Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. NO.

170829, November 20, 2006

Petitioner: Perla G. Patricio

Respondents:Marcelino G. Dario III and the Honorable Court of Appeals

CHAPTER 2. THE FAMILY HOME (Arts 152-162)

After settling the estate of Marcelino Dario, a new title for the family home was issued under the
name of the wife and two children as co-owners. When the wife and one of the sons wanted to
partition the family home, the other son opposed on the ground that the family home should remain
despite the death of one or both the spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary referring to the
oppositor's son, the grandchild of the decedent.

ISSUE:

Whether the grandchild of the decedent is considered as a minor beneficiary of the family
home.

HELD:

No, the grandchild in the case at bar is not considered as a minor beneficiary of the family
home. Indeed, the requisites on the relationship and that the beneficiary should live in the family
home are present. However, the requisite that the dependent must be dependent for legal support
upon the head of the family was not met because liability for legal support falls primarily on his
parents and, only in their default, is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Hence, partition
should take place. 

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail
of the benefits derived from Art. 159. The son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent
has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent,
hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
As to the third requisite, the grandson cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if
he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on
his parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family.
The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the
father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Hence, partition
should take place.
Olivia De Mesa v. Acero, G.R. NO. 185064 Jan. 16, 2012 663 SCRA 40
Petitioner: Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa
Respondents: Spouses Claudio D. Acero, Jr. and Ma. Rufina D. Acero,
Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte and Registrar Alfredo Santos
CHAPTER 2. THE FAMILY HOME (Arts 152-162)
Facts:The family home of Spouses De Mesa was sold at a public auction to the highest bidder Spouses Acero to
satisfy an unpaid loan to the latter. Thereafter, Spouses Acero leased the subject property to Spouses De Mesa
but the latter defaulted in the payment of the rent, hence, an ejectment case was filed. Spouses De Mesa
claimed ownership of the family home on the basis that it is exempt from execution under the Family Code,
and thus, could have not been validly levied upon. It must be noted that Spouses De Mesa never assailed the
validity of the levy.
Issue: Whether or not Spouses De Mesa are the lawful owners of the family home.
Held: No, they are not the lawful owners but the Spouses Acero. While it is true that the family home is
generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject
property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a
reasonable time thereafter. The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. The petitioners now are barred from raising the same.
Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.
Spouses De Mesa obtained a loan from Spouses Acero which was secured by a mortgage over their
family home. When Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan, the property was sold at a public auction. Spouses
Acero was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to them. Thereafter, they
leased the subject property to Spouses De Mesa who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to
collect the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses De Mesa.  In their
defense, Spouses De Mesa claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the subject property. They deny that
they are mere lessors, alleging that they are the lawful owners of the subject property and, thus cannot be
evicted therefrom. The MTC ruled in Spouses Acero’s favor. Spouses De Mesa appealed the Decision.
Petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy.
In the meantime, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to
nullify the title of Spouses Acero on the basis that the subject property is a family home which is exempt from
execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying
writ of execution on their unpaid loan.
ISSUE: Whether the subject property is exempt from execution
HELD: It is without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However,
this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a
family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the
debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and
proved to the Sheriff.
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right within a
reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since
the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to
invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the
status of the subject property as a family home.
Rodriguez vs. CA, G.R. NO. 85723, Jun. 19, 1995 245 SCRA 150
Petitioner: Bienvenido Rodriguez
Respondents:Court of Appeals and Clarito Agbulos
CHAPTER 2. PROOF OF FILIATION (Articles 172-174)

Facts:

Clarito Agbulos filed an action for compulsory recognition and support against
Bienvenido Rodriguez before the RTC. Clarito’s mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as witness,
was asked to reveal the identity of the father but was objected. Clarito filed a petition for
review before the CA which allowed the admission of the testimony. Rodriguez contended
that the mother should not be allowed to reveal the name of the father because such
revelation was prohibited by Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal
the name of the person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he or she state any
circumstance whereby the other party may be identified.
Issue:

Whether or not the mother should be allowed to reveal the identity of the father of
Clarito.

Held:
Yes, the mother should be allowed to reveal the identity of the father of Clarito.
There is no similar prohibition found in Article 280 of the Civil Code has been replicated in the
Family Code. Thus, the intention of the legislature is to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity of illegitimate children. The Family Code allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art. 175).
Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate children is by any of the following:

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

When a recognition has been made by one parent, the name of the other parent may be revealed in
an action by the child to compel such other parent to recognize him also.
Cang vs. CA, G.R. NO.105308, Sept. 25, 1998 296 SCRA 128

Petitioner: Herbert Cang

Respondents:Court of Appeals, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano & Maria Clara Clavano

Adoption

Facts:
Herbert and Anna Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Upon learning
of her husband's extramarital affairs, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation which
was approved. While in US, Herbert was issued a divorce decree which granted sole custody
of the children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation to Herbert. The brother and
sister-in-law of Anna Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children with the written
consent of Anna Marie. The RTC and the CA granted the adoption stating that the consent
of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the minor children can be legally adopted without the written consent of
Herbert on the ground that he has abandoned them.

Held:

No, the written consent of Herbert is necessary because he has not abandoned his
children. Abandonment means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children." Herbert did not manifest
any conduct that would forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over
his children so as to constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without
financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was
physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. There were evidences that he maintained regular communications
with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send them packages catered
to their whims.
Obedencio vs. Murillo, A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1753. Feb. 5, 2004 422 SCRA 21

Complainant: Capistrano Obedencio, Jr.

Respondent: Judge Joaquin M. Murillo

Duty to Provide Support

Facts:

Obedencio and his wife assisted their daughter, Licel-14 years old, in filing a criminal
complaint for rape allegedly committed upon her when she was 11 years old by her uncle. Obedencio
found out that Judge Murillo dismissed the case upon Licel’s filing of an affidavit of desistance
accompanied by her maternal grandparents to affirm such. Obedencio charged Judge Murillo of
unjustly dismissing the criminal case.

Issue:

Whether or not there is unjust dismissal of the case.

Held:

Yes, the case was unjustly dismissed. Family Code gives to the parents the right and duty to
represent Licel in all matters affecting her interest. Thus, they were entitled to be notified and to
attend every hearing on the case. Licel was only 14 years old, when she was presented before
respondent’s sala to affirm the execution of her affidavit of desistance. Said affidavit should have
been executed with the concurrence of her parents. Licel cannot fully comprehend for herself the
impact and legal consequence of the affidavit of desistance neither can she validly give
consent to an affidavit of desistance, for a minor is incompetent to execute such an instrument.
18. Aberca vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1989)
FACTS: This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and
liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force
Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver “to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro
Manila,”
Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members
of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were
arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and
counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on
them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all
violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract
information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans
being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza,
alleging among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability
for acts done in the performance of their official duties.
ISSUE:
1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution?
2. If such action for damages may be maintained, may a superior officer under the notion of respondent
superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose
constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
HELD:
1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners’ right and
cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights.
The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the
right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.
 
2. YES. The purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or
any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person ‘directly’ or “indirectly” responsible
for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has
also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the
constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or
from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a state witness.
G.R. No. L-24332 January 31, 1978
RAMON RALLOS, Administrator of the Estate of CONCEPCION RALLOS, petitioner, vs.
FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
This is a case of an attorney-in-fact, Simeon Rallos, who after of his death of his principal,
Concepcion Rallos, sold the latter's undivided share in a parcel of land pursuant to a power of
attorney which the principal had executed in favor. The administrator of the estate of the went to
court to have the sale declared uneanforceable and to recover the disposed share. The trial court
granted the relief prayed for, but upon appeal the Court of Appeals uphold the validity of the sale
and the complaint.
Hence, this Petition for Review on certiorari.
The following facts are not disputed. Concepcion and Gerundia both surnamed Rallos were sisters
and registered co-owners of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11116 of the Registry of Cebu. On April 21, 1954, the
sisters executed a special power of attorney in favor of their brother, Simeon Rallos, authorizing him
to sell for and in their behalf lot 5983. On March 3, 1955, Concepcion Rallos died. On September
12, 1955, Simeon Rallos sold the undivided shares of his sisters Concepcion and Gerundia in lot
5983 to Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation for the sum of P10,686.90. The deed of sale was
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Cebu, TCT No. 11118 was cancelled, and a new transfer
certificate of Title No. 12989 was issued in the named of the vendee.
On May 18, 1956 Ramon Rallos as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Concepcion Rallos filed a
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. R-4530 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, praying (1) that
the sale of the undivided share of the deceased Concepcion Rallos in lot 5983 be d unenforceable,
and said share be reconveyed to her estate; (2) that the Certificate of 'title issued in the name of
Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation be cancelled and another title be issued in the names of
the corporation and the "Intestate estate of Concepcion Rallos" in equal undivided and (3) that
plaintiff be indemnified by way of attorney's fees and payment of costs of suit. Named party
defendants were Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation, Simeon Rallos, and the Register of
Deeds of Cebu, but subsequently, the latter was dropped from the complaint. The complaint was
amended twice; defendant Corporation's Answer contained a crossclaim against its co-defendant,
Simon Rallos while the latter filed third-party complaint against his sister, Gerundia Rallos While
the case was pending in the trial court, both Simon and his sister Gerundia died and they were
substituted by the respective administrators of their estates.
After trial the court a quo rendered judgment with the following dispositive portion:
A. On Plaintiffs Complaint —
(1) Declaring the deed of sale, Exh. "C", null and void insofar as the one-
half pro-indiviso share of Concepcion Rallos in the property in question,
— Lot 5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu — is concerned;
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu City to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12989 covering Lot 5983 and to issue in lieu
thereof another in the names of FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY
CORPORATION and the Estate of Concepcion Rallos in the proportion of
one-half (1/2) share each pro-indiviso;
(3) Ordering Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation to deliver the
possession of an undivided one-half (1/2) share of Lot 5983 to the herein
plaintiff;
(4) Sentencing the defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the
Estate of Simeon Rallos, to pay to plaintiff in concept of reasonable
attorney's fees the sum of P1,000.00; and
(5) Ordering both defendants to pay the costs jointly and severally.
B. On GO CHANTS Cross-Claim:
(1) Sentencing the co-defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the
Estate of Simeon Rallos, to pay to defendant Felix Co Chan & Sons
Realty Corporation the sum of P5,343.45, representing the price of one-
half (1/2) share of lot 5983;
 (2) Ordering co-defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate
of Simeon Rallos, to pay in concept of reasonable attorney's fees to Felix
Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation the sum of P500.00.
C. On Third-Party Complaint of defendant Juan T. Borromeo administrator of Estate
of Simeon Rallos, against Josefina Rallos special administratrix of the Estate of
Gerundia Rallos:
(1) Dismissing the third-party complaint without prejudice to filing either a complaint
against the regular administrator of the Estate of Gerundia Rallos or a claim in the
Intestate-Estate of Cerundia Rallos, covering the same subject-matter of the third-
party complaint, at bar. (pp. 98-100, Record on Appeal)
Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation appealed in due time to the Court of Appeals from the
foregoing judgment insofar as it set aside the sale of the one-half (1/2) share of Concepcion Rallos.
The appellate tribunal, as adverted to earlier, resolved the appeal on November 20, 1964 in favor of
the appellant corporation sustaining the sale in question. 1 The appellee administrator, Ramon
Rallos, moved for a reconsider of the decision but the same was denied in a resolution of March 4,
1965. 2
What is the legal effect of an act performed by an agent after the death of his principal? Applied
more particularly to the instant case, We have the query. is the sale of the undivided share of
Concepcion Rallos in lot 5983 valid although it was executed by the agent after the death of his
principal? What is the law in this jurisdiction as to the effect of the death of the principal on the
authority of the agent to act for and in behalf of the latter? Is the fact of knowledge of the death of
the principal a material factor in determining the legal effect of an act performed after such death?
Before proceedings to the issues, We shall briefly restate certain principles of law relevant to the
matter tinder consideration.
1. It is a basic axiom in civil law embodied in our Civil Code that no one may contract in the name
of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent
him. 3 A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or the legal
representation or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified,
expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by
the other contracting party. 4 Article 1403 (1) of the same Code also provides:
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are justified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who hi - been given no
authority or legal representation or who has acted beyond his powers; ...
Out of the above given principles, sprung the creation and acceptance of the relationship of
agency whereby one party, caged the principal (mandante), authorizes another, called the agent
(mandatario), to act for and in his behalf in transactions with third persons. The essential elements
of agency are: (1) there is consent, express or implied of the parties to establish the relationship; (2)
the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agents acts as a
representative and not for himself, and (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority. 5
Agency is basically personal representative, and derivative in nature. The authority of the agent to
act emanates from the powers granted to him by his principal; his act is the act of the principal if
done within the scope of the authority. Qui facit per alium facit se. "He who acts through another
acts himself". 6
2. There are various ways of extinguishing agency, 7 but her We are concerned only with one cause
— death of the principal Paragraph 3 of Art. 1919 of the Civil Code which was taken from Art. 1709
of the Spanish Civil Code provides:
ART. 1919. Agency is extinguished.
xxx xxx xxx
3. By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the
agent; ... (Emphasis supplied)
By reason of the very nature of the relationship between Principal and agent, agency is extinguished
by the death of the principal or the agent. This is the law in this jurisdiction.  8
Manresa commenting on Art. 1709 of the Spanish Civil Code explains that the rationale for the law
is found in thejuridical basis of agency which is representation Them being an in. integration of the
personality of the principal integration that of the agent it is not possible for the representation to
continue to exist once the death of either is establish. Pothier agrees with Manresa that by reason of
the nature of agency, death is a necessary cause for its extinction. Laurent says that the juridical tie
between the principal and the agent is severed ipso jure upon the death of either without necessity
for the heirs of the fact to notify the agent of the fact of death of the former. 9
The same rule prevails at common law — the death of the principal effects instantaneous and
absolute revocation of the authority of the agent unless the Power be coupled with an
interest. 10 This is the prevalent rule in American Jurisprudence where it is well-settled that a
power without an interest confer. red upon an agent is dissolved by the principal's death, and any
attempted execution of the power afterward is not binding on the heirs or representatives of the
deceased. 11
3. Is the general rule provided for in Article 1919 that the death of the principal or of the agent
extinguishes the agency, subject to any exception, and if so, is the instant case within that
exception? That is the determinative point in issue in this litigation. It is the contention of
respondent corporation which was sustained by respondent court that notwithstanding the death of
the principal Concepcion Rallos the act of the attorney-in-fact, Simeon Rallos in selling the former's
sham in the property is valid and enforceable inasmuch as the corporation acted in good faith in
buying the property in question.
Articles 1930 and 1931 of the Civil Code provide the exceptions to the general rule afore-mentioned.
ART. 1930. The agency shall remain in full force and effect even after the death of the
principal, if it has been constituted in the common interest of the latter and of the
agent, or in the interest of a third person who has accepted the stipulation in his
favor.
ART. 1931. Anything done by the agent, without knowledge of the death of the
principal or of any other cause which extinguishes the agency, is valid and shall be
fully effective with respect to third persons who may have contracted with him in good.
faith.
Article 1930 is not involved because admittedly the special power of attorney executed in favor of
Simeon Rallos was not coupled with an interest.
Article 1931 is the applicable law. Under this provision, an act done by the agent after the death of
his principal is valid and effective only under two conditions, viz: (1) that the agent acted without
knowledge of the death of the principal and (2) that the third person who contracted with the agent
himself acted in good faith. Good faith here means that the third person was not aware of the death
of the principal at the time he contracted with said agent. These two requisites must concur the
absence of one will render the act of the agent invalid and unenforceable.
In the instant case, it cannot be questioned that the agent, Simeon Rallos, knew of the death of his
principal at the time he sold the latter's share in Lot No. 5983 to respondent corporation. The
knowledge of the death is clearly to be inferred from the pleadings filed by Simon Rallos before the
trial court. 12 That Simeon Rallos knew of the death of his sister Concepcion is also a finding of fact
of the court a quo 13 and of respondent appellate court when the latter stated that Simon Rallos
'must have known of the death of his sister, and yet he proceeded with the sale of the lot in the
name of both his sisters Concepcion and Gerundia Rallos without informing appellant (the realty
corporation) of the death of the former. 14
On the basis of the established knowledge of Simon Rallos concerning the death of his principal
Concepcion Rallos, Article 1931 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. The law expressly requires for its
application lack of knowledge on the part of the agent of the death of his principal; it is not enough
that the third person acted in good faith. Thus in Buason & Reyes v. Panuyas, the Court applying
Article 1738 of the old Civil rode now Art. 1931 of the new Civil Code sustained the validity , of a
sale made after the death of the principal because it was not shown that the agent knew of his
principal's demise. 15 To the same effect is the case of Herrera, et al., v. Luy Kim Guan, et al., 1961,
where in the words of Justice Jesus Barrera the Court stated:
... even granting arguemendo that Luis Herrera did die in 1936, plaintiffs presented no
proof and there is no indication in the record, that the agent Luy Kim Guan was aware
of the death of his principal at the time he sold the property. The death 6f the
principal does not render the act of an agent unenforceable, where the latter had no
knowledge of such extinguishment of the agency. (1 SCRA 406, 412)
4. In sustaining the validity of the sale to respondent consideration the Court of Appeals reasoned
out that there is no provision in the Code which provides that whatever is done by an agent having
knowledge of the death of his principal is void even with respect to third persons who may have
contracted with him in good faith and without knowledge of the death of the principal. 16
We cannot see the merits of the foregoing argument as it ignores the existence of the general rule
enunciated in Article 1919 that the death of the principal extinguishes the agency. That being the
general rule it follows a fortiorithat any act of an agent after the death of his principal is void ab
initio unless the same fags under the exception provided for in the aforementioned Articles 1930
and 1931. Article 1931, being an exception to the general rule, is to be strictly construed, it is not to
be given an interpretation or application beyond the clear import of its terms for otherwise the
courts will be involved in a process of legislation outside of their judicial function.
5. Another argument advanced by respondent court is that the vendee acting in good faith relied on
the power of attorney which was duly registered on the original certificate of title recorded in the
Register of Deeds of the province of Cebu, that no notice of the death was aver annotated on said
certificate of title by the heirs of the principal and accordingly they must suffer the consequences of
such omission. 17
To support such argument reference is made to a portion in Manresa's Commentaries which We
quote:
If the agency has been granted for the purpose of contracting with certain persons, the
revocation must be made known to them. But if the agency is general iii nature,
without reference to particular person with whom the agent is to contract, it is
sufficient that the principal exercise due diligence to make the revocation of the
agency publicity known.
In case of a general power which does not specify the persons to whom represents' on
should be made, it is the general opinion that all acts, executed with third persons
who contracted in good faith, Without knowledge of the revocation, are valid. In such
case, the principal may exercise his right against the agent, who, knowing of the
revocation, continued to assume a personality which he no longer had. (Manresa Vol.
11, pp. 561 and 575; pp. 15-16, rollo)
The above discourse however, treats of revocation by an act of the principal as a mode of
terminating an agency which is to be distinguished from revocation by operation of law such as
death of the principal which obtains in this case. On page six of this Opinion We stressed that by
reason of the very nature of the relationship between principal and agent, agency is
extinguished ipso jure upon the death of either principal or agent. Although a revocation of a power
of attorney to be effective must be communicated to the parties concerned, 18 yet a revocation by
operation of law, such as by death of the principal is, as a rule, instantaneously effective inasmuch
as "by legal fiction the agent's exercise of authority is regarded as an execution of the
principal's continuing will. 19 With death, the principal's will ceases or is the of authority is
extinguished.
The Civil Code does not impose a duty on the heirs to notify the agent of the death of the principal
What the Code provides in Article 1932 is that, if the agent die his heirs must notify the principal
thereof, and in the meantime adopt such measures as the circumstances may demand in the
interest of the latter. Hence, the fact that no notice of the death of the principal was registered on
the certificate of title of the property in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is not fatal to the cause of
the estate of the principal
6. Holding that the good faith of a third person in said with an agent affords the former sufficient
protection, respondent court drew a "parallel" between the instant case and that of an innocent
purchaser for value of a land, stating that if a person purchases a registered land from one who
acquired it in bad faith — even to the extent of foregoing or falsifying the deed of sale in his favor —
the registered owner has no recourse against such innocent purchaser for value but only against
the forger. 20
To support the correctness of this respondent corporation, in its brief, cites the case of Blondeau, et
al., v. Nano and Vallejo, 61 Phil. 625. We quote from the brief:
In the case of Angel Blondeau et al. v. Agustin Nano et al., 61 Phil. 630, one Vallejo
was a co-owner of lands with Agustin Nano. The latter had a power of attorney
 supposedly executed by Vallejo Nano in his favor. Vallejo delivered to Nano his land
titles. The power was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. When the
lawyer-husband of Angela Blondeau went to that Office, he found all in order
including the power of attorney. But Vallejo denied having executed the power The
lower court sustained Vallejo and the plaintiff Blondeau appealed. Reversing the
decision of the court a quo, the Supreme Court, quoting the ruling in the case
of Eliason v. Wilborn, 261 U.S. 457, held:
But there is a narrower ground on which the defenses of the defendant-
appellee must be overruled. Agustin Nano had possession of Jose
Vallejo's title papers. Without those title papers handed over to Nano
with the acquiescence of Vallejo, a fraud could not have been
perpetuated. When Fernando de la Canters, a member of the Philippine
Bar and the husband of Angela Blondeau, the principal plaintiff,
searched the registration record, he found them in due form including
the power of attorney of Vallajo in favor of Nano. If this had not been so
and if thereafter the proper notation of the encumbrance could not have
been made, Angela Blondeau would not have sent P12,000.00 to the
defendant Vallejo.' An executed transfer of registered lands placed by the
registered owner thereof in the hands of another operates as a
representation to a third party that the holder of the transfer is
authorized to deal with the land.
As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the
consequence of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act
of coincidence bear the loss. (pp. 19-21)
The Blondeau decision, however, is not on all fours with the case before Us because here We are
confronted with one who admittedly was an agent of his sister and who sold the property of the
latter after her death with full knowledge of such death. The situation is expressly covered by a
provision of law on agency the terms of which are clear and unmistakable leaving no room for an
interpretation contrary to its tenor, in the same manner that the ruling in Blondeau and the cases
cited therein found a basis in Section 55 of the Land Registration Law which in part provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever any voluntary instrument
is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to
the register of deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a memorandum of
registration in accordance with such instruments, and the new certificate or
memorandum Shall be binding upon the registered owner and upon all persons
claiming under him in favor of every purchaser for value and in good faith: Provided
however, That in all cases of registration provided by fraud, the owner may pursue all
his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice,
however, to the right, of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. ... (Act
No. 496 as amended)
7. One last point raised by respondent corporation in support of the appealed decision is an 1842
ruling of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Cassiday v. McKenzie wherein payments made to
an agent after the death of the principal were held to be "good", "the parties being ignorant of the
death". Let us take note that the Opinion of Justice Rogers was premised on the statement that
the parties were ignorant of the death of the principal. We quote from that decision the following:
... Here the precise point is, whether a payment to an agent when the Parties are
ignorant of the death is a good payment. in addition to the case in Campbell before
cited, the same judge Lord Ellenboruogh, has decided in 5 Esp. 117, the general
question that a payment after the death of principal is not good. Thus, a payment of
sailor's wages to a person having a power of attorney to receive them, has been held
void when the principal was dead at the time of the payment. If, by this case, it is
meant merely to decide the general proposition that by operation of law the death of
the principal is a revocation of the powers of the attorney, no objection can be taken to
 it. But if it intended to say that his principle applies where there was 110 notice of
death, or opportunity of twice I must be permitted to dissent from it.
... That a payment may be good today, or bad tomorrow, from the accident
circumstance of the death of the principal, which he did not know, and which by no
possibility could he know? It would be unjust to the agent and unjust to the debtor. In
the civil law, the acts of the agent, done bona fide in ignorance of the death of his
principal are held valid and binding upon the heirs of the latter. The same rule holds
in the Scottish law, and I cannot believe the common law is so unreasonable... (39 Am.
Dec. 76, 80, 81; emphasis supplied)
To avoid any wrong impression which the Opinion in Cassiday v. McKenzie may evoke, mention
may be made that the above represents the minority view in American jurisprudence. Thus
in Clayton v. Merrett, the Court said.—
There are several cases which seem to hold that although, as a general principle,
death revokes an agency and renders null every act of the agent thereafter performed,
yet that where a payment has been made in ignorance of the death, such payment will
be good. The leading case so holding is that of Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 Watts & S. (Pa)
282, 39 Am. 76, where, in an elaborate opinion, this view ii broadly announced. It is
referred to, and seems to have been followed, in the case of Dick v. Page,17 Mo. 234,
57 AmD 267; but in this latter case it appeared that the estate of the deceased
principal had received the benefit of the money paid, and therefore the representative
of the estate might well have been held to be estopped from suing for it again. . . .
These cases, in so far, at least, as they announce the doctrine under discussion, are
exceptional. The Pennsylvania Case, supra (Cassiday v. McKenzie 4 Watts & S. 282,
39 AmD 76), is believed to stand almost, if not quite, alone in announcing the
principle in its broadest scope. (52, Misc. 353, 357, cited in 2 C.J. 549)
So also in Travers v. Crane, speaking of Cassiday v. McKenzie, and pointing out that the opinion,
except so far as it related to the particular facts, was a mere dictum, Baldwin J. said:
The opinion, therefore, of the learned Judge may be regarded more as an extrajudicial
indication of his views on the general subject, than as the adjudication of the Court
upon the point in question. But accordingly all power weight to this opinion, as the
judgment of a of great respectability, it stands alone among common law authorities
and is opposed by an array too formidable to permit us to following it. (15 Cal. 12,17,
cited in 2 C.J. 549)
Whatever conflict of legal opinion was generated by Cassiday v. McKenzie in American
jurisprudence, no such conflict exists in our own for the simple reason that our statute, the Civil
Code, expressly provides for two exceptions to the general rule that death of the principal revokes
ipso jure the agency, to wit: (1) that the agency is coupled with an interest (Art 1930), and (2) that
the act of the agent was executed without knowledge of the death of the principal and the third
person who contracted with the agent acted also in good faith (Art. 1931). Exception No. 2 is the
doctrine followed in Cassiday, and again We stress the indispensable requirement that the agent
acted without knowledge or notice of the death of the principal In the case before Us the agent
Ramon Rallos executed the sale notwithstanding notice of the death of his principal Accordingly, the
agent's act is unenforceable against the estate of his principal.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We set aside the ecision of respondent appellate court, and We
affirm en toto the judgment rendered by then Hon. Amador E. Gomez of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, quoted in pages 2 and 3 of this Opinion, with costs against respondent realty corporation
at all instances.
So Ordered.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Phils.

[G.R. No.162994.  September 17, 2004]

Facts:

Pedro A. Tecson was hired by Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.) as medical representative
on October 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation. Tecson signed a
contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide
by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that if management perceives a
conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employee’s
employment with the company, the management and the employee will explore the
possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or
preparation for employment outside the company after six months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an
employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s
Branch Coordinator in Albay. Despite of warnings, Tecson married Bettsy. The superiors of
Tecson reminded him of the company policy and suggested that either him or Bettsy shall
resign from their respective companies. Tecson requested more time to resolve the issue. In
November of 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to Mindanao area involving the provinces of
Butuan, Surigao and Agusan del Sur. Tecson did not agree to the reassignment and
referred this matter to the grievance committee. It was resolved and was submitted to
voluntary arbitration.

Issue:

Is the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying

employees of any competitor company valid?

Ruling:

Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a

competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Glaxo has a right to
guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are
rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor

companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down
the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility
that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. That Glaxo
possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied.

No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such
a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and
growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social
justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided
in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also
entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
Title: MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, G. R. No. 183622,
February 8, 2012

FACTS: Deceased Orlando B. Catalan is a naturalized American citizen. After he obtained a US

divorce for his first marriage with Felicitas Amor, he subsequently contracted a second marriage
with herein petitioner Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan.
Felicitas, thereafter, filed a bigamy case against Merope for having contracted a second
marriage with her husband despite an existing marriage to one Eusebio Bristol.
Sometime in 1998, the RTC acquitted Merope of bigamy . It ruled that since the deceased
was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under the Philippine
jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. Furthermore, it found out that
petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.
Sometime in 2004, Orlando died inestate in the Philippines. Thus, on February 28, 2005,
petitioner filed a petition for the. Pending said petition, herein respondent, one of the children of
Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition. The two cases were subsequently
consolidated.
Respondent questioned the legal standing of the petitioner to file such an action. She alleged
that Merope cannot be considered as an interested person to qualified to file such action since she
was never considered married to the deceased by virtue of the decision of the RTC on the bigamy
case.
On June 26, 2006, the trial court dismissed the petition filed by petitioner and granted that
of the respondent. It held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and
subsisting when she married Orlando, and went on to say that petitioner was not an interested
party to file such petition.
Hence, the petitioner went to the CA armed with a marriage certificate of her marriage with
Orlando. However, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari she filed and ruled that a marriage
certificate, like any public document, is only a prima facie evidence of facts stated therein. In
addition the CA stated that the deduction of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Merope, being the second wife of the deceased Orlando, has a
legal standing on filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of the latter notwithstanding the deduction of the trial court
that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage
with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her.

HELD: Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law, as a matter
of comity; provided further that before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary
in the prosecution or defense of an action.” It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative
In this case, the US divorce obtained by Orlando, a naturalized American citizen, for his
marriage with Felicitas may be recognized in the Philippines.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s
divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence
to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the
preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of
administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
deceased.
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, - versus -LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,
Feb. 8, 2012

Facts:
 Case is for issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
 Orlando Catalan – naturalized American citizen.
 After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the US from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted
a second marriage with petitioner herein.
 18 Nov 2004 – Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
 28 Feb 2005 – Petitioner filed a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando.
 3 Mar 2005 – respondent (one of the children from Orlando’s first marriage), filed a similar
petition.
 Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando.
o In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was
filed against petitioner, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to
Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December
1959.
 6 Aug 1998 – RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy on the ground that the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and
since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage
between him and petitioner was not valid.
o Furthermore, the court found that petitioner had never been married to Eusebio
Bristol.
 26 June 2006, Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner was
dismissed.
o Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy
case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an
interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
 CA denied appeal.

Issue:
1) WON Petitioner has proven her divorce with Eusebio Bristol, allowing her to validly marry
the deceased.
Held:
1) No. Evidence of the official documents of divorce was not presented.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial
Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
Ratio:
 Our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. (Citing
Van Dorn v Romillo Jr.)
 Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v.
Recio.
o Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must
first be presented and admitted in evidence.
o A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
o The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.
o Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
 (1) an official publication or
 (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
o If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
 (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and
 (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
o The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
o Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only
to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.
 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.
 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
 Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
o The burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.”
 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of
the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters.
 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
o It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.
 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
 Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed
to know by reason of their judicial function.
 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
 In the case at bar, the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the US and the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased.
G.R. Nos. L-50441-42 September 18, 1980
ALENJANDRO RAS, petitioner, vs.
HON. JAINAL D. RASUL, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Basilan, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 
TEEHANKEE, J.:
This is a petition brought by the petitioner to review and set aside the order of
respondent Judge dated December 12, 1978 in Criminal Case No. 240 of the Court of First
Instance of Basilan denying petitioner's motion as accused therein to suspend proceedings
due to the existence of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 73 of the same court.
Finding the petition and the Solicitor General's concurrence therewith to be meritorious,
this Court hereby grants the petition and accordingly sets aside the questioned order and
hereby enjoins the respondent Judge from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 73
until Civil Case No. 240 is finally decided and terminated.
A chronological statement of the antecedent facts follows:
On or about April 27, 1978, Luis Pichel filed a complaint against petitioner Alejandro Ras
and a certain Bienvenido Martin before the Court of First Instance of Basilan, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 73 praying for the nullification of the deed of sale executed by
Alejandro Ras in favor of his codefendant Bienvenido Martin and for the declaration of the
prior deed of sale allegedly executed in his favor by the defendant Alejandro Ras as valid.
In their answer, the defendants (the Ras spouses) alleged that they never sold the property
to Pichel and that the signatures appearing in the deed of sale in favor of plaintiff Pichel (in
Civil Case No. 73) were forgeries and that therefore the alleged deed of sale in Pichel's favor
sought to be declared valid was fictitious and inexistent.
While Civil Case No. 73 was being tried before the Court of First Instance of Basilan, the
Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed on or about September 5, 1978 an Information for Estafa
in the same court against Alejandro Ras arising from the same alleged double sale subject
matter of the civil complaint filed by Luis Pichel. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 240 of the Court of First Instance of Basilan.
On November 6, 1978, petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion for Suspension of
Action" in said Criminal Case No. 240 claiming that the same facts and issues were
involved in both the civil and criminal case and that the resolution of the issues in the civil
case would necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed his opposition on December 4, 1978.
In his Order of December 12, 1978, the respondent judge saw no prejudicial question and
accordingly denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the
court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or
tribunal 1 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 2
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension
of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil, it must appear not only that
the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal pro. prosecution is based,
but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessary
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 3
On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against petitioner and
in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a
prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras' defense
(as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale
in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witness in the criminal
case) is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner
Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of
Pichel is void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be
innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to
proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally
decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and
spurious.
The Solicitor General in his comment expressed his concurrence with the petition thus:
"The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 73
that he had never sold the property in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his
signatures in the alleged deed of and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is,
therefore, necessary that the truth or falsity of such claim be first determined because if his
claim is true, then he did not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed. The
question of nullity of the sale is distinct and from the crime of estafa (alleged double sale)
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein
petitioner in the c action."
Wherefore, the Order of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 240 dated December 12,
1978 is hereby set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 16,
1979 is hereby made permanent and respondent judge is enjoined from proceeding with the
arraignment and trial of Criminal Case No. 240 until and unless Civil Case No. 73 shall
have been finally decided and terminated adversely against petitioner. No costs.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.