Bloomsbury Collections - Judicial Review and The Constitution

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Forsyth, Christopher.

"Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial
Review." Judicial Review and the Constitution. Ed. Christopher Forsyth. London: Hart Publishing, 2000. 29–46.
Bloomsbury Collections. Web. 27 Dec. 2022. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472558916.ch-002>.
Retrieved from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com

Copyright The contributors severally 2000. All rights reserved. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited
without prior permission in writing from the publishers.
Judicial Review and the Constitution
Christopher Forsyth (ed)
Hart Publishing 2000

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Chapter DOI 10.5040/9781472558916.ch-002 Page Range 29–46

Chapter 2. Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales


The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review
Christopher Forsyth

Extract

The doctrine of ultra vires has been aptly described by Sir William Wade as “the central principle of administrative law” but in recent years it
has been subjected to criticism. First the academics weighed in and, increasingly, eminent judges speaking or writing extra-judicially have
described the doctrine as a “fairy tale” or a “fig leaf” and declared its redundancy and lack of utility. The major grounds of criticism have
been, first, that the doctrine is artificial in that the legislature could never have formed an intention, express or implied, on the many, subtle
and various principles which form the modern law of judicial review. The content of the rules of natural justice, the concept of irrationality
and the like are judicial, not legislative, constructs. And this should be recognised in the abolition of the doctrine of ultra vires. Secondly, it is
argued that the concept of ultra vires can simply play no part in determining whether, as is clearly the case, non–statutory bodies which
exercise no legal powers at all are subject to judicial review.

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