San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez

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[PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS] Module 1 (#36)

Topic: Human Relations (19-36, New Civil Code)


Title: San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez G.R. No. 166836
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J. Date September 04, 2013
DOCTRIN
E
/RIGHTS
APPLIED
FACTS Petitioner San Miguel Properties (SMP) purchased from BF Homes Inc.,
represented by Atty. Orendain as its duly authorized rehabilitation
receiver, 130 residential lots in its subdivision in BF Homes Parañaque.
However, 20 TCTs (out of 40) were withheld delivery by BF Homes since
Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of
the transactions; BF Homes refused to deliver the TCTs despite demands.
Because of this, SMP filed a complaintaffidavit in the Office of the
Prosecutor (OCP) of Las Pinas charging respondent directors and officers of
BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Sec. 25 in relation to
Sec. 29 both of PD No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’
Protective Decree). Simultaneously, SMP sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20
TCTs in its favor.

The OCP dismissed SMP’s criminal complaint for violation of PD No. 957 on
the ground, among others, that there existed a prejudicial question
necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on
the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en
banc or by the HLURB. SMP appealed the resolution of the OCP to the DOJ,
which denied the same. Upon elevation of the case to the CA via Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus, SMP submitted the issue of whether or not
HLURB Case presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension
of the criminal action for violation of PD No. 957. CA dismissed SMP’s
petition.
ISSUE/S Whether the HLURB administrative case for specific performance could be
a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the
violation of PD No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.
RULING YES, an action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an
administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question that must first be
determined before the criminal case for violation of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957
could be resolved. Prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the
criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It
is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve
it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that
[PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS] Module 1 (#36)

it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind


the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal


case. Yet, contrary to SMP’s submission that there could be no prejudicial
question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question
arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises
a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings
determining the charge for the criminal violation of PD No. 957. This is true
simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in
nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose
jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended


because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues
raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related
with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of PD No.
957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be
determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case.

Here, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine
whether or not SMP was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the
remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not
BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the
20 TCTs. The resolution of the former (admin case) must obviously precede
that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold SMP to be not entitled to the
delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority
to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been
terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of
Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to
proceed with the criminal case.

Hence, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the dismissal of SMP’s criminal complaint for violation of PD No.
957 for lack of probable cause and for reason of a prejudicial question.

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