Change 1 To SUTS PDF

(ADRP 3-90 &Doctrine 2015)
SMARTupdate to SUTS
(ADRP 3-90 &Doctrine 2015)
SMARTupdate to SUTS
Change 1
Change 1 (ADRP 3-90 & Doctrine 2015 SMARTupdate) to SUTS updates/replaces
material in frst edition Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook (ISBN 978-0-9742486-6-0) with new
material from ADRP 3-90 (Aug 12) and ADRP 3-0 (May 12), along with additional Army
Doctrine 2015 pen and ink reference citation and terminology changes from ADRPs 5-0,
6-0, 1-02 and ATTP 3-06.11.
Readers of the frst edition Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook (ISBN 978-0-9742486-6-0) can
obtain Change 1 to SUTS online at: www.TheLightningPress.com/SMARTupdates/
SMARTupdate Instructions
1. Insert SMARTupdate title page (this sheet) in front of the SUTS title page.
2. Insert Change 1 Notes and replace SUTS Table of Contents.
3. Replace SUTS pp. 1-1 to 1-10 with Change 1 pp. *1-1 to *1-10.
5. Replace SUTS pp. 2-1 to 2-6 wih Change 1 pp. *2-1 o *2-6.
8. Insert Change 1 pp. *5-27 to *5-30.
6. Make Pen & Ink reference citation and terminology changes to SUTS as indi-
cated on Change 1 Notes, p. 6.
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The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook
Change 1
Change 1 (ADRP 3-90 & Doctrine
2015 SMARTupdate) to SUTS
The Lightning Press
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6-0, 1-02 and ATTP 3-06.11.
*Pages marked with asterisks represent changed/inserted pages.
Copyright 2012 Norman M. Wade
ISBN: 978-1-935886-27-3
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Change 1 (Notes) 1-1*
material in frst edition Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook (ISBN 978-0-9742486-6-0)
with new material from ADRP 3-90 (Aug 12) and ADRP 3-0 (May 12), along with
additional Army Doctrine 2015 pen and ink reference citation and terminology
changes from ADRPs 5-0, 6-0, 1-02 and ATTP 3-06.11.
Doctrine 2015 changes/updates to SUTS include:
ADP/ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug 12), provides the doctrine for the con-
duct of offensive and defensive tasks, along with additional information on the basic
concepts and control measures associated with the art and science of tactics. The of-
fensive and defensive considerations apply to small tactical units, such as companies
and battalions, even though most of the fgures in this manual use the division and the
brigade combat team (BCT) echelons to illustrate points in the text.
ADP 3-0 (Oct 11) and ADRP 3-0 (May 12), Unifed Land Operations, shifted the
Armys operational concept from full spectrum operations to unifed land opera-
tions. The doctrine of unifed land operations describes how the Army demonstrates
its core competencies of combined arm maneuver and wide area security through
decisive action. The term decisive action replaces the term full spectrum operations
as the concept of continuous, simultaneous offense, defense, stability, or defense
support of civil authorities.
ADP/ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process (May 12), provides a discussion of plan-
ning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. ADRP 5-0 updates doctrine on
the operations process to include incorporating the Armys operational concept of
unifed land operations (ADP 3-0) and the principles of mission command (ADP 6-0).
ADP/ADRP 6-0, Mission Command (May 12), presents the Armys guidance on
command, control, and the mission command warfghting function. It describes how
commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art of command and the science
of control to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and accomplish
missions.
ADP/ADRP 1-02, Operational Terms and Military Symbology (Aug 12), contains
a compilation of Army operational terms, defnitions, abbreviations, and acronyms as
refected in the latest editions of Army doctrinal publications. These terms are com-
monly used for the conduct of operations.
ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (Jun 11), estab-
lishes doctrine for combined arms operations in urban terrain for the brigade combat
team (BCT) and battalion/squadron commanders and staffs, company/troop com-
manders, small-unit leaders, and individual Soldiers.
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CHANGE 1 to SUTS
*1-2 Notes (Change 1)
Offense and Defense (Decisive Operations)
Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug 12).
Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other
(CJCSM 5120.01). Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish mis-
sions. The tactical-level commander employs combat power in the conduct of engage-
ments and battles. This section addresses the tactical level of war, the art and science of
tactics, and hasty versus deliberate operations.
The Tactical Level of War
ADP 3-90 is the primary manual for offensive and defensive tasks at the tactical level.
It does not provide doctrine for stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. It is
authoritative and provides guidance in the form of combat tested concepts and ideas for
the employment of available means to win in combat. These tactics are not prescriptive in
nature, and they require judgment in application.
The tactical level of war is the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned
and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0).
Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements
in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. It is important to
understand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and operational
levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are
just a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Strategic and operational success is a
measure of how one or more battles link to winning a major operation or campaign. In turn,
tactical success is a measure of how one or more engagements link to winning a battle.
The Offense
The offense is the decisive form of war. While strategic, operational, or tactical con-
siderations may require defending for a period of time, defeat of the enemy eventually
requires shifting to the offense. Army forces strike the enemy using offensive action
in times, places, or manners for which the enemy is not prepared to seize, retain, and
exploit the operational initiative. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of
action throughout an operation (ADRP 3-0).
The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force.
Additionally, commanders conduct offensive tasks to secure decisive terrain, to deprive
the enemy of resources, to gain information, to deceive and divert the enemy, to hold the
enemy in position, to disrupt his attack, and to set the conditions for future successful
operations.
The Defense
While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the
stronger type. Army forces conduct defensive tasks as part of major operations and joint
campaigns, while simultaneously conducting offensive and stability tasks as part of deci-
sive action outside the United States.
Commanders choose to defend to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows
Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting a defense include to
retain decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy, to attrit or fx the enemy as a
prelude to the offense, in response to surprise action by the enemy, or to increase the
enemys vulnerability by forcing the enemy to concentrate forces.
Tactical Enabling Tasks
Commanders direct tactical enabling tasks to support the conduct of decisive action.
Tactical enabling tasks are usually shaping or sustaining. They may be decisive in the
conduct of stability tasks. Tactical enabling tasks discussed in ADRP 3-90 include recon-
naissance, security, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement
operations, and urban operations. Stability ultimately aims to create a condition so the
local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable.
Offense and Defense (Unifying Logic Chart)
Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense, fig. 1, p. iv.
Unified Land Operations
Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a
position of relative advantage in sustained land operations in
order to create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.
Executed through...
Forms of maneuver
Forms of the defense
Tactical enabling tasks
Tactical mission tasks
Envelopment
Flank attack
Frontal attack
Infiltration
Penetration
Turning movement
Defense of a linear obstacle
Perimeter defense
Reverse slope defense
Refer to The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Unifed
Land Operations and the Six Warfghting Functions) for discussion of the
fundamentals, principles and tenets of Army operations, plus chapters on
each of the six warfghting functions: mission command, movement and
maneuver, intelligence, fres, sustainment, and protection.
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug 12), preface and introduction.
II. ADRP 3-90: Overview (Whats New!)
Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90 provides guidance in the form of
combat-tested concepts and ideas modifed to exploit emerging Army and joint offensive
and defensive capabilities. ADRP 3-90 expounds on the doctrine established in Army
Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90. It provides additional information on the basic concepts
and control measures associated with the art and science of tactics. ADRP 3-90 provides
the doctrine for the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks, just as ADRP 3-07 provides
doctrine for the conduct of stability tasks and Field Manual (FM) 3-28 provides the
doctrine for defense support of civil authorities. Offensive and defensive tasks conducted
as part of joint operations within the geographic limits of the U.S. and its territories are
referred to in joint doctrine as homeland defense. (See Joint Publication [JP] 3-27.)
ADRP 3-90 focuses on the organization of forces, minimum essential control measures,
and general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for each primary offen-
sive and defensive task. It is the common reference for all students of the art and science
of tactics, both in the feld and the Army school system. The offensive and defensive
considerations in this manual apply to small tactical units, such as companies and bat-
talions, even though most of the fgures in this manual use the division and the brigade
combat team (BCT) echelons to illustrate points in the text. Echelon specifc feld manu-
als and Army techniques publications address the specifcs of how each tactical echelon
employs these tactical concepts.
Introduction
To understand ADRP 3-90, the reader must understand the operational art, the principles
of war, and the links between the operational and tactical levels of war described in JP
1, JP 3-0, ADP 3-0, and ADRP 3-0. The reader should understand how the stability and
defense support of civil authorities tasks described in ADPs and ADRPs 3-07 and 3-28
carry over and affect the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks and vice versa. The
reader should understand the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess)
and how that process relates to the Armys military decisionmaking process and troop-
leading procedures described in ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0. Reviewing these publications
assists the reader in understanding ADRP 3-90.
The use of an operational framework assists commanders in articulating their visualization
of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. In ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0 the Army
established three different frameworksdeep, close, security; decisive, shaping, and sus-
taining; and main and supporting efforts. To avoid redundancy, this manual uses only the
decisive, shaping, and sustaining framework where necessary to provide needed tactical
information. This is not meant to imply that the other two frameworks are not equally valid.
Refer to The Operations & Training SMARTbook and ADRP 3-0 for additional
information on the use of the other two frameworks.
Organization
The fve chapters of ADRP 3-90 focus on the tactics used to employ available means to
win in combat (the offense and the defense) and constitute the Armys collective view of
how it conducts prompt and sustained tactical offensive and defensive actions on land.
Those tactics require judgment in application. As such, this manual is not prescriptive,
but it is authoritative. ADRP 3-90 provides a common discussion of how commanders
from the battalion task force level through the division echelon conduct tactical offensive
and defensive tasks and their supporting tactical enabling tasks. The doctrine in this pub-
lication focuses on the employment of combined arms in lethal combat operations. These
offensive and defensive principles and considerations apply to the conduct of operations,
but they cannot be used in isolation. Their application must be tempered by the obliga-
tion to protect the civilian population within the area of operations.
ADRP 3-90 contains fve chapters:
Chapter 1 establishes the context of the art and science of tactics
Chapter 2 defnes common tactical concepts and tactical echelons
Chapter 3 addresses offensive tasks
Chapter 4 addresses defensive tasks
Chapter 5 addresses those tactical enabling tasks that are not the subject of their
own publication
The tactics discussed in this manual are only examples of ways to conduct a specifc
offensive or defensive task. Collectively they provide a set of tools that commanders
employ in accordance with the exact tactical situation that they face at any one given time.
The tactical situation is defned as the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and
weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).
New, Rescinded, and Modifed Terms
Term

Remarks
w e N w e r c definition
deep, close, and security operational framework Introduced in ADP 3-0
fire team New definition
main and supporting effort operational framework Introduced in ADP 3-0
w e N n o o t a l p definition
w e N n o i t c e s definition
w e N d a u q s definition
Rescinded Army Terms
New Army Terms
Modifed Army Terms
Term Remarks
calculated risk Replaced by prudent risk

civil affairs activities

Replaced by civil affairs operations

heavy brigade combat team

Replaced by armored brigade combat team

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
Replaced by
information collection when talking
about these three things collectively. Individually
the terms are still doctrinal terms.
d e c a l p e R t h g i l by infantry when referring to Army forces
military gamble Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
d e c a l p e R d e z i r o t o m by Stryker when referring to Army forces
Term Remarks
corps
No longer considered a tactical echelon of
command
division New definition for the division echelon
stability-centric/offensive-centric/
The suffix centric is no longer used when talking
about the elements of decisive action
subordinate tasks within the mission command
,
intelligence
,
fires, and protection warfighting
functions
Subordinate task changes based on ADRP 3-0
defensive-centric
Pen & Ink Changes
In accordance with the Armys Doctrine 2015 initiative to reorganize and restructure the
Armys doctrinal publication system, the following references and terms have changed as
cited in The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook. However, the material referenced in these
chapters remain relatively unchanged (only located now in a different primary source).
6-0, 1-02 and ATTP 3-06.11.
Pen & Ink Changes
p. 1-1, The Art of Tactics. Change reference to ADRP 3-90, Offense & Defense (Aug 12),
chap. 1.
P. 1-11, Tactical Mission Tasks. Change reference to ADRP 1-02, Operational Terms and
Military Symbols (Aug 12), chap. 1 and 9.
p. 1-25, Tactical Mission Tasks. Change reference from FM 5-0, chap. 4 to ATTP 5-0.1,
Commander and Staff Offcer Guide (Sept. 11), chap. 5.
p. 1-45, Preparation & PCI. Update reference from FM 6-0, chap. 6 to ADRP 5-0, The
Operations Process (Mar 12), chap. 3.
p. 1-36, Risk Management. The Army no longer uses the term composite risk manage-
ment. Term replaced with joint term risk management. Risk Management is the process
of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making
decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefts. (JP 3-0)
p. 1-51, Rehearsals. Update reference from FM 6-0 (Aug 03), app. F to ATTP 5-0.1,
Commander and Staff Offcer Guide (Sept. 11), chap. 8.
p. 1-55, The After Action Review. Update reference from FM 7-1 Battle Focused Train-
ing, app. C to FM 6-01.1, Knowledge Management Operations (Jul 12), app. B and A
Leaders Guide to After Action Reviews (Aug 12).
Chap. 2, Offensive Operations. Update reference to ADRP 3-90, Offense & Defense
(Aug 12), chap. 3.
Chap. 3, Defensive Operations. Update reference to ADRP 3-90, Offense & Defense
(Aug 12), chap. 4.
Chap. 4, Stability Operations. Change reference to ADRP, 3-07, Stability Operations
(Aug 12).
Chap. 5, Tactical Enabling Operations. Change Tactical Enabling Operations to Tactical
Enabling Tasks. Change all references from FM 3-90 Tactics to ADRP 3-90 Offense and
Defense (Aug 12), chap. 5
Table of Contents-1*
Table of Contents
I. The Art of Tactics ........................................................................ 1-1*
I. The Tactical Level of War ............................................................................... 1-1*
Individuals, Crews, and Small Units ............................................................ 1-1*
Battles, Engagements and Small-Unit Actions ............................................ 1-2*
II. The Science and Art of Tactics ..................................................................... 1-2*
Aspects of the Art of Tactics ........................................................................ 1-3*
Solving Tactical Problems ......................................................................... 1-3a*
III. Hasty vs. Deliberate Operations .................................................................. 1-4*
II. The Armys Operational Concept ............................................. 1-5*
I. Unifed Land Operations ................................................................................ 1-5*
II. Foundations of Unifed Land Operations ...................................................... 1-5*
A. Seize, Retain and Exploit the Initiative.................................................... 1-6*
B. Decisive Action........................................................................................ 1-6*
- Tasks of Decisive Action ...................................................................... 1-8*
C. Army Core Competencies ..................................................................... 1-10*
D. Mission Command ................................................................................ 1-10*
III. Tactical Mission Tasks ........................................................... 1-11*
A. Mission Symbols .........................................................................................1-11*
B. Effects on Enemy Forces ........................................................................... 1-12*
C. Actions by Friendly Forces ......................................................................... 1-13*
D. Tactical Doctinal Taxonomy ........................................................................ 1-14*
IV. Understand, Visualize, Describe, Direct, Lead, Assess ...... 1-15*
I. Understand .................................................................................................. 1-15*
II. Visualize ..................................................................................................... 1-16*
The Operational Framework...................................................................... 1-18*
III. Describe..................................................................................................... 1-16*
A. Commanders Intent ............................................................................. 1-20*
B. Planning Guidance................................................................................ 1-20*
C. Commanders Critical Information Requirments (CCIR) ....................... 1-20*
D. Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) ............................... 1-21*
IV. Direct ......................................................................................................... 1-17*
Elements of Combat Power....................................................................... 1-22*
Organizing Combat Power ........................................................................ 1-22*
The Six Warfghting Functions .................................................................. 1-23*
V. Lead ............................................................................................................ 1-17*
VI. Assess ....................................................................................................... 1-17*
Activities of the Operations Process ............................................................... 1-24*
V. Troop Leading Procedures .......................................................1-25
I. Troop Leading Procedure Steps ....................................................................1-26
II. METT-TC (Mission Analysis) ........................................................................1-31
III. OCOKA - Military Aspects of the Terrain ......................................................1-32
IV. Composite Risk Management (CRM) ..........................................................1-36
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Tactical Mission
Fundamentals
*2-Table of Contents
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The Offense .................................................................................... 2-1*
I. Primary Offensive Tasks ................................................................................ 2-2*
II. Purposes of Offensive Tasks ........................................................................ 2-3*
III. Forms of Maneuver...................................................................................... 2-4*
A. Envelopment ........................................................................................... 2-4*
B. Turning Movement .................................................................................. 2-4*
C. Infltration ................................................................................................ 2-5*
D. Penetration ............................................................................................. 2-5*
E. Frontal Attack .......................................................................................... 2-5*
IV. Common Offensive Control Measures....................................................... 2-5a*
V. Transition .....................................................................................................2-5c*
VI. Characteristics of Offensive Operations ...................................................... 2-6*
I. Movement to Contact ...................................................................2-7
Meeting Engagement..........................................................................................2-7
I. Organization ....................................................................................................2-8
Search and Attack .........................................................................................2-8
Approach-March Technique ..........................................................................2-8
II. Planning & Preparation ...................................................................................2-9
III. Conducting the MTC - A Small Unit Perspective .........................................2-10
On Point ............................................................................................................2-12
II. Attack ..........................................................................................2-13
I. Organization ..................................................................................................2-14
II. Planning & Preparation .................................................................................2-15
III. Conducting the Attack - A Small Unit Perspective .......................................2-16
On Point ............................................................................................................2-18
Maneuver Control Measures .......................................................................2-18
Fire Control Measures .................................................................................2-18
The
Offense
VI. Combat Orders .........................................................................1-37
I. Warning Order (WARNO) ..............................................................................1-38
II. Operations Order (OPORD) .........................................................................1-39
III. Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) ......................................................................1-40
Techniques for Issuing Orders ..........................................................................1-41
The Operations Order (OPORD) - A Small Unit Perspective ............................1-42
On Point ............................................................................................................1-44
VII. Preparation and Pre-Combat Inspection (PCI) .....................1-45
I. Preparation ....................................................................................................1-45
II. The Pre-Combat Inspection (PCI) ................................................................1-45
On Point ............................................................................................................1-50
VIII. Rehearsals ..............................................................................1-51
I. Rehearsal Techniques ...................................................................................1-52
II. Rehearsals - Company Level & Smaller .......................................................1-54
IX. The After Action Review (AAR) ...............................................1-55
I. Types of After Action Reviews .......................................................................1-56
II. Steps in the After Action Review ...................................................................1-57
III. AARs - A Small Unit Perspective .................................................................1-58
On Point ............................................................................................................1-60
III. Exploitation ...............................................................................2-19
I. Organization ..................................................................................................2-20
III. Conducting the Exploitation - A Small Unit Perspective...............................2-20
On Point ............................................................................................................2-22
Transition .....................................................................................................2-22
IV. Pursuit .......................................................................................2-23
I. Organization ..................................................................................................2-24
A. Frontal Pursuit.........................................................................................2-24
B. Combination Pursuit................................................................................2-25
III. Conducting the Pursuit - A Small Unit Perspective ......................................2-26
On Point ............................................................................................................2-28
Transition .....................................................................................................2-28
V. Small Unit Offensive Tactical Tasks ........................................2-29
I. Seize ..............................................................................................................2-30
II. Suppress.......................................................................................................2-30
III. Support by Fire ............................................................................................2-31
IV. Clear ............................................................................................................2-32
V. Attack by Fire ................................................................................................2-34
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The Defense ................................................................................... 3-1*
I. Purposes of Defensive Operations ................................................................ 3-2*
II. Defensive Tasks ............................................................................................ 3-2*
III. Characteristics of the Defense..................................................................... 3-3*
IV. Common Defensive Control Measures ...................................................... 3-3a*
V. Transition ...................................................................................................... 3-4*
I. Mobile Defense .............................................................................3-5
I. Organization ....................................................................................................3-6
A. The Fixing Force .......................................................................................3-6
B. The Striking Force .....................................................................................3-6
III. Conducting the Mobile Defense - A Small Unit Perspective ..........................3-8
On Point ............................................................................................................3-10
II. Area Defense ..............................................................................3-11
I. Organization ..................................................................................................3-12
Primary Positions ........................................................................................3-12
Alternate Positions ......................................................................................3-12
Supplementary Positions.............................................................................3-12
Subsequent Positions..................................................................................3-12
A. Range Card.............................................................................................3-14
B. Sector Sketch..........................................................................................3-14
C. Sectors of Fire ........................................................................................3-15
D. Engagement Areas .................................................................................3-16
III. Conducting the Area Defense - A Small Unit Perspective ...........................3-17
IV. Priorities of Work in the Defense .................................................................3-18
The
Defense
I. Stability Operations......................................................................4-1
I. Primary Stability Tasks .....................................................................................4-2
II. Purposes of Stability Operations ....................................................................4-2
III. Types of Stability Operations .........................................................................4-4
IV. Use of Force in Stability Operations ..............................................................4-6
V. Small Unit Stability Tasks................................................................................4-7
A. Establish and Occupy a Lodgement Area or a .........................................4-7
Forward Operating Base (FOB)
B. Monitor Compliance with an Agreement ...................................................4-7
C. Negotiations ..............................................................................................4-8
D. Establishing Observation Posts and Checkpoints ..................................4-10
E. Search.....................................................................................................4-12
F. Patrol .......................................................................................................4-12
G. Escort a Convoy .....................................................................................4-12
H. Open and Secure Routes .......................................................................4-12
I. Conduct Reserve Operations ...................................................................4-12
J. Control Crowds ........................................................................................4-12
II. Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations ...................................4-13
I. Aspects of the Counterinsurgency .................................................................4-14
II. The Nature of Counterinsurgency Operations ..............................................4-15
Initial Stage: Stop the Bleeding .................................................................4-15
Middle Stage: Inpatient Care--Recovery ...................................................4-15
Late Stage: Outpatient Care--Movement to Self-Suffciency ....................4-15
III. Historical Principles for Counterinsurgency .................................................4-16
IV. Contemporary Imperatives of Counterinsurgency .......................................4-18
V. Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations ...............................................4-20
VI. Successful and Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Practices.......................4-22
Stability and Counter-
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III. Retrograde ................................................................................3-19
I. Delay..............................................................................................................3-20
A. Delay Within a Sector .............................................................................3-20
B. Delay Forward of a Specifed Line for a Specifed Time .........................3-20
II. Withdrawal ....................................................................................................3-21
A. Assisted...................................................................................................3-21
B. Unassisted ..............................................................................................3-21
III. Retirement ...................................................................................................3-21
Conducting the Retrograde - A Small Unit Perspective ....................................3-20
On Point ............................................................................................................3-22
Reconstitution..............................................................................................3-22
IV. Small Unit Defensive Techniques ...........................................3-23
I. Defend an Area ..............................................................................................3-23
II. Defend a Battle Position ...............................................................................3-24
III. Defend a Strongpoint ...................................................................................3-25
IV. Defend a Perimeter .....................................................................................3-27
V. Defend a Reverse Slope ..............................................................................3-27
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I. Security Operations .....................................................................5-1
I. Forms of Security Operations ..........................................................................5-1
Security Fundamentals..................................................................................5-2
A. Screen.......................................................................................................5-1
B. Guard ........................................................................................................5-4
C. Cover ........................................................................................................5-5
D. Area Security ............................................................................................5-6
E. Local Security ...........................................................................................5-7
* Combat Outposts ........................................................................................5-7
II. Fundamentals of Security Operations ............................................................5-3
On Point ..............................................................................................................5-8
II. Reconnaissance Operations ......................................................5-9
Reconnaissance Objective .................................................................................5-9
I. Reconnaissance Fundamentals ....................................................................5-10
II. Organization ................................................................................................. 5-11
III. Planning & Preparation ................................................................................ 5-11
IV. Forms of the Reconnaissance ..................................................................... 5-11
A. The Route Reconnaissance ....................................................................5-12
Recon Push ............................................................................................5-13
Recon Pull ..............................................................................................5-13
B. The Zone Reconnaissance .....................................................................5-14
C. The Area Reconnaissance ......................................................................5-16
Single-Team Method ..............................................................................5-16
Double-Team Method .............................................................................5-17
Dissemination of Information ..................................................................5-17
D. Reconnaissance in Force (RIF) ..............................................................5-18
On Point ............................................................................................................5-18
III. Relief in Place ...........................................................................5-19
I. Organization ..................................................................................................5-20
Hasty or Deliberate......................................................................................5-20
III. Conducting the Relief in Place - A Small Unit Perspective ..........................5-21
Techniques: Sequential, Simultaneous or Staggered..................................5-21
On Point ............................................................................................................5-22
IV. Passage of Lines ......................................................................5-23
I. Conducting the Relief in Place - A Small Unit Perspective ............................5-24
Departing the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) ............................................5-24
Reentering the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) ..........................................5-25
II. Organization .................................................................................................5-26
On Point ............................................................................................................5-26
V. Encirclement Operations ........................................................ 5-27*
I. Offensive Encirclement Operations ............................................................. 5-27*
II. Defending Encircled.................................................................................... 5-27*
VI. Troop Movement .................................................................... 5-29*
I. Methods of Troop Movement ....................................................................... 5-29*
II. Movement Techniques ................................................................................ 5-30*
Tactical Enabling
Tasks
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Special Purpose
Attacks
Special Purpose Attacks .................................................................6-1
I. Ambush .........................................................................................6-3
Near Ambush.................................................................................................6-4
Far Ambush ...................................................................................................6-4
I. Organization ....................................................................................................6-5
A. Near Ambush ............................................................................................6-6
B. Far Ambush...............................................................................................6-8
A. Near Ambush ..........................................................................................6-10
B. Far Ambush.............................................................................................6-10
III. Conducting the Ambush - A Small Unit Perspective .................................... 6-11
A. Near Ambush ..........................................................................................6-12
B. Far Ambush.............................................................................................6-14
IV. Ambush Categories .....................................................................................6-16
Deliberate ....................................................................................................6-16
Hasty ...........................................................................................................6-16
Area Ambush ...............................................................................................6-16
Point Ambush ..............................................................................................6-16
II. Raid .............................................................................................6-17
I. Organization ..................................................................................................6-18
A. Security Team .........................................................................................6-18
B. Support Team ..........................................................................................6-18
C. Assault Team ..........................................................................................6-18
III. Conducting the Raid - A Small Unit Perspective ..........................................6-20
A. Infltrate to the Objective .........................................................................6-20
B. Actions on the Objective .........................................................................6-21
On Point ............................................................................................................6-22
III. Swarming Attack ......................................................................6-23
I. Organization ..................................................................................................6-24
A. Autonomy ................................................................................................6-25
B. Mobility ....................................................................................................6-26
C. Communication .......................................................................................6-27
D. Synchronization ......................................................................................6-27
II. Planning and Preparation .............................................................................6-27
III. Conducting the Swarming Attack - A Small Unit Perspective ......................6-28
1. Locate......................................................................................................6-28
2. Converge .................................................................................................6-28
3. Attack.......................................................................................................6-29
4. Disperse ..................................................................................................6-29
5. Pulse .......................................................................................................6-29
On Point ............................................................................................................6-30
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Urban Operations &
I. Small Unit Operations in Urban Areas ..................................... 7-1*
Urban Operations (UO)................................................................................... 7-1a*
Understanding the Urban Environment ...........................................................7-1c*
Threat ............................................................................................................. 7-1e*
I. Find ..................................................................................................................7-1
II. Isolate the Building .........................................................................................7-1
Cordon...........................................................................................................7-2
III. Assault a Building ..........................................................................................7-2
A. Entering a Building ....................................................................................7-3
Top Entry ..................................................................................................7-3
Bottom Entry ............................................................................................7-3
Secure the Near and Far Side of the Point of Penetration.......................7-4
B. Clearing Rooms ........................................................................................7-5
C. Moving in the Building...............................................................................7-6
Diamond Formation (Serpentine Technique) ...........................................7-6
Vee Formation (Rolling-T Technique) ......................................................7-6
1. Clearing Hallway Junctions ..................................................................7-6
2. Clearing a T Intersection ...................................................................7-7
3. Clearing Stairwells and Staircases ......................................................7-7
IV. Follow Through ..............................................................................................7-8
II. Attacking Fortifed Areas ............................................................7-9
Characteristics ....................................................................................................7-9
I. Find ................................................................................................................7-10
II. Fix .................................................................................................................7-10
III. Finish (Fighting Enemies in Fortifcations) ...................................................7-10
A. Securing the Near and Far Side--Breaching Protective Obstacles .........7-10
B. Knocking out Bunkers .............................................................................7-10
C. Assaulting Trench Systems.....................................................................7-12
1. Entering the Trenchline ......................................................................7-12
2. Clearing the Trenchline ......................................................................7-13
3. Moving in a Trench.............................................................................7-13
IV. Follow Through ............................................................................................7-14
Attacking Fortified Areas
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Patrols and Patrolling .....................................................................8-1
Combat Patrols ...................................................................................................8-1
Reconnaissance Patrols .....................................................................................8-1
I. Organization of Patrols ....................................................................................8-2
II. Planning & Conducting a Patrol ......................................................................8-4
III. Elements of a Combat Patrol .........................................................................8-6
A. Assault Element ........................................................................................8-6
B. Support Element .......................................................................................8-6
C. Security Element.......................................................................................8-6
Patrols &
Patrolling
I. Traveling Techniques ...................................................................8-7
I. Traveling ..........................................................................................................8-8
II. Traveling Overwatch .......................................................................................8-8
III. Bounding Overwatch .....................................................................................8-9
On Point ............................................................................................................8-10
II. Attack Formations .....................................................................8-11
Fire Team Formations ....................................................................................... 8-11
Attack Formation Considerations......................................................................8-12
I. The Line .........................................................................................................8-13
II. The File .........................................................................................................8-14
Variation: The Staggered Column ...............................................................8-15
III. The Wedge ..................................................................................................8-16
Variation: The Diamond ...............................................................................8-17
On Point ............................................................................................................8-18
Security Checks While on Patrol .................................................................8-18
5 and 20 Meter Checks ...............................................................................8-18
III. Crossing a Danger Area ...........................................................8-19
Types of Danger Areas .....................................................................................8-19
I. Patch-to-the-Road Method ............................................................................8-20
II. Heart-Shaped Method ..................................................................................8-22
III. Bypass Method ............................................................................................8-24
IV. Box Method .................................................................................................8-25
V. Crossing Large Open Areas .........................................................................8-25
On Point ............................................................................................................8-26
Enemy Contact ............................................................................................8-26
IV. Establishing a Security Halt ....................................................8-27
I. Cigar-Shaped Method....................................................................................8-29
II. Wagon Wheel Method ..................................................................................8-30
III. Priorities of Work at the Objective Rally Point (ORP) ..................................8-31
On Point ............................................................................................................8-32
En Route Rally Point (ERP) ........................................................................8-32
Objective Rally Point (ORP) ........................................................................8-32
V. Establishing a Hide Position ....................................................8-33
Considerations ..................................................................................................8-33
I. Back-to-Back Method ....................................................................................8-34
II. Star Method ..................................................................................................8-35
On Point ............................................................................................................8-36
Site Selection ..............................................................................................8-36
Site Sterilization...........................................................................................8-36
VI. Establishing a Patrol Base ......................................................8-37
Site Selection ....................................................................................................8-37
The Triangle Method .........................................................................................8-38
Planning Considerations ...................................................................................8-39
Security Measures ............................................................................................8-39
Priorities of Work ..............................................................................................8-40
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Index
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Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement
and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain and the enemy to
translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. (Dept. of
Army photo by Staff Sgt. Russell Bassett).
I. The Tactical Level of War
Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The
tactical-level commander employs combat power to accomplish assigned missions.
The tactical level of war is the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned
and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP
3-0). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat
elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. It is
important to understand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and
operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical
operations are reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused actions.
Tactical operations always require judgment and adaptation to the unique circum-
stances of a specifc situation. Techniques and procedures are established patterns
that can be applied repeatedly with little or no judgment in a variety of circumstanc-
es. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide commanders and staffs with a
set of tools to use in developing the solution to a tactical problem.
Individuals, crews, and small units
Individuals, crews, and small units act at the tactical level. At times, their actions may
produce strategic or operational effects. However, this does not mean these elements
are acting at the strategic or operational level. Actions are not strategic unless they
contribute directly to achieving the strategic end state. Similarly, actions are considered
operational only if they are directly related to operational movement or the sequencing
of battles and engagements. The level at which an action occurs is determined by the
perspective of the echelon in terms of planning, preparation, and execution.
(Tactical Mission Fundamentals) I. The Art of Tactics 1-1*
I. The Art of Tactics
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense & Defense (Aug 12), chap. 1.
Tactical Mission Fundamentals
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Battles, Engagements and Small-Unit Actions
Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each
other. Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions.
The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and
small-unit actions. A battle consists of a set of related engagements that lasts longer
and involves larger forces than an engagement. Battles can affect the course of a
campaign or major operation. An engagement is a tactical confict, usually between
opposing, lower echelons maneuver forces (JP 1-02). Engagements are typically
conducted at brigade level and below. They are usually short, executed in terms of
minutes, hours, or days.
II. The Science and Art of Tactics
The tactician must understand and master the science and the art of tactics, two dis-
tinctly different yet inseparable concepts. Commanders and leaders at all echelons
and supporting commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned staff offcers must be
tacticians to lead their soldiers in the conduct of full spectrum operations.
A. The Science
The science of tactics encompasses the understanding of those military aspects of
tacticscapabilities, techniques, and proceduresthat can be measured and codi-
fed. The science of tactics includes the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy
organizations and systems, such as determining how long it takes a division to move
a certain distance. It also includes techniques and procedures used to accomplish
specifc tasks, such as the tactical terms and control graphics that comprise the
language of tactics. While not easy, the science of tactics is fairly straightforward.
Much of what is contained in this manual is the science of tacticstechniques
and procedures for employing the various elements of the combined arms team to
achieve greater effects.
Mastery of the science of tactics is necessary for the tactician to understand the
physical and procedural constraints under which he must work. These constraints
include the effects of terrain, time, space, and weather on friendly and enemy forces.
Howeverbecause combat is an intensely human activitythe solution to tactical
problems cannot be reduced to a formula. This realization necessitates the study of
the art of tactics.
B. The Art
The art of tactics consists of three interrelated aspects: the creative and fexible
array of means to accomplish assigned missions, decision making under conditions
of uncertainty when faced with an intelligent enemy, and understanding the human
dimensionthe effects of combat on soldiers. An art, as opposed to a science,
requires exercising intuitive faculties that cannot be learned solely by study. The
tactician must temper his study and evolve his skill through a variety of relevant,
practical experiences. The more experience the tactician gains from practice under a
variety of circumstances, the greater his mastery of the art of tactics.
Military professionals invoke the art of tactics to solve tactical problems within his
commanders intent by choosing from interrelated options, including
Types and forms of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission tasks
Task organization of available forces, to include allocating scarce resources
Arrangement and choice of control measures
Tempo of the operation
Risks the commander is willing to take
*1-2 (Tactical Mission Fundamentals) I. The Art of Tactics
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(Tactical Mission Fundamentals) I. The Art of Tactics 1-3*
Aspects of the Art of Tactics
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense & Defense (Aug 12), pp. 1-2 to 1-3 (not labeled in ADRP 3-90).
There are three aspects to the art of tactics that defne a competent tactician:
1. Domain Knowledge
Note: For more complete discussion of domain knowledge, see The Leaders
SMARTbook or FM 6-22 Army Leadership, pp. 6-5 to 6-9.
The frst is the creative and fexible application of the tools available to the commander,
such as doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, training, organizations, materiel, and
soldiers in an attempt to render the enemys situational tactics ineffective. The tactician
must understand how to train and employ his forces in full spectrum operations. The
factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil consid-
erations (METT-TC) are variables whose infnite mutations always combine to form a
new tactical pattern.
They never produce exactly the same situation; thus there can be no checklists that
adequately address each unique situation. Because the enemy changes and adapts to
friendly moves during the planning, preparation, and execution of an operation, there
is no guarantee that a technique which worked in one situation will work again. Each
tactical problem is unique and must be solved on its own merits.
2. Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty
The second aspect of the art of tactics is decision making under conditions of uncer-
tainty in a time-constrained environment and demonstrated by the clash of opposing
willsa violent struggle between two hostile, thinking, and independent opposing
commanders with irreconcilable goals. Each commander wants to impose his will on
his opponent, defeat his opponents plans, and destroy his opponents forces. Combat
consists of the interplay between these two opposing commanders, with each com-
mander seeking to accomplish his mission while preventing the other from doing the
same. Every commander needs a high degree of creativity and clarity of thought to
outwit a willing and able opponent. He must quickly apply his judgment to a less than
omniscient common operational picture provided by his command and control (C2)
system to understand the implications and opportunities afforded him by the situa-
tion. The commander always uses the most current intelligence in order to facilitate
his visualization of the enemy and environment. That same C2 system transmits the
decisions resulting from his situational understanding to those individuals and units
required to engage and destroy the enemy force.
3. The Human Dimension
The third and fnal aspect of the art of tactics is understanding the human dimension
what differentiates actual combat from the problems encountered during training and
in a classroom. Combat is one of the most complex human activities, characterized by
violent death, friction, uncertainty, and chance. Success depends at least as much on
this human aspect as it does on any numerical and technological superiority.
The tactician cannot ignore the human aspect. He seeks to recognize and exploit
indicators of fear and weakness in his enemy, and to defeat the enemys will, since
soldiers remain key to generating combat power. More than any other human activity,
continuous combat operations against an intelligent enemy takes a toll on soldiers,
severely straining their physical and mental stamina. This creates in soldiers the tan-
gible and intangible effects of courage, fear, combat experience, exhaustion, isolation,
confdence, thirst, and anger.
Leaders must be alert to indicators of fatigue, fear, lapses in discipline standards, and
reduced morale in friendly and enemy soldiers. These conditions can have a cumula-
tive effect on units that can lead to collapse. The tactician must understand how they
affect human endurance and factor them into his plans. He must understand the limits
of human endurance in combat.
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Solving Tactical Problems
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense & Defense (Aug 12), pp. 1-7 to 1-9.
Success in tactical problem solving results from the aggressive, intelligent, and decisive
use of combat power in an environment of uncertainty, disorder, violence, and danger. A
commander wins by maintaining the initiative and forcing the enemy to react to friendly
operations, initiating combat on the commanders own termsat a time and place of
the commanders choosing. A commander should never surrender the initiative once it
is gained. The commander should build momentum quickly to win decisively through
the simultaneous rapid application of available combat power while operating inside the
enemys decisionmaking cycle, and mastering the transitions between the defense to the
offensive and vice versa. This allows the commander to maximize friendly and minimize
enemy combat power by preventing the enemy from fghting as a combined arms force.
Offensive action is almost always the key to achieving decisive results. Command-
ers conduct the offense to achieve assigned missions---destroying enemy forces or seiz-
ing terrain---that cumulatively produce the effects required by the operational commander.
Circumstances may require defending; however, tactical success normally requires shift-
ing to the offense as soon as possible. The offense ends when the forces conducting it
accomplish their missions, reach their limits of advance, or approach culmination. Those
forces then consolidate, resume the attack, or prepare for other operations.
Commanders initiate combat on their own terms to gain important advantages. This
allows the massing of the effects of combat power against selected inferior and isolated
enemy units in vulnerable locations. Possession of the initiative allows a commander to
continually seek vulnerable spots and shift the decisive operation when opportunities
occur. A commander seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative by
Maneuvering more rapidly than the enemy to gain positional advantage (the place
where the effects of fres are most destructive) over the enemy
Employing frepower to facilitate and exploit positional advantage
Sustaining subordinate forces before, during, and after the engagement with the
enemy
Achieving and maintaining a better understanding of the tactical situation than that
possessed by enemy decision makers
Planning beyond the initial operation and anticipating possible events
The commander tenaciously and aggressively presses the battle. The commander ac-
cepts risk while leading Soldiers and pushing systems to their limits.
Commanders seek ways to build momentum quickly by seizing the initiative and execut-
ing operations at a high tempo. Momentum complements and helps to retain the initiative.
Concentrating combat power at the decisive place and time overwhelms an enemy and
gains control of the situation. Rapid maneuver to place the enemy in a disadvantageous
position also builds momentum. Momentum allows the commander to create opportuni-
ties to engage the enemy from unexpected directions with unanticipated capabilities.
Having seized the initiative, the commander continues to control the relative momentum
by taking action to maintain focus and pressure, controlling the tempo of operations, and
creating and exploiting opportunities, while always assessing the situation and taking
prudent risks.
The mission command system assists the rapid building of momentum by allowing the
commander to see and understand the situation so quickly that subordinate forces can
act before the enemy forces can react to the initial situation. The operations process fo-
cuses on executing rather than planning. Modern information systems allow compressed
planning and effective incremental adjustments to the plan during execution. This allows
the commanders forces to adapt more quickly to emerging threats and opportunities, as
they are identifed. Units whose commanders can make and implement decisions faster,
*1-3a (Tactical Mission Fundamentals) I. The Art of Tactics
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even to a small degree, gain an accruing advantage that becomes signifcant over time.
Making decisions quicklyeven with incomplete informationis crucial. Commanders
and staffs at higher echelons require frequently updated, relevant information from lower
echelons, particularly in regards to friendly and enemy force dispositions and activities.
Commanders choose from a number of tactical options to create the solution to the tacti-
cal problem facing them. Although commanders solve specifc tactical problems facing
them by following the general principles as outlined in ADRP 3-90. There is no single,
doctrinally correct, procedurally derived solution to any problem. The commander who
employs the more appropriate tactics, given the existing situation, has a distinct advan-
tage over an opponent, even if their forces have equal combat power.
The commander uses a mastery of the art and science of tactics, an understanding
of the situation, and sound judgment to create unique solutions appropriate to the mis-
sion and the other specifc mission variables of METT-TC. There are usually several solu-
tions that might work, although some will be more effective than others. The commander
seeks a solution that defeats the enemy in the time available at the least cost in blood
and materiel. The solution should be decisive and posture the unit for future missions,
while providing the greatest fexibility for unexpected enemy actions or reactions. The
solution must be in accordance with the higher commanders intent. A thorough under-
standing of the enemy greatly assists the commander in the development of workable
solutions. Commanders visualization is the doctrinal term for this process.
The commander should train to be able to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its
important elements, and base decisions on those important elements as a part of master-
ing the Army profession. Commanders develop this capability after years of education in
military schools, self-study, and practical training experiences, which eventually develop
the intuitive faculties required to solve tactical problems.
Doctrine requires human judgment when applied to a specifc situation. In choosing a
solution to a tactical problem, applicable laws and regulations, the mission, the laws of
physics, human behavior, and sustainment realities constrain commanders, but standard-
ized tactics, techniques, and procedures codifed in Army doctrine as best practices do
not. The true test of the solution to any military problem is not whether it uses the specifc
tactics, techniques, or procedures contained in this manual and subordinate manuals,
but whether the tactics, techniques, and procedures used were appropriate to the situa-
tion. Tactical profciency is not defned by mastery of written doctrine, but by the ability to
employ available means to win battles and engagements. A solution may not match any
previous doctrinal example; however, the language used to communicate that concept
must be technically precise and doctrinally consistent, using commonly understood and
accepted doctrinal terms and concepts.
Transitions between the different elements and primary tasks of operations are diffcult
and, during execution, may create unexpected opportunities for Army or enemy forces.
Commanders and their supporting staffs must quickly recognize such opportunities, de-
veloping transitions as branches or sequels during the planning process and act on them
immediately as they occur. A transition from an emphasis on one element of operations to
another is a complex operational consideration.
Tactical victory occurs when the opposing enemy force can no longer achieve its
tactical objectives or prevent friendly forces from accomplishing their mission.
That is the end goal of all offensive and defensive tasks. Decisive tactical victory occurs
when the enemy no longer has the means to oppose the friendly force. It also occurs when
the enemy admits defeat and agrees to a negotiated end of hostilities. Historically, a rapid
tactical victory results in fewer friendly casualties and reduced resource expenditures.
In closing, solutions to tactical problems are a collective effort. Success results from
the commanders plan and the ability of subordinates to execute it. Commanders must
have full confdence in their subordinates mastery of the art and science of tactics and in
their ability to execute the chosen solution.
(Tactical Mission Fundamentals) I. The Art of Tactics 1-3b*
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III. Hasty vs. Deliberate Operations
A hasty operation is an operation in which a commander directs his immediately
available forces, using fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), to perform activities with
minimal preparation, trading planning and preparation time for speed of execution.
A deliberate operation is an operation in which a commanders detailed intelligence
concerning the situation allows him to develop and coordinate detailed plans, includ-
ing multiple branches and sequels. He task organizes his forces specifcally for the
operation to provide a fully synchronized combined arms team. He conducts exten-
sive rehearsals while conducting shaping operations to set the conditions for the
conduct of his decisive operation. Most operations lie somewhere along a continuum
between these two extremes.
Choices and Trade-offs
The leader must choose the right point along the continuum to operate. His choice
involves balancing several competing factors. He bases his decision to conduct a
hasty or deliberate operation on his current knowledge of the enemy situation, and
his assessment of whether the assets available (to include time), and the means to
coordinate and synchronize those assets, are adequate to accomplish the mission.
If they are not he takes additional time to plan and prepare for the operation or bring
additional forces to bear on the problem. The commander makes that choice in an
environment of uncertainty, which always entails some risk.
Risk Reduction
Uncertainty and risk are inherent in tactical operations and cannot be eliminated. A
commander cannot be successful without the capability of acting under conditions
of uncertainty while balancing various risks and taking advantage of opportunities.
Although the commander strives to maximize his knowledge about his forces, the
terrain and weather, civil considerations, and the enemy, he cannot let a lack of
information paralyze him. The more intelligence on the enemy, the better able the
commander is to make his assessment. Less information means that the command-
er has a greater risk of making a poor decision for the specifc situation.
Risk Reduction Factors
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense, fig. 1-1, p. 1-5.
*1-4 (Tactical Mission Fundamentals) I. The Art of Tactics
(Tactical Mission Fundamentals) II. The Armys Operational Concept 1-5*
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I. Unifed Land Operations (Defned)
Unifed land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the
initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land
operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in
order to prevent or deter confict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favor-
able confict resolution (ADP 3-0). Unifed land operations is the Armys operational
concept and the Armys contribution to unifed action.
Goal of Unifed Land Operations
The goal of unifed land operations is to apply land power as part of unifed action
to defeat the enemy on land and establish conditions that achieve the joint force
commanders end state. Todays operational environments require commanders to
demonstrate the core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area
security conducted through offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of
civil authorities tasks to reach this goal.
Unifed land operations is the Armys operational concept and the Armys contribution
to unifed action. The central idea of unifed land operations is how the Army seizes,
retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage
in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability
or defense support of civil authorities tasks to prevent or deter confict, prevail in war,
and create the conditions for favorable confict resolution. Where possible, military
forces working with unifed action partners seek to prevent or deter threats. However,
if necessary, military forces possess the capability in unifed land operations to prevail
over aggression.
II. Foundations of Unifed Land Operations
By integrating the four foundations of unifed land operationsinitiative, decisive
action, Army core competencies, and mission commandArmy commanders can
achieve strategic success. Strategic success requires full integration of U.S. military
operations with the efforts of unifed action partners. The foundations of unifed land
operations begin and end with the exercise of individual and operational initiative.
Initiative is used to gain a position of advantage that degrades and defeats the
enemy throughout the depth of an organization. The Army demonstrates its core
competencies through decisive action.
The Armys two core competenciescombined arms maneuver and wide area
securityprovide the means for balancing the application of Army war fghting
functions within the tactical actions and tasks inherent in the offense, defense, and
stability overseas, or defense support of civil authorities in the United States. By
demonstrating the two core competencies, Army forces:
Defeat or destroy an enemy,
Seize or occupy key terrain,
Protect or secure critical assets and populations, and
Prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage
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Operational Concept
II. The Armys
Ref: ADRP 3-0, Unifed Land Operations (May 12), chap. 1 and 2.
*1-6 (Tactical Mission Fundamentals) II. The Armys Operational Concept
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A. Seize, Retain and Exploit the Initiative
All Army operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve
decisive results. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action
throughout an operation. Individual initiative is the willingness to act in the absence
of orders, when existing orders no longer ft the situation, or when unforeseen op-
portunities or threats arise. Initiative gives all operations the spirit, if not the form, of
the offense. It originates in the principle of war of the offensive. This principle goes
beyond simply attacking. It requires action to change the situation on the ground.
Risk and opportunity are intrinsic in seizing the initiative. To seize the initiative,
commanders evaluate and take prudent risks as necessary to exploit opportunities.
Initiative requires constant effort to control tempo and momentum while maintaining
freedom of action. This offensive mindset, with its focus on initiative, is central to the
Armys operational concept and guides all leaders in the performance of their duty. It
emphasizes opportunity created by developing the situation through decisive action,
whether in offensive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authorities tasks.
In combined arms maneuver, commanders compel the enemy to respond to friendly
action. In the offense, it involves taking the fght to the enemy and never allowing en-
emy forces to recover from the initial shock of the attack. In the defense, it involves
preventing the enemy from achieving success and then counterattacking to seize the
initiative. The object is more than just killing enemy personnel and destroying their
equipment. Combined arms maneuver forces the enemy to react continuously and
fnally to be driven into untenable positions. Seizing the initiative pressures enemy
commanders into abandoning their preferred courses of action, accepting too much
risk, or making costly mistakes. As enemy mistakes occur, friendly forces seize op-
portunities and create new avenues for exploitation. Ultimately, combined arms ma-
neuver aims to break the enemys will through relentless and continuous pressure.
B. Decisive Action
Army forces demonstrate the Armys core competencies through decisive action
the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or
defense support of civil authorities tasks. In unifed land operations, commanders
seek to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to
achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States
and its territories simultaneously combine three elementsoffense, defense, and
stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines the ele-
ments of defense support of civil authorities and, as required, offense and defense to
support homeland defense.
See following pages (pp. *1-8 to *1-9) for further discussion.
The mission determines the relative weight of effort among the elements.
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Ref: ADP 3-0, Unifed Land Operations (Oct 11).
Unifed land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initia-
tive to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations
through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent
or deter confict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable confict resolu-
tion. ADP 3-0, Unifed Land Operations, is the Armys basic warfghting doctrine and is
the Armys contribution to unifed action.
Unified Land Operations (Underlying Logic)
Ref: ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, fig. 1, pp. iii to iv.
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Decisive action requires simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability or
defense support of civil authorities tasks.
1. Offensive Tasks
An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize ter-
rain, resources, and population centers. Offensive tasks impose the commanders will on
the enemy. In combined arms maneuver, the offense is a task of decisive action. Against
a capable, adaptive enemy,
the offense is the most direct
and a sure means of seizing,
retaining, and exploiting the
initiative to gain physical and
psychological advantages
and achieve defnitive results.
In the offense, the decisive
operation is a sudden, shatter-
ing action against an enemy
weakness that capitalizes on
speed, surprise, and shock.
If that operation does not
destroy the enemy, operations
continue until enemy forces
disintegrate or retreat to where
they no longer pose a threat.
Executing offensive tasks
compels the enemy to react,
creating or revealing additional
weaknesses that the attack-
ing force can exploit.
For discussion of offensive
tasks, see chap. 2, pp. 2-1
to 2-34.
2. Defensive Tasks
A defensive task is a task
conducted to defeat an
enemy attack, gain time,
economize forces, and
develop conditions favorable
for offensive or stability tasks.
Normally the defense alone
cannot achieve a decision.
However, it can set condi-
tions for a counteroffensive
or counterattack that enables
Army forces to regain the initiative. Defensive tasks can also establish a shield behind
which wide area security can progress. Defensive tasks are a counter to the enemy of-
fense. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They
also preserve and maintain control over land, resources, and populations. The purpose
of defensive tasks is to retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabili-
ties against enemy attacks. Commanders can conduct defensive tasks to gain time and
economize forces so offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere.
For discussion of defensive tasks, see chap. 3, pp. 3-1 to 3-28.
Defensive Tasks
Primary Tasks
Mobile defense
Area defense
Retrograde
Purposes
Deter or defeat enemy offensive operations
Gain time
Achieve economy of force
Retain key terrain
Protect the populace, critical assets and
infrastructure
Develop intelligence
Tasks of Decisive Action
Ref: ADRP 3-0, Operations (Mar 12), pp. 2-4 to 2-8 (and table 2-1, p. 2-5).
Offensive Tasks
Primary Tasks
Movement to contact
Attack
Exploitation
Pursuit
Purposes
Dislocate, isolate, disrupt and destroy enemy forces
Seize key terrain
Deprive the enemy of resources
Develop intelligence
Deceive and divert the enemy
Create a secure environment for stability operations
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3. Stability Tasks
Stability is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activi-
ties conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of na-
tional power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.
(See JP 3-0.) Army forces conduct stability tasks during both combined arms maneuver
and wide area security. These tasks support a host-nation or an interim government or
part of a transitional military authority when no government exists. Stability tasks involve
both coercive and constructive actions. They help to establish or maintain a safe and
secure environment and fa-
cilitate reconciliation among
local or regional adversar-
ies. Stability tasks can also
help establish political,
legal, social, and economic
institutions while supporting
the transition to legitimate
host-nation governance.
Stability tasks cannot suc-
ceed if they only react to
enemy initiatives. Stabil-
ity tasks must maintain
the initiative by pursuing
objectives that resolve the
causes of instability.
For discussion of stability
tasks, see chap. 4, pp. 4-1
to 4-12.
4. Defense
Support of Civil
Authority Tasks
DSCA is support provided
by U.S. Federal military
forces, Department of
Defense civilians, Depart-
ment of Defense contract
personnel, Department of
Defense component as-
sets, and National Guard
forces (when the Secretary
of Defense, in coordination
with the Governors of the
affected States, elects and
requests to use those forces
in Title 32, U.S. Code, status). This support is in response to requests for assistance from
civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic
activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Defense support of civil authori-
ties is a task that takes place only in the homeland, although some of its tasks are similar
to stability tasks. Defense support of civil authorities is always conducted in support of
another primary or lead federal agency.
Refer to JP 2-28 for further discussion.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks
Primary Tasks
Provide support for domestic disasters
Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents
Provide support for domestic civilian law enforce-
ment agencies
Provide other designated support
Purposes
Save lives
Restore essential services
Maintain or restore law and order
Protect infrastructure and property
Maintain or restore local government
Shape the environment for interagency success
Stability Tasks
Primary Tasks
Establish civil security (including security force asst)
Establish civil control
Support to governance
Support to economic and infrastructure development
Purposes
Provide a secure environment
Secure land areas
Meet the critical needs of the populace
Gain support for host-nation government
Shape the environment for interagency and
host-nation success
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C. Army Core Competencies
Army forces demonstrate their core competencies of combined arms maneuver
and wide area security by combining offensive, defensive, and stability or defense
support of civil authorities tasks simultaneously. As part of a combined arms force
within unifed land operations, Army forces accept prudent risk to create opportuni-
ties to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action of lethal and non-
lethal effects, proportional to the mission and informed by an understanding of an
operational environment. Mission command that conveys commanders intent guides
the adaptive use of Army forces.
D. Mission Command
Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using
mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commanders intent to em-
power agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unifed land operations (see Army
doctrine on mission command). Exercised by Army commanders, it blends the art of
command and the science of control while integrating the war fghting functions to con-
duct the tasks of decisive action. Mission command has six fundamental principles:
Build cohesive teams through mutual trust
Create shared understanding
Provide a clear commanders intent
Exercise disciplined initiative
Use mission orders
Accept prudent risk
As a philosophy, mission command is essential to the Armys core competencies.
Mission command illuminates the Army leaders responsibility to understand, visual-
ize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. It provides commanders and staff with a
philosophy for operating in an uncertain environment as opposed to trying to create
certainty and impose order and control over a situation. Mission command recog-
nizes that Army leaders command not only Army forces but also work with diverse
unifed action partners. Mission command emphasizes the critical contributions of
leaders at every echelon. It establishes a mindset among Army leaders that the best
understanding comes from a synthesis of information and an understanding from all
echelons and unifed action partnersbottom-up input is as important as top-down
guidance. Mission command emphasizes the importance of creating shared under-
standing and purpose.
Mission command is the overarching term for both the warfghting function and the
philosophy of command. Mission command guides Army leaders how to think about
what subordinate leaders and their Soldiers do to conduct successful operations
on land. By emphasizing people as the driving force behind the development of
technology, mission command adapts technology to human needs, not humans to
technological restrictions. Understanding and infuencing people to achieve success
in unifed land operations are fundamental to how the commander exercises the art
of command.
Refer to The Battle Staff SMARTbook (Guide to Designing, Planning &
Conducting Military Operations) for discussion of mission command....
(Tactical Mission Fundamentals) IV. Commanders Activities 1-15*
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Commanders Activities
Commanders are the most important participants in the operations process. While
staffs perform essential functions that amply the effectiveness of operations,
commanders drive the operations process through understanding, visualizing,
describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.
See p. 1-24 for an overview and discussion of the operations process.
The Commanders Role in Ops Process
Ref: ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, fig. 1-2, p. 1-3.
I. Understand
Understanding is fundamental to the commanders ability to establish a situations
context. It is essential to effective decision making during planning and execution.
Analysis of the operational and mission variable provides the information used to
develop understanding and frame the problem. In addition, conceptual and de-
tailed planning assist commanders in developing their initial understanding of the
operational environment and the problem. To develop a better understanding of an
operational environment, commanders circulate within the area of operations as
often as possible, collaborating with subordinate commanders and with Soldiers. Us-
ing personal observations and inputs from others (to include running estimates from
the staff), commanders improve their understanding of their operational environment
throughout the operations process.
Information collection (to include reconnaissance and surveillance) is indispensable to
building and improving the commanders understanding. Formulating CCIRs, keeping
them current, determining where to place key personnel, and arranging for liaison
also contribute to improving the commanders understanding. Greater understanding
enables commanders to make better decisions throughout the conduct of operations.
Ref: ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process (Mar 12), chap. I.
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Describe, Direct, Lead, Assess
IV. Understand, Visualize
*1-16 (Tactical Mission Fundamentals) IV. Commanders Activities
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II. Visualize
As commanders begin to understand their operational environment and the problem,
they start visualizing a desired end state and potential solutions to solve the prob-
lem. Collectively, this is known as commander's visualizationthe mental process of
developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envision-
ing an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state (ADP
5-0). Assignment of a mission provides the focus for developing the commanders
visualization that, in turn, provides the basis for developing plans and orders. During
preparation and execution, the commanders visualization helps commanders deter-
mine if, when, and what to decide, as they adapt to changing conditions.
Completed Commanders Visualization
Ref: ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, fig. 1-3, p. 1-4.
In building their visualization, commanders frst seek to understand those conditions that
represent the current situation. Next, commanders envision a set of desired future con-
ditions that represents the operations end state. Commanders complete their visualiza-
tion by conceptualizing an operational approacha description of the broad actions the
force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 5-0).
Commanders apply the Army design methodology and use the elements of opera-
tional art when developing and describing their commanders visualization. They also
actively collaborate with higher, subordinate and adjacent commanders, the staff,
and unifed action partners to assist them in building their visualization. Unifed ac-
tion partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and elements of the private sector that Army forces plan, coordinate, synchro-
nize, and integrate with during the conduct of operations (ADRP 3-0). Because of the
dynamic nature of military operations, commanders must continuously validate their
visualization throughout the operations process.
See pp. *1-18 to *1-19 for further discussion.
III. Describe
After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordi-
nates to facilitate shared understanding and purpose. During planning, commanders
ensure subordinates understand their visualization well enough to begin course of
action development. During execution, commanders describe modifcations to their
visualization in updated planning guidance and directives resulting in fragmentary
orders that adjust the original order. Commanders describe their visualization in doc-
trinal terms, refning and clarifying it, as circumstances require. Commanders express
their visualization in terms of:
Commanders intent
Planning guidance, including an operational approach
Commanders critical information requirements
Essential elements of friendly information
See pp. *1-20 to *1-21 for further discussion of the above elements.
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Refer to The Leaders SMARTbook for complete discussion of
the basis of leadership; the Army leader; leading, developing,
achieving; counseling, coaching, mentoring; training for full
spectrum operations and METL development; training plans,
meetings and schedules; training execution and training
exercises; and training assessments and AARs!
IV. Direct
Commanders direct all aspects of operations by establishing their commanders
intent, setting achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units.
Throughout the operations process, commanders direct forces by
Preparing and approving plans and orders
Establishing command and support relationships
Assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures, and task organization
Positioning units to maximize combat power
Positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure supervision
Allocating resources to exploit opportunities and counter threats
Committing the reserve as required
V. Lead
Through leadership, commanders provide purpose, direction, and motivation to sub-
ordinate commanders, their staff, and Soldiers. In many instances, a commanders
physical presence is necessary to lead effectively. Where the commander locates
within the area of operations is an important leadership consideration. Commanders
balance their time between leading the staff through the operations process and pro-
viding purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate commanders and Soldiers
away from the command post.
See pp. *1-22 to *1-23 for further discussion. Refer to The Army
Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Unifed Land
Operations and the Six Warfghting Functions) for discussion for
discussion of the operational framework, elements of combat
power, and the six warfghting functions.
VI. Assess
Commanders continuously assess the situation to better understand current condi-
tions and determine how the operation is progressing. Continuous assessment helps
commanders anticipate and adapt the force to changing circumstances. Commanders
incorporate the assessments of the staff, subordinate commanders, and unifed action
partners into their personal assessment of the situation. Based on their assessment,
commanders modify plans and orders to adapt the force to changing circumstances.
Refer to The Battle Staff SMARTbook (Guide to Designing,
Planning & Conducting Military Operations) for discussion of
the operations process, to include assessment. Commanders,
supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive
the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand,
visualize, and describe their operational environment; make
and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military
operations.
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The Operational Framework (Visualize)
ADRP 3-0, Unifed Land Operations (Mar 12), pp. 1-9 to 1-13 (and fg. 1-1, p. 1-10).
Area of Operations
When establishing the operational frame-
work, commanders use control measures
to assign responsibilities, coordinate fres
and maneuver, and control combat opera-
tions. One of the most important control
measures is the area of operations. An
area of operations is an operational area
defned by the joint force commander for
land and maritime forces that should be
large enough to accomplish their missions
and protect their forces (JP 3-0). For land
operations, an area of operations includes
subordinate areas of operations as well.
The Army command or joint force land
component commander is the supported
commander within an area of operations
designated by the joint force commander
for land operations. Within their areas of
operations, commanders integrate and
synchronize combat power. To facilitate
this integration and synchronization, com-
manders have the authority to designate
targeting priority, effects, timing, and effects
of fres within their areas of operations.
Area of Infuence
Commanders consider a units area of
infuence when assigning it an area of
operations. An area of infuence is a geo-
graphical area wherein a commander is
directly capable of infuencing operations
by maneuver or fre support systems nor-
mally under the commanders command
or control (JP 3-0). The area of infuence
normally surrounds and includes the area
of operations. Understanding the area of
infuence helps the commander and staff
plan branches to the current operation in
which the force uses capabilities outside
the area of operations. An area of opera-
tions should not be substantially larger than
the units area of infuence. Ideally, the area
of infuence would encompass the entire
area of operations.
Area of Interest
An area of interest is that area of concern to
the commander, including the area of infu-
ence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending
into enemy territory. This area also includes
areas occupied by enemy forces who could
jeopardize the accomplishment of the mis-
sion (JP 3-0). An area of interest for stability
or defense support of civil authorities tasks
may be much larger than that area associ-
ated with the offense and defense.
The operations structurethe operations process, warfghting functions, and opera-
tional frameworkis the Armys common construct for operations. It allows Army leaders
to rapidly and effectively organize effort in a manner commonly understood across the
Army. The operations process provides a broadly defned approach to developing and
executing operations. The war fghting functions provide an intellectual organization for
common critical functions. The operational framework provides Army leaders with basic
conceptual options for visualizing and describing operations.
Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in
time, space, purpose, and resources. An established operational framework and as-
sociated vocabulary can assist greatly in this task. Army leaders are not bound by any
specifc framework for conceptually organizing operations, but three operational frame-
works have proven valuable in the past. The higher headquarters will direct the specifc
framework or frameworks to be used by subordinate headquarters.
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DeepCloseSecurity
The deep-close-security operational framework has historically been associated with ter-
rain orientation but can be applied to temporal and organizational orientations as well.
Deep operations involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being
committed in a coherent manner. The purpose of deep operations is frequently tied to
other events distant in time, space or both. Deep operations might aim to disrupt the
movement of operational reserves, for example, or prevent the enemy from employing
long-range cannon, rocket, or missile fres.
Close operations are operations that are within a subordinate commanders area of
operations. Operations projected in close areas are usually against hostile forces in im-
mediate contact and are often the decisive operation. A close operation requires speed
and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and
place and to exploit success.
Security operations involve efforts to provide an early and accurate warning of enemy op-
erations and to provide time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy. These
operations protect the force from surprise and develop the situation to allow the commander
to use the force effectively. Security operations include necessary actions to retain freedom
of action and ensure uninterrupted support or sustainment of all other operations.
In deep, close, and security operations, a commander may refer to a support area.
DecisiveShapingSustaining
The decisive-shaping-sustaining framework lends itself to a broad conceptual orientation.
The decisive operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission. It de-
termines the outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. The decisive opera-
tion is the focal point around which commanders design an entire operation. Decisive
operations lead directly to the accomplishment of a commanders intent. Commanders
typically identify a single decisive operation, but more than one subordinate unit may
play a role in a decisive operation.
A shaping operation is an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive oper-
ation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. Inform and infuence
activities, for example, may integrate Soldier and leader engagement tasks into the
operation to reduce tensions between Army units and different ethnic groups through
direct contact between Army leaders and local leaders. Shaping operations preserve
conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Commanders may designate more
than one shaping operation.
A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive op-
eration or shaping operation by generating and maintaining combat power. Sustaining
operations differ from decisive and shaping operations in that they focus internally (on
friendly forces) rather than externally (on the enemy or environment). Sustaining opera-
tions include personnel and logistics support, rear area security, movement control,
terrain management, and infrastructure development.
Main and Supporting Efforts
The main and supporting efforts operational frameworksimpler than other organizing
frameworksfocuses on prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore, leaders
can use the main and supporting efforts with either the deep-close-security framework or
the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework.
The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in
time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the prepon-
derance of combat power. Typically, commanders shift the main effort one or more
times during execution. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource
allocation. When commanders designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of
support and resources.
A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the
success of the main effort. Commanders may provide augmentation to the main effort
or develop a supporting plan synchronized with the higher plan. They resource sup-
porting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to accomplish the mission. Forces
often realize success of the main effort through success of supporting efforts.
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Describe
Ref: ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process (Mar 12), pp. 1-4 to 1-6.
After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates
to facilitate shared understanding and purpose. During planning, commanders ensure
subordinates understand their visualization well enough to begin course of action devel-
opment. During execution, commanders describe modifcations to their visualization in
updated planning guidance and directives resulting in fragmentary orders that adjust the
original order. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refning and
clarifying it, as circumstances require. Commanders express their visualization in terms of:
Commanders intent
Planning guidance, including an operational approach
Commanders critical information requirements
Essential elements of friendly information
A. Commanders Intent
The commanders intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the opera-
tion and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to
the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the com-
manders desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold
as planned (JP 3-0). During planning, the initial commanders intent drives course of
action development. In execution, the commanders intent guides disciplined initiative as
subordinates make decisions when facing unforeseen opportunities or countering threats.
Commanders develop their intent statement personally. It must be easy to remember and
clearly understood by commanders and staffs two echelons lower in the chain of com-
mand. The more concise the commanders intent, the easier it is to recall and understand.
B. Planning Guidance
Commanders provide planning guidance to the staff based upon their visualization.
Planning guidance must convey the essence of the commanders visualization, including
a description of the operational approach. Effective planning guidance refects how the
commander sees the operation unfolding. It broadly describes when, where, and how the
commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission, within the higher
commanders intent. Broad and general guidance gives the staff and subordinate leaders
maximum latitude; it lets profcient staffs develop fexible and effective options.
Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning
guidance. They ensure staffs understand the broad outline of their visualization while
allowing them the latitude necessary to explore different options. This guidance provides
the basis for the concept of operations without dictating the specifcs of the fnal plan.
As with their intent, commanders may modify planning guidance based on staff and
subordinate input and changing conditions. (See ATTP 5-0.1 for a detailed discussion of
developing and issue planning guidance).
C. Commanders Critical Information
Requirements (CCIR)
A commanders critical information requirement is an information requirement identifed
by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key
elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence require-
ments (JP 3-0). A commanders critical information requirement (CCIR) directly infuences
decision making and facilitates the successful execution of military operations. Command-
ers decide to designate an information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions
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and their visualization of the course of the operation. A CCIR may support one or more
decisions. During planning, staffs recommend information requirements for commanders
to designate as CCIRs. During preparation and execution, they recommend changes to
CCIRs based on assessment. A CCIR is:
Specifed by a commander for a specifc operation
Applicable only to the commander who specifes it
Situation dependentdirectly linked to a current or future mission
Time-sensitive
Always promulgated by a plan or order, commanders limit the number of CCIRs to focus
the efforts of limited collection assets. The fewer the CCIRs, the easier it is for staffs to
remember, recognize, and act on each one. This helps staffs and subordinates identify
information the commander needs immediately. While most staffs provide relevant infor-
mation, a good staff expertly distills that information. It identifes answers to CCIRs and
gets them to the commander immediately. It also identifes vital information that does not
answer a CCIR but that the commander nonetheless needs to know. A good staff devel-
ops this ability through training and experience. Designating too many CCIRs limits the
staffs ability to immediately recognize and react to them. Excessive critical items reduce
the focus of collection efforts.
The list of CCIRs constantly changes. Commanders add and delete them throughout an
operation based on the information needed for specifc decisions. Commanders deter-
mine their own CCIRs, but they may select some from staff nominations. Once approved,
a CCIR falls into one of two categories: priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and
friendly force information requirements (FFIRs).
Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR)
A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for
intelligence support, which the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or
the operational environment (JP 2-0). PIRs identify the information about the enemy and
other aspects of the operational environment that the commander considers most im-
portant. Lessons from recent operations show that intelligence about civil considerations
may be as critical as intelligence about the enemy. Thus, all staff sections may recom-
mend information about civil considerations as PIRs. The intelligence offcer manages
PIRs for the commander through planning requirements and assessing collection.
Refer to ATTP 2-0.1.
Friendly Force Information Requirement (FFIR)
A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to
understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). FFIRs identify
the information about the mission, troops and support available, and time available for
friendly forces that the commander considers most important. In coordination with the
staff, the operations offcer manages FFIRs for the commander.
D. Essential Elements of Friendly
Information (EEFI)
Commanders also describe information they want protected as essential elements of
friendly information. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a
friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to
failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy
detection. Although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. EEFIs establish
elements of information to protect rather than one to collect. Their identifcation is the frst
step in the operations security process and central to the protection of information.
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Elements of Combat Power (Direct)
Ref: ADRP 3-0, Unifed Land Operations (Mar 12), pp. 3-1 to 3-2 (and fg. 3-1).
Organizing Combat Power
Ref: ADRP 3-0, Unifed Land Operations (Mar 12), pp. 3-6 to 3-7.
Commanders employ three means to organize combat power: force tailoring, task-orga-
nizing, and mutual support.
Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence
of their deployment in support of a joint force commander.
Task-organizing is the act of designing an operating force, support staff, or sustain-
ment package of specifc size and composition to meet a unique task or mission.
Mutual support. Commanders consider mutual support when task-organizing forces,
assigning areas of operations, and positioning units. Mutual support is that support which
units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position
relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP 3-31).
Combined arms maneuver and wide area security, executed through simultaneous offen-
sive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authorities tasks, require continuously
generating and applying combat power, often for extended periods. Combat power is the
total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or
formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting
potential into effective action.
To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of
combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission com-
mand, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fres, sustainment, and protection. The Army
collectively describes the last six elements as the warfghting functions. Commanders
apply combat power through the warfghting functions using leadership and information.
Generating and maintaining combat power throughout an operation is essential to
success. Factors contributing to generating combat power include employing reserves,
rotating committed forces, and focusing joint support. Commanders balance the ability
to mass lethal and nonlethal effects with the need to deploy and sustain the units that
produce those effects. They balance the ability of accomplishing the mission with the
ability to project and sustain the force. Commanders apply leadership through mission
command. Leadership is the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. Informa-
tion enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions on how best to apply
combat power. Ultimately, this creates opportunities to achieve defnitive results. Knowl-
edge management enables commanders to make informed, timely decisions despite the
uncertainty of operations.
Protection
Movement and
Maneuver
Intelligence
Fires Sustainment
Mission
Command
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The Six Warfghting Functions
ADRP 3-0, Unifed Land Operations (Mar 12), pp. 3-2 to 3-8.
1. Mission Command
The mission command warfghting function is the related tasks and systems that develop
and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and
the science of control in order to integrate the other warfghting functions. Commanders,
assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within the headquar-
ters and across the force as they exercise mission command.
2. Movement and Maneuver
The movement and maneuver warfghting function is the related tasks and systems that
move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and
other threats. Direct fre and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and
maneuver warfghting function includes tasks associated with force projection related to
gaining a position of advantage over the enemy. Movement is necessary to disperse and
displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver is the employment
of forces in the operational area.
3. Intelligence
The intelligence warfghting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate under-
standing the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. This warfghting function includes
understanding threats, adversaries, and weather. It synchronizes information collection
with the primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence
operations. Intelligence is driven by commanders and is more than just collection. De-
veloping intelligence is a continuous process that involves analyzing information from all
sources and conducting operations to develop the situation.
4. Fires
The fres warfghting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and
coordinated use of Army indirect fres, air and missile defense, and joint fres through the
targeting process. Army fres systems deliver fres in support of offensive and defensive
tasks to create specifc lethal and nonlethal effects on a target.
5. Sustainment
The sustainment warfghting function is the related tasks and systems that provide sup-
port and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong
endurance. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment.
Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to
retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment provides the support necessary to
maintain operations until mission accomplishment.
6. Protection
The protection warfghting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the
force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission.
Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants)
and physical assets of the United States and multinational military and civilian partners,
to include the host nation. The protection warfghting function enables the commander
to maintain the forces integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to
which potential threats can disrupt operations and then counters or mitigates those threats.
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Refer to The Battle Staff SMARTbook (Guide to Designing, Planning &
Conducting Military Operations) for discussion of the operations process.
Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to
drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand,
visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and
articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.
Ref: ADP 5-0, The Operations Process (Mar 12), pp. 2 to 6.
Activities of the Operations Process
The Operations Process (Underlying Logic)
Ref: ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, fig. 1, p. iv.

The Armys framework for exercising mission command is the operations process -- the
major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing,
executing, and continuously assessing the operation.
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The Offense 2-1*
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug 12), chap. 3.
Offensive actions are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy
forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the com-
manders will on the enemy. A commander may also conduct offensive actions to
deprive the enemy of resources, seize decisive terrain, deceive or divert the enemy,
develop intelligence, or hold an enemy in position. This chapter discusses the basics
of the offense. The basics discussed in this chapter apply to all offensive tasks.
The commander seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative when conducting offensive
actions. Specifc operations may orient on a specifc enemy force or terrain feature
as a means of affecting the enemy. Even when conducting primarily defensive ac-
tions, wresting the initiative from the enemy requires offensive actions.
Effective offensive operations capitalize on accurate intelligence regarding the
enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Commanders maneuver their
forces to advantageous positions before making contact. However, commanders
may shape conditions by deliberately making contact to develop the situation and
mislead the enemy. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden, shattering
action against enemy weakness that capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock. If
that operation does not destroy the enemy, operations continue until enemy forces
disintegrate or retreat to where they are no longer a threat.
Offense
The
Offensive operations are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy
enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the
commanders will on the enemy. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).
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*2-2 The Offense
I. Primary Offensive Tasks
An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize
terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0). The four primary offensive
tasks are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.
A. Movement to Contact
Movement to contact is an offensive task designed to develop the situation and to
establish or regain contact. The goal is to make initial contact with a small element
while retaining enough combat power to develop the situation and mitigate the asso-
ciated risk. A movement to contact also creates favorable conditions for subsequent
tactical actions. The commander conducts a movement to contact when the enemy
situation is vague or not specifc enough to conduct an attack. Forces executing this
task seek to make contact with the smallest friendly force feasible. A movement to
contact may result in a meeting engagement. Once contact is made with an enemy
force, the commander has fve options: attack, defend, bypass, delay, or withdraw.
The Army includes search and attack and cordon and search operations as part of
movement to contact operations.
B. Attack
An attack is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and
secures terrain, or both. Attacks incorporate coordinated movement supported by
fres. They may be either decisive or shaping operations. Attacks may be hasty or
deliberate, depending on the time available for assessing the situation, planning,
and preparing. However, based on mission variable analysis, the commander may
decide to conduct an attack using only fres. An attack differs from a movement to
contact because, in an attack, the commander knows part of the enemys disposi-
tion. This knowledge enables the commander to better synchronize and employ
combat power more effectively in an attack than in a movement to contact.
Subordinate forms of the attack have special purposes and include the ambush,
counterattack, demonstration, feint, raid, and spoiling attack. The commanders
intent and the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) determine
which of these forms of attack are employed. The commander can conduct each of
these forms of attack, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a deliberate operation.
See pp. 2-13 to 2-18.
C. Exploitation
Exploitation is an offensive task that usually follows the conduct of a successful at-
tack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. Exploitations seek to disin-
tegrate enemy forces to the point where they have no alternative but to surrender or
take fight. Exploitations take advantage of tactical opportunities. Division and higher
headquarters normally plan exploitations as branches or sequels.
See pp. 2-19 to 2-22.
D. Pursuit
A pursuit is an offensive task designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to
escape, with the aim of destroying it. A pursuit normally follows a successful exploita-
tion. However, any offensive task can transition into a pursuit, if enemy resistance
has broken down and the enemy is feeing the battlefeld. Pursuits entail rapid move-
ment and decentralized control. Bold action, calculated initiative, and accounting for
the associated risk are required in the conduct of a pursuit.
See pp. 2-23 to 2-28.
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The Offense 2-3*
Ref: Adapted from FM 3-0 Operations (2008) and ADRP 3-90 (Aug 12).
II. Purposes of Offensive Operations
The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force.
Additionally, commanders conduct offensive tasks to secure decisive terrain, to deprive
the enemy of resources, to gain information, to deceive and divert the enemy, to hold
the enemy in position, to disrupt the enemys attack, and to set up the conditions for
future successful operations.
1. Defeat, Destroy, or Neutralize the Enemy force
Well-executed offensive operations dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy
forces. If destruction is not feasible, offensive operations compel enemy forces to re-
treat. Offensive maneuver seeks to place the enemy at a positional disadvantage. This
allows friendly forces to mass overwhelming effects while defeating parts of the enemy
force in detail before the enemy can escape or be reinforced. When required, friendly
forces close with and destroy the enemy in close combat. Ultimately, the enemy sur-
renders, retreats in disorder, or is eliminated altogether.
2. Seize Decisive Terrain
Offensive maneuver may seize terrain that provides the attacker with a decisive
advantage. The enemy either retreats or risks defeat or destruction. If enemy forces
retreat or attempt to retake the key terrain, they are exposed to fres and further
friendly maneuver.
3. Deprive the Enemy of Resources
At the operational level, offensive operations may seize control of major population
centers, seats of government, production facilities, and transportation infrastructure.
Losing these resources greatly reduces the enemys ability to resist. In some cases,
Army forces secure population centers or infrastructure and prevent irregular forces
from using them as a base or beneftting from the resources that they generate.
4. To Gain Information
Enemy deception, concealment, and security may prevent friendly forces from gaining
necessary intelligence. Some offensive operations are conducted to develop the situa-
tion and discover the enemys intent, disposition, and capabilities.
5. Disrupt the Enemys Attack
Offensive operations distract enemy ISR. They may cause the enemy to shift reserves
away from the friendly decisive operation.
6. Set up the Conditions for Future Successful Operations
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*2-4 The Offense
Ref: FM 3-90 Tactics, pp. 3-11 to 3-32.
III. Forms of Maneuver
Forms of maneuver are distinct tactical
combinations of fre and movement with a
unique set of doctrinal characteristics that
differ primarily in the relationship between
the maneuvering force and the enemy.
The commander generally chooses one
form on which he builds a course of action
(COA). The higher commander rarely
specifes the specifc form of offensive ma-
neuver. However, his guidance and intent,
along with the mission that includes im-
plied tasks, may impose constraints such
as time, security, and direction of attack.
A. Envelopment
The envelopment is a form of maneuver
in which an attacking force seeks to avoid
the principal enemy defenses by seizing
objectives to the enemy rear to destroy
the enemy in his current positions. At
the tactical level, envelopments focus on
seizing terrain, destroying specifc enemy
forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal
routes. Envelopments avoid the enemy
front, where he is protected and can eas-
ily concentrate fres. Single envelopments
maneuver against one enemy fank;
double envelopments maneuver against
both. Either variant can develop into an
encirclement.
To envelop the enemy, commanders fnd
or create an assailable fank. Sometimes
the enemy exposes a fank by advancing,
unaware of friendly locations. In other
conditions, such as a fuid battle involving
forces in noncontiguous AOs, a combina-
tion of air and indirect fres may create an
assailable fank by isolating the enemy on
unfavorable terrain.
ENY
ENY
Decisive
Operation
A turning movement attacks the enemy rear to "turn" him
out of position and force him to fight to the rear of his
flanks.
OBJ

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ENY
ENY
Decisive
Operation
Shaping
Operation
An envelopment avoids enemy strength by maneuver
around or overenemy defenses. The decisive operation
is directed against the enemy flanks or rear.
An envelopment may result in an
encirclement. Encirclements are operations
where one force loses its freedom of
maneuver because an opposing force is
able to isolate it by controlling all ground
lines of communications. An offensive
encirclement is typically an extension of
either a pursuit or envelopment. A direct
pressure force maintains contact with the
enemy, preventing his disengagement and
reconstitution. Meanwhile, an encircling
force maneuvers to envelop the enemy,
cutting his escape routes and setting inner
and outer rings. The outer ring defeats
enemy attempts to break through to his
encircled force. The inner ring contains
the encircled force. All available means,
including obstacles, should be used to
contain the enemy. Then friendly forces
use all available fres to destroy him.
Encirclements often occur in nonlinear
offensive operations.
B. Turning Movement
A turning movement is a form of maneuver
in which the attacking force seeks to avoid
the enemys principal defensive posi-
tions by seizing objectives to the rear and
causing the enemy to move out of current
positions or divert major forces to meet the
threat. A major threat to his rear forces the
enemy to attack or withdraw rearward, thus
turning him out of his defensive posi-
tions. Turning movements typically require
greater depth than other maneuver forms.
Deep fres take on added importance. They
protect the enveloping force and attack the
enemy.
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The Offense 2-5*
ENY
ENY
Decisive
Operation
An infiltration uses covert movement of forces through
enemy lines to attack position in the enemy rear.
OBJ
Shaping
Operation
C. Infltration
An infltration is a form of maneuver in which
an attacking force conducts undetected
movement through or into an area occupied
by enemy forces to occupy a position of
advantage in the enemy rear while exposing
only small elements to enemy defensive
fres. The need to avoid being detected and
engaged may limit the size and strength of
infltrating forces. Infltration rarely defeats a
defense by itself. Cdrs direct infltrations to
attack lightly defended positions or stronger
positions from the fank and rear, to secure
key terrain to support the decisive operation,
or to disrupt enemy sustaining operations.
D. Penetration
A penetration is a form of maneuver in
which an attacking force seeks to rupture
enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt
the defensive system. It is used when
enemy fanks are not assailable or time
does not permit another form of maneuver.
Successful penetrations create assailable
fanks and provide access to enemy rear
areas. Penetrations frequently are directed
into the front of the enemy defense, and risk
more friendly casualties than envelopments,
turning movements and infltrations.
ENY
ENY
A frontal attack is conducted across a wide front over the
most direct approach.
Shaping
Operation
OBJ
OBJ
Decisive
Operation
E. Frontal Attack
A frontal attack is a form of maneuver in
which an attacking force seeks to destroy
a weaker enemy force or fx a larger
enemy force in place over a broad front.
At the tactical level, an attacking force
can use a frontal attack to rapidly overrun
a weaker enemy force. A frontal attack
strikes the enemy across a wide front
and over the most direct approaches.
Commanders normally use it when they
possess overwhelming combat power
and the enemy is at a clear disadvan-
tage. Commanders mass the effects of
direct and indirect fres, shifting indirect
and aerial fres just before the assault.
Success depends on achieving an
advantage in combat power throughout
the attack.
ENY
ENY
Decisive
Operation
OBJ
Shaping
Operation
OBJ
OBJ
Shaping
Operation
A penetration has three stages: initial rupture, rolling up
the flanks, and continuing the attack to secure a deep
objective.
The frontal attack is frequently the
most costly form of maneuver, since
it exposes the majority of the attack-
ers to the concentrated fres of the
defenders. As the most direct form of
maneuver, however, the frontal attack is
useful for overwhelming light defenses,
covering forces, or disorganized enemy
resistance. It is often the best form of
maneuver for hasty attacks and meeting
engagements, where speed and simplic-
ity are essential to maintain tempo and
the initiative. Commanders may direct a
frontal attack as a shaping operation and
another form of maneuver as the deci-
sive operation. Commanders may also
use the frontal attack during an exploita-
tion or pursuit. Commanders of large
formations conducting envelopments
or penetrations may direct subordinate
elements to conduct frontal attacks as
either shaping operations or the decisive
operation.
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*2-5a The Offense
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug 12), pp. 3-4 to 3-7.
IV. Common Offensive Control Measures
This section defnes common control measures that a commander uses to synchronize
the effects of combat power. The commander uses the minimum control measures
required to successfully complete the mission while providing subordinates the fexibility
needed to respond to changes in the situation.
Assault Position. An assault position is a covered and concealed position short of the
objective from which fnal preparations are made to assault the objective. Ideally, it offers
both cover and concealment. These fnal preparations can involve tactical consider-
ations, such as a short halt to coordinate the fnal assault, reorganize to adjust to combat
losses, or make necessary adjustments in the attacking forces dispositions. They can
also involve technical items, such as engineers conducting their fnal prepare-to-fre
checks on obstacle clearing systems and the crews of plow- and roller-equipped tanks
removing their locking pins. An assault position may be located near a fnal coordination
line (FCL) or a probable line of deployment (PLD).
Assault Time. The assault time establishes the moment to attack the initial objectives
throughout the geographical scope of the operation. It is imposed by the higher head-
quarters in operations to achieve simultaneous results from several different units. It syn-
chronizes the moment the enemy feels the effects of friendly combat power. It is similar
to the time-on-target control method for fre mission processing used by the feld artillery.
A commander uses it instead of a time of attack because of the different distances that
different elements of the force must traverse, known obstacles, and differences in unit
tactical mobility.
Attack by Fire Position. An attack by fre position designates the general position from
which a unit conducts the tactical task of attack by fre. The purpose of these positions is
to mass the effects of direct fre systems from one or multiple locations on the enemy. An
attack by fre position does not indicate the specifc site. Attack by fre positions are rarely
applicable to units larger than company size.
Attack Position. The attack position is the last position an attacking force occupies or
passes through before crossing the line of departure. An attack position facilitates the
deployment and last-minute coordination of the attacking force before it crosses the
line of departure (LD). It is located on the friendly side of the LD and offers cover and
concealment. It is used primarily at battalion level and below. Whenever possible, units
move through their attack position without stopping. A unit occupies an attack position for
a variety of reasons, such as waiting for specifc results from preparation fres or when it
is necessary to conduct additional coordination, such as a forward passage of lines.
Axis of Advance. An axis of advance designates the general area through which the
bulk of a units combat power must move. When developing the axis of advance, the
commander also establishes bypass criteria. Bypass criteria are measures during the
conduct of an offensive operation established by higher headquarters that specify the
conditions and size under which enemy units and contact may be avoided.
Battle Handover Line. The battle handover line is a designated phase line on the
ground where responsibility transitions from the stationary force to the moving force
and vice versa. The common higher commander of the two forces establishes the battle
handover line (BHL) after consulting both commanders. The stationary commander
determines the location of the line. The BHL is forward of the forward edge of the battle
area (FEBA) in the defense or the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in the offense.
Direction of Attack. The direction of attack is a specifc direction or assigned route a
force uses and does not deviate from when attacking. It is a restrictive control measure.
The commanders use of a direction of attack maximizes control over the subordinate
unit movement, and is often used during night attacks, infltrations, and when attacking
through smoke.
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The Offense 2-5b*
Final Coordination Line. The fnal coordination line is a phase line close to the enemy
position used to coordinate the lifting or shifting of supporting fres with the fnal deploy-
ment of maneuver elements. Final adjustments to supporting fres necessary to refect the
actual versus the planned tactical situation take place prior to crossing this line. It should
be easily recognizable on the ground. The FCL is not a fre support coordination measure.
Limit of Advance. The limit of advance is a phase line used to control forward progress of
the attack. The attacking unit does not advance any of its elements or assets beyond the
limit of advance, but the attacking unit can push its security forces to that limit.
Line of Departure. The line of departure is a phase line crossed at a prescribed time by
troops initiating an offensive task. The purpose of the LD is to coordinate the advance
of the attacking force, so that its elements strike the enemy in the order and at the time
desired. The LD also marks where the unit transitions from movement to maneuver. The
commander can also use it to facilitate the coordination of fres. Generally, it should be
perpendicular to the direction the attacking force will take on its way to the objective.
Objective. An objective is a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase op-
erations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort. An objective can be
terrain- or force-oriented. Terrain objectives should be easily identifable on the ground to
facilitate their recognition. The commander determines force-oriented objectives based on
known enemy positions. The commander normally assigns subordinate commanders only
their fnal objectives, but can assign intermediate objectives as necessary.
Point of Departure. The point of departure is the point where the unit crosses the line
of departure and begins moving along a direction of attack. Units conducting patrols and
other operations in a low-visibility environment commonly use a point of departure as a
control measure. Like a LD, it marks the point where the unit transitions from movement to
maneuver under conditions of limited visibility.
Probable Line of Deployment. A probable line of deployment is a phase line that desig-
nates the location where the commander intends to deploy the unit into assault formation
before beginning the assault. The PLD is used primarily at battalion level and below when
the unit does not cross the LD in its assault formation. It is usually a linear terrain feature
perpendicular to the direction of attack and recognizable under conditions of limited
visibility. The PLD should be located outside the range where the enemy can place the
attacking force under effective direct fre. It has no use except as it relates to the enemy.
Rally Point. A rally point is an easily identifable point on the ground at which units can
reassemble and reorganize if they become dispersed. Alternatively, it is an easily identif-
able point on the ground at which aircrews and passengers can assemble and reorganize
following an incident requiring a forced landing (ADRP 1-02). The objective rally point is
a rally point established on an easily identifable point on the ground where all elements
of the infltrating unit assemble and prepare to attack the objective. It is typically near the
infltrating units objective; however, there is no standard distance from the objective to the
objective rally point. It should be far enough away from the objective so that the enemy
will not detect the infltrating units attack preparations.
Support by Fire Position. A support by fre position designates the general position from
which a unit conducts the tactical mission task of support by fre. The purpose of these po-
sitions is to increase the supported forces freedom of maneuver by placing direct fres on
an objective that is going to be assaulted by a friendly force. Support by fre positions are
located within the maximum friendly direct-fre range of enemy positions. The commander
selects them so that the moving assault force does not mask its supporting fres. For this
reason, support by fre positions are normally located on the fank of the assault force,
elevated above the objective if possible. Support by fre positions are rarely applicable to
units larger than company size.
Time of Attack. The time of attack is the moment the leading elements of the main body
cross the line of departure, or in a night attack, the point of departure. A commander uses
it when conducting simultaneous operations where a shaping operation must accomplish
its mission to set the conditions for the success of the decisive operation.
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*2-5c The Offense
V. Transition
A transition occurs when the commander makes the assessment that the unit must
change its focus from one element of decisive action to another.
A commander halts the offense only when it results in complete victory and the end of
hostilities, reaches a culminating point, or the commander receives a change in mission
from a higher commander. This change in mission may be a result of the interrelation-
ship of the other instruments of national power, such as a political decision.
All offensive actions that do not achieve complete victory reach a culminating point
when the balance of strength shifts from the attacking force to its opponent. Usually, of-
fensive actions lose momentum when friendly forces encounter heavily defended areas
that cannot be bypassed. They also reach a culminating point when the resupply of fuel,
ammunition, and other supplies fails to keep up with expenditures, Soldiers become
physically exhausted, casualties and equipment losses mount, and repairs and replace-
ments do not keep pace with losses. Because of enemy surprise movements, offensive
actions also stall when reserves are not available to continue the advance, the defender
receives reinforcements, or the defender counterattacks with fresh troops. Several of
these causes may combine to halt an offense. When this occurs, the attacking unit can
regain its momentum, but normally this only happens after diffcult fghting or after an
operational pause.
The commander plans a pause to replenish combat power and phases the operation
accordingly, if the commander cannot anticipate securing decisive objectives before sub-
ordinate forces reach their culminating points. Simultaneously, the commander attempts
to prevent the enemy from knowing when friendly forces become overextended.
Transition to Defense
Once offensive actions begin, the attacking commander tries to sense when subordi-
nates reach, or are about to reach, their respective culminating points. Before they reach
this point, the commander must transition to a focus on the defense. The commander
has more freedom to choose where and when to halt the attack, if the commander can
sense that subordinate forces are approaching culmination. The commander can plan
future activities to aid the defense, minimize vulnerability to attack, and facilitate renewal
of the offense as the force transitions to branches or sequels of the ongoing operation.
For example, some of the commanders subordinate units may move into battle posi-
tions before the entire unit terminates its offensive actions to start preparing for ensuing
defensive tasks. The commander can echelon sustainment assets forward to establish a
new echelon support area. This may also serve to prevent overburdening the extended
lines of communications that result from advances beyond eight hours of travel from the
echelon support area.
A lull in combat operations often accompanies a transition. The commander cannot
forget about stability tasks because the civilian populations of the units AO tend to come
out of their hiding positions and request assistance from friendly forces during these
lulls. The commander must consider how to minimize civilian interference with the forces
combat operations while protecting civilians from future hostile actions in accordance
with the law of armed confict. The commander must also consider the threat civilians
pose to the force and its operations, if enemy agents or saboteurs are part of the civilian
population.
A commander anticipating the termination of unit offensive actions prepares orders that
include the time or circumstances under which the current offense transitions to the
defense, the missions and locations of subordinate units, and control measures.
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The Offense 2-5d*
As the unit transitions from an offensive focus to a defensive focus, the commander
Maintains contact and surveillance of the enemy, using a combination of recon-
naissance units and surveillance assets to develop the information required to plan
future actions
Establishes a security area and local security measures
Redeploys artillery assets to ensure the support of security forces
Redeploys forces for probable future employment
Maintains or regains contact with adjacent units in a contiguous AO and ensures that
units remain capable of mutual support in a noncontiguous AO
Shifts the engineer emphasis from mobility to countermobility and survivability
Consolidates and reorganizes
Explains the rationale for transitioning from the offense to the units Soldiers
The commander conducts any required reorganization and resupply concurrently with
other transition activities. This requires a transition in the sustainment effort. It shifts in
emphasis from ensuring the forces ability to move forward (POL and forward repair of
maintenance and combat losses) to ensuring the forces ability to defend on its chosen lo-
cation (forward stockage of construction, barrier, and obstacle material, and ammunition).
A transition is often a time when units can perform equipment maintenance. Additional
assets may also be available for casualty evacuation and medical treatment because of a
reduction in the tempo.
Transition to Stability
At some point in time the unit will probably transition from one phase of the major opera-
tions or campaign plan to another and begin executing a sequel to its previous operations
order. The end of the offense action may not be the decisive act. The conduct of stability
tasks may be the decisive operation in the major operation or campaign. The transition
to a focus on stability tasks cannot be an afterthought. Setting the conditions for stability
operations may have signifcant impact on the planning and execution of offensive tasks.
It is likely that a signifcant reorganization of the unit will occur to introduce those capabili-
ties required by the changes in the mission variables of METT-TC. Depending on the spe-
cifc operational environment the unit fnds itself in, the appropriate offcial departmental
publications dealing with other missions should be referenced to refresh previous training
and education in those subjects. The mission command and protection functions remain
important because it is likely that some Soldiers may want to relax discipline and safety
standards as the stress of active offensive actions disappears.
During major combat operations, the commander transitions to a stability focus, if the
units offensive actions are successful in destroying or defeating the enemy and the situ-
ation makes a focus on defensive actions inappropriate. The commanders concept of
operations and intent drive the design of and planning for the conduct of stability tasks.
Generally, a tactical commander will focus on meeting the immediate essential service
and civil security needs of the civilian inhabitants of the area of operations in coordination
with any existing host nation government and nongovernmental organizations before ad-
dressing the other three primary stability tasks. Also, the commander will probably change
the rules of engagement, and these rules must be transmitted down to the squad and
individual Soldier level.
When involved in other missions, such as peace operations, irregular warfare, and military
engagement, unit offensive actions normally are closely related to the movement to
contact tasks of search and attack or cordon and search. Offensive actions in these other
types of tasks will normally employ restrictive rules of engagement throughout the mis-
sion, regardless of the dominate type of action at any specifc moment. When executing
tasks within these other missions, the emphasis on the stability element is much more
dominate than the defensive element of decisive action.
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*2-6 The Offense
VI. Characteristics of Offensive Operations
Characteristics of the offense include audacity, concentration, surprise, and rapid
tempo. Effective offensive actions capitalize on accurate and timely intelligence
and other relevant information regarding enemy forces, weather, and terrain. The
commander maneuvers forces to advantageous positions before contact. Protection
tasks, such as security operations, operations security, and information protection
keep or inhibit the enemy from acquiring accurate information about friendly forces.
Contact with enemy forces before the decisive operation is deliberate, designed to
shape the optimum situation for the decisive operation. The decisive operation that
conclusively determines the outcome of the major operation, battle, and engagement
capitalizes on subordinate initiative and a common operational picture to expand
throughout the area of operations (AO). Without hesitation, the commander violently
executes both maneuver and freswithin the higher commanders intentto break
the enemys will or destroy the enemy.
A. Audacity
Audacity means boldly executing a simple plan of action. Commanders display
audacity by developing bold, inventive plans that produce decisive results. Com-
manders demonstrate audacity by violently applying combat power. They understand
when and where to take risks, and they do not hesitate as they execute their plan.
Commanders dispel uncertainty through action; they compensate for lack of informa-
tion by seizing the initiative and pressing the battle.
B. Concentration
Concentration is the massing of overwhelming effects of combat power to achieve a
single purpose. Commanders balance the necessity for concentrating forces to mass
effects with the need to disperse them to avoid creating lucrative targets. Advances
in ground and air mobility, target acquisition, and long-range precision munitions en-
able attackers to rapidly concentrate effects.
C. Surprise
In the offense, commanders achieve surprise by attacking the enemy at a time or
place the enemy does not expect or in a manner that the enemy is unprepared for.
Estimating the enemy commanders intent and denying that commander the ability to
gain thorough and timely situational understanding is necessary to achieve surprise.
Unpredictability and boldness help gain surprise. Surprise delays enemy reactions,
overloads and confuses the enemy commanders command and control systems,
induces psychological shock in enemy soldiers and leaders, and reduces the
coherence of the defense. By diminishing enemy combat power, surprise enables
attackers to exploit enemy paralysis and hesitancy. Operational and tactical surprise
complement each other. Operational surprise creates the conditions for successful
tactical operations. Tactical surprise can cause the enemy to hesitate or misjudge a
situation. But tactical surprise is feeting.
D. Tempo
Controlling or altering tempo is necessary to retain the initiative. At the operational
level, a faster tempo allows attackers to disrupt enemy defensive plans by achieving
results quicker than the enemy can respond. At the tactical level, a faster tempo al-
lows attackers to quickly penetrate barriers and defenses and destroy enemy forces
in depth before they can react.
Commanders adjust tempo as tactical situations, sustainment necessity, or opera-
tional opportunities allow to ensure synchronization and proper coordination, but not
at the expense of losing opportunities to defeat the enemy. Rapid tempo demands
quick decisions. It denies the enemy the chance to rest, and it continually creates
opportunities.
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The Defense 3-1*
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug 12), chap. 4.
While the offensive element of combat operations is more decisive, the defense
is the stronger element. However, the conduct of defensive tasks alone normally
cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counterof-
fensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting
defensive actions include
Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to the enemy
Attriting or fxing the enemy as a prelude to offensive actions
Surprise action by the enemy
Increasing the enemys vulnerability by forcing the enemy commander to con-
centrate subordinate forces
A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, econo-
mize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP
3-0). While the offensive element of combat operations is more decisive, the defense
is the stronger element. The inherent strengths of the defense include the defenders
ability to occupy positions before the attack and use the available time to prepare
the defenses. The defending force ends its defensive preparations only when it retro-
grades or begins to engage the enemy. Even during combat, the defending force
takes the opportunities afforded by lulls in the action to improve its positions and
repair combat damage. The defender maneuvers to place the enemy in a position
of disadvantage and attacks the enemy at every opportunity, using fres, electronic
warfare, and joint assets, such as close air support.
Defense
The
While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the
stronger type. The inherent strengths of the defense include the defenders ability
to occupy his positions before the attack and use the available time to prepare his
defenses. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).
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The static and mobile elements of the defense combine to deprive the enemy of the
initiative. The defender contains the enemy while seeking every opportunity to transi-
tion to the offense.
I. Purposes of Defense Operations
Commanders choose to defend to create conditions for a counteroffensive that
allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting a defense
include to retain decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy, to attrit or fx the
enemy as a prelude to the offense, in response to surprise action by the enemy, or to
increase the enemys vulnerability by forcing the enemy to concentrate forces.
II. Defensive Tasks
There are three basic defensive tasksarea defense, mobile defense, and retro-
grade. These apply to both the tactical and operational levels of war, although the
mobile defense is more often associated with the operational level. These three
tasks have signifcantly different concepts and pose signifcantly different problems.
Therefore, each defensive task must be dealt with differently when planning and
executing the defense. Although the names of these defensive tasks convey the
overall aim of a selected defense, each typically contains elements of the other and
combines static and mobile elements.
Although on the defense, the commander remains alert for opportunities to attack
the enemy whenever resources permit. Within a defensive posture, the defending
commander may conduct a spoiling attack or a counterattack, if permitted to do so
by the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).
A. Area Defense
The area defense is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces
access to designated terrain for a specifc time rather than destroying the enemy
outright. The focus of the area defense is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the
defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units
maintain their positions and control the terrain between these positions. The decisive
operation focuses on fres into engagement areas, possibly supplemented by a
counterattack.
Note: See pp. 3-11 to 3-18.
B. Mobile Defense
The mobile defense is a defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or de-
feat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force. The mobile defense
focuses on defeating or destroying the enemy by allowing enemy forces to advance
to a point where they are exposed to a decisive counterattack by the striking force.
C. Retrograde
The retrograde is a defensive task that involves organized movement away from
the enemy. The enemy may force these operations, or a commander may execute
them voluntarily. The higher commander of the force executing the retrograde must
approve the retrograde operation before its initiation in either case. The retrograde is
a transitional operation; it is not conducted in isolation. It is part of a larger scheme
of maneuver designed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy.
*3-2 The Defense
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A feature of the defense is a striving to
regain the initiative from the attacking
enemy. The defending commander uses
the characteristics of the defense to help
accomplish that task. (Photo by Jeong,
Hae-jung).
A. Disruption
Defenders disrupt the attackers tempo
and synchronization with actions de-
signed to prevent them from massing
combat power. Commanders employ
disruptive actions to unhinge the enemys
preparations and attacks. Disruption
methods include misdirecting or destroy-
ing enemy reconnaissance forces, break-
ing up formations, isolating units, and
attacking or disrupting systems.
B. Flexibility
The conduct of the defense requires fex-
ible plans. Commanders focus planning
on preparations in depth, use of reserves,
and the ability to shift the main effort.
Commanders add fexibility by designat-
ing supplementary positions, designing
counterattack plans, and preparing to
counterattack.
C. Maneuver
Maneuver allows the defender to take full
advantage of the area of operations and
to mass and concentrate when desirable.
Maneuver, through movement in com-
bination with fre, allows the defender to
achieve a position of advantage over the
enemy to accomplish the mission.
D. Mass and Concentration
Defenders seek to mass the effects of
overwhelming combat power where they
choose and shift it to support the decisive
operation. Commanders retain and, when
III. Characteristics of the Defense
necessary, reconstitute a reserve and
maneuver to gain local superiority at the
point of decision.
E. Operations in Depth
Simultaneous application of combat
power throughout the area of opera-
tions improves the chances for success
while minimizing friendly casualties.
Quick, violent, and simultaneous action
throughout the depth of the defenders
area of operations can hurt, confuse, and
even paralyze an enemy force just as that
enemy force is most exposed and vulner-
able. Synchronization of decisive, shap-
ing, and sustaining operations facilitates
mission success.
F. Preparation
The defense has inherent strengths. The
defender arrives in the area of opera-
tions before the attacker and uses the
available time to prepare. Defenders
study the ground and select positions
that allow the massing of fres on likely
approaches. They combine natural and
manmade obstacles to canalize attacking
forces into engagement areas. Defending
forces coordinate and rehearse actions
on the ground, gaining intimate familiar-
ity with the terrain. They place security,
intelligence, and reconnaissance forces
throughout the area of operations. These
preparations multiply the effectiveness
of the defense. Commanders continue
defensive preparations in depth, even as
the close engagement begins.
G. Security
Commanders secure their forces princi-
pally through protection, military decep-
tion, inform and infuence activities, and
cyber electromagnetic activities. Security
operations prevent enemy intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance as-
sets from determining friendly locations,
strengths, and weaknesses. Protection
efforts preserve combat power. Military
deception and cyber electromagnetic
activities inaccurately portray friendly
forces, mislead enemy commanders, and
deny those same enemy commanders the
ability to use cyberspace and the electro-
magnetic spectrum.
The Defense 3-3*
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IV. Common Defensive Control Measures
The commander controls the defense by using control measures to provide the fexibility
needed to respond to changes in the situation and allow the defending commander to
rapidly concentrate combat power at the decisive point.
A. Battle Positions
A battle position is a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach.
The battle position is an intent graphic that depicts the location and general orientation of
the majority of the defending forces. A commanders use of a battle position does not di-
rect the subordinate to position the subordinates entire force within its bounds since it is
not an area of operations. Units as large as battalion task forces and as small as squads
or sections use battle positions. They may occupy the topographical crest of a hill, a
forward slope, a reverse slope, or a combination of these areas. The commander selects
positions based on terrain, enemy capabilities, and friendly capabilities. A commander
can assign some or all subordinates battle positions within the area of operations.
Multiple battle positions may be assigned to a single unit, which allows that unit to
maneuver between battle positions. The commander specifes mission and engagement
criteria to the unit assigned to a battle position. Security, support, and sustainment forces
typically operate outside a units battle position.
There are fve kinds of battle positionsprimary, alternate, supplementary, subsequent,
and strong point.
The primary position is the position that covers the enemys most likely avenue of
approach into the area of operations. It is the best position from which to accom-
plish the assigned mission, such as cover an engagement area to prevent enemy
penetration.
An alternate position is a defensive position that the commander assigns to a
unit or weapon system for occupation when the primary position becomes unten-
able or unsuitable for carrying out the assigned task. It covers the same area as
the primary position. The commander locates alternate positions so the occupant
can continue to fulfll the original task, such as covering the same avenue of ap-
proach or engagement area as the primary position. These positions increase the
defenders survivability by allowing the defender to engage the enemy from multiple
positions. For example, a unit moves to its alternate positions when the enemy
brings suppressive fres on the primary position.
A supplementary position is a defensive position located within a units assigned
area of operations that provides the best sectors of fre and defensive terrain along
an avenue of approach that is not the primary avenue where the enemy is expected
to attack. For example, an avenue of approach into a units area of operations from
one of its fanks normally requires establishing supplementary positions to allow a
unit or weapon system to engage enemy forces traveling along that avenue.
A subsequent position is a position that a unit expects to move to during the
course of battle. A defending unit may have a series of subsequent positions. Sub-
sequent positions can also have primary, alternate, and supplementary positions
associated with them.
A strong point is a heavily fortifed battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing
obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or to deny the enemy decisive or key
terrain. The commander prepares a strong point for all-around defense. The com-
mander positions strong points on key or decisive terrain. The unit occupying the
strong point prepares positions for its weapon systems, vehicles, Soldiers, and sup-
plies. The commander also establishes a strong point when anticipating that enemy
actions will isolate a defending force retaining terrain critical to the defense.
*3-3a The Defense
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B. Direct Control Measures
The commander engages the enemy force with all available fres when it enters the
defending units engagement area. ADRP 1-02 defnes direct fre control measures, such
as target reference points, trigger lines, and engagement areas.
C. Disengagement Line
A disengagement line is a phase line located on identifable terrain that, when crossed by
the enemy, signals to defending elements that it is time to displace to their next position.
The commander uses these lines in the delay and the defense when the commander
does not want the defending unit to become decisively engaged. The commander estab-
lishes criteria for the disengagement, such as number of enemy vehicles by type, friendly
losses, or enemy movement to fanking locations. Commanders may designate multiple
disengagement lines, one for each system in the defense.
D. Fire Support Coordination Measures
The commander tries to engage the enemy at extended ranges and attrit the enemy
force as the enemys attack advances. To control indirect fres, the commander uses
common FSCMs described in ADRP 1-02. The commander can also employ fnal protec-
tive fres. Final protective fre is an immediately available preplanned barrier of fres
designed to impede enemy movement across defensive lines or areas (JP 1-02). Both
direct- and indirect- fre weapons can provide fnal protective fres (FPFs). The com-
mander can only assign each fring battery or platoon a single FPF. A FPF is a priority
target for an element or system, and those fre units are laid on that target when they are
not engaged in other fre missions. When the enemy force initiates its fnal assault into a
defensive position, the defending unit initiates its FPFs to kill enemy infantry soldiers and
suppress enemy armored vehicles.
E. Forward Edge of the Battle Area
The forward edge of the battle area is the foremost limit of a series of areas in which
ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screen-
ing forces are operating, designated to coordinate fre support, the positioning of forces,
or the maneuver of units (JP 3-09.3). The Army uses a forward edge of the battle area
(FEBA) only during the defense. The FEBA is not a boundary, but it conveys the com-
manders intent. It marks the foremost limits of the areas in which the preponderance
of ground combat units deploy, excluding the areas in which security forces are operat-
ing. MBA forces can temporarily move forward of the FEBA to expedite the retrograde
operations of security forces. The commander designates a FEBA to coordinate fre
support and to assist in the maneuver of subordinate forces. A phase line designating
the forward-most point of the MBA indicates the FEBA. The FEBA shows the senior com-
manders planned limit for the effects of direct fres.
F. Main Battle Area
The main battle area is the area where the commander intends to deploy the bulk of the
units combat power and conduct decisive operations to defeat an attacking enemy. The
defending commanders major advantage is the ability to select the ground on which the
battle takes place. The defender positions subordinate forces in mutually supporting posi-
tions in depth to absorb enemy penetrations or canalize them into prepared engagement
areas, defeating the enemys attack by concentrating the effects of overwhelming combat
power. The natural defensive strength of the position determines the distribution of forces
in relation to both frontage and depth. In addition, defending units typically employ feld
fortifcations and obstacles to improve the terrains natural defensive strength. The MBA
includes the area where the defending force creates an opportunity to deliver a counter-
attack to defeat or destroy the enemy.
The MBA extends from the FEBA to the units rear boundary. The commander locates
subordinate unit boundaries along identifable terrain features and extends them out
beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT) by establishing forward boundaries. Unit
boundaries should not split avenues of approach or key terrain.
The Defense 3-3b*
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V. Transition
If a defense is successful, the commander anticipates and attempts to transition to the
offense. If the defense is unsuccessful, the commander transitions from a defensive
posture into retrograde operations. Transition from one type of operation or task to
another requires mental as well as physical agility on the part of involved commanders,
staffs, and units as well as an accurate understanding of the situation.
The commander deliberately plans for sequential operations, assisting the transition
process and allowing the setting of the conditions necessary for a successful transition.
A. Transition to Offense
A defending commander transitions to a focus on the offensive element of operations
by anticipating when and where the enemy force will reach its culminating point or
require an operational pause before it can continue. At those moments, the combat
power ratios most favor the defending force. The enemy force will do everything it can
to keep the friendly force from knowing when the enemy force is becoming overex-
tended. Indicators that the enemy is becoming overextended include when
Enemy forces begin to transition to the defensethis defense may be by forces
in or out of contact with friendly forces
Enemy forces suffer heavy losses
Enemy forces start to deploy before encountering friendly forces
Enemy forces are defeated in most engagements
Enemy forces are committed piecemeal in continued attacks
Enemy reserve forces are identifed among attacking forces
Examination of captured or killed enemy soldiers and captured or destroyed
enemy equipment and supplies shows that the enemy is unable to adequately
sustain itself
A noticeable reduction in the tempo of enemy operations
Local counterattacks meet with unexpected success
B. Transition to the Retrograde
A retrograde usually involves a combination of delay, withdrawal, and retirement
operations. These operations may occur simultaneously or sequentially. As in other
operations, the commanders concept of operations and intent drive planning for the
retrograde. Each form of retrograde has its unique planning considerations, but con-
siderations common to all retrogrades are risk, the need for synchronization, and rear
security. However, the following key considerations receive special emphasis during
the transition from the defense to the retrograde.
The transition to the retrograde must be accompanied by efforts designed to
Reduce the enemys strength and combat power
Provide friendly reinforcements
Concentrate forces elsewhere for the attack
Prepare stronger defenses elsewhere within the area of operations
Lure or force part or all of the enemy force into areas where it can be counterat-
tacked
C. Transition to Stability Tasks
The transition to stability tasks is conditional, but it should be planned for in advance.
A defending commander may transition to emphasize stability tasks, if the defense
retained decisive terrain, denied vital areas to the enemy, and so successfully attrited
the attacking enemy that offensive actions are superfuous. As in other operations, the
commanders concept of operations and intent drive the design of and planning for
stability tasks.
*3-4 The Defense
(Stability & COIN) I. Stability Operations 4-1*
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Ref: ADP 3-07, Stability (Aug 12).
Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities con-
ducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national
power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian
relief (JP 3-0). Stability operations can be conducted in support of a host-nation or
interim government or as part of an occupation when no government exists.
Coordination, integration, and synchronization between host-nation elements, other
government agencies, and Army forces are enhanced by transparency and cred-
ibility. The degree to which the host nation cooperates is fundamental. Commanders
publicize their mandate and intentions. Within the limits of operations security, they
make the populace aware of the techniques used to provide security and control.
Actions on the ground reinforced by a clear and consistent message produce trans-
parency. This transparency reinforces credibility. Credibility refects the populaces
assessment of whether the force can accomplish the mission. Army forces require
the structure, resources, and rules of engagement appropriate to accomplishing the
mission and discharging their duties swiftly and frmly. They must leave no doubt as
to their capability and intentions.
Stability operations involve both coercive and constructive military actions. They
help to establish a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among
local or regional adversaries. Stability operations can also help establish political,
legal, social, and economic institutions and support the transition to legitimate local
governance. It is essential that stability operations maintain the initiative by pursing
objectives that resolve the causes of instability. Stability operations cannot succeed if
they only react to enemy initiatives. (Dept. of Army photo by Sgt. Robert Yde).
Operations
I. Stability
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*4-2 (Stability & COIN) I. Stability Operations
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I. Stability Operations (Decisive Operations)
Ref: ADP 3-07, Stability (Aug 12).
Stability ultimately aims to create a condition so the local populace regards the situa-
tion as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. These conditions consist of the level of
violence; the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions; and the
general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior.
Sources of instability manifest themselves locally. First, instability stems from decreased
support for the government based on what locals actually expect of their government.
Second, instability grows from increased support for anti-government elements, which
usually occurs when locals see spoilers as helping to solve the priority grievance. Lastly,
instability stems from the undermining of the normal functioning of society where the
emphasis must be on a return to the established norms.
Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of
instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. While long-term development
requires stability, stability does not require long-term development. Therefore, stability
tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability and by building the
capacity of local institutions.
II. Primary Army Stability Tasks
Army units conduct fve primary stability tasks. These tasks support efforts that encom-
pass both military and nonmilitary efforts generally required to achieve stability. These
tasks are similar to and nested with the joint functions and DOS stability sectors. Taken
together, they provide a base for linking the execution of activities among the instruments
of national and international power as part of unifed action.
1. Establish Civil Security. Establishing civil security involves providing for the safety of
the host nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats.
Establishing civil security provides needed space for host-nation and civil agencies and
organizations to work toward sustained peace.
2. Establish Civil Control. Establishing civil control supports efforts to institute rule of
law and stable, effective governance. Civil control relates to public orderthe domain of
the police and other law enforcement agencies, courts, prosecution services, and prisons
(known as the Rule of Law sector).
3. Restore Essential Services. The restoration of essential services in a fragile environ-
ment is essential toward achieving stability. The basic functions of local governance stop
during confict and other disasters. Initially, military forces lead efforts to establish or re-
store the most basic civil services: the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support
necessary to sustain the population until forces restore local civil services. Military forces
follow the lead of other USG agencies, particularly United States Agency for International
Development, in the long restoration of essential services.
4. Support to Governance. When a legitimate and functional host-nation government
exists, military forces operating to support the state have a limited role. However, if the
host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functionswhatever
the reasonsome degree of military support to governance may be necessary. Military
efforts to support governance focus on restoring public administration and resuming
public services.
5. Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development. Military efforts to support
the economic sector are critical to sustainable economic development. The economic
viability of a host nation often exhibits stress and ultimately fractures as confict, disaster,
and internal strife overwhelms the government. Signs of economic stress include rapid
increases in infation, uncontrolled escalation of public debt, and a general decline in
the host nations ability to provide for the well-being of its people. Economic problems
inextricably connect to governance and security concerns. As one institution begins to
fail, others likely follow.
(Stability & COIN) I. Stability Operations 4-3*
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Refer to The Stability, Peace and Counterinsurgency SMARTbook (Nontra-
ditional approaches in a Dynamic Security Environment) for discussion of
stability operations. Related topics include peace and counterinsurgency
operations; civil-military operations; engagement, security cooperation, and
security force assistance, multinational operations and IGO/NGO coordination.
Stability Underlying Logic
Ref: ADP 3-07, Stability, fig. 1, p. iii.
Operations conducted outside the United States
Conducted by
the United States
military in joint
operations
using...
The role of Army forces as part of
a joint operation is to conduct...
Stability tasks are tasks
conducted as part of operations
outside the United States in
coordination with other
instruments of national power to
maintain or reestablish a safe
and secure environment, and
provide essential governmental
services, emergency, infrastruc-
ture reconstruction, and
humanitarian relief.
To do this the Army conducts the primary stability tasks integrated into the joint stability functions
and the United States Government stability sectors to achieve the end state conditions...
These operations must be founded in the stability principles of...
Before conflict During conflict After conflict
Mission Command
defensive tasks offensive tasks stability tasks
Across the range of military operations
Guided by...
And executed by decisive action, simultaneously combining...
End state
conditions
Safe and secure
environment
Established rule
of law
Social well-being
Stable
governance
Sustainable
economy
Conflict
termination
Unity of effort Legitmacy and
host-nation
ownership
Building partner
capacity
Establish civil
security
Security Security
Establish civil
control
Rule of law Justice and
reconciliation
Restore essential
services
Restore essential
services
Support to
governance
Support to
governance
Governance and
participation
stabilization
Economic
and
infrastructure
stabilization
Economic
and
infrastructure
economic and
Support to
infrastructure
development
assistance and
Humanitarian
social well-being
Unified Action
Unified land operations
To produce...
*4-4 (Stability & COIN) I. Stability Operations
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III. Types of Stability Operations
Ref: FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10) The Infantry Company, pp. 6-6 to 6-8.
Stability operations typically fall into ten broad types that are neither discrete nor mutu-
ally exclusive. For example, a force engaged in a peace operation may also fnd itself
conducting arms control or a show of force to set the conditions for achieving an end
state. Stability operations normally occur in conjunction with either offensive, defensive,
or support operations.
Peace Operations
Peace operations encompass three general areas: operations in support of diplomatic
efforts, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.
Peacekeeping Operations. A peacekeeping force monitors and facilitates the
implementation of cease-fres, truce negotiations, and other such agreements. In
doing so, it must assure all sides in the dispute that the other involved parties are
not taking advantage of settlement terms to their own beneft. The Infantry company
most often observes, monitors, or supervises and aids the parties involved in the
dispute. The peacekeeping force must remain entirely neutral. If it loses a reputation
for impartiality, its usefulness within the peacekeeping mission is compromised.
Peace Enforcement Operations. What characteristics distinguish peace enforce-
ment activities from wartime operations and from other stability operations? The dif-
ference is that PEO compel compliance with international resolutions or sanctions,
and they restore or maintain peace and order. They might entail combat, armed
intervention, or the physical threat of armed intervention. Under the provisions of an
international agreement, the battalion and its subordinate companies might have to
use coercive military power to compel compliance with the applicable international
sanctions or resolutions.
Foreign Internal Defense
Foreign internal defense means the participation, by the civilian and military agencies of
a government, in any action programs taken by another government to free and protect
its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JP 1-02). The objective is
to promote stability by helping the host nation establish and maintain institutions and
facilities that can fll its peoples needs. Army forces in foreign internal defense normally
advise and assist host-nation forces conducting operations to increase their capabilities.
Security Assistance
Army forces assist in providing HN security by training, advising, and assisting allied and
friendly armed forces. Security assistance includes the participation of Army forces in
any program through which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other
defense-related services to support national policies and objectives. Security assistance
can take the form of grants, loans, credit, or cash sales (JP 3-07).
Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs help the HN populace in conjunction
with military operations and exercises. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations
are also limited in scope and duration. They focus only on providing prompt aid to resolve
an immediate crisis. In contrast to foreign humanitarian (only) assistance operations,
HCA is planned, and provides only--
Medical, dental, and veterinary care in rural areas of a country.
Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
(Tactical Enabling Tasks) V. Encirclement Opns 5-27*
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Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug 12), chap 5, pp. 5-6 to 5-7.
V. Encirclement Opns
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Encirclement operations are operations where one force loses its freedom of ma-
neuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines
of communications and reinforcement. A unit can conduct offensive encirclement
operations designed to isolate an enemy force or conduct defensive encirclement
operations as a result of the units isolation by the actions of an enemy force. En-
circlement operations occur because combat operations involving modernized forces
are likely to be chaotic, intense, and highly destructive, extending across large areas
containing relatively few units as each side maneuvers against the other to obtain
positional advantage.
I. Offensive Encirclement Operations
The commander conducts offensive encirclements to isolate an enemy force. Typi-
cally, encirclements result from penetrations and envelopments, or are extensions
of exploitation and pursuit operations. As such, they are not a separate form of
offensive operations but an extension of an ongoing operation. They may be planned
sequels or result from exploiting an unforeseen opportunity. They usually result from
the linkup of two encircling arms conducting a double envelopment. However, they
can occur in situations where the attacking commander uses a major obstacle, such
as a shoreline, as a second encircling force. Although a commander may designate
terrain objectives in an encirclement, isolating and defeating enemy forces are the
primary goals. Ideally, an encirclement results in the surrender of the encircled force.
This minimizes friendly force losses and resource expenditures.
II. Defending Encircled
An encircled force can continue to defend encircled, conduct a breakout, exfltrate
toward other friendly forces, or attack deeper into enemy-controlled territory. The
commanders form of maneuver once becoming encircled depends on the senior
commanders intent and the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weath-
er, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC),
including the
Availability of defensible terrain
Relative combat power of friendly and enemy forces
Sustainment status of the encircled force and its ability to be resupplied, includ-
ing the ability to treat and evacuate wounded Soldiers
Morale and fghting capacity of the Soldiers
Encirclement of a friendly force is likely to occur during highly mobile and fuid
operations, or when operating in restrictive terrain. A unit may fnd itself encircled
as a result of its offensive actions, as a detachment left in contact, when defending
a strong point, when occupying a combat outpost, or when defending an isolated
defensive position. The commander anticipates becoming encircled when assigned
a stay-behind force mission, or when occupying either a strong point or a combat
outpost. The commander then makes the necessary preparations.
The senior commander within an encirclement assumes command over all encircled
forces and takes immediate action to protect them. In the confusion leading to an
encirclement, it may be diffcult to even determine what units are being encircled,
*5-28 (Tactical Enabling Tasks) V. Encirclement Opns
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let alone identify the senior commander. However, the senior commander must be
determined as quickly as possible. When that commander determines the unit is
about to be encircled, the commander must decide quickly what assets stay and
what assets leave. The commander immediately informs higher headquarters of the
situation. Simultaneously, the commander directs the accomplishment of the follow-
ing tasks
Establish security
Reestablish a chain of command
Establish a viable defense
Maintain morale
The commander positions security elements as far forward as possible to reestablish
contact with the enemy and provide early warning. Vigorous patrolling begins imme-
diately. Each unit clears its position to ensure that there are no enemy forces within
the perimeter. Technical assets, such as Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARS) and electronic warfare systems, augment local security and locate
those areas along the perimeter where the enemy is deploying additional forces.
The commander reestablishes unity of command. The commander reorganizes
any fragmented units and places Soldiers separated from their parent units under
the control of other units. The commander establishes a clear chain of command
throughout the encircled force, reestablishes communications with units outside the
encirclement, and adjusts support relationships to refect the new organization.
A. Breakout from an Encirclement
A breakout is an operation conducted by an encircled force to regain freedom of
movement or contact with friendly units. It differs from other attacks only in that a si-
multaneous defense in other areas of the perimeter must be maintained. A breakout
is both an offensive and a defensive operation. An encircled force normally attempts
to conduct breakout operations when one of the following four conditions exist:
The commander directs the breakout or the breakout falls within the intent of a
higher commander
The encircled force does not have suffcient relative combat power to defend
itself against enemy forces attempting to reduce the encirclement
The encircled force does not have adequate terrain available to conduct its
defense
The encircled force cannot sustain itself long enough to be relieved by forces
outside the encirclement
B. Exfltration
If the success of a breakout attack appears questionable, or if it fails and a relief
operation is not planned, one way to preserve a portion of the force is through orga-
nized exfltration.
Friendly forces exfltrate when they have been encircled by enemy forces and can-
not conduct a breakout or be relieved by other friendly forces. Forces returning from
a raid, an infltration, or a patrol behind enemy lines can also conduct an exfltration.
The commander exfltrates an encircled force to preserve a portion of the force; it is
preferable to the capture of the entire force. A force exfltrates only after destroying
or incapacitating all equipment (less medical) it must leave behind. Only as a last
resort, when the alternative is the capture of the entire force, does a force conduct-
ing an exfltration leaves its casualties in place with supplies, chaplain support, and
medical attendants.
FM 3-90, app B, describes exfltration in more detail.
(Tactical Enabling Tasks) VI. Troop Movement 5-29*
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Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug 12), chap 5, pp. 5-4 to 5-5.
VI. Troop Movement
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Troop movement is the movement of troops from one place to another by any avail-
able means. The ability of a commander to posture friendly forces for a decisive
or shaping operation depends on the commanders ability to move that force. The
essence of battlefeld agility is the capability to conduct rapid and orderly movement
to concentrate combat power at decisive points and times. Successful movement
places troops and equipment at their destination at the proper time, ready for com-
bat. The three types of troop movement are administrative movement, tactical road
march, and approach march.
I. Methods of Troop Movement
Troop movements are made by dismounted and mounted marches using organic
combat and tactical vehicles and motor transport air, rail, and water means in various
combinations. The method employed depends on the situation, the size and compo-
sition of the moving unit, the distance the unit must cover, the urgency of execution,
and the condition of the troops. It also depends on the availability, suitability, and
capacity of the different means of transportation. Troop movements over extended
distances have extensive sustainment considerations. When necessary, dismounted
and mounted marches can be hurried by conducting a forced march.
A. Administrative Movement
B. Tactical Road March
A tactical road march is a rapid movement used to relocate units within an area of
operations to prepare for combat operations. Units maintain security against enemy
air attack and prepare to take immediate action against an enemy ambush, although
they do not expect contact with enemy ground forces. (If the moving unit anticipates
making contact with signifcant enemy ground forces, it will use a mix of combat
formations and movement techniques.)
The primary consideration of the tactical road march is rapid movement. However,
the moving force employs security measures, even when contact with enemy ground
forces is not expected. Units conducting road marches may or may not be organized
into a combined arms formation. During a tactical road march, the commander is
always prepared to take immediate action if the enemy attacks.
C. Approach March
An approach march is the advance of a combat unit when direct contact with the en-
emy is intended. However, it emphasizes speed over tactical deployment. Armored,
Stryker, and infantry forces conduct tactical road marches and approach marches.
*5-30 (Tactical Enabling Tasks) VI. Troop Movement
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II. Movement Techniques
Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug 12), p. 5-5.
The commander uses the combat formations described in FM 3-90 in conjunction with
three movement techniques: traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch.
The following fgure illustrates when a unit is most likely to use each technique.
See also pp. 8-7 to 8-10 for discussion of the traveling techniques as applied in patrols
and patrolling (dismounted).
Movement Techniques
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense, fig. 5-1, p. 5-5.
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(Urban Ops & Fortifcations) I. Urban Operations 7-1*
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug 12), chap 5, pp. 5-8 to 5-9. FM 3-21.8 (FM
7-8) The Infantry Rife Platoon and Squad, pp. 7-36 to 7-47. For further discussion
refer to ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (Jun 11).
in Urban Areas
I. Small Unit Operations
Infantry platoons conduct operations in urban areas using the same principles
applicable to other offensive operations. This section explains the general tactics,
techniques, and procedures used for a limited attack in an urban area.
I. Find
The compartmentalized nature of urban terrain, limited observation and felds of
fre, and the vast amounts of potential cover and concealment mean that defenders
can disperse and remain undetected. The origin of enemy gunfre can be diffcult to
detect, because distance and direction become distorted by structures. The nature of
urban conficts makes it more diffcult for leaders to exercise command and control
verbally, and for Soldiers to pass and receive information. Situational understanding
is normally limited to the platoons immediate area.
II. Isolate the Building
The fx function has two aspects: isolating the objective to prevent interference from
the outside (while preventing enemy from exiting), and separating forces on the
objective from each other (denying mutual support and repositioning). This is accom-
plished by achieving fre superiority and seizing positions of advantage.
Depending on the scale of the operation, Infantry platoons or squads may be
required to conduct any or all of the fnd, fx, fght, and follow-through functions.
Leaders should expect trouble in the process of determining the exact location of the
enemy and should anticipate enemy knowledge of their movements prior to arriving
in the objective area. (Dept. of Army photo by Richard Rzepka, 101st Airborne).
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*7-1a (Urban Ops & Fortifcations) I. Urban Operations
Urban Operations (UO)
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug 12), pp. 5-8 to 5-9 and ATTP 3-06.11, Combined
Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (Jun 11), introduction.
Commanders conducting major urban operations use their ability to visualize how doctrine
and military capabilities are applied within the context of the urban environment. An
operational framework is the basic foundation for this visualization. In turn, this visualiza-
tion forms the basis of operational design and decisionmaking. To accurately visualize,
describe, and direct the conduct of operations in an urban environment, commanders and
their staffs must understand the basic fundamentals applicable to most urban operations.
Fundamentals of Urban Operations
The impact of the urban operations environment often differs from one operation to the
next. However, some fundamentals apply to urban operations regardless of the mis-
sion, geographical location, or level of command. Some of these fundamentals are not
exclusive to urban environments. Yet, they are particularly relevant to an environment
dominated by man-made structures and a dense noncombatant population. Vitally, these
fundamentals help to ensure that every action taken by a commander operating in an
urban environment contributes to the desired end-state of the major operation.
Maintain close combat capability
Avoid the attrition approach
Control the essential
Minimize collateral damage
Preserve critical infrastructure
Separate noncombatants from combatants
Understand the human dimension
Create a collaborative information environment
Transition control
Urban Operational Construct
The fve essential components of the urban operational construct are described below.
Understand
Understanding requires the continuous assessment of the current situation and opera-
tional progress. Commanders use visualization, staffs use running estimates, and both
use the IPB process to assess and understand the urban environment. Commanders and
staffs observe and continually learn about the urban environment (terrain, society, and
infrastructure) and other mission variables. They use reconnaissance and security forces;
information systems; and reports from other headquarters, services, organizations, and
agencies. They orient themselves and achieve situational understanding based on a
common operational picture and continuously updated CCIR. The commanders ability to
rapidly and accurately achieve an understanding of the urban environment contributes to
seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative during UO.
Shape
Reconnaissance, security, and inform and infuence activities are essential to successful
UO. These shaping operations set the conditions for decisive operations at the tactical
level in the urban area. Isolation, decisive action, minimum friendly casualties, and ac-
ceptable collateral damage distinguish success when the AO is properly shaped. Failure
to adequately shape the urban AO creates unacceptable risk. Urban shaping operations
may include actions taken to achieve or prevent isolation, understand the environment,
maintain freedom of action, protect the force, and develop cooperative relationships with
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(Urban Ops & Fortifcations) I. Urban Operations 7-1b*
the urban population. Some shaping operations may take months to successfully shape
the AO.
Engage
In UO, the BCT engages by appropriately applying the full range of capabilities against
decisive points leading to centers of gravity. Successful engagements take advantage of
the BCTs training; leadership; and, within the constraints of the environment, equip-
ment and technology. Engagement can be active or passive and has many components,
but it is characterized by maintaining contact with the threat and population to develop
the situation. Successful engagements also require the establishment of necessary
levels of control and infuence over all or portions of the AO until responsibilities can be
transferred to other legitimate military or civilian control. Engagements may range from
the overwhelming and precise application of combat power in order to defeat an enemy
to large-scale humanitarian operations to HN security force assistance characterized by
information and infuencing activities.
Consolidate
Forces consolidate to protect and strengthen initial gains and ensure retention of the
initiative. Consolidation includes actions taken to eliminate or neutralize isolated or
bypassed enemy forces (including the processing of prisoners and civilian detainees)
to increase security and protect lines of communications. It includes the sustainment
operations, rapid repositioning, and reorganization of maneuver forces and reconnais-
sance and security forces. Consolidation may also include activities in support of the
civilian population, such as the relocation of displaced civilians, reestablishment of law
and order, humanitarian assistance and relief operations, and restoration of key urban
infrastructure.
Transition
When planning UO, commanders ensure that they plan, prepare for, and manage transi-
tions. Transitions are movements from one phase of an operation to another and may
involve changes in the type of operation, concept of the operation, mission, situation, task
organization, forces, resource allocation, support arrangements, or mission command.
Transitions occur in all operations. However, in UO, they occur with greater frequency
and intensity, are more complex, and often involve agencies other than U.S. military
organizations. All operations often include a transition of responsibility for some aspect of
the urban environment to (or back to) a legitimate civilian authority. Unless planned and
executed effectively, transitions can reduce the tempo of UO, slow its momentum, and
cede the initiative to the enemy.
Key Tactical Considerations
Commanders and planners of major operations must thoroughly understand the tactical
urban battle as well as the effects of that environment on men, equipment, and systems.
The complexity of urban environment changes and often compresses many tactical
factors typically considered in the planning process. These compressed tactical factors
include
Time
Distances
Density
Combat power
Levels of war
Decision making
Commanders and their staffs should carefully review ATTP 3-06.11 for techniques that
support tactical urban operations.
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*7-1c (Urban Ops & Fortifcations) I. Urban Operations
Understanding the Urban Environment
Ref: ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (Jun 11), pp. xii to xviii.
Urban operations are among the most diffcult and challenging missions a BCT can
undertake. Most UO are planned and controlled at division or corps level but executed by
BCTs. The unifed action environment of UO enables and enhances the capabilities of the
BCT to plan, prepare, and execute offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Urban
operations are Infantry-centric combined arms operations that capitalize on the adaptive
and innovative leaders at the squad, platoon, and company level.
The special considerations in any UO go well beyond the uniqueness of the urban ter-
rain. JP 3-06 identifes three distinguishing characteristics of the urban environment
physical terrain, population, and infrastructure. FM 3-06 identifes three key overlapping
and interdependent components of the urban environment: terrain (natural and man-
made), society, and the supporting infrastructure.
Terrain
Urban terrain, both natural and man-made, is the foundation upon which the population
and infrastructure of the urban area are superimposed. The physical environment includes
the geography and man-made structures in the area of operations (AO). A city may con-
sist of a core surrounded by various commercial ribbons, industrial areas, outlying high-
rise areas, residential areas, shantytowns, military areas, extensive parklands or other
open areas, waterways, and transportation infrastructure. City patterns may consist of a
central hub surrounded by satellite areas, or they may be linear, networked, or segment-
ed. They may contain street patterns that are rectangular, radial, concentric, irregular, or
a combination of patterns. They may be closely packed where land space is at a premium
or dispersed over several square miles. The infnite ways in which these features may be
combined make it necessary to approach each urban area as a unique problem.

Understanding the physical characteristics of urban terrain requires a multidimensional
approach. Commanders operating in unrestricted terrain normally address their AO in
terms of air and ground. However, operations within the urban environment provide
numerous man-made structures and variables not found in unrestricted terrain. Com-
manders conducting UO must broaden the scope of their thinking. The total size of the
surfaces and spaces of an urban area is usually many times that of a similarly size piece
of natural terrain because of the complex blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior,
and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural landscape.
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(Urban Ops & Fortifcations) I. Urban Operations 7-1d*
Society
Urban operations often require forces to operate in close proximity to a high density of ci-
vilians. Even evacuated areas can have a large stay-behind population. The populations
presence, attitudes, actions, communications with the media, and needs may affect the
conduct of the operation. To effectively operate among an urban population and maintain
its goodwill, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the population and its
culture, to include values, needs, history, religion, customs, and social structure.
The demographics of the HN can complicate urban operations. The Army is likely to
conduct UO in countries with existing or emerging cultural, ethnic, or religious conficts.
When these conditions exist, the local population may be sympathetic to enemy causes.
Refugees and displaced persons are likely to be present. For these and other reasons,
cultural awareness is imperative to mission success.
Accommodating the social norms of a population is potentially the most infuential factor
in conducting UO. Soldiers function well by acting in accordance with American values but
may encounter diffculties when applying American culture, values, and thought processes
to the populace or individuals the unit and leadership is trying to understand. Defning the
structure of the social hierarchy is often critical to understanding the population.
Other considerations include:
Many governments of developing countries are characterized by nepotism, favor
trading, sectarianism, and indifference
Regardless of causes or political affliations, civilian casualties are often the focal
point of press coverage to the point of ignoring or demeaning any previous accom-
plishments.
Religious beliefs and practices are among the most important yet least understood
aspects of the cultures of other peoples. In many parts of the world, religious norms
are a matter of life and death.
Another signifcant problem is the presence of displaced persons within an urban
area. Noncombatants without hostile intent can inadvertently complicate UO.
Infrastructure
A citys infrastructure is its foundation. Restoration or repair of urban infrastructure is often
decisive to mission accomplishment. During full spectrum operations, destroying, control-
ling, or protecting vital parts of the urban infrastructure may be a necessary shaping
operation to isolate an enemy from potential sources of support. An enemy force may rely
on the areas water, electricity, and sources of bulk fuel to support his forces. To transport
supplies, the enemy may rely on roads, airfelds, sea or river lanes, and rail lines.
Controlling these critical infrastructure systems may prevent the enemy from resupplying
his forces. The infrastructure of an urban environment consists of the basic resources, sup-
port systems, communications, and industries upon which the population depends. The key
elements that allow an urban area to function are signifcant to full spectrum operations.
The force that can control and secure the water, telecommunications, energy production
and distribution, food production and distribution, and medical citys boundaries.
All systems ft into six broad categories. Commanders should analyze key facilities in
each category and determine their role and importance throughout all phases of UO.
(Refer to FM 3-06 for details.) The six categories of infrastructure are
Communications and Information.
Transportation and Distribution
Energy
Economics and Commerce
Administration and Human Services
Cultural
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Threat
Ref: ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (Jun 11), pp. xvii to xix.
During UO, units should be prepared to face and defeat traditional, irregular, and hybrid threats.
Traditional
Traditional threats compose regular armed forces employing recognized military capabili-
ties with large formations conducting offensive or defensive operations that specifcally
confront the BCTs combat power and capabilities.
Irregular
Irregular threats are forces composed of armed individuals or groups who are not mem-
bers of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. They engage in
insurgency, guerrilla activities, and unconventional warfare as principle activities.
Hybrid
Hybrid threats are likely to simultaneously employ dynamic combinations of traditional
and irregular forces, including terrorist and criminal elements to achieve their objec-
tives. They will use an ever-changing variety of conventional and unconventional tactics
within the urban AO to create multiple dilemmas for UO forces. Commanders at all
levels should organize and equip their forces so they do not rely on a single solution or
approach to problem sets. Furthermore, commanders should be prepared to alter plans
and operations accordingly when approaches to problems do not work as anticipated.
Hybrid threats attempt to avoid confrontation with the UOs combat power and capabili-
ties and may use the civilian population and infrastructure to shield their capabilities from
BCT fres. They are most likely based in and target urban areas to take advantage of the
density of civilian population and infrastructure.
Potential enemies (traditional, irregular, and hybrid) in UO share some common characteris-
tics. The broken and compartmented terrain is best suited for small-unit operations. Typical
urban fghters are organized in squad-size elements and employ small-unit tactics that can
be described as guerrilla tactics, terrorist tactics, or a combination of the two. They normally
choose to attack (often using ambushes) on terrain that allows them to infict casualties and
then withdrawal. They attempt to canalize UO forces and limit their ability to maneuver or
mass. Small-arms weapons, sniper rifes, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), mines, impro-
vised explosive devices (IED), and booby traps are often the preferred weapons.
Enemy forces in conventional major combat operations oppose U.S. forces with a variety of
means, including high technology capabilities built into mechanized, motorized, and light In-
fantry forces. These forces may be equipped with newer generation tanks and Infantry fght-
ing vehicles and have signifcant numbers of antitank guided missile systems, Man-Portable
Air Defense System (MANPADS) weapons, advanced fxed- or rotary-wing aviation assets,
missiles, rockets, artillery, mortars, and mines. They may feld large numbers of Infantry
and robust military and civilian communications systems. In addition, they may possess
weapons of mass destruction. Enemy forces in major combat operations may be capable of
long-term resistance using conventional formations, such as divisions and corps. They may
also conduct sustained unconventional operations and protracted warfare.
The enemy in unconventional small-scale contingency environments employs forces
characterized by limited armor. Some are equipped with small numbers of early genera-
tion tanks, some with mechanized forces but most forces are predominately Infantry.
Guerrillas, terrorists, paramilitary units, special-purpose forces, special police, and local
militias are present in the environment. These forces are equipped primarily with antitank
guided missile systems, MANPADSs, mortars, machine guns, and explosives. Their
forces are expected to have robust communications, using conventional military devices
augmented by commercial equipment, such as cell phones. These forces may not be
capable of long-term, sustained, high-tempo operations. They can conduct long-term,
unconventional terrorist and guerrilla operations.
*7-1e (Urban Ops & Fortifcations) I. Urban Operations
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Insurgents or Guerrillas
Insurgents are members of a political party who rebel against established leadership.
Guerrillas are a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along
military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or
denied territory.
Insurgents and guerrillas are highly motivated and can employ advanced communica-
tions; some precision weapons, such as guided mortar rounds and MANPADS missiles;
and some ground-based sensors in varying combinations with conventional weapons,
mines, and IEDs. They usually conduct psychological and other information warfare
against the HN government and population, sometimes using assassinations, kidnap-
pings, and other terrorist techniques. Because of this, the BCT should communicate
clearly with the population and operate in support of HN government forces rather than
act independently as the main security and combat force.
Under the conditions of insurgency within the urban environment, the commander should
emphasize
Developing population status overlays showing potential hostile neighborhoods
Developing an understanding of how the insurgent or guerrilla organization operates
and its organization
Determining primary operating or staging areas
Determining mobility corridors and infltration/exfltration routes
Determining most likely targets
Determining where the enemys logistic facilities are and how they operate
Determining the level of popular support (active and passive)
Determining the recruiting, command and control, reconnaissance and security,
logistics (to include money), and operations techniques and methods.
Locating neutrals and those actively opposing these organizations
Using pattern analysis and other tools to establish links between the insurgent or
guerilla organization and other organizations (to include family links)
Determining the underlying social, political, and economic issues
Enemy Tactics
Adaptive urban enemies seek to modify their operations to create false presentations
and reduce signatures to infuence and disrupt accurate intelligence preparation of the
battlefeld (IPB). They also attempt to deceive the BCT by showing it exactly what it ex-
pects to see. Enemy forces and organizations position decoys and deception minefelds
in locations where the BCT expects to see them and emplace real mines where the BCT
does not anticipate them.
In complex urban terrain, the enemy can close undetected with BCT forces and employ
low-signature weapons against command posts (CP), communications nodes, sustain-
ment units, and uncommitted forces. This makes the survivability of these elements and
forces at the BCT level more diffcult in an urban environment. The need to fnd, engage,
and defeat the enemy must include an understanding that all forces within the BCT must
be prepared to fght and secure themselves, their equipment, and their means to move
and maneuver. This, combined with commercially available deception measures avail-
able to the enemy, raises the level of uncertainty and slows the pace of BCT maneuver,
potentially making it more vulnerable.
Urban enemies seek to complicate BCT targeting by hugging BCT forces or through
shielding their forces among civilian populations or within important cultural landmarks and
social or religious structures. Enemy use of high technology systems also makes discern-
ing the signatures of high-payoff systems more diffcult, further confounding BCT targeting
efforts. Differentiating between valid and invalid targets is time-consuming and impacts
reconnaissance and security capabilities through enemy deception and dispersion.
(Urban Ops & Fortifcations) I. Urban Operations 7-1f*
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*7-2 (Urban Ops & Fortifcations) I. Urban Operations
Cordon
A cordon is a line of troops or military posts that enclose an area to prevent passage.
The Infantry platoon normally conducts a cordon as part of a larger unit. It is estab-
lished by positioning one or more security elements on key terrain that dominates
avenues of approach in and out of the objective area. The overall goal is the protec-
tion of the maneuver element, and to completely dominate what exits or enters the
objective area. This requires a detailed understanding of avenues of approach in
the area. There are many techniques used to facilitate isolation including, blocking
positions, direct fre (precision and area), indirect fre, roadblocks, checkpoints, and
observation posts. The same techniques can be used to cordon and search a small
urban area (such as a village) surrounded by other terrain.
Ideally these positions are occupied simultaneously, but a sequential approach can
also be useful. Limited visibility aids can be used in the establishment and security
of the cordon. The security element can either surround the area while the maneuver
element simultaneously moves in, or it can use a sequential technique in which they
use stealth to get into position before the actual assault.
Plans should be developed to handle detained personnel. Infantrymen will normally
provide security and accompany police and intelligence forces who will identify,
question, and detain suspects. Infantry may also conduct searches and assist in de-
taining suspects, but their principal role is to reduce any resistance that may develop
and to provide security for the operation. Use of force is kept to a minimum unless
otherwise directed.
III. Assault a Building
Squads and platoons, particularly when augmented with engineers, are the best
organized and equipped units in the Army for breaching protective obstacles; gain-
ing access to buildings; and assaulting rooms, hallways, and stairways. Although
there are specifc drills associated with fghting in buildings, the overall assault is an
operation, not a drill. During planning, the leaders level of detail should identify each
window (aperture, opening, or fring port) in his sector fortifcations. He should then
consider assigning these as a specifc TRP when planning fres.
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