MCDP 3 Expeditionary Operations

MCDP 3
Expeditionary
Operations
U.S. Marine Corps
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
PCN 142 000009 00

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20380-1775
16 April 1998
FOREWORD
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 3, Expedition-

ary Operations, establishes doctrine for the conduct of mili-
tary operations by the U.S. Marine Corps. It describes the
Marine Corps as an expeditionary force-in-readiness that is
manned, trained, and equipped specifically to respond quickly
to a broad variety of crises and conflicts across the full range
of military operations anywhere in the world. It emphasizes
the naval character of Marine Corps forces. This naval expe-
ditionary character provides capabilities both to forward-
deploy forces near the scene of potential crises as well as to
deploy sustainable, combined arms teams rapidly by sea and
air. With reduced overseas presence in terms of force levels
and bases, these capabilities have become essential elements
of our national military strategy. This publication also under-
scores the value of Marine Corps forces as a highly cost-
effective option in a wide range of situations, including crises
requiring forcible entry. Importantly, this publication estab-
lishes versatility and adaptability as critical capabilities in a
broad range of circumstances for expeditionary forces in an
uncertain world. Finally, this publication describes the
Marine Corps' key expeditionary concepts.
This publication is compatible with the Marine Corps' cap-

stone doctrinal publication, MCDP 1, Warfighting. Warfight-
ing provides the broad institutional and operating philosophy
that underlies all Marine Corps expeditionary operations, re-
gardless of echelon of command or operating setting. This
publication applies that philosophy more specifically to the
operations of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and
to the types of expeditionary settings in which these forces
will likely be required to operate. Where MCDP 1 describes
the Marine Corps' philosophy of warfighting, this publication
describes the types of operations of which Marine Corps
forces must be capable.
Chapter 1 describes the complex and uncertain geopolitical

environment near the turn of the 21St century—the environ-
ment in which Marine Corps forces will be required to oper-
ate. Based on chapter 1, chapter 2 establishes the need for a
flexible, naval expeditionary force-in-readiness, describes the
requirements of expeditionary operations, and identifies the
characteristics and capabilities of Marine Corps forces that
satisfy those requirements. Chapter 3 describes the particular
expeditionary organizations and forces that the Marine Corps
contributes in support of national interests overseas. Chapter
4 describes the operating concepts that underlie the Marine
Corps' conduct of expeditionary operations. Key among these
is the naval concept, operational maneuver from the sea.
This publication is designed for Marine Corps leaders who
must conduct expeditionary operations or advise others on the
effective employment of Marine Corps forces and for those
outside the Marine Corps who must understand Marine Corps
capabilities and operating concepts. Because this publication
describes concepts that are fundamental to Marine Corps op-
erations, it is required reading for all Marines.
DISTRIBUTION: 142 000009 00
© 1998 United States Government as represented by the Sec-

retary of the Navy. All rights reserved.
Throughout this publication, masculine nouns and pronouns

are used for the sake of simplicity. Except where otherwise
noted, these nouns and pronouns apply to either gender.
MCDP3
Expeditionary Operations
Chapter 1. The Landscape: Chaos in the Littorals

After the Cold War: The "New Anarchy"—Crises: Disaster,
Disruption, Dispute—Fragmentation and Integration—Major
Regional Contingency—Smaller-Scale Contingencies—
Nonstate Actors—The Developing World—Population
Factors—Urbanized Terrain—The Importance of the Sea
and the Littoral Regions—Weaponry——Conclusion
Chapter 2. The Nature of Expeditionary Operations

National Interests, Crisis Prevention, and Crisis Response—
Expeditionary Operations Defined and Discussed—Reasons
for Conducting Expeditionary Operations—Sequence in
Projecting Expeditionary Forces—Expeditionary Mindset—
Naval Character—Strategic Mobility: Closure Rate and
Global Reach—Operational Mobility—Operational and
Tactical Competence—Sustainability—Adaptability—
Reconstitution—Cost-Effectiveness—--Conclusion
Chapter 3. Expeditionary Organizations

Naval Expeditionary Forces—Marine Corps Forces
Commands—Marine Air-Ground Task Forces—
Expeditionary Operations MCDP 3
The Structure of the MAGTF—The Marine Expeditionary

Force—The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Capable)—The Special Purpose MAGTF—Maritime
Prepositioning Forces—Air Contingency Forces—
Marine Component Commands—Standing Task Force
Headquarters—Conclusion
Chapter 4. Expeditionary Concepts

Operational Maneuver from the Sea—Case Study: The
Marianas, 1944—Sustained Operations Ashore—Case
Study: The Persian Gulf, 1990—1991—Military Operations
Other Than War—Case Study: Mogadishu, Somalia,
1991—Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations—Case
Study: Saudi Arabia, 1990-Conclusion
Epilogue. Operation Littoral Chaos

Case Study: West Africa, 2017—18—Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 1
The Landscape: Chaos

in the Littorals
"It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to
carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous
to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. "
—Niccolo Machiavelli
a second Cold War might be upon us—a protracted

struggle between ourselves and the demons of crime, popula-
tion pressure, environmental degradation, disease, and cul-
ture conflict. "2
—Robert D. Kaplan
MCDP 3 The Landscape: Chaos in the Littorals
T his chapter discusses the environment in which U.S.

forces in general, and Marine Corps expeditionary
forces in particular, have to operate. It describes a world char-
acterized by disorder and crisis, especially in the littoral re-
gions of the developing world.
AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE "NEW ANARCHY"
The end of the Cold War has ushered in a period of wide-

spread uncertainty, rapid change, and turmoil. The Cold War
provided a known enemy whom we thought we understood
fairly well and against whom we could prepare. The Cold
War provided structure and stability. The global ideological
struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union
tended to subsume lesser, regional conflicts. As local
belligerents positioned themselves on opposing sides of the
Cold War, local conflicts were overshadowed by the global
struggle and were often suppressed out of fear of starting a
global war.
The certainty, structure, and stability that the Cold War

provided have disappeared. The geopolitical situation has
shifted from a bipolar global structure to multiple regional
power centers with a single world superpower—the United
States. Conflict has arisen as political groups vie for regional
dominance. Long-simmering animosities have erupted into
3
conflict. In short, the threat has shifted from the known ene-
mies of the Cold War to a broader, heterogeneous set of po-
tential competitors and adversaries and a variety of types of
conflict. Some of these opponents are traditional nation-
states, but many will be nonstate actors—such as terrorist
groups and international organized crime networks—that pre-
sent new and unique challenges.
The political map of the world is changing quickly, and the

trend seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future. De-
mocracy and capitalism continue to spread across the globe,
although the transition is hardly a smooth or peaceful one.
Where democracy has newly taken hold, its survival is not as-
sured. For that matter, democratic states are not necessarily
peaceful states. At the same time, anti-Western sentiment, es-
pecially anti-American sentiment, thrives in many parts of the
world. According to one noted political scientist, the ideologi-
cal clash of the Cold War will be replaced by a "clash of
civilizations."3 The perception of the U.S.'s political, eco-
nomic, and military dominance, reinforced by the military re-
suits o the Gulf War, will lead many potential enemies to
adopt asymmetrical methods that avoid our material and tech-
nological superiority and exploit our perceived weaknesses.
Along with other asymmetrical forms of political violence,
terrorism will continue to pose a threat to U.S. citizens, prop-
erty, and interests and will remain difficult to combat.
Dangerous combinations of demographic, economic, and

social forces threaten to overwhelm resources, infrastructure,
4
and governmental control in many parts of the world. As a re-

sult, the need for humanitarian assistance will continue to
grow in the foreseeable future. According to one estimate, hu-
manitarian crises today are four times more frequent, last
longer, and cause more damage than in the 1980s.4 This is es-
pecially true in the developing world, although not exclu-
sively. Several established states have demonstrated
surprising instability and currently face the prospect of great
change and uncertain futures.
While threats to national security may have decreased in

order of magnitude, they have increased in number, fre-
quency, and variety. These lesser threats have proven difficult
to ignore. The main point of this discussion is to point out
that the post-Cold War geopolitical situation has fundamen-
tally altered the nature and scope of future military conflicts.
This situation requires a diverse range of military methods
and capabilities for effective response. Far from creating a
new world order, the end of the Cold War has led to what for-
mer United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar has
described as the "new anarchy."5
CRISES: DISASTER, DISRUPTION, DISPUTE
In short, the end of the Cold War has resulted in a world char-
acterized by widespread disorder and potential crisis.6 In the
5
coming years, the ability to respond effectively and quickly to

crises will be essential to the protection of U.S. interests. Cri-
ses that will threaten U.S. interests in the near future fall into
three broad categories: disasters, disruptions, and disputes.7
Disasters are accidents or calamities—complex human

emergencies—that cause suffering on a massive scale. Disas-
ters create societal and political instability as well as physical
devastation. If a disaster reaches significant enough propor-
tions without an effective government response, it may lead
to violence and even rebellion. Disasters may be natural or
manmade. Natural disasters are the best known and include
hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, droughts, plagues,
epidemics, and wildfires. Less frequent but sometimes even
more destructive are manmade disasters such as nuclear or
other industrial accidents, economic failures, or catastrophic
governmental collapse.
The second class of crisis is disruption. Disruptions are

intentionally disorderly activities that cause internal commo-
tion on a scale sufficient to interfere with a government's
ability to perform its functions. Unlike disasters, which are
generally the result of the forces of nature or unintentional
human actions, disruptions are the result of human intent.
These may be the actions of an organized political group with
a unified agenda such as an insurgency movement or terrorist
organization, a criminal organization more interested in prof-
its than politics such as a drug cartel, or an accumulation of
6
individuals or small groups acting in their own self-interest.

The effects of disruptions are internal to the country in ques-
tion, although the disruptive element itself may originate ex-
ternally or receive external support. Disruptions may include
genocide, terrorism, insurgency, drug trafficking, and epi-
demic crime. They may stem from sectarianism, nationalism,
racial or religious hatred, or extreme poverty. Disasters can
lead to disruption if there is widespread dissatisfaction with
the government response to the disaster.
The third class of crisis is dispute, a clash between two po-

litical groups. A disruption may escalate to a dispute when
the disruptive element becomes powerful enough to openly
challenge the established government rather than to merely
subvert its authority. Disputes may be internal, as in a rebel-
lion or insurrection, or external between sovereign states or
other independent political groups. A dispute may result from
a single incident, or it may be a lasting ethnic, ideological, or
other difference. It may take the form of political tension that
does not generally result in military violence—such as the
Cold War—or it may result in open warfare that may itself
take any number of forms and intensities.
The intent here is not to try to categorize every type of po-

litical crisis. The point is simply that in a broad range of
situations potentially threatening to U.S. interests, the actual
or contemplated commitment of U.S. military forces will
arise. The actual U.S. response will depend on the situation.
7
FRAGMENTATION AND INTEGRATION
Two of the primary forces that drive changes in global poli-

tics are the simultaneous processes of fragmentation and inte-
gration, which one noted political scientist has described as
"fragmegration."8 These processes contribute significantly to
the complexity and unpredictability of current world events.
A main trend in global politics is fragmentation: the

breakup of multination states into smaller, more natural na-
tional groups with narrower communities of interest. Since
1990, the trend toward fragmentation has been unmistakable.
This trend reflects the failure of some states to satisf' the po-
litical needs of all their constituents. It also reflects the ten-
dency of groups to define their interests more narrowly than
before. This fragmentation is rarely a smooth process. The
existing state usually resists the loss of authority. Moreover,
the drawing of boundaries and the creation of other arrange-
ments can rarely be done to the satisfaction of all concerned
parties. The simple increase in the number of active political
groups as a result of fragmentation increases the complexity
of global political relations because the interests of some dif-
ferent groups invariably overlap and conflict.
A second major trend in global relations is integration. At

the same time that the world is fragmenting politically, it is
becoming increasingly connected economically through the
rise in global markets. This economic integration results
8
largely from advances in communications technologies that

provide both near-instantaneous worldwide transfer of capital
and worldwide access to goods and services. As a simple ex-
ample, one popular "American" basketball shoe is actually
assembled from 52 different components that come from five
different countries, and it is shipped by sea or air to markets
all over the world.9 The United States has significant com-
mercial interests worldwide. Some of them, such as Persian
Gulf oil, are clearly vital to national interests while others,
such as the basketball shoe industry, are important but not vi-
tal. Another manifestation of increased interconnectedness
may be the current decline of unilateral action and the rise of
consensus-building among governments before applying mili-
tary force.
The result of simultaneous fragmentation and integration is

a tightly coupled, increasingly complex global social-political
system that is potentially very sensitive to disruptions and in
which seemingly local events in one part of the world can
have potentially significant effects elsewhere.
MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY
At the high end of the range of potential crises is the threat

posed by major regional contingencies. At present, the United
States is the single nation on the globe that possesses a
9
military capability to unilaterally protect and pursue its inter-

ests worldwide. This condition is likely to be the case for the
immediate future, but if history is any guide, it is unlikely to
be permanent. At some time in the future, another pow-
er—whether an existing state, a new state, an alliance of
states, or some other political entity—is likely to rise up to
challenge the United States on roughly equal military and
other terms.
Despite the current absence of a global peer competitor,

the world remains an uncertain and dangerous place, and the
United States faces a number of significant challenges to its
security. Several regions, including the Korean peninsula and
the Mideast, are areas of continuous political tension with a
more or less pennanent threat of hostilities. Numerous re-
gional powers are capable of temporarily challenging U.S. su-
premacy regionally and compelling the United States to make
a significant commitment of military forces to establish supe-
riority. Several regional powers hostile to, or at least not
friendly toward, the United States maintain large militaries
with offensive capability in relatively high states of readiness.
They may not be equipped with the very latest technology,
but they may compensate with quantity for what they lack in
quality. Furthermore, some of these powers have demon-
strated a tolerance for casualties that to some extent offsets
the technological superiority of U.S. forces. Several regional
powers possess nuclear weapons, and more have chemical
and biological weapons.
10
These powers may attack U.S. forces, activities, or inter-

ests directly in a region, but a more likely scenario is a clash
between regional powers that threatens U.S. interests. Al-
though a third party to such conflicts, the United States may
find itself bound by treaty obligations or may feel pressure
from the world community to intervene as a major member of
an international coalition.
A direct military conflict with a major power is an unlikely

event—at least for the foreseeable future—but it would be the
conflict most threatening to our national interests and secu-
rity. It would be the one eventuality that poses a direct threat
to national survival, and so we must be prepared to protect
against it. Such a conflict could involve, among other things,
intense conventional combat with advanced weaponry and
large military formations. Such a conflict could be protracted
and would likely involve a period of mobilization and deploy-
ment of forces. The initial clashes, however, could occur un-
expectedly and would almost certainly involve the rapid
commitment of forward units that must therefore maintain the
capability to fight such wars.
SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES
While major regional contingencies pose the gravest threat to

national security, the most likely and most frequent crises
11
into which the United States will find itself drawn will be
smaller-scale contingencies involving military operations
other than war. Environmental disasters, insurrections, sepa-
ratist movements, rebellions, coups, genocide, and general so-
cietal and governmental collapse all generate violence and
instability that may not lead to major regional contingencies
but may nonetheless threaten U.S. interests. U.S. commit-
ments in these situations may include presence, civil support,
counterdrug operations, peace building and peacekeeping,
counterinsurgency, and noncombatant evacuation operations.
Smaller-scale contingencies may involve combat with

regular, or conventional, military forces. Most militaries in
the developing world are organized and equipped primarily to
maintain internal order or for defense, and they lack a power-
projection capability. Some of these conventional forces may
have advanced weapons and equipment, but usually they use
predominantly older equipment, äften purchased as surplus
from major powers that are upgrading their own arsenals.
They tend to use inexpensive weapons systems that are easy
to maintain, sustain, and operate rather than expensive, high-
technology platforms, but they may invest in high technology
in certain areas like air defense, command and control, etc.
Included in this category are explosive mines, both land and
sea, that can be as effective as they are inexpensive and wide-
spread. The rampant and unrecorded use of mines can take a
horrible toll on combatants and civilian populations and can
pose a threat for generations.
12
Conversely, smaller-scale contingencies frequently also in-

volve clashes with unconventional military or paramilitary or-
ganizations—criminal and drug rings, vandals and looters,
militias, guerrillas, terrorist organizations, urban gangs—that
blur the distinction between war and widespread criminal
violence'0 These organizations are likely to employ uncon-
ventional weapons and techniques—even relatively simple
and cheap weapons of mass destruction—that provide a chal-
lenging asymmetrical response to a superior conventional Ca-
pability. The weapons our future foes most often choose to
employ against us may bear little resemblance to today's con-
ventional weapons.
Even noncombat missions such as humanitarian assistance

that do not involve a clearly identified enemy are not neces-
sarily undertaken in a permissive environment. U.S. forces
performing such missions may find themselves operating in a
lawless environment dominated by the threat of violence. The
operating environment often fluctuates between permissive
and hostile, and protection of the force is invariably a key
consideration.
NONSTATE ACTORS
Although the state remains the predominant entity in global

politics, its preeminence in the use of organized political
13
violence has declined. One of the trends of modern conflict is

the rise of powerful nonstate groups able and willing to apply
force on a scale sufficient to have noticeable political effect.
This rise of nonstate actors is one of the manifestations of the
political fragmentation discussed earlier. The result is a de-
cline in conventional interstate warfare. According to 1996
United Nations statistics, of the 82 conflicts started since the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, only three were conventional
wars between states; 79 were civil wars or insurgencies in-
volving at least one nonstate belligerent."
Many of these nonstate groups employ unconventional

military methods and weapons because they cannot compete
with established states in conventional military terms. They
are likely not to abide by the laws and conventions of warfare
recognized by states. They are especially unlikely to be will-
ing to meet an industrialized military power like the United
States on its own terms but will probably adopt methods spe-
cifically intended to counter the conventional material and
technological superiority of their foe. As a result, they are of-
ten difficult to target militarily. Furthermore, lack of political
accountability makes them less vulnerable to political, diplo-
matic, and economic pressure than established states.
Nonstate groups are most likely to have significant influ-

ence in smaller-scale contingencies, especially internal con-
flicts, but this influence is not restricted to participation in
smaller-scale contingencies. Some nonstate powers may
wield significant influence in larger conflicts as well.
14
Tm DEVELOPING WORLD
The most volatile regions of the globe—the most likely
scenes of crisis requiring U.S. involvement—are generally
not in the industrialized world, but in the developing world.
These are generally the regions undergoing the greatest
change. They are often regions afflicted by drought, disease,
and ages-old ethnic hatreds. Government institutions lack sta-
bility, and many suffer from internal corruption.
Some of the most rapidly growing regions in the world

usually lack the economy, infrastructure, and government in-
stitutions needed to deal with that rapid growth. Some of the
most densely populated regions on earth often suffer severe
resource shortages. Competition for scarce resources—
whether basic necessities such as food, water, and shelter or
strategic resources that can bring prosperity—can lead to
conflict.
Under these conditions, practically any crisis can result in

mass refugee movement. The cause of this movement var-
ies—it may be famine, genocide, internal warfare, conven-
tional war, lack of work, or political oppression. "Worldwide,
the UN estimates there are more than 17 million refugees—
10,000 people a day forced to leave their countries for fear of
persecution and violence—and there are more than 30 mil-
lion internally displaced persons within certain countries.
Refugees and displaced persons bring their frustrations,
15
disappointments, fears, and grievances with them. They im-

pose a logistical and financial burden upon their hosts."2
Refugees introduce humanitarian and often political issues
into any military intervention, complicating the conduct of
military operations. In fact, refugee management may itself
be the primary objective of an operation.
Lack of modern or developed infrastructure can pose sig-

nificant problems for military action in the developing world.
Many ports cannot handle the deepest-draft ships. Many air-
fields in the developing world cannot handle the largest mili-
tary transport aircraft. Many roads and bridges cannot
accommodate military traffic.
The developing world often lacks the capability to cope

with major disasters and disruptions—or to deal with the
refugee migrations that these cause. Developing countries of-
ten lack the military might to resist invasion from without or
insurrection from within. Thus, it is in the developing world
that American forces will most likely find themselves com-
mitted to protect national interests.
POPULATION FACTORS
Conflict is at base a clash of human interests. Conflict arises

where there is discontent, where conditions are in flux, and
16
where resources are in short supply. Uncontrolled population

growth in the developing world increases competition for the
basic necessities of life. Nearly all of this growth will be in
Asia, Latin America, and Africa, some of the poorest regions
of the world.'3 While in the developed world populations will
age without significant growth, populations in the developing
world will continue to increase dramatically for the foresee-
able future. (See figure.) This rate of increase alone will in-
crease the competition for resources and the likelihood of
conflict.
World population trends.

Rapid population growth will likely lead to two demo-
graphic phenomena with major security implications: urbani-
zation and a "youth bulge."4 As the population continues to
grow, more people move to the cities. Today, 45 percent of
the world's population—2.5 billion people—lives in cities. At
17
projected rates, the world's urban population will double—to

5 billion—by 2025, making 61 percent of the entire world's
population urban dwellers.'5
As recently as 1950, widespread urbanization was a dis-

tinction of the industrialized world. Today urban areas are in-
creasingly a feature of the developing world. Of the cities of
more than a million people, two-thirds are now in the devel-
oping world. As much as 90 percent of the world's population
growth will occur in the cities of the developing world.'6
A rapidly increasing population becomes proportionately

younger than a stable population. This youth bulge stresses
governments and societies in two mutually reinforcing ways.
First, children are relatively unproductive members of soci-
ely, consumers rather than producers of goods. They must be
supported by the society. Second, youth in many cultures are
impatient for change and thus more likely to favor radical,
even violent, solutions to societal problems. Because of the
youth bulge, an increasingly large part of the population in
the developing world will be both unproductive and prone to
disruptive behavior.
From the basic needs of food, water, and shelter to the in-
dustrial requirements for raw materials and energy, more peo-
ple require more resources. However, population growth will
most likely occur in just those areas least able to support bur-
geoning populations. The disadvantaged, deprived, and dis-
satisfied are likely to fight for what they think they must have
18
or to try to move where they think they can get it. Groups
may resort to war over control of resources, and factions able
to control resources will gain disproportionate influence over
central governments.'7
URBANIZED TERRAIN
Urbanization has significant environmental effects. As the

earth's urban population increases, so does the proportion of
the earth's surface given over to urbanization. As the earth's
population becomes increasingly urban, so do tomorrow's
likely battlefields. Currently, only about 1 percent of the
earth's surface is urbanized terrain. However, urban areas are
rapidly expanding. Nearly 1.2 million acres of arable land in
developing regions are transformed to urban use annually.'8
These burgeoning cities are not the organized, high-rise

cities of the industrialized world. Large parts are spontaneous
shanty or squatter settlements that tend to grow much more
rapidly and haphazardly than the rest of a city. These un-
planned sprawls can swell to huge dimensions, becoming
"unintended" cities in themselves, technically within the
boundaries of a metropolitan area but beyond the control of
local government and without any organized infrastructure.'9
Urbanized terrain has significant military implications. It

favors the defender over the attacker and the local over an
19
expeditionary force. It often poses significant security prob-

lems for a foreign intervention. While training for military
operations on urbanized terrain has focused on the difficulties
posed by modem multistory urban areas (to include subterra-
nean levels), some of the most challenging areas will be the
shanty slums spreading quickly through and around modem
cities. These closely packed and densely populated warrens of
transient populations, temporary structures, and no organized
design can pose greater military problems than modern urban
areas.
Combat in urbanized areas is both costly and time consum-

ing. Urbanized terrain tends to complicate the employment of
armor, artillery, and close air support. The presence of a non-
combatant population provides concealment for indigenous
combatants or disruptive elements and can restrict the em-
ployment of heavy weapons. Whether the mission is one of
humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, or combat, urban terrain fa-
vors the use of ground forces, especially infantry, because the
use of mechanized forces is often restricted. Moreover, be-
cause of the compartmentalized nature of the terrain, an urban
battlefield can absorb much greater numbers of troops than
open terrain. Combat tends to take place at extremely short
range between small units, leading to greater reliance on
small-unit leadership and proficiency.
20
Tm IMPORTANCE OF THE SEA AND THE

LITTORAL REGIONS
The sea dominates the surface of our globe. Despite the avail-
ability of transoceanic aircraft, most international trade is car-
ried by sea. More than 99.5 percent of all overseas cargo by
weight travels in ships, and total world seaborne trade contin-
ues to increase.20 A standard 30-knot transport ship can outlift
even the largest transport aircraft in weight of cargo by
roughly 200:1 2I The undeniable conclusion is that, for the
foreseeable future, there is no viable alternative to shipping
by sea for the overwhelming preponderance of world
commerce.
The world's littoral regions, where land and sea meet, are
equally important. The littorals are where seaborne trade
originates and enters its markets. The littorals include straits,
most of the world's population centers, and the areas of maxi-
mum growth. Straits represent strategic chokepoints from
which the world's sea lanes of communications can be con-
trolled. Population centers are focal points of both trade and
conflict. Some 60 percent of the world's population lives
within 100 kilometers of the ocean. Some 70 percent lives
within 320 kilometers. By far the most cities with populations
of more than one million are located in the Iittorals.22 Coastal
21
cities—that is, cities directly adjacent to the sea—are home to

almost a billion people worldwide and are experiencing un-
precedented growth. Again, much of this growth is occurring
in developing regions. Growth rates in many coastal cities of
the developing world substantially exceed growth rates in sur-
rounding rural regions. Of the world cities with a population
of 500,000 or more, nearly 40 percent are located on the
shore.23 (See figure.)
World cities at night.
The United States is a maritime state, relying on the guar-

anteed use of the seas for both its economic well-being and its
ability to project military power in support of its national in-
terests. For any global power, seapower is essential. Even
with extensive strategic airlift capability, the sea remains the
only viable means to move and sustain sizable military forces.
As the number of U.S. bases overseas has decreased in the
22
last years of the twentieth centuiy, the importance of forward-

deployed U.S. naval power, with its amphibious capability for
forcible entry, has increased dramatically.
The worldwide proliferation of weapons and munitions, in-

cluding chemical and biological munitions will make the se-
curity of expeditionary forces against terrorist acts or other
attacks a significant issue. Land-based expeditionary forces
and their support will be continually at risk. Adding security
forces for protection will paradoxically increase the potential
targets for terrorist attack and may also increase the likeli-
hood of undesired political friction and incident. In many
parts of the developing world, contagious diseases may pose
an additional threat to expeditionary forces ashore. Finally,
situations may arise in which the host nation does not desire a
large U.S. presence ashore. The sea is thus becoming increas-
ingly important militarily not only as a vital means for mov-
ing military forces but as a secure base of operations, not
merely for initially projecting power ashore but for the dura-
tion of the expeditionary operation. In the future, an impor-
tant factor may be the ability to conduct and sustain
expeditionary operations from sea bases.
As the range at which naval forces can project power in-

land increases, an increasingly larger portion of the globe
falls under the potential influence of U.S. naval power. Just as
it is undeniable that there is no alternative to the sea for world
trade, it is equally undeniable that there is no alternative to
naval power for the global projection of military influence.
23
WEAPONRY
Trends in weapons distribution pose two main areas of con-

cern. The first is the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction—nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
Although obviously dangerous, nuclear weapons are pos-
sessed by relatively few of our potential enemies because of
their expense and technical complexity. Nonetheless, while
the number of admitted, confirmed, or suspected nuclear
powers remains relatively small, several of them are hostile to
the United States.24 Moreover, the technical knowledge re-
quired to produce nuclear weapons is spreading. Especially
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the dispersal of
its nuclear arsenal, it becomes more likely that the possession
of these weapons will not be limited to established, responsi-
ble states.
Chemical weapons are more widespread than nuclear

weapons, and their availability already extends beyond estab-
lished governments to other political groups, as demonstrated
by the attack by the cult Aum Shinri Kyo in Japan in 1995.
Twelve people were killed and more than 5,000 injured by the
release of the nerve agent sarin on the Tokyo subway during
rush hour. The "poor man's nuclear weapon," chemical weap-
ons offer significant destructive effect at a relatively low cost.
Regardless of treaties, it is difficult to regulate the develop-
ment and stockpiling of such weapons. As with chemical
24
weapons, the development of a biological weapons capability

by a potentially hostile political group is difficult to detect
and prevent.
The targets of weapons of mass destruction are not neces-

sarily military ones. Terrorist organizations are just as likely
to use these weapons against civilian populations. Further-
more, weapons of mass destruction do not necessarily require
an advanced delivery system such as a missile or aircraft; an
automobile, a suitcase, or even a small glass vial could suf-
fice. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is per-
haps the gravest single threat to national security in the short
term.
The other trend of concern is the increasing availability of

inexpensive but lethal conventional weapons ranging from
mines to rocket grenades to car bombs to shoulder-launched
antiaircraft missiles. These weapons are extremely effective,
portable, highly destructive, easy to operate, difficult to detect
and counteract, practically impossible to regulate, and in need
of little technical or logistical support. These weapons can of-
ten be manufactured locally or are readily available on the in-
ternational arms market. They are abundant and pose a
significant threat to military and civilian targets alike. When
in the hands of terrorists or other nonstate actors, this threat is
particularly difficult to counter. Even in the poorest regions of
the world, these weapons will likely be widespread.
25
CONCLUSION
While arguably threats to national security have decreased in

magnitude, they have increased in number, frequency, and va-
riety. Far from creating a period of global peace, the end of
the Cold War has ushered in a period of crises and conflicts.
We see established nation-states all across the globe splinter-
ing along ethnic, religious, or tribal lines. These trends not
only produce crises between and within nations but create a
much greater degree of instability—instability that can even-
tually degenerate into chaos. Where crises rise from relatively
stable states led by state actors (premiers or presidents), chaos
is the by-product of growing change and uncertainty, and is
typically led by non-state actors (tribal chiefs and warlords).
In this chaotic world, the United States will have to respond
in defense of national interests. Many, perhaps even most, of
these crises will occur in the heavily populated littoral regions
of the developing world. As a result, the protection of na-
tional interests requires a strong, responsive naval expedition-
ary capability. That is the subject of chapter 2.
26
Chapter 2
The Nature of
Expeditionary
Operations
"Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great is-
sues between nations at war have always been decided—ex-
cept in the rarest cases—either by what your army can do
against your enemy's territory and national lfe or else by the
fear of what the fleet makes itpossiblefor your army to do.
—Julian S. Corbett
"Word came on May 27 that another revolution was in full

swing at Bluefields, on the east coast of Nicaragua. We re-
ceived orders to leave at eight thirty in the morning and by
eleven thirty were on our way—two hundred and fifty officers
and men. Mrs. Butler had [gone]. .to do some shopping.
.
2
When she returned at noon, I was gone
—Smedley D. Butler
MCDP 3 The Nature of Expeditionary Operations
B asedon the wide variety of overseas crises and conflicts

described in chapter 1, this chapter discusses the nature
and requirements of expeditionary operations and the Marine
Corps' role in and approach to their conduct.
NATIONAL INTERESTS, CRISIS PREVENTION, AND

CRISIS RESPONSE
Chapter 1 described a chaotic world where threats to U.S. in-

terests may arise quickly and in unexpected places. The na-
tional security strategy places these interests into three
categories: vital interests of broad, overriding importance to
the survival, safety, and vitality of the United States; impor-
tant interests that affect national well-being; and humanitarian
interests.3
History teaches that our nation's interests are less likely to

be threatened when other nations are at peace, and their po-
litical, economic, and social systems are relatively stable.
Therefore, peacetime deterrence is one of the military's most
important roles in shaping the international environment. A
capable military and the resolve to use it against a potential
adversary are key to effective deterrence. By preventing a po-
tential belligerent from taking actions that threaten the inter-
ests of the United States or our allies, the military helps
promote regional stability and fosters an environment where
29
differences and issues can be resolved or addressed peace-

fully.
Even with the best efforts at deterrence, complex and cha-

otic conditions in the world will inevitably produce crisis and
conflict. Therefore, protection of the interests of the United
States and its allies demands an effective crisis-response Ca-
pability—the ability to respond quickly and effectively to a
wide variety of potentially dangerous situations. Not all crises
require a military response. However, when diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and informational power prove inadequate, the ability
to apply military power is essential to the protection of na-
tional interests. Military action may not be the preferred solu-
tion, and it may be used infrequently, but under some
conditions the United States will inevitably find it necessary
to use military force.
An effective military response to an overseas crisis involv-

ing U.S. interests often requires the expeditionary capability
to intervene or interpose in foreign political controversies. A
military intervention is the deliberate act of a nation or group
of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an
existing controversy in order to influence events. A military
interposition, on the other hand, is the deliberate act of a na-
tion to introduce military forces into a foreign country during
a crisis to protect its citizens from harm without otherwise be-
coming involved in the course of the crisis. The ability to act
swiftly in such circumstances may be the best way to contain,
30
resolve, or mitigate the consequences of a crisis that could

otherwise become more costly and deadly.
Crisis response requires the full spectrum of military capa-

bilities, including the capability for forcible entry—the intro-
duction of military forces in the face of organized, armed
resistance. National interest requires an expeditionary crisis-
response force specifically organized, trained, equipped, and
deployed to project military power overseas. Because of the
unpredictability of potential crises, such crisis-response
forces should be designed with a broad range of capabilities
rather than in response to a specific threat. Such a rapid-
response, general-purpose force must maintain itself in a con-
tinuous state of readiness, ready to deploy rapidly by both air
and sea and able to adapt to a broad range of operating envi-
ronments on short notice.
EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS DEFINED A1)

DISCUSSED
An expedition is a military operation conducted by an armed

force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.4
The missions of military expeditions may vary widely. Exam-
ples of missions of military expeditions include providing hu-
manitarian assistance in times of disaster or disruption;
31
establishing and keeping peace in a foreign country; protect-

ing U.S. citizens or commerce abroad; retaliating for an act of
aggression by a foreign political group; and destroying an en-
emy government by defeating its armed forces in combat.
The defining characteristic of expeditionary operations is

the projection of force into a foreign setting.5 By definition,
an expedition thus involves the deployment of military forces
to the scene of the crisis or conflict and their requisite support
some significant distance from their home bases. These forces
may already have been forward-deployed, as in the case of a
Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable), de-
ployed aboard Navy amphibious ships and ready for immedi-
ate employment, or they may be required to deploy from their
home bases in response to a developing situation. Expedition-
ary operations involve the establishment of forward bases,
land or sea, from which military power can be brought to bear
on the situation. An expeditionary operation thus requires the
temporary creation of a support apparatus necessary to sustain
the operation to its conclusion. Logistics, the movement and
maintenance of forces—the "mounting" of the expedition—is
thus a central consideration in the conduct of expeditionary
operations.6
In some cases an expeditionary force may accomplish its

mission without the direct application of coercive force by
merely establishing a visible and credible presence nearby.
However, this indirect influence can result only from the per-
ception of a nation's capability and willingness to physically
32
establish military forces on foreign soil if necessary, and so

the ability to project a physical presence remains central. Fur-
thermore, in some situations presence must be established in
the face of hostile resistance—that is, through forcible entry.
All expeditions involve the projection of power into a for-

eign setting. However, it is important to recognize that not all
power projection constitutes expeditionary operations; power
projection is a necessary component but not a sufficient con-
dition by itself to constitute an expeditionary operation. op-
erations that do not involve actual deployment of forces are
not expeditionary operations.
Power projection does not imply that expeditionary opera-

tions are by definition offensive. The initial deployment of
forces to the Persian Gulf in 1990, Operation Desert Shield,
had the mission of defending Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi at-
tack. Only when the defense of Saudi Arabia was secured did
Desert Shield give way to preparations for Desert Storm, the
offensive to liberate Kuwait. Desert Storm in turn gave way
to Operation Provide Comfort, a humanitarian mission to pro-
tect Kurds against Iraqi attacks and to provide food, water,
and shelter for thousands of Kurdish refugees along the Turk-
ish border.
An expeditionary force need not be primarily a ground

combat organization. Even in humanitarian operations, an ex-
peditionary force will invariably include some ground forces,
if only to provide local security. However, the composition of
33
an expeditionary force depends on the requirements of the

mission. For example, an expeditionary force may consist of
aviation units to operate and fly missions out of an expedi-
tionary airfield, supported by only a small security force. In
disaster relief or refugee control missions, the predominant
forces may be combat service support.
Expeditionary forces vary significantly in size and compo-

sition. The American Expeditionary Force, for example, that
fought in the First World War eventually totaled some two
million troops in 42 infantry divisions plus supporting organi-
zations. The special purpose MAGTF that conducted Opera-
tion Eastern Exit, the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in
Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1991, consisted of a reinforced heli-
copter squadron, a combat service support detachment, and
less than one battalion of infantry embarked on two amphibi-
ous ships.
Expeditionary operations may also vary greatly in scope,

ranging from full-scale combat to noncombat missions. Op-
eration Desert Storm was an overwhelming offensive to de-
feat Iraqi forces by offensive air and mechanized ground
operations following a massive, deliberate buildup of forces
and supplies. Operation Assured Response in April 1996 was
much more limited, consisting of the evacuation by the 22d
Marine Expeditionary Unit (special operations capable) of
more than 2,100 people from Liberia in the face of sporadic
violence.
34
The term "expeditionary" implies a temporary duration

with the intention to withdraw from foreign soil after the ac-
complishment of the specified mission. The American Expe-
ditionary Force first helped repulse German offensives in
France in the spring of 1918 and then participated in continu-
ous combat until the end of the war in November, at which
point it returned home. In contrast, Operation Eastern Exit,
the evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Somalia in 1991, was
of much shorter duration. From the time the U.S. Ambassador
requested military assistance to the time the evacuees were
offloaded in Oman, the expedition lasted 10 days, although
the actual evacuation operation, from the launching of the
first wave of helicopters to the return of the last wave with the
withdrawing security force, lasted only 24 hours. An opera-
tion that involves a permanent or indefinite presence sup-
ported by a standing organization and infrastructure such as
the U.S. forces stationed in Europe, Japan, or Korea ceases to
be an expedition and becomes a permanent station.
The term "expeditionary" also implies austere conditions

and support. This does not mean that an expeditionary force is
necessarily small or lightly equipped, but that it is no larger
or heavier than necessary to accomplish the mission. Sup-
plies, equipment, and infrastructure are limited to operational
necessities; amenities are strictly minimized. Expeditionary
bases or airfields, for example, provide less than the full
range of support typically associated with permanent stations.
Operational considerations such as force protection and intel-
ligence prevail over administrative, quality-of-life, or other
35
considerations. This tendency toward austerity derives from

security considerations, the temporary nature of expeditionary
operations, and the imperative to minimize lift and support
requirements.
In summary, to perform expeditionary operations requires

a special mindset—one that is constantly prepared for imme-
diate deployment overseas into austere operating environ-
ments, bringing everything necessary to accomplish the
mission. There are different ways to conduct expeditionary
operations, and the various armed Services provide differing
but complementary capabilities. In general, naval expedition-
ary forces provide a self-sustaining, sea-based capability for
immediate or rapid response, especially through forward de-
ployment. Land-based forces, on the other hand, generally re-
quire a longer deployment phase and the creation of an
in-theater logistics apparatus to achieve the buildup of deci-
sive force. While all the Services include units capable of ex-
peditionary operations, the entire operating forces of the
Marine Corps are specifically organized, equipped, and train-
ed for expeditionary service.
REASONS FOR CONDUCTING EXPEDITIONARY

OPERATIONS
Some political objectives can be secured through the actual or

potential destruction that long-range bombing or the precision
36
fires of a fleet can provide. Some potential aggressors can be

deterred and some actual aggressors can be compelled to
change their behavior through the threat of punishment from
afar. That said, there are many policy aims or military mis-
sions that can be accomplished only by establishing a potent
military force on foreign soil. In numerous situations, physi-
cal destruction alone cannot achieve policy aims, or massive
destruction is inconsistent with political goals. Because, as
Corbett's epigraph at the beginning of this chapter suggests,
politicai issues are ultimately decided on land, there will be
no shortage of conflicts requiring an ongoing physical pres-
ence at the scene of the conflict. Expeditionary operations
will thus be required for a variety of reasons, including—
• To assure that policy objectives pursued by other means

have in fact been secured; for example, to ensure com-
pliance with established diplomatic solutions such as the
adherence to cease-fire arrangements or an agreement to
hold free elections.
• To seize or control key physical objectives such as air-
ports, ports, resource areas, or political centers in order
to ensure their safe use by all groups, to deny their use
to an enemy or disruptive element, or to facilitate future
actions such as the introduction of follow-on forces.
• To control urban or other restrictive terrain.
• To establish a close, physical, and highly visible pres-
ence in order to demonstrate political resolve, deter ag-
gressive action, or compel desired behavior.
37
• To establish and maintain order in an area beset by

chaos and disorder.
• To protect or rescue U.S. citizens or other civilians.
• To separate warring groups from each other or from the
population at large, especially when enemy or disruptive
elements are embedded in the population.
• To provide physical relief and assistance in the event of
disaster.7
SEQUENCE IN PROJECTING EXPEDITIONARY

FORCES
The projection of an expeditionary force generally occurs in

the following sequence:
• Predeployment actions.
• Deployment.
• Entry.
• Enabling actions.
• Decisive actions.
• Redeployment.
38
This sequence is in no way meant to dictate the phases of an

operation. It merely provides a framework for discussion and
further understanding.
All military expeditions begin with planning and prede-

ployment actions. These actions include the commander's or-
ganization of the deployment to ensure that forces arrive in
the objective area in a logical sequence, at the right time, and
with the correct equipment and sustainment to support the
concept of operation.
Deployment is the movement of forces, their equipment,

and their sustainment to either a theater of operations or an
objective area in accordance with the commander's plan. Air-
lift is normally the quickest way to deploy forces, although it
requires the presence of a secure airhead at the destination.
The quickest way to introduce significant, sustainable forces
is by sealift. Maritime prepositioning force operations, dis-
cussed in chapter 4, combine the advantages of both airlift
and sealift. The initial U.S. forces deploying to Operation
Desert Shield, including the 7th and 1St Marine Expeditionary
Brigades,8 arrived by air, although the equipment and supplies
for the Marine brigades arrived aboard maritime preposition-
ing ships. In the end, 90 percent of U.S. forces and supplies
arrived by sea.
The speed at which capable forces can be deployed to the

scene of a crisis is often vitally important. The more quickly
forces can deploy to stabilize a situation, the greater will be
39
the likelihood of eventual success and the less may be the

eventual cost. What matters, however, is not just how quickly
the first forces can deploy; it is the speed at which capable,
sustainable forces can deploy. Thus, an expeditionary force
deploys by phases in support of the commander's concept of
operations. Typically, forward-deployed or rapidly deploy-
able forces move as the initial crisis response, followed by
other, often heavier forces deploying more slowly. The
Marine Corps achieves rapid deployment through placing
some forces in ships and other locations abroad, through
transporting some forces by air, and through placing some
supplies in ships and other locations abroad.
It is not enough to be able to deploy forces to a foreign

theater. There is also the problem of access, gained by force if
necessary. Many expeditionary forces are not capable of
forcible entry, although all amphibious forces are. "Entry" re-
fers to the initial introduction of forces onto foreign soil. Dur-
ing this period, expeditionary forces are often at greatest risk,
and for this reason, the introduction of forces is often a com-
plicated military evolution. Entry is normally accomplished
by seaborne or airborne movement, although in some cases
forces may be introduced by ground movement from an expe-
ditionary base in an adjacent country. Historically, entry has
required the establishment of an expeditionary base ashore
from which to operate, but this is not necessary if the expedi-
tionary force can operate effectively from a sea base. Key to
the entry phase is the presence or creation of some entry
point—an available airfield or port, an assailable coast line, a
40
suitable and supportable drop zone, or an accessible frontier.

The most difficult type of entry is forcible entry—seizing a
lodgment area in hostile territory via combat. Not all expedi-
tionary operations involve forcible entry. Many involve the
introduction of forces into a permissive environment or an en-
vironment that has not yet turned hostile. Because there is al-
ways a potential for hostile resistance and because the level of
hostility can change quickly, a forcible-entry capability is a
permanent requirement for successful expeditionary opera-
tions.
Enabling actions refer to those preparatory actions taken

by the expeditionary force to facilitate the eventual accom-
plishment of the mission. Deployment and entry could also be
thought of as enabling actions, but because of their impor-
tance and particular requirements, we have considered them
separately. With the possible exception of expeditions of very
limited scope and duration, such as a noncombatant evacua-
tion or a punitive raid, the forces that can initially deploy and
enter an area will rarely be sufficient to accomplish the mis-
sion. Usually, other forces will follow, and the initial forces
will undertake actions that are designed to set the stage for
the eventual decisive actions. Enabling actions may include,
for example, seizing a port or airfield to facilitate the secure
introduction of follow-on forces. They may include establish-
ing the necessary logistics and other support capabilities. In
cases of disaster or disruption, enabling actions usually in-
volve the initial restoration of order or stability. In the case of
open warfare, enabling actions may involve operations to
41
seize a lodgment area for follow-on forces or to capture key

terrain necessary for the conduct of decisive operations.
Decisive actions are those actions intended to create the

conditions that will accomplish the political objective—in
other words, to accomplish the mission. In disasters, they in-
clude relief operations. In disruptions, they often include
peacemaking and peacekeeping until local governmental con-
trol can be reestablished. In conflict, they usually involve the
military defeat of the enemy's fighting forces. In Operation
Desert Shield, for example, the decisive actions were those
undertaken to protect Saudi Arabia against Iraqi attack. In
Operation Desert Stonn, the decisive actions were the offen-
sive to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait and destroy their offen-
sive capability. In Operation Provide Comfort, the decisive
actions were those to protect the Kurds from Iraqi attack and
to provide humanitarian aid. In Operation Restore Democ-
racy, the 1994—1995 intervention in Haiti, the decisive actions
were those to restore and support the democratically elected
government and to ensure the peaceful transition of authority
through the next election.
Because expeditions are by definition temporary, all expe-

ditionary operations involve a redeployment—the departure
of the expeditionary force or a transition to a permanent pres-
ence of some sort. This is often one of the most difficult as-
pects of expeditionary operations. An "exit strategy"
therefore must be an important consideration in both the ini-
tial decision to take military action and the conduct of
42
operations. Departure is not as simple as the tactical with-

drawal of the expeditionary force from the scene. It requires
the withdrawing of force in a way that maintains the desired
political situation. If a situation has been stabilized to the
point that the local government can maintain peaceful order,
military forces may depart altogether. It is more likely, how-
ever, that the expeditionary force will be replaced by a
longer-lasting presence, whether an occupation force, an ob-
servation force, or some nonmilitary agency. For example,
Operation Provide Comfort, the relief effort that was initially
conducted primarily by military forces previously deployed
for Desert Storm, was turned over to the United Nations High
Commission on Refugees in June 1991. At that point, military
forces, including the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations Capable), began departing northern Iraq.
Although a similar sequence of phases can be seen in many

expeditionary operations, they are conducted in many differ-
ent ways. What follows is a discussion of the Marine Corps'
approach to the conduct of expeditionary operations.
EXPEDITIONARY MIND SET
The most important element in the Marine Corps' conduct of

expeditionary operations is not a particular organization, fam-
ily of equipment, or tactic. It is a state of mind. For the
43
Marine Corps, being "expeditionary" is, before anything else,

a mindset. The epigraph by Smedley Butler at the beginning
of this chapter captures this attitude. Just as every Marine is a
rifleman regardless of duties and military specialty, all
Marines must also think of themselves as part of a fundamen-
tally expeditionary organization designed and intended to
project military force overseas. This expeditionary mindset is
epitomized by the phrase "bags packed"—that is, ready and
willing to deploy on a moment's notice, any time, to any
place, to perform any mission. All operating forces, rather
than selected ready units, must maintain themselves in a high
state of deployability and general readiness. The expedition-
ary mindset implies a Spartan attitude: an expectation and a
willingness to endure—in fact, a certain pride in endur-
ing—hardship and austere conditions. As an example of this
attitude, embarkation boxes substitute for bookcases, even in
garrison, and creature comforts are minimal.
An expeditionary mindset implies the versatility and adapt-

ability to respond effectively without a great deal of prepara-
tion time to a broad variety of circumstances. Another part of
this expeditionary mindset is a global perspective oriented to
responding to a diverse range of threats around the globe
rather than to a specific threat in a specific part of the world.
This mindset is a matter of training and institutional cul-

ture. Commanders must realize the continuous importance of
imparting and maintaining this attitude within their units.
44
NAVAL CHARACTER
The Marine Corps is fundamentally a naval service. Marines

are "soldiers of the sea," trained to operate on the sea but to
fight on the land. This distinction is more than just historical
or cultural—although it is that also. It is first a matter of prac-
tical significance. The sea remains the only viable way to de-
ploy large military forces to distant theaters and to rapidly
shift forces between theaters. Additionally, in many situa-
tions, sea basing provides a viable, secure option for sustain-
ing expeditionary operations. Given the range of naval
aviation, few parts of the globe are beyond the operational
reach of naval expeditionary forces today. For a country that
possesses naval dominance, the sea becomes an avenue for
projecting military power practically anywhere in the world.
The Marine Corps' naval character facilitates global

sourcing, the composition of an expeditionary force by
Marine elements from anywhere in the world. I Marine Expe-
ditionary Force in Operation Desert Storm was composed of
forces from bases on the U.S.'s east and west coasts and in
the Pacific. Naval mobility similarly facilitates the rapid and
flexible shifting of forces between theaters.
There is more to naval expeditionary power projection,

however, than using the sea to provide strategic or operational
mobility. There is also the significant practical problem of
projecting military power from the sea onto land in the face
45
of hostile resistance. In the words of General George C. Mar-

shall: "A landing against organized and highly trained opposi-
tion is probably the most difficult undertaking which military
forces are called upon to face."9 Amphibious operations re-
quire a high degree of training to achieve proficiency. All
Marine Corps forces are specifically organized, trained, and
equipped to deploy aboard, operate from, and sustain them-
selves from Navy ships. They are specifically designed to
project land combat power ashore from the sea. Forcible entry
through amphibious landing remains the Marine Corps'
specialty.'° Given a decreasing permanent U.S. military pres-
ence overseas and the volatility in the littoral regions of the
developing world, this amphibious expertise provided by the
Marine Corps is one of the most valuable components in the
Nation's power projection capabilities.
STRATEGIC MOBILITY: CLOSURE RATE AND

GLOBAL REACH
In an age of global uncertainty and rapidly developing crises,

closure rate and global reach are critical expeditionary con-
siderations. Closure rate refers to how quickly a military force
can close on an objective area once tasked. The ability to
close quickly is extremely important, especially in the early
stages of a developing situation. Reach refers to the geo-
graphical limits to which a force can deploy and sustain
46
credible military power. Both considerations are functions of

strategic mobility, the capability to deploy and sustain mili-
tary forces worldwide in support of national strategy.TM
In large part, although not exclusively, the Marine Corps

gains its strategic mobility from its naval character. Marine
Corps forces maintain strategic mobility in three ways. First
is through the forward deployment of combined arms,
general-purpose operating forces in the form of Marine air-
ground task forces (MAGTFs). The composition and capabili-
ties of MAGTFs are discussed in chapter 3. Deployed aboard
amphibious Navy ships, these task forces maintain a continu-
ous presence at strategic locations around the globe and can
be rapidly moved to and indefinitely stationed at the scene of
potential trouble. Because the globe is dominated by water,
there are few locations beyond the reach of forward-deployed
MAGTFs. When deploying to an objective area, naval forces
can move continuously, unlike land or air forces, which must
suspend movement for rest and replenishment. Also unlike
land or air forces, naval forces can loiter indefinitely near the
scene of a potential crisis. A good example of this ability to
loiter is Operation Sharp Edge, the evacuation of Liberia in
1990. Amphibious Squadron 4 and the 22d Marine Expedi-
tionary Unit (special operations capable) arrived off the coast
of Liberia on 3 June 1990 as the situation in that country dete-
riorated. They remained on station, some 50 miles offshore,
for 62 days before evacuation operations were required start-
ing 5 August.
The second element of Marine Corps strategic mobility is

the prepositioning of equipment and supplies aboard ships at
47
sea. The advantage of maritime prepositioning is that Marines

can link up in an objective area with prepositioned equipment
and supplies more quickly than those same Marines can de-
ploy from their home base with their equipment and supplies.
As with forward-deployed MAGTFs, prepositioned equip-
ment and supplies can be moved quickly nearly anywhere in
the world and can be maintained indefinitely near the scene of
a potential crisis. Chapter 3 discusses the organization of
maritime prepositioning forces while chapter 4 discusses
maritime prepositioning force operations.
The third element of Marine Corps strategic mobility is the

rapid deployability of units by sea and air. Strategic airlift is
generally the faster way to deploy but is limited in the amount
of lift. Strategic airlift also requires a secure airhead for the
introduction of forces, whereas naval amphibious shipping
can support forcible entry. Shipping generally cannot match
airlift for speed of deployment but remains the only viable
means for deploying large forces and adequate supplies and
equipment. All Marine Corps operating forces are specifically
organized and equipped for deployment aboard Navy am-
phibious ships.
OPERATIONAL MOBILITY
Operational mobility is the capability of military forces to

move from place to place within a theater to perform their
48
missions. Whereas strategic mobility is the ability to move

from theater to theater and tactical mobility is the ability to
move in combat, operational mobility is the ability to move
between engagements or other actions within the context of
the campaign. Operational mobility is a function of range and
sustained speed over a significant distance. The Marine Corps
achieves operational mobility in several ways: through am-
phibious shipping, assault support aircraft, landing craft, as-
sault amphibious vehicles, and light armored vehicles.
Although we typically think of shipping as a component of

strategic mobility, it may also be employed to significant op-
erational effect as well. In many cases, a MAGTF carried on
amphibious shipping can enjoy greater operational mobility
along a coastline than an enemy moving along the coast by
land. This is especially true when the naval force has the abil-
ity to interfere with an enemy's use of roads. This may like-
wise be true in the developing world where road systems may
not be adequate for the movement of large, mechanized for-
mations. In this way, the sea can be an avenue of approach
rather than an obstacle to movement, and the amphibious
force maneuvers by landing at the time and place of its own
choosing, where the enemy is vulnerable. An excellent exam-
ple of this is Operation Chromite, MacArthur's landing of the
1st Marine Division at Inchon in September 1950 to dramati-
cally sever North Korean lines of communications during the
Korean War.
49
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL COMPETENCE
Operational and tactical competence refers to the consistent

ability of the organization to effectively accomplish assigned
missions and tasks. More simply, competence is the ability to
"get things done," and it is obviously an essential element of
effective expeditionary operations. Competence is a broad
and largely intangible quality based on, among other factors,
experience, doctrine, technical proficiency, training, educa-
tion, and leadership.
Experience is perhaps the single most important factor in

developing operational and tactical competence. Experience
provides understanding of the practical problems of execution
and an appreciation for what is feasible and what is not. Doc-
trine contributes the body of concepts and principles that
guide action. The Marine Corps' institutional doctrinal phi-
losophy is based on tempo, surprise, and focused exploitation
of enemy critical vulnerabilities, a doctrine called maneuver
warfare.
One of the purposes of training and education is to instill

sound judgment in leaders at all levels. Competence requires
leaders who can see beyond the tactical requirements of the
immediate problem and who understand the larger impli-
cations of their decisions—to include the nature of military
action as an element of politics and policy. Technical profi-
ciency refers to expertise in the employment of equipment
50
and procedures and is largely a function of individual and unit

training. Marine leadership is best summarized by the princi-
ple of leadership by example. Finally, competence requires
capable, reliable equipment and support, which is not to say
that it always requires the most advanced equipment avail-
able.
Competence is a complex combination of various skills

and qualities. Furthermore, competence is situationally de-
pendent. What it takes to be competent with respect to one
mission may not be what it takes to be competent with respect
to another mission.
SUSTAINABILITY
Effective expeditionary operations are not merely a matter of

projecting military power but also of sustaining that power
throughout the duration of the expedition. Sustainability is the
ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of opera-
tional activity to achieve military objectives. It is a function
of providing for and maintaining the levels of forces, maté-
riel, and supplies needed to support military effort.'2 Sustain-
ability can be an especially important consideration in the
developing world, where many regions often lack the infra-
structure necessary to support highly advanced military
forces.
51
Expeditionary operations generally involve the establish-

ment of some forward operating base or bases near the scene
of the action. This may be an expeditionary land or sea base
or a combination of both. Sea bases have the advantage of be-
ing ready-made and ready-to-operate when a naval expedi-
tionary force deploys, whereas land bases must be established
ashore. Sea bases also have the advantage of being easily re-
trievable at the end of the operation, facilitating departure and
redeployment. However, sea bases are limited by shipping ca-
pacity, technical challenges of offloading and ship-to-shore
movement, and the access limitations imposed by combat
loading requirements. The last two of these are partially offset
by efficient procedures developed over time by the Navy and
Marine Corps as the result of extensive experience. The limits
of sea bases will be further offset as new ship designs facili-
tate accessibility of supplies and selective offloading. The
relative security of expeditionary land and sea bases is
situation-dependent, based on the capabilities of the enemy.
In many cases, sea bases are more secure, especially in situa-
tions in which friendly naval forces dominate the seas. How-
ever, in some cases, expeditionary bases may actually be
more secure, as in the Falklands War of 1982 in which the
greatest British losses were ships sunk by Argentine air-to-
surface missiles. This said, the conditions likely to prevail in
future expeditionary operations—threats of disease and rear
area attack, host-nation sensitivity to a large foreign pres-
ence—argue for an increase in the importance and utility of
sea basing. Effectiveness in future expeditionary operations
52
will require the ability to operate routinely and continuously

from sea bases.
A self-contained sustainment capability can be an impor-

tant logistic consideration in expeditionary operations, espe-
cially in the early stages of deployment before a theater
sustainment system has been put in place. All MAGTFs de-
ploy with the supplies necessary to sustain the force until re-
inforcements arrive.
Finally, another important consideration for sustaining an

expeditionary force is the support requirements of the force.
A military force able to operate under the most austere condi-
tions can be at a significant advantage, especially in undevel-
oped regions that lack the infrastructure to satisfy massive
logistic requirements. Such a force is more easily sustained
and is less adversely affected by logistic limitations. It places
less of a demand on strategic, operational, and tactical lift. It
requires a smaller expeditionary base, which enhances force
protection. Because expeditionary operations are by defini-
tion temporary, a smaller, lighter footprint simplifies the
problems of redeployment.
ADAPTABILITY
Adaptability is the capacity to change—tactics, techniques,
organizations, and so on—in anticipation of or in response to
53
changes in the situation. In an uncertain, chaotic world envi-

ronment, adaptability is an essential characteristic of effective
expeditionary operations. The more quickly an organization
can adapt in a changing environment, the more effective it
will be.
We can adapt through improvisation, departing from the

planned action in response to an unexpected change in the
situation. At the lowest echelons, where decision cycles are
short, improvisation may involve a truly spontaneous action.
At higher echelons, where decision cycles are likely to be
longer, improvisation is more likely to involve rapid modifi-
cation of the existing plan. In any event, improvisation in-
volves a specific, untested response to a particular set of
unexpected conditions.
We can also adapt through innovation, the systematic

adoption of new operating methods, organizations, or tech-
nologies either in response to actual experience or in anticipa-
tion of likely need. An improvisation that proves to have
general value can become an innovation through its system-
atic adoption and refinement. In fact, this is a common source
of innovation. A good example of innovation is the Marine
Corps' development of amphibious warfare doctrine, meth-
ods, and equipment after the First World War in anticipation
of war in the Pacific against Japan. Innovation should not be
the result only of formal programs but should also "bubble
up" from the bottom of the organization as operating units
down to the lowest levels develop, institutionalize, and pass
54
on valuable new methods. Commanders at all levels must not

only be open to innovation but must actively encourage it
from subordinates. Only by these complementary top-down
and bottom-up processes of innovation can the Marine Corps
maintain the necessary adaptiveness.
As with most of the other characteristics of effective expe-

ditionary operations, adaptability is largely a function of
mindset. It requires leaders at all levels with flexibility of
mind who are willing to exercise judgment and initiative on
the basis of situational awareness rather than merely to follow
orders and apply techniques by rote. This ability is largely a
function of training, education, and especially institutional
culture. Adaptability requires a learning organization—an or-
ganization that is self-critical and is able to change quickly in
response to its experiences.
Adaptability also has an important organizational aspect.

Balanced, multidimensional, general-purpose organizations
demonstrate adaptability through the ability to task-organize
rapidly and effectively on the basis of the requirements of
each situation.
Adaptability has a doctrinal aspect as well. The maneuver

warfare concept of mission tactics requires leaders down to
the lowest levels to exercise local initiative on the basis of
their understanding of the larger situation and intent. This de-
centralized form of command and control increases the speed
at which an organization can adapt to changing situations.
55
RECONSTITUTION
Reconstitution refers to the ability of an expeditionary force

to regenerate, reorganize, replenish, and reorient itself for a
new mission after employment elsewhere without having to
return to home base. This is not merely the ability to divert
from an original deployment to another mission but to com-
plete one mission ashore and then redeploy to perform an-
other. It is the ability to project expeditionary power anew
from an existing expeditionary base or forward-deployed
status. The ability to reconstitute is a source of the adaptabil-
ity that is vitally important in modem expeditionary opera-
tions. It can save significant time and cost in deploying to
meet an emerging crisis. For example, in October 1983, the
22d Marine Amphibious Unit was diverted to Grenada while
en route to Lebanon. The Marine amphibious unit conducted
landings as part of Operation Urgent Fury at Grenada on 25
October and at Carriacou on 1 November. By 3 November,
the Marine amphibious unit was reembarked aboard its am-
phibious shipping and had resumed its passage to Lebanon.
Another example is the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade's
participation in Operation Sea Angel in April 1991. The bri-
gade was returning home via the Indian Ocean from duty dur-
ing Operation Desert Storm when it was diverted to
Bangladesh to provide disaster relief in the wake of a cyclone
that had left millions homeless.
The Marine Corps' ability to reconstitute combat power

comes from several sources. First is the nature of the MAGTF
56
as a combined arms, general-purpose force readily tailorable

to different situations. MAGTFs are readily and routinely re-
organized during both deployment and employment. This al-
lows a MAGTF performing one mission to reorganize quickly
for another. Second is the naval character of Marine forces
and the self-contained nature of MAGTFs deployed aboard
amphibious ships. Self-contained, sea-based sustainment al-
lows Marine expeditionary forces to be reemployed without
the need to first put in place a sustainment system. The exist-
ing system for sustaining routinely forward-deployed units
can also be used to reconstitute combat power.
COST-EFFECTiVENESS
It is difficult to put a price on national security or to weigh

the cost of action versus inaction in any particular crisis.
When costs and benefits are measured in terms of human life,
traditional cost-benefit analysis becomes inadequate. How-
ever, the resources of the United States are not unlimited.
Consequently, it is imperative as a general principle that mili-
tary forces conduct expeditions as economically as possible.
The need for economy becomes especially important in an
uncertain era characterized by unexpected crises requiring the
unanticipated and unbudgeted allocation of military force.
Cost-effectiveness does not simply mean accomplishing a

mission inexpensively. Too small a commitment early may
57
lead at best to an unnecessarily larger commitment later and

at worst to a failed mission. As with the military principle of
economy of force, cost-effectiveness here means accom-
plishing the mission with no greater cost or commitment than
is necessary to accomplish the mission properly.
Several factors contribute to cost-effectiveness. First, the

Marine Corps routinely forward-deploys expeditionary forces
and equipment near the scene of potential crises. This cuts
down on the cost of deployment in response to an operational
need because much of the cost of deployment is covered in
routine operating expenses. The regenerative ability described
earlier contributes to this aspect of cost-effectiveness. Addi-
tionally, routine deployments with the Navy develop
institutional proficiency and efficiency at deploying. The re-
quirements of being routinely deployed aboard ship imbue the
institutional culture with a decidedly Spartan character.
Versatility is another source of cost-effectiveness——for ex-

ample, the ability to task-organize for a wide variety of con-
tingencies. This versatility applies to equipment as well. The
assault amphibious vehicles and helicopters, for example, that
provide mobility from ship to objective in amphibious opera-
tions also provide mechanized or helicopterborne tactical mo-
bility during operations ashore and are invaluable in
supporting disaster relief operations in the littorals. This kind
of versatility can translate into major cost savings by mini-
mizing the requirement for specialized units and equipment.
58
CONCLUSION
As the sole remaining superpower in an increasingly intercon-

nected world, the United States finds its national interests af-
fected by events in every part of the globe. These interests
include vital interests of national survival, important interests
of national well-being, and humanitarian interests. While po-
litical, economic, and psychological components of national
power play an important role in responding to worldwide cri-
ses, the preservation of the national interest also demands the
ability to project military force into foreign countries. The
ability to respond quickly and effectively to the entire range
of political crises anywhere in the world is the foundation of
national military strategy. There will be numerous missions
requiring expeditionary operations—sometimes the physical
establishment of a military force on foreign soil, in the face of
hostile resistance. The rest of this publication describes the
organizations and concepts with which the Marine Corps pro-
vides that capability through the conduct of expeditionary
operations.
59
Chapter 3
Expeditionary
Organizations
"Under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to
be considered a fundamental principle, and the basis upon
which all hope of success must ultimately depend "
—George Washington, 1780
"There 's no reason for having a Navy and Marine Corps.

General Bradley tells me that amphibious operations are a
thing of the past. We 'ii never have any more amphibious op-
erations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air
Force can do anything the Navy can do nowadays, so that
does away with the Navy. "2
—Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, December 1949

MCDP 3 Expeditionary Organizations
M arine Corps forces are organized and equipped spe-

cifically to meet the requirements of expeditionary
operations. These organizations possess the characteristics of
versatility, flexibility, expandability, rapid deployability, sus-
tainability, and reconstitutive ability necessary for expedition-
ary operations. This chapter describes the way the Marine
Corps organizes for such operations.
NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
The Navy and Marine Corps provide naval expeditionary

forces as part of a joint force. These forces are organized to
accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.3 They
are designed to project military power ashore from the sea, to
include the establishment of a landing force on foreign soil if
needed, and thus to operate in the littoral regions.
Naval expeditionary forces combine the complementary

but distinct capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps.
Through attack aircraft, surface fire support, sea-launched
cruise missiles, and special-warfare forces, Navy forces pro-
vide the capability to attack targets in the littorals, and they
provide the capability to deploy, land, and sustain expedition-
ary forces ashore. Navy forces contribute the seaward element
of naval expeditionary power projection. Marine forces con-
tribute landing forces, the landward extension of naval
63
xpeuiuunauy JperaLIuus -- MCDP 3
expeditionary power. Landing forces include not only ground

combat forces but also Marine aviation and logistics elements
that can operate from expeditionary land as well as sea bases.4
In addition to projecting landing forces ashore, deployed
Marine aviation forces can also strike targets ashore operating
from aircraft carriers and amphibious ships.
Naval forces operating in international waters can mini-

mize military and political liabilities. Naval expeditionary
forces are self-contained, able to conduct most military opera-
tions without external support. Operating from the sea, naval
expeditionary forces can maintain a presence in an area al-
most indefinitely, eliminating the need for ground-based stag-
ing and reducing the influence that host nations or other local
powers can exert on U.S. policy initiatives. Naval expedition-
ary forces are unencumbered by the treaties and access agree-
ments that land-based forces require to operate overseas.5
Through forward presence and deployability, naval expedi-

tionary forces provide a rapid response to many crises or po-
tential crises. Naval forces are typically the first to arrive at
the scene of a crisis. As part of a joint force, they can serve as
enabling forces by stabilizing a situation and preparing for
follow on operations.
Naval expeditionary forces offer the combatant com-

mander a flexible range of options in the support of national
interests, covering peacetime missions, crisis, and conflict.
They can offer a visible deterrent presence in full view of
64
potential aggressors or can operate from over the horizon to

minimize political provocation or gain operational surprise
and security. They can perform missions ranging from hu-
manitarian assistance to forcible entry. They have the flexibil-
ity to project power inland to a significant depth at the time
and place of their own choosing.
MARINE CORPS FORCES COMMANDS
There are three Marine Corps Forces commands: Marine

Corps Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT), Marine Corps
Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), and Marine Corps Forces
Reserve (MARFORRES). Marine Corps Forces commanders
are part of the Service or administrative chain of command
and are responsible to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
for equipping, training, administering, and sustaining their
forces. These forces include—
• I Marine Expeditionary Force, based in southern Cali-

fornia and Arizona, under Marine Corps Forces Pacific.
• II Marine Expeditionary Force, based in North and
South Carolina, under Marine Corps Forces Atlantic.
• III Marine Expeditionary Force, based in Okinawa,
mainland Japan, and Hawaii, under Marine Corps
Forces Pacific.
65
• 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and 4th

Force Service Support Group, stationed throughout the
United States, under Marine Corps Forces Reserve.
The commanders of Marine Corps Forces Atlantic and Pa-

cific provide operating forces to combatant commanders or
other operational commanders. In this capacity, the com-
manders of Marine Corps Forces Atlantic and Pacific provide
three types of expeditionary elements: amphibious forces,
maritime prepositioning forces, and air contingency forces.
They also provide special-purpose units tailored for a specific
mission, such as mobile training teams or Special Purpose
MAGTF Unitas, the annual military cooperation deployment
to South America.

cific are also Marine Corps Service component commanders.
For example, Commander, Marine Corps Forces Pacific is as-
signed as the Marine Corps component commander for U.S
Pacific Command and designated as the Marine Corps com-
ponent commander for U.S Central Command and U.S.
Forces Korea. Commander, Marine Corps Forces Atlantic is
assigned as the Marine Corps component commander for U.S.
Atlantic Command and designated as the Marine Corps com-
ponent commander for U.S. European Command and U.S.
Southern Command. Componency is further discussed later in
this chapter.
66

cific retain the titles and responsibilities of commanding gen-
erals of Fleet Marine Forces (FMFs) Atlantic and Pacific.
Fleet Marine Force commanding generals have the status of
type commanders and provide forces to the Commander, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet.6 For exam-
ple, the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Pacific, is also the
commanding general of Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, respon-
sible to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, for providing
combat-ready expeditionary forces for service with the oper-
ating fleet. (See figure, page 68.) This includes, for example,
Marine expeditionary units deployed with amphibious ready
groups.
The Marine Corps Reserve is closely integrated with the

active duty Marine Corps Forces. Within the Service chain of
command, the commander of Marine Corps Forces Reserve
provides Selected Marine Corps Reserve units and individual
augmentees to the active duty Marine Forces when directed
by the National Command Authorities through the Comman-
dant of the Marine Corps. The Commander in Chief, U.S. At-
lantic Command has training and readiness oversight
authority over assigned Selected Marine Corps Reserve units
on a continuous basis. He executes his training and readiness
oversight authority through Commander, Marine Corps
Forces Atlantic. When Selected Marine Corps Reserve units
are mobilized or ordered to active duty (other than for train-
ing), Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command exercises
67
* A Marine Corps Forces commander (COMMARFORLANT or COMMARFORPAC)

is designated simultaneously as a Marine Corps component commander (In
relation to the joint force commander) and as the commanding general
of Fleet Marine Forces (in relation to the Navy component).
The Marine Corps component and the

Fleet Marine Forces of a joint force.
combatant command (command authority) and is the force

provider to the supported combatant commanders.
68
MARINE Am-GROUND TASK FORCES
The MAGTF is the Marine Corps' principal organization for

all missions across the range of military operations. The
MAGTF provides a combatant commander in chief or other
operational commander with a versatile expeditionary force
for responding to a broad range of crisis and conflict situa-
tions. MAGTFs are balanced, combined arms forces with
organic command, ground, aviation, and sustainment ele-
ments.
MAGTFs are organized, trained, and equipped to perform

forward-presence, crisis-response, and full-scale combat mis-
sions, including forcible entry by amphibious assault. With
the exception of special purpose MAGTFs (discussed later),
MAGTFs are general-purpose air-ground-logistics forces that
can be tailored to the requirements of a specific situation.
Marines routinely organize, train, deploy, and operate as

MAGTFs. The MAGTF is a modular organization tailorable
to each mission. Most military organizations are specifically
designed for particular missions, and reorganization tends to
reduce their effectiveness. However, the Marine Corps' build-
ing-block approach to MAGTF organization makes reorgani-
zation a matter of routine. Tailoring MAGTFs for specific
missions through task organization is standard procedure. As
a result, the MAGTF is a cohesive military organization with
69
well-understood command relationships and operating proce-

dures.
MAGTFs can perform missions ranging from humanitarian

assistance to peacekeeping to intense combat and can operate
in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. MAGTFs
can operate from sea or expeditionary bases, or both. Depend-
ing on the requirements of the situation, they can present
minimal presence ashore or a highly visible presence. They
can project combat power ashore in measured degrees as
needed and can provide secure staging areas ashore for
follow-on forces. In this way, sea-based MAGTFs provide the
National Command Authorities and combatant commanders a
"rheostat" of options and capabilities to vary the composition,
scope, and size of the forces phased ashore.
Tm STRUCTURE OF THE MAGTF

While MAGTFs are task-organized, each MAGTF, regardless
of size or mission, has the same basic structure. Each
MAGTF has four core elements: a command element, ground
combat element, aviation combat element, and combat serv-
ice support element. The MAGTF's combat forces reside
within these four elements. (See figure page 71.)
The command element provides the command and control

necessary for the effective planning and execution of all
70
Structure of the MAGTF.
military operations. It is normally a permanent headquarters.

It also includes units that provide intelligence, communica-
tions, and administrative support in general support of the
MAGTF.
The ground combat element is task-organized to conduct

ground operations in support of the MAGTF mission. During
amphibious operations, it projects ground combat power
ashore using transport helicopters from the aviation combat
element and organic and Navy landing craft. It may have any
composition required by the mission, although normally it is
built around an infantry unit reinforced with artillery, recon-
naissance, armor, engineer, and other forces as needed. The
ground combat element may range from a light, air-
transportable unit to one that is relatively heavy and
mechanized.
71
The aviation combat element is task-organized to support

the MAGTF mission by performing some or all of the six
functions of Marine aviation: antiair warfare, assault support,
offensive air support, air reconnaissance, electronic warfare,
and control of aircraft and missiles. The aviation combat ele-
ment is normally built around an aircraft organization aug-
mented with appropriate air command and control, combat,
combat support, and combat service support units. The avia-
tion combat element can operate effectively from ships, expe-
ditionary airfields, or austere forward operating sites and can
readily and routinely transit between sea bases and expedi-
tionary airfields without loss of capability. The aviation com-
bat element can range in size and composition from an
aviation detachment with specific capabilities to one or more
Marine aircraft wings.
The combat service support element is task-organized to

provide a full range of support functions from sea bases
aboard naval shipping or from expeditionary bases ashore.
The combat service support element provides sustainment for
the MAGTF. It can also provide logistical support external to
the MAGTF, as in disaster relief operations, for example.
MAGTFs can augment this organic sustainability by external
support from Navy, other-Service, and host nation support
organizations.
One of the key features of Marine expeditionary organiza-

tion is expandability. Because of the frequent need for rapid
response, the initial force at the scene of a developing crisis
72
may not be the decisive force. Crisis response requires the

ability to expand the expeditionary force after its introduction
in theater without sacrificing the continuity of operational ca-
pability. The MAGTF's modular structure lends itself to rap-
idly and easily expanding into a larger force as a situation
demands by simply adding forces as needed to the core units
of each existing element. This expandability includes expand-
ing into a joint or combined force, because the generic
MAGTF structure parallels the structure of a multidimen-
sional joint force.
Tmi MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
The Marine expeditionary force (MEF) is the principal

Marine Corps warfighting organization, particularly for larger
crises or contingencies. It is capable of missions across the
range of military operations, including amphibious assault
and sustained operations ashore in any environment.
The three standing Marine expeditionary forces—I, II, and

III MEFs—are each located near airports, railheads, and ports
for rapid deployment. Each Marine expeditionary force con-
sists of a permanent command element and one Marine divi-
sion, Marine aircraft wing, and force service support group.
Each forward-deploys Marine expeditionary units on a con-
tinual basis.
73
The size and composition of a deployed Marine expedi-

tionary force can vary greatly depending on the requirements
of the mission. A Marine expeditionary force can deploy with
not only its own units but also units from the other standing
Marine expeditionary forces, the Marine Corps Reserve, or
other Services. For example, I Marine Expeditionary Force in
Operation Desert Storm included 1St and 2d Marine Divi-
sions, 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups, 3d Marine
Aircraft Wing reinforced with groups and squadrons from the
1st and 2d Marine Aircraft Wings, elements from Marine
Forces Reserve, and the U.S. Army's "Tiger" Brigade. A
Marine expeditionary force typically deploys with 60 days of
sustainment.
A Marine expeditionary force normally deploys by eche-

lon. The lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary force, tai-
lored to meet a specific mission, is designated the Marine
expeditionary force (Forward) and may be commanded by the
Marine expeditionary force commander personally or by a
designated commander. The Marine expeditionary force (for-
ward) prepares for the subsequent arrival of the rest of the
Marine expeditionary force or other joint or combined forces.
However, the deployment of the Marine expeditionary force
(forward) does not necessarily mean that all the forces of the
standing Marine expeditionary force will follow. This would
occur only if the entire Marine expeditionary force were
required.
74
Tmi MAIUE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL

OPERATIONS CAPABLE)
The Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable

(MEU(SOC)) is the standard forward-deployed Marine expe-
ditionary organization. Though each Marine expeditionary
unit (special operations capable) is task-organized, a typical
Marine expeditionary unit includes—
• A standing command element.

• An infantry battalion reinforced with artillery, recon-
naissance, engineer, armor, and assault amphibian units.
• A reinforced helicopter squadron with transport, utility,
and attack helicopters, a detachment of vertical/short
takeoff and landing (V/STOL) fixed-wing attack air-
craft, and other detachments as required.
• A task-organized combat service support element.
• Sustainment for 15 days.
Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable)

undergo intensive predeployment training and are augmented
with selected personnel and equipment to provide enhanced
capabilities such as specialized demolition operations, clan-
destine reconnaissance and surveillance, raids, and in-
extremis hostage recovery.
75
Expeditionary Operations MCD? 3
Marine Corps Forces Atlantic and Pacific maintain

forward-deployed Marine expeditionary units (special opera-
tions capable) in the Mediterranean Sea, the western Pacific,
and the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf region. The Marine ex-
peditionary unit (special operations capable) can be thought
of both as a self-contained operating force capable of mis-
sions Of limited scope and duration and as a forward-deployed
extension of the Marine expeditionary force. Deployed with
an amphibious ready group, the Marine expeditionary unit
(special operations capable) provides either a combatant com-
mander in chief or other operational commander a quick, sea-
based reaction force for a wide variety of situations. In many
cases, the Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capa-
ble) embarked on amphibious shipping will be the first U.S.
force at the scene of a crisis and can conduct enabling actions
for larger follow-on forces, whether a Marine expeditionary
force, joint task force, or some other force. It can provide a
visible and credible presence in many potential trouble spots
and can demonstrate the United States' willingness to protect
its interests overseas. The Marine expeditionary unit (special
operations capable) has a limited forcible entry capability.
THE SPECIAL PURPOSE MAGTF
A special purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) may be formed to

conduct a specific mission that is limited in scope and focus
and often in duration. A special purpose MAGTF may be any
76
size, but normally it is a relatively small force—the size of a

Marine expeditionary unit or smaller—with narrowly focused
capabilities chosen to accomplish a limited mission. Common
missions of a special purpose MAGTF include raids,
peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuation, disaster relief, and
humanitarian assistance. For example, a special purpose
MAGTF was deployed to Haiti to restore democracy, conduct
peacekeeping operations, and provide humanitarian assis-
tance. Special purpose MAGTFs are normally designated by
the mission location or operation name, such as "SPMAGTF
Somalia" or "SPMAGTF Support Democracy."
A special purpose MAGTF may be task-organized deliber-

ately from the assets of a standing Marine expeditionary force
and deployed from its home base for a particular mission, or
it may be formed on a contingency basis from an already-
deployed MAGTF to perform an independent, rapid-response
mission of usually limited scope and duration. An example of
the former is SPMAGTF Liberia, which was formed from
elements of the II Marine Expeditionary Force and deployed
from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to relieve the 22d
Marine Expeditionary Unit (special operations capable) de-
ployed off the coast of Liberia in April 1996. An example of
the latter is the special purpose MAGTF that conducted op-
eration Eastern Exit, the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in
Mogadishu, Somalia, in January J99J7 It was formed from
elements of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, deployed
in the Gulf of Oman for Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm in 1990—1991.
77
MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCES
Maritime prepositioning forces are a key element of the

Marine Corps' expeditionary capability. The deployment of
expeditionary forces rapidly to practically any part of the
globe is made possible through the linkup of personnel from
the operating forces with prepositioned equipment and sup-
plies. A maritime prepositioning force consists of two basic
building blocks:
• Prepositioned shipping carrying equipment and supplies.

• Marines and Sailors, with selected items of equipment,
flown into the objective area by strategic airlift to link
up with the equipment. Depending on the mission, the
fly-in echelon can include some 120 self-deploying air-
craft.
There are three maritime prepositioning ships squadrons.

Each squadron consists of four or five multipurpose vessels.
These squadrons are maintained at strategic locations around
the globe that allow at least one of them to steam to any part
of the world within a matter of days. The equipment on a sin-
gle maritime prepositioning ships squadron is the equivalent
of more than 3,000 airlift sorties.
Each maritime prepositioning ships squadron contains

equipment and 30 days of sustainment for nearly 18,000
78
Marines from one of the standing Marine expeditionary

forces task-organized around a Marine infantry regiment, a
Marine aircraft group, and a combat service support element.
These forces, along with a Navy support element, fly into the
theater using 250 strategic airlift sorties and link up with the
equipment unloaded from the prepositioning ships. Within a
few days, any combatant commander can have the lead eche-
lon of a Marine expeditionary force ready for employment.
Maritime prepositioning forces can deploy in conjunction

with a forward-deployed amphibious force that secures the
linkup site, or it can deploy independently where a secure ar-
rival and assembly area already exists. With the capability to
offload pierside or at sea, the maritime prepositioning force
MAGTF can go ashore with minimal or nonexistent port
facilities.
Maritime prepositioning forces can provide a variety of

employment options to a combatant commander. Through
designated offload from prepositioning ships in concert with a
tailored fly-in echelon, a commander can task-organize to—
• Deploy a MAGTF weighted to provide a specific capa-

bility, such as support to a military operation other than
war.
• Augment the capabilities of an on-the-scene Marine ex-
peditionary unit (special operations capable) by provid-
ing additional equipment.
79
Selectively reinforce a Marine expeditionary unit (spe-

cial operations capable) or air contingency MAGTF by
providing mixes of Marines and equipment that can be
absorbed into the unit's command, ground combat, avia-
tion combat, and combat service support elements.
By combining all three maritime prepositioning ships

squadrons, the entire combat power of a heavy, mechanized
Marine expeditionary force can be deployed to a region.
The ultimate usefulness of maritime prepositioning forces

is their enormous flexibility. Through a building-block ap-
proach, they provide combatant commanders a cost-effec-
tive, rapid, sustainable global crisis response capability that
can be employed across a wide range of expeditionary opera-
tions.
AIR CONTINGENCY FORCES
Air contingency forces may be dispatched to respond to fast-

developing crises. An air contingency MAGTF is an on-call,
combat-ready task organization that can begin deployment by
strategic airlift within 18 hours of notification. The fixed
wing aircraft of the air contingency MAGTF will normally
self-deploy. Both Marine Corps Forces Atlantic and Marine
80
Corps Forces Pacific maintain air contingency MAGTFs in a

continuous state of readiness. These forces require a secure
airfield at the point of entry. The air contingency MAGTF
that deploys will be task-organized based on the mission,
threat, and available airlift. Its size can range from a rein-
forced rifle company with a small combat service support ele-
ment to a MAGTF with a regimental-size ground combat
element and appropriate aviation and combat service support
elements.
An air contingency MAGTF can deploy independently or

in conjunction with a Marine expeditionary unit (special op-
erations capable), maritime preposition ing force, or other ex-
peditionary force. Unlike maritime prepositioning force
troops who deploy without most of their organic equipment in
anticipation of marrying up in theater with that from the mari-
time prepositioning squadrons, air contingency forces must
deploy to the theater with all of the organic equipment they
require. Also unlike maritime prepositioning forces, air con-
tingency forces do not have an organic sustainment
capability.
MARINE CORPS COMPONENT COMMANDS
All joint forces include Service components. A component is

one of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint
81
force. A Service component command consists of the Service

component commander and all those individuals, units, de-
tachments, organizations, and installations under that com-
mand that are assigned to a joint force—that is, to a
combatant command, subordinate unified command, or joint
task force.8
The Service component commander is responsible in the

operational chain of command to the joint force commander
and in the administrative chain of command to the respective
Service chief. The Marine Corps component commander
deals directly with the joint force commander in matters af-
fecting assigned Marine forces. The Marine Corps component
commander commands, trains, equips, and sustains all Marine
component forces. In general, the Marine Corps component
commander is responsible for—
• Advising the joint force commander on the use of

Marine Corps forces.
• Accomplishing missions or tasks assigned by the joint
force commander.
• Informing the joint force commander as to the situation
and progress of assigned Marine Corps forces.
• Providing Service-specific support—administrative, lo-
gistical, training, and intelligence—to assigned Marine
Corps forces.
82
There are two levels of Marine Corps components: a

Marine Corps component commander under command of a
combatant commander or a subunified commander, and a
Marine Corps component commander under command of a
joint task force commander. A Marine Corps component
commander under a combatant commander may have one or
more MAGTFs assigned, as well as other required theater-
level organizations. For example, a Marine Logistic Com-
mand might be established to provide theater logistical sup-
port for all Marine forces, freeing the combat service support
element of each MAGTF to focus internally on MAGTF com-
bat service support requirements.
When so designated by the joint force commander, a

Marine Corps component commander may also serve as a
-
functional component commander. A functional component

command is a command that is normally composed of forces
of two or more Military Departments. It may be established to
perform particular operational missions.9 Joint force com-
manders may establish functional component commanders
(i.e., joint force air component commander, joint force land
component commander, joint force maritime component
commander, and joint force special operations component
commander) to conduct operations or employ them primarily
to coordinate selected functions. Normally, the component
commander with the preponderance of forces or the requisite
command and control capability to perform the required mis-
sion is designated the functional component commander. A
83
Marine Corps component commander designated as a func-

tional component commander retains Service component
command responsibilities. Due to the unique nature of Marine
Corps forces assigned to a joint force, the Marine Corps com-
ponent commander may be designated as the joint force mari-
time, land, or air component commander.
MAGTFs operate effectively under the operational control

of either the Marine Corps component commander or a func-
tional component commander. However, exercise of opera-
tional control through the Marine Corps component
commander normally takes greater advantage of established
chains of command, maintains the operational integrity of
Marine Corps forces, exploits common Service doctrine and
operating methods, and facilitates the coordination of operat-
ing and support requirements.
CONCLUSION
The Marine Corps provides a variety of versatile, deployable,

and expandable organizations specifically designed to con-
duct or support expeditionary operations. The MAGTF, a
modular task organization of air, ground, and logistics ele-
ments, is the Marine Corps' basic operating organization.
MAGTFs can deploy rapidly as part of amphibious ready
forces, maritime prepositioning forces, or air contingency
84
forces. Coming in a variety of sizes and capabilities, they pro-

vide a combatant commander or other operational com-
mander with a responsive and adaptive expeditionary
capability suitable for satisfying a broad range of operational
needs.
85
Chapter 4
Expeditionary
Concepts
"A Military, Naval, Littoral War, when wisely prepared and
discreetly conducted, is a terrible Sort of War. Happy for that
People who are Sovereigns enough of the Sea to put it into
Execution! For it comes like Thunder and lightning to some
unprepared Part of the World.
—Thomas More Molyneux, 1759
"Ever since the days of the Phoenicians, the ability to land on

defended shores has been a source of strength for those who
possess it and a source of concern for those who must oppose
"2
it.
—Robert H. Barrow
MCDP 3 Expeditionary Concepts
T his chapter describes the Marine Corps' fundamental

operating concepts for the conduct of expeditionary op-
erations: operational maneuver from the sea, sustained opera-
tions ashore, military operations other than war, and maritime
prepositioning force operations. The applicable concept in
any given instance depends on the particular political and
military conditions. All of these expeditionary concepts are
compatible with the fundamental Marine Corps doctrine of
maneuver warfare.
OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA
The capstone operating concept for Marine Corps expedition-

ary operations is Operational Maneuver from the Sea.3 This
concept describes the maneuver of naval forces at the opera-
tional level in a maritime implementation of Marine Corps
maneuver warfare doctrine across the range of military opera-
tions—from major theater war to military operations other
than war.
Operational maneuver from the sea is an amphibious op-

eration that seeks to use the sea as an avenue for maneuvering
against some operational-level objective.4 The concept recog-
nizes the requirement for forcible entry—an amphibious land-
ing in the face of organized military resistance—although not
all operational maneuvers from the sea entail forcible entry.
89
The concept envisions the MAGTF operating as part of a na-

val expeditionary force conducting operations as part of a
theater or joint task force campaign. Operational maneuver
from the sea may or may not develop into sustained opera-
tions ashore.
Operational maneuver from the sea is not limited to com-

bat at the high end of the range of military operations. In fact,
one of the principles of operational maneuver from the sea is
to use the mobility provided by naval power to avoid enemy
strengths and strike where the enemy is weak. Many opera-
tional maneuvers from the sea will be conducted during mili-
tary operations other than war.
By definition, an operational maneuver from the sea in-

volves the entry phase of an expeditionary operation. It may
also include enabling actions or decisive actions, depending
on the nature of the situation. In other words, the operational
maneuver may be intended to set the stage for the decisive ac-
tion, or it may itself constitute the decisive move.
As the title of the concept denotes, there are two main as-
pects to operational maneuver from the sea. The first is opera-
tional maneuver, the employment of the MAGTF as an
operational-level force in such a way as to gain and exploit an
operational advantage. Classically, this has often meant using
the sea as a means for turning the enemy's flank and threaten-
ing his lines of operations. For example, in one brilliant
stroke, General MacArthur's landing of the 1st Marine
90
Division at Inchon to attack Seoul in 1950 turned the tide of

the Korean War. It cut off the North Korean army's lines of
communications at Seoul and facilitated 8th Army's breakout
from the Pusan perimeter. The Allied landing at Salerno, It-
aly, in 1944, although predictable and not well executed,
sought to bypass Axis defenses in southern Italy rather than
attack frontally the length of the peninsula. Another example
of operational maneuver was Operation Galvanic, the bloody
assault of Tarawa in November 1943, which secured a
jumping-off point for the campaign to seize the operationally
important Marshall Islands. Possession of the Marshalls in
turn facilitated the decisive penetration of the heart of the
Japanese defenses in the Marianas.
Operational maneuver from the sea is not merely a way of

introducing an expeditionary force onto foreign soil, although
it does that, but a way of projecting expeditionary power di-
rectly against some center of gravity or critical vulnerability.
The idea is to use the operational mobility of naval power to
launch an attack at the time and place of our choosing to ex-
ploit an enemy weakness.
Operational maneuver from the sea includes the imple-

menting concept of ship-to-objective maneuver. Historically,
amphibious operations have involved creating an initial lodg-
ment on a foreign shore, followed by a buildup of combat
power and supplies on an established beachhead. The ship-to-
shore movement was primarily a way of transferring combat
power ashore. The choice of landing beach was necessarily
91
dictated largely by the technical and tactical problems of get-

ting ashore safely. Only after sufficient combat power and
supplies had been placed ashore could the landing force
launch its attack against its main objective ashore, which was
its reason for landing in the first place. This buildup of com-
bat power also gave the enemy time to strengthen his de-
fenses, nullif'ing any advantages in tempo and surprise the
attacker had gained. Frequently, this warning and consequent
reinforcement compelled the landing force to plan and fight a
deliberate and often costly pitched battle to break out of the
beachhead. Made possible primarily by advances in the tech-
nology for transporting landing forces ashore, the operational
maneuver from the sea concept seeks to generate operating
tempo by combining the ship-to-shore movement and what
has traditionally been called "subsequent operations ashore"
into a single, decisive maneuver directly from the ship.
It may not always be possible to maneuver directly against

operational objectives. However, even where objectives are
tactical, we should seek to exploit the mobility and firepower
provided by naval power and the ability to introduce ground
combat power quickly to attack rapidly at a time and place of
our own choosing before the enemy can respond adequately.
As an example, on the morning of 25 October 1983, the 22d
Marine Amphibious Unit launched a helicopterborne assault
to capture Pearls and Grenville on the northeast coast of Gre-
nada in Operation Urgent Fury. The same unit exploited the
operational mobility provided by Amphibious Squadron 4 to
launch an unplanned surfaceborne assault at Grand Mal Bay
on the west side of the island later the same day.
92
The second main aspect of operational maneuver from the

sea is "from the sea." The operational maneuver from the sea
concept seeks to fully exploit the naval character of Marine
Corps forces—their ability to move by sea, deploy at sea near
the scene of a crisis, project power ashore and sustain them-
selves from the sea, and redeploy to the sea. What distin-
guishes operational maneuver from the sea is the use of the
sea as a means of gaining operational advantage, as an avenue
for friendly movement that is simultaneously a barrier to the
enemy, and as a means of avoiding disadvantageous engage-
ments.
Sea basing is an important implementing concept of opera-

tional maneuver from the sea. Sea basing applies to fire sup-
port, command and control, and other functions as well as to
logistics. However, sea basing is not an absolute requirement
for operational maneuver from the sea; support may also be
based ashore as each situation dictates.
The operational maneuver from the sea concept envisions

that most or all aviation—especially fixed-wing aviation—
will remain sea based during the evolution. Likewise, some or
most logistics will remain sea based. Sea-based logistics does
not mean that ground units will not carry unit-level supplies;
it means that most landing-force-level logistics, including
supply dumps and repair facilities, will remain afloat. The op-
erational maneuver from the sea concept also envisions that
most MAGTF command and control will remain afloat rather
than ashore. However, some command and control in support
93
of the ground combat element will be passed ashore as the

situation requires. Finally, the concept envisions that the
landing force will be supported by naval surface fires to aug-
ment its own land-based fire support.
Sea basing done properly can be a source of operational

freedom of action. Historically, the tactical and operational
options available to landing forces were constrained by the
need to establish, employ, and protect large supply dumps
ashore. These logistical bases dictated and limited operational
direction and range. With the increased use of sea basing, the
logistics tail of landing forces will be smaller, subsequent op-
erations ashore can start without the traditional buildup phase
within the beachhead, and landing forces will have greater
operational freedom of action. The important results can be
an increase in operating tempo and reduced requirements for
rear area security. The reduction of the support infrastructure
ashore will also facilitate the rapid redeployment of the land-
ing force. All of this helps the landing force avoid combat on
unfavorable terms.
CASE STUDY: THE MARIANAS, 1944
Operation Forager, the U.S. invasion of the Marianas Islands

in the summer of 1944 during the Second World War,
94
provides a classic example of operational maneuver from the

sea.5 The Allied strategy in the Pacific called for a two-prong
counteroffensive: General MacArthur would advance gener-
ally northwest out of Australia in the southwest Pacific thea-
ter of operations while Admiral Nimitz drove west out of
Hawaii in the central Pacific. While MacArthur was starting
his New Guinea drive in early 1944, Nimitz moved on the
heavily fortified Marshalls in the central Pacific. The key is-
land of Kwajalein fell on 7 February, and Eniwetok, the west-
ernmost garrison, was captured by 21 February. The Joint
Chiefs approved Nimitz's recommendation to bypass Truk in
the Carolines and instead to attack the Marianas in June. The
stage was now set for Operation Forager.
The Marianas were of significant strategic importance.

Considered part of the Japanese homeland, their capture by
the Allies would have an important political and psychologi-
cal effect on both sides. Moreover, this maneuver into the
heart of the Japanese defenses threatened Japanese north-
south lines of communications. Allied possession of the Man-
anas isolated the Carolines to the south and endangered
Japanese sea lines of communication to Rabaul in New
Guinea and Truk. Control of the Caroliries was essential to
protecting the right flank of MacArthur's upcoming invasion
of the Philippines. It was also of significant military impor-
tance that possession of the Marianas exposed most of the re-
maining Japanese positions and opened more operational
options to the Allies than the Japanese could defend against:
95
south to the Carolines and Truk, southwest to the Palaus, west

to the Philippines, northwest to Okinawa, or north to the Vol-
canoes and Bonins. Finally, the Marianas provided air bases
for long-range air strikes against the Japanese mainland. (See
figure.)
Nimitz assigned operational command of Forager to Admi-

ral Raymond Spruance, commander of the U.S. 5th Fleet.
Spruance organized three main forces:
• The Joint Expeditionary Force including, as its Expedi-

tionary Troops, General Holland M. Smith's V Am-
phibious Corps of 127,000 troops.
• Task Force 58, the Fast-Carrier Attack Force, under Ad-
miral Marc Mitscher.
• All U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine land-based aircraft
assigned to support the operation, including the Army's
7th Air Force, under Navy command.
The military objectives were three of the southernmost

Marianas islands, Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. The northern-
most, Saipan, would be attacked first to deny airfields to any
Japanese air support flying from Iwo Jima in the Volcanoes
or from mainland Japan. Saipan was more than a thousand
miles from Eniwetok in the Marshalls, the nearest U.S.
advanced naval base. This would be by far the longest am-
phibious projection attempted yet in the war. Previously, am-
phibious advances had been limited to about 300 miles, the
96
97
range of land-based fighters providing close air support. In

Operation Forager, all close air support would be sea-based,
flying off Task Force 58's carriers.
The Joint Expeditionary Force assembled in California,

Hawaii, and Guadalcanal and rendezvoused in the Marshalls.
Task Force 58 arrived east of Guam on 11 June and com-
menced bombardment with aviation and naval gunfire. The
2d and 4th Marine Divisions landed abreast at Saipan on 15
June against heavy resistance. They made slow progress, re-
quiring the Guam landing to be delayed by a month. Saipan
was finally secured on 13 July; the Guam landing began on
21 July and the Tinian landing on 24 July. After tough fight-
ing, Guam was declared secured on 10 August.
There was only limited latitude for tactical maneuver

ashore, although both Saipan and Tinian involved the use of
amphibious feints, and the Tinian operation achieved tactical
surprise. Nevertheless, all three landings amounted to hard-
fought direct assaults against fortified defenses. The real sig-
nificance of the Forager landings was their direct operational
and strategic effect. The Marianas operation pierced the inner
defenses that Japan had constructed to defend its empire. The
cabinet led by General Tojo was forced to resign in disgrace.
By November, B-29 bombers operating from Saipan were at-
tacking Japan on a daily basis, eventually reaching a rate of
over a thousand sorties a week. Although the war in the Pa-
cific continued for another year after Forager, this operational
98
maneuver from the sea against the Marianas had sealed Ja-
pan's ultimate fate.
This case study illustrates that operational maneuver from

the sea is not a new concept dependent on emerging technol-
ogy but instead has a strong historical basis. Some of the most
effective employments of amphibious forces and operations
throughout history have been to conduct operational and even
strategic maneuver. That said, due to recent advances in doc-
trine, techniques, and technology, current operating capabili-
ties greatly exceed those of 1944. As these advances continue,
capabilities will continue to improve. The fictional case study
starting on page 125 illustrates the potential future application
of operational maneuver from the sea and other expeditionary
concepts.
SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE
While organized and equipped to participate in naval cam-

paigns, the Marine Corps has frequently been called on to
conduct sustained operations ashore. From the American
Civil War to the Vietnam War to the Gulf War, Marine Corps
forces have participated in operations in which their naval
character and their relations with the Navy played a limited
role.
99
Today's sustained operations ashore are those extended op-

erations, usually of significant scale, in which MAGTFs fight
not as amphibious or sea-based naval forces, but essentially
as land forces. This concept envisions that Marine Corps
forces are part of a larger joint or combined force with the
Marine Corps forces operating under the Marine Corps Serv-
ice component or a functional land component.
During sustained operations ashore, Marine Corps forces

will use the sea to complement their land-based operational
mobility—including shore-to-shore or even ship-to-shore op-
erations. MAGTFs conducting sustained operations ashore
may employ a combination of sea- or land-based fires, logis-
tics, and command and control support—depending upon the
situation.
In sustained operations ashore, MAGTFs are often best

employed as independent formations that are assigned opera-
tional or tactical missions appropriate to a self-contained,
self-sustaining combined arms force with both air and ground
capabilities. Operational maneuver is as integral to sustained
operations ashore as it is to operational maneuver from the
sea. Appropriate missions include advance force, covering
force, and enabling force operations, independent supporting
attacks, and employment as an operational reserve or opera-
tional maneuver element. Depending on the nature and scale
of operations, a MAGTF may constitute or compose part of
100
an enabling force or a decisive force. A MAGTF engaged in

sustained operations ashore may include elements from other
Services or countries, as I Marine Expeditionary Force in-
cluded the British 7 Armour Brigade during Operation Desert
Shield and the U.S. Army "Tiger" Brigade during Operation
Desert Storm.
Sustained operations ashore may follow an operational ma-

neuver from the sea when the amphibious operation is a way
of introducing forces into a theater for a sustained campaign.
The Allied landings in Normandy in 1944, for example, were
the opening move in Eisenhower's campaign in Europe, in
contrast to the Forager landings, started 9 days later in the
Marianas, which were part of a series of landings conducted
during Nimitz's campaign in the central Pacific.
Currently when sustained operations ashore follow an am-

phibious operation, a transition must generally be made from
sea basing to land basing. This transition is a complex under-
taking involving the phasing ashore of various command and
support functions. Future technology and mobility enhance-
ments will allow the Marine Corps to execute ship-to-
objective maneuver. Ship-to-objective maneuver reduces the
footprint ashore, provides greater security to the force, and al-
lows the force to sea base many of the command and support
functions previously trans itioned ashore.
101
CASE STUDY: THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990.6 On 7 August, Presi-

dent Bush ordered 125,000 troops to the Persian Gulf as part
of a multinational force with the initial mission of protecting
Saudi Arabia. Designated Desert Shield, the U.S. operation
was under the command of the Commander in Chief, U.S.
Central Command, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Among
the U.S. forces was I Marine Expeditionary Force based in
Camp Pendleton, California, which arrived at the beginning
of September under the command of Lieutenant General Wal-
ter E. Boomer. Lieutenant General Boomer was also desig-
nated as Central Command's Marine Corps component
commander, responsible directly to General Schwarzkopf for
the operations of all Marine Corps forces save those assigned
to the Navy component as landing forces. The Marine Corps
component was assigned the mission of defending the Jubayl
sector throughout the duration of Desert Shield. (See figure.)
The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing established its headquarters

at Shaikh Isa Air Base as I Marine Expeditionary Force's
aviation combat element. Marine aviation during Desert
Shield/Desert Storm was based ashore, except for the aviation
belonging to MAGTFs assigned to the Navy component. Air-
craft squadrons were based ashore at several military and ci-
vilian airfields.
102
103
One of the first and most difficult issues to be worked out

was the control of Marine aviation. An agreement was
reached with the commander of U.S. Air Forces Central Com-
mand. The joint force air component commander would issue
a daily air tasking order to coordinate all theater air opera-
tions. Marine aviation would support the Marine Corps forces
while providing a percentage of its fixed-wing sorties to Cen-
tral Command for theater missions. In turn, joint force air
component commander sorties would strike deep targets
nominated by the Marine Corps component. To ensure the re-
sponsive close air support traditionally enjoyed by Marine
ground forces, the Marine Corps component would control
offensive air missions within its area of operations.
By the end of October, planning began for an offensive op-

eration to liberate Kuwait. Initial planning called for I Marine
Expeditionary Force to be treated as if it were an Army
corps—employed to create a breach in the Iraqi barrier
through which the Anny mechanized forces would
pass—with most of its organic aviation employed in support
of non-Marine units. Lieutenant General Boomer argued for
more effective employment of the Marine expeditionary
force, and General Schwarzkopf agreed. The Marines would
launch a supporting attack toward Kuwait City.
Eventually, I Marine Expeditionary Force was given the

mission "to conduct a supporting attack to penetrate Iraqi de-
fenses, destroy Iraqi forces in its zone of action, and secure
key objectives to prevent reinforcement of Iraqi forces facing
104
the Joint Forces Command-North/Northern Area Command.

Once this was achieved, I Marine Expeditionary Force was to
establish blocking positions to halt the northerly retreat of
Iraqi forces from southeastern Kuwait and Kuwait City and to
assist passage of Coalition Forces in Kuwait City."7 On the
Marine expeditionary force's right flank would be Joint
Forces Command East, comprising five Arab mechanized bri-
gades. On the Marine expeditionary force's left flank would
be Joint Forces Command North, another Arab force. Farther
west as part of Central Command's main attack was the heav-
ily armored U.S. VII Corps, which had arrived from Germany
in November. Farther west still, also part of the flanking at-
tack, was the U.S. XVIII Corps. (See figure, page 106.)8
An offensive operation would require more forces, and re-

inforcements to I Marine Expeditionary Force started arriving
in December. The 2d Marine Division arrived from North
Carolina to constitute a second maneuver element in the
ground combat element. Elements of 2d Marine Aircraft
Wing arrived from North Carolina to reinforce 3d Marine
Aircraft Wing, now increased to 32 aircraft squadrons.
With the arrival of 2d Force Service Support Group, Lieu-

tenant General Boomer reorganized his logistics. The 1st
Force Service Support Group assumed the role of general
support logistics for all Marine Corps forces from the port at
Jubayl to the combat service support area. The newly arrived
2d Force Service Support Group became the Direct Support
Command, responsible for direct support of the divisions and
105
106
forward aviation units from the combat service support area

to the front.
Headquarters Marine Corps also activated 80 units of the

Selected Marine Corps Reserve, more than half the personnel
of the 4th Division-Wing team. The largest Reserve unit mo-
bilized was the 24th Marines, which in January 1991 assumed
responsibility for rear area security.
Offensive air operations commenced on 17 January for the

purpose of knocking out Iraq's command and control and
transportation systems and attacking the Republican Guards.
The ground offensive began on 24 February. First Marine Ex-
peditionary Force's two divisions attacked abreast, 2d on the
left and 1St on the right. The plan was to penetrate into the
depth of the Iraqi defensive system at an identified weak
point at the "elbow" of Kuwait in order to outflank the pre-
pared defensive positions and quickly destroy Iraqi opera-
tional reserves. The 1St Division attacked toward Al Jaber
Airfield. It would continue the attack to capture Marine expe-
ditionary force Objective B, Kuwait International Airport, in
order to isolate Kuwait City. The 2d Division would attack to-
ward Marine expeditionary force Objective C, the main sup-
ply route intersections near Al Jahrah, some 33 kilometers
west of Kuwait City, in order to prevent Iraqi forces from es-
caping west and north. (See figure.)9
By 26 February, I Marine Expeditionary Force's units were

closing in on their objectives. That morning, aircraft from
107
Marine Aircraft Group 11 and Marine Aircraft Group 13 at-

tacked more than a thousand Iraqi vehicles trying to escape
north on the highway from Al Jahrah. Marine Aircraft Group
11 alone flew 298 sorties. By that afternoon, 2d Marine Divi-
sion had captured Al Jahrah. Early on 27 February, elements
of 1st Division secured Kuwait International Airport and then
halted while the Arab Joint Forces Command entered Kuwait
City.
By now, Central Command's flanking attack had reached

the Euphrates River. Iraqi resistance was disintegrating. On
28 February, President Bush declared a cease-fire. The
ground offensive had lasted 100 hours.
In both the defensive operations of Desert Shield and the

offensive operations of Desert Storm, in both ground and air
operations, Marine Corps forces designed for naval opera-
tions proved their worth in sustained operations ashore fight-
ing side-by-side with mechanized and armored forces
designed specifically for mobile, desert warfare.
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
The concept of military operations other than war encom-

passes the use of military capabilities across the range of
military operations short of war. These military actions can be
108
applied to complement any combination of the other instru-

ments of national power and occur before, during, and after
war.'°
Not all military operations other than war take place in a

permissive environment or even a relatively safe one. The
situation may be almost completely permissive, as in, for ex-
ample, disaster relief situations in which the disaster has not
led to social or political disorder. However, military opera-
tions other than war may also take place in environments
characterized by widespread random violence or even combat
of less than large scale.
In military operations other than war more than in war, po-

litical concerns tend to restrict the application of military
force. Political considerations may even necessitate military
actions or deployments that are not militarily advantageous.
Rules of engagement will often greatly restrict military ac-
tion. In many cases, it is difficult to identify clear and finite
military objectives that constitute the measure of success.
Military operations other than war generally require closer

coordination with the host nation government, other nonmili-
tary agencies, and the local populace than do conventional,
large-scale combat operations. Furthermore, the types of
situations that lead to military operations other than war are
generally of significant interest to the media and generally al-
low greater access than do combat situations. As a result,
many military operations other than war require military
109
forces to deal with the media daily or more frequently than in

conventional combat operations.
The types of missions that constitute military operations

other than war have historically been Marine Corps missions.
They are generally directed at limited objectives and are often
of limited duration. As conducted by the Marine Corps, most
military operations other than war apply the principles of op-
erational maneuver from the sea. That is, they involve the use
of the sea for strategic, operational, and even tactical mobility
to project military force against some center of gravity or
critical vulnerability at the time and place of our choosing.
Most involve sea basing or at least some sea-based support.
Common examples of military operations other than war

include—
• Noncombatant evacuation operations.

• Humanitarian assistance, to relieve the effects of natural
or manmade disasters.
• Peacekeeping, to monitor and implement an existing
truce.
• Peacemaking, or military intervention to establish peace
between belligerents who may or may not be engaged in
actual combat.
110
• Counterterrorism, counterdrug, and security operations,

either in the form of technical support to law enforce-
ment agencies or as purely military actions.
• Mobile training teams, to provide in-country military in-
struction to host nation personnel.
MAGTFs conduct military operations other than war as

part of a joint or combined task force. The MAGTF may
serve as the nucleus for such a task force. However, given the
extremely wide range of military operations other than war,
there will be a correspondingly wide range of command rela-
tionships. For example, a Marine Corps mobile training team
may be assigned to a military advisory group, or a Fleet an-
titerrorism security team may be assigned to reinforce a
Marine security guard detachment.
CASE STUDY: MOGADISILU, SOMALIA, 1991
The evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia,

in January 1991 is just one example of military operations
other than war that Marine expeditionary forces can routinely
be expected to conduct." Somalia's long-simmering civil war
had worsened throughout the fall of 1990. On 2 January 1991,
U.S. Ambassador James K. Bishop requested military assis-
tance for evacuation of the embassy.
111
The mission fell to U.S. Central Command, which already

had numerous forces deployed to the Persian Gulf for Opera-
tions Desert Shield/Desert Stonn. Amphibious Group 2, with
4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade embarked, was stationed
outside the Persian Gulf, 1,500 nautical miles from Moga-
dishu. (See figure.)'2
A contingency MAGTF was formed from 4th Marine

Expeditionary Brigade elements aboard the amphibious as-
sault ship USS Guam (LPH 9) and amphibious transport ship
USS Trenton (LPD 14), which set off for Somalia. The
MAGTF included two squadrons of CH-46 medium transport
helicopters and a detachment of two CH-53E heavy transport
helicopters. The ground combat element included the Head-
quarters and Service Company, one rifle company, and the 81
mm mortar platoon from 1st Battalion, 2d Marines. The com-
bat service support element included a military police pla-
toon, landing support detachment, and medical/dental
detachment that would be responsible for manning the
evacuation coordination center.
Early on the morning of 5 January, at a distance of 466

nautical miles from Mogadishu, the USS Guam launched the
two CH-53Es with a 60-man security force, including a
9-man U.S. Navy sea-air-land (SEAL) team. The flight re-
quired two aerial refuelings en route. The first guaranteed
enough fuel to reach the embassy compound; the second pro-
vided enough fuel to begin the return flight to the ships.
112
113
CH-53Es landed at the compound at 0710. The SEAL team

concentrated on protecting the ambassador at the chancery
building while the Marines secured the remainder of the com-
pound. After an hour on the ground, the CH-53Es lifted off
with 61 evacuees for the return flight, with one aerial refuel-
ing, to the USS Guam, now 380 miles away. On the ground,
the security force maintained the perimeter throughout the
day. A few stray rounds impacted within the compound, but
the Marines did not return fire. At one point during the day, a
detachment from the security force and the embassy staff
formed a convoy of hardened commercial vehicles to escort
four American officials and several foreign nationals from the
Office of Military Cooperation, which was several blocks
away. Throughout the day, foreigners seeking evacuation ar-
rived at the embassy.
Meanwhile, the USS Guam and USS Trenton had contin-

ued to steam at full speed toward Mogadishu, and upon arriv-
ing near the coast at 0043 on 6 January, they launched the
final evacuation. This consisted of four waves of five CH-46s
each. The first three waves were to evacuate civilians; the last
wave would withdraw the security force. The entire CH-46
evolution was conducted using night vision goggles during
the hours of darkness with the embassy compound darkened.
As the last wave of CH-46s lifted off with the security force,
armed looters could be seen scaling the walls of the embassy
compound.
114
The evacuation was declared complete at 0343 on 6 Janu-

ary when the last CH-46 wave returned to the USS Guam.
The ships turned north for Muscat, Oman, with 281 evacuees,
including eight ambassadors, 61 Americans, and 39 Soviets.
The entire expedition lasted less than 10 days. From the
launch of the CH-53Es to the return of the last CH-46s, the
evacuation itself had lasted less than 24 hours. On 11 January,
the USS Guam and USS Trenton offloaded the evacuees in
Muscat, including an infant born aboard ship, bringing the
operation to a successful conclusion.
The fictional case study starting on page 125 provides an

example of the possible nature and some of the challenges of
future military operations other than war.
MAIuTI1'n PREPOSITIONING FORCE

OPERATIONS
The concept of maritime prepositioning force operations is

not an operating concept for conducting a particular expedi-
tionary mission or category of missions. Instead, it is a de-
ployment concept, but it is important enough as a means of
rapidly providing expeditionary capability that it deserves
special attention. Maritime prepositioning is not an absolute
requirement for the conduct of expeditionary operations, but
115
it figures prominently in their effective and successful execu-

tion. Maritime prepositioning force operations can support
operational maneuver from the sea, sustained operations
ashore, and military operations other than war. The maritime
prepositioning force concept continues to evolve as new tech-
nologies improve the capabilities of the maritime preposition-
ing force.
A maritime prepositioning force operation is the rapid de-

ployment and assembly of a MAGTF in a forward area using
a combination of airlift and forward-deployed maritime
prepositioning ships.'3 Maritime prepositioning force opera-
tions are a strategic deployment option that is global and na-
val in character and suitable for employment in a variety of
circumstances. Maritime prepositioning provides combatant
commanders with an increased capability to respond rapidly
to crisis or conflict with a credible force. The purpose of a
maritime prepositioning force operation is to rapidly establish
in theater a MAGTF ready to conduct operations across the
full operating spectrum. The strategic contribution of mari-
time prepositioning force operations is the rapid concentra-
tion of forces in a specified littoral region.
A maritime prepositioning force is formed when a naval

force of one or more maritime prepositioning ships squadrons
is united with a fly-in echelon, consisting of a MAGTF and a
Navy support element. A maritime prepositioning force op-
eration can range from one ship and an appropriately tailored
fly-in echelon to all three maritime prepositioning ships
116
squadrons and a full Marine expeditionary force. A maritime

prepositioning force by itself does not possess the capability
for forcible entry; it can deploy to augment forward-
deployed, amphibious ready forces, which do. Maritime
prepositioning force operations can also be used for missions
such as occupying advanced naval bases or preemptively oc-
cupying and defending key chokepoints along sea lanes of
communication. Maritime prepositioning forces are particu-
larly well suited for supporting disaster relief and other hu-
manitarian missions.
The pillars of future maritime prepositioning force opera-

tions are force closure, amphibious task force integration, in-
definite sustainment, and reconstitution and redeployment.
The futuristic case study beginning on page 125 illustrates
these concepts.
Currently, maritime prepositioning forces require access to

a secure port and airfield for the assembly of the force. In the
future, the force-closure capability will provide for the at-sea
arrival and assembly of the maritime prepositioning force.
Marines will deploy via a combination of surface mobility
means and strategic and theater airlift to meet underway mari-
time prepositioning en route to the objective area. Units will
be billeted aboard the maritime prepositioning ships while
readying their equipment.
Once assembled at sea, future maritime prepositioning

forces will be capable of integrating with amphibious task
117
forces. By using selective offloading to reinforce the am-

phibious assault echelon, the maritime prepositioning forces
will be able to participate in operational maneuver from the
sea. Maritime prepositioning ships will provide advanced fa-
cilities for the employment of assault support aircraft, surface
assault craft, advanced amphibious assault vehicles, and the
ships' organic lighterage. Further, the ships' communications
systems will be fully compatible with the tactical command
and control architecture of the naval expeditionary force as a
whole.
Maritime prepositioning ships of the future will provide in-

definite sustainment by serving as a sea-based conduit for lo-
gistics support ashore. This might be accomplished as part of
a larger sea-based logistics effort which would include not
only maritime prepositioning ships but also aviation logistics
support ships, hospital ships, and offshore petroleum distribu-
tion systems. Maritime prepositioning ships will also be able
to integrate with joint in-theater logistics agencies and to
make a transition from sea-based logistics to a shore-based
logistics system.
Finally, future maritime prepositioning forces will be able

to conduct in-theater reconstitution and redeployment without
a requirement for extensive materiel maintenance or replen-
ishment at a strategic sustainment base. This capability to re-
constitute and redeploy the maritime prepositioning force
MAGTF will facilitate immediate employment in follow-on
missions.
118
CASE STUDY: SAUDI ARABIA, 1990
The first operational use of the maritime prepositioning force

concept was in the initial buildup for Operation Desert Shield
in the fall of 1990.' The maritime prepositioning concept had
been initiated in 1979 and became operational in 1984. By the
summer of 1990, three maritime prepositioning ships squad-
rons were in service, each loaded with equipment for a
Marine expeditionary brigade.
On 7 August, President Bush ordered 125,000 troops to the

Persian Gulf for Operation Desert Shield. Three Marine expe-
ditionary brigades were immediately put on alert: the 7th in
California, the 1st in Hawaii, and the 4th in North Carolina.
On 10 August, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Com-
mander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, ordered the airlift
of 1St and 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigades and the sealift
of 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to the Persian Gulf. The
7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade would spearhead the de-
ployment of the Central Command expeditionary force. Its
ground combat element consisted of the 7th Marines (Rein-
forced), comprising five battalions including a light armored
infantry battalion. Its aviation combat element was Marine
Aircraft Group 70, consisting of fixed-wing, helicopter, air
command and control, and air-defense missile units. The
combat service support element was Brigade Service Support
Group 7. Within 96 hours, the 7th Marine Expeditionary Bri-
gade began embarking from air bases in southern California
as the first echelon of I Marine Expeditionary Force to
119
deploy. The U.S. Air Force's Military Airlift Command flew

259 missions to deploy the personnel of the brigade.
Meanwhile, the ships of Maritime Prepositioning Ships

Squadron 2 were already steaming north from Diego Garcia,
in the Indian Ocean, toward the Persian Gulf.
The first troops landed at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 14

August. The Marines then moved north 100 kilometers to the
commercial port of Jubayl to link up with their equipment.
The port was large enough to handle the simultaneous offload
of an entire maritime prepositioning ships squadron. The
nearby Jubayl Naval Air Facility became the aerial port of en-
try for most Marine personnel. Within four days of its arrival,
the brigade was ready to deploy.
On 25 August, the personnel of 1St Marine Expeditionary

Brigade, less its command element, started to deploy by air
from Hawaii. The lead elements, two battalions from the 3d
Marines, arrived at Jubayl the following day and began taking
possession of the equipment provided by Maritime Preposi-
tioning Ships Squadron 3, which had arrived from Guam the
same day.
On 2 September, Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer

took command of all Marine Corps forces in theater as Com-
mander, Marine Corps Forces Central Command, and as the
commander of I Marine Expeditionary Force, which included
1st Marine Division, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and 1st Force
120
Service Support Group. The 1st and 7th Marine Expedition-

ary Brigades were dissolved and their forces incorporated into
the elements of the Marine expeditionary force. With the dis-
solution of 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Major General
Hopkins took over as deputy commander for the Marine ex-
peditionary force, and his staff joined the Marine expedition-
ary force command element.
Not all of tile early deployments of Marine units were by

maritime prepositioning. The 4th Marine Expeditionary Bri-
gade deployed in early August by amphibious shipping.
Along with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Op-
erations Capable), already afloat, it arrived in September and
became the Marine expeditionary force afloat reserve.
By the end of September, 1 Marine Expeditionary Force

had grown to more than 30,000 Marines, Central Command's
most capable combat-ready force in the theater. This was due
largely to the effective first-time execution of the maritime
prepositioning force concept. It had provided two-thirds of
the Marine expeditionary force's combat power and supplies
and had also helped sustain other forces in the theater.
CONCLUSION
Our capstone operational concept, Operational Maneuver

from the Sea, and its supporting concepts of sustained
121
operations ashore and military operations other than war

describe how MAGTFs will conduct expeditionary opera-
tions, both combat and noncombat, in response to any contin-
gency that may be in the national interest. The maritime
prepositioning force concept describes an important and
proven means by which capable MAGTFs can respond
quickly to crises practically anywhere in the world within a
matter of days. Together these concepts describe a respon-
sive, versatile, and reliable expeditionary capability that is in-
valuable in today's uncertain and turbulent world.
122
Epilogue
Operation Littoral
Chaos
"... there has been speculation that war itself may not have a
future and is about to be replaced by economic competition
among the great 'trading blocks' now forming in Europe,
North America, and the Far East. This. .. view is not correct.
Large-scale, conventional war—war as understood by to-
day's principal military powers—may indeed be at its last
gasp; however, war itself war as such, is alive and kicking
and about to enter a new epoch. "
—Martin van Creveld

MCDP 3 Operation Littoral Chaos
T he case studies in chapter 4 provide examples of the

historical application of the different expeditionary con-
cepts. However, because of continuing doctrinal, technologi-
cal, tactical, and other advancements, no historical example
can do full justice to the current and future applications of
those concepts. The following fictiohal vignette is intended to
illustrate the expeditionary principles established in chapter 2
and the potential near-future application of operational ma-
neuver from the sea and other expeditionary concepts de-
scribed in chapter 4—all in a deteriorating, chaotic political
environment such as depicted in chapter 1.
CASE STUDY: WEST AFRICA, 2017-18
The West African War of 20 17—18 had its origins in the col-
lapse of civil and governmental order in the overpopulated,
disease-infested slums of the African coast from Lagos in Ni-
geria to Conakry in Guinea. By 2017, Lagos had become the
second largest city in the world with a population of some 25
million, most of them living in squalor in the burgeoning
shanty slums north of the old city. Lagos had long since
ceased to be under governmental control. Rule was instead di-
vided among competing tribal groups and criminal groups
with their own organized paramilitaries equipped by the
growing Sudanese arms industry. A combination epidemic of
malaria and HLV was the spark that ignited the war. An
125
outbreak of malaria resistant to mefloquine necessitated

treatment by blood transfusion, which accelerated the
already-rapid spread of HIV. By May 2017, some health or-
ganizations were estimating the death toll from the epidemic
at between a quarter and half a million. In early June, as the
United Nations debated courses of action, mass violence
erupted between Muslim Hausa and Fulani tribes on the one
hand and Christian Yorubas and Ibos on the other in the
disease-infested suburban slums of Ikeja and Mushin. The
tribal violence quickly spread westward, engulfing Benin and
Togo by mid-June. Within two weeks, riotous violence had
turned into organized military action as Military Coalition of
West African Governments peacekeeping forces, unpaid for
months, were quickly bought off by one or the other of the
opposing factions.
On 10 June, the United Nations passed an emergency reso-

lution asking member nations to send immediate military as-
sistance and humanitarian aid to the region. The U.S.
Commander-in-Chief, Europe (CINCEUR), would command
what would eventually become a 15-nation coalition. The
U.S. contingent to the multinational force was designated as
Joint Task Force 405.
The 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (special operations ca-

pable), stationed offshore on forward-deployment since late
May, landed in the early morning of 12 June. (See figure.) Es-
corted by their organic short takeoff and vertical landing joint
strike fighters (STOVL JSFs), the Marine Expeditionary
126
Lagos, June 2017.
127
Unit's (special operations capable) MV-22s transported

Marine forces directly to objectives near Mushin and Ikeja,
while surfacebome elements moved by advanced amphibious
assault vehicles (AAAV) and air-cushion landing craft
(LCAC) through the narrow Lagos Harbor into Lagos La-
goon, bypassing the industrial city and landing instead near
the campus of the University of Lagos, a hotbed of unrest. On
the same day, a battalion of the French Foreign Legion de-
ployed to Lagos by air but was diverted to Ilorin some 300
kilometers to the north until the Marine expeditionary unit
could secure Lagos' Murtala Muhammed Airport the follow-
ing day. After a week of continuous patrolling in the face of
intennittent resistance, Marine and Foreign Legion forces re-
stored some semblance of order to the northern suburbs of
Lagos. Malaria was so pervasive that parts of the city had to
be quarantined. Marines and Legionnaires were billeted
aboard U.S. Navy ships and were ferried back and forth by
MV-22.
Also on 12 June, Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)

Squadron 1, stationed in the Med iterranean, headed for the
scene via the Strait of Gibraltar. The squadron included two
newly commissioned enhanced maritime prepositioning ships
designed to augment amphibious operations. (See figure.)
On 22 June the ready brigade of the 82d Airborne Division

began to arrive by air at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to perform hu-
manitarian aid and peacekeeping missions. In late June and
early July, forces from France, Great Britain, Italy, Angola,
128
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1
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0
E
0
0.
0
0
2
0
U.
129
and South Africa began arriving at coastal cities to perform

similar missions. On 26 June, Regimental Landing Team 2
and other elements of II Marine Expeditionary Force de-
ployed by amphibious shipping from North Carolina. Mean-
while, Regimental Landing Team 6 deployed by commercial
and military airlift to Douala, Cameroon, to link up by
MV-22 with MPS Squadron 1. The II Marine Expeditionary
Force commenced peacemaking and peacekeeping operations
in Lagos in early July, absorbing the 22d Marine Expedition-
ary Unit (special operations capable). Using decentralized
tactics developed over the previous two decades, the Marines
systematically cleared the cramped urban terrain of resistance
through aggressive patrolling and a series of isolated small-
unit combined-arms actions.
Joining Joint Task Force 405 from the United States were
an aviation logistics support ship to provide sea-based avia-
tion support and a hospital ship to provide a floating disease
treatment center. Digitally connected to disease specialists in
the United States, medical personnel afloat were eventually
able to get the epidemic under control by autumn.
Meanwhile, various groups took advantage of the unrest to

advance their own interests. On 29 June, Muslim-backed
forces fighting for the People's Dahomian Nation (PDN)
shelled Accra, Ghana, as fighting continued westward. Fight-
ing also began to move inland as opposing armies fought for
control of Nigerian and Ghanian oil and mineral fields. Abid-
jan was overrun by refugees fleeing the fighting, and the city
130
nearly doubled in population, to nearly three million, in the

span of a month. Overwhelmed by starvation and disease,
Abidjan quickly became a disaster area.
One of the greatest threats to expeditionary forces ashore

was malaria which threatened the operational effectiveness of
several units, including one Italian battalion that suffered 40
percent casualties due to the disease. Reports of anthrax usage
by the warring factions in several cities could not be con-
firmed because some urban areas were essentially inaccessi-
ble. A more common threat to United Nations forces was the
use of "Lagos smokers," crude chemical devices that upon
impact produced toxic fumes by mixing potassium cyanide
with acid. Delivered by hand or by rocket, these simple but
effective weapons could produce mass casualties and could
leave an area uninhabitable for days. Initially, these were em-
ployed primarily against civilian populations, but soon they
were used increasingly against United Nations forces and fa-
cilities by both Muslim and Christian factions. By mid-
August, Marine patrols were routinely operating in protective
gear, and that same month, the chemical-biological incident
response team from Marine Corps Forces Atlantic deployed
to Lagos. Due to the chemical threat, several United Nations
positions ashore became untenable and had to be withdrawn
in August and September to ships of MPS Squadron 1, which
thereafter provided permanent sea bases and billeting for sev-
eral United Nations units. In September, MPS Squadron 2 de-
ployed from Diego Garcia via the Cape of Good Hope to
provide additional sea-basing support for U.S. and United Na-
tions forces.
131
In August the westward expansion of fighting had halted

east of Abidjan, now held in force by the 82d Airborne Divi-
sion. The war entered a positional phase which lasted for the
next 6 months as Muslim and Christian forces regularly
launched rocket and artillery attacks against each other, civil-
ian populations, and occasionally United Nations forces. By
late September, some relief organizations estimated total
casualties due to military action and disease at over 750,000.
On 21 September, with organized violence on the rise again,
the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution ex-
panding the charter of coalition forces, authorizing them to
use military force to disarm any military or paramilitary
forces in the field. Over the next 4 months the 22d Marine
Expeditionary Unit (special operations capable), designed as
the Joint Task Force 405 amphibious strike force, conducted
six amphibious raids against Muslim or Christian positions in
the Ivory Coast to a range of up to 250 kilometers inland.
In March 2018, the course of the war changed dramatically

when the National Liberian People's Front (NLPF), out of
power some 15 years, launched a successful coup in Mon-
rovia, Liberia, supported by units from the army of Sierra Le-
one. (See figure.) The coup was coordinated with a renewed
offensive by the PDN that threatened to eliminate organized
Christian opposition in Ghana and Nigeria. The NLPF and
PDN followed the coup in Liberia with a campaign of geno-
cide aimed at Christian and animist tribes in Liberia, Ghana,
and Nigeria.
132
.c
2
0
0
0
0
0
4-
133
In mid-March, the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (special

operations capable) was designated Special Purpose MAGTF
Deep Strike and was reinforced with the 2d Light Armored
Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion (already deployed to La-
gos), 1st LAR Battalion (deploying by air from Camp Pendle-
ton, California, to link up with selected ships of MPS
Squadrons I and 2), and a squadron of attack helicopters with
organic ground aviation support. The ground combat element
came ashore at Monrovia from maritime prepositioning and
amphibious ships on 18 March, met sporadic resistance, and
struck immediately inland against the NLPF and PDN. Two
days later a French-led Multinational Strike Force struck from
the United Nations lodgment in Nigeria to destroy PDN
forces in the field there.
In conjunction with air strikes and MV-22 attacks against

targets in the enemy rear, the light armor battalions of Deep
Strike drove inland under orders "to defeat NLPF forces and
stop the tribal slaughter." MAGTF fixed- and rotary wing
aviation assets conducted urban offensive air support
throughout the area of operations. Dense civilian populations
made target discrimination difficult, but accurate overhead
imagery provided by organic unmanned aerial vehicles and
low-yield precision-guided munitions fired by fixed- and ro-
tary wing assets greatly reduced that problem. After continu-
ous skirmishing, the decisive battle occurred outside Danane,
Ivory Coast, on 3 April, and remaining NLPF forces surren-
dered near Daloa on 11 April. The Deep Strike ground forces
continued on to Abidjan, linking up with the 82nd Airborne
and their own sea-based support on 13 April. On 20 April, the
134
replenished ground combat element struck inland again, this

time against PDN forces in the Ivory Coast and Ghana, reach-
ing Kumasi on 28 April and the Ghanian coast on the eastern
outskirts of Accra on 9 May. Supported entirely from the sea
by naval long-range fires, STOVL JSFs, MV-22s, and other
assault support aircraft, Special Purpose MAGTF Deep Strike
ground units had maneuvered some 1,400 kilometers in the
6-week operation. By this time the Multinational Strike Force
had defeated PDN forces in Nigeria and advanced as far west
as Cotonou, Benin. On 10 May, the U.S. Commander-in-
Chief, Europe, ordered offensive operations halted, putting an
end to major military operations in the war, although
peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations continued.
The special purpose MAGTF deployed home in late May,

followed by II Marine Expeditionary Force. Starting with the
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (speclal operations capable)
in early June, a forward-deployed Marine expeditionary unit
remained nearby for the next 18 months. With the situation
ashore stabilized, and under the protection of a permanent
United Nations observation force, relief organizations began
returning in the early summer of 2018.
CONCLUSION
In addition to illustrating future operational maneuver from

the sea, this fictional case study also shows the key
135
implementing concepts of ship-to-objective maneuver, mari-

time prepositioning, and sea basing in a chaotic littoral envi-
ronment. Landing forces use enhanced tactical and
operational mobility to avoid enemy defenses and maneuver
directly against operational objectives without first establish-
ing a beachhead. Maritime prepositioning forces, using at-sea
arrival and assembly capabilities, are integrated into the am-
phibious task force. Landing forces sustained and supported
from the sea enjoy increased freedom of action by eliminating
the need to establish and protect a large support base ashore.
136
MCDP 3 Notes
The Landscape: Chaos in the Littorals
1. Niccolô Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci (New

York: Mentor Books, 1952) P. 55.
2. Robert D. Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the

Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Random House, 1996) p. 10.
3. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" For-

eign Affairs (Summer 1993) pp. 22—49.
4. U.S. Congress. Senate. Senate Select Committee on Intelli-

gence. Global Threats and Challenges to the United States and Its
Interests Abroad. Statement presented by LtGen Patrick M. Hughes,
U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to the 105th
Cong., 1st Sess., 5 February 1977.
5. Kaplan, p. 8.
6. Crisis: "An incident or situation involving a threat to the

United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or
vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such
diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commit-
ment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to
achieve national objectives." (Joint Pub 1-02)
7. MCIA-1586-001-97, Marine Corps Midrange Threat

Estimate—I 997—2007: Finding Order in Chaos (Quantico, VA:
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, August 1996) p. 1.
137
8. Dr. James N. Rosenau, "Fragmegrative Challenges to Na-

tional Security," in Understanding US. Strategy: A Reader, ed.
Terry L. Heyns (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1983) pp. 65—82.
9. MCIA-1586-0O1-97,p. 11.
10. Ibid.,pp. 14—iS and42—43.
11. Charles William Maynes, "Relearning Intervention," For-

eign Policy (Spring 1995) p. 108.
12. MCIA-1586-00i-97, p. 2.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.,p.3.
16. World Resources 1996—97 (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1996) p. ix.
17. MCIA-1586-0O1-97, p. 8.
18. World Resources 1996—97, pp. 58—59.
19. Ibid.,p.9.
20. Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (London: Routledge,

1990) p. 31.
138
MCDP 3 Notes
21. Ibid.,p.46.
22. MCIA-1586-001-97, pp. 1 and 3.
23. World Resources 1996—97, pp. 60—61.
24. The five permanent members of the United Nations Secu-

rity Council—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,
France, and the People's Republic of China—are all declared nu-
clear powers. India, Pakistan, and Israel are known to possess nu-
clear weapons. North Korea and Iraq have had confirmed nuclear
weapons production programs, and Iran is suspected of conducting
nuclear weapons research. Politicians in Taiwan have expressed an
interest in developing nuclear weapons, and South Korea had offi-
cial plans to develop nuclear weapons as late as 1991. South Africa,
Argentina, and Brazil have all renounced their nuclear weapons pro-
grams but have the technological capability to resume them at any
time. Essentially any group with a technological capability equiva-
lent to that of the United States in the 1 960s could design a nuclear
weapon. MCIA-1586-00l-97, p. 15.
The Nature of Expeditionary Operations
1. Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988) p. 16.
2. Lowell Thomas, Old Gimlet Eye: The Adventures of Smed-

ley D. Butler (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1933) p. 127.
139
3. U.S. President. A National Security Strategy for a New

Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Office of the Presi-
dent of the United States, May 1997) PP. 14—15.
4. Expedition: "A military operation conducted by an armed

force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country." (Joint
Pub 1-02)
5. Force: "1. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon

systems, vehicles, and necessary support, or combination thereof."
(Joint Pub 1-02)
6. Logistics: "The science of planning and carrying out the

movement and maintenance of forces." (Joint Pub 1-02)
7. F. G. Hoffman, "Advanced Expeditionary Warfare—20 15"

(unpublished draft concept paper, Marine Corps Combat Develop-
ment Command, Studies and Analysis Division, Quantico, VA,
1996).
8. The Marine Corps no longer employs the Marine expedi-

tionary brigade organization. A Marine expeditionary brigade was
roughly one-third the size of a Marine expeditionary force and com-
prised a permanent command element and units from one of the
standing Marine expeditionary forces. These brigade command ele-
ments are no longer in existence.
9. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Retired, Dictionary of

Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Na-
val Institute, 1966) p. 11.
140
MCDP 3 Notes
10. This responsibility is assigned to the Marine Corps by

United States Code, Title 10, chapter 503, section 5013, with the
following words: "The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination
with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious opera-
tions that pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equipment used by
landing forces."
11. Strategic mobility: "The capability to deploy and sustain

military forces worldwide in support of national strategy." (Joint
Pub 1-02)
12. Sustainability: "The ability to maintain the necessary level

and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives.
Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those
levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to sup-
port military effort." (Joint Pub 1-02)
Expeditionary Organizations
1. Quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Retired, The

Marine Officer's Guide (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1977) p. 71.
2. Quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Col., USMC, Retired, Vic-

tory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Baltimore, MD:
The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979)
pp. 6—7.
3. Expeditionary force: "An armed force organized to ac-

complish a specific objective in a foreign country." (Joint Pub 1-02)
141
4. Landing force: "A task organization of troop units, avia-

tion and ground, assigned to an amphibious assault. It is the highest
troop echelon in the amphibious operation." (Joint Pub 1-02)
5. "Department of the Navy 1997 Posture Statement," Marine

Corps Gazette (April 1997) p. 14, excerpt from a report by the Hon-
orable John H. Dalton, Adm Jay L. Johnson, and Gen Charles C.
Krulak.
6. Fleet Marine Force: "A balanced force of combined arms

comprising land, air, and service elements of the U.S. Marine Corps.
A Fleet Marine Force is an integral part of a U.S. Fleet and has the
status of a type command." (Joint Pub 1-02)
7. The force that conducted Operation Eastern Exit was at the

time called a "contingency MAGTF," a term no longer in use.
8. Service component command: "A command consisting of

the Service component commander and all those Service forces,
such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installa-
tions under the command, including the support forces, that have
been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a
subordinate unified command or joint task force." (Joint Pub 1-02)
9. Functional component command: "A command nor-

mally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Mili-
tary Departments which may be established across the range of
military operations to perform particular operational missions that
may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time."
(Joint Pub 1-02)
142
MCDP 3 Notes
Expeditionary Concepts
1. Quoted in Hem!, Victory at High Tide, p. xv.
2. Quoted in Assault From the Sea: Essays on the History of

Amphibious Warfare, ed. Merrill L. Bartlett, LtCol USMC, Retired
(Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1983) p. xi.
3. Operational Maneuver from the Sea, (Quantico, VA:

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Concepts Division,
1996) PCN 145 000001 00.
4. Amphibious operation: "An attack launched from the sea

by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a
landing on a hostile or potentially hostile shore." (Joint Pub 1-02)
5. For the history of Operation Forager, see Henry 1. Shaw,

Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pac/Ic Drive,
History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. III
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Historical
Branch, 1966) pp. 23 1—585; Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The
US. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in
the Pacfic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951) pp.
320—371; and FMFRP 12-109, The Amphibians Came to Conquer.
The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, vol II (September,
199l)pp. 853—968.
6. This case study is taken primarily from Col Charles J. Quil-

ter, US. Marines in the Persian Gulf 1990—1991. With the I Marine
Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums
143
Division, 1993). See also J. Robert Moskin, The US. Marine Corps
Story (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1992).
7. Quilter, pp. 73—74.
8. Ibid.,p.76.
9 Ibid., p. 102.
10. Military operations other than war: "Operations that en-

compass the use of military capabilities across the range of military
operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to
complement any combination of the other instruments of national
power and occur before, during, and after war." (Joint Pub 1-02).
According to Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations
Other Than War (June 1995), the 16 types of military operations
other than war are: arms control, combatting terrorism, DOD sup-
port to counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions/maritime
intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of
navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support
to civil authorities, nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency,
noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, protection of
shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and
raids, and support to insurgency. This listing of military operations
other than war is somewhat misleading in that many of the opera-
tions included in this category, for example strikes and raids, clearly
fall within the classical definition of war.
11. The definitive treatment of Operation Eastern Exit is Adam

B. Siegel, Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
(NEO) from Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991 (Alexandria,
VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1991). See also Adam B. Siegel,
144
MCDP 3 Notes
"Lessons Learned From Operation EASTERN EXIT," Marine

Corps Gazette, June 1992, pp. 75—81.
12. Siegel, "Lessons From Operation EASTERN EXIT," June

1992, p. 77.
13. FMFM 5-1, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations

(October 1993) p. 1-1.
14. This case study is taken primarily from Quilter.
Operation Littoral Chaos
1. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New

York: The Free Press, 1991) p. 2.
145
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MCDP 3

U.S. Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

PCN 142 000009 00

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 3, Expedition-

This publication is compatible with the Marine Corps' cap-

Chapter 1 describes the complex and uncertain geopolitical

DISTRIBUTION: 142 000009 00

© 1998 United States Government as represented by the Sec-

Throughout this publication, masculine nouns and pronouns

Chapter 1. The Landscape: Chaos in the Littorals

Chapter 2. The Nature of Expeditionary Operations

Chapter 3. Expeditionary Organizations

The Structure of the MAGTF—The Marine Expeditionary

Chapter 4. Expeditionary Concepts

Epilogue. Operation Littoral Chaos

The Landscape: Chaos

a second Cold War might be upon us—a protracted

T his chapter discusses the environment in which U.S.

AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE "NEW ANARCHY"

The end of the Cold War has ushered in a period of wide-

The certainty, structure, and stability that the Cold War

The political map of the world is changing quickly, and the

Dangerous combinations of demographic, economic, and

and governmental control in many parts of the world. As a re-

While threats to national security may have decreased in

CRISES: DISASTER, DISRUPTION, DISPUTE

coming years, the ability to respond effectively and quickly to

Disasters are accidents or calamities—complex human

The second class of crisis is disruption. Disruptions are

individuals or small groups acting in their own self-interest.

The third class of crisis is dispute, a clash between two po-

The intent here is not to try to categorize every type of po-

FRAGMENTATION AND INTEGRATION

Two of the primary forces that drive changes in global poli-

A main trend in global politics is fragmentation: the

A second major trend in global relations is integration. At

largely from advances in communications technologies that

The result of simultaneous fragmentation and integration is

MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY

At the high end of the range of potential crises is the threat

military capability to unilaterally protect and pursue its inter-

Despite the current absence of a global peer competitor,

These powers may attack U.S. forces, activities, or inter-

A direct military conflict with a major power is an unlikely

While major regional contingencies pose the gravest threat to

Smaller-scale contingencies may involve combat with

Conversely, smaller-scale contingencies frequently also in-

Even noncombat missions such as humanitarian assistance

Although the state remains the predominant entity in global

violence has declined. One of the trends of modern conflict is

Many of these nonstate groups employ unconventional

Nonstate groups are most likely to have significant influ-

Some of the most rapidly growing regions in the world

Under these conditions, practically any crisis can result in

disappointments, fears, and grievances with them. They im-

Lack of modern or developed infrastructure can pose sig-

The developing world often lacks the capability to cope

Conflict is at base a clash of human interests. Conflict arises

where resources are in short supply. Uncontrolled population