PGD1 Safety in Engineering
PGD1 Safety in Engineering
PGD1 Safety in Engineering
ON
(CVE 714)
TOPIC
SAFETY IN ENGINEERING AND
INTRODUCTION TO RISK ANALYSIS
PREPARED BY
ABDULRAUF ISMAIL BUSAYO
MATRIC PD2000019
REFERENCES
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 Introduction and definitions
1.1 SAFETY
The term safety refers to a condition of being safe or protected. Safety in the context of
occupational health and safety means a state of been protected against physical,
psychological, occupational, mechanical failure, damage, accident, death, injury, or such highly
undesirable events. Safety can therefore be defined as the protection of people from physical
injury.
Health and safety are used together to indicate concern for the physical and mental well-being
of the individual at work.
Safety is also describe as a condition, where positive control of known hazards exists in an
effort to achieve an acceptable degree of calculated risk such as a permissible exposure limit.
Safety is one of the prime considerations in any organization, whether it is profitable or non-
profitable. Management is fully responsible for planning and implementing all protective
measures to safeguard all employees and properties from any sort of hazard in the workplace.
Safety is also required by local laws, industrial regulations and practices. Employees need to be
trained and informed about all safety aspects they might encounter in their workplaces. Safety
monitoring and controlling is one of the major day to day tasks of management, since the
accidents, damage, injury and other health hazards cost money, hamper production or service
and have tremendous negative effect on employee morale and business goodwill.
Industrial safety can be defined as the ability to manage the risks inherent to operations or
related to the environment. Industrial safety is not a dislike of risks; rather it is a commitment
to clearly identify them in relation to production operations, assess them in terms of quality
and quantity, and manage them.
The safety of an onshore facility is a function of how safely the facility is designed. People are
hurt and sometimes killed when explosions, fires, and toxic-gas releases occur at oil- and gas-
producing facilities that were designed without regard to measures that could have prevented
such incidents. The safety of people and equipment needs to be considered and included along
every step in the engineering of oil and gas facilities. Properly designed oil and gas facilities can
eliminate injuries and deaths.
1.8 WHY SAFETY ENGINEERING.
Safety has become a very important issue each year as a vast number of people die and get
serious injured due to workplace and other accidents. For example, in the u.s alone, for the
year 1996, there were 93400 deaths and vast number of disabling injuries due to accidents
with a total loss of $121 billion.
Many otherwise sincere individuals have mistakenly believed or assumed that these factors
are subject to equal control and that only one or the other of the two need be of major
concern in the prevention of accidents. Typically, such focus has been on “unsafe acts,” as the
majority of practitioners do not possess the expertise to evaluate the technical issues involved,
or do not recognize with what relative ease and positive effect unsafe conditions can be
controlled.
The term “unsafe act” may also contain an unwarranted implication of blame or fault (rather
than a genuine lack of knowledge or training). During the investigation of accidents, such an
inordinate focus on “unsafe acts” will typically stifle the effective control of accidents, as the
investigation is typically ended when the first immediate cause is identified (unsuraprisingly
some action or inaction on the part of the accident victim). As a result, potentially more
important root causes related to system design are overlooked.
Herein, the term “unsafe condition” is retained, but the term “unsafe act” is rejected as
historically leading to error or incomplete cause analysis.
Rather, inappropriate human actions or inactions of persons that contribute to accidents
(resulting from error or human nature associated with the common relevant human factor
capabilities and limitations of men and women) are called “unsafe actions,” defined as unsafe
system use methods and procedures, without any initial implication of fault or blame.
2.2 HAZARD CONTROL:
Engineering vs. Work Methods
Given the initial proposition that accidents can be prevented by either controlling the design of
a system’s hardware, or by controlling the actions or behavior of system operators – that is, by
controlling the design of the product, machine, or facility (the machine or environment), or by
controlling the actions of operators or users of such systems (the man or human factor), the
question then becomes:
If the goal is the effective prevention of accidents (personal injury), should one give initial
primary attention to the identification and control of potential unsafe physical conditions
(hazardous system hardware components), or the identification and control of potential
unsafe actions (unsafe work methods and system use procedures)?
In essence, this question is asking: Are hazardous product, machine, and facility components,
or the hazardous actions or behaviors of people, more easily or effectively (a) identified, (b)
evaluated, and (c) controlled? (See Appendix for a discussion of this issue.)
Determination of potential severity should center on the most likely resulting injury or damage
as well as the most severe potential outcome. Severity becomes the controlling factor when
severe injury or death is a likely possibility among the several plausible outcomes. That is, even
when other risk factors indicate a low probability of mishap over time, if severe injury or death
may occur as a result of mishap, the risk associated with such hazards must be considered as
being “unacceptable,” and strict attention given to the control of such hazards and related
mishaps.
Exposure evaluation should consider the typical life expectancy of the system containing a
particular hazard, the number of systems in use, and the number of individuals who will be
exposed to these systems over time.
Acceptable vs. Unacceptable Risk
This step in the hazard evaluation process will ultimately serve to divide the list of potential
hazards into a group of “acceptable” hazards and a group of “unacceptable” hazards.
Acceptable hazards are those associated with acceptable risk factors; unacceptable hazards
are those associated with unacceptable risk factors.
An “acceptable risk” can be thought of as a risk that a group of rational, well-informed, ethical
individuals would deem acceptable to expose themselves to in order to acquire the clear
benefits of such exposure. An “unacceptable risk” can be thought of as a risk that a group of
rational, well-informed, ethical individuals would deem unacceptable to expose themselves to
in order to acquire the exposure benefits.
Hazards associated with an acceptable risk are traditionally called “safe,” while hazards
associated with an unacceptable risk are traditionally called “unsafe.” Therefore, what is called
“safe” does contain elements of risk that are judged to be “acceptable.” Once again, the mere
presence of a hazard does not automatically mean that the hazard is associated with any real
danger. It must first be measured as being unacceptable.
The result of this evaluation process will be the compiling of a list of hazards (or risks and
dangers) that are considered unacceptable. These unacceptable hazards (rendering the system
within which they exist “unreasonably dangerous”) are then carried to the third stage of the
safety engineering process, called “hazard control.”
Cardinal Rule #1
The first cardinal rule of hazard control (safe design) is “hazard elimination” or “inherent
safety.” That is, if practical, control (eliminate or minimize) potential hazards by designing
them out of products and facilities “on the drawing board.” This is accomplished through the
use of such interrelated techniques as hazard removal, hazard substitution, hazard
attenuation, and/or hazard isolation through the use of the principles and techniques of
system and product safety engineering, system and product safety management, and human
factors engineering, beginning with the concept and initial planning stages of the system
design process.
Cardinal Rule #2
The second cardinal rule of hazard control (safe design) is the minimization of system hazards
through the use of add-on safety devices or safety features engineered or designed into
products or facilities, also “on the drawing board,” to prevent the exposure of product or
facility users to inherent potential hazards or dangerous combinations of hazards; called
“extrinsic safety.” A sample of such devices would include shields or barriers that guard or
enclose hazards, component interlocks, pressure relief valves, stairway handrails, adequate
lighting, and passive vehicle occupant restraint and crashworthiness systems.
Passive vs. Active Hazard Controls
A principle that applies equally to the first two cardinal rules of safe design is that of “passive
vs. active” hazard control. Simply, a passive control is a control that works without requiring
the continuous or periodic involvement or action of system users. An active control, in
contrast, requires the system operator or user to “do something” before system use,
continuously or periodically during system operation in order for the control to work and avoid
injury. Passive controls are “automatic” controls, whereas active controls can be thought of as
“manual” controls. Passive controls are unquestionably more effective than active controls.
Cardinal Rule #3
The third cardinal rule of hazard control (safe design) is the control of hazards through the
development of warnings and instructions; that is, through the development and effective
communication of safe system use (and maintenance) methods and procedures that first warn
persons of the associated system dangers that may potentially be encountered under
reasonably foreseeable conditions of system use, misuse, or service, and then instruct them
regarding the precise steps that must be followed to cope with or avoid such dangers. This
third approach must only be used after all reasonably feasible design and safeguarding
opportunities (first and second rule applications) have been exhausted.
Further, it must be recognized that the (attempted) control of system hazards through the use
of warnings and instructions, the least effective method of hazard control, requires the
development of a variety of state-of-the-art communication methods and materials to assure
that such warnings and instructions are received and understood by system users.
Among other things, the methods and materials used to communicate required safe use or
operating methods and procedures must give adequate attention to the nature and potential
severity of the hazards involved, as well as reasonably anticipated user capabilities and
limitations (human factors).
Briefly stated, the cardinal rules of hazard controls involve system design, the use of physical
safeguards, and user training. It must further be thoroughly understood that no warning or
safe procedure can equal or replace an effective safety device, and no safety device can
equal or replace the elimination of a hazard on the drawing board.
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 RISK ANALYSIS
4.1 RISK ANALYSIS AND INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE
• “Risk analysis methods and tools are important resources for articulating scientific
knowledge to those who make decisions regarding public and occupational health.” Synergist
April, 2012
• “Risk analysis is a framework for decision making under uncertainty.”
Me March, 2013
RISK
• Risk is a measure of the probability and consequence of uncertain future events
– Risk = Probability x Consequence
In industrial hygiene
– Risk = Likelihood x Severity
Toxicity/adverse effects on humans, environment or other endpoints
Exposure = e (frequency, duration, magnitude, pathway/route)
“FLAVORS” OF RISK
• Risk includes
– Exposure to losses (hazards)
• Risk managers avoid risks
– Potential for gain (opportunities)
• Risk managers take risks
UNCERTAINTY LEADS TO RISK
Macro-Level (Values)
• Increasing social complexity
• Rapidly increasing pace of change
• Global effects
Micro-Level (Facts)
• Knowledge uncertainty
Risk Assessment
• What can go wrong?
• How can it happen?
• How likely is it?
• What are the consequences?
CAUTION: The fact that control of system hazards and resulting potential personal injury to
system operators and users is recognized as first involving attention to designing hazards out,
and designing safety into various product, machine, and facility systems, should not detract
from the vital importance of giving paramount attention to the use of adequate warnings and
instructions and the development and effective communication of safe system operating
methods and procedures to system users at the proper time in the system design process.
In every hardware system, not only must human factors be considered early in the design
process to learn how people might be exposed to system hazards, so that these hazards can be
removed or minimized in the design process, residual hazards that cannot be designed out of
such systems through engineering means must be given proper attention in the form of
adequate warnings and instructions, and in many situations, required formal training (and
subsequent supervision). If the training becomes complex, a formal certification program must
be developed.
For Total Company, that means, in practical terms, regularly looking at how risk management
is addressed at the company's facilities and how much progress the company has made in its
action plans to reduce them.
Total company is exposed to three types of risk: risks related to the products that we use or
make; risks related to the processes and equipment used in our operations; and transportation
risks related to our operations.
Risk is never acceptable in itself. A risk is acceptable or unacceptable in a given environment at
a given time. A risk may be considered to be less serious when the environment is not very
sensitive, but is assessed more critically when the same operations are conducted in a more
sensitive environment.
Risk acceptability is assessed through dialogue and cooperation between the company and its
environment throughout a facility's lifetime. In the past, dialogue did not seem as necessary as
it is today, particularly in France. After the Toulouse disaster, a wide-ranging national debate
revealed the increased importance of cooperation among stakeholders.
Total company is aware of the need to broaden dialogue and is an active participant in the
process. 2004 was the third year of application of Total's 2002–05 safety action plan, which
focuses on two areas and is supported by real-world targets.
The purpose of safety engineering is to control risk by reducing or completely eliminating it. It
also aims to reduce the rate of failures and if failure does occur, it is not life threatening.
Safety engineering usually begins during the design of a system or product development.
Safety engineers study possible accidents under various conditions and bring forward the
accident risks. They then design safety guards or procedures the operators must follow to
remain safe. Sometimes, they take the help of computer models, prototypes or replicate the
situations to assess the hazards and risks. Before implementing a system or produce a product,
safety engineers consider all possibilities, including, engineering, technical safety, material
reliability, legislations and human factors to make sure that there is no known hazard.
Acceptable Risk. A risk is acceptable if it has been reduced to a level that your organization can
tolerate given its occupational health and safety (OH&S) policy and its legal obligations.
Audit. An audit is an evidence gathering process. Audit evidence is used to evaluate how well
audit criteria are being met. Audits must be both objective and independent and the audit
process must be both systematic and documented.
Corrective Action. Corrective actions are steps that are taken to remove the cause or causes of
an existing nonconformity or other undesirable situation. Corrective actions address actual
problems. In general, the corrective action process can be thought of as a problem solving
process.
Hazard Identification Hazard identification is a process that involves recognizing that an OH&S
hazard exists and then describing its characteristics.
ILL Health ILL health is an adverse physical or mental condition. In order to qualify as an
occupational health and safety problem, an adverse physical or mental condition must be
identifiable and be caused or aggravated by a work activity or a work related situation.
Incident. An incident is a work related event during which: injury, ill health, or fatality actually
occurs, or injury, ill health, or fatality could have occurred.
An accident is a type of incident. It is a work-related event during which injury, ill health, or
fatality actually occurs.
It is a type of incident A close call, near miss, near hit, or dangerous occurrence is also a type of
incident. It is a work-related event during which injury, ill health, or fatality could have
occurred, but didn’t actually occur (see 2, above).
Preventive Action Preventive actions are steps that are taken to remove the causes of
potential nonconformities or other undesirable situations that have not yet occurred.
Preventive actions address potential problems. In general, the preventive action process can
be thought of as a risk analysis process .must be used to carry out the work.
Risk. Risk combines three elements: it starts with a potential event, and then combines its
probability with its potential severity. In the context of OH&S, the concept of risk asks two
future oriented questions: What is the probability that a particular hazardous event or
exposure will actually occur in the future? How severe would the impact on health and safety
be if the hazardous event or exposure actually occurred? A high risk hazardous event or
exposure would have both high probability of occurring and a severe impact on OH&S if it
actually occurred. A high risk event or exposure is one that is likely to cause severe injury or ill
health.
REFERENCES
1. Introduction to Risk Analysis
Chesapeake AIHA/ASSE Educational Seminar March 13, 2013
Charles Yoe, Ph.D. [email protected]
2. Safety and reliability engineering design (2015)
mr. jonathan oteng / all nations university college (Studocu.com)