Frank Colmenar, In His Capacity As An Heir Of The Late Francisco Colmenar Vs.

Apollo
A. Colmenar, Et Al. G.R. No. 252467. June 21, 2021

Facts:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Order dated May 22, 2020 of the Regional Trial
Court dismissing the complaint of petitioner Frank Colmenar for declaration of nullity of deeds of extrajudicial
settlement of estate, deeds of sale, cancellation of titles, and damages on the ground that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action as against them. In dismissing the case, the trial court applied the 2019 Amendments to the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure even though it was allegedly not feasible and it caused injustice to petitioner.

Petitioner is the second child of Francisco Colmenar who was divorced to his mother, after the latter died, he learned
that Appollo, Jeanie, and Victoria Colmenar executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Francisco Jesus Colmenar,
and another Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Francisco Jesus Colmenar and Loida Colmenar, where they
made it appear that they were the surviving heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, and by virtue thereof, allocated unto
themselves the interests of his late father in the aforesaid properties.

The subject property then sold to Crisanta Realty, and PEC. These sale were made without petitioners knowledge, which
deprived him of his successional rights under Philippine laws as a legitimate son of his late father.

Allegedly, the sale to PEC was void because the respondents are not the heirs of Francisco, hence, had no rightful
claim and interest over the property.

ProFriends invoked as affirmative defense lack of cause of action, while PEC and Crisanta Realty, averred that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action against them. They also invoked the following common defenses: (1) they
are innocent purchasers for value; and (2) petitioner's claim is barred by laches and/or prescription.

Apollo and Amaia, on the other hand, filed their respective motions to dismiss. Amaia, like PEC and Crisanta Realty,
averred that the complaint stated no cause of action against it and that it was a buyer in good faith.

Crisanta Realty and PEC then filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Set the Case for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative
Defenses (Motion for Leave of Court).

On April 1, 2019, judge Pascua of the RTC granted the aforesaid motion and set the affirmative defense hearing.

Judge Gil, however, set aside the April 1, 2019 order and deemed PEC and Crisanta Realty's Motion for Leave of Court, as
well as Apollo and Amaia's respective motions to dismiss, submitted for resolution.

On Feb. 12, 2020, Judge Gil issued an omnibus order, denying the motion to dismiss, and the motion to hear
affirmative defenses on the ground that the issues raised by the Defendants are complex and the matters raised are
evidentiary, which can be best threshed out during trial.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, and Judge Gil dismissed the complaint against respondents on the
ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against them.

Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court against the assailed Order dated May 22, 2020. He faults Judge Gill
for applying the 2019 Rules on Civil Procedure to the case, and based thereon, motu proprio acted on the affirmative
defenses of respondent companies despite the clear injustice it caused to him.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao v. Prudencio, held that the lack of specific allegation in the complaint that
respondent companies acquired the properties in bad faith does not equate to failure to state a cause of action against
them.

Main (related issue to the topic) Issue:

Did the trial court commit reversible error when it applied the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure (now known as the 2019 Rules of Procedure) to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by respondent
companies?

Ruling:

Yes. The trial court committed a reversible error when it applied the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure.
As worded, the 2019 Amendments shall also govern all pending cases commenced before they took effect on May 1,
2020, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work
injustice, in which case, the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern. Here, the case commenced with
the filing of the complaint in September 2018 and remained pending when the 2019 Amendments took effect.

The records though readily show that when Judge Gill motu proprio resolved the affirmative defenses on May 22, 2020,
the prescribed thirty (30) day period had long expired. ProFriends filed 1ts answer with affirmative defense in
December 2018; PEC and Crisanta Realty on January 3, 2019; and Amaia on February 27, 2020. Judge Gill should have,
therefore, desisted from applying the 2019 Amendments to the case below, specifically SECTION 12, RULE 8 thereof,
because when she did, the same was no longer feasible.( The court shall motu proprio resolve the affirmative
defenses within thirty (30) calendar days from the filing of the answer.)

The worst part is when Judge Gill ignored the injustice caused by the application of the 2019 Amendments to the case.
For as a consequence, petitioner lost his substantial right to be heard on the common affirmative defense of PEC,
Crisanta Realty, and Amaia, and his right to seek a reconsideration of the order of dismissal which were both granted
him under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.

Issue on the failure to state a cause of action

Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank[58] further explained:

Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not interchangeable. It may
be observed that lack of cause of action is not among the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

The dismissal of a Complaint for lack of cause of action is based on Section 1 of Rule 33, which provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. - After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may
move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion
is denied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be made before a responsive pleading is filed;
and the issue can be resolved only on the basis of the allegations in the initiatory pleading. On the other hand, if the
Complaint lacks a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be filed after the plaintiff has rested its case.

Cause of action Essential Requisites:

(a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;

(b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and

(c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to
a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

Here, assuming the foregoing allegations to be true, petitioner as legitimate child and lawful heir of Francisco Jesus
Colmenar has the right to the relief prayed for. i.e., to declare as void the extrajudicial settlement of estate effected by
the individual respondents who, not being lawful heirs of his father, had no legal right to settle the estate; and to declare
as void the subsequent deeds of sale executed by these individual respondents in favor of respondent companies which
consequently also did not derive any valid title from the individual respondents.
Jose Lino Luna Vs. Eulogio Rodriguez And Servando De Los Angeles, Eulogio Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-12647

Facts:

The first question, presented by this appeal, is, Did the opinion of the judge, which he signed on the 14th day of January,
1917, become the decision of the court on the 17th day of January, 1917, the date on which it was filed with the clerk of
the court? If it did, then the other questions presented by the appellant must be decided now. If it did not, then there is
no decision in this case, and the record must be returned to the court whence it came with direction to proceed to a
new trial and to render a judgment in accordance with the law.

These proceedings grew out of an election contest for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal. A protest was duly
presented, an answer was filed, and a trial was had which closed on the 5th day of October, 1916, and the cause was
submitted to the court for decision. The record shows that the opinion of the judge was signed by him on the 14th day
of January, 1917, but was not filed with the clerk of the court until the 17th day of January, 1917. Notice of said opinion
was given to the respective parties on the 17th day of January, 1917.

Issue:

Whether the signed opinion of Judge Baretto is clothed with a color of right to promulgate judgement.

Ruling:

No. Judge Baretto is neither a de jure nor de facto judge at the time he signed his opinion to the election protest.

The appellant alleges that at the time said opinion was filed and the decision promulgated, the judge who wrote the
opinion was not then judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal. We think the proposition will not be
denied, if, at the time the said opinion was promulgated as the decision of the court, the judge was not then a judge
either de jure or de facto, that said decision was null and void. The appellant asserts that the judge who wrote the
opinion was not judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal at the time said opinion was filed with the
clerk; that he had theretofore vacated his office as judge of said court and had become "Secretary of Finance," in the
executive department of the Government. These are the facts which constituted the basis of the motion for a new trial
presented by the appellant in the court below and the facts which he desired an opportunity to prove.

In order that a court may promulgate a legal decision or judgment two things are essential and necessary: (a) There must
be a court legally organized or constituted; and (b) there must be a judge, or judges, legally appointed or elected and
actually acting, either de jure or de facto. If either of these essentials is absent then the judgment promulgated is a
nullity. If there is no legal court there can be no legal judgment. The same is true if there is no judge. It is sufficient that
there has been a judge of the court. There must be no one actually acting either de jure or de facto.

It is essential element to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that he is actually acting under some color of right. If
he has ceased to be judge by actually accepting and entering into some other office and has actually entered upon the
performance of the duties of the other office, it is difficult to understand how he can still be considered as actually
occupying and performing the duties of the office which he had abandoned and vacated. An abandonment and a
vacation of an office is inconsistent and repugnant to the idea of actually continuing to perform the duties of such office.
There may be cases, however, where the judge de jure has been appointed or elected to some other office and has
accepted said other office without actually entering upon the performance of the duties of the other office and
continues to act as judge. In such a case he will be considered as a judge de facto. (Woolside vs. Wagg, 71 Me., 207.) If
he actually enters into the other office and commences the performance of the duties of the other office and ceases to
act as judge, then certainly he cannot be considered either a judge de jure or a judge de facto.

Section 13 of Act 867 makes provision in certain cases by which the judge may sign a final judgment when he is outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the particular court. Said section provides that "it shall be lawful for him (a judge), if the
case was heard and duly argued or an opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel in the proper
province, to prepare his judgment after he has left the province and to send the same back properly signed, to the clerk
of the court, to be entered in the court as of the day when the same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if
the judge had been present in court to direct the entry of the judgment." It will be noted that said section permits a
judge to prepare his judgment "after he has left the province;" but there is no provision permitting him to prepare his
judgment after he has quit the office of judge. It further provides that the opinion so prepared does not become a
judgment of the court until "the day when the same was received by the clerk," with the further provision that it is then
received as a judgment in the same manner as if the judge had been present personally. Now, if the conditions exist
which would prevent him from being present in court on said day when the opinion is received by the clerk, by reason of
his having left the office of judge, by resignation, or death, or otherwise, then it must follow that no such judgment can
be valid. The presumption of his presence stated by the law, in the face of the fact of the impossibility of his presence as
judge, destroys absolutely the possibility of such an opinion becoming a decision of the court.
Cipriano P. Primicias Vs. Felicisimo Ocampo, As Judge-At-Large Presiding Over Branch C Of The Court Of First
Instance Of Manila And Eugenio Angeles, As City Fiscal Of Manila, Representing The People Of The
Philippines, G.R. No. L-6120 June 30, 1953

Facts:

This is a petition which seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of two criminal cases which
were then pending against petitioner without the assistance of assessors in accordance with the provisions of section 49
of Republic Act No. 409 in relation to section 154 of Act No. 190, and as an auxiliary remedy, to have a writ of
preliminary injunction issued so that the trial may be held pending until further orders of this court.

This petition was originally filed with the Court of Appeals, but was later certified to this court on the ground that the
main basis of the petition is section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of
Manila, approved on June 18, 1949, and respondents assail the constitutionality of said section in that it contravenes the
constitutional provision that the rules of court "shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade . . . .(Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution.).

Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses, in that he failed to
submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and
failed to obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign
port.

On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed to
assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No.
409, which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the
Court of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure."

This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for the People of the Philippines.

On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with the promulgation of the Rules
of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but expressly repealed, that the
Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the portions of the Code of Civil
Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49 of Republic Act
No. 409 on the provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage. Believing that this order is
erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.

Issue:

Whether the right of petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right, and the duty of the
court to provide assessors is mandatory.

Ruling:

Yes.

The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old
Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court. This is so because in said SECTION 154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a party litigant. SECTION
2477 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a manner that a similar right is implied when invoked by a
party litigant. It says that the aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. And this right
has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked.

Thus, it was there said that these provisions "necessarily lead to the conclusion that the intervention of the assessors is
not an empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or the spirit of the law. It is another
security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without
vitiating all the proceedings. Were we to agree that for one reason or another the trial by assessors may be done away
with, the same line of reasoning would force us to admit that the parties litigant may be deprived of their right to be
represented by counsel, to appear and be present at the hearings, and so on, to the extent of omitting the trial in a civil
case, and thus set at naught the essential rights granted by the law to the parties, with consequent nullity of the
proceedings."

The contention of respondents — we reckon — is predicated on the assumption that the provisions on assessors of the
Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed. Such is not the case. We have already pointed out that the basic
provisions on the matter partake of the nature of substantive law and as such they were left intact by the Supreme
Court. The corollary to this conclusion is that this remedy may be invoked out only in Manila but in all other places
where it existed prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Court. This is true in civil cases. With regard to criminal cases,
we have already said that the same remedy may be invoked in the cities of Cebu, Iloilo and Quezon, with the
particularity that their charters make express reference, either directly or indirectly, to the provisions of the code of Civil
Procedure. With this historical background, the claim that under the theory we have entertained the trial with the aid of
assessors can only be invoked in the City of Manila is certainly without merit.

SUBSTANTIVE LAW- deals with people’s rights and responsibilities. For example, substantive law dictates the kind of
punishment that someone may receive upon being convicted at the conclusion of his criminal trial. Substantive law also
defines types of crimes and their severity.
Gios-Samar, Inc., Represented By Its Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao Vs. Department Of
Transportation And Communications And Civil Aviation Authority Of The Philippines G.R. No. 217158.
March 12, 2019

Facts:

The 1987 Constitution and the Rules of Court promulgated, pursuant to its provisions, granted us original jurisdiction
over certain cases. In some instances, this jurisdiction is shared with Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) and the Court of
Appeals (CA). However, litigants do not have unfettered discretion to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction. The
doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct recourse to this Court is allowed only to resolve questions of law,
notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is not mere
policy, rather, it is a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more
fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land.

On December 15, 2014, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and its attached agency, the
Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), issued its Invitation to Pre-qualify and bid on the airport
development, operations and maintenance of six key regional air ports, which has a total cost of P116.23 Billion.
According to respondents, this project will be accomplished through a concession agreement with a private section
and will last for 30 years. It will be awarded through competitive bidding, in accordance with the procurement rules
and procedure prescribe under Republic Act No. 6957 as amended by RA No. 7718 (BOT Law) and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations. On March 10, 2015, DOTC and CAAP issued the Instructions to Prospective Bidders (ITPB),
which provided the general procedure. In the ITBP, the projects were bundled into two, which allows prospective
bidders to bid for only Bundle 1 or Bundle 2, or bid for both Bundles. The Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) will have its policy which would determine whether a prospective bidder may be awarded both
bundles or with only one bundle. Before the actual submission of the Pre-Qualification of Queries and Qualification
Documents, Gios-Samar, suing as a taxpayer filed a petition for prohibition. Petitioner sought direct recourse before the
Supreme Court, invoking the transcendental importance of the issue.

Petitioner in its petition assailed the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and sought to enjoin the DOTC and
the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding. In its petition, Gios-Samar raised that bundling of the Projects violated
the constitutional prohibitions the ANTI-DUMMY AND THE GRANT OF OPPORTUNITY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC TO
INVEST in public utilities under Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

It alleged that bundling would allow companies with questionable or shaky financial background to have direct
access to the Projects by simply joining a consortium, which under the bundling scheme adopted by the DOTC said
Projects. Furthermore, assailed act of respondents violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies under Section
19, Article XII of the Constitution because it would allow one winning bidder to operate and maintain several airports
thus establishing a monopoly and bundling will allow undue restraint of trade, since it will effectively placed the
projects beyond the reach of a medium-sized Filipino companies.

The petitioner also asserted that PBAC of the DOTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction when it bundled the projects without legal authority. Lastly, it raised that bundling made a mockery of public
bidding. To counter the arguments raised by the petitioner, respondent DOTC asserted that petition raises no justiciable
question, since the petition is premature and there was no actual bidding yet. It also stated in its comment that
petitioner Gios-Samar has no legal standing to file the suit.

Respondent countered that allegation on the violation of anti-dummy and equal opportunity clauses of the
Constitution are speculative and conjectural. It also said that Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution is not
applicable to the bidding process assailed by petitioner. The bundling of the Projects does not violate the prohibitions on
monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade and the DOTC and CAAP did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In addition to DOTC’s defense, CAAP claimed that petition failed to adhere to
fundamental principle of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Moreover, it asserted that petition failed to invoke any
special and compelling reason to seek direct recourse from the Court. Since petitioner raises factual issues, in which it
must be filed first in a trial court.

Issue:

Whether the case filed is under the exemption of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Ruling:

The three above argument of the petitioner must be dismissed for failure to sufficiently plead a cause of action. Even
assuming that petitioner's causes of action were properly alleged, the resolution of said issues would still require the
determination of factual issues which this Court simply cannot undertake.

Hierarchy of courts is a constitutional imperative

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts recognizes the various levels of courts in the country as they are established under
the Constitution and by law, their ranking and effect of their rulings in relation with one another, and how these
different levels of court interact with one another. It determines the venues of appeals and the appropriate forum for
the Issuance of extraordinary writs.

Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts also proceeds from considerations of due process. While the term
"due process of law" evades exact and concrete definition, this Court, in one of its earliest decisions, referred to it as a
law which hears before it condemns which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It means that
every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society. Under the present Rules of Court, which governs our judicial proceedings, warring factual allegations of parties
are settled through presentation of evidence. Evidence is the means of ascertaining, in a judicial proceeding, the truth
respecting a matter of fact: As earlier demonstrated, the Court cannot accept evidence in the first instance. By directly
filing a case before the Court, litigants necessarily deprive themselves of the oportunity to completely pursue or defend
their causes of actions. Their right to due process is effectively undermined by their own doing.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts as a filtering mechanism

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates to: (1) prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; (2) prevent further overcrowding of the
Court's docket; and (3) prevent the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases
which often have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as
the court better equipped to resolve factual questions.

Aside from the special civil actions over which it has original Jurisdiction, the Court, through the years, has allowed
litigants to seek direct relief from it upon allegation of "serious and important reasons." The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections (Diocese) summarized these circumstances in this wise:

(1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time;

(2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance;

(3) cases of first impression;

(4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court;

(5) exigency in certain situations;

(6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;

(7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom of
expression; [and]

(8) the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."

To be clear, the transcendental importance doctrine does not clothe us with the power to tackle factual questions and
play the role of a trial court. The only circumstance when we may take cognizance of a case in the first instance, despite
the presence of factual issues, is in the exercise of our constitutionally-expressed task to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the President's proclamation of MARTIAL LAW UNDER Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The case before us does not fall under this exception.
Ernesto Dy Vs. Hon. Gina M. Bibat- Palamos, In Her Capacity As Presiding Judge Of The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City, And Orix Metro Leasing And Finance Corporation G.R. No.
196200 September 11, 2013

Facts:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure questions the December 13, 2010
and March 7, 2011 Orders of the RTC, granting the motion for execution of petitioner, but denying his prayer for the
return of his cargo vessel in the condition when the possession thereof was seized from him.

Petitioners were the proprietors of Limchia Enterprises which was engaged in the shipping business. In 1990, Limchia
Enterprises, with Lourdes as co-maker, obtained a loan from Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (respondent)
to fund its acquisition of M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel. As additional security for the loan, Limchia Enterprises executed the
Deed of Chattel Mortgage over M/V Pilar-I.

Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I was attacked by pirates, Spouses Dy failed to make the scheduled
payments as required in their promissory note. After receiving several demand letters from respondent, Spouses Dy
applied for the restructuring of their loan. Meanwhile, Lourdes issued several checks to cover the remainder of their
loan but the same were dishonored by the bank, prompting respondent to institute a criminal complaint for violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law. Lourdes appealed to respondent with a new proposal to update their outstanding loan
obligations.

On August 18, 1992, respondent filed the Complaint and Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred Ship
Mortgage under PD. 1521 with Urgent Prayer for Attachment with the RTC. Following the filing of an affidavit of merit
and the posting of bond by respondent, the RTC ordered the seizure of M/V Pilar-I and turned over its possession to
respondent. On September 28, 1994, respondent transferred all of its rights, title to and interests, as mortgagee, in M/V
Pilar-I to Colorado Shipyard Corporation (Colorado).

On July 31, 1997, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Dy, ruling that they had not yet defaulted on their loan
because respondent agreed to a restructured schedule of payment. There being no default, the foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage on M/V Pilar-I was premature. The RTC ordered that the vessel be returned to Spouses Dy.

This was affirmed by the CA, with the modification that Spouses Dy be ordered to reimburse the respondent for repair
and dry docking expenses while the vessel was in the latter’s possession.

On appeal, the Court promulgated its Decision, upholding the findings of the CA but deleting the order requiring Spouses
Dy to reimburse respondent.

Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment with the RTC. In the intervening period, Colorado filed
its Manifestation/Motion, informing the RTC that M/V Pilar-I, which was in its possession, had sustained severe damage
and deterioration and had sunk in its shipyard because of its exposure to the elements.
For this reason, it sought permission from the court to cut the sunken vessel into pieces, sell its parts and deposit
the proceeds in escrow. However, in his comment/objection, petitioner insisted that he had the right to require that
the vessel be returned to him in the same condition that it had been at the time it was wrongfully seized by
respondent or, should it no longer be possible, that another vessel of the same tonnage, length and beam similar to
that of M/V Pilar-I be delivered. Colorado, however, objected to the petitioner’s demand, and that petitioner should it
be done at the expense of the party adjudged by the court to pay the same.

The RTC granted the motion for execution but denying petitioner’s prayer for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same state
in which it was taken by respondent.

In so resolving, the RTC ratiocinated:

First, the judgment of the Supreme Court does not require the delivery of M/V Pilar in the state the defendants
wanted it to be. Secondly, said judgment has now become final and it is axiomatic that after judgment has become
executory, the court cannot amend the same, except: x x x None of the three circumstances where a final and
executory judgment may be amended is present in this case. And third, the present deplorable state of M/V Pilar
certainly did not happen overnight, thus, defendants should have brought it to the attention of this Court, the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court after it became apparent. Their inaction until after the judgment has become final,
executory and immutable rendered whatever right they may have to remedy the situation to be nugatory.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the case should be exempted under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts?

Ruling:
Yes.

The case falls under one of the exceptions for the court to take cognizance of it under its original jurisdiction under Rule
65. The 20 years it took for the court to adjudge the case warrants the relaxation of the rules.

oUnder the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme Court is a
court of last resort.

It must remain to be so in order for it to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and
prevent the overcrowding of its docket.

oNonetheless, the invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain
instances on the ground of special and important reasons such as:

(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader
interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and
compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.
After having been deprived of his vessel for almost two decades, through no fault of his own, it would be the height
of injustice to permit there turn of M/V Pilar-I to petitioner in pieces, especially after a judgment by this very same
Court ordering respondent to restore possession of the vessel to petitioner. To do so would leave petitioner with
nothing but a hollow and illusory victory for although the Court ruled in his favor and declared that respondent
wrongfully took possession of his vessel, he could no longer enjoy the beneficial use of his extremely deteriorated
vessel that it is no longer seaworthy and has no other commercial value but for the sale of its parts as scrap.

Doctrine of Immutability of judgement- When a judgment becomes final and executory, it is made immutable and
unalterable, meaning it can no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this
Court.
Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili Vs. Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Presiding Judge, Rtc, Branch 8, Marawi
City A.M. No. Rtj-10-2225 September 6, 2011
(Formerly A.M. Oca I.P.I. No. 09-3182-Rtj)

Facts:

FACTS:

Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili (Atty. Cabili) was counsel of the Heirs of Jesus Ledesma in the latters action for damages against
the Mindanao State University (MSU) and others arising from the death of the late Jesus Ledesma in Civil Case 06-254 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 6.

The RTC rendered judgment against the defendants, including MSU, ordering them to pay damages to the Heirs. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision which became final and executory. Eventually, on motion of
the Heirs, on March 6, 2009 the RTC Branch 6 caused the issuance of a writ of execution against the defendants.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) belatedly filed an opposition to the issuance of the writ, resulting in its denial
on the ground of mootness of the motion. Meantime, the Sheriff of Branch 6, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje, served a notice
of garnishment on MSUs funds with the Land Bank of the Philippines Marawi City Branch by reason of MSUs failure to
obey the writ.

On April 1, 2009, to prevent seizure of its Land Bank deposits that it needed for operations, MSU filed a special civil
action of prohibition and mandamus with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and,
subsequently, a preliminary injunction before the RTC Branch 8, presided over by respondent acting presiding judge,
Judge Rasad G. Balindong, against Land Bank and Sheriff Gaje.

In its petition, MSU averred that it is a state university, funded by appropriations law enacted by Congress; that despite
OSG opposition to the issuance of a writ of execution against it, such writ was issued and Sheriff Gaje garnished upon
MSUs deposits with Land Bank, who in turn gave notice to MSU that it was putting on hold the sum of P2,726,189.90 on
its deposit in Account 2002-0000-35; that, this money being government funds, Sheriff Gaje was executing on the same
in violation of Commission on Audit (COA) Circular 2001-002 dated July 31, 2001 and SC Administrative Circular 10-2000;
and that unless restrained, the garnishment of government fund would disrupt MSUs operations.

After due hearing, Judge Balindong issued a TRO, enjoining Land Bank and Sheriff Gaje from proceeding with the
garnishment of the MSU deposit with Land Bank. To determine whether the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
was warranted, Judge Balindong heard the parties and required them to submit memoranda.

Instead of submitting a memorandum, Sheriff Gaje filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that RTC Branch 8 had no
jurisdiction to issue an injunction order against another court of equal rank. Finding merit, on April 28, 2009 Judge
Balindong issued an Order, dismissing the petition. For having initially taken cognizance of the case and issuing a TRO,
Atty. Cabili filed the present administrative action Judge Balindong for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
authority, abuse of discretion and/or grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial service.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found ground to hold Judge Balindong guilty of gross ignorance of the law
for interfering with the judgment of a co-equal court. It recommended the imposition of a fine of P40,000.00 on Judge
Balindong with a stern warning against a future offense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Balindong acted with gross ignorance of the law when he issued the TRO, pending hearing on the
application for preliminary injunction that enjoined Sheriff Gaje from garnishing MSUs Congress-appropriated operating
funds for the satisfaction of the judgment of RTC Branch 6.

HELD:

YES.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an
elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or
orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.

The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and
renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in
connection with this judgment.
Judge Balindong clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain Sheriff Gaje
from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the
garnishment of the amount of P2,726,189.90 from MSUs account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch.

The respondent Judge was aware that he was acting on matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a
co-equal and coordinate court since he even quoted MSUs allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order. The respondent Judge
should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on
any question on the enforcement of the writ of execution.

Judge Balindong was declared by the Supreme Court ignorant of the law.
Rosario Mas Vs.Elisa Dumara-Og And Benigno Abalajon G.R. No. L-16252 September 29, 1964

Facts:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Antique dismissing Rosario Mas' complaint for
annulment of the judgment Of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in its Civil Case No. 4284.

It appears that on February 26, 1957, Elisa Dumara-og and Benigno Abalajon filed against said Rosario Mas, in the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, an action for the recovery of a sum of money. On the basis of a confession of judgment signed
by Rosario, decision was rendered in favor of Elisa and Benigno.

The same having become final and executory, the former's properties located in Sebalom, Antique, were levied on
execution. And the legal requirements having been observed, the aforesaid parcels of land were sold to the latter as the
highest bidders in a public auction sale.

(Two years after the judgment had been rendered), Rosario Mas instituted in CFI of Antique this complaint imputing
fraud and deceit to Elisa and Benigno in the obtainment of the aforesaid judgment. The said complaint alleged that they
had been made to sign the confession of judgment through deceit and misrepresentation.

As affirmative defense thereto, and as a basis for the motion to dismiss, defendants averred that the Court of First
Instance of Antique had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action; that the action should be filed with the
same court that had rendered the controverted judgment.

The complaint was dismissed accordingly. Hence, this appeal.

The dismissal is allegedly erroneous because the instant action falls under Section 44 (a) of Republic Act No. 296 as
amended, which places such kind of actions within the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance; and considering
Section 50 of the same republic act, the Court of First Instance of Antique, the 11th Judicial District is the proper court
within which to file such action. It is also urged that the instant action being a personal action 2 venue thereof is
governed by Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court (at present Sec. 2(b), Rule 4, Rules of Court) which rule Rosario Mas has
observed.

Appellees' answer to the assigned errors rests on the principle that Courts of First Instance are co-equal and coordinate;
that courts of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction cannot by injunction, interfere with each other's judgments.

Issue:

Whether or not the annulment of judgement should be filed in the same court where the decision is rendered.

Ruling:

No.

The principle has been announced that a judge of a branch of one court should not annul the order of a judge of another
branch of the same court (meaning the same judicial district) because both of them are judges of the same category who
act coordinately and independently of each other — except of course, if the second judge acts in the place of the first
judge in the same proceedings.

Appellant's statement that the action is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance is correct, and that the
venue is within the 11th Judicial District. However, it is incorrect to lay as premise, the proposition that the Court of First
Instance of Antique is the 11th Judicial District. The true statement is that it is one of the branches of the 11th District.
Another of its several branches is the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. These two courts are of the same class and
category. Both discharge functions which are co-equal in character. Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. For the
same reason, the power to open, modify or vacate a judgment is not only possessed by, but is restricted to the court in
which the judgment was rendered.
Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc., Petitioner, Vs. Alfonso O. Pineda, Jr., And Josephine C. Pineda
G.R. No. 227147. July 30, 2018

FACTS:

Petitioner extended a loan to respondents, as evidenced by a Promissory Note, in the amount of P557,808.00. Notably,
the Promissory Note states that "any action to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall exclusively be
brought in the proper court within the National Capital Judicial Region or in any place where Radiowealth Finance
Company, Inc. has a branch/office, at its sole option."Due to respondents' default, petitioner demanded payment of the
whole remaining balance of the loan, which stood at P510,132.00. As the demand went unheeded, petitioner filed the
instant suit for sum of money and damages with application for a Writ of Replevin before the RTC, further alleging that it
has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal.

In an Order, the RTC issued a Writ of Replevin. However, in an Amended Order, the RTC recalled the
Writ of Replevin and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of  jurisdiction. It pointed out
that since:

(a) petitioner's principal place of business is in Mandaluyong City,Metro Manila; and

(b) respondents' residence is in Porac, Pampanga, it has no jurisdiction over any of the party-litigants, warranting the
dismissal of the complaint. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but denied, hence, this petition

ISSUES:

1.Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

2.Whether or not the venue has been properly laid.

RULINGS:

1.No. The RTC is not correct in dismissing the petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction."Jurisdiction is
defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. In addition to being conferred by
the· Constitution and the law, the rule is settled that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character of the relief sought
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted." This is markedly different from the
concept of venue, which only pertains to the place or geographical location where a case is filed. . Jurisdiction is amatter
of substantive law, while venue is a matter of procedural law..

2.Yes. The venue has been properly laid.

On the other hand, venue is "the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought." In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A party's
objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer; otherwise the objection shall be deemed waived.

Wrong venue is merely a procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional impediment. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive
law, while venue is a matter of procedural law.

In this case, petitioner filed a complaint for, inter alia, sum of money involving the amount of P510,132.00. Pursuant to
Section 19 (8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended by Section 5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7691, the RTC
irrefragably has jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. Thus, it erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground
of its purported lack of jurisdiction.