many other erty, contains, cause, reason). A graph consists of a
types of knowledge structures, such as organiza- set of nodes connected by arcs. Below we describe
tional charts of positions in a corporation and the some different kinds of graphs that are depicted in
lineage in family trees. All of these knowledge Figure 5.1.
structures emphasize how knowledge is intercon-
nected and that ideas close to each other in the struc-
ture are more conceptually related than ideas far
5.3.1 Taxonomic Structures
away. When an idea is activated during learning, it Taxonomic structures represent the concepts that
tends to activate its nearby neighbors in the structure were discussed in Chapter 4, “Concepts: Structure
more than neighbors far away (Collins & Loftus, and Acquisition”. The concepts are organized in a
1975). hierarchical structure that is connected by is-a arcs.
There is a terminology that researchers use to talk A robin is-a bird, a turkey is-a bird, a bird is-a an-
about these knowledge structures. Nodes are basic imal, an animal is-a living thing. These is-a arcs

Spatial Structures Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck
that are directly represented in the graph, but others from Memphis to Jackson, Tennessee seems closer
can be inferred by the principle of transitivity: a than to Jackson, Mississippi, yet the actual distance
robin is an animal, a turkey is an animal, a robin is the opposite.
is a living thing, a turkey is a living thing, and a
bird is a living thing. Each of these concept nodes
5.3.3 Goal-action Procedures
have distinctive properties, such as a robin has a red
breast, a turkey is eaten by humans, a bird can fly, an Goal-action procedural structures are organized
animal breathes, and living things can move. These into a hierarchy of nodes connected by “in order
properties can be inherited by transitive inference, to” arcs. The nodes refer to goals or desired states
such as the following expressions: a robin can fly, a that are organized hierarchically and that guide a
robin breathes, a robin can move, a bird can move, sequence of actions that achieve the goals if the pro-
and so forth. There is some evidence that these in- cedure is successfully performed. Imagine you have
ferred expressions take a bit more time to judge as a goal of eating at a restaurant. The structure in
true or false than the direct expressions (Collins & Figure 5.1 shows how this could be accomplished.
Loftus, 1975). In order to eat at the restaurant, you need to get to
the restaurant and order your food. In order to get
to a restaurant, you need to drive your car and look
5.3.2 Spatial Structures
for the restaurant. This specific knowledge structure
Spatial structures have a hierarchy of regions that in Figure 5.1 does not require careful deliberation to
are connected by is-in arcs (or the inverse contains plan and execute. The procedure becomes a routine
relation). As shown in Figure 5.1, Los Angeles is-in through experience and repetition. It would be ex-
California, San Diego is-in California, Reno is-in hausting to plan through problem solving for each
Nevada, California is-in the western US, Nevada step of every goal-action procedure you carry out
is-in the western US, and the western US is-in the throughout the day. However, such problem solv-
USA. From these, we can derive via transitivity the ing (see Chapter 9) is needed when a person visits
following inferences: Los Angeles is in the western another country.
US, San-Diego is in the western US, Reno is in the The structure in Figure 5.1 is taken from the per-
western US, Los Angeles is in the USA, and so on. spective of one person who needs food. However,
The locations within each region can also be con- there are other people who have their own agenda,
nected by relational arcs that specify north, south, such as the cook and the person at the counter. A
east, and west. We see in Figure 5.1 that Los Ange- script is a structure that considers all of the people
les is north-of San-Diego and California is west-of who participate in the organized activity of a restau-
Nevada. We can infer by transitivity that San Diego rant (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979). The cook, the
is west of Reno. Most of these transitive inferences person at the counter who collects money, and the
are correct when we look at actual maps. However, customer all have their own goal structures and per-
these inferences are not always correct (Stevens & spectives. The script also has taxonomic structures
Coupe, 1978). For example, San Diego is actually (cook → employee → person) and spatial structure
east of Reno rather than west of Reno according to (table → restaurant → building).
an actual map. Similarly, Seattle is actually north These goal-action procedures and script struc-
of Toronto and El Paso is actually west of Denver. tures explain a number of psychological phenomena.
Knowledge structures and these transitive inferences Each goal-action node is broken down into subor-
are often accurate, but sometimes generate some in- dinate nodes that become much more detailed in
teresting errors. The knowledge structures also can the activity. People tend to forget the lower-level
to some extent predict biases in distance. For ex- details of the actions and procedures (Bower et al.,
ample, distances between cities within a region can 1979), which are often automatized from repetition
also, to some extent, seem closer than distances be- and experience (see Chapter 13, “Expertise”). Peo-
tween cities from different regions. The distance ple tend to notice obstacles to goals being accom-

plished and may become frustrated, as everyone The structures in Figure 5.1 are very systematic,
who has waited for many minutes trying to order organized, and conceptually precise. The mental
food at a counter knows. When people visually ob- structures are not that neat and tidy. One approach
serve scripts being enacted, they tend to notice event to help people learn is to have them construct such
boundaries (i.e., junctures, separations) after a goal graphs during or after they comprehend text, digital
is achieved/interrupted, when there is a new spatial environments on the internet, conduct an experi-
setting, and when a new person enters a scene (Za- ment, or perform some other activity. The activity
cks, Speer, & Reynolds, 2009). When people read of constructing these conceptual graphs can help
stories, sentences take more time to read when they them learn a subject matter even though they are not
introduce new goals, spatial settings, and characters likely to generate neat and tidy structures. Available
(Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). These structures also research has also revealed that nodes that are more
explain answers to questions. When asked, “Why central in the structure (i.e., many arcs radiate from
do you go to a restaurant?”, a good answer would go them) are more important and better remembered
up the structure (in order to eat food) but not down (Bower et al., 1979; van den Broek, 2010).
the structure (in order to drive). When asked “how
do you go to a restaurant?”, a good answer would
be down the structure (you drive) but not up the 5.4 Associative Representations of
structure (you eat). Organized structures like these Knowledge
explain a large body of data involving neuroscience,
cognition, behavior, emotion, and social interaction. According to classical associationism, ideas vary in
how strongly associated they are with each other.
That is no doubt true, but the deep secret lies on
5.3.4 Causal Networks what can predict the strength of association. A word
like “evil” has likely strong associations to words
Causal networks can be used to answer the ques- like “bad” (a functional synonym), “good” (an oppo-
tion, “What causes something to occur?” For exam- site), “Halloween” (an event), “Knieval” (part of the
ple, one could use causal networks to show the chain phrase evil Knievel, the dare devil), and “devil” inter-
of events that cause a volcanic eruption, cancer, the esting etymology), but not to words like “smooth”,
winner of an election and other phenomenon in phys- “birthday”, and “Michael Jordan.”
ical, biological, and technological systems (van den What makes associations strong versus weak?
Broek, 2010). In a causal network, nodes represent Strength of repetition is clearly one factor. The
events (or states, or processes) whereas arcs point strength of association between ideas increases with
from one node to another if an event causes or en- the frequency of the ideas occurring together at the
ables another event. For example, in Figure 5.1, we same time and location. Another prediction is the
have a causal network showing how heart disease similarity of the ideas. The strength of association
can be a result of a causally driven chain of events. between two ideas is stronger to the extent they are
Some of these events are inspired by sociological similar in meaning. Positive outcomes is yet another
factors (getting a divorce) and psychobiological fac- prediction: two ideas have stronger association to
tors (smoking), whereas other events are entirely the extent that they lead to positive outcomes (a
products of biological systems (hardening of the reward, a solution) rather than negative outcomes
arteries). The events in the causal system that are (punishment, failure). In summary, repetition, sim-
linked through enables arcs convey a weak sense of ilarity, and reinforcement are major predictions of
causality, while the causes arcs indicate a stronger the strength of association between two ideas.
sense of causality. Causal networks are complex. These principles of associationism have been
They are not strictly hierarchical or follow a linear known for at least two centuries. They are deeply en-
order but can have many paths of connections and trenched in modern cognitive models of perception,
loops. categorization, memory, judgment, and other auto-

Associative Representations of Knowledge Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck
Figure 5.2: A neural network with an input layer, two hidden layers, and an output node.
mated processes of cognition. Neural networks They could refer to higher order categories, such
are a noteworthy class of models that implement as the overall amount of movement, positive versus
associationism (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1987). negative emotions, upper face parts versus lower
Figure 5.2 presents an example of a neural network. face parts, or angle of perspective. The hidden lay-
A neural network is a structure of nodes (analogous ers and nodes within these layers are statistically
to neurons) in multiple layers that are interconnected derived characteristics that depend on a long history
by directed, weighted arcs that potentially activate of experiences that the individual person has had.
the nodes (positive weights) or inhibit the nodes It is important to emphasize that these neural net-
(negative weights). A node is fired (all-or-none) if works learn from experience. The nodes and arcs
the arcs that feed into it receive enough activation, are strengthened or otherwise altered with each ex-
with the sum of the activation being stronger than perience. The networks capture the associationist
the inhibition. principles of repetition, similarity, reinforcement,
and contiguity of events in time and space.
In order to illustrate the mechanisms of a neu-
ral network, consider a neural network that detects Today neural networks are frequently used in ma-
whether or not a person’s face shows confusion. The chine learning and artificial intelligence to enable
input layer of nodes would correspond to states, computers to perceive people, objects, events, and
events, or processes on parts of the face at particular scenes, to guide robots in completing routine tasks,
positions. For example, the right eyelid opens wide, and to solve some types of problems. In this “deep
the mouth opens wide, or the left corner of the lip learning” revolution, massive amounts of experi-
contracts. Ekman and his colleagues developed a ences are fed into the computer during training of
facial action coding system that defines these fea- the neural network, far more than a single person
tures for those who investigate facial expressions would ever receive. As a consequence, the com-
(Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005). The output node is puter outperforms humans in precisely defined tasks.
activated if the set of activated input node features This has the potential to threaten the workforce for
show a pattern of confusion, but otherwise it is not some jobs that humans traditionally perform (El-
activated. There may also be one or more hidden lay- liot, 2017). These neural networks can handle only
ers of nodes that refer to intermediate states, events, specific tasks, however. A neural network for detect-
or processes. Exactly what these hidden nodes refer ing confusion would not be of much use to detect
to is not necessarily clear-cut and easy to interpret. surprise or boredom – they cannot generalize and

transfer to other tasks. Nevertheless, it is widely tions performed by characters, and their emotions.
acknowledged that generalization and transfer are Your experience is similar to watching a movie or
also very difficult for humans to accomplish (Hattie acting the parts yourself. Mental representations
& Donoghue, 2016). Perhaps the human mind is lit- are often colored with perceptual images, motoric
tle more than a large collection of these specialized actions, and visceral emotions rather than being ab-
neural networks. This is a debate in the cognitive stract conceptualizations. The meaning of abstract
and learning sciences. concepts (such as love) is often fortified by these
Another example of associative knowledge rep- dimensions of perception, action, and emotion, such
resentations is latent semantic analysis, LSA (Lan- as visual image of a wedding cake, a dance, or a first
dauer, McNamara, Dennis, & Kintsch, 2007). LSA kiss (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). There is
is a statistical representation of word knowledge and substantial evidence that memory is improved for
world knowledge that considers what words appear verbal material when learners construct visual im-
together in documents, such as articles in books, ages in their mind (Clark & Paivio, 1991) or they
speeches, conversations, and other forms of verbal perform actions associated with the content.
communication. According to LSA, the meaning of The importance of embodied cognition in com-
a word depends on the other words that accompany prehension is obvious when you go someplace new
it in real-world documents. The word riot often and ask for directions to a specific location, such
occurs in the company of other particular words in as the city hall. When you ask a stranger, “Where
documents, such as crowd, dangerous, protest, po- is the city hall?” the helpful stranger nearly always
lice, and run. These words do not always occur with points in the right direction and launches several sen-
the word riot of course, but they do with some co- tences with landmarks, paths, and left-right-straight
occurrence probability. These probabilities of words comments, typically accompanied by hand gestures.
with other words define a word’s meaning, which is You get confused by the second sentence but politely
very different than word meanings in a dictionary nod. Then you follow the suggested direction and
or thesaurus. LSA has been found to predict data soon ask the next person. The problem is that there
in many cognitive tasks such as priming (a word is very little shared knowledge between you and the
automatically activates another word), judgments stranger so you have no foundation for constructing
of sentence similarity, inferences, and summariza- a precise embodied path to the destination. Embod-
tion of text (Landauer et al., 2007). LSA has also ied representations are necessary for precise compre-
been used in computer systems that automatically hension of important messages about the physical,
grade student essays (Foltz, 2016) and tutor them in social, and digital worlds.
natural language (Graesser, 2016). The importance of embodied representations on
reading comprehension has been confirmed in the
Moved by Reading program (Glenberg, Goldberg,
5.5 The Body in Cognition & Zhu, 2011). Readers who struggle with reading
comprehension experience difficulty constructing
Proponents of embodied cognition believe that an embodied representation of the text. Suppose
mental representations are shaped and constrained that students read a text about events that occur at a
by the experience of being in a human body. Our tea party. This would be difficult to imagine if they
bodies influence what we perceive, our actions, and had no knowledge or experience with tea parties. In
our emotions. These embodied dimensions are often Moved by Reading, the student is presented with an
incorporated in representations when we compre- image of a tea set on a computer screen and then
hend text (Zwaan, 2016) and influence how we learn asked to act out a story on the content by pouring
(Glenberg, Goldberg, & Zhu, 2011). Embodied rep- tea, sipping tea, and performing other actions con-
resentations are constructed, for example, when you veyed in the story. Students are also later asked to
read a novel and get lost in the story world. There imagine acting out the story so they will internalize
is a rich mental model of the spatial setting, the ac- the strategy of constructing a mental model of the

Conversations Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck
text. When compared to students who were asked to edge representations are to some extent shaped by
simply reread the text, the students who were asked these conversations that are observed, enacted, re-
to imagine manipulating the objects showed large membered, or otherwise internalized in the mind
gains in comprehension and memory. One of the in- (Vygotsky, 1978). Texts that are written in the style
teresting research questions is whether it is better to of stories and oral conversation are read faster, com-
physically perform the actions compared to digitally prehended better, and remembered better than tech-
moving images on a computer screen or to imagine nical text that is distant from conversation.
performing actions in the mind. There is also solid evidence that one-on-one hu-
man tutoring helps to learn subject matter in courses
more than simply listening to lectures or reading
5.6 Conversations texts (Cohen, Kulik, & Kulik, 1982; VanLehn, 2011).
The individual tutor can find out the problems the
People have learned by observing and participating learner is facing, provide hints or direct assertions
in conversations throughout most of the history of on helping them, and answer their questions. Re-
personkind, especially prior to the invention of the searchers have developed intelligent tutoring sys-
printing press and computer technologies. The se- tems that simulate human tutors (VanLehn, 2011),
crets of family life and a person’s livelihood were including some systems like AutoTutor that hold
learned by holding conversations with members of a conversations with the student in natural language
family, a tutor, a mentor, a master, or a group of peo- (Graesser, 2016). These systems help students learn
ple participating in the practical activities. Knowl- subject matters like computer literacy, physics, and
Figure 5.3: This is a screenshot showing pedagogical agents used in an intelligent tutoring system (D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, &
Graesser, 2014). In this example, the tutor agent, Dr. Williams is on the left of the screen, and the peer agent, Chris, is on
the right of the screen. Reprinted from Learning and Instruction, 29, D’Mello, S., Lehman B., Pekrun, R., & Graesser, A.C.
Confusion can be beneficial for learning. 153-170. ©(2014), with permission from Elsevier.

scientific reasoning about as good as human tutors, For example, one case study described a new pill
both of which are better than conventional training that purportedly helps people lose weight, but the
methods like reading texts and listening to lectures. sample size was small and there was no control
group. During the course of the three-way conver-
A promising approach to establish deeper knowl-
sation, the agents periodically expressed false infor-
edge representations is to plant contradictions and
mation and contradictions. Disagreements between
information that clashes with prior knowledge to
the agents and with what the student believed tended
the point of the learner experiencing cognitive dise-
to create cognitive disequilibrium, confusion, and
quilibrium. Cognitive disequilibrium occurs when
disagreement. During the course of the trialogue
people face obstacles to goals, interruptions, con-
conversation, the agents periodically asked students
tradictions, incongruities, anomalies, impasses, un-
for their views (e.g., “Do you agree that the control
certainty, and salient contrasts. Cognitive conflicts
group in this study was flawed?”). The students’
can provoke information-seeking behavior, which
responses were coded on correctness and also the
engages the learner in inquiry, reasoning and deep
vacillation in making decisions when asked a ques-
learning. Learning environments with computer
tion multiple times throughout a conversation. There
agents have been designed to stage contradictions
were also measures of confusion. The correctness
and debates, thereby inducing cognitive disequilib-
and confusion scores confirmed that the cognitive
rium (D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, & Graesser, 2014).
disequilibrium that resulted from contradictions im-
These studies had tutor and peer agents engage with
proved learning, particularly among the students
the student in conversational trialogues while cri-
who had enough knowledge and thinking to be con-
tiquing research studies in psychology, biology, and
fused. That is, the experience of confusion, a signal
chemistry. An example screenshot is shown in Fig-
of thinking, played an important role in the deep
ure 5.3. Most of the research studies had one or
learning.
more flaws with respect to scientific methodology.
Table 5.1: Key affordances of learning technologies (National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018). ©National
Academies Press. Reprinted with permision. https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24783/how-people-learn-ii-learners-contexts-a
nd-cultures
1. Interactivity. The technology systematically responds to the actions of the learner.

2. Adaptivity. The technology presents information that is contingent on the behavior,
knowledge, or characteristics of the learner.
3. Feedback. The technology gives the learner information about the quality of their
performance and how it could improve.
4. Choice. The technology gives learners options on what to learn and how to regu-
late their own learning.
5. Nonlinear access. The technology allows the learner to select or receive learning activities
in an order that deviates from a set order.
6. Linked representations. The technology provides quick connections between representations for
a topic that emphasizes different conceptual viewpoints, media, and
pedagogical strategies.
7. Open-ended learner input. The technology allows learners to express themselves through natural
language, drawing pictures, and other forms of open-ended communica-
tion.
8. Communication with other people. The learner communicates with one or more people or agents.

Importance of Media and Technology in Knowledge Representation and Learning Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck
5.7 Importance of Media and alytical judgment, the output of a computer pro-
Technology in Knowledge gram, or a decision of a group. There are ques-
Representation and Learning tions such as “Should I write down on a piece
of paper the groceries I need to buy or try to
Theories of distributed cognition assume that the memorize them?”; “Should I compute this square
mind is shaped and constrained by the physical root by hand or use a calculator?”; “Should I ask
world, technologies, and other people in their en- my friends where to on vacation or decide that
vironment (Dror & Harnad, 2008; Hutchins, 1995). for them?” These are decisions in a distributed
An expert problem solver in a distributed world world.
needs to assess whether a technology, a social Media and technology play a central role in
community, the external physical world, or his/her shaping cognitive representations in a distributed
own analytical mind is best suited for achieving world. It is important to take stock of how they
particular steps in solving challenging problems. do so. Old-school media consisted of listening to
Judgments are involved in the decisions you make lectures, watching video presentations, and reading
when you decide whether to trust your own an- books. For these media, the learners passively ob-
Table 5.2: Mayer’s (2009) Principles to Guide Multimedia Learning. Adapted from NAESM (2018). With permission from National
Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018. ©National Academies Press. https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24783
/how-people-learn-ii-learners-contexts-and-cultures
1. Coherence Principle People learn better when extraneous words, pictures and sounds are excluded
rather than included.
2. Signaling Principle People learn better when cues that highlight the organization of the essential
material are added.
3. Redundancy Principle People learn better from graphics and narration than from graphics, narration
and on-screen text.
4. Spatial Contiguity Principle People learn better when corresponding words and pictures are presented near
rather than far from each other on the page or screen.
5. Temporal Contiguity Principle People learn better when corresponding words and pictures are presented simul-
taneously rather than successively.
6. Segmenting Principle People learn better from a multimedia lesson is presented in user-paced segments
rather than as a continuous unit.
7. Pre-training Principle People learn better from a multimedia lesson when they know the names and
characteristics of the main concepts.
8. Modality Principle People learn better from graphics and narrations than from animation and on-
screen text.
9. Multimedia Principle People learn better from words and pictures than from words alone.
10. Personalization Principle People learn better from multimedia lessons when words are in conversational
style rather than formal style.
11. Voice Principle People learn better when the narration in multimedia lessons is spoken in a
friendly human voice rather than a machine voice.
12. Image Principle People do not necessarily learn better from a multimedia lesson when the
speaker’s image is added to the screen.

serve or linearly consume the materials at their own there is no substance in helping people learn and
pace. However, the learning environments in today’s build useful knowledge representations. We live in
world require learners to be more active by strate- a world replete with games and social media that
gically searching through hypermedia, constructing contribute to shallow rather than deep knowledge
knowledge representations from multiple sources, representations.
performing tasks that create things, and interacting It is important to consider the characteristics
with technologies or other people (Chi, 2009; Wiley of the learning technologies that support deeper
et al., 2009). From the standpoint of technology, it knowledge representations and learning (Millis et
is worthwhile taking stock of the characteristics of al., 2019; NASEM, 2018). Mayer (2009) has also
learning environments that facilitate active, construc- identified 12 principles of multimedia learning that
tive, interactive learning environments. Table 5.1 improve knowledge representation and acquisition
shows some of these characteristics that were iden- (see Table 5.2). These principles are all based on
tified by the National Academy of Sciences, Engi- psychological theories and confirmed by data col-
neering, and Medicine in the second volume of How lected in experiments.
People Learn (NASEM, 2018). It is important to The hope is that stakeholders and policy mak-
consider these characteristics when selecting tech- ers in education encourage learning environments
nologies to support the acquisition of knowledge rep- which support knowledge representations needed
resentations in different subject matters, populations, in the 21st century. Citizens in the 21st century are
and individual learners. All of these characteristics faced with complex technologies, social systems and
have been implemented in learning technologies and subject matters (National Research Council, 2012;
have shown some successes in improving knowledge Levy & Murnane, 2006). Mastery of facts and rou-
representations and learning. tine procedures are necessary, but not sufficient for
Unfortunately, there is an abundance of commer- participation in a world that demands deeper com-
cial technologies that are not well designed, are not prehension of technical material and more complex
based on scientific principles of learning, and have problem solving, reasoning, information handling
no evidence they improve learning. There are many and communication. Understanding the nature of
bells and whistles of multimedia in so many prod- knowledge representations will be extremely impor-
ucts (a lot of razzle dazzle), but under the hood tant in meeting this challenge.
Summary
1. People construct mental representations when they experience the social, physical, and digital
world. Our perceptions are not exact copies of the world, but are simplified with errors
and missing information. Learning and performance on tasks are influenced by how our
knowledge is represented.
2. This chapter has reviewed the different types of representations that have been proposed by
researchers in the cognitive and learning sciences who investigate adult learning of different
subject matters. The types of representations include (1) ensembles of knowledge components,
(2) knowledge structures, (3) associationistic neural networks, (4) embodied perceptions,
actions, and emotions, (5) conversation, and (6) distributed cognition with diverse multimedia
and technologies.
3. Knowledge of a specific subject matter is represented by a set of knowledge components
which express ideas relevant to the topic. Knowledge structures consist of nodes, which
represent concepts, states, events, goals or processes, and arcs that connect the nodes with

Importance of Media and Technology in Knowledge Representation and Learning Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck
different types of relations (e.g., is-a, has-a, contains, causes). Four example knowledge
structures were discussed: taxonomic, spatial, causal, and goal-action procedures.
4. Neural networks model associationistic representations with neuron nodes connected by

associative weights. The strengths of the associations are determined by repetition, similarity,
how often nodes co-occur in time, and positive versus negative outcomes.
5. Knowledge representations and acquisition are influenced by our human experience and how
we interact with our environment. Embodied representations capture perception, action, and
emotion. Conversational representations include the social discourse we observe and enact
with families, tutors, mentors, and groups.
6. Digital technologies will continue to shape and constrain the mental representations and
influence how people learn. These technologies are making information about topics more
distributed across people, times, locations, and media sources.
Review Questions
1. Sketch a map of your town or city, including major landmarks and streets, based on your
memory. Try to be as detailed as possible. After you finish, compare your sketch with an
actual map. What did you get right, what did you miss, and what errors did you make in your
mental representation?
2. Create a more complete knowledge structure of eating at a fast food restaurant that includes
all types of structures in Figure 5.1: taxonomic, spatial, goal-action procedure, and causal.
3. According to the text, there are computerized tutoring systems that help people learn as well
as human tutors. What sort of subject matters have representations that are very difficult for
computer tutors to simulate, and why?
4. One very abstract concept is “peace.” To what extent can this concept be represented by
embodied perception, action, and emotion? What features of peace would be impossible to
capture with embodied cognition?
5. Consider a class you are currently taking. Which of the characteristics in Table 5.1 are part of
the class activities? For any characteristics that are missing, how could they be incorporated
by changing the class activities?

Hot Topic
Our research, along with colleagues in the interdisciplinary Institute for In-
telligent Systems, investigates language, discourse and learning. Our primary
focus is on the mastery of deep knowledge rather than shallow knowledge
in adults. Examples of shallow knowledge are facts, definitions, and routine
procedures, whereas deep knowledge involves causal reasoning, justification
of claims with evidence, resolution of contradictions, precise quantification of
ideas, and problem solving (Graesser, 2015). The workforce in the 21st century
has an increased expectation to acquire deep knowledge to the extent that
routine tasks are handled by robots and other digital technologies. Unfortu-
nately, the process of deep learning is challenging because the material is
difficult, useful strategies are sometimes novel, and some of the accompanying
emotions are negative (such as confusion and frustration, D’Mello, Lehman,
Art Graesser
Pekrun, & Graesser, 2014). Moreover, our current educational systems are
typically designed for acquiring shallow knowledge rather than deep knowledge.
One approach to acquiring deep knowledge is to develop com-
puterized intelligent tutoring systems that help adults acquire deep
knowledge. These systems have pedagogical strategies that are
tailored to the knowledge, skills and abilities of individual stu-
dents. We have developed a system called AutoTutor (Graesser,
2016), where a student learns by having conversations with ani-
mated conversational agents (computer-generated avatars). AutoTu-
tor presents difficult questions or problems, often with associated
figures and diagrams; the student and AutoTutor have a multiturn Keith T. Shubeck
conversation to co-construct an answer/solution. AutoTutor has
been developed and tested on a number of difficult subject matters, such as computer literacy,
physics, electronics, scientific reasoning, and comprehension strategies. These conversational ITS
have shown significant learning gains on deep knowledge compared with pretests and control
conditions such as reading text. Some versions of AutoTutor implement “trialogues” that involve
a conversation between the student and two computer agents, a tutor and a peer (Graesser, Li, &
Forsyth, 2014). The two agents can model good social interaction, productive reasoning, and at
times argue with each other to show different perspectives and resolutions of conflicts (D’Mello et
al., 2014).
We have investigated other approaches to improve deep learning through
language and discourse (Graesser, 2015). These include investigating inference
generation and mental models during the comprehension of stories, technical
text, illustrated texts, hypertext, and hypermedia. We have developed computer
systems (available on the internet for free) that scale texts on difficulty (Coh-
Metrix, http://cohmetrix.com) and questions on comprehension problems
(QUAID, http://quid.cohmetrix.com). We have investigated collaborative
problem solving where groups of people in computer-mediated communication
tackle problems that individuals cannot solve alone. A curriculum for 21st -
century skills is destined to include discourse technologies that facilitate deeper
knowledge acquisition.
Anne M. Lippert

References Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck
References
D’Mello, S., Lehman, B., Pekrun, R., & Graesser, A. C. (2014). Confusion can be beneficial for learning.
Learning and Instruction, 29, 153–170. doi:10.1016/j.learninstruc.2012.05.003
Graesser, A. C. (2015). Deeper learning with advances in discourse science and technology. Policy Insights
from Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2, 42–50. doi:10.1177/2372732215600888
Graesser, A. C. (2016). Conversations with AutoTutor help students learn. International Journal of Artificial
Intelligence in Education, 26, 124–132. doi:10.1007/s40593-015-0086-4
Graesser, A. C., Li, H., & Forsyth, C. (2014). Learning by communicating in natural language with conversa-
tional agents. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23, 374–380. doi:10.1177/0963721414540680
References
Barsalou, L. W., & Wiemer-Hastings, K. (2005). Sit- Dror, I. E. & Harnad, S. (Eds.). (2008). Cognition
uating Abstract Concepts. In Pecher D. & Zwaan, distributed: How cognitive technology extends our
R. (Eds.), Grounding cognition: The role of percep- minds. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
tion and action in memory, language, and thinking doi:10.1075/bct.16
(pp. 129–163). Cambridge: Cambridge University Ekman, P., & Rosenberg, E.L. (Eds.). (2005). What the
Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511499968.007 face reveals: Basic and applied studies of sponta-
Bower, G. H., Black, J. B., & Turner, T. J. (1979). Scripts neous expression using the facial action coding sys-
in memory for text. Cognitive Psychology, 11(2), tem (FACS). Change to Oxford Scholarship Online.
177–220. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(79)90009-4 doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179644.001.0001
Chi, M. T. H. (2009). Active-Constructive-Interactive: Elliot, S. (2017). Computers and the future of skill
A conceptual framework for differentiating learning demand. Retrieved from the OECD Publishing.
activities. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1, 73–105. doi:10.1787/9789264284395-en
doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01005.x Fiore, S. M., & Wiltshire, T. J. (2016). Technology as
Clark, J. M. & Paivio, A. (1991). Dual coding theory teammate: Examining the role of external cognition
and education. Educational Psychology Review, 3(3), in support of team cognitive processes. Frontiers
149–170. doi:10.1007/BF01320076 in Psychology: Cognitive Science, 7(1531), 1–17
Cohen, P. A., Kulik, J. A., & Kulik, C. C. (1982). Ed- doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01531
ucational outcomes of tutoring: A meta-analysis of Foltz, P. W. (2016). Advances in automated scoring of
findings. American Educational Research Journal, writing for performance assessment. In Y. Rosen, S.
19(2), 237–248. doi:10.3102/00028312019002237 Ferrara, & M. Mosharraf (Eds.), Handbook of Re-
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading- search on Technology Tools for Real-World Skill De-
activation theory of semantic processing. Psycho- velopment (pp. 659–678). Hershey, PA: IGI Global.
logical Review, 82(6), 407–428. doi:10.1037/0033- doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-9441-5.ch025
295X.82.6.407 Glenberg, A. M., Goldberg, A. B., & Zhu, X. (2011).
Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of pro- Improving early reading comprehension using em-
cessing: A framework for memory research. Journal bodied CAI. Instructional Science, 39(1), 27–39.
of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11(6), 671– doi:10.1007/s11251-009-9096-7
684. doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(72)80001-X Goldman, S.R., Britt, M. A., Brown, W., Cribb, C.,
D’Mello, S., Lehman, B., Pekrun, R., & Graesser, George, M. A., Greenleaf, C., Lee, C. D., & Shana-
A. C. (2014). Confusion can be beneficial for han, C. (2016). Disciplinary literacies and learning to
learning. Learning and Instruction, 29, 153–170. read for understanding: A conceptual framework for
doi:10.1016/j.learninstruc.2012.05.003

disciplinary literacy. Educational Psychologist, 51(2), Millis, K., Long, D. L., Magliano, J. P., & Wiemer,
219–246. doi:10.1080/00461520.2016.1168741 K. (Eds.). (2019). Deep comprehension: Multi-
Graesser, A. C. (2016). Conversations with Auto- disciplinary approaches to understanding, enhancing,
Tutor help students learn. International Journal and measuring comprehension. New York: Routledge.
of Artificial Intelligence in Education, 26,124–132. doi:10.4324/9781315109503
doi:10.1007/s40593-015-0086-4 National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and
Graesser, A. C., Hu, X., & Sottilare, R. (2018). Intelligent Medicine (2018). How People Learn II: Learners,
tutoring systems. In F. Fischer, C. E. Hmelo-Silver, S. contexts, and cultures. Washington, D.C.: National
R. Goldman, and P. Reimann (Eds.), International Academies Press. https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24783
handbook of the learning sciences (pp. 246–255). /how-people-learn-ii-learners-contexts-and-cultures
New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315617572- National Research Council (2012). Education for Life and
24 Work: Developing Transferable Knowledge and Skills
Hattie, J. A. C., & Donoghue, G. M. (2016). Learning in the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: The National
strategies: A synthesis and conceptual model. Na- Academies Press. doi:10.17226/13398
ture Partner Journal: Science of Learning, 1, 1–13. Pickering M.J., & Garrod S. (2004). Toward
doi:10.1038/npjscilearn.2016.13 a mechanistic psychology of dialogue. Be-
Hutchins, E. (1995), Cognition in the wild, MIT Press, havioral and Brain Sciences, 27(2), 169–225.
Cambridge, MA. doi:10.1017/S0140525X04000056
Jurafsky, D., & Martin, J. (2008). Speech and language Rapp, D. N., & Braasch, J. L. G. (Eds). (2014). Pro-
processing (2nd ed.). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. cessing inaccurate information: Theoretical and ap-
plied perspectives from cognitive science and the
Kintsch, W. (1998). Comprehension: A paradigm for
educational sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
cognition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
doi:10.7551/mitpress/9737.001.0001
Press.
Rubin, D. (1995). Memory in oral traditions: The cog-
Koedinger, K. R., Corbett, A. C., & Perfetti, C. (2012).
nitive psychology of epics, ballads, and counting-out
The Knowledge-Learning-Instruction (KLI) frame-
rhymes. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
work: Bridging the science-practice chasm to enhance
robust student learning. Cognitive Science, 36(5), 757– Stevens, A., & Coupe, P. (1978). Distortions in judged
798. doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01245.x spatial relations. Cognitive Psychology, 10(4), 422–
437. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(78)90006-3
Landauer, T., McNamara, D. S., Dennis, S., & Kintsch, W.
(Eds.). (2007). Handbook of latent semantic analysis. van den Broek, P. (2010). Using texts in science education:
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Cognitive processes and knowledge representation.
Science, 328, 453–456. doi:10.1126/science.1182594
Levy, F. & Murnane, R. J. (2006). Why the chang-
ing American economy calls for twenty-first cen- VanLehn, K. (2011). The relative effectiveness of hu-
tury learning: Answers to educators’ questions. man tutoring, intelligent tutoring systems and other
New Directions for Youth Development, 110, 53–62. tutoring systems. Educational Psychologist, 46(4),
doi:10.1002/yd.167 197–221. doi:10.1080/00461520.2011.611369
Mayer, R. E. (2009). Multimedia Learning (2nd ed.). New von Davier, A. A., Zhu, M., & Kyllonen, P. C. (Eds.).
York: Cambridge University Press. (2017). Innovative Assessment of Collaboration.
Cham, Switzerland: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-
McClelland, J. L., Rumelhart, D. E., & the PDP Research
33261-1
Group (1987). Parallel Distributed Processing: Ex-
plorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volume Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development
2: Psychological and Biological Models, Cambridge, of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA:
Massachusetts: MIT Press. Harvard University Press.
McNamara, D. S., Graesser, A. C., McCarthy, P. M., Cai, Wiley, J., Goldman, S. R., Graesser, A. C., Sanchez,
Z. (2014). Automated evaluation of text and discourse C. A., Ash, I. K., & Hemmerich, J. A. (2009).
with Coh-Metrix. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Uni- Source evaluation, comprehension, and learning
versity Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511894664 in Internet science inquiry tasks. American Ed-

References Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck
ucational Research Journal, 46(4), 1060–1106. Zwaan, R. A. (2016). Situation models, mental simula-
doi:10.3102/0002831209333183 tions, and abstract concepts in discourse comprehen-
Zacks, J. M., Speer, N. K., & Reynolds, J. R. (2009). Seg- sion. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(4), 1028–
mentation in reading and film comprehension. Journal 1034. doi:10.3758/s13423-015-0864-x
of Experimental Psychology: General, 138(2), 307– Zwaan, R. A., & Radvansky, G. A. (1998). Situation mod-
327. doi:10.1037/a0015305 els in language comprehension and memory. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 123(2), 162–185. doi:10.1037//0033-
2909.123.2.162

Graesser, Lippert, & Shubeck Glossary
Glossary
arcs In a knowledge structure, arcs are what con- knowledge structure Relational structure be-
nect two different nodes and represent how tween concepts in a particular topic. De-
the nodes are related: is-a, has-a-part, prop- scribes how ideas are conceptually related in
erty of, contains, cause, reason. 74 terms of their proximity with each other. 74
causal networks A knowledge structure consist- neural network Structure of nodes organized in
ing of event nodes that are connected by “en- multiple layers that are interconnected by arcs
ables” arcs. 76 that either activate or inhibit nodes given arc
direction and arc weight. 77
embodied cognition The idea that knowledge
and mental representations are influenced by nodes In a knowledge structure, nodes are con-
experiences of the human body (e.g., emotion, cepts, states, events, processes, goals or ac-
perception, actions). 78 tions of basic ideas that can be expressed by
words, phrases, or sentences. 74
goal-action procedure A hierarchical knowledge
structure where nodes represent goals or de-
script A structure that encompasses the goal-action
sired states which are connected by “in order
procedures of all participants in an organized
to” arcs. 75
activity. 75
graph The set of nodes that are connected by arcs.
74 spatial structure A hierarchy of regions that are
connected by “is-in” or “contains” arcs. 75
knowledge component Describes a mental struc-
ture used by learners to understand a topic. taxonomic structure A hierarchical knowledge
Any given topic may consist of many differ- structure in which concepts are connected by
ent knowledge components. 72 “is-a” arcs. 74

Chapter 6
Metacognition:
Monitoring and Controlling One’s Own
Knowledge, Reasoning and Decisions
K LAUS F IEDLER , R AKEFET ACKERMAN & C HIARA S CARAMPI
University of Heidelberg, Israel Institute of Technology & University College London
6.1 Introduction: What is m/). Thus, metacognition is cognition about one’s

Metacognition? own cognition. It serves to monitor the correctness
of our cognitive operations and to correct for in-
correct operations in order to control for the costs
6.1.1 Setting “Metacognition” Apart and benefits of our judgments and decisions (Nelson
from “Cognition” & Narens, 1990). To illustrate, an invoice must be
checked (monitoring) and corrected for potential
Metacognition is the “top manager” of cognitive calculation errors (control). Before a written exam
functioning. Memory, for instance, consists of the can be submitted, all responses must be validated
basic cognitive functions for storing and retrieving (monitoring) and revised if necessary (control). Pur-
information. Metacognitive processes are respon- chasing decisions must be confirmed (monitoring)
sible for regulating these functions: setting goals or revised in case of dissatisfying expected results
for learning, examining the quality of memory stor- (control).
age and retrieval, allocating time to memory pro-
cesses, choosing among strategies for reasoning,
making decisions, and acknowledging achieving 6.1.2 Metacognitive Monitoring and
goals. Metacognition is not separate from cognition,
Control
but integral to all higher-order cognitive inferences,
including explicit learning, skill development, re- The output of the metacognitive monitoring func-
call of personal events, communication, decision tion provides the input to the metacognitive control
making, problem solving, navigation, design, etc. function (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Monitoring judg-
It refers to the superordinate and in a way to the ments, the critical assessment of the mental opera-
most responsible level of all cognitive functions. It tions used to transform the stimulus information, are
constitutes the quality control of one’s own mental preconditions for appropriate corrections and for any
functions. decisions or actions. Thus, the veracity of verbal
The prefix “meta” in Greek loanwords denotes communications has to be assessed critically before
“something that consciously references or comments one can decide whether to trust, distrust or discard
upon its own subject” (https://www.dictionary.co the communication. One monitors the navigation

Fiedler, Ackerman & Scarampi Metacognition
of one’s car or boat in order to draw a controlled quisition to retention, retrieval, and inferences lead-
decision at the next branching. Or, monitoring the ing to judgments and decisions. It is an extended
money one has spent on prior occasions affords a version of a diagram that was originally presented
precondition for the controlled use of the remaining in a seminal article by Nelson and Narens (1990),
budget. which focused on memory processes. As apparent
Metacognition is ubiquitous because virtually all from the direction of arrows, monitoring functions
cognitive operations are monitored and controlled, are informed by the contents of the primary cogni-
before, during, and after their execution. The ex- tive processes, whereas control functions constitute
ecution of an action plan—such as telling a story metacognitive influences exerted on the cognitive
about what we did last weekend—is not confined processes, informed by monitoring results.
to retrieval and speech activities; it also involves
monitoring operations such as keeping track of the Metacognition covers both meta-memory and
position reached in the story, checking grammar meta-reasoning (see Ackerman & Thompson,
and pronunciation, assessing the available time left, 2015, 2017). That is, monitoring and control func-
receiving signals from communication partners, or tions are not only concerned with memory proper but
noting the ease (or difficulty) with which story de- also with memory-dependent reasoning processes
tails come to mind (e.g., “I don’t recall the name leading to judgments and decision making. Thus, a
now, it will probably come to mind soon”). As cognitive-ecological perspective on judgment and
a function of these monitoring results, one can decision calls for an extended metacognitive ap-
then control speed and story detail, correct for mis- proach, which must not only regulate internal cogni-
takes, secure comprehension, and maybe change tive functions but also check on the validity and us-
one’s nonverbal behavior in order to appear hon- ability of environmental information samples. In this
est. regard, Figure 6.1 indicates that for judgments and
Figure 6.1 provides a schematic overview of decisions to be unbiased and accurate, the weight
generic monitoring and control functions involved given to sampled information must depend on a crit-
in different stages of cognitive processing, from ac- ical assessment of its validity and trustworthiness.
Figure 6.1: Schematic overview of major monitoring and control functions, based on Nelson and Narens (1990).

Review of Insights Gained from Metacognition Research Fiedler, Ackerman & Scarampi
6.2 Review of Insights Gained from order, and participants are asked to recall the right
Metacognition Research word that was attached to it in the study phase. Anal-
yses of study time, JOL, and recall success provide
In a review of four decades of pertinent research (see evidence about the way people allocate study time
Kornell & Bjork, 2007; Son & Sethi, 2010), some across items and in various conditions (e.g., high
milestones can be identified. The general research motivation for success; repeated learning; emotion-
theme is the interplay of monitoring and control ally loaded vs. neural words; words presented in
(Nelson & Narens, 1990), which need not be strictly large or small fonts).
unidirectional (see Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, The causal role of JOL for effort regulation was
2006). Yet, only when monitoring is reliable can established by Metcalfe and Finn (2008). They
people have a solid basis for effective control of asked participants to learn half of the word pairs
strategies and allocation of effort and resources. once and half repeated three times in the study list.
Participants then provided their JOLs and recalled
6.2.1 Metacognitive Regulation of the items. Not surprisingly, JOL and recall were
higher for the items learned three times than for
Effort
those learned only once. In a second block, the
Imagine Lisa, a student, who is studying a chapter items studied once in the first block were now pre-
in a text book for an exam. While reading the chap- sented three times, and vice versa. All items were
ter, Lisa is considering her proficiency and decides thus learned four times altogether and recall of both
whether to restudy a previous paragraph, look for sets was equivalent. However, JOLs were higher
additional information over the Internet, continue to for items learned three times than for those learned
the next paragraph, or stop studying, either because only once in the first block, presumably because of
she does not progress adequately today, or because the advantage in the initial recall test after the first
she knows the entire chapter to a satisfactory degree. block. This effect of a previous test on JOL is called
All these regulatory functions rely on monitoring her memory for past test. Most relevant for effort reg-
knowledge of each paragraph in the chapter. This ulation is that when providing JOL for the second
assessment allows Lisa to identify the weak points block, which differed between the item sets, par-
and those which she mastered already. ticipants were also asked whether they would like
The available empirical evidence on effort reg- to restudy each item. Although recall performance
ulation was to a large extent collected by simple was equivalent for both item sets, participants chose
methodologies involving memorized lists of words to restudy items for which JOL was lower—those
or word pairs. Nevertheless, the scientific insights studied only once in the first block. This finding
gained from these paradigms are robust and gener- demonstrates that effort regulation decisions, like
alizable to many other cognitive tasks (e.g., solving decisions to restudy items, depend on JOL rather
problems, answering knowledge questions, learning than on actual memory strength. Similarly, people
from texts, decision making). In a typical paired- relied on JOL when betting on success, even when
associate memory study, people are asked to memo- these judgments were misleading (Hembacher &
rize pairs of related or unrelated words (e.g., KING Ghetti, 2017).
– CROWN; FLAG – POT) presented one after the Using more complex learning and memory tasks,
other. They are allowed to allocate time to each Thiede, Anderson, and Therriault (2003) found that
item freely. Immediately after memorizing each judgments of comprehension guide decisions to
word pair, people assess their chance for success restudy texts. When these JOLs were more reliable,
by providing a Judgment of Learning (JOL). For participants were better attuned to their knowledge
adults, the tasks typically involve memorizing 60 level and chose to restudy the less well-known texts.
word pairs presented in a random order. After mem- This strategy led to higher achievement, demonstrat-
orizing all of them, there is a recall phase, in which ing that effort regulation becomes more effective
the left words are presented one by one in a new with more reliable JOLs. For visual perception, sub-

jective confidence guided decisions to get a hint compromise in the target level of knowledge (Thiede
that was helpful for choosing among two options & Dunlosky, 1999). High motivation for success,
(Desender, Boldt, & Yeung, 2018). Notably, the in contrast, leads people to raise their stopping cri-
tight association between monitoring and control terion, yielding longer time investment aiming to
was reduced among clinical populations and en- increase the chances of success (Koriat et al., 2006).
hanced among young and healthy people (e.g., Dan- As known from real-life scenarios, when the items
ion, Gokalsing, Robert, Massin-Krauss, & Bacon, to be studied are extremely difficult, people may give
2001; Koren et al., 2004). Thus, a well-functioning up early, even when they acknowledge that they do
monitoring-control link should not be taken for not know them as they would have desired. This
granted. strategy is effective since it reduces labor-in-vain:
The next question to ask is when people stop in- time investment in items that have a low chance of
vesting effort. That is, what are the stopping rules being mastered, even after extensive effort to master
that guide effort regulation? A regular finding is them. Moreover, this strategy allows more time to
that people invest more time in studying the more be invested in other items, at intermediate difficulty
difficult items (Zacks, 1969). This finding led to levels, which have a higher chance of being mas-
the development of Discrepancy Reduction Models, tered (Son & Sethi, 2010). Indeed, it was shown
which assume that people set a target level accord- that people compromise on their target level as more
ing to their motivation in the given scenario. The time is invested. They also set a time limit, beyond
target acts as a stopping rule: they study each item which they are not willing to invest further time in
until monitoring indicates that their knowledge of studying an item (Ackerman, 2014). This time limit
this item is satisfactory (Nelson & Narens, 1990; is adjusted to be higher when learners have high
see Figure 6.2). For more difficult items (B in Fig- motivation and to be lower when they learn under
ure 6.2) this takes longer than for easier items (A). time pressure (Undorf & Ackerman, 2017).
There are conditions, such as time pressure, under One more consideration is order effects. Dun-
which the stopping criterion gets lower, reflecting a losky and Ariel (2011) demonstrated that, when pre-
Figure 6.2: Illustration of the discrepancy reduction model, based on Ackerman and Goldsmith (2011, Figure 1). It shows the straight
criterion and the regulatory role of Judgment of Learning (JOL) in guiding the decision whether to continue or cease
learning. A – early termination with overconfidence, B – termination with perfect calibration, C – point of decision to
continue learning because the stopping criterion was not reached yet.

The Heuristic Bases for Metacognitive Judgments Fiedler, Ackerman & Scarampi
sented with several items, people tend to choose to not directly “read” their knowledge and the quality
restudy items encountered earlier in their habitual of their own cognitive processing, but instead, must
reading order (e.g., from left to right) rather than base their judgments on cues experienced when they
those appearing later. When study time is too short perform the task and immediately after stopping
to master all materials, investing too much in early performing it.
list parts is counterproductive, relative to waiving One prominent cue is fluency—the subjective ease
the most difficult items: the time invested in the dif- with which a cognitive task is performed. Fluency
ficult items, when they appear early in the list, could is accounted to underlie many metacognitive judg-
be used more effectively for studying easier items ments; it is indeed a rather valid cue for success.
appearing later in the list. Beyond this order effect, For instance, memorizing the word pair TUBER –
Dunlosky and Ariel (2011) also found indications AZORES is hard as the words are rarely encountered
for waiving the most difficult items. Thus, these and their pairing is rather unusual. When memo-
strategies are complementary rather than mutually rizing this word pair among sixty other pairs, the
exclusive. chances of remembering the right word when en-
Generalizing these principles to text learning, countering the left one remains low despite investing
Ackerman and Goldsmith (2011) compared learning a lot of effort, which means that this item’s fluency
printed texts to learning the same texts presented on is low. In contrast, when a pair consists of familiar
computer screens. In both cases, participants were words which are often encountered in the same con-
allowed to write comments and highlight text sec- text (e.g., SOCK – FOOT), cued recall is typically
tions. In the computerized condition, participants quick and has a high chance of success, and thus
believed to learn more quickly than on paper, and characterized by high fluency. Koriat, Ma’ayan, and
thus stopped learning earlier (see Figure 6.2, point Nussinson (2006) suggested that people use in such
A). In fact, though, rate of learning was equivalent contexts a memorizing effort heuristic: longer learn-
in both media. As a result, performance in tests ing times, experienced as lower fluency, indicate a
taken immediately after studying was respectively lower probability of memorizing the item later.
lower in the computerized than in the printed-text The predictive accuracy of metacognitive judg-
condition. This apparently reflects the role of over- ments depends on the diagnosticity of the utilized
confidence in effort regulation—people stop when cues. A great deal of research focused on condi-
they think they know the materials adequately. If tions under which heuristic cues, like fluency, can
they are overconfident, stopping will be premature. be misleading. For instance, people may feel that
Later studies showed that learning in computerized they found the correct solution for a problem right
environments suffers most from limited learning away and based on fluency be confident they solved
time (for a meta-analysis, seeDelgado, Vargas, Ack- it successfully, while in fact they are wrong, and
erman, & Salmerón, 2018). Similar overconfidence investing more effort could increase their chance of
effects were found with problem-solving tasks of success. Thus, identifying factors that induce pre-
the types students encounter in math, logic, geome- dictable biases in people’s confidence is important
try, and psychometric tests (Ackerman, 2014; Sidi, because such biases impair effort regulation.
Shpigelman, Zalmanov, & Ackerman, 2017). The potentially misleading impact of heuristics
suggests that metacognitive judgments are dissocia-
6.2.2 The Heuristic Bases for ble from the actual success of cognitive processes;
factors that affect performance do not necessarily
Metacognitive Judgments
affect judgments regarding the same cognitive pro-
The metacognitive judgments regarding memory, cesses, and vice versa. In particular, dissociation of
reading comprehension, and solutions to problems JOL from actual performance can stem from surface
introduced in the preceding section are known to be properties of the to-be-learned items affecting per-
based on heuristic cues (see Dunlosky & Tauber, ceptual fluency rather than the more relevant cue of
2014, for a review; Koriat, 1997). Thus, people can- processing fluency. Rhodes and Castel (2008) found

higher JOLs for words printed in large font than for to read fonts). Both FOR and final confidence re-
those printed in smaller fonts, although recall was flected processing fluency, as both judgments were
less affected by font size (see Undorf, Zimdahl, & associated with response times. However, none of
Bernstein, 2017, for a similar perceptual influence the examined judgments reflected perceptual fluency,
on JOL). Conversely, other variables have more pro- unlike the aforementioned font-size effects on JOL.
nounced effects on performance than on JOLs. For This example of a difference between metacognitive
instance, rehearsal improves recall, and long delays judgments of memory processes and of reasoning
between learning and test cause substantial forget- processes suggests that research should delve into
ting, yet JOLs are hardly sensitive to either (Koriat, commonalities and differences across tasks (Acker-
1997; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004). Thus, ac- man & Beller, 2017; Ackerman & Thompson, 2015,
curacy of JOLs and other metacognitive judgments for a review).
depends on the validity of the utilized cues. Convincing evidence for the role of fluency in
An effective and easy-to-adapt solution to several judgments, as reflected by response time, was pro-
biases of JOLs is to delay the JOL elicitations to vided by Topolinski and Reber (2010). Using three
a time closer to the test, rather than immediately different types of problems, they first presented each
after learning. The delayed JOL effect is robust (see problem and then, delayed either for a short or
Rhodes & Tauber, 2011, for a meta-analysis). De- longer time, presented a potential answer, which
layed JOL accuracy reflects access to more diagnos- was the target stimulus. Participants had to judge
tic heuristic cues from long-term memory reflecting whether the presented answer was the correct solu-
better the state of knowledge when taking the test tion for the presented problem. For both correct and
than when provided immediately after learning each incorrect candidates, faster appearing solutions were
item. more frequently judged to be correct than those pre-
In the context of problem solving, Ackerman and sented after a delay. Because solution display time
Zalmanov (2012) compared performance and confi- was the only difference, the findings indicate that
dence in the solutions of multiple-choice and open- mere delay led to lower endorsement of answers as
ended test format. As expected, they found higher correct.
success rates in a multiple-choice test format than Two other heuristic cues were shown to affect
in the open-ended test because of guessing or iden- feelings-of-knowing regarding answers to knowl-
tifying the correct option when readily available. edge questions. The first cue is the familiarity of the
However, subjective confidence ratings were equiv- question terms or the knowledge domain (e.g., Reder
alent in both test formats; they did not reflect this & Ritter, 1992; Shanks & Serra, 2014). The second
performance difference. Confidence in the same cue is accessibility, which reflects the number of
solutions was however sensitive to response time: associations that come to mind during a retrieval
lower for slow responses than for quick responses. attempt, regardless of whether this information pro-
This finding reflects utilization of fluency. Simi- motes retrieval of correct answers (Koriat, 1993).
larly, Fernandez-Cruz, Arango-Muñoz, and Volz For example, Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) com-
(2016) found sensitivity to processing fluency for posed general knowledge questions that differed in
both feeling of error and final confidence in a nu- familiarity of the terms (e.g., the ballets “Swan lake”
merical calculation task. Thompson and colleagues vs. “The Legend of Joseph”) and in accessibility,
(2013) examined fluency effects on final confidence operationalized as the number of names people can
and on Feeling of Rightness (FOR)—an initial confi- provide for a category (e.g., people tend to know
dence judgment collected immediately after produc- more composers than choreographers). These cues
ing the first solution that comes to mind, and before contributed independently to feeling-of-knowing-
rethinking the solution. They used misleading math judgments, which were higher for more familiar
problems and considered both processing fluency, objects, especially when items were highly accessi-
based on ease of processing, and perceptual fluency, ble. Accessibility also affected judgments regarding
manipulated by font readability (e.g., hard vs. easy problem solutions (Ackerman & Beller, 2017). Al-

The Heuristic Bases for Metacognitive Judgments Fiedler, Ackerman & Scarampi
though not necessarily reflected in response time, it judgments on the experience of ease while perform-
is possible that familiarity and accessibility affect ing the task (experience-based cues), or on knowl-
fluency by affecting the ease of processing experi- edge about cognitive processes, which is general
ence. rather than specific to the current experience with
Focusing on a rarely considered cue, Topolinski, the item at hand (theory-based cues; Koriat, 1997).
Bakhtiari, and Erle (2016) examined the effects of For instance, the unjustified effect of font size on
ease of pronouncing on judgments of solvability— JOL mentioned above could stem from experience
quick assessment as to whether the problem is of easy learning when the fonts are large relative to
solvable—has a solution—or whether it includes an experience of difficulty when the fonts are small
contradiction that does not allow one to solve it at (Undorf & Zimdahl, 2018). The same effect on JOL
all. Topolinski and colleagues presented participants could also stem from people’s implicit theories of
with solvable anagrams (scrambled words) and un- learning, saying that large presentation helps memo-
solvable letter sets, that could not be rearranged to rizing while small presentation adds a challenge to
form a valid word, and manipulated their pronounce- the task. Attempts were made to separate the two in-
ability. For instance, for the word EPISODE, they formation sources. Kelley and Jacoby (1996) aimed
had two anagram options: EDISEPO and IPSDEOE. to focus on experience-based cues while controlling
Easy- and hard-to-pronounce versions also existed for potential theories people might have. They pre-
for the unsolvable letter sets. As expected, easy- sented participants anagrams (scrambled words). In
to-pronounce anagrams were more often rated as the first phase of the experiment, participants studied
solvable than hard-to-pronounce anagrams, regard- the solution words to half the anagrams. This prior
less of whether anagrams were in fact solvable or exposure led to faster solutions of those anagrams
not. This finding is particularly interesting because in a second phase, as the correct solution came to
in reality anagrams that are easier to pronounce are mind more easily. After experiencing such process-
often harder to solve, since people find it harder to ing ease, participants expected these anagrams to be
rearrange their letters. Thus, pronounceability may easier for other people to solve relative to anagrams
function as a misleading heuristic cue for metacog- these participants solved without prior exposure to
nitive judgments. their answers. This finding demonstrates the intri-
Most heuristic cues considered in memory and cate role of experience-based cues in metacognitive
reasoning research somehow refer to semantic judgments.
knowledge activated in verbal tasks. This is the The contribution of experience-based fluency and
case with relatedness of word pairs, familiarity of theory-based beliefs is a source of debate about
question terms, accessibility of relevant knowledge, heuristic cues. Mueller, Tauber, and Dunlosky
and pronounceability, as reviewed above. Studying (2013) found dominance of theory-based beliefs that
heuristic cues that affect perceptual decisions pro- related word pairs (SOCK - FOOT) were easier to
vides opportunities to consider non-semantic heuris- remember than unrelated word pairs (PARROT –
tic cues. In a study by Boldt, De Gardelle, and GAZ) over effects of experience-based processing
Yeung (2017) participants judged the average color fluency on JOLs. Based on Undorf and Erdfelder’s
of an array of eight colored shapes and rated confi- (2015) counter-evidence that experience-based flu-
dence in their choice. The higher the variability of ency is nevertheless an important basis for JOLs,
colors across the eight shapes, the lower the partici- both teams later concluded that theory-based beliefs
pants’ confidence in the average color choice, even contribute to JOLs in addition to experience-based
when equating the actual difficulty. Thus, people fluency (Mueller & Dunlosky, 2017; Undorf & Zim-
utilize misleading heuristic cues in perceptual tasks dahl, 2018).
as they do in verbal tasks. In sum, metacognitive judgments are prone to pre-
When considering the bases for metacognitive dictable biases due to utilizing heuristic cues that
judgments, in particular those associated with flu- are generally valid, though misleading under distinct
ency, a question in place is whether people base their conditions. Understanding factors that people take

into account when making metacognitive judgments Several indexes of resolution can be computed to
is essential for any attempt to educate and improve assess the accuracy of a judgment once it has been
effort and behavior regulation. elicited. All measures require the acquisition of an
independent performance criterion that quantifies
6.2.3 Knowing What You Know: the relationship between accuracy and confidence.
In previous research, resolution has been measured
Judgment Accuracy using confidence-accuracy correlations within par-
Judgments and decisions are generally accompa- ticipants (Nelson, 1984). As an alternative, other
nied by a subjective feeling of confidence, aimed researchers have suggested signal detection theory
at assessing the probability of being correct. This (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; see Figure 6.4 be-
metacognitive judgment serves as a guide for current low), which assesses discrimination between objec-
and future behavior, helping people avoid repeating tive states of the world (e.g., distinguishing signal
the same mistakes and evaluate whether the avail- from noise, or the presence or absence of a stimu-
able information suffices to make a reliable decision. lus). Applied to metacognitive judgments, resolu-
Most research on confidence has focused on the tion can be seen as the sensitivity to a signal. More
relation between confidence judgments and objec- precisely, the primary cognitive task (e.g., memory,
tive performance on a criterion task, with the aim of decision making, etc.) is often called Type 1 task,
investigating how well individuals can monitor their whereas the task of the discriminating of confidence
own knowledge. Two main aspects of judgment ac- ratings between one’s own correct and incorrect re-
curacy can be distinguished, resolution (or metacog- sponses in the Type 1 task is called Type 2 task. Ad-
nitive sensitivity) and calibration (or metacogni- vancers of SDT have argued that gamma correlations
tive bias). Resolution refers to distinguishing be- can be problematic, as they can be affected by the
tween correct and incorrect answers (Fleming & overall tendency to use higher or lower confidence
Lau, 2014), whereas calibration refers to the extent ratings (i.e., metacognitive bias; Fleming & Lau,
to which confidence judgments tend to be overconfi- 2014). Nevertheless, gamma correlations continue
dent (i.e., more optimistic than actual performance) to be used in metacognition research. Above-chance
versus underconfident (i.e., less optimistic). confidence-accuracy correlations were found in a
Resolution. Resolution plays an important role variety of tasks, ranging from perceptual decision
in metacognitive control processes and people’s be- making to challenging problem solving, indicating
havior (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Imagine a student that people are skilled at identifying whether their
facing a multiple-choice test in which errors are pe- responses are correct or wrong (see Ackerman & Zal-
nalized whereas omissions are not. The test will manov, 2012; Koriat, 2018 and references therein).
be solved differently depending on the assessment Calibration. Another key monitoring accuracy
the student makes of their candidate answers. If an measure in metacognition and self-regulation is cali-
answer is judged as correct, it may be worthwhile bration. A simple measure of calibration is the differ-
responding and risking the penalty. In contrast, if ence between mean confidence in success with each
an answer is assessed as wrong, the student might item and actual success rate. Several studies have
decide to withhold the response. The decision to indicated that people tend to be overconfident across
produce or withhold an answer is determined by res- a variety of conditions (Dunning, Heath, & Suls,
olution. Perfect resolution will lead to offering all 2004). In particular, Kruger and Dunning (1999)
the candidate responses which are indeed correct, documented a metacognitive bias through which
and withhold all incorrect responses. Conversely, relatively unskilled individuals not only make erro-
poor resolution—at the same level of knowledge— neous responses but also overestimate their abilities.
may lead to withholding some of the correct answers That is, a deficit in knowledge prevents poor per-
and to offering a portion of the incorrect ones, re- formers from realizing how poorly they are perform-
sulting in penalties and lost opportunities for points ing. However, if trained to become more competent,
(Higham & Higham, 2018). their self-assessment also becomes more accurate.

Knowing What You Know: Judgment Accuracy Fiedler, Ackerman & Scarampi
Calibration and resolution are independent mea- in retrospective than in prospective judgments by
sures. An individual may have high overall confi- Fleming, Massoni, Gajdos, and Vergnaud (2016),
dence, but poor resolution and vice versa (Fleming & using a perceptual decision task. Retrospective con-
Lau, 2014). Nevertheless, recent research has shown fidence ratings were provided on every trial, whereas
that the two are not independent when the proba- prospective judgments were only provided prior to
bilistic structure of the environment is considered every fifth trial. The authors found dissociable in-
(Koriat, 2018). Across a series of experiments using fluences on prospective and retrospective judgments.
two-alternative forced choice items from different Whereas retrospective judgments were strongly in-
domains (e.g., perceptual decision making, general fluenced by current-trial fluency, and accuracy and
knowledge, memory, and predictions about others’ confidence in the immediately preceding decision,
judgments, beliefs, and attitudes), Koriat (2018) prospective judgments were influenced by previous
found that resolution is strictly dependent on the confidence over a longer time frame. Furthermore,
accuracy of Type 1 task performance and that posi- individual overconfidence was stable across prospec-
tive correlations between confidence and accuracy tive and retrospective judgments, suggesting that
observed across many studies are confined to items overconfidence represents a stable personality trait
for which accuracy is better than chance. Further- (Ais, Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2016; Jack-
more, calibration depended on task difficulty: items son & Kleitman, 2014).
with accuracy smaller than 50% led to a strong over- As many reasoning and problem-solving tasks go
confidence bias, whereas items for which accuracy on over an extended period of time, the assessment
was better than chance were associated with almost of performance and success probability must be up-
perfect calibration. These results support the propo- dated repeatedly (Ackerman, 2014). Intermediate
sition that for difficult items that are likely to elicit confidence is an internal estimate of the adequacy of
erroneous responses, individuals are largely unaware possible responses considered before arriving at a fi-
of making a mistake. Consistent with this account, nal solution (see Ackerman & Thompson, 2017). To
the overconfidence bias decreases markedly when study this process, Ackerman (2014) asked partici-
the selective reliance on difficult items is avoided pants to rate their intermediate confidence every few
through representative sampling (Gigerenzer, Hof- seconds until they provided a solution, after which
frage, & Kleinbölting, 1991). they rated their final confidence. The first interme-
Another key element of metacognitive judgments diate judgment turned out to be a good predictor
is the time of elicitation. Judgments can be prospec- of the amount of time participants spent solving
tive (i.e., occurring before performing a task), or the problems. Confidence tended to increase over
retrospective (i.e., occurring after task completion). time. However, whereas at the beginning, partici-
For example, a student may reflect on their current pants tended to provide answers when confidence
knowledge to predict their success on an upcoming was high, over time they became more willing to
test (prospective judgment) and, judge afterwards provide answers at a lower level of confidence. Fi-
how well they did, trying to estimate their grade (ret- nal low-confidence responses could be as low as
rospective judgment). Few behavioral studies have 20%, even when there was an option to give up, by
pitted prospective against retrospective judgments answering “I don’t know”.
for the same task. Siedlecka, Paulewicz and Wierz- The study of confidence judgments has been ex-
choń (2016) compared prospective and retrospective tended in the last few decades to collective decision
confidence judgments. Participants rated whether making. In numerous perceptual as well as cognitive
presented words were the solution to anagram tasks. decisions, interacting individuals can make more ac-
Participants also rated their certainty, either before curate decisions by discussing one’s own perceptual
or after seeing the suggested solution. The authors experiences with others and integrating different
found that post-decision confidence ratings were opinions, achieving a reliable collective benefit even
more accurate than ratings made prospectively. Res- in the absence of objective feedback (Bahrami et al.,
olution and calibration were also found to be higher 2010). That is, the accuracy achieved by sharing

and combining subjective information via social in- inate in the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC;
teraction can exceed the accuracy of each individual Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994).
opinion, even that of the best individual in the group. Since the introduction of these seminal studies,
This phenomenon is known as the “two-heads-better- further research into such domains as memory, per-
than-one” effect (Koriat, 2012) or “wisdom of the ception, and decision making, has identified neural
crowd” (Surowiecki, 2004). Koriat (2012) presented correlates of metacognitive judgments and further
participants with two-alternative forced inference dissociated cognitive from metacognitive processes.
tasks and showed that members of a dyad can take Fleming et al. (2010) had participants performing a
advantage of the wisdom of the group by using a perceptual decision-making task and providing rat-
simple heuristic: choosing the response expressed ings of confidence after each decision. The authors
with the highest level of confidence. These find- found considerable variation between participants in
ings have relevant implications for collective and metacognitive accuracy. Using MRI, this variation
democratic decisions and actions. in confidence accuracy was found to be correlated
with grey matter volume in the right rostrolateral
areas of the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Furthermore,
6.2.4 Neuroscience of Metacognition
greater accuracy in metacognitive judgments was as-
In recent years, the study of metacognition was en- sociated with increased white-matter microstructure
riched by growing evidence from neuroscience con- connected with this area of the PFC. These results
cerning the underlying neurocognitive architecture. point to neural bases of metacognition that differ
Specific neural substrates (especially in frontolateral, from those supporting primary perception. Similarly,
frontomedial, and parietal regions; see Figure 6.3) in a study by Do Lam and colleagues (2012), partici-
are involved in metacognition (e.g., Fleming, Hui- pants who had first learned the pairwise associations
jgen, & Dolan, 2012; Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & between faces and names were then presented again
Blackmon, 2014; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & with each face and asked to provide judgments of
Rees, 2010). However, the neural bases of human learning (JOLs) regarding the chance of recalling the
metacognition remain controversial. Metacognition associated name. A neurological dissociation was
operates on a variety of first-order processes, rang- found between the processes of memory retrieval,
ing from memory to perception, problem solving, which were located in the hippocampal region (i.e.,
etc. The diversity of the tasks to be monitored and medial temporal lobes), and those underlying JOLs,
controlled complicates the study of its neural signa- which were located in the medial PFC, orbitofrontal
ture, as it can be difficult to differentiate between cortex (OFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
the neural activations attributable to the metacogni- Anatomical, functional, and neuropsychological
tive monitoring and control processes and the neural studies have confirmed the consistent involvement
signature of the first-order cognitive/emotional pro- of a frontoparietal network in metacognition (Vac-
cesses (Metcalfe & Schwartz, 2016). caro & Fleming, 2018). Activations were located
Existing attempts to isolate the metacognitive in the posterior medial PFC, ventromedial PFC and
monitoring and control processes from first-order bilateral anterior PFC/ dorsolateral PFC. Other re-
processes, testify to the uniqueness of metacognitive searchers observed activations in the bilateral insula
processes. Initial evidence was obtained from neu- and dorsal precuneus (Vaccaro & Fleming, 2018).
ropsychological cases. For instance, Shimamura and These results suggest that the parietal cortex, par-
Squire (1986) suggested that frontal lobe (behind ticularly precuneus, and insula represent key nodes
forehead) impairments in patients with Korsakoff’s supporting metacognition, together with the PFC.
syndrome—a chronic memory disorder character- Existing research supports the existence of neural
ized by severe anterograde amnesia—can impact dissociations between prospective and retrospective
metacognitive judgments independently of cogni- metacognitive judgments (Chua, Schacter, & Sper-
tive performance per se. A common finding suggests ling, 2009; Fleming & Dolan, 2012). For example,
that neural signals involved in error monitoring origin a study on patients with lateral frontal lesions,

Neuroscience of Metacognition Fiedler, Ackerman & Scarampi
Pannu, Kaszniak, and Rapcsak (2005) found im- nition activates medial aspects of the PFC, while ret-
paired retrospective confidence judgments, but pre- rospective metacognitive accuracy is correlated with
served judgments of future task performance. Con- lateral PFC activity (Fleming & Dolan, 2012). When
versely, Schnyer and colleagues (2004) found an as- separating metamemory judgments by temporal fo-
sociation between damage to the right ventromedial cus in their meta-analysis, Vaccaro and Fleming
PFC and a decrease in accuracy for metacognitive (2018) found that retrospective judgments were as-
judgments about future recall (feeling of knowing), sociated with activity in the bilateral parahippocam-
but not for accuracy of retrospective confidence judg- pal cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus, whereas
ments. Further evidence comes from functional MRI prospective judgments activated the posterior me-
studies, which have shown that prospective metacog- dial PFC, left dorsolateral PFC, and right insula.
Figure 6.3: Gross neuroanatomy. a) Relative position and direction of brain structures. b) The four brain lobes from a lateral view. c)
and d) Approximate locations of the broadest subdivisions of the PFC and other areas linked to metacognition. Illustrations
adapted from Patrick J. Lynch, medical illustrator, C. Carl Jaffe, MD, cardiologist, under the Creative Commons Attribution
2.5 License, 2006 (CC-BY-2.5). Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brain_human_lateral_view.svg
and https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brain_human_sagittal_section.svg. Abbreviations: dmPFC, dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex; rlPFC, rostrolateral prefrontal; vlPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex.

Nevertheless, neuroimaging evidence directly com- and retrospective judgments. Convergent evidence
paring between different judgement types is scarce. indicates that the function of the rostral and dorsal
In one of the few studies directly comparing neural areas of the lateral PFC is important for the accuracy
activation related to prospective feeling of know- of retrospective judgments of performance. In con-
ing and retrospective confidence judgment, Chua trast, prospective judgments of performance seem
and colleagues (2009) found an association between to depend on medial PFC. Recent studies have re-
prospective judgements and activation in medial sulted in a rather nuanced picture, suggesting the
parietal and medial temporal lobe, whereas retro- co-existence in the brain of both domain-specific
spective judgements were associated with inferior and domain-general signals.
prefrontal activity. However, common activations
associated with both prospective and retrospective
judgments were also observed in regions of medial 6.3 Metacognitive Perspectives on
and lateral PFC, and mid-posterior areas of cingulate Applied Rationality
cortex. These results suggest that neural activations
related to different judgment type may differ in de- The research reviewed so far has proven to be fruit-
gree rather than in kind (Vaccaro & Fleming, 2018). ful and thought-provoking, suggesting metacogni-
Another relevant question tackled in neuroscience tive explanations of adaptive behavior. We have seen
is whether metacognition relies on a common, that metacognitive deficits can lead to irrationality
domain-general resource or on domain-specific and inefficiency. In particular, we have reviewed
components that are particular to the respective memorable evidence on the illusion of knowledge,
first-order tasks. Recent neuroimaging studies which consists of the gross overestimation of one’s
yielded pertinent evidence for both domain-general chance of success, typically brought about by de-
and domain-specific neural markers (see Rouault, ceptive feelings of fluency or flow (Fiedler, 2013).
McWilliams, Allen, & Fleming, 2018, for a review). Overconfidence, in particular, can be a major source
A frontoparietal network contributes to metacogni- of bias and a dangerous obstacle in decision making
tive judgments across a range of different domains. under risk and under uncertainty (Glaser & Weber,
Still, neuroimaging evidence for direct comparisons 2007; Kruger & Dunning, 1999).
is scarce. In a recent meta-analysis, Vaccaro and The metacognitive perspective is of particular
Fleming (2018) observed common regions in sepa- importance for applied research on rational think-
rate investigations of memory and decision-making ing, adaptive regulation, medical diagnosis and
tasks, which included: insula, lateral PFC, and pos- treatment, democratic decision making, lie detec-
terior medial PFC. As suggested by Morales et al. tion, debunking of fake news, argumentation, trust,
(2018), this result may indicate that judgments in (im)moral action, and procedural justice in court-
both memory and decision making are driven by rooms, selection committees, or executive deci-
common inputs. The meta-analysis also pointed to sions. Checking and optimizing the quality of
further regions that are activated by specific tasks. higher-order cognitive operations—the very domain
More precisely, meta-memory engaged left dorsolat- of metacognition—is crucial for rational and respon-
eral PFC and clusters in bilateral parahippocampal sible behavior. We illustrate this point in the remain-
cortex, whereas right anterior dorsolateral PFC was der of this section.
involved in decision making (Vaccaro & Fleming,
2018).
6.3.1 Legal Judgments and Decisions
In summary, the neural underpinnings of even
the most straightforward metacognitive judgments A classical domain of metacognitive research in le-
are complicated. Although metacognition can be gal psychology is eyewitness identification perfor-
dissociated from task performance, most studies mance. Because everybody expects eyewitnesses
have revealed activations in multiple brain areas, to identify the perpetrator in a lineup and because
and differences have emerged between prospective the persons in the presented lineup are much more

Metacognitive Myopia as a Major Impediment of Rationality Fiedler, Ackerman & Scarampi
vivid than the original persons in a past episode, metacognitive myopia (Fiedler, 2000, 2008, 2012).
the enhanced readiness to make a positive recogni- As the term “myopia” (short-sightedness) suggests,
tion decision produces many correct identifications experimentally demonstrated violations of rational
(when the identified suspect is indeed the perpetra- norms typically do not reflect insufficient attention
tor) but also many incorrect identifications (when or insensitivity to the stimulus data. On the con-
the identified suspect is not the perpetrator). trary, people are quite sensitive to the data given;
As illustrated in Figure 6.4, a liberal identifica- they are in a way too sensitive, taking the data for
tion criterion (rather left position of C) produces, granted and failing to discriminate between valid
say, 90% correct identifications but roughly 40% and invalid information. For example, when judging
incorrect identifications. A high false-alarm rate can the success of different stocks on the stock-market,
be conceived as a case of overconfidence; C is appar- participants were quite sensitive to the frequency
ently too weak a criterion to discriminate guilty and with which various stocks were reported in TV pro-
innocent persons, yielding an intolerably high rate of grams among the daily winners. However, they
wrong convictions. Consistent with this account, a failed to take into account that the daily winning
majority of exoneration cases after the introduction outcomes of some stocks had been reported in more
of DNA proofs turned out to be innocent victims of than one TV program (Unkelbach, Fiedler, & Frey-
incorrect eyewitness identification. tag, 2007). Although they fully understand that two
The distinction between prospective and retro- TV programs on the same day provide the same
spective confidence judgments is also relevant to stock-market news, participants do not exhibit much
eyewitness testimony (Nguyen, Abed, & Pezdek, success in taking the redundancy into account. Even
2018). Witnesses are often asked to rate shortly af- when they are explicitly reminded of the redundancy
ter witnessing a crime their ability to recognize the and instructed not to be misled by such repetitions,
perpetrator in the future (prospective confidence). they cannot avoid their misleading influence. This
Subsequently, when asked to identify someone from failure to overcome a known pitfall is a metacogni-
a lineup, eyewitnesses are asked how confident they tive flaw.
are that they identified the correct person as the per- Analogous findings were observed across many
petrator (retrospective confidence). Nguyen, Abed, experimental tasks. Fully irrelevant numerical an-
and Pezdek (2018) found that postdictive confidence chors influence quantitative judgments (Wilson,
was a better indicator of identification accuracy than Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). Samples that dra-
predictive confidence, both for faces of the same matically over-represent the base-rate of rare events
race as the witness and for cross-race faces. Con- (e.g., samples in which the prevalence of HIV is 50%
sistent with the lab findings reviewed above, this rather than 0.1% as in reality) are used to estimate
suggests that eyewitness confidence should be col- associated risks (Fiedler, Hütter, Schott, & Kutzner,
lected at the time of identification rather than earlier 2018). Correctly denied questions referring to ob-
on the crime scene. jects or behaviors not included in a film nevertheless
increased the probability that the non-existing ob-
6.3.2 Metacognitive Myopia as a Major jects were later recalled erroneously (Fiedler, Arm-
bruster, Nickel, Walther, & Asbeck, 1996). In a
Impediment of Rationality perseverance paradigm, explicit debriefing about an
Fewer optimistic insights were obtained in other ar- experimental lie did not erase the implications and
eas of metacognition research. Rational judgments psychological consequences of the lie (Ross, Lepper,
and decisions about economic, political, legal, and & Hubbard, 1975). Common to all these findings
health-related issues rely heavily on the critical as- is that participants, who fully understand that in-
sessment of both the logical correctness of mental valid stimulus information should be discarded, are
operations and the validity of the underlying evi- nevertheless influenced by that invalid information.
dence. A conspicuous deficit in this sorely needed The conspicuous naivety with which information
function of critical assessment has been termed is used and retained uncritically, regardless of its

Figure 6.4: Signal detection analysis of eyewitness-identification performance: the solid (dashed) curve represents the distribution of
memory strength when the suspect in a lineup is (is not) the real perpetrator. Discriminability is the average horizontal
difference d’ between curves. An identification decision is made when memory strength exceeds the criterion C. The areas
right of C under the solid (dashed) curve are the probabilities of correct (incorrect) identification.
invalidity, is reminiscent of Hannah Arendt’s (1963) attractiveness of products offered by Amazon may
admonition that compliance and uncritical confor- depend on quantity (number of available reviews)
mity are the origin of severe harm and violations of more than on quality (mean rating provided by pre-
legal norms of humanity. But although the super- vious customers). Confusion of quantity and quality
ego residing in the metacognition’s pre-frontal brain was also observed by Fiedler, Kareev, Avrahami,
area is ethically obliged to engage in critical test and Beier, Kutzner, and Hütter (2016), who found that
reconfirmation, its role in higher-order cognition is increases (decreases) between samples of two sym-
often impoverished. Meta-analyses of modern re- bols in the proportion of one critical symbol were
search on debunking (Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson, readily detected only when absolute sample size
& Albarracín, 2017), for instance, testify to the in- increased (decreased) well.
ability of scientific or political debriefing to erase In causal reasoning, metacognitive myopia is ev-
fake news or obvious myths. Thus, even when the ident in a tendency to exclusively focus on effect
public are fully debriefed that Iraq did not possess strength and to disregard the strength of the causal in-
any atomic bombs when the US invaded, that the put that was necessary to induce the observed effect
evidence on global warming is uncontestable, or that strength. For example, the impact of a drug on ath-
polygraph lie detection is not supported by reliable letic performance is judged to be higher if the same
studies, people change their erroneous beliefs only dose of the drug causes a performance increase of 10
slightly and continue to hold the discredited wrong scale points rather than 1 point. However, whether
beliefs to a considerable extent. 254 mg or only 34 mg of the drug were necessary
When it comes to integrating different individual to induce the same observed performance change is
opinions in group decision making or advice taking, given little weight (Hansen, Rim, & Fiedler, 2013).
a typical uncritical strategy is equal weighting of Why do irrational consequences of metacognitive
opinions, in spite of better knowledge or even ex- myopia extend from objectively difficult to such triv-
plicit feedback about clearly unequal competence ially easy task settings? Why do people continue
of different advice givers (Fiedler et al., 2018; Mah- to be influenced by invalid information which is
moodi et al., 2015). Recent research by Powell, obviously wrong (like an irrelevant numerical an-
Yu, DeWolf, and Holyoak (2017) showed that the chor) and which they explicitly classify as invalid?

Metacognitive Myopia as a Major Impediment of Rationality Fiedler, Ackerman & Scarampi
A tentative answer might lie in a kind of metacogni- straightforward. In any case, metacognitive myopia
tive learned-helplessness effect (Maier & Seligman, seems to constitute a major impediment in the way
1976). Homo sapiens may have learned that many of rational behavior.
real-life tasks do not provide us with sufficient infor-
mation for a normatively sound monitoring and con-
Acknowledgment
trol process. Thus, a Bayesian algorithm required to
correct for biases in an information sample is often The work underlying the present article was sup-
unknown or does not exist at all. This experience ported by a grant provided by the Deutsche
may then be over-generalized to easy situations in Forschungsgemeinschaft to the first author (FI
which monitoring and control would be simple and 294/26-1).
Summary
1. The term “metacognition” refers to the subset of cognitive operations that are involved in
the critical assessment and quality control of one’s own cognitive functions. It is useful to
distinguish between monitoring and control as the two major metacognitive functions. Rather
than being separate from cognition, metacognition is integral to every cognitive performance,
from brief perceptual tasks to complex reasoning challenges.
2. Guiding people to effective regulation of effort is the "holy grail", or ultimate goal, of
metacognitive research.
3. Crucial to understanding sources for monitoring biases is measurement of resolution, the

ability to distinguish between correct and incorrect answers, and calibration, the extent to
which judgments tend to be overconfident or underconfident.
4. Retrospective, post-decision confidence ratings were found to be more accurate than prospec-
tive ratings provided beforehand.
5. Metacognitive judgments (e.g., of confidence) utilize distinct heuristic cues, such as fluency,
familiarity, accessibility, and pronounceability.
6. Although the neuropsychological underpinnings of metacognition are complicated, convergent
evidence indicates that rostral and dorsal parts of the lateral PFC are important for the accuracy
of retrospective performance judgments, whereas prospective judgments of performance seem
to depend on the medial PFC.
7. Metacognitive myopia—the uncritical and naïve tendency to rely on invalid samples of
information—constitutes a serious impediment of rational behavior.
Review Questions
1. Is metacognition confined to monitoring and control of conscious and deliberate cognition, or

is it also required to regulate automatic processes in low-level cognition?
2. Does metacognition apply to animal learning and decisions?
3. How do we know that we know? Explain the bases of metacognitive judgments.

References Forgas
were induced into a positive affective state (after watching cheerful, happy videos) were significantly
more gullible and showed higher ‘bullshit receptivity’ than those in a negative affective state.
In a companion experiment, we asked happy and sad participants to judge the meaningfulness of
various abstract expressionist paintings. Again, positive affect increased and negative affect reduced
their willingness to perceive meaning in these images. Further studies will look at the reasons
why these effects occur. For example, the universal human tendency to seek and find patterns in
otherwise random information may also be influenced by affect. The evolutionary significance of
these mild, but reliable affective influences on how we see and evaluate complex information will
also be explored. The role of affective states in promoting or inhibiting mental flexibility—the
ability to see multiple meanings in ambiguous information—will also be studied, as a step towards
better understanding the role of affect in why people often accept dubious information.
References
Forgas, J. P., Vargas, P., & Laham, S. (2005). Mood effects on eyewitness memory: Affective influ-
ences on susceptibility to misinformation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 574–588.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2004.11.005
Koch, A. S. & Forgas, J. P. (2012). Feeling good and feeling truth: The interactive effects of mood
and processing fluency on truth judgments. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 481–485.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.10.006
Matovic, D. & Forgas, J. P. (2018). Mood Effects on Ingratiation: Affective Influences on Producing
and Responding to Ingratiating Messages. Journal of Experimental social Psychology, 76, 186–197.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2018.02.002
References
Adolphs, R., & Damasio, A. R. (2001). The interaction cial cognition and behaviour (pp. 65–84). New York:
of affect and cognition: A neurobiological perspec- Psychology Press.
tive. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Handbook of affect and Bodenhausen, G. V., Kramer, G. P., & Süsser, K. (1994).
social cognition (pp. 27–49). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Happiness and stereotypic thinking in social judg-
doi:10.4324/9781410606181 ment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
Ambady, N., & Gray, H. (2002). On being sad and mis- 66, 621–632. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.66.4.621
taken: Mood effects on the accuracy of thin-slice judg- Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. Ameri-
ments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, can Psychologist, 36, 129–148. doi:10.1037//0003-
83, 947–961. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.83.4.947 066x.36.2.129
Becker, M. W., & Leinenger, M. (2011). Attentional Bower, G. H. (1991). Mood congruity of social judgments.
selection is biased toward mood-congruent stimuli. In J.P. Forgas (Ed.), Emotion and social judgments
Emotion. 1248–1254. doi:10.1037/a0023524 (pp. 31–53). Oxford: Pergamon.
Blaney, P. H. (1986). Affect and memory: A review. Psy- Bower, G. H., & Mayer, J. D. (1989). In search of mood-
chological Bulletin, 99, 229–246. doi:10.1037//0033- dependent retrieval. Journal of Social Behavior and
2909.99.2.229 Personality, 4, 121–156.
Bless, H., & Fiedler, K. (2006). Mood and the regulation Brown, J. D., & Mankowski, T. A. (1993). Self-esteem,
of information processing and behavior. In J.P. Forgas mood, and self-evaluation: Changes in mood and
(Ed.), Hearts and minds: Affective influences on so- the way you see you. Journal of Personality and

Forgas Affect and Thought
Social Psychology, 64, 421–430. doi:10.1037//0022- tion. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 55,
3514.64.3.421 283–288. doi:10.1037/h0042811
Byrne, D., & Clore, G. L. (1970). A reinforcement model Fiedler, K. (2001). Affective influences on social infor-
of evaluation responses. Personality: An International mation processing. In J.P. Forgas (Ed.), Handbook of
Journal, 1, 103–128. affect and social cognition (pp. 163–185). Mahwah,
Clark, M. S., & Isen, A. M. (1982). Towards understand- NJ: Erlbaum.
ing the relationship between feeling states and social Fiedler, K., Nickel, S., Asbeck, J., & Pagel, U. (2003).
behavior. In A. H. Hastorf & A. M. Isen (Eds.), Cog- Mood and the generation effect. Cognition and Emo-
nitive social psychology (pp. 73–108). New York: tion, 17, 585–608. doi:10.1080/02699930302301
Elsevier. Forgas, J. P. (1992). On mood and peculiar people: Affect
Clore, G. L., & Storbeck, J. (2006). Affect as informa- and person typicality in impression formation. Jour-
tion about liking, efficacy and importance. In: J.P. nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 863–
Forgas (Ed.). Affect in social thinking and behav- 875. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.5.863
ior. (pp. 123–142). New York: Psychology Press. Forgas, J. P. (1994). Sad and guilty? Affective influ-
doi:10.4324/9780203720752 ences on the explanation of conflict episodes. Jour-
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., Wittenbrink, B., Sadler, nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 56–68.
M. S., & Keesee, T. (2007). Across the thin blue doi:10.1037/0022-3514.66.1.56
line: Police officers and racial bias in the decision to Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: The affect
shoot. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, infusion model (AIM). Psychological Bulletin, 117,
92, 1006–1023. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.6.1006 39–66. doi:10.1037//0033-2909.117.1.39
Detweiler-Bedell, B., & Detweiler-Bedell, J. B. (2006). Forgas, J. P. (1998a). On feeling good and getting your
Mood-congruent perceptions of success depend on way: Mood effects on negotiating strategies and out-
self-other framing. Cognition and Emotion, 20, 196– comes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
216. doi:10.1080/02699930500294996 74, 565–577. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.565
Direnfeld, D. M., & Roberts, J. E. (2006). Mood- Forgas, J. P. (1998b). Asking nicely? Mood effects on
congruent memory in dysphoria: The roles of state af- responding to more or less polite requests. Person-
fect and cognitive style. Behavior Research and Ther- ality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 173–185.
apy, 44, 1275–1285. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.03.014 doi:10.1177/0146167298242006
Dolan, R. J. (2002) Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior. Forgas, J. P. (1999). On feeling good and being rude:
Science, 1191–1194. doi:10.1126/science.1076358 Affective influences on language use and requests.
Eich, E. (1995). Searching for mood dependent memory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 928–
Psychological Science, 6, 67–75. doi:10.1111/j.1467- 939. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.6.928
9280.1995.tb00309.x Forgas, J. P. (Ed.). (2006). Affect in social thinking
Eich, E., & Macaulay, D. (2000). Are real moods re- and behavior. Psychology Press: N.Y. doi:10.4324/
quired to reveal mood-congruent and mood-dependent 9780203720752
memory? Psychological Science, 11, 244–248. Forgas, J. P. (2011). Affective influences on self-
doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00249 disclosure strategies. Journal of Personality and
Eich, E., Macaulay, D., & Lam, R. (1997). Ma- Social Psychology, 100(3), 449–461. doi:10.1037/
nia, depression, and mood dependent mem- a0021129
ory. Cognition and Emotion, 11, 607–618. Forgas, J. P. (2013). Don’t Worry, Be Sad! On the Cogni-
doi:10.1080/026999397379836b tive, Motivational and Interpersonal Benefits of Nega-
Eich, E., Macaulay, D., & Ryan, L. (1994). Mood depen- tive Mood. Current Directions in Psychological Sci-
dent memory for events of the personal past. Journal ence, 22, 225–232. doi:10.1177/0963721412474458
of Experimental Psychology: General, 123(2), 201– Forgas, J. P. (2018). Mood effects on gullibility.
215. doi:10.1037//0096-3445.123.2.201 Manuscript, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
Feshbach, S., & Singer, R. D. (1957). The effects of fear Forgas, J. P. (in press). Mood effects on gullibility. Cur-
arousal and suppression of fear upon social percep- rent Directions in Psychological Science.

References Forgas
Forgas, J. P., & Bower, G.H. (1987). Mood effects on Gouaux, C. (1971). Induced affective states and interper-
person perception judgments. Journal of Personality sonal attraction. Journal of Personality and Social
and Social Psychology, 53, 53–60. doi:10.1037//0022- Psychology, 20, 37–43. doi:10.1037/h0031697
3514.53.1.53 Griffitt, W. (1970). Environmental effects on interper-
Forgas, J. P., Bower, G. H., & Krantz, S. (1984). The sonal behavior: Temperature and attraction. Journal
influence of mood on perceptions of social interac- of Personality and Social Psychology, 15, 240–244.
tions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 20, doi:10.1037/h0029432
497–513. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(84)90040-4 Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal rela-
Forgas, J. P., & East, R. (2008). On being happy and tions. New York: Wiley. doi:10.1037/10628-000
gullible: Mood effects on skepticism and the detection Hilgard, E. R. (1980). The trilogy of mind: Cogni-
of deception. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol- tion, affection, and conation. Journal of the His-
ogy, 44, 1362–1367. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.04.010 tory of the Behavioral Sciences, 16(2), 107–117.
Forgas, J. P., Goldenberg, L., & Unkelbach, C. (2009). doi:10.1002/1520-6696(198004)16:2%3C107::AID-
Can bad weather improve your memory? Mood JHBS2300160202%3E3.0.CO;2-Y
effects on memory in a real-life setting. Journal Isen, A. M. (1984). Towards understanding the role of
of Experimental Social Psychology, 54, 254–257. affect in cognition. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.),
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.08.014 Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 179–236).
Forgas, J. P., Matovic, D., & Slater, I. (2018). Mood ef- NJ: Erlbaum.
fects on bullshit receptivity: Positive affect increases, James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. Holt,
and negative affect reduces gullibility and the ac- New York. doi:10.1037/10538-000
ceptance of meaningless statements as meaningful.
Josephson, B. R., Singer, J. A., & Salovey, P. (1996).
Manuscript, UNSW, Sydney.
Mood regulation and memory: repairing sad moods
Forgas, J. P., Vargas, P., & Laham, S. (2005). Mood with happy memories. Cognition and Emotion, 10,
effects on eyewitness memory: Affective influ- 437–444. doi:10.1080/026999396380222
ences on susceptibility to misinformation. Journal
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. London:
of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 574–588.
Penguin Books.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2004.11.005
Kihlstrom, J. F. (1989). On what does mood-dependent
Fredrickson, B. L. (2009). Positivity. New York, NY:
memory depend? Journal of Social Behavior and
Crown.
Personality, 4, 23–32.
Gasper, K., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Attending to the big
Koch, A. S., Forgas, J. P., & Matovic, D. (2013). Can
picture: Mood and global versus local processing of
negative mood improve your conversation? Affective
visual information. Psychological Science, 13, 34–40.
influences on conforming to Grice’s communication
doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00406
norms. European Journal of Social Psychology, 43,
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The corre- pp. 326–334. doi:10.1002/ejsp.1950
spondence bias. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 21–38.
Koestler, A. (1967). The Ghost in the Machine (1990
doi:10.1037//0033-2909.117.1.21
reprint ed.). Penguin Group.
Gilboa-Schechtman, E., Erhard-Weiss, D., & Jecemien, P.
Koster, E. H. W., De Raedt, R., Goeleven, E., Franck,
(2002). Memory for facial expressions in depressed
E., & Crombez, G. (2005). Mood-Congruent Atten-
and anxious men and women. Psychiatry Research,
tional Bias in Dysphoria: Maintained Attention to
113, 279–293. doi:10.1016/s0165-1781(02)00266-4
and Impaired Disengagement From Negative Infor-
Goodwin, D. W. (1974). Alcoholic blackout and state- mation. Emotion, 5(4), 446–455. doi:10.1037/1528-
dependent learning. Federation Proceedings, 33, 3542.5.4.446
1833–1835.
Matovic, D., Koch, A. S., & Forgas, J. P. (2014). Can
Gotlib, I. H, & Joormann, J. (2010). Cognition and de- negative mood improve language understanding? Af-
pression: current status and future directions. An- fective influences on the ability to detect ambiguous
nual Review of Clinical Psychology, 6, 285–312. communication. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
doi:10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.121208.131305 chology, 52, 44–49. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2013.12.003

Forgas Affect and Thought
Mayer, J. D., Gaschke, Y. N., Braverman, D. L., & Evans, Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 759–777.
T. W. (1992). Mood-congruent judgment is a general doi:10.1037//0022-3514.69.4.759
effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Sinclair, R. C., Mark, M. M., & Clore, G. L.
63, 119–132. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.1.119 (1994). Mood-related persuasion depends on
Miranda, R., & Kihlstrom, J. (2005). Mood con- misattributions. Social Cognition, 12, 309–326.
gruence in childhood and recent autobiographical doi:10.1521/soco.1994.12.4.309
memory. Cognition and Emotion, 19, 981–998. Sokal, A. D., & Bricmont, J. (1998). Fashionable Non-
doi:10.1080/02699930500202967 sense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science.
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., Picador USA: New York.
& Fugelsang, J. A. (2015). On the reception and de- Smith, S. M., & Petty, R. E. (1995). Personality moder-
tection of pseudo-profound bullshit. Judgment and ators of mood congruency effects on cognition: The
Decision Making, 10, 549–563. role of self-esteem. Journal of Personality and So-
Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. cial Psychology, 68, 1092–1107. doi:10.1037//0022-
New York: Free Press. doi:10.1037/11168-000 3514.68.6.1092
Rapaport, D. (1961/1942). Emotions and memory. New Tamir, M., & Robinson, M. D. (2007). The
York: Science Editions. doi:10.1037/11400-000 happy spotlight: Positive mood and selective at-
Razran, G. H. (1940). Conditioned response changes in tention to rewarding information. Personality
rating and appraising sociopolitical slogans. Psycho- and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 1124–1136.
logical Bulletin, 37, 481–493. doi:10.1177/0146167207301030
Reus, V. I., Weingartner, H., & Post, R. M. (1979). Tan, H. B., & Forgas, J. P. (2010). When happiness makes
Clinical implications of state-dependent learning. us selfish, but sadness makes us fair: Affective influ-
American Journal of Psychiatry, 136, 927–931. ences on interpersonal strategies in the dictator game.
doi:10.1176/ajp.136.7.927 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 571–
576. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.01.007
Ruiz-Caballero, J. A., & Gonzalez, P. (1994). Implicit
and explicit memory bias in depressed and non- Ucros, C. G. (1989). Mood state-dependent memory: A
depressed subjects. Cognition and Emotion, 8, 555– meta-analysis. Cognition & Emotion, 3, 139–169.
570. doi:10.1080/02699939408408959 doi:10.1080/02699938908408077
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattri- Unkelbach, C., Forgas, J. P., & Denson, T. F.
bution and judgments of well-being: Informative (2008). The turban effect: The influence of Mus-
and directive functions of affective states. Journal lim headgear and induced affect on aggressive re-
of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 513–523. sponses in the shooter bias paradigm. Journal of
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513 Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1409–1413.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.04.003
Schwarz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informa-
tional and motivational functions of affective states. Wadlinger, H., Isaacowitz, D. M. (2006). Positive affect
In E. T. Higgins & R. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of broadens visual attention to positive stimuli. Motiva-
motivation and cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 527–561). New tion and Emotion, 30, 87–99. doi:10.1007/s11031-
York: Guilford. 006-9021-1
Sedikides, C. (1994). Incongruent effects of sad mood Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emo-
on self-conception valence: It’s a matter of time. Eu- tional reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
ropean Journal of Social Psychology, 24, 161–172. 3, 1–14. doi:10.1037/h0069608
doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420240112 Zajonc, R. B. (2000). Feeling and thinking: Closing the
Sedikides, C. (1995). Central and peripheral self- debate over the independence of affect. In J. P. For-
conceptions are differentially influenced by mood: gas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in
The differential sensitivity hypothesis. Journal of social cognition (pp. 31–58). New York: Cambridge
University Press.

Glossary Forgas
Glossary
affect congruence Selective attention to, access to infer their reaction rather than computing
to, and use of information from memory that a response based on the actual features of the
has previously been associated with the cur- stimulus. 342
rent affective state, resulting in an affect-
congruent bias in thinking. 341, 342, 344 associative network model A theory that pre-
dicts that affective states are linked to
Affect Infusion Model A model predicting that thoughts and memories in a cognitive network
the infusion of affect into thinking and judg- of associations, such that the experience of an
ments depends on the kind of information pro- affective states facilitates the recall and use of
cessing strategy used, with more open, genera- cognitive contents previously associated with
tive strategies increasing affect infusion. 342, it in the past. 342
344, 347
affect state dependence Improved memory and emotion Intense, conscious and directed affective
use for information that has been acquired in state with clear cognitive content. 342
a similar, matching affective state. 344, 345
affect-as-information A theory that predicts that mood Mild, nonspecific and often enduring and
in some evaluative judgments, people may use subliminal positive or negative affective state
their current affective state as a heuristic cue with little cognitive content. 342

Chapter 19
Culture and Thought

M ARY G AUVAIN
University of California, Riverside
Throughout the day, people solve many different use of space, are described. Navigating in and using
types of problems. The nature of these problems large-scale space effectively are critical to the every-
and the way that people understand and think about day functioning and the survival of all human beings.
them can have enormous consequences for individ- The importance of spatial knowledge, along with
uals and their well-being. Psychologists have great variations across cultural settings in the environment
interest in this process and one thing is increasingly and the resources available for understanding and us-
clear—in order to understand human thinking it is ing space, make this a rich area to study culture and
necessary to take culture into account (Greenfield, thought (Dasen & Mishra, 2010). What is clear from
Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003). This insight is this research is that, across cultures, there exists a
based on research that shows that culture, the natu- vast array of solutions for solving spatial problems
ral environment or habitat of the human species, is and they affect how people explore, learn about, and
an essential and inextricable part of human psycho- remember the world around them. To help people
logical experience, including thought. solve spatial problems, cultures, over the course
This chapter describes the relation between cul- of human history, have devised various social con-
ture and thought. It begins with a brief historical ventions (e.g., ways of describing space, teaching
account of how culture has been studied in psycho- people about how to understand and use space) and
logical research on human cognition. We then de- symbolic and material ways of encoding and repre-
scribe how culture becomes part of individual mental senting spatial information (e.g., maps, models, com-
functioning. Throughout the chapter, the focus is on passes, frames of reference). These cultural tools
both the content and process of human cognition. are used to solve spatial problems including how
Content includes behaviors and other psychological people communicate spatial information (e.g., direc-
properties, such as knowledge. Process is about how tions), identify locations, orient themselves in space,
thinking works and includes mental functions such and find their way around. These cognitive skills
as attention, perception, reasoning, classification, and the practices associated with them are highly
memory, problem solving, and planning. Culture valued in cultures and, as such, they are shared by
plays a significant role in determining both the con- community members and passed across generations
tent and the process of human thinking. in the process of cognitive socialization (Gauvain
To illustrate these ideas, findings from research in & Perez, 2015b).
the area of spatial cognition, the understanding and

Gauvain Culture and Thought
19.1 A Brief Historical Look at Glick, & Sharp, 1971). Interestingly, at the same
Psychological Research on time, the research participants, both children and
Culture and Cognition adults, who had performed poorly on conventional
laboratory assessments of cognition were observed
using impressive cognitive capabilities in their daily
Psychologists have been interested in the relation lives, including spatial knowledge, reasoning, classi-
between culture and human cognition for well over fication, and linguistic and number systems (e.g., see
a century. At the very beginning of the discipline in Gladwin, 1970; Hutchins, 1983; Lancy, 1983; Ser-
the late 1800s, Wilhelm Wundt, a founder of mod- pell, 1979). Moreover, these skilled performances
ern psychology, was concerned with how cultural- resonated closely with the practices and values of
historical forms, such as language and methods of the participants’ cultural group.
reasoning, affect cognitive functions (Cole, 1996). These observations provided understanding that
At the same time, Wundt and other psychologists may seem obvious in hindsight, but were at the time
were also committed to studying human psychology quite profound. First, they suggested that human
experimentally, an approach to research that makes cognitive performance is better when it is assessed
it very difficult to study culture. This is because on the activities and skills that people practice and
two principal features of the experimental method, are valued in their culture. Second, the more a cog-
random assignment and manipulation, cannot be nitive assessment deviates from the familiar con-
used—a person cannot be randomly assigned to a text in which an individual lives, the poorer the per-
culture nor can culture be experimentally manipu- son’s cognitive performance will be. Third, because
lated (Whiting, 1976). In short order, the attention the patterns were similar for children and adults,
of these early researchers landed on topics better the connection between culture and cognition ex-
suited to experimentation, such as physiological and ists throughout the lifespan. And, finally, results
perceptual psychology. As a result, in the early 20th that demonstrate better cognitive performance in
century, the study of culture and human cognition, people who live in Western, more industrialized
at least among psychologists in the U.S. and Europe, cultures are often based on assessments that favor
declined significantly. Interestingly, at this same their experiences. In many cases, they reflect the
time, there was strong interest in Russia where Lev S. cultural background and values of the researchers
Vygotsky and other Activity Theorists were putting themselves. When taken together, these observa-
forward exciting ideas about culture and cognition, tions set the stage for a new generation of research
many of which are taken up later in the chapter when on culture and human cognition, one based on the
the sociocultural approach is described (Wertsch, idea that experience in culture is fundamental to the
1985). development and expression of human thinking.
By the mid-20th century in American and Eu- Since that time, two different approaches to study-
ropean psychology, there was renewed interest in ing culture and cognition have been used (Göncü &
culture and cognition. It was fueled, in part, by the Gauvain, 2012; Table 19.1). One, the cross-cultural
“cognitive revolution” occurring in psychology at approach, focuses on comparisons across cultures,
the time (Bruner, 1957; Neisser, 1967) along with while the other approach, based on the area of re-
a number of practical concerns that had great soci- search known as cultural psychology, concentrates
etal significance. Of particular importance was the on processes and systems of meaning within cul-
need to understand cognitive variation in human per- tures. Each of these approaches has strengths and
formance on studies that included individuals from limitations.
different social or cultural backgrounds (Munroe & For Margaret Mead (1931), a founder of the cross-
Gauvain, 2010). Some researchers observed that cultural tradition, this approach is essentially a type
cognitive performance varied systematically with of experimental research design, one that investi-
participants’ social class and their experience with gates how natural variations in culture affect the
Western forms of schooling (e.g., see Cole, Gay, human experience. Despite this hopeful point of

A Brief Historical Look at Psychological Research on Culture and Cognition Gauvain
Table 19.1: Contemporary approaches for studying culture and cognition.
Approach Method Purpose

Cross-cultural psychology Compares individuals across cultural set- Investigates how natural variation across
tings cultural settings relates to patterns of hu-
man cognition and its development
Cultural psychology Focuses on processes and systems of Investigates how values and practices of
meaning within a culture a culture relate to the expression and de-
velopment of human cognition in that
culture
view, the approach has, in practice, fallen short of community members through the customary prac-
this goal. Most significantly, it is prone to biases tices, values, and beliefs of the group (Goodnow,
that favor one cultural group, typically the one simi- Miller, & Kessel, 1995; Shweder at al., 1998). Chil-
lar to the researchers’ own background, over other dren, over the course of development, are socialized
groups. Also, over time, research based on this into these traditions, values, and practices through
approach resulted in a number of unsubstantiated their participation in regular events and activities
assumptions about universality, most often by iden- (Rogoff, 2003). Cultural knowledge and ways of
tifying the performances of Western middle-class thinking are conveyed to young and new commu-
participants living in industrialized communities as nity members socially, both through direct social
normative or optimal and applying deficit interpre- contact (i.e., social interaction) and less socially di-
tations to participants whose performances do not rect, but nonetheless, social forms of information
match up (e.g., Cole et al., 1971; Rogoff, 2003; exchange such as rituals, customs, and shared tools
Serpell, 2017; Shweder, 1990). Studies of within- and resources, including technology (Gauvain &
nation cultural differences that use this method, such Nicolaides, 2015).
as research conducted in the U.S. when children
from low-income communities are compared with
their middle-class counterparts, have often been sim- Some contemporary researchers working from
ilarly flawed when commonalities between groups this approach are called sociocultural or sociohis-
are overlooked and differences are interpreted as the torical psychologists and they base many of their
deficits of low-income children (Cole, 1996; Rogoff, ideas on the aforementioned insights of Vygotsky
2003). and Activity Theorists (Cole, 1996; Vygotsky, 1978).
Sociocultural approaches hold the view that human
The cultural psychology approach was, in part, thinking is culturally mediated, that is, it takes place
developed to address these limitations (Göncü, Tuer- in historically-situated activities that are informed
mer, Jain, & Johnson, 1999; Shweder et al., 1998). and guided by culture. Culture becomes part of indi-
It avoids cross-cultural comparisons and takes issue vidual psychological experience as people engage in
with the use of one culture as the standard or norm in the practices, institutions and tools in settings where
such comparisons. Rather, it views culture as an in- the accumulated knowledge of the culture is used
herently integrated system of meaning that provides and made available to new members. Over the last
organization and direction for human cognition and decades, this view has helped shift attention away
learning. In this view, culture is psychologically ex- from a view of human cognition as a solitary, indi-
perienced and takes form in individual thinking and vidual, and internally driven process towards one
behavior. Research based on this approach has con- that sees cognition as emerging from the coordina-
centrated on how cultural meanings are expressed tion of inherent human abilities and cultural systems
and communicated in the day-to-day functioning of of meaning.

This chapter draws on empirical evidence from 2015a). In considering research on culture and
both the cross-cultural and within-culture research thought, it is also important to understand that cul-
traditions. As stated, each approach has strengths tures are not static. They change over time as people
and they can be used in a complementary way to and their environments change. And, lastly, it is
guide theory and research (Van de Vijver, Hofer, & worth remembering that human beings may belong
Chasiotis, 2010). That said, each approach also has to and move between many different cultures, or sys-
limitations. The ultimate goal is to take culture into tems of meanings, at the same time—a phenomenon
account by benefitting from the unique insights each that is increasingly evident today in the context of
approach can offer while avoiding problems asso- widespread globalization.
ciated with their earlier use and interpretation. For
instance, cross-cultural research can be useful when
19.2 Defining the Relation of Culture
researchers do not assign greater value or worth
to any cultural pattern or behavior. Focusing on a and Cognition
common point of reference across cultures, such
Human beings learn to think about and solve prob-
as behaviors related to universal developmental and
lems in their everyday lives with the support and
cognitive tasks (e.g., early dependency on caregivers,
guidance of practices and resources that have been
spatial navigation; Van de Vijver, et al., 2010), is
developed by their culture over time, continue to be
particularly useful. Careful sampling and data anal-
used, and are passed across generations. This type
ysis are critical in order to avoid ethnocentrism that
of social learning is called cumulative cultural evo-
reifies any particular way of life.
lution (Boyd & Richardson, 1996). It is the process
Research rooted in cultural psychology can pro- that enables human beings to create resources and
vide depth of understanding about a culture. How- tools that support and extend human activity, in-
ever, it is important not to adopt a monolithic view cluding thought processes, and for these resources
of a culture that suggests that all its members adhere and tools to be used by subsequent generations in
to cultural values and practices in the exact same the same or a modified form. These modifications,
way and to the same extent. There is variation in referred to as the ratchet effect, are maintained by
cognition and behavior both within and across cul- culture and they enable the accumulation of modifi-
tures. Individual differences within cultures stem cations over time. As Tomasello (1999) explains
from many sources including age, interests, capabil-
ities, and other aspects of psychological functioning, “some individual or group of individuals first
such as emotionality. These variations provide one invented a primitive version of [an] artifact or
of the sources of complexity inherent to culture, practice, and then some later user or users made a
which contributes in important ways to the diversity modification, an ‘improvement,’ that others then
of thinking that can help a culture address new and adopted perhaps without change for many gener-
unexpected challenges (D’Andrade, 1984; Good- ations, at which point some other individual or
now, 1990). group of individuals made another modification,
To summarize, for over a century there has been which was then learned and used by others, and
interest among psychologists in the relation between so on over historical time in what has sometimes
culture and human cognition. After many years of been dubbed ‘the ratchet effect’ [3, p. 5].
research, several interesting ideas have taken shape
about how to conceptualize and approach this topic. As this quotation makes clear, human beings are
Research has made it clear that cognition has com- active agents in this process as they adopt and adapt
plex and deep connections to the cultural context cultural practices and ways of thinking to meet their
in which an individual lives. This is because the current needs (Tomasello, 1999).
cultural context provides the social processes, tools, Few would dispute the fact that the content of
practices, and institutions that support and guide thought varies across cultures. Less clear is what it
cognition and its development (Gauvain & Perez, means to state that processes of cognition, such as

Thinking in Niches Gauvain
attention and memory, differ across cultures. It is im- guage appears to be uniform (Rosch, 1977). Thus,
portant to understand that this is not the same thing both universal and culturally specific patterns in
as saying that different groups of human beings pos- the perception and classification of color have been
sess fundamentally different intellectual functions. found. Such patterns suggest that even in basic cog-
Basic intellectual functions are shared across cul- nitive processes such as color perception, we see
tures and attest to our integrity as a species. All cultural variations on a common theme.
human beings perceive stimuli, remember things,
solve problems, engage in social interaction, de-
velop and use tools to support human activity, are 19.3 Thinking in Niches
self-aware and so forth. However, social and cultural
One way to trace out the cultural contributions to
experiences contribute to the form these processes
human thinking is to identify the means by which
take in any particular instance or setting. As a re-
culture becomes part of an individual’s knowledge
sult, for any given psychological function there are
and thought processes. To describe this process,
both commonalities and differences across cultural
Gauvain (1995) built on ideas put forth by Super and
communities.
Harkness (1986) in their conception of the develop-
Consider an example from color perception. Be- mental niche. In their approach, Super and Harkness
cause all intact human brains have the same visual adapted a concept from biological ecology, the eco-
system and photoreceptors, color perception is, as logical niche, to describe in a single framework how
far as we know, invariant across members of the social-psychological experience connects directly
species and emerges on a similar developmental to culture over the course of human development.
course in early infancy (Franklin, Piling, & Davies, Super and Harkness identified three subsystems of
2005). However, cultural and linguistic experience the developmental niche: the physical and social
determine a number of factors related to color per- settings of development, customs of child care, and
ception and categorization. The number of colors the psychology of caregivers.
identified by a single color term, how hue is classi- In extending this idea to describe human cognition
fied, and the valence or preference for certain col- and its development, Gauvain (1995) identified three
ors varies across cultures in relation to the words subsystems of culture: (1) conventions for organiz-
used in the language to denote and categorize colors ing and communicating knowledge, (2) material and
(Johnson & Hannon, 2015). And, although some symbolic tools that facilitate thinking and problem
languages possess more color terms than others, the solving, and (3) cultural practices and social institu-
sequence in which new terms are added to the lan- tions (Table 19.2). Each of these subsystems relies
Table 19.2: Subsystems of culture that contribute to human knowledge and thought processes.
Cultural Subsystems Description Examples

Ways of conveying knowledge Conventions of language that peo- Scripts, schemas, mental represen-
ple use to organize and communicate tations (e.g., a mental tour), spatial
knowledge relational terminology
Tools that aid thinking Material and symbolic methods that Maps, compass, directions, frames
are used to support and extend think- of reference in orienteering, Global
ing and problem solving Positioning System (GPS)
Cultural practices and social institu- Formal and informal settings in School, apprenticeships, wayfinding
tions which people carry out everyday ac- techniques, navigational systems, rit-
tivities and learn about and apply uals, daily routines
cognitive skills

in important ways on social interaction as a primary There are a number of examples of organizing
means by which culture and cognition become con- and communicating spatial information that reveal
nected to one another. However, each also includes culture contributions to this process. Research con-
less interpersonally direct, but still fundamentally ducted in Western cultural settings has found that
social processes, that contribute to the acquisition, when adults describe spatial information, they tend
organization, and use of cognitive functions through to use structured narratives that resemble route-like
the use of historically, or culturally, formulated tools directions that include the temporal and spatial con-
and resources for understanding the world and solv- tiguity, or relatedness, of areas in the space, almost
ing problems. In this section, these three subsystems as if someone is taking an imagined walk through it
are described and illustrated with research on spatial or what is called a “mental tour” (Linde & Labov,
cognition. 1975). From early to middle childhood, children’s
descriptions of large-scale space come to resemble
this type of mental tour (Gauvain & Rogoff, 1989).
19.3.1 Conventions for Organizing and However, cultural values determine which informa-
Communicating Knowledge tion is important to include and this information is
found in descriptions produced even by young chil-
An important aspect of human cognition is organiz- dren. For example, the route directions of Iranian
ing and communicating knowledge in understand- preschoolers living in Britain include more vivid and
able ways to others. These skills not only help peo- fuller accounts of sites along a route and less direc-
ple structure their knowledge for effective use, they tional information than the directions of same age
also connect members of a community to one an- British children living in the same region (Spencer
other. Examples are schema and scripts, which are & Darvizeh, 1983). This difference suggests that as
abstract representations that connect pieces of infor- early as three years of age, children are beginning
mation into an overarching organization (Bobrow & to display some of the values of their culture when
Norman, 1975; Nelson, 1993; Schank & Abelson, communicating spatial information to others.
1977). Scripts, for example, include the order or se- There is also evidence that cultural ways of com-
quence in which actions are expected to happen and municating spatial information affect the process
how one should behave in a situation (e.g., going of thinking about space and wayfinding (Peterson,
to a restaurant). Even infants and toddlers organize Nadel, Bloom, & Garrett, 1996). In some languages
their knowledge of routine events, such as bathing, absolute directions are used to describe spatial rela-
along script-like lines. By the end of the first year, tions. The Guugu Yimithirr are a case in point. They
infants use temporal information in recalling events are an Aboriginal community in eastern Australia
such as Teddy Bear’s bath: first put Teddy in the tub, and the language these people use to describe spatial
then wash him with a sponge, then dry him with a relations does not rely on relativistic terms, such as
towel (Bauer et al., 2000). By 20-months of age, if left, right, up, and down (Levinson, 1996). Rather,
toddlers are told about a familiar event in which the they describe spatial information in absolute terms
order of actions is violated, they will correct it (e.g., in accord with cardinal directions, such as north,
“No, wash Teddy before drying him”) or say, “That’s south, east, and west. In a series of studies that in-
so silly.” These ways of organizing complex infor- volved asking speakers of this language to point to
mation are valuable to cognitive functioning. They out-of-sight locations (called dead reckoning) in the
support memory by aiding recall of events and they desert and to reproduce the arrangements of objects
can be used to plan or guide behaviors to reach a on table tops in adjacent rooms, Guugu Yimithirr
goal, for example, what to do to get ready for school speakers identified and reconstructed spatial infor-
or work in the morning. And, similar to routinized mation according to the absolute rather than the rel-
actions or habits, schema and scripts aid learning ative positioning of objects. Thus, even when they
and problem solving by freeing up mental space for were not speaking, they behaved in ways consistent
new or challenging activities. with the communicative conventions in their cul-

Material and Symbolic Tools That Aid Thinking Gauvain
ture for describing space. The rapidity and precision used in carrying out an activity and in learning about
with which the participants provided absolute spatial the world.
information on these tasks led Levinson to conclude The mostly widely studied cultural tool of spatial
that their spatial encoding reflected an orientation thinking is the map, which functions as both a mem-
consistent with the linguistic form. Although ex- ory store and a tool for action. Children’s skill at
amples of this sort are rare, similar communicative devising, understanding, and using maps increases
and cognitive systems have been found in other cul- from early to middle childhood (Liben & Downs,
tures, such as the Tzeltal Maya (Levinson, 2003) 2015). Research shows that preschool children have
and Tongans in Polynesia (Bennardo, 2014). a basic understanding of what maps represent (e.g.,
they understand that maps depict locations) and how
they can be used (e.g., to find a place in space), but
19.3.2 Material and Symbolic Tools they misunderstand many of the symbolic aspects of
That Aid Thinking maps (e.g., expect that a road shown as red on a map
is actually red; Liben, 2009). It is not until middle
Material and symbolic tools and resources are de- childhood, when children are formally introduced
veloped and used by cultures to guide and support to maps in school, that they begin to develop a more
mental activity and, as such, they play a central role sophisticated understanding of maps (Uttal, 2005).
in the development and organization of cognitive Full competence at reading and using maps may
skill. This view, developed by Vygotsky (1987) and not be achieved until adolescence or later depend-
other Activity Theorists (Wertsch, 1981), suggests ing on the opportunities available for developing
that tools and symbols mediate the origin and con- these skills (Presson, 1987). Some very important
duct of human activity and, thereby, connect the or highly specialized maps, such as those represent-
human mind not only with the world of places and ing the location of secret and valuable places (e.g.,
objects but also with other people and their cultural water sources) that are carved on weapons, rocks
history. Thus, by acquiring and using culturally and the human body by the Ngatajara people of the
developed tools for thinking, a person’s mental func- Australian desert (Gould, 1969) or maps represent-
tioning assumes a link to sociohistorical means and ing state or national electric grid systems, may be
understanding transmitted through these tools and inaccessible to most people in a culture.
symbols. Cole and Griffin (1980) refer to these How does experience with maps relate to cog-
tools and symbols as cultural amplifiers, that is, nition? Research shows that this experience helps
techniques or technological features provided by a people obtain insights about large-scale space that
culture that alter the approaches individual cultural would not otherwise be possible (Liben, 2001). It
members use in solving problems posed by their also suggests that people’s ability to use maps not
environment. only reflects their particular spatial representational
Material and symbolic tools play an important skills, but also the individual’s experience and prac-
role in spatial thinking because they extend cogni- tice with a system of representation or tools available
tive capabilities by allowing people to describe and in their culture. Or as Uttal (2005) put it, skill at
use large-scale space in ways that would not be pos- using maps to navigate in space results from living
sible without the tools. That is, these tools not only in a map-immersed culture. Because learning how
aid thinking, e.g. by easing navigation and travel, to understand and use maps is a social and com-
they also transform thinking and behavior. For ex- municative process, people need to be taught what
ample, an individual may attend to and remember representations in maps stand for and how they can
directions to a location differently depending on be used. Such skills are highly valued in cultures
whether pencil and paper or GPS technology is at with these tools. In fact, recent innovations in STEM
hand. In this way, the availability of tools determines (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathemat-
how individuals attend to and store information, in ics) learning include introducing young people in
other words, the very cognitive processes that are such cultures to map use across a diverse range of

spatial contexts and technologies (Committee on scriptions, whereas Namibian children were more
Support for Thinking Spatially, 2006). likely to use absolute descriptions. In addition, when
Cultural symbol systems, such as numeracy and the children were instructed to use their nondomi-
language, also contribute to spatial thinking. Much nant frame of reference, they had great difficulty in
of the research that examines language in relation doing so and performed poorly. Thus, spatial cogni-
to spatial cognition is centered on testing the idea tion and language variability across cultures covary
proposed by Whorf (1956) that language affects the in systematic ways.
ways in which speakers conceptualize the world and The symbols and tools that cultures devise and use
even their nonlinguistic cognitive abilities. Results to represent and support thinking are not static. They
suggest that variation across languages in the cate- change over time and may do so in a rather sweep-
gorization of spatial concepts contributes to cultural ing fashion. Recently, there have been a number of
variation in spatial understanding. For instance, re- major changes in the tools people use to imagine,
search conducted by Bowerman and colleagues (e.g., communicate about, and experience large-scale or
Bowerman & Choi, 2003; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, geo-space, including geographic information sys-
Haun, & Levinson, 2004) found that culturally spe- tems (GIS), global positioning systems (GPS), and
cific reading patterns can influence performance on geo-visualization tools (GeoVis). Downs (2014) de-
seemingly unrelated tasks. In one study, participants scribes these changes as revolutionary because of
spoke and read either English or Mandarin; English their potential to affect the development and use of
text is written in a left-right pattern, whereas Man- spatial cognition along with people’s understanding
darin text is written vertically. When participants of and relation to the world as a whole. The ex-
were asked to described how they thought about the tent of the impact is, as of yet, unknown. What is
future, English readers described the future as occur- known is that people are adopting these technologies
ring in a forward direction and the past in a backward at a rapid pace and their use is both widespread and
direction while Mandarin readers described the fu- regular. People use handheld spatial navigation de-
ture as occurring in an upward manner and the past vices on a daily basis for moving around the world
in a downward manner. in vehicles and on foot. Even people living in ge-
Research has also found that language is related ographically isolated communities in the Majority
to cultural differences in preferences for particular World use these tools, accessed mainly on mobile
frames of reference in describing space. Majid and or cell phones (Mpogole, Usanga, & Tedre, 2008).
colleagues (2004) identified three frames of refer- Although most people in remote regions report pur-
ence: (1) relative, which involves use of the viewers’ chasing these phones for social and emergency con-
own perspective (e.g., the spoon is to the right of the tact, the phones are also used to help people carry
fork); (2) absolute, which uses an external frame- out activities that are spatial in nature. For instance,
work (e.g., the spoon is to the north of the fork); they help rural villagers living in very spread-out re-
and (3) intrinsic, which uses the relationship of the gions make decisions important for their livelihood,
items themselves without reference to personal or such as where to find clean water for livestock and
external coordinates (e.g., the fork is at the nose of household use.
the spoon). The frequency of using these frames of Downs (2014) identifies some potential down-
reference differs across languages. English speakers sides to adopting these technologies that warrant
are more likely to use relative and intrinsic frames more attention from researchers. For instance, he
while the aforementioned Guugu Yimithirr speak- asks, how do people evaluate the quality and utility
ers from Australia exclusively use absolute frames of the spatial information provided by these tech-
of reference. Similarly, Haun, Rapold, Janzen, and nologies? Do people monitor their activities as they
Levinson (2011) found that Dutch and Namibian el- rely on this information to be certain it is helpful or
ementary school children (6=Akhoe Haikom speak- correct? Downs is also concerned about dependency.
ers) also differed in their spatial frames of reference. These tools, without question, can afford greater
Dutch children were more likely to use relative de- ease and flexibility for people when traveling, es-

Cultural Practices and Institutions Gauvain
pecially in distant or unfamiliar places. Yet users Hatano, 1997). The relation between schooling and
may become dependent on them, which may, in turn, cognitive development is well known. What is im-
lead to an abandonment of more traditional methods portant for present purposes is how experience in
of thinking about and using space. These changes school includes practice and skill development in
would, inevitably, reduce the likelihood that tradi- culturally-valued areas and that these experiences
tional methods of spatial thinking and representation carry over into everyday thinking. For instance,
are transmitted across generations. schooling contributes to the development of spatial
Taken together, this research supports the view thinking through the skills that are emphasized and
that symbolic and material tools devised and used practiced there. The types of measurement and pre-
by a culture are integrated with the development and cision promoted in schools is evident in the degree
use of spatial thinking skills. These cultural tools of accuracy seen or expected in people’s everyday
alter how individuals solve spatial problems, and as distance estimation, model replication, and map use
a result, they transform spatial cognition. However, in cultures that value these skills. This degree of pre-
their contribution to spatial thinking is complex and cision is less common in spatial representations and
provides both opportunities and constraints. Tools, memory among people living in some other cultural
such as maps, and symbolic systems, including lan- communities, even though these individuals exhibit
guage, can provide ways of solving spatial problems high levels of spatial skill (Gauvain, 1998). Other
that would not be possible without these resources. highly skilled ways of characterizing space may em-
However, at the same time, these tools constrain spa- phasize configurational information (where places
tial problem solving and what people know about are relative to one another) or information about
space. For instance, people’s understanding of the changing landscape conditions (due to seasonal or
geography of London is more reflective of the spatial other types of climatic factors) that can alter the tex-
layout depicted in the map of the city’s underground ture and dimension of a terrain and affect travel time
subway system than it is of the city itself (Roberts, or safety.
2005). Here we are reminded of our earlier discus- Culture may also influence spatial memory and
sion about how to interpret an individual’s success use through more formalized traditional practices
or failure when asked to solve a problem or do a for exploring and traversing large-scale space. Tra-
cognitive task. The body of research just described ditional Puluwat seafarers in Micronesia have de-
demonstrates that when a person is asked to solve a veloped a navigational system that does not rely on
spatial problem that is integrated with a cultural tool, modern instruments. Rather, these navigators learn a
symbolic or material, the person’s performance will complex set of principles to guide their travels (Glad-
reflect not only the individual’s inherent cognitive win, 1971; Hutchins, 1983). Some of this informa-
skills, but also their experience with the symbols tion is directly observed, such as wave patterns, and
and tools of their culture. other parts are inferred, such as the sidereal (star)
compass. The sidereal compass is an abstract men-
19.3.3 Cultural Practices and tal reference system of 32 star paths that defines the
courses or routes of travel among islands. This huge
Institutions
memorization task is eased by the use of cultural
Culture provides institutions and other formal and myths as mnemonics or memory aids (Hage, 1978).
informal social settings and arrangements, including The remarkable skill of traditional Puluwat naviga-
rituals and routines, that facilitate and guide human tors relies on knowing many star paths that define
thinking (Goodnow et al., 1995). Formal institu- courses of travel among islands. Similar to most
tions are designed to train people in the valued skills knowledge of familiar local space, star paths are not
and practices of their culture. School, for instance, fixed map routes or action sequences, rather they are
promotes and supports the development of particu- a reservoir of possible action plans for solving spa-
lar approaches and methods that are valued in the tial navigational problems. Locomotion, either real
culture, such as literacy and numeracy (Serpell & or imagined, provides information about landmarks

and actual or potential routes, as well as immedi- Less formal social institutions and social settings
ate cues (e.g., direction, winds, tides, currents, bird also influence spatial thinking. In cultures where
patterns) that are used to update and adjust spatial verbal explanation is highly valued, cultural prac-
orientation and route finding in real time. tices reflect this value in the form of oral narratives
Other institutions of culture, such as rituals and and storytelling. These practices assume much im-
routines, also play important roles in cultural learn- portance and are part of everyday experience and
ing. By definition, rituals and routines entail un- cognitive exchange that children have with older
changing and prescribed patterns or sequences of children and adults (Heath, 1983). For example,
actions that are deemed important in the culture research shows that children are introduced to and
(Goodnow et al., 1995). These action sequences learn about cultural ways of conceptualizing and
are displayed on a regular and predictable basis, representing space and how to use these represen-
and as such, children have ample opportunity to tational forms by interacting with their caregivers.
learn about them via observational and participatory Szechter and Liben (2004) found that mothers’ use
means. Children also learn about their cultural sig- of spatial language during picture book reading with
nificance, often in the context of family life, which 3- to 5-year-old children predicted children’s suc-
enhances motivation to learn about them and carry cess on a spatial task that involved spatial-graphic
them out (Fiese, 2006). Even early in life, chil- representations (i.e., understanding of graphically
dren have a role in cultural rituals and routines and depicted distance). Adults also guide children in
their role changes with development, typically in the exploring new environments and they help children
direction of increased expectations of independent learn spatial routes of travel (Spencer & Blades,
performance and responsibility (Rogoff, 2003). 2006).
Do cultural practices affect the development of Researchers have also studied how variation in
spatial thinking skills? In a study comparing the spa- cultural practice, such as access to aerial views of
tial skills of Australian Aboriginal children reared in the earth, relate to how individuals come to un-
the desert and European Australian children reared derstand and solve spatial problems (Blaut, Mc-
in the city, Kearins (1981) found that the Aborig- Cleary, & Blaut, 1970, Spencer & Blades, 2006).
inal children performed far better on all the spa- Hund, Schmettow and Noordzij (2012) discuss two
tial location tasks presented to them. This result wayfinding strategies or perspectives: (1) route per-
echoes the consistent finding that increased experi- spectives, or first-person mental tours, that provide
ence in an environment enhances memory for space information such as left and right turns and land-
and aids spatial orientation (Liben & Christensen, mark descriptions; and (2) survey perspectives, or
2010). Cultures differ in the opportunity children third-person perspectives that involve considering
have to explore space during everyday routine activ- the entire travel space at once (e.g., aerial views) and
ities, which has consequences for spatial thinking use cardinal directions (e.g., north, south), precise
and its development. For example, research con- distances, and specific locations. The researchers
ducted in the Logoli community in Kenya found a found that participants from the Midwestern United
relation between the distance children played from States tended to use a survey perspective whereas
their village and their skill on spatial tasks (Munroe participants from the Netherlands tended to use a
& Munroe, 1971). Children’s directed distance from route perspective. In explanation, the researchers
home, that is travel undertaken while engaging in considered the ecological factors of the two regions.
an activity away from the home area (e.g., herding, Whereas the Midwestern United States is character-
running errands to neighboring villages, weeding ized by grid-like property boundaries, the Nether-
crops in the field) and not free-time distance from lands uses more natural features to define bound-
home (e.g., playing in non-adult defined or directed aries. Thus, spatial frame of reference is shaped by
activities) was the important contributor to spatial the confluence of experience in the environment and
skill on several tasks (Munroe, Munroe, & Brasher, cultural conventions that have been developed over
1985). time for describing a space. These conventions take

Cultural Practices and Institutions Gauvain
time to learn and this learning relies on guidance places actually to the north or south. Nonetheless,
and support from others in the community. the ocean is conventionally described as being to
Finally, although directional information in lan- the west. In both examples, the terms ‘south’ and
guage may seem clear, research indicates that it is ‘west’ are not veridical, or true, descriptions of the
not possible to know which directional framework a world, but rather concepts or ideas for referring the
person is using from the literal meaning of a direc- world within a particular cultural frame of reference
tional term. Frake (1980) describes how one needs or practice. In order to know what directional frame-
to understand cultural practices to interpret absolute work a person is using, even when using terms that
directions (e.g., north, south, east west) and contin- seem unequivocal in spatial information, it is nec-
gent directions (e.g., left-right, forward-behind). For essary to know the cultural context for using and
instance, in traditional navigation in Southeast Asia, interpreting this information. Stated more generally,
‘south’ is often used to refer to ‘seaward’ rather than to understand human spatial thinking it is necessary
‘landward’, not to true south. If this seems puzzling, to attend to the cultural practices people use to guide
consider a more familiar example. California has a their exploration, memory and communication about
jagged coastline and the Pacific Ocean is in many large-scale space.
Summary
1. Culture is an organized social unit in which members of the group share values, beliefs, and
understandings about the world, participate in common practices, and transmit information
and ways of living across generations.
2. Culture influences both the content and processes of human thought.

3. Cultural contributions to human thinking exist in many forms including communication,
material and symbolic tools, and formal and informal practices and institutions.
4. As people participate in social interaction and other forms of social experience, the shared
understandings and behaviors of the culture become part of the person’s own thoughts and
actions.
5. Human spatial understanding is vital to everyday functioning and culture informs both our
knowledge of space and how we use space to carry out activities.
6. Culture influences spatial thinking by providing methods that support exploration and memory
of space, including communicative conventions such as route descriptions, material and
symbolic tools such as maps and frames of reference, and traditional practices for conducting
activities in space such as navigational routines.

Review Questions
1. How is culture a psychological process?

2. How does the study of cognitive psychology benefit from taking culture into account?
3. What are the benefits of passing on cultural ways of thinking and acting across generations in
cumulative cultural evolution? What, if any, downsides might there be?
4. Why is understanding large-scale space important to everyday functioning?

5. Do you think some large-scale spaces are more difficult to understand than others? If so, what
makes them more difficult to understand?
6. In his 2014 essay on the relation of new geo-spatial technologies and human cognition, Downs
claims that this cultural change will re-define the self and our relationship to the world. What
do you think he means by this?
Hot Topic: What will spatial cognition be like in the future?

Globalization is a pervasive force that is increasing connections across so-
cieties and cultures and rapidly transforming people and places around the
world. A principal feature of globalization is integration of technology and
other resources typically encountered in industrialized settings. These societal-
level changes are significant for human cognition because they affect, on a
daily basis, the work people do, the way children are cared for and educated,
and the nature and strength of links between the community and the world
beyond it. Thus, both inside and outside the home these changing conditions
of life expose people to new and recurrent modes of acting, interacting, and
learning that have direct relevance to psychological functioning.
Mary Gauvain
Research shows that cultural tools contribute in meaningful ways to spatial
thinking. Thus, a reasonable question to ask is what might spatial cognition be like in the future?
One of the major changes taking place today are technologies that help people imagine, learn about,
and explore large-scale space. Many of these changes are due to changing map technologies (e.g.,
geographic information system, or GIS; Global Positioning System, or GPS) and their impact on
society is widespread and occurring at a rapid pace (Downs, 2014). These types of changes are
not only affecting adults in communities, children also learn to use them. In fact, they may be the
primary or only way many children today are learning to navigate in space. If this is true, these tools
will introduce a new mode of thinking about and using space in the community going forward. The
fact that these tools did not originate in many of the cultures adopting them is also an important
part of this story. Furthermore, the rapid pace at which these technologies are being adopted may
be destabilizing. Research has found that rapid, widespread change in a community can produce a
breakdown of traditional cultural systems, difficulties for individuals in adjusting to the changes, and
in some instances an increase in individual pathologies (Bodley, 1982; Munroe & Munroe, 1980).
Geospatial technologies connect people to the world beyond the community in many new and
exciting and, also, unknown ways. Unlike earlier tools for navigation that often emerged from

References Gauvain
within the community itself, and therefore were shaped to local needs and values, community
members are not involved in the creation of the geo-technology information that is used to guide
their spatial activities. As Downs explains, “While users have options, the shape of the world is
set by hardware and software designers. To the extent that we accept default settings of devices as
given, our experience of the world is dictated by others (p. 9).” Thus, in using the default settings on
these devices, there are benefits, but there are also tradeoffs for human spatial thinking. Research is
needed on societal-level changes that result from the adoption and use of technologies to support
spatial activity and how these changes may affect spatial thinking in the future.
References
Bodley, J. H. (1982). Victims of progress. Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/Cummings.
Downs, R. M. (2014). Coming of age in the geospatial revolution: The geographic self re-defined. Human
Development, 57, 35–57. doi:10.1159/000358319
Munroe, R. L., & Munroe, R. H. (1980). Perspectives suggested by anthropological data. In H. C. Triandis &
W. W. Lambert (Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 253–317). Boston, MA: Allyn
& Bacon.
References
Bauer, P. J., Wenner, J. A., Dropik, P. L., & Wewerka, thought (pp. 387–427). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
S. S. (2000). Parameters of remembering and forget- doi:10.7551/mitpress/4117.003.0021
ting in the transition from infancy to early childhood. Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1996). Why culture is com-
Monographs of the Society for Research in Child De- mon, but cultural evolution is rare. In W. G. Runciman,
velopment, 65(4), No. 263. J. M. Smith, & R. I. M. Dunbar (Eds.), Proceedings
Bennardo, G. (2014). Space and culture: Giv- of The British Academy, Vol. 88. Evolution of social
ing directions in Tonga. Ethos, 42, 253–276. behaviour patterns in primates and man (pp. 77–93).
doi:10.1111/etho.12054 New York: Oxford University Press.
Blaut, J. M., McCleary, G. S., & Blaut, A. S. Bruner, J. S. (1957). Going beyond the information given.
(1970). Environmental mapping in young chil- In J. S. Bruner, E. Brunswik, L. Festinger, F. Hei-
dren. Environment and Behavior, 2, 335–349. der, K. F. Muenzinger, C. E. Osgood, et al. (Eds.),
doi:10.1177/001391657000200305 Contemporary approaches to cognition (pp. 41–69).
Bobrow, D. G., & Norman, D. A. (1975). Some prin- Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
ciples of memory schemata. In D. G. Browbow Cole, M. (1996). Cultural psychology: A once and fu-
& A. G. Collins (Eds.), Representation and under- ture discipline. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
standing: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 131–150). Press.
New York: Academic Press. doi:10.1016/b978-0-12- Cole, M., Gay, J., Glick, J., & Sharp, D. W. (1971). The
108550-6.50010-0 cultural context of learning and thinking. New York:
Bowerman, M., & Choi, S. (2003). Space under Basic Books.
construction: Language-specific spatial categoriza- Cole, M., & Griffin, P. (1980). Cultural amplifiers recon-
tion in first language acquisition. In D. Gen- sidered. In D. P. Olson (Ed.), The social foundations
tner & S. Goldin-Meadow (Eds.), Language in of language and thought (pp. 343–364). New York:
mind: Advances in the study of language and Norton.

Committee on Support for Thinking Spatially (2006). book of socialization: Theory and research (2nd Ed.,
Learning to think spatially: GIS as a support system pp. 566–589). New York: Guilford.
in the K-12 curriculum. Washington, DC: National Gauvain, M., & Rogoff, B. (1989). Ways of speak-
Academies Press. ing about space: The development of children’s
Dasen, P. R., & Mishra, R. (2010). Development of skill at communicating spatial knowledge. Cogni-
geocentric spatial language and cognition: An eco- tive Development, 4, 295–307. doi:10.1016/0885-
cultural perspective. New York: Cambridge Univer- 2014(89)90011-7
sity Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511761058 Gladwin, T. (1971). East is a big bird. Cambridge, MA:
D’Andrade, R. G. (1984). Cultural meaning systems. In Harvard University Press.
R. A. Shweder & R. A. LeVine (Eds.), Culture the- Göncü, A., & Gauvain, M. (2012). Sociocultural ap-
ory: Essays on mind, self, and emotion (pp. 88–119). proaches to educational psychology: Theory, research,
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. and application. In K. R. Harris, S. Graham, T. Urdan,
Downs, R. M. (2014). Coming of age in the geospatial C. B. McCormick, G. M. Sinatra, & J. Sweller (Eds.),
revolution: The geographic self re-defined. Human APA educational psychology handbook, Vol 1: The-
Development, 57, 35–57. doi:10.1159/000358319 ories, constructs, and critical issues (pp. 125–154).
Fiese, B. H. (2006). Family routines and rituals. New Washington, DC: American Psychological Associa-
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. tion. doi:10.1037/13273-006
Frake, C. (1980). The ethnographic study of cognitive Göncü, A., Tuermer, U., Jain, J. & Johnson, D. (1999).
systems. In C. Frake (Ed.), Language and cultural de- Children’s play as cultural activity. In A. Göncü, (Ed.).
scriptions (pp. 1–17). Stanford: Stanford University Children’s engagement in the world: Sociocultural
Press. perspectives (pp. 148–170). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Franklin, A., Piling, M., & Davies, I. (2005). The na-
ture of infant color categorization: Evidence from Goodnow, J. J. (1990). The socialization of cogni-
eye movements on a target detection task. Jour- tion: What’s involved? In J. W. Stigler, R. A.
nal of Experimental Child Psychology, 91, 227–248. Shweder, & G. Herdt (Eds.), Cultural psychology:
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2005.03.003 Essays on comparative human development (pp. 259–
286). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Gauvain, M. (1995). Thinking in niches: Sociocultural
doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173728.008
influences on cognitive development. Human Devel-
opment, 38, 25–45. doi:10.1159/000278297 Goodnow, J. J., Miller, P. J., & Kessel, F. (1995). Cultural
practices as contexts for development. San Francisco,
Gauvain, M. (1998). Sociocultural and practical influ-
CA: Jossey-Bass.
ences on spatial memory. In M. J. Intons-Peterson
& D. L. Best (Eds.), Memory distortions and their Gould, R. A. (1969). Yiwara: Foragers of the Australian
prevention (pp. 89–111). Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum. desert. New York: Scribners.
doi:10.4324/9780203774779 Greenfield, P. M., Keller, H., Fuligni, A., & Maynard, A.
Gauvain, M., & Nicolaides, C. (2015). Cognition (2003). Cultural pathways through universal devel-
in childhood across cultures. In L. A. Jensen opment. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 461–490.
(Ed.), The Oxford handbook of human develop- doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145221
ment and culture: An interdisciplinary perspective Hage, P. (1978). Speculations on Pulatwese mnemonic
(pp. 198–213). New York: Oxford University Press. structure. Oceania, 49, 81–95. doi:10.1002/j.1834-
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199948550.013.13 4461.1978.
Gauvain, M., & Perez, S. M. (2015a). Cognitive devel- Haun, D. M., Rapold, C. J., Janzen, G., & Levin-
opment and culture. In R. M. Lerner (Series Ed.), son, S. C. (2011). Plasticity of human spa-
and L. Liben and U. Müller (Vol. Eds.), Handbook of tial cognition: Spatial language and cognition
child psychology and developmental science, 7th Ed.: covary across cultures. Cognition, 119, 70–80.
Vol. 2: Cognitive processes (pp. 854–896). New York: doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.12.009
Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781118963418 Heath, S. B. (1983). Ways with words: Language,
Gauvain, M., & Perez, S. M. (2015b). The socialization life and work in communities and classrooms.
of cognition. In J. Grusec & P. Hastings (Eds.), Hand-

References Gauvain
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Linde, C., & Labov, W. (1975). Spatial networks as a site
doi:10.1017/cbo9780511841057 for the study of language and thought. Language, 51,
Hutchins, E. (1983). Understanding Micronesian nav- 924–939. doi:10.2307/412701
igation. In D. Gentner & A. Stevens (Eds.), Majid, A., Bowerman, M., Kita, S., Haun, D. M., & Levin-
Mental models. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. son, S. C. (2004). Can language restructure cognition?
doi:10.4324/9781315802725 The case for space. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(3),
Hund, A. M., Schmettow, M., & Noordzij, M. L. (2012). 108–114. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.01.003
The impact of culture and recipient perspective on Mpogole, H., Hidaya U., & Tedre, M. (2008). Mobile
direction giving in the service of wayfinding. Jour- phones and poverty alleviation: A survey study in
nal of Environmental Psychology, 32(4), 327–336. rural Tanzania. Proceedings of 1st International Con-
doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2012.05.007 ference on M4D Mobile Communication Technology
Johnson, S. P., & Hannon, E. E. (2015). Perceptual for Development, 2008.
development. In R. M. Lerner (Series Ed.), and L. Mead, M. (1931). The primitive child. In C. Murchi-
Liben and U. Müller (Eds.), Handbook of child psy- son (Ed.), A handbook of child psychology (pp. 669–
chology and developmental science, 7th Ed.: Vol. 2: 687). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press.
Cognitive processes (pp. 63–112). New York: Wiley. doi:10.1037/13524-022
doi:10.1002/9781118963418 Munroe, R. L., & Gauvain, M. (2010). The cross-cultural
Kearins, J. (1981). Visual spatial memory in Aboriginal study of children’s learning and socialization: A short
and White Australian children. Cognitive Psychology, history. In D. F. Lancy, J. Bock, & S. Gaskins (Eds.),
13, 434–460. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(81)90017-7 The anthropology of learning in childhood (pp. 35–
Lancy, D. F. (1983). Cross-cultural studies in cognition 63). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
and mathematics. New York: Academic Press. Munroe, R. H., Munroe, R. L., & Brasher, A.
Levinson, S. C. (1996). Frames of reference and (1985). Precursors of spatial ability: A lon-
Molyneux’s question: Cross-linguistic evidence. In gitudinal study among the Logoli of Kenya.
P. Bloom, M. A. Peterson, L. Nadel, & M. F. Garrett The Journal of Social Psychology, 125, 23–33.
(Eds.), Language and space (pp. 109–169). Cam- doi:10.1080/00224545.1985.9713505
bridge, MA: The MIT Press. Munroe, R. L., & Munroe, R. H. (1971). Effect of en-
Levinson, S. C. (2003). Space in language and cog- vironmental experience on spatial ability in an East
nition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. African society. The Journal of Social Psychology, 83,
doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613609 15–22. doi:10.1080/00224545.1971.9919968
Liben, L. S. (2001). Thinking through maps. In M. Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. East Norwalk,
Gattis (Ed.), Spatial schemas and abstract thought CT: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
(pp. 45–77). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Nelson, K. (1993). Events, narratives, memory: What de-
doi:10.7551/mitpress/6392.003.0005 velops? In C. A. Nelson (Ed.), Memory and affect in
Liben, L. S. (2009). The road to understanding maps. Cur- development. The Minnesota Symposia on Child Psy-
rent Directions in Psychological Science, 18, 310–315. chology (Vol. 26, pp. 1–24). Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01658.x doi:10.4324/9781315806846
Liben, L. S., & Christensen, A. E. (2010). Spatial de- Peterson, M. A., Nadel, L., Bloom, P., & Garrett, M. F.
velopment: Evolving approaches to enduring ques- (1996). Space and language. In P. Bloom, M. A. Pe-
tions. In U. Goswami (Ed.), Blackwell handbook of terson, L. Nadel, & M. F. Garrett (Eds.), Language
childhood cognitive development, 2nd Ed. (pp. 326– and space (pp. 553–577). Cambridge, MA: The MIT
348). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers. Press.
doi:10.1002/9781444325485.ch17 Presson, C. C. (1987). The development of spatial cog-
Liben, L. S., & Downs, R. M. (2015). Map use skills. nition: Secondary uses of spatial information. In N.
In M. Monmonier (Ed.), Cartography in the twenti- Eisenberg (Ed.), Contemporary topics in developmen-
eth century (pp. 1074–1080). Chicago: University of tal psychology (pp. 77–112). New York: Wiley.
Chicago Press. Roberts, M. (2005). Underground maps after Beck. Har-
row Weald, England: Capital Transport.

Rogoff, B. (2003). The cultural nature of human develop- Super, C. M., & Harkness, S. (1986). The de-
ment. New York: Oxford University Press. velopmental niche: A conceptualization of the
Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorization. In N. Warren interface of child and culture. International
(Ed.), Advances in cross-cultural psychology (Vol. 1, Journal of Behavioral Development, 9, 545–569.
pp. 1–72). London: Academic Press. doi:10.1177/016502548600900409
Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans, Szechter, L. E., & Liben, L. S. (2004). Parental guid-
goals and understanding. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. ance in preschoolers’ understanding of spatial-graphic
doi:10.4324/9780203781036 representations. Child Development, 75, 869–885.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00711.x
Serpell, R. (1979). How specific are perceptual
skills? A cross-cultural study of pattern reproduc- Tomasello M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cog-
tion. British Journal of Psychology, 70, 365–380. nition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1979.tb01706.x Tversky, B. (2003). Places: Points, planes, paths,
Serpell, R. (2017). How the study of cognitive and portions. In E. van der Zee & J. Slack
growth benefits from a cultural lens. Perspec- (Eds.), Representing direction in language and space
tives on Psychological Science, 12, 889–899. (pp. 132–143). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
doi:10.1177/1745691617704419 doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260195.003.0007
Serpell, R., & Hatano, G. (1997). Education, school- Uttal, D. H. (2005). Spatial symbols and spatial thought:
ing, and literacy. In J. W. Berry, P. R. Dasen & T. S. Cross-cultural, developmental, and historical perspec-
Saraswathi (Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural psy- tives on the relation between map use and spatial cog-
chology, Vol. 2: Basic processes and human develop- nition. In L. L. Namy (Ed.), Symbol use and sym-
ment (2nd ed., pp. 339–376). Needham Heights, MA: bolic representation: Developmental and compara-
Allyn & Bacon. tive perspectives (pp. 3–23). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
doi:10.4324/9781315087528
Shweder, R. A. (1990). Cultural psychology: What
is it? In J. W. Stigler, R. A. Shweder, & Van de Vijver, F. J. R., Hofer, J., & Chasiotis,
G. Herdt (Eds.). Cultural psychology: Essays A. (2010). Methodology. In M. H. Bornstein
on comparative human development (pp. 1–43). (Ed.), Handbook of cultural developmental science
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. (pp. 21–37). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173728.002 doi:10.4324/9780203805497
Shweder, R. A., Goodnow, J. J., Hatano, G., LeVine, R. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development
A., Markus, H. R., & Miller, P. J. (2006). The cul- of higher mental functions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
tural psychology of development: One mind, many University Press.
mentalities. many mentalities. In W. Damon & R. Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). The collected works of L. S. Vy-
M. Lerner (Series Eds.) and R. M. Lerner (Vol. gotsky: Vol. 1. Problems of general psychology. New
Ed.), Handbook of child psychology, 6th Ed.: Vol. York: Plenum Press.
1: Theoretical models of development (pp. 716–792) Wertsch, J. V. (1981). The concept of activity in Soviet
doi:10.1002/9780470147658.chpsy0113 psychology. Armonk, NY: Sharpe.
Spencer, C., & Blades, M. (2006). Children and Wertsch, J. V. (1985). Culture, communication, and cog-
their environments: Learning, using and designing nition: Vygotskian perspectives. Cambridge: Cam-
spaces. New York: Cambridge University Press. bridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/cbo9780511521232
Whiting, B. (1976). The problem of the packaged vari-
Spencer, C., & Darvizeh, Z. (1983). Young children’s able. In K. F. Reigel & J. A. Meacham (Eds.), The
place-descriptions, maps, and route-finding: A com- developing individual in a changing world (Vol. 1):
parison of nursery school children in Iran and Britain. Historical and cultural issues (pp. 303–309). Mouton:
International Journal of Early Childhood, 15, 26–31. The Hague.
doi:10.1007/BF03174949
Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thought, and reality.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Glossary Gauvain
Glossary
cognitive socialization The process by which common practices, and transmit information
parents and others ensure that a child’s way and ways of living across generations. 363
of understanding and operating on the world
conforms to those appropriate in and valued cumulative cultural evolution Process whereby
by the culture. 363 human beings create resources and tools that
support and extend human activity, including
cross-cultural approach A research method that thought processes, and for these resources and
focuses on comparisons across cultures. 364 tools to be used by subsequent generations in
the same or a modified form. 366
cultural amplifiers Techniques or technological
features provided by a culture that alter the ap-
proaches individual cultural members use in human cognition The mental activity through
solving problems posed by their environment. which human beings acquire and process
369 knowledge. 363
cultural psychology An approach to studying psy-

sociocultural approach An approach that sees
chology that concentrates on processes and
development as emerging from children’s in-
systems of meaning within cultures. 364
teractions with more skilled people and the
cultural tools Symbols or objects provided by cul- institutions and tools provided by their culture.
ture, such as literacy and technology, that 364
support thinking and regulate interactions be-
tween the individual and the world. 363 spatial cognition Thinking that involves process-
ing, remembering, and using visual informa-
culture Organized social unit in which members tion about the world in terms of spatial fea-
of the group share values, beliefs, and un- tures such as orientation, relationships, and
derstandings about the world, participate in location. 363

Subject Index
abstraction, 56 categorization, 214

accommodation, 349 category, 55
Activity Theorist, 364 category-based induction, 139
affect, 341–354 Cattell-Horn-Carroll model, 259
Affect as information theory, 343 causal hypothesis, 28
affect congruence, 341–344, 347 causal induction, 141
Affect Infusion Model, 342, 344 chess, 240
affect-state dependence, 345 children, 146
age, 316 classical approach, 57
alignment in dialogue, 204 cognition, 215
analogical reasoning, 143 cognitive
anchoring effect, 186 flexibility, 280
artificial grammars, 200 processing, 224
assimilation, 349 socialization, 363
associationism, 20 cognitivism, 21, 341
associative network theory, 342 collaboration, 286
availability heuristic, 137 color, 218
color perception, 367
balance theory of wisdom, 316
common ground, 205
basic level of categorization, 63
communication, 200, 354
behavioral genetic research, 244
interpersonal, 353
behaviorism, 21, 341
communicative convention, 368
Berlin wisdom paradigm, 311
complex skill(s), 235
bias
computational model, 46
belief bias, 33, 116
concept, 55
confirmation bias, 137, 184
hindsight bias, 185 conditional inference, 117–119
linguistic bias, 205 conditioning, classical, 342
matching bias, 120 confidence, 92
metacognitive bias, 96 consciousness, 219
status quo bias, 185 consumption, 292
bilingual, 225 content validity, 261
bilingualism, 201 convergent thinking, 279, 283
biological maturation, 336 conversation, 78
bottom-up processing, 224 core knowledge, 330
brainstorming, 285 correlation study, 27
bullshit receptivity, 352, 357 creative
problem solving, 285
calibration, 96 process, 290

Subject Index
creative potential, 279 endowment effect, 185

creativity enumerative induction, 137
enhancement, 293 ethnocentrism, 366
multivariate approach, 278, 280 evidence accumulation, 35
techniques, 295 executive function, 202
creator, 277 exemplar approach, 58
cross exemplar of wisdom, 308
-cultural approach, 364 experience, 336
-linguistic studies, 224 experiment, 4, 28
cultural expertise, 235, 281, 308, 336
amplifiers, 369 extended cognition, 224
history, 369 eye tracking, 41, 206
psychology, 364 area of interest, 42
symbol systems, 370 heatmaps, 42
tool, 363 scanpaths, 42
culture, 363
cumulative cultural evolution, 366 factor analysis, 257, 258
fallacy, 316
data analysis, 4 base-rate fallacy, 186
decision making, 223, 327 conjunction fallacy, 186
declarative knowledge, 222 sunk-cost fallacy, 185
deduction paradigm, 125 false belief task, 331
deeper levels of comprehension, 72 feeling(s) of rightness, 128
deficit interpretations, 365 Flynn effect, 266
deliberate practice, 239, 240 fMRI, 46
dependent variable, 27 FOR, 128
development, 316 foreclosure, 334
diagnostic task, 31 foreign language, 225
dialectic, 16 effect, 225
dialogue, 203 frame of reference, 218, 370
directional framework, 373 framing, 225
divergent thinking, 279 functional fixedness, 145, 223
domain, 6 functionalism, 19
-generality, 6
-specificity, 6, 280 g-factor, 256, 257
drift diffusion model, 35 gender, 214
dual-process theory, 123, 124 gender stereotype, 206
gene-environment
education, 266, 336 correlation, 243
effort regulation, 91 interaction, 243
Einstellung effect, 223 interplay, 243
eliminative induction, 137 general intelligence, 124
embodied cognition, 78 genotype, 244
embodied language, 203 geo-visualization tools (GeoVis), 370
emotion, 341, 342 geographic information systems (GIS), 370
emotional intelligence, 260 Gestalt, 21
empiricism, 4, 15 global positioning systems (GPS), 370

Subject Index
globalization, 366 prospective, 97

goal setting, 328 retrospective, 97
goal-action procedure, 75 judgment accuracy, 96
GPS technology, 369 Judgment of Learning, 91
graded structure, 57
grammar, 218 knowledge, 281
gullibility, 352, 356 procedural, 7
knowledge base, 327, 328
heuristic, 344 knowledge component, 72
affect heuristic, 184 knowledge representation, 71
availability heuristic, 184
cues, 93 language, 199, 213, 328
recognition heuristic, 184 acquisition, 200
higher order cognitive processes, 330 comprehension, 202
home-sign, 221 processing, 353
hypothesis, 4 production, 203
hypothetical thinking, 113 leadership, 288
learning, 71
identity achieved, 335 life experience, 309
identity development, 334 linguistic
identity diffused, 334 determinism, 216
idiosyncrasy, 279, 282 relativity, 214
illusory correlation, 137 tool, 218
implicit learning, 200 logical
incubation, 282 intuition, 129
independent variable, 27 tautology, 334
individual differences, 255, 256, 366 logical contradiction, 334
induction development, 147 logical form, 334
inductive evidence, 146
information board, 39 maximal cognitive effort, 255
information processing strategy, 342 measurement model, 33
information search, 39 measures of wisdom, 309
innovation, 287, 292 media, 81
insight, 145 memory, 224, 343–345
intelligence, 4 mental flexibility, 279
crystallized, 6, 257, 258, 261, 264 mental logic, 122
fluid, 6, 257, 258, 260–264 mental model theory, 122, 123
gene, 4 mental model(s), 122, 123
practical, 309 mental representation, 71, 328
training, 266, 267 mental state, 223
intervention, 315 mental tour, 368
introspection, 28, 29 meta-analysis, 240
introspection, criticism of, 29 meta-memory, 90
IQ, 124 meta-reasoning, 90
metacognition, 89
joint method of agreement and disagreement, 142 metacognitive control, 89
judgment, 100, 346, 350 metacognitive myopia, 101
Psychology of Human Thought • 383

Subject Index
method PPIK theory, 257

of agreement, 141 predictive validity, 265
of concomitant variation, 142 premise monotonicity, 136
of disagreement, 141 primacy effect, 350
methodological behaviorism, 29 primary mental abilities, 257
mind-body dualism, 16 problem solving, 223, 327
mnemonic, 371 procedural knowledge, 222
molecular genetic, 245 process
monitoring, 89 creative, 282
mood, 341, 344–347, 349–353 prototype approach, 58
moral dilemma, 225 psychoanalysis, 342
moratorium, 335 psychology of human thought, 3
MORE Life Experience Model, 318
mother tongue, 223 Ramsey test, 126
mouse-tracking, 44 ratchet effect, 366
multifactorial perspective, 235 rational thinking disposition, 124
multilingualism, 201 rationalism, 4, 15
multiple intelligences theory, 259 reactivity, 29
music, 240 reasoning, 223, 262–264, 327
reductionism, 18
narrative, 368, 372 reflection, 309
native language, 223 reliability, 311
naturalistic decision making, 9 representation, 200, 216
nature - nurture, 4, 236 representational effect, 222
navigational system, 371 representativeness heuristic, 139
neural network, 77 resolution, 96
neuroimaging, 100 response time analysis, 34
new paradigm, 125 risk taking, 279, 281
new paradigm psychology of reasoning, 125 ritual, 371
niche, developmental, 367 routine, 371
object permanence, 328 schema, 368

open-ended measure, 314 school, 371
openness to experience, 279 script, 368
operationalization, 27 selection task, 119, 125
originality, 291 selective attention, 58
overconfidence, 93 self-report scale, 312
sensorimotor stage, 328
perception, 218 set effect, 223
performance sex differences, 269
cognitive, 349 similarity, 56
personal wisdom, 312 social behavior, 343, 347
personality, 309 social learning, 366
phenotype, 244, 246 sociocultural approach, 290, 364
philosophy, 341 sociocultural developmental approach, 286
planning, 328 sociohistorical means, 369
positron emission tomography, 8 spatial

Subject Index
cognition, 363 tense, 216

memory, 371 thematic facilitation effect, 120
orientation, 372 theory, 3
problems, 372 theory of mind, 223, 331
relations, 368 theory-driven approach, 60
representational skills, 369 thinking, 327
thinking skills, 372 thinking-aloud-method, 29
spatial structure, 75 thought, 213
speed-accuracy tradeoff, 35 Three-Stratum Theory, 258, 259
STEM, 369 top-down processing, 224
stereotyping, 351 twin study, 244
strategies, 3 two-response task, 128
strategy index, 41
study, longitudinal, 337 uncertainty, 309
subtraction method, 34 unexpected contents task, 332
supervised category learning, 61
syllogism, 114 validity, 7, 311
syllogistic reasoning, 114 verbal interference, 221
talent, 242 Wason selection task, 119

task wason selection task, 125
cognitive, 366 wayfinding, 368
developmental, 366 wisdom, 307
taxonomic structure, 74 wise reasoning, 312
technology, 81 working memory capacity, 263, 264

Author Index
A Arendt, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Bar, S. K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Abed, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Ariel, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 92, 93 Bar-Ilan, O. . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Abelson, R. P. . . . . . . . . . 368 Ariely, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Barbot, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Abraham, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Aristotle . . . . . . .5, 17, 18, 22 Bargh, J. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Ackerman, P. L. . . . 256, 257, Arkes, H. R. . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Baron, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
264, 265, 269 Armbruster, T. . . . . . . . . . 101 Barrick, M. R. . . . . . . . . . 266
Ackerman, R. 90, 92–94, 96, Armstrong, P. I. . . . . . . . . 264 Barron, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
97, 105 Armstrong, S. L. . . . . . . . . 57 Barrouilett, P. . . . . . . . . . . 331
Ackermann, P. L. . . . . . . . 240 Arnold, N. R. . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Barsalou, L. W. . . 63, 64, 78
Adams, R. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Asbeck, J. . . . . . . . . 101, 349 Barston, J. L. . . . . . . . . . . 116
Adolphs, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 Ashby, F. G. . . . . . 58, 59, 64 Barttfeld, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Agnoli, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 Ashton, M. C. . . . . . . . . . 259 Bassok, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Ahn, W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Astington, J. W. . . . . . . . . 332 Bastos, A. M. . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Ais, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Athanasopoulos, P. . . . . . 225 Batchelder, W. H. . . . . . . . 33
Albarracín, D. . . . . . . . . . 102 Atran, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Batey, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
Albert, M. V. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Atwood, M. E.. . . . . . . . . 166 Batty, G. D. . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Aldwin, C. M. . . . . . 309, 319 Austin, G. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Bauer, P. J . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
Alhakami, A. . . . . . . . . . . 184 Avenanti, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 296 Baumann, K. . . . . . . . . . . 319
Alias, A. G. . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Averill, J. R. . . . . . . . . . . . 282 Baumert, J. . . . 261, 265, 266
Allen, M. G. . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Avrahami, J. . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Bayen, U. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Allopenna, P. D. . . . . . . . . . 60 Aznar, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294 Beatty, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Altenbaumer, H. E. . . . . . 337 Beaty, R. E. . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Altmann, E. M. . . . . . . . . 240 B Beauducel, A. . . . . . . . . . 265
Amabile, T. M. . . . . 278, 291 Baas, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 Becker, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Ambady, N. . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Bacon, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Becker, M. W. . . . . . 266, 345
Amir, O. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Bacon, F. T. . . . . . . . . . . . 213 Becker, N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Amthauer, R. . . . . . . . . . . 265 Baer, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 Bedell, K. E. . . . . . . . . . . . 289
Anderson, A. . . . . . . . . . . 204 Bago, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Beeman, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Anderson, J. R. . . 10, 46, 65, Bahrami, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Beghetto, R. A. . . . 277, 278,
164, 240 Baillargeon, R. . . . . 329, 330 285, 288, 293
Anderson, M. C. M. . . . . . 91 Bakhtiari, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Behrens, W. W. . . . . . . . . 167
Antonucci, I. . . . . . . . . . . 246 Baldwin, D. A. . . . . 138, 146 Beier, M. E. . . . . . . . 256, 269
Apperly, I. A. . . . . . 331, 332 Bales, R. F. . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Beier, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Arango-Muñoz, S. . . . . . . . 94 Ball, L. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Beller, S. 218, 221–223, 226,
Arcuri, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Ballard, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 227
Ardelt, M. 308–310, 313, 316, Baltes, P. B. . . 308–311, 315, Beller, Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
317, 326 317, 319, 326 Bender, A. . . . 218, 221–223,
Arden, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .295 Bär, A. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 226, 227

Author Index
Benedek, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 296 Boomsma, D. I. . . . . . . . . 245 Busemeyer, J. R. . . . . . . . . 35

Benjamin, D. J. . . . . . . . . 246 Boring, E. G. . . . . . . . . . . 260 Busse, T. V. . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Bennardo, G. . . . . . . . . . . 369 Boroditsky, L. . . . . . 218, 226 Buzan, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Berkovic, S. F. . . . . . . . . . 246 Bouchard, T. J. . . 6, 245, 266 Buzan, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Berlin, B. . . . . . . . . . 218, 219 Bowen, K. R. . . . . . 256, 269 Byrne, D. . . . . . . . . . 342, 343
Berman, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 Bower, G. H. . . . 75, 76, 342, Byrne, R. M. J. 31, 116, 122,
Bernstein, D. M. . . . . . . . . 94 343, 345, 346, 348 123
Berry, D. C. . . . . . . . . . . . 162 Bowerman, M. . . . . 218, 370 Byrnes, J. P. . . . . . . . . . . . 334
Besançon, M. . . . . . 283, 293 Boyd, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
Besemer, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 Bröder, A. 32, 33, 36, 38, 40, C
Betsch, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 42, 48 Cabra, J. F. . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Bettman, J. R. . . . . . . 41, 177 Braasch, J. L. G. . . . . . . . . 72 Cai, Z. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Beukeboom, C. J. . . 206, 207 Braine, M. D. . . . . . . . . . . 122 Caldwell-Harris, C. L. . . 225
Beyth, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Brainerd, C. J. . . . . . 182, 183 Camacho, J. . . . . . . . . . . . 313
Bialystok, E. . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Branigan, H. P. . . . . . . . . . 204 Camargo, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 290
Bian, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 Bransford, J. . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Camerer, C. . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Bickel, W. K. . . . . . . . . . . 181 Brasher, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 Campitelli, G. 236, 240, 241
Bierhoff, H. W. . . . . . . . . 282 Braverman, D. L. . . . . . . 343 Cara, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Bierhoff-Alfermann, D. . 282 Bredenkamp, J. . . . . . . . . . 29 Care, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Billick, S. B. . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Brekke, N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Carey, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Binet, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 261 Brickman, D. . . . . . . . . . . 133 Carey, S. . . . . . . . . . . . 64, 146
Birren, J. E. . . . . . . . . . . . . 307 Bricmont, J. . . . . . . . . . . . 352 Carlson, S. M. . . . . . . . . . 332
Bjork, R. A. . . . . 91, 94, 260 Bridgeman, B. . . . . . . . . . 261 Carmichael, L. . . . . . . . . . 213
Black, J. B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Brienza, J. P. . . 312, 314, 317 Carpenter, P. A. . . . . . . . . 263
Blackmon, K. . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Bristol, A. S. . . . . . . 278, 296 Carroll, J. B. . . . . . . 257, 258,
Blades, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 Broadbent, D. A. . . . . . . . 162 262–265
Blais, A. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Broca, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Carruthers, P. . . . . . . . . . . 223
Blanche, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Brocke, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 Caruso, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
Blanchette, I. . . . . . . 143, 144 Brooks, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Cashon, C. H. . . . . . . . . . .330
Blaney, P. H. . . . . . . . . . . . 343 Brown, D. D. . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Castel, A. D. . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Blaut, A. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 Brown, J. D. . . . . . . . . . . . 347 Cattell, R. B. . 257, 261, 264,
Blaut, J. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 Brown, R. E. . . . . . . . . . . . 257 265
Blazer, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 Brown, S. C. . . . . . . 310, 313 Ceci, S. J. . . . . . . . . . 183, 266
Bless, H. . . . . . 348, 349, 354 Brown, S. D. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Cesarini, D. . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Bloom, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368 Brown, T. . . . . . . . . . 285, 295 Chabris, C. F. . . . . . . . . . . 246
Bluck, S. . . . . . 307, 308, 310, Brugger, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Chalmers, D. . . . . . . . . . . 224
314–316, 318 Brugman, G. M. . . . . . . . 310 Chan, M. S. . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Blumer, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Bruine de Bruin, W. . . . . 188 Chandler, M. J. . . . . . . . . 307
Bobocel, D. R. . . . . 314, 317 Bruner, J. S. . . . . 15, 62, 364 Chapman, S. B. . . . . . . . . . . 3
Bobrow, D. G. . . . . . . . . . 368 Brunner, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 261 Chase, W. G. . . 35, 238, 239
Böckenholt, U. . . . . . . . . . . 41 Brust-Renck, P. G. . . . . . 182 Chasiotis, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 366
Bodenhausen, G. V. . . . . 351 Buccino, G. . . . . . . . 202, 203 Chater, N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Bodley, J. H. . . . . . . . . . . . 374 Bühler, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Cheng, P. W. . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Bohlmeijer, E. T. . . . . . . . 317 Bühner, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Chi, M. T. H. . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Boldt, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 92, 95 Burkhardt, J. - M. . . . . . . 298 Chi, R. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Bonaccorso, G. . . . . . . . . 202 Burns, B. D. . . . . . . . . . . . 162 Chick, C. F. . . . . . . . 180, 183
Bonn, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Buschkuehl, M. . . . . . . . . 267 Choi, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370

Author Index
Chomsky, N. . 199, 200, 215, Cosmides, L. . . . . . . . . . . 121 Debois, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

238 Costa, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Deco, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Chrisomalis, S. . . . . . . . . . 221 Coupe, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Defeyter, M. A. . . . . . . . . 147
Christal, R. E. . . . 6, 263, 264 Coyle, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 DeFries, J. C. . . . . . . . . . . 244
Christensen, A. E. . . . . . . 372 Craik, F. I. M. . . . 27, 73, 202 Dehaene, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Christensen, P. R. . . . . . . 281 Cranach, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Delgado, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Chua, E. F. . . . . . . . . . 98, 100 Crombez, G. . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Dennis, I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Cialdini, R. B. . . . . . . . . . 187 Cronbach, L. J. . . . . 260, 267 Dennis, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Cibelli, E. . . . . . . . . .224, 226 Cropley, A. J. . . . . . . . . . . 292 Denson, T. F. . . . . . . 342, 352
Cieri, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 Cropley, D. H. . . . . . . . . . 292 Descartes, R. . . . . . . . . 18, 22
Ciner, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 Cropper, S. J. . . . . . . . . . . 145 Desender, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Claridge, G. . . . . . . . . . . . 282 Cross, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332 DeSoete, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Clark, A. . . . . . . . . . 224, 226 Csapó, B. . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 172 Detweiler-Bedell, J. B. . . 347
Clark, H. H. . . . . . . . . 35, 205 Csikszentmihalyi, M. . . . 286 DeVos, J. . . . . . . . . . 329, 330
Clark, J. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Dewey, J. . . . . . . . . . . 20, 156
Clark, M. S. . . 344, 348, 349 D DeWolf, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Clausewitz, C. von. . . . . . 157 D’Mello, S. . . . . . . . . . 80, 84 Di Rosa, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Claxton, L. J. . . . . . . . . . . 332 D’Andrade, R. G. . . . . . . 366 Dietl, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Clayton, V. P. . . . . . . . . . . 307 Dabrowska, E. . . . . . . . . . 215 Dietrich, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Clearwater, S. H. . . . . . . . 166 Damasio, A. R. . . . . . . . . 341 Dijksterhuis, A. . . . . . . . . 204
Cleland, A. A. . . . . . . . . . 204 Danay, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Dijkstra, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Clifford, M. M. . . . . . . . . 293 Daniel, D. B. . . . . . . . . . . 104 Dilts, R. B. . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Cliffordson, C. . . . . . . . . . 266 Danion, J. M. . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Direnfeld, D. M. . . . . . . . 345
Clore, G. L. . . 342–344, 349, Danks, J. H. . . . . . . . . . . . 223 Dixon, R. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 267
350, 353 Danner, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Do Lam, A. T. A. . . . . . . . 98
Clydesdale, G. . . . . . . . . . 286 Darbellay, F. . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Dolan, R. J. 98, 99, 181, 341,
Cohen, J. D. . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Darvizeh, Z. . . . . . . . . . . . 368 344, 349, 354
Cohen, L. B. . . . . . . . . . . . 330 Darwin, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 Dolscheid, S. . . . . . . . . . . 226
Cohen, L. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Darzi, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Donders, F. C. . . . .34, 37, 46
Cohen, P. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Dasen, P. R. . . . . . . . . . . . 363 Donkin, C. . . . . . . . . . . 35, 37
Colage, I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Davidoff, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 Donoghue, G. M. . . . . . . . .78
Colcombe, S. . . . . . . . . . . 267 Davidson, J. E. . . . . 145, 278 Dörner, D. 10, 156, 168–170,
Cole, M. . . . . . 364, 365, 369 Davies, I. . . . . . . . . . 219, 367 172
Coley, J. D. . . 137, 138, 140, Davies, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 Dörner, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
146 Davis, M. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 284 Dougherty, M. R. . . . . . . . . . 3
Collins, A. M. . . . . . . . 74, 75 Dax, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Downs, R. M. 369, 370, 374
Collins, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 Day, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Drayna, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Colvin, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 De Bono, E. . . . . . . . 285, 294 Driskell, J. E. . . . . . . . . . . 287
Conaway, N. . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 De Dreu, C. K. . . . . . . . . . 284 Dror, I. E. . . . . . . . . . . 81, 281
Confrey, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 De Gardelle, V. . . . . . . . . . 95 Dshemuchadse, M. . . . . . . 44
Conway, A. R. A. . . . . . . . . 6 de Groot, A. D. . . . . . . . . 238 Duke, K. E. . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Coon, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 de Lange, M. . . . . . . . . . . 245 Dul, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
Corazza, G. E. 285, 292, 296 De Neys, W. . . . . . . 129, 183 Dunbar, K. . . . 143, 144, 161
Corbett, A. C. . . . . . . . . . . . 72 De Raedt, R. . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Duncker, K. . . 145, 147, 164,
Corbett, G. . . . . . . . . 217, 219 de Villiers, J. . . . . . . . . . . 223 213, 223
Corbin, J. C. . . 180, 182, 183 De Vries, H. . . . . . . . . . . . 290 Dunlosky, J. . 92, 93, 95, 104
Correll, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Deary, I. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Dunning, D. . . . . . . . . 96, 100

Author Index
Dupont, J. . . . . . . . . 295, 299 Farrell, S. . . . . . . . . . . 46, 264 Frensch, P. A. . . . . . . 16, 281

Dzindolet, M. . . . . . . . . . . 287 Feeney, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Freytag, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Feeny, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Fuligni, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
E Feigenson, L. . . . . . . . . . . 220 Funke, J. 9, 16, 31, 157, 169,
Eagly, A. H. . . . . . . . . . . . 207 Feist, G. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 170, 172
East, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 Feldman, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Furnham, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 278
Ebbinghaus, H. . 20, 28, 256 Fernandez-Cruz, A. L. . . . 94 Fuson, K. C. . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Eden, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Ferrari, M. . . . 308, 315, 326
Edgington, D. . . . . . 118, 125 Ferrer, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 G
Edwards, W. . . . . . . . . . . . 187 Feshbach, S. . . . . . . . . . . . 342 Gadja, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Eich, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Feuerstein, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Gagné, F. . . . . . . . . . 240, 243
Ekman, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Fiedler, K. . . . 100–102, 205, Gaissmaier, W. . 32, 38, 183,
Ellingsen, V. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 6 343, 344, 348, 349, 354 184
Elliot, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Fiedler, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Gajdos, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Ellis, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Fiese, B. H. . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 Galanter, E. H. . . . . . . . . . . 21
Ellis, J. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 42, 43 Fincham, J. M. . . . . . . . . . . 10 Galotti, K. M. 329, 332, 334,
Ellis, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Finke, R. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 282 335, 337
Ellis, S. C. . . . . . . . . 181, 183 Finkenauer, C. . . . . . . . . . 206 Galotti, K.M. . . . . . . . . . . 337
Elnakouri, A. . . . . . . . . . . 312 Finn, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Galton, F. . . . . . . . . . 237, 255
Engle, R. W. . . . . . . . . 6, 264 Finucane, M. L. . . . . . . . . 184 Gambi, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Erdfelder, E. . . . . . 33, 37, 95 Fiore, S. M. . . . . . . . . 72, 170 Gardner, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Ereku, M. H. . . . . . . . . . . 235 Fischer, A. . . . . . . . . 157, 170 Gardner, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Erev, I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Fischhoff, B. . . . . . . . . . . 185 Gardner, H. 6, 238, 240, 259,
Erhard-Weiss, D. . . . . . . . 345 Fisher, A. V. . . . . . . . . . . . 146 278
Erickson, M. A. . . . . . . . . . 59 Fitch, W. T. . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Gardner, W. . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Ericsson, K. A. 29, 162, 163, Flaherty, A. W. . . . . . . . . 295 Garner, W. R. . . . . . . . . . . . 10
239–242, 244, 247, 308 Flavell, E. R. . . . . . . . . . . . 331 Garrett, M. F. . . . . . . . . . . 368
Eriksen, C. W. . . . . . . . . . . 10 Flavell, J. H. . . . . . . . . . . . 331 Garrod, S. . . . . . 73, 203–205
Erikson, E. H. . . . . . . . . . 334 Fleming, S. M. . . . . . 96–100 Gaschke, Y. N. . . . . . . . . . 343
Erle, T. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Fletcher, J. M. . . . . . . . . . 266 Gasper, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Esaulova, Y. . . . . . . . 206, 207 Florida, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 Gatta, V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Eshet-Alkalai, Y. . . . . . . . 105 Flynn, J. R. . . . . . . . . . .4, 266 Gauvain, M. . . 363–368, 371
Estrada, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 Fogli, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 Gay, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
Etling, K. M. . . . . . . . . . . 101 Foltz, P. W. . . . . . . . . . . 72, 78 Gazzaniga, M. S. . . . . . . . . . 8
Ettlin, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Foresman, G. A. . . . . . . . 135 Geary, D. C. . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Evans, J. St. B. T. . 114–116, Forgas, J. P. . . . . . . . 342–356 Geddes, B. W. . . . . . . . . . 162
118–120, 123–126, 129, 181 Forgas, J. P. . . . . . . . . . . . .353 Geerts, H. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 337
Evans, N. . . . . . . . . . 199, 215 Fosl, P. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Geipel, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Evans, T. W. . . . . . . . . . . . 343 Fox, C. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 Gelman, S. A. 133, 146, 147
Everett, D. L. . . . . . . . . . . 221 Fox, P. W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 Gennari, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Eysenck, H. J. . . . . . . . 4, 282 Frake, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373 Gentner, D. 63, 143, 144, 216,
Franck, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 226
F Franco-Watkins, A. M. . . .44 German, T. P. . . . . . . . . . . 147
Faloon, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Frank, M. C. . . . . . . 221, 224 Getz, I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
Fancher, R. E. . . . 8, 236–238 Franklin, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 367 Ghetti, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Farley, F. . . . . . . . . . 181–183 Frederickson, B. L. 348, 349 Gibbons, R. . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Farrell, M. P. . . . . . . . . . . . 287 Freeman, J. B. . . . . . . . . . . 44 Gibbs, Jr. R. W. . . . . . . . . 203

Author Index
Gigerenzer, G. . . 3, 4, 32, 48, Goodwin, D. W. . . . . . . . 345 Hahn, U. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

97, 183, 184, 187 Gopnik, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 332 Haier, R. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9
Gilbert, A. L. . . . . . . . . . . 219 Gordon, J. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Hake, H. W. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Gilbert, D. T. . . . . . . . . . . 350 Gordon, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 Hall Jamieson, K. . . . . . . 102
Gilboa-Schechtman, E. . 345, Goschke, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Halpern, D. F. . . . . . . . . . 170
346 Goswami, G. . 133, 135, 136, Hambrick, D. Z. . . . 236, 240,
Gillham, N. W. . . . . . . . . 236 144, 146, 147 242, 243, 245, 247, 264
Gippel, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 Goswani, G. . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Hamilton, D. L. . . . . . . . . 137
Girotto, V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Gottesman, I. I. . . . . . . . . 266 Hampson, S. E. . . . . . . . . . 62
Glöckner, A. . . . . . 32, 40, 48 Gottfredson, L. S. . 260, 266 Hampton, J. A. . . . . . . . . . . 58
Glück, J. . 307–311, 313–319 Gouaux, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 342 Handley, S. J. . 115, 123, 126
Gladwell, M. . . . . . . . . . . 239 Gould, R. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 369 Hannon, E. E. . . . . . . . . . . 367
Gladwin. T. . . . . . . . 364, 371 Gould, S. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Hansen, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Glaholt, M. G. . . . . . . . . . . 42 Graesser, A. C. 72, 73, 78–80, Harkness, S. . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Glaser, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 84 Harley, T. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Glaveanu, V. P. 283, 284, 290 Graumann, C. F. . . . . . . . 158 Harmoni, R. . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Gleitman, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Gray, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Harms, P. D. . . . . . . 308, 326
Gleitman, L. R. . . . . . . . . . 57 Green, D. M. . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Harnad, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Glenberg, A. M. . . . . 78, 202 Green, F. L. . . . . . . . . . . . . 331 Harper, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Glick, J. . . . . . . 331, 332, 364 Greene, J. A. . . . . . . 310, 313 Harrington, D. M. . 288, 290
Glimcher, P. W. . . . . . . . . 181 Greenfield, P. M. . . . . . . . 363 Harris, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Glodowski, A.-S. . . . . . . . 157 Griffin, P. . . . . 163, 170, 369 Hasher, L. . . . . . . . . 183, 213
Glover, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Griffin, T. D. . . . . . . . . . . .105 Haslbeck, J. M. B. . . . . . . . 45
Glucksberg, S. . . . . . . . . . 223 Griffitt, W. . . . . . . . . . . . . 342 Hatano, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
Gobbi, N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Grigorenko, E. L. . . . . . . 4, 8 Hattie, J. A. C. . . . . . . . . . . 78
Gobet, F. . . . . . 235, 240, 241 Grosjean, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Hattori, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Gödker, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Grossmann, I. 309, 310, 312, Hauk, O. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Godman, N. . . . . . . . . . . . 134 314, 315, 317, 319, 326 Haun, D. B. . . 218, 226, 370
Goel, V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 Gruber, H. E. . . . . . . . . . . 281 Hauser, M. D. . . . . . . . . . 199
Goeleven, E . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Gu, X. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Hawkins, J. . . . . . . . 331, 332
Gokalsing, E. . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Guéguen, N. . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Hayakawa, S. . . . . . . . . . . 225
Goldberg, A. B. . . . . . . . . . 78 Guegan, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 Hayes, B. K. . 133, 135, 140,
Goldenberg, L. . . . . 349, 350 Guilford, J. P. . . . . . 281–283 146, 147
Goldin-Meadow, S. . . . . . 226 Gumperz, J. J. . . . . . . . . . 226 Hayes, J. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Goldman, S. R. . . . . . . . . . . 71 Guo, K. L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Heath, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Goldsmith, K. . . . . . . . . . . 181 Gureckis, T. M. . . 59, 62, 63 Heath, S. B. . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Goldsmith, M. . . . . . . . . . . 93 Güss, C. D. . . . . . . . . 10, 163 Heck, D. W. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Goldstein, D. G. 32, 183–185, Gustafsson, J. E. . . . 258, 266 Hegel, G. W. F. . . . . . . . . . 16
187 Gutheil, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 Heider, F. . . . . . . . . . 347, 353
Goldstone, R. L. . . . . . . . . 63 Guthrie, E. . . . . . . . . . . 20, 21 Heit, E. . 133–136, 139, 140,
Goldwater, M. B. . . . . . . . . 63 Guttman, L. . . . . . . . . . . . 257 146
Golfinos, J. G. . . . . . . . . . . 98 Hembacher, E. . . . . . . . . . . 91
Göncü, A. . . . . . . . . 364, 365 H Henle, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Gonen-Yaacovi, G. . . . . . 295 Hadjichristidis, C. . . . . . . 126 Henninger, F. . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Gonzalez, P. . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Hage, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 Herrnstein, R. J. . . . . . . . .266
Goodnow, J. J. . 15, 365, 366, Hagemann, D. . . . . . . . . . 169 Hershberger, S. L. . . . . . . 245
371, 372 Hager, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Hertzog, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Author Index
Hezlett, S. A. . . . . . . . . . . 266 Hyde, J. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Jones, C. R. . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Higham, D. P. . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Hynan, L. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Jones, R. G. Jr. . . . . . . . . . 134
Higham, P. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Jonides, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Hildebrandt, A. . . . . . . . . 264 I Joseph, D. L. . . . . . . . . . . 260
Hilgard, E. R. . . . . . . . . . . 341 Igarashi, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 Josephson, B. R. . . . . . . . 345
Hippocrates . . . . . . . . . 16, 17 Imai, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 Jung, R. E. . . . . . . . . . . 9, 296
Hiscock, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Innes, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 Jurafsky, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Hitler, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Irmen, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 Just, A. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Hockett, C. F. . . . . . . . . . . 199 Isaacowitz, D. M. . . . . . . 345
Hofer, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366 Isaksen, S. G. . . . . . . . . . . 295 K
Hoffrage, U. . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Isen, A. M. . . . 344, 348, 349 Kable, J. W. . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Hogarth, R. M. . . . . . . . . . 187 Ivry, R. B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Kahneman, D. 3, 9, 125, 137,
Hogg, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 139, 179–181, 184–186, 225,
Holland, J. L. . . . . . . . . . . 266 J 349, 350
Holliday, S. G. . . . . . . . . . 307 Jackson, S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Kalish, C. W. . . . . . . . . . . 333
Holmes, K. J. . . . . . 214–217 Jacobs, J. E. . . . . . . . . . . . 146 Kallgren, C. A. . . . . . . . . .187
Holmes, N. G. . . . . . . . . . 105 Jacoby, L. L. . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Kamin, L. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Holmqvist, K. . . . . . . . 41, 43 Jaeger, G. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 277 Kane, M. J. . . . . . . . . . . 6, 264
Holt, D. V. . . . . . . . . 169, 170 Jaeggi, S. M. . . . . . . . . 8, 267 Kanfer, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Holyoak, K. J. 102, 121, 144, Jahn, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Kanso, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
162 Jain, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 Kant, I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 22
Holzinger, K. J. . . . . . . . . 257 Jäkel, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 Kareev, Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Honke, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 James, W. . . . . . . . . . . 20, 341 Karwowski, M. . . . . 281, 293
Houran, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Janveau-Brennan, G. . . . 333 Kaschak, M. P. . . . . . . . . . 202
Houston, C. E. . . . . . . . . . 101 Janzen, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370 Kaszniak, A. W. . . . . . . . . . 99
Hsia, A. N. . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Jarrold, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 Kaufman, J. C. . . 8, 277, 278,
Hu, X. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Jason, L. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 313 288, 292, 296
Hubbard, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Jauk, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 Kaufman, M. . . . . . . . . . . 177
Huber, O. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Jecemien, P. . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Kaup, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Huber, O. W. . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Jeffries, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Kavanaugh, R. D. . . . . . . 332
Huberman, B. A. . . . . . . . 166 Jekel, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 48 Kay, P. . . . . . . . . . . . 218–220
Huijgen, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Jennings, P. A. . . . . . . . . . 309 Kearins, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Hull, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Jensen, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Keatron, J. L. . . . . . . . . . . 144
Hulme, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Jepson, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Keel, S. W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Hultsch, D. F. . . . . . . . . . . 267 Jeste, D. V. . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 Keil, F. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Hume, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 John-Steiner, V. . . . . . . . . 286 Keller, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Humphreys, G. W. . . . . . . . 37 Johnson, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 Kelley, C. M. . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Hund, A. M. . . . . . . . . . . . 372 Johnson, E. J. 29, 40, 41, 177, Kelly, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Hunt, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 185 Kempton, W. . . . . . . 219, 220
Hunter, J. E. . . . . . . 265, 266 Johnson, J. G. . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Kennedy, S. . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Hunter, S. T. . . . . . . . . . . . 289 Johnson, S. M. . . . . . . . . . 184 Kessel, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
Hutcherson, C. . . . . . . . . . . 44 Johnson, S. P. . . . . . . . . . . 367 Keysar, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Hutchins, E. . . . 81, 224, 364, Johnson, W. . . . . . . . . . 6, 266 Kieslich, P. J. . . . . . . . . 44, 45
371 Johnson-Laird, P. N. . 31, 60, Kihlstrom, J. F. . . . . . . . . 345
Hutchins, R. M. . . . . . . . . . . 5 114, 115, 119, 120, 122, 123, Kim, K. H. . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
Huttenlocher, J. . . . . . . . . 224 134 Kim, N. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Hütter, M. . . . . . . . . 101, 102 Jones, B. F. . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 Kim, S. . . . . . . . . . . . 183, 333

Author Index
King, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 Krampe, R. T. . . . . . 239, 308 Lehmann, A. C. . . . . . . . . 240

Kintsch, W. . . . . . . . . . 73, 78 Krantz, D. H. . . . . . . . . . . 136 Leiman, J. M. . . . . . . . . . . 257
Kirby, K. N. . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Krantz, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 Leinenger, M. . . . . . . . . . 345
Kita, S. . . . . . . . . . . . 218, 370 Krauss, R. M. . . . . . . . . . . 205 Lepper, M. R. . . . . . 101, 185
Kitayama, S. . . . . . . . . . . . 312 Krems, J. F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Leritz, L. E. . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Klahr, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Krepelka, E. J. . . . . . . . . . 295 Leutner, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Klauer, K. C. 33, 34, 117, 227 Kretzschmar, A. . . . . . . . 169 Levelt, W. J. M. . . . . . . . . 203
Klein, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Kreuzig, H. W. . . . . . . . . . 168 Levenson, M. R. . . 309, 310,
Klein, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Kross, E. . . . . . 315, 319, 326 313, 317, 319
Kleinbölting, H. . . . . . . . . . 97 Krueger, C. W. . . . . . . . . . 157 Levering, K. R. . . . . . . . . . 62
Kleitman, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Kruger, J. . . . . . . . . . . 96, 100 Levinson, S. C. 199, 215, 218,
Knetsch, J. L. . . . . . . . . . . 185 Kruschke, J. K. . . . . . . 58, 59 226, 368–370
Knight, B. G. . . . . . . . . . . 310 Kuhn, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 Levitsky, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Knoblich, G. . . . . 31, 44, 165 Kuhn, T. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 Levy, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Knopik, V. S. . . . . . . . . . . 244 Kuja-Halkola, R. . . . . . . . 245 Levy, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Knutson, B. . . . . . . . 177, 181 Kulik, C. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Levy-Sadot, R. . . . . . . . . . . 94
Koch, A. S. . . 349, 353, 354, Kulik, J. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Lewandowsky, S. . . . 46, 264
356 Kuncel, N. R. . . . . . . . . . . 266 Liben, L. S. . . . . . . . 369, 372
Koch, S. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 Kundra, Z. . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Lickel, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Koedinger, K. R. . . . . . . . . 72 Kung, F. Y. H. . . . . . 314, 317 Liebenson, P. . . . . . . . . . . 146
Koenig, A. M. . . . . . . . . . 207 Kunzmann, U. 309–311, 314 Lieberei, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Koestler, A. . . . . . . . 295, 341 Kurovskaja, J. . . . . . . . . . 213 Liepmann,D. . . . . . . . . . . 265
Koffka, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Kurtz, K. J. 59, 60, 62–64, 66 Lievens, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Kogan, N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 Kutzner, F. . . . . . . . . 101, 102 Lilienfeld, S. O. . . . . . . . . . 46
Koh, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 Kwiatkowski, J. . . . . . . . . 133 Lillard, A. S. . . . . . . . . . . 332
Kohanyi, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 290 Kwon, Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 Lindblom, C. E. . . . . . . . . 157
Köhler, W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Kyllonen, P. C. . . . 6, 72, 263, Linde, C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
Kohn, N. W. . . . . . . . . . . . 287 264 Linden, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Köller, O. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Lindenberger, U. . . . . . . . 267
Koller, I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 L Lipko, A. R. . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Komatsu, L. K. . . . . . . . . . 60 Labov, W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368 Lipshitz, R. . . . . . . . . . 9, 156
König, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318 Laham, S. . . . . . . . . .350, 356 Little, D. R. . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Konishi, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 Laibson, D. I. . . . . . 181, 246 Lloyd, F. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Kootstra, G. J. . . . . . . . . . 205 Laidlaw, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . 310 Locke, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 22
Kopiez, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 Lam, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Lockhart, R. S. . . . . . . 27, 73
Koren, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Lambert, M. I. . . . . . . . . . 246 Loehlin, J. C. . . . . . . . . . . 244
Koriat, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 91–98 Lamberts, R. P. . . . . . . . . 246 Loevinger, J. . . . . . . . . . . . 270
Kornell, N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Lancy, D. F. . . . . . . . . . . . 364 Loewenstein, G. . . . 181, 186
Korsten, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . .288 Landauer, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Loewenstein, J. . . . . . . . . . 63
Koster, E. H. W. . . . . . . . .345 Lau, H. C. . . . . . . . . . . . 96, 97 Loftus, E. F. . . . . 74, 75, 213
Kotovsky, K. . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Lauterman, T. . . . . . . . . . . 105 Lohman, D. F. . . . . . . . . . 263
Kounios, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Lawson, C. A. . . . . . . . . . 146 Lohse, G. L. . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Kousta, S. T. . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Lazar-Meyn, H. A. . . . . . 219 Long, D. L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Kovacs, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Lea, G. . . . . . . . . . . . 160, 161 Loose, S.M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Kraemer, H. C. . . . . . . . . 316 Lee, J. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 Lopez, A. . . . . . . . . . 136, 146
Kramer, A. F. . . . . . . . . . . 267 Lee, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . 216, 226 Lopez, D. F. . . . . . . . . . . . 311
Kramer, G. P. . . . . . . . . . . 351 Lehman, B. . . . . . . . . . 80, 84 Lord, C. G. . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Author Index
Lord, F. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 Markant, D. B. . . . . . . 62, 63 Metcalfe, J. 91, 98, 145, 165,

Lorenz, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 Markman, A. B. . . 60, 62, 63 166
Lövdén, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Markman, E. M. . . 146, 147, Mickler, C. . . . . . . . 310, 312
Love, B. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 334 Mihov, K. M. . . . . . . . . . . 295
Lubart, T. 277, 278, 282–284, Markovits, H. . . . . . 331, 333 Mill, J. S. . . . . . 18, 141, 142
289, 290, 292, 293, 295, 298 Marshalek, B. . . . . . . . . . . 263 Miller, G. A. . . . . . . . . 21, 60
Luchins, A. S. . . . . . 158, 223 Marsman, M. . . . . . . . . . . 265 Miller, K. F. . . . . . . . 223, 226
Luchins, E. H. . . . . . 158, 223 Martin, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Miller, P. J . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
Lucy, J. A. . . . . . . . . 214, 226 Martindale, C. . . . . . 133, 296 Miller, R. M. . . . . . . . . . . 205
Lüdtke, O. . . . . . . . . 261, 266 Massen, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Millis, K. . . . . . . . . . . . 72, 82
Luhrmann, T. . . . . . . . . . . 223 Massin-Krauss, M. . . . . . . 92 Mills, B. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Lupyan, G. . . . . 57, 224, 226 Massoni, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Minda, J. P. . . . . . . . . . 58, 62
Lynch, E. B. . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Mastria, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 Miranda, R. . . . . . . . . . . . 345
Mata, R. . . . . . . . . . . 187, 188 Mishra, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
M Matovic, D. . . 349, 352–354, Mitchell, A. A. . . . . . . . . . 207
Ma, H.- H. . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 356 Mitterer, H. . . . . . . . 219, 220
Ma’ayan, H. . . . . . . . . . 91, 93 Maule, A. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 187 Miura, I. T. . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Maas, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Mayer, J. D. . . 260, 261, 343, Mollo, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Macaulay, D. . . . . . . . . . . 345 345 Moody, Z. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
MacCann, C. . . . . . . . . . . 260 Mayer, R. E. . . . . . . . 82, 145 Morales, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Macnamara, B. N. . 240, 242 Maynard, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 363 Moreau, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Madden, C. J. . . . . . . . . . . 202 McAdams, D. . . . . . . . . . . 315 Morgenstern, O. . . . 177, 178
Maddox, W. T. . . . 58, 59, 64 McArdle, J. J. . . . . . . . . . . 265 Morineau, T. . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Madison, G. . . . . . . . . . . . 245 McCarthy, P. M. . . . . . . . . . 73 Moses, L. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 332
Madsen, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 McCleary, G. S. . . . . . . . . 372 Moshman, D. . . . . . . . . . . 335
Magliano, J. P. . . . . . . . . . . 72 McClelland, J. L. . . . . . . . . 77 Mosing, M. A. . . . . 243–245
Mahmoodi, A. . . . . . . . . . 102 McClure, S. M. . . . . . . . . 181 Moss, H. E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Mahn, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 McCormick, M. J. . . . . . . 181 Mouchiroud, C. . . . . . . . . 298
Maier, N. R. F. . . . . . . . . . . 31 McDaniel, M. . . . . . . . . . . 260 Mount, M. K. . . . . . . . . . . 266
Maier, S. F. . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 McDonald, J. . . . . . . . . . . 136 Moxley, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Majid, A. . . . . . . . . . 218, 370 McGrew, K. S. . . 6, 257, 259 Mpogole, H. . . . . . . . . . . . 370
Malone, P. S. . . . . . . . . . . 350 McKinley, S. C. . . . . . . . . . 59 Mueller, M. L. . . . . . . . . . . 95
Malt, B. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 McMillan, A. . . . . . . . . . . 245 Mullen, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Mance, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 McNamara, D. S. . . . . 73, 78 Mumford, M. D. . . 282, 289,
Mangun, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 McPherson, G. E . . . . . . . 246 295
Manichaikul, A. . . . . . . . .245 McWilliams, A. . . . . . . . . 100 Munroe, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Mankowski, T. A. . . . . . . 347 Mead, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364 Munroe, R. H. . . . . . 372, 374
Manktelow, K. I. . . . 116, 121 Meadows, D. H. . . . . . . . . 167 Munroe, R. L. 364, 372, 374
Mann, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Meadows, D. L. . . . . . . . . 167 Muratovski, G. . . . . . . . . . 288
Mann, T. N. . . . . . . . . . . . 246 Medin, D. L. . 57–60, 62, 63, Murdock, M. C. . . . . . . . . 288
Mansfield, R. S. . . . . . . . . 295 140 Murnane, R. J. . . . . . . . . . . 82
Marchese, W. . . . . . . . . . . 313 Mednick, S. . . . . . . . . . . . 283 Murphy, G. L. . . . . . . 60, 133
Marcia, J. E. . . . . . . 334, 335 Meeks, T. W. . . . . . . . . . . 316 Murray, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Marcus, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 Meinz, E. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 240 Musch, J. . . . . . . . . . . 33, 117
Marewski, J. N. . . . . . . . . . 48 Melartin, R. L. . . . . . . . . . 146
Maris, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 Melby-Lervag, M. . . . . . . 267 N
Mark, M. M. . . . . . . . . . . . 353 Mervis, C. B. . . . . . . . . 58, 63 Na, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312

Author Index
Nadel, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368 Okada, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282 Perfors, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Nagy, Z. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Olaru, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Perlman, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Naples, A. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Oostrom, J. K. . . . . . . . . . 261 Perner, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Narens, L. . . . . . . . 89–92, 96 O’Quin, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 Perret, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Narloch, R. H. . . . . . . . . . 146 Orasanu, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Perrig, W. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Naumer, B. . . . . . . . . . 33, 117 Orita, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Peters, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Navarro, D. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Ormerod, T. C. . . . . . . . . . 282 Peterson, M. A. . . . . . . . . 368
Neiderhiser, J. M. . . . . . . 244 Orquin, J. L. . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Peterson, R. . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Neisser, U. . . 7, 22, 260, 266, Osborn, A. F. . 285, 294, 295 Petty, R. E. . . . . . . . . 345, 347
364 Osherson, D. N. . . . 136, 140, Pezdek, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Nelson, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 334
Piaget, J. . . . . . . . . . .328, 349
Nelson, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368 Oswald, F. L. . . . . . . . . . . 240
Pica, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Nelson, T. O. . . . . .89–92, 96 Öttl, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Pickering, M. J. 73, 203–205
Neth, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 Over, D. E. . . . 118, 119, 121,
Pierce, T. W. . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Neubauer, A. C. . . . . . . . . 296 123, 125, 126
Neubert, J. C. . . . . . . . . . . 169 Pietschnig, J. . . . . . . . . . . 266
Newell, A. . 22, 46, 145, 159, P Piling, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
160 Paap, K. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Pinker, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Newen, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Pagel, U. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349 Plato . . . . . . . . . . 5, 17, 18, 22
Newman, D. A. . . . . . . . . 260 Paggetti, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Platz, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Newstead, S. E. . . . 116, 119 Paivio, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Plomin, R. . . . 244–246, 266
Nguyen, T. B. . . . . . . . . . . 101 Palmer, J. C. . . . . . . . . . . . 213 Plous, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Nickel, S. . . . . . . . . . 101, 349 Palmeri, T. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Pollard, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Nickerson, R. B. . . . 118, 119 Pannu, J. K. . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Polson, P. G. . . . . . . 166, 239
Nickerson, R. S. . . . . . . . 295 Papafragou, A. . . . . 215, 217 Pool, R. . . . . . . . . . . . 239, 241
Nicolaides, C. . . . . . . . . . 365 Pape, A. D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Popper, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Nijstad, B. A. . . . . . . . . . . 284 Pardo, J. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Posner, M. I. . . . . . . . . 58, 98
Nisbett, R. E. . 136, 189, 312 Paredes, D. R. . . . . . . . . . 226 Post, R. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
Noordzij, M. L. . . . . . . . . 372 Park, D. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 Posthuma, D. . . . . . . . . . . 245
Norman, D. A. 222, 224, 368 Parker, A. M. . . . . . . . . . . 188 Powell, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Nosofsky, R. M. . . . . . 58, 59 Pashler, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 Power, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Novick, L. R. . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Pasupathi, M. . . . . . . . . . . 317 Prelec, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Novick, M. R. . . . . . . . . . 256 Paulewicz, B. . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Presson, C. C. . . . . . . . . . 369
Nunes, L. . . . . . . . . . 187, 188 Paulhus, D. L. . . . . . 308, 326
Pretz, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
Núñez, R. E. . . . . . . . . . . . 221 Paulus, P. B. . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Pretz, J. E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Nurmi, J.-E. . . . . . . . . . . . 334 Pavlenko, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Prewitt-Freilino, J. L. . . . 213
Nussinson, R. . . . . . . . 91, 93 Pavlov, I. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Payne, J. W. . . . . 39–41, 177 Pribram, K. H. . . . . . . . . . . 21
Nutter-Pridgen, K. L. . . . 309,
Payne, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 Pridgen, S. . . . . . . . . 309, 317
317
Payne, T. W. . . . . . . . . . . . 264 Primi, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
O Pea, R. D. . . . . . . . . .331, 332 Pringle, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
O’Brien, D. P. . . . . . . . . . 122 Pedersen, N. L. . . . . . . . . 245 Proffitt, J. B. . . . . . . . . . . . 140
O’Toole, B. I. . . . . . . . . . . 266 Pekrun, R. . . . . . . . . . . 80, 84 Prowse Turner, J. A. . . . . 128
Oakes, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 Pennycook, G. . . . . 128, 352 Puccio, G. J. . . . . . . 285, 288
Oaksford, M. . . . . . . . . . . 125 Peretz, I. . . . . . . . . . . 244–246 Pulvermüller, F. . . . . . . . . 203
Oberauer, K. . . . . . . 135, 264 Perez, S. M. . . . . . . . 363, 366 Purves, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Ohlsson, S. . . . . . . . . .29, 165 Perfetti, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Pyers, J. E. . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Author Index
Q Ritchie, S. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Santos, H. C. . . . . . . 314, 317

Quinteros Baumgart, C. . 202 Ritter, F. E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Sapir, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Rivkin, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 Satel, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
R Roberson, D. . . . . . . 219, 224 Satterthwaite, T. D. . . . . . 182
Radvansky, G. A. . . . . . . . 76 Robert, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Savage, L. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Ramalingam, D. . . . . . . . . . . 9 Roberts, J. E. . . . . . . . . . . 345 Savi, A. O. . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Ramsey, F. P. . . . . . . . . . . 126 Roberts, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 Sawyer, R. K. . . . . . . . . . . 287
Randers, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Roberts, R. D. . . . . . . . . . 260 Sayama, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Raney, G. E. . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Robertson, D. A. . . . . . . . 202 Schacter, D. L. . . . . . . . . . . 98
Rangel, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Robinson, M. D. . . . . . . . 345 Schaffer, M. M. . . . . . . . . . 58
Rapaport, D. . . . . . . . . . . . 341 Rogoff, B. . . . . 365, 368, 372 Schalk, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Rapcsak, S. Z. . . . . . . . . . . 99 Rohdes, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Schank, R. C. . . . . . . . . . . 368
Rapold, C. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 370 Rohrbach, B. . . . . . . . . . . 294 Schankin, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Rapp, D. N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Rohrer, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 Scherbaum, S. . . . . . . . 44, 45
Ratcliff, R. . . . . . . . . . . 35, 36 Roll, I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Schiffer, S. . . . . . . . . . . 32, 38
Rayner, R. . . . . . . . . . 21, 342 Romer, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 Schipolowski, S. . . . . . . . 264
Razran, G. H. . . . . . 341, 342 Rosch, E. . . . 16, 58, 63, 367 Schlimm, D. . . . . . . 221, 222
Razran, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Rosenberg, E. L. . . . . . . . . 77 Schmettow, M. . . . . . . . . . 372
Read, J. D. . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 Rosenblum, L. D. . . . . . . 205 Schmid, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Reali, C. . . . . . . . . . . 206, 207 Ross, B. H. . . . . . 60, 62, 133 Schmidt, F. L. . . . . . 265, 266
Reber, A. S. . . . . . . . . . . . 200 Ross, L. . 101, 185, 186, 189 Schmiedek, F. . . . . . . . . . . 267
Reber, R. . . . . . . . . . . 94, 145 Rotello, C. M. . . . . . . . . . 135 Schneider, W. . . . . . . . . . . 240
Reder, L. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Rothermund, K. . . . . . . . . . 36 Schnyer, D. M. . . . . . . . . . . 99
Redick, T. S. . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Rotter, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 Scholz, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Rees, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Rouault, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Schooler, J. W. . . . . . . . . . . 29
Rehder, B. . . . . . 60, 141, 143 Rounds, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 Schott, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Reichler, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 313 Rubin, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Schreiber, C. . . . . . . . . . . 162
Reingold, E. M. . . . . . . . . . 42 Ruiz-Caballero, J. A. . . . 345 Schroeders, U. 260, 264, 269
Reiter-Palmon, R. . . . . . . 278 Rumelhart, D. E. . . . . . 60, 77 Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M. 33,
Reither, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 Runco, M. A. . . . . . 277, 292 39, 40, 45
Renkewitz, F. . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Rupp, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 Schulze, R. . . . . 35, 135, 264
Reno, R. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 Russo, J. E. . . . . . . . . . . 29, 41 Schumpeter, J. . . . . . . . . . 292
Reus, V. I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Ryan, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Schustack, M. W. . . . . . . 142
Reyna, V. F. 3, 180–184, 188, Ryu, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Schwartz, B. L. . . . . . . . . . 98
189 Schwartz, S. H. . . . . . . . . . 63
Reynolds, J. R. . . . . . . . . . . 76 S Schwarz, N. . . 342–344, 348,
Reznitskaya, A. . . . . . . . . 319 Sackett, P. R. . . . . . . . . . . 261 349
Rhodes, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 Sadler-Smith, E. . . . . . . . 282 Scott, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Rhodes, M. G. . . . . . . . 93, 94 Sakakibara, A. . . . . . . . . . 241 Scott, R. M. . . . . . . . . . . . 330
Richardson, D. C. . . . . . . . 43 Salas, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 287 Scribner, S. . . . . . . . 331, 332
Richerson, P. J. . . . . . . . . 366 Salmerón, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Sedikides, C. . 344, 346, 347
Ridley, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 Salovey, P. . . . . . . . . 260, 345 Seligman, M. E. . . . . . . . .103
Riefer, D. M. . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Salthouse, T. A. . . . . . . . . 267 Selimis, S. . . . . . . . . 215, 217
Rim, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Salvi, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Sells, S. B. . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Rips, L. J. . . 36, 37, 122, 139 Samuels, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Semin, G. R. . . . . . . 205, 206
Rispoli, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Samuelson, W. . . . . . . . . . 185 Senghas, A. . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Ristikari, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 Sanchez, K. . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Serpell, R. . . . . 364, 365, 371

Author Index
Serra, M. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Smith, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Stevenson, R. J. . . . . . . . . 162

Sethi, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 91, 92 Smith, S. M. . . 282, 345, 347 Stillerman, B. J. . . . . . . . . . 44
Seymour, B. . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Smolen, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 Stillwell, C. H. . . . . . . . . . . 63
Shafir, E. . . . . . . . . . 136, 140 Snieder, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 Stoet, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Shafir, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Snow, R. E. . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Storbeck, J. . . . 342–344, 350
Shafto, P. . . . . . . . . . 137, 138 Snowdon, C. T. . . . . . . . . 201 Storme, M. . . . . . . . .290, 294
Shakeshaft, N. G. . . . . . . 245 Snyder, A. W. . . . . . . . . . . 296 Story, G. W. . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Shanks, L. L. . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Socrates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Strasser, D. I. . . . . . 308, 326
Shannon, C. E. . . . . . . . . . 159 Sokal, A. D. . . . . . . . . . . . 352 Strodtbeck, F. L. . . . . . . . 156
Sharp, D. W. . . . . . . . . . . . 364 Söllner, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Strough, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Shaw, J. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Solomon, K. O. . . . . . . . . . 60 Stuebing, K. K. . . . . . . . . 266
Sheffer, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Son, L. K. . . . . . . . . . . . 91, 92 Stuppia, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Shell, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Sottilare, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Su, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 264, 269
Shenk, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Sowden, P. T. . . . . . . . . . . 285 Süß, H.-M. . . . . . . . . 135, 264
Shepard, R. N. . . . . . . . . . . 56 Spaepen, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 Sullivan, N. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Shimamura, A. P. . . . . . . . .98 Spearman, C. . . . . . . . . 6, 256 Suls, J. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Shiraishi, R. W. . . . . . . . . 309 Spears, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 Super, C. M. . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Shoben, E. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Spector, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 Suppes, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Shoffelen, J.-M. . . . . . . . . . 46 Speer, N. K. . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Surowiecki, J. . 98, 316, 319
Shpigelman, M. . . . . . . . . . 93 Spencer, C. . . . . . . . 368, 372 Süsser, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
Shrager, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Sperber, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Svenson, O. . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Shweder, R. A. . . . . . . . . 365 Sperling, R. A. . . . . . . . . . . 98 Swendsen, H. . . . . . . . . . . 135
Sidi, Y. . . . . . . . . 93, 104, 105 Sperry, R. W. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Swets, J. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Siedlecka, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Spivey, M. J. . . . . . . . . 43, 44 Swineford, F. . . . . . . . . . . 257
Sigman, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Sporns, O. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 Syed, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Simon, H. A. 22, 29, 46, 145, Squire, L. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Szechter, L. E. . . . . . . . . . 372
159–161, 163, 167, 177, 183, Sriraman, B. . . . . . . . . . . . 293
238 Stäudel, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 T
Simon, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Stadler, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Tamir, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
Simonton, D. K. . . . . . . . . 281 Stanfield, R. A. . . . . . . . . 202 Tan, H. B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
Sinclair, R. C. . . . . . . . . . 353 Stankov, L. . . . . . . . 260, 266 Tan, L. H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Singer, J. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Stanovich, K. E. . . . 121, 124, Tan, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Singer, R. D. . . . . . . . . . . 342 125, 180, 181, 189 Tan, Y. T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Sio, U. N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282 Starko, A. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Tanaka, J. W. . . . . . . . 63, 133
Siok, W. T. . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Staudinger, U. M. . . . . . . 308, Tandler, J. M. . . . . . . . . . . 337
Skinner, B. F. . . . . . . .21, 238 310–312, 315, 317, 319, 326 Tannenbaum, D. . . . . . . . 178
Slater, I. . . . . . . . . . . 352–354 Stein, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Tauber, S. K. . . . . . . . . 93–95
Slobin, D. I. . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Steinbeck, J. . . . . . . 135, 145 Taylor, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Sloman, S. A. . . . . . . 31, 126 Steinberg, L. . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Taylor, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Sloutsky, V. M. . . . . . . . . . 64 Stephens, D. L. . . . . . . . . . 29 Tedre, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
Slovic, P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 Sternberg, R. J. 4, 6–8, 16, 23, Teigen, K. H. . . . . . . . . . . 237
Small, B. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 142–144, 149, 156, 169, 177, Tesch-Römer, C. . . .239, 308
Smith, E. E. . . 36, 37, 57, 60, 242, 245, 257, 278, 281, 282, Thalbourne, M. A. . . . . . 295
136, 140, 146 292, 307–310, 316, 318, 319, Thaler, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Smith, J .D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 321 Therriault, D. . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Smith, J. . . . . . . . . . . 308, 317 Sternberg, S. . . . . . . . . 35, 37 Thiede, K. W. . . . 91, 92, 105
Smith, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Stevens, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Thomas, Jr. J. C. . . . . . . . . 39

Author Index
Thomas, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 V Ward, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Thompson, V. A. . 90, 94, 97, Vaccaro, A. G. . . . . . . 98–100 Ward, T. B. . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
128 Vaillant, G. . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 Wartenberg, F. . . . . . . . . . . 31
Thomson, G. H. . . . . . . . . 257 Van de Vijver, F. J. R. . . . 366 Wason, P. C. . . 114, 119, 120,
Thorndike, E. L. . . . . 20, 237 van den Broek, P. . . . . . . . . 76 124, 125, 137, 138, 141
Thornhill-Miller, B. 288, 295, van der Maas, H. L. J. . . 257, Wassmann, J. . . . . . . . . . . 223
298, 299 265 Watson, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
Thurstone, L. L. . . . . . 6, 257 van der Sluis, S. . . . . . . . . 245 Watson, J. B. . . . 28, 29, 158,
Thurstone, T. G. . . . . . . . . 257 van Hell, J. G. . . . . . . . . . 205 237, 342
Titchener, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 van Natta, D. . . . . . . 235, 236 Watson, J. C. . . . . . . . . . . 135
Tobin, L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Vanderputte, K. . . . . . . . . 183 Watson, J. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Tolman, E. C. . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Vanhove, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Wattenmaker, W. D. . . . . . 62
Tomasello, M. . . . . . 201, 366 VanLehn, K. . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Wearing, A. J. . . . . . . . . . 156
Vargas, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Weaver, W. . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Topolinski, S. . . . 94, 95, 145
Vargas, P. . . . . . . . . . 349, 356 Webb, M. E. . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Tordjman, S. . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Varnum, M. E. . . . . . . . . . 312 Weber, E. U. . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Torrance, E. . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Vartanian, O. . 133, 278, 296 Weber, M. . . . . 100, 158, 178
Townsend, J. T. . . . . . . . . . 35
Vergnaud, J.-C. . . . . . . . . . . 97 Webster, J. D. 309, 310, 313,
Trahan, L. H. . . . . . . . . . . 266 315, 317
Vernon, P. A. . . . . . . . . . . 259
Trautwein, U. . . . . . 261, 266 Wehr, P. . . . . . . . . . . 308, 326
Vigo, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Treffinger, D. J. . . . . . . . . 295 Vinden, P. G. . . . . . . . . . . 223 Weibe, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Trofimovich, P. . . . . . . . . 205 Vinkhuyzen, A. A. . . . . . 245 Weil, R. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Trzaskowski, M. . . . . . . . 245 Visser, B. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 259 Weingartner, H. . . . . . . . . 345
Tschan, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Viswanathan, M. . . . . . . . 202 Weiskopf, D. A. . . . . . . . . 202
Tucker, D. M. . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Vitkin, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137 Weldon, R. B. . . . . . 181–183
Tucker, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 Vlaev, I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Wellman, H. M. . . . . . . . . 332
Tucker-Drob, E. M. 244, 245, Vogel, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Wells, G. L. . . . . . . . . . . . 104
266 Vollmeyer, R. . . . . . . . . . . 162 Werbik, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Tuermer, U. . . . . . . . . . . . 365 Volz, K. G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Wernicke, C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Tuholski, S. W. . . . . . . . . 264 von Davier, A. A. . . . . . . . 72 Wertheimer, M. . . . . . 21, 158
Turkheimer, E. . . . . . . . . . 266 von Neumann, J. . . 177, 178 Wertsch, J. V. . . . . . 364, 369
Turner, T. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 von Stockhausen, L. 206, 207 West, R. F. . . . . . . . . 180, 189
Tversky, A. 56, 137, 139, 179, von Stumm, S. . . . . . . . . . 266 Westerhof, G. J. . . . . . . . . 317
180, 184–187, 225 von Winterfeldt, D. . . . . . 187 Weststrate, N. M. . . 307, 308,
Tyler, L. K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 von Wright, G. H. . . . . . . 156 314–316, 318, 319, 326
Vong, W. K. . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Whiting, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
Voracek, M. . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Whorf, B. L. . . 214, 216, 370
U Voss, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Wichary, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Ucros, C. G. . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Voss, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Wider, R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Ullén, F. . . . . . . 243–245, 247 Vygotsky, L. S. 79, 364, 365, Widom, T. R. . . . . . . . . . . 221
Undorf, M. . . . . . . 92, 94, 95 369 Wiebe, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Unkelbach, C. 101, 342, 349, Wiemer, K. . . . . . . . . . . 72, 78
350, 352 W Wiener, H. J. D. . . . . . . . . 337
Urban, K. K. . . . . . . . . . . . 283 Wadlinger, H. . . . . . . . . . . 345 Wierzchoǹ, M. . . . . . . . . . . 97
Usanga, U. . . . . . . . . . . . . 370 Wallach, M. A. . . . . . . . . . 283 Wiese, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Uttal, D. H. . . . . . . . . . . . . 369 Walther, E. . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Wigboldus, D. H. J. . . . . 206
Uzzi, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 Ward, E. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 Wiley, J. . . . . . . . . . . . 82, 105

Author Index
Wilhelm, O. . . 135, 263, 264, Woodward, A. L. . . . . . . . 330 Z

269 Woodworth, R. S. . . . . . . 114 Zacks, J. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Wilhelms, E. A. . . . 182, 183 Woody, W. D. . . . . . . . . . . 104 Zacks, R. T. . . . . . . . . 92, 183
Wilkie, O. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Woulfe, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 Zajonc, R. B. . . . . . . . . . . 341
Wilkins, M. C. . . . . . . . . . 114 Wu, B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Zalmanov, H. . . . . 93, 94, 96
Willemsen, M. C. . . . . . . . 40 Wuchty, M. A. . . . . . . . . . 286 Zanon, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Wilson, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 Wulff, D. U. . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Zeckhauser, R. J. . . . . . . . 185
Wilson, S. J. . . . . . . . . . . . 246 Wundt, W. 18, 20, 28, 29, 364 Zedeck, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Wilson, T. D. . . . . . . . . . . 101 Wüstenberg, S. . . . . . . . . . 169 Zenasni, F. . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Wiltshire, T. J. . . . . . . . . . . 72 Zhang, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Wimmer, H. . . . . . . . . . . . 331
X
Zhu, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Xu, X. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Winawer, J. . . . . . . . 219, 220 Zhu, X. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Winner, E. . . . . . . . . 240, 242 Y Ziblatt, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Wisniewski, E. J. . . . . . . . . 60 Yamauchi, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Ziegler, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Witte, E. H. . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Yang, N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 Zimdahl, M. F. . . . . . . 94, 95
Wittgenstein, L. . . . . . . 57, 58 Yang, S. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . 310 Zmigrod, S. . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Wittmann, W. W. . . . . . . . 135 Yeung, N. . . . . . . . . . . . 92, 95 Zoanetti, N. . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Wixted, J. T. . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Yokochi, S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 282 Zuidema, W. . . . . . . 202, 203
Wolf, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 Young, A. G. . . . . . . . . . . 333 Zwaan, R. A. 76, 78, 202, 203
Wolff, P. . . . . . . . . . . 214–217 Yu, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Zylberberg, A. . . . . . . . . . . 97

The “Psychology of Human Thought” is an “open access” collection of
peer-reviewed chapters from all areas of higher cognitive processes. The
book is intended to be used as a textbook in courses on higher processes,
complex cognition, human thought, and related courses. Chapters include
concept acquisition, knowledge representation, inductive and deductive
reasoning, problem solving, metacognition, language, expertise, intelli-
gence, creativity, wisdom, development of thought, affect and thought,
and sections about history and about methods. The chapters are written
by distinguished scholarly experts in their respective fields, coming from
such diverse regions as North America, Great Britain, France, Germany,
Norway, Israel, and Australia. The level of the chapters is addressed to
advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students.
ISBN 978-3-947732-34-0
9 783947 732340

Psychology of Human Thought 101

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Psychology of Human Thought 101

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Psychology of Human Thought 101

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

THE PSYCHOLOGY

Robert J. Sternberg & Joachim Funke (Eds.)

Text © 2019 by the authors.

Cover image: Matthias Ripp, Gentrification (detail),

ISBN: 978-3-947732-34-0 (Softcover)

Rakefet Ackerman Joachim Funke

Andrea Bender Kathleen M. Galotti

Arndt Bröder David M. Garavito

Joseph P. Forgas Zach Hambrick

Todd Lubart Branden Thornhill-Miller

1 The Psychology of Human Thought: Introduction

2 History of the Field of the Psychology of Human Thought

3 Methods for Studying Human Thought

4 Concepts: Structure and Acquisition

5 Knowledge Representation and Acquisition

6 Metacognition: Monitoring and Controlling One’s Own Knowledge, Reasoning and

12 Language and Thought

15 Creativity: An Overview of the 7C’s of Creative Thought

17 Development of Human Thought

18 Affect and Thought: The Relationship Between Feeling and Thinking

Subject Index 381

Author Index 387

https://doi.org/10.17885/heiup.470.c6663 Psychology of Human Thought • 1

2 • Psychology of Human Thought

The Psychology of Human Thought:

Cornell University & Heidelberg University

https://doi.org/10.17885/heiup.470.c6664 Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1 • 3

4 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1

Table 1.1: Major Themes in the Study of Human Thought.

Number One Emphasis Other Emphasis

Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1 • 5

6 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1

Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1 • 7

8 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1

Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1 • 9

complicated ill-defined problems), political and eco- 1.4 Conclusion

1. Why is there no single "best" method for studying human thought?

3. How are human intelligence and human problem solving related?

10 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1

Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1 • 11

12 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1

Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 1 • 13

History of the Field of the Psychology of

https://doi.org/10.17885/heiup.470.c6665 Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 2 • 15

16 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 2

Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 2 • 17

18 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 2

School of Thought Main Emphasis

Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 2 • 19

2.7 Pragmatism of yesterday. Second, the school of thought raises

20 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 2

Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 2 • 21

22 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 2

1. How do rationalism and empiricism differ?

Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 2 • 23

24 • Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 2

Psychology of Human Thought • Chapter 2 • 25

Methods for Studying Human Thought

3.1 Introduction tive psychologists have developed for discovering