Belgian Standing Intelligence

Agencies Review Committee

N° Notice : 2018.262

Review investigation of the information available to the

intelligence services regarding the death of Dag Hammarskjöld.

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Contents

I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................3

I.1. Mandate........................................................................................................................ 3
I.2. Methodology and activities............................................................................................. 4
I.2.1. INVESTIGATION PROPOSAL AND DECISION ............................................................4
I.2.2. DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY AND ACTIVITIES .................................................6
II. INDEX OF RELEVANT INFORMATION ....................................................................................9

III. FINDINGS ..................................................................................................................... 21

IV. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 27

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I. INTRODUCTION

I.1. MANDATE

In compliance with resolution A/RES/72/252 of 24 December 2017 of the General Assembly

of the United Nations (UN), the federal government of Belgium – by means of the Ministers
of Justice and of Defence -, in April 2018, requested Mr. Guy Rapaille, Chairman of the
Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee (Standing Committee I), to act as
independent and high-ranking official to conduct a dedicated internal review of the
intelligence, security and defence archives to search for relevant information regarding the
conditions and circumstances resulting in the death of former Secretary-general Dag
Hammarskjöld and the party accompanying him on the night of 17 to 18 September 1961.
In his capacity as Chairman of the Standing Committee I, Mr. Rapaille has access to the
(classified) files and archives of both the military and civil intelligence agencies of Belgium,
namely the General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS) and the State Security.
Mr. Rapaille communicated by letter on 25 April 2018 to the Ministers of Justice and of
Defence that he was willing to accept – in the name of the Standing Committee I - the
request submitted to him by the federal government. He accepted the assignment ‘to
respond to requests from the United Nations as an independent, high-level officer
responsible for conducting a focused review of the archives of the Belgian intelligence,
security and defence services, to determine whether they contain information relevant to
the investigation into the death of Dag Hammarskjöld, and to transmit to the Secretary-
General a summary of the conclusions of that examination’.
The Chairman of the Chamber of Representatives was also informed on 24 April 2018 of the
acceptance of this assignment, as the Standing Committee I is a parliamentary body.
For the investigations in the (unclassified) files and archives of the Ministry of Defence, the
federal government decided to appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. Kris Quanten, professor at
the Royal Military Academy (RMA) to assist Mr. Rapaille in his mandate.
It should be emphasized that the mandate given by the Belgian federal government to Mr.
Rapaille and Lieutenant-Colonel Quanten only provides access to the archives of the two
intelligence services and of the Ministry of Defence, and not to the archives of non -state
actors or private organisations.

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I.2. METHODOLOGY AND ACTIVITIES

I.2.1. INVESTIGATION PROPOSAL AND DECISION

According to the usual procedures of the Standing Committee I, a conceivable investigation

proposal was formulated in the first instance. This proposal was then approved by the
Standing Committee I, and converted into an investigation decision.
This investigation decision is as follows:

a) Context

The United Nations appointed a few years ago an Eminent Person, Judge Othman, to try to
shed light on the death of Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations,
during the crash of his plane in the Katanga during the civil war in Congo in 1961.
Mr. Othman published a report on his work in late 2015. Following this report, the UN
General Assembly adopted a new resolution renewing the mandate of Mr. Othman.
This resolution makes the following particular request: ‘The UN General Assembly
encourages all member States that may hold relevant information related to the death of
Dag Hammarskjöld and the members of the party accompanying him to appoint, without
delay, an independent and high-ranking official to conduct a dedicated internal review of
their intelligence, security and defence archives to determine whether relevant information
exists, and to communicate to the Secratry-General a summary of the results to the
Secretary-General before the end of the main part of its seventy-third session under such
confidentiality arrangements as presented in the report of the Eminent Person.’
The causes of the UN Secretary-General’s plane crash on the night of 17 to 18 September
1961 have never been established and have given rise to numerous enquiries and
hypotheses. A book published in 2011 – Who Killed Hammarskjöld’ by Susan Williams –
rekindled interest in this tragic event and led the United Nations to entrust an Eminent
Person with the task of conducting an investigation.
Belgium is primarily concerned since a civil war was raging in its former colony and
particularly in the Katanga that had seceded. Moreover, for a long time and also in the first
report of judge Othman, Belgium and Belgians are quoted as having been able to participate
or having played a role in the crash of the UN Secretary –General’s plane.

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b) Authority of the Standing Committee I

It concerns an investigation requested by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Defence
pursuant to Article 32 of the Law of 18 July 1991 on the Control of Police and Intelligence
Services and the Coordination Body for Threat Analysis.

c) Purpose of the investigation

The purpose of the investigation is to examine the archives of the State Security and GISS –
which did not exist at the material time, but there was a military intelligence service whose
archives are kept at the GISS – to discover if they contain ‘relevant information’ concerning
the crash of the aircraft, and to transmit a summary of the conclusions of this examination
to the Eminent Person.

d) Investigation questions

- Do both services have information in their archives related to the death of Dag
Hammarskjöld?

- Do the services have information on persons named in the UN-report, whether

Belgians or non-Belgians, airmen or not, military or former military personnel,
mercenaries or other persons who have played a role in the secession of Katanga
and the fighting that has taken place, as well as on planes used in fighting in
Katanga?

- Non-exhaustive, are cited a certain ‘Beukels’, a certain ‘Van Risseghem’ (several

spelling possibilities of this name are cited in the report), Lieutenant-Colonel
Lamouline, a certain ‘De Troyer’, a certain ‘Jerry Puren’ etc…

- Do the two services have any information after 1961 on the facts or persons cited,
since on several occasions in the 1960s and after articles, interviews, books, … were
published? There have also been more or less formal inquiries in concerned
countries such as Sweden. Are the services informed of these surveys?

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e) Methods of collecting information

Since it concerns events which took place 57 years ago, the only method of investigation is
to consult the archives of both services. The consultation may lead the Standing
Committee I to question other government departments such as Defence or Foreign
Affairs.

I.2.2. DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY AND ACTIVITIES

As stated above, the search for relevant information in the context of the investigation into
the conditions and circumstances resulting in the death of former Secretary-general Dag
Hammarskjöld, was limited to the files and archives of the two intelligence services and of
the Ministry of Defence.
The State Security and the GISS were contacted on 8 May 2018 with the request to appoint
persons who could act as a point of contact (POC) in the context of this research. Shortly
afterwards, the services announced that they wished to appoint the heads of their
respective archives departments as point of contact.
The search was based on the reading of the report A/71/1042 of July 2017, written by the
Eminent Person, judge Mohamed Chande Othman.
The reading of the report focused on the identification of any information that could point
to Belgium, or to persons and/or entities that could be associated with Belgium. In this way,
a number of elements could be identified.

a) Elements referring to Belgium in the UN-report of Mr. Othman

1) The UN Independent Panel of Experts obtained information in 2015 that a Belgian

pilot, who as a mercenary trained pilots of the Katangese air force, had possibly shot
down Dag Hammarskjöld’s plane. This information came from a message from the
American ambassador to Congo in 1961, Edmund Gullion, to Washington. The name
quoted in this message is a certain Van Riesseghel (real name or alias). Other
possible spellings of the name are Van Risseghem, Van Reisseghem, Van Rysseghem,
Van Reisenghan. Certain rumors circulated that this individual was possibly a
Rhodesian mercenary.

Information from the Belgian authorities indicates that a certain Van Risseghem
stayed in Belgium until 16 September 1961, after travelling to Belgium from Katanga
on 8 September. On 22 September, the American embassy in Brussels sent a
message to Washington that showed that there had been contact between the two
countries about Van Risseghem. This contact showed that according to the Belgian
authorities, Van Risseghem was at that time possibly in Brussels or Paris.
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 A report from the UNOC (=mission of the UN in Congo) from 1962 on the activities
of mercenaries in Katanga mentions that Van Risseghem was arrested in
Elisabethville on 28 August 1961 and was repatriated to Belgium on 7 September.
However, he would have been involved in hostilities against UN troops as pilot of a
Fouga Magister aircraft later in the month of September. The person concerned was
then known under the alias ‘Captain Jan’.

Another message from the US ambassador in Congo of 16 September 1961 reports

that a pilot of a commercial aircraft had recognized the pilot in an incident involving
a Katangese jet plane as ‘Van Reisseghem’. Van Risseghem / Van Reisseghem would
be a former pilot of Sabena.

Finally, information from the Belgian government, communicated to the UN in 2017,

claims that the only pilot of a Fouga Magister plane who was employed by Katanga,
was a certain Peter Wicksteed.

2) A Belgian mercenary pilot named ‘Beukels’ (other possible spellings: Beuckels,

Beuchels) in 1967 would have told mr. Claude de Kemoularia, former assistant of
Dag Hammarskjöld, that he would have inadvertently shot down mr.
Hammarskjöld’s plane. His intention would have been to force the plane to land in
Kamina, on the orders of the Chief of Staff of the Katangese armed forces. This chief
of staff would also have been a Belgian, a certain Lieutenant-Colonel Lamouline.
Also another (Belgian?) mercenary would have been aware of the above facts, a
certain De Troyer or De Troye (possible alias: Claude Bastard).

3) American information is available that around 16 February 1961 three fighter

planes, type Fouga Magister from the firm ‘Potez’, were shipped from France to
Katanga by an American company ‘Seven Seas Airlines’. These fighter aircraft would
have been ordered by ‘Belgium’.

The Katangese air force according to American, Belgian and German information
would, in September 1961, also have disposed of several aircraft type Dornier-27 or
28. These aircraft would have been flown from Munich to Katanga in August 1961.
The aircraft would have been delivered in the name of a certain Belgian colonel John
Cassart.

4) It appears from documents of the UN that at least eleven mercenary pilots were
employed by the Katangese air force during the period 1961-1962. A number of
names of these pilots are mentioned in the report: Delin, Gelen, Glaspole, Hirsch,
Magain, (Jerry) Puren (or Purren), Van Risseghem, Verloo, and Wicksteed (or
Wickstead).
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5) A certain Charles Southall, employee of the American NSA and stationed in Nicosia
(Cyprus) on 17-18 September 1961, stated that he had seen a transcript of a
communication that night, in which a pilot of an aircraft reports that he had shot
down Mr. Hammarskjöld’s plane.
An unidentified American officer then informed Southall that the pilot in question
was a Belgian, known as ‘lone ranger’. This would have been the call sign of the
Belgian pilot Joseph Delin (source: an article in the journal ‘Modern African Studies’
by Bengt Rösiö).

b) Query for the services

On 23 May 2018, a delegation of the Standing Committee I visited the two

intelligence services, with the aim of making agreements with the designated POC
about the investigations to be carried out in the archives of the services.

On this occasion, the Standing Committee I handed over a letter with a number of
questions. These questions were based on the elements described under 2.a)

The questions were the following:

1) What information is available at your service about VAN RISSEGHEM (or other
possible spelling)? What information is available about WIGSTEAD (other
possible spellings: WICKSTEAD or WICKSTEED)? What information is available in
the archives regarding the then involvement of (Belgian) mercenaries with the
Katangese armed forces?

2) What information does your service have regarding BEUKELS (BEUCKELS,

BEUCHELS), Robert LAMOULINE, DE TROYER or Claude BASTARD?

3) What information is available at your service about deliveries of aircraft to

Katanga in 1960-61, and the persons or entities involved, for example John
CASSART?

4) What information is available at your service about the following names:

(Joseph) DELIN, GELEN, GLASSPOLE, HIRSCH, (José) MAGAIN, (Jerry) PUREN (or
PURREN), VERLOO, Charles HUYGHE?

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II. INDEX OF RELEVANT INFORMATION

INDEX OF RELEVANT INFORMATION IDENTIFIED

Type of information Origin Location Summary of content Classification

File ‘Van Risseghem’

1. Identity sheet of ‘Jean State State Declassified

Henri Van Risseghem Security Security
de Sautiernon de St.- (VSSE) archives
Clément’,
dd.08/11/1962

2. Note of the State State Declassified

Administrator- Security Security
director-general of (VSSE) archives
the State Security
requesting an
investigation into Van
Risseghem, on behalf
of the Ministry of
Africain Affairs,
dd.19/09/1961

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3. Intel report on the State State Contains information on the employment of Van Risseghem by the Declassified
identification and Security Security Belgian air force and Sabena, prior to 1961, and also confirms his
background of Jean (VSSE) archives employment by the army of Katanga in 1961. The report further
Henri Van Risseghem states that he was probably recruited in Katanga.
de Sautiernon de St.-
Clément, dd.
20/09/1962

4. Intel report on the State State Confirms the involvement of Jean Henri Van Risseghem with the air Declassified
background and Security Security force of Katanga (Avikat) as pilot/instructor in 1961, and his return
whereabouts of Jean (VSSE) archives to Belgium from Katanga in late August or beginning of September
Henri Van Risseghem, 1961. The report states that he left his home in Lint (Belgium) for
dd. 21/09/1961 Katanga on 16 September 1961.

5. Intel report nr.1598

State State Confirms that the passenger Jean Van Risseghem, arriving with the Declassified
on the return to
Belgium of Jean Van Security Security flight Kamina (Congo)-Brussels, was checked at Brussels airport on 8
(VSSE) archives September 1961.
Risseghem,
dd.21/09/1961

6. Intel report on the State State Mentions the visit of (Belgian) mercenaries to the diplomatic mission Declassified
visit of mercenaries to
Security Security of Katanga in Brussels. The name Van Risseghem is mentioned in the
the diplomatic
(VSSE) archives margin of the report, but not in the report itself. The report also
mission of Katanga in contains information on the delivery of a type Dornier airplane to
Brussels, Katanga, and the involvement of Jean Cassart in this transaction. It
dd.29/09/1961
also identifies the pilot of the only operational Fouga Magister
airplane of the air force of Katanga in September 1961 as one Peter
Wicksteed.

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 7. Intel report on the State State Confirms the membership of Van Risseghem of the gendarmerie of Declassified
activities of Jan Van Security Security Katanga as ‘volunteer’. The report states that van Risseghem had the
Risseghem, (VSSE) archives rank of Commander and acted as pilot of a Fouga Magister airplane
dd.08/05/1962 during the hostilities with UN troops in 1961. Van Risseghem would
have also acted as commander of the airbase of either Luena or
Luano (Elisabethville). After being arrested in Katanga in August
1961 (by the UN?) and being repatriated to Belgium, he returned to
Africa and would have acted as an agent for the purchase of aircraft
by the Katangese government in Salisbury (Rhodesia).

8. Short note (date State State Short note stating that Van Risseghem would have presented Declassified
unknown) on the Security Security himself at the diplomatic mission of Katanga in Brussels to regulate
whereabouts of Jean (VSSE) archives his administrative situation, and that he arrived in Elisabethville on
Henri Van Risseghem 21 September 1961, arriving from Paris.
between 17 and 21
September 1961

9. Short biographical State State States that Van Risseghem piloted one of the Fouga Magister Declassified
note on Jan Henri Van Security Security airplanes in Katanga, and that he resided in Luanda (Angola) in April
Risseghem, dd. (VSSE) archives 1963.
08/07/1967

File ‘De Troyer’

10. Identity sheet of State State Declassified

‘Jacques De Troyer’, Security Security
date unknown (VSSE) archives

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 11. Note from Ministry of Ministry of State Identifies Jacques De Troyer as a Belgian military officer. He would Declassified
Foreign Affairs to Foreign Security have acted as a military adviser and chief of personnel to the
Belgian Mission at Affairs archives gendarmerie of Katanga in September 1961.
UN, dd.05/10/1962,
identifying Jacques De
Troyer

File ‘Lamouline’

State State Declassified

12. Identity sheet of
‘Robert Lamouline’ Security Security
(VSSE) archives

13. Letter of State

State State States that Lamouline acts as leader of a group of 12 foreign officers Declassified
Security to the
Ministry of Foreign Security Security and of a private army, operating under orders of the local chieftain
(VSSE) archives Kasongo-Niembo in Kamina (Congo)
Affairs regarding the
result of
investigations into the
background of several
Belgian mercenaries,
active in Katanga,
dd.12/10/1962

14. Intel report on the State State States that Lamouline served as officer in the Belgian army and Declassified
past activities of
Security Security subsequently the colonial Force Publique from 1944 until 1961.
Robert Lamouline, (VSSE) archives
dd.28/11/1962

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File ‘Huyghe’

15. Identity sheet of State State Declassified

‘Charles Corneille Security Security
Juliette Huyghe’, date (VSSE) archives
unknown

16. Intel report on the States that Huyghe was appointed as Major in the gendarmerie of Declassified
whereabouts of State State Katanga and that he let the mission of Katanga in Brussels know in
Charles ‘Carlo’ Security Security beginning September 1961 that he was staying in Brussels at that
Huyghe, (VSSE) archives time.
dd.06/09/1961
Declassified
17. Short note on Charles States that Charles Huyghe was a close collaborator of mr.
State State Munongo, minister of the Interior during the secessionist period of
Huyghe, dd.
Security Security Katanga, was based in Kamina and was involved in the procurement
06/11/1976
(VSSE) archives of weaponry for the government of Katanga.

File ‘Dornier’

18. Letter from State State State States that Jan Van Risseghem presented himself at the diplomatic Declassified
Security to Ministry of Security Security mission of Katanga in Brussels on 17 September 1961. Further states
Foreign Affairs, (VSSE) archives that a fighter airplane of the type Dornier – disassembled and in
dd.02/10/1961 cases - was shipped to Brazzaville by intervention of the Belgian
citizen Jean Cassart, prior to hostilities between Katanga and the UN.

State State Cites the names of 10 individuals belonging to possible crews which Declassified
19. Intel note regarding
Security Security flew 4 airplanes, type Dornier, from Germany to Katanga.
transport of airplanes
type Dornier from (VSSE) archives

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 Germany to Katanga,
dd.27/10/1961

20. Note from State States that 5 airplanes, type Dornier, were ordered in Germany by Declassified
Scurity about the State State the Belgian-Congolese company MITRACO, directed by Jean Cassart.
delivery of 5 Security Security One of the five planes would have been delivered in April 1961, and
airplanes, type (VSSE) archives four at an unknown later date.
Dornier, to Katanga

21. Short note with States that a Dornier-27 type airplane is in principle used as a Declassified
State State transport plane, but can also be converted in a fighter or bomber
technical data sheet
attached regarding Security Security plane.
(VSSE) archives
Dornier-27 airplane,
dd.24/10/1961.

22. Letter from State State State Declassified

Security to Ministry of
Security Security
Foreign Affairs (VSSE) archives
concerning the
background of Jean
Cassart

23. Intel report on the State State MITRACO is the company responsible for the delivery to Katanga of Declassified
business results of Security Security Dornier type airplanes in 1961.
MITRACO, (VSSE) archives
dd.10/11/1961

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 24. Intel report on several State State Identification of 4 individuals, who were crew members for the flight Declassified
crew members Security Security of 4 Dornier type airplanes from Germany to Katanga.
involved in flying (VSSE) archives
Dornier airplanes to
Katanga,
dd.10/11/1961

File ‘Documentation: Congo

& Rwanda-Burundi’

25. Monthly report of the Ministry of State Describes events in Congo from 25 August until 22 September 1961. Declassified
Ministry of Foreign Foreign Security
Affairs on events Affairs archives
Congo, Rwanda and
Burundi, dd. 09/1961

File ‘Documenten over Dag

Hammarskjöld’

26. Folder with Confidential

documents on various
subjects; Contents:

a) 000002-000007: press ‘Jeune State Unclassified

articles on the Europe’ Security
delivery to Katanga magazine archives
and Congo of Fouga
Magister type

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 airplanes, dd.05-
06/1964

b) 000008-000009: note State State Confidential

from State Security to Security Security
Ministry of Foreign (VSSE) archives
Affairs on 6 Fouga
Magister airplanes,
blocked in the port of
Antwerp,
dd.18/03/1964

c) 000010-000012: press
‘Pourquoi State Contains information on Katangese aviation (Avikat). Unclassified
article on the air
capabilities of Avikat, Pas?’ Security
magazine archives
dd.29/09/1961

d) 000013: press article ‘La Libre State security Claims that the Avikat Fouga Magister pilot is one José Deulin, of Unclassified
on the identity of the Belgique’ archives Belgian origin and former officer in the South African army.
pilot of the Fouga newspaper
Magister type
airplane of Avikat,
03/10/1961

e) 000014-000023: ‘Le Soir’, ‘La State Confirms the purchase by the government of Katanga of three Unclassified
various press articles Libre Security French Fouga Magister airplanes, and their delivery by the American
on the purchase by, Belgique’ and archives company Seven Seas Airlines to Elisabethville.
and delivery to, ‘Le Peuple’
Katanga of Fouga newspapers

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 Magister
airplanes,02-03/1961

f) 000024: intel report State State States that the Belgian pilot who flew the Avikat Magister airplane Unclassified
on the build-up of a Security Security during the hostilities between Katanga and the UN, was residing in
mercenary force in (VSSE) archives Teixeira de Sousa (Angola) in the beginning of 1964.
Angola,
dd.31/03/1964

g) 000025-000027: open Formulates different hypotheses regarding the death of Mr. Unclassified
‘Remarques State Hammarskjöld. One hypothesis claims that an attempt to hijack Mr.
source article on the
death of mr. congolaises’ Security Hammarskjöld’s plane was the cause of the crash. The individual
magazine archives responsible for the failed hijacking would be one Robert Gheysels, a
Hammarskjöld,
young Belgian officer with the rank of lieutenant in the gendarmerie
dd.22/06/1963
of Katanga.
h) 000028-000031: Ministry of State Mentions activities and presence of Jan Van Risseghem in Luanda Unclassified
letter from the
Foreign Security (Angola), and of Victor Verloo, also a former pilot of Avikat and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives mentioned in the UN-report of Mr. Othman, in Ndola (Rhodesia).
Affairs regarding the
activities of (Belgian)
mercenaries in
Central Africa,
dd.14/05/1963

i) 000032-000033: press ‘La Dernière State Mentions several names of individuals serving as pilots of Avikat. Unclassified
article regarding a Heure’ Security
UN-list of 50 foreign newspaper archives
mercenaries active in
Katanga,
dd.15/11/1962

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 j) 000034-000053: intel State Mentions the name of J.C. Delin or Deulin as the commander of a Unclassified
report containing a Security State Fouga Magister airplane of Avikat.
list of names of (VSSE) Security
individuals serving as archives
mercenaries in
Katanga,
dd.13/01/1962

k) 000054-000056: intel State State Not relevant. Unclassified

Security Security
report on 3 Polish
nationals, residing in (VSSE) archives
Belgium, who were
intercepted by the UN
in Katanga,
dd.18/10/1961

l) 000057-000086: intel State State Contains the names of several individuals who acted as pilot for Confidential
report nr.1120 Security Security Avikat
containing a list of (VSSE) archives
names of individuals
(mercenaries),
declared persona non
grata by the
Congolese
government,
dd.10/06/1963

File ‘GISS’

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27. Intel report from an GISS GISS archives Contains information on several individuals who made statements Confidential
unconfirmed source, about the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr.
dd. 31/03/1988 Hammarskjöld. One of these individuals is Jacques Duchemin who
stated that Mr. Hammarskjöld’s plane crashed after a failed hijack.

28. List of names of

GISS GISS archives Unclassified
(Belgian)
mercenaries, active in
Congo in 1960

29. Intel report GISS GISS archives Identifies Roger Bracco (former pilot for Avikat in 1961). Confidential
containing an extract
from the national
register, dd.
08/02/2002

30. Intel report on GISS GISS archives Connects Roger Bracco to mercenary activities and to French Confidential
mercenary activities, mercenary leader Robert ‘Bob’ Denard.
dd. 26/01/1996

31. Intel report on GISS GISS archives Contains information on the whereabouts and activities of Roger Confidential
mercenary activities, Bracco.
dd. 08/01/1996

32. Data sheet, dd. GISS GISS archives Confirms that Roger Bracco followed a pilot training in 1955. Confidential
28/07/1955

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File ‘Centre de
Documentation Historique de
la Défense (CDH)’

33. Telegram from the CDH Military Contains the testimony of Roland Parmentier of UMHK concerning Unclassified
Belgian Consulate in archives the night flight capacity of the airfield of Kengere
Salisbury to Brussels –
26 January 1962

34. Extrait de Matricule CDH Military General information on the military career of Van Risseghem in the Unclassified
of Jan Van Risseghem archives Belgian Army

35. Letter from Potez Air

CDH Military Potez Air Fouga sends three technicians to Katanga to make the Unclassified
Fouga to Secretaire
archives Fouga Magister operational
d’Etat de la Défense
au Katanga –
February 1961

36. Fouga Magister Belgian Air Belgian Technical analysis of the capacities of the Fouga Magister Unclassified
CM170 Technical Force Defence • Ann A : Reference of flight manual 1961
Analysis Aviation • Ann B : Cruise table
Safety • Ann C : Performance charts
Directorate • Ann D : Night flight
• Ann E : Night landing pattern
• Ann F : Weapons

37. Van Risseghem’s pilot Family Contains all the information concerning the flights Van Risseghem
logbook archives Antwerp executed during the months July – August – September 1961 Unclassified

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III. FINDINGS

For the scope of the review, full access was given by the Belgian Government to all the files
and archives kept by the Ministry of Defence (in the Centre de Documentation Historique de
la Défense in Evere, Brussels), the State Security service (VSSE) and the General Intelligence
and Security Service (GISS, military intelligence service).
The conclusion after a thorough and meticulous analysis of these archives, is that they do
not contain any direct information related to the death of Dag Hammarskjöld. Although,
some elements which may shed an additional light on the proposed research, have been
selected :

Fouga Magister CM 170

In order to gain a better understanding of the capacities of the Fouga Magister, a technical
analysis was ordered (36). As the Belgian Air Force used exactly the same airplanes at that
moment, the Belgian Air Force Aviation Safety Directorate (which in add ition to their
practical flight experience, also retains all the necessary archives related to the Belgian
Fouga Magister) was called upon. In order to guide the research and analysis, the following
questions were proposed to them :

− What was the maximum range of the Fouga Magister CM 170?

− Was the CM 170 equipped with onboard radar?
− Was the CM 170 capable of performing a night intercept?
− The CM 170 was equipped with which radio and what were the emission and
reception ranges?
− Could the CM 170 operate from an unprepared runway (laterite, grass, etc) or did it
need a prepared runway (asphalt, concrete)?
− Was the CM 170 equipped to take-off, land and operate during the night?
− Did the CM 170 have an air-to-air capability?

For the full report and the detailed answers to the different questions, please refer to the
annex. In this report only the conclusions are presented.

The Fouga Magister CM 170 was a two-seater training aircraft, equipped with two jet
engines. The Katangese leader, Moïse Tshombe, initially ordered nine Fougas from the
company Potez Air Fouga (which was established in France) (35). However, only three of
the ordered planes were delivered at the airfield of Luano in Elisabethville on 15 February
1961. The other six were blocked in Pointe Noire (Congo Brazzaville) as a direct
consequence of the UN embargo imposed upon Katanga (the six remaining Fougas would
finally end up in Ireland). The three Fouga Magister planes of the Avikat were matriculated:
KAT91, KAT92 and KAT93. KAT91 crashed in June ‘61 during a training mission (pilot Jean-
-21-
Marie Dagonnier). KAT92 was in repair in August 1961 due to engine failure (as a result of
the intake of waste in one of the jet engines). It was seized at the airfield of Luano
(Elisabethville) by the UN-forces during the operation Rumpunch at the end of August.
Subsequently, the only Fouga Magister which was still operational in September 1961, was
the KAT93 which operated from the airfield of Kengere in Kolwezi.

The Fouga Magister were not equipped with an onboard radar, which makes an aircraft
intercept at night most likely impossible. They were equipped with an ARTUS VHF-radio,
which had a limited radius (line-of-sight). The armament consisted of two 7.62 mm machine
guns placed in the nose of the plane. They disposed of no air-to-air capability. As the CM
170 is equipped with two jet engines and the air intakes are located rather close to the
runway, the Fouga Magister cannot operate from an unprepared runway (laterite or grass).
Only an emergency landing (with the engine inoperative or low engine setting) on an
unprepared runway is possible (36). The only airfields with a hardened runway in 1961 in
Katanga were Kamina (BaKa), Elisabethville (Luano) and Kolwezi (Kengere). The first two
were under control of the UN in September 1961. This also explains why the main base of
Avikat at that moment was Kolwezi.

Night flying in CM 170 was possible provided that the runway was equipped with a lighting
system. But even in that case, accurate navigation at night continued to be a very difficult
undertaking. Only gross visual navigation was possible provided very clear landmarks (light
of cities, main roads or highways) were visible. Interesting in this respect is a telegram dated
26 January 1961 in which the Belgian Vice-Consul in Ndola, Jacques Matthys, mentions the
testimony of Roland Parmentier, who was an agent of UMHK, to the official Rhodesian
Commission of Inquiry (33). He declared that in September 1961 the beacons at the airfield
of Kengere were not operational (and that since July 1961) because of maintenance works
on the runway. According to his testimony, night flights were excluded from Kengere in
September 1961.

Dornier airplanes (Dornier (DO) - 28)

Katangese Aviation (Avikat) also disposed of German built airplanes of the type Dornier 28.
From the information available, it is not entirely clear how many Dornier-28 planes were
acquired by Avikat, and when these planes were delivered to Katanga.

One State Security document from the beginning of October 1961 states that one Dornier
28 could have already been flown from Germany to Brazzaville, and subsequen tly to
Kolwezi, at a date prior to the hostilities between the gendarmerie of Katanga and the UN
in September 1961. A second plane of the same type could have been flown from Germany
directly to Katanga at an unknown date after the start of hostilities between Katanga and
the UN (18).

-22-
Another document of the end of October 1961 contains information on a ‘recent’ delivery
of four Dornier planes from Germany to Katanga, and cites the names of persons who would
have operated these flights (19). The total number of Dornier planes delivered to Avikat
could have been six (20).

A technical data sheet of 1961 describes the Dornier-27, of which the Dornier-28 was an
improved and modernized version, as a propeller engine aircraft, normally used for
transports and reconnaissance flights. However, it would have been possible to use the
aircraft as a combat plane, if equipped with adjusted weaponry (21).

However, given its characteristics, it seems unlikely if not impossible, that a Dornier -28
aircraft, could have been used in an attack against a Douglas DC-6 plane, as was used to
transport Mr. Hammarskjöld’s delegation in September 1961.

Jan Van Risseghem

Jan Van Risseghem de Sautiernon de Saint Clement (this was his official full name) was a
Belgian pilot who was active in the Belgian Section of the Royal Air Force in Great Britain
during the Second World War (34). After the war he left the Belgian Air Force and flew for
civilian companies (this explains that in 1961 he still had the rank of senior captain in the
reserve troops) (1 & 3). In March 1961 the Katangese Avikat recruited him as a mercenary
pilot. Nearly six months later, on 28 August, he was arrested in Elisabethville by the UN-
forces during the UN-operation ‘Rumpunch’ and repatriated to Belgium on 7 September.
He arrived at the airport of Zaventem in Belgium on 8 September where his arrival was
formally registered (5). According to the archives of the Belgian State Security (see above),
he stayed at least until 16 September in Belgium (4). From that date on, there were rumors
that he would have returned to Katanga. As there are no traces concerning his departure
from Zaventem international airport (the departure of known mercenaries was registered
by the Belgian customs authorities), it is highly probable that he left via Paris (where there
was no formal registration) (8). A journey from Belgium to Congo via Paris was quite an
undertaking in 1961 and looked as follows:

− Antwerp (Van Risseghem lived in Lint, which is near Antwerp) to Brussels;

− By train from Brussels to Paris;
− By plane from Paris to Brazzaville;
− Crossing of the Congo River from Brazzaville to Leopoldville; *
− By plane from Leopoldville to Elisabethville;*
− By plane/train from Elisabethville to Kolwezi (airfield of Kengere). *

*These are wrong or impossible statements.

see last page of this PDF
-23-
Taking into account the length and complexity of the journey, it is clear that this would have
taken several days. This implies a practical problem. Indeed, if Van Risseghem had left
Antwerp (Belgium) no earlier than Saturday 16 September it seems hardly possible that he
could already have arrived on Sunday evening 17 September in Kolwezi (Congo), ready to
start a totally unprepared flight mission on the spot.

Besides that, the family archives contain Van Risseghem’s original signed pilot logbook (37).
In such a logbook, pilots note all the flights they operate, the precise timings, the type of
airplane with which they flew, the purpose of the flight, the name of the copilot and the
duration of the flight. According to Van Risseghem’s logbook, his flights sto pped on 27
August (which corresponds with the start of the operation ‘Rumpunch’ during which he was
arrested) and resumed on 20 September 1961. During the months of July and August, he
flew with the following types of aircraft : Dove, Piper, DC-3 and Fouga Magister. All the
Fouga flights were with the airplane matriculated KAT93. The copilots mentioned were
Delcourt, Wicksteed, Pieret, De L(o)uigi, and Bracco.

It is interesting to note that the logbook also mentions a night flight with the Fouga Magister
on August 10, 1961. The copilot on this occasion was Bracco. This seems to suggest that it
was possible to fly at night, and that the aircraft was indeed used for these purposes.

In September, Van Risseghem only flew with Dornier-28, which was being transferred at
that moment from Brazzaville, coming from Germany. The copilot on these flights was
‘Colonel John Cassart’.

Information that was obtained in the context of this research indicates that the latter can
be most probably identified as Jean Cassart (°02/07/1906), a war volunteer during WWII
and officer in the Belgian army until the mid-1950’s. After his military career, Cassart
became managing director of the Congolese company MITRACO, which acted as an
intermediary in the purchase of Dornier airplanes by the government of Katanga in 1961
(22 & 23) .

Beukels

Concerning the testimony of the French diplomat, Claude de Kemoularia, who met the
Belgian mercenary pilot ‘Beukels’, the following elements were retained during our
research :

− The military archives do not contain any reference to a pilot named Beukels. The
same goes for all the publications we have read concerning the Avikat : his name is
mentioned nowhere.

-24-
 − According to the same testimony, Lieutenant-Colonel Lamouline was in charge of
the air operations. However, Robert Lamouline had nothing to do with the Avikat.
He was engaged in the Gendarmerie Katangaise (member of the ground forces) as
the personal advisor to the tribal Chief Kasongo Nyembo and was in no way involved
in the organization or execution of air operations (12, 13 & 14).
− According to the same testimony, two Fouga Magisters were involved in the
operation. Nevertheless, in September 1961 there was only one operational Fouga
Magister (KAT93) (see above).

Other mercenary pilots: Wicksteed, Bracco, Delin.

Jan Van Risseghem’s pilot logbook for the period July-August 1961 (see above) mentions
four flights on Fouga Magister in July 1961, and four flights in August 1961. For each of these
flights, the name of the copilot is mentioned. These names are Delcourt, Wicksteed, Pieret,
De L(o)uigi, and Bracco.

A document from September 1961, provided by the State Security, identifies ‘Wicksteed’ as
Peter Wicksteed, (°United Kingdom 06/04/1933), residing at 287c Nacton Road, Ipswich (6).
‘Bracco’ most probably identifies as Roger Bracco (°25/10/1934). From our research, we
were able to obtain information that confirms that Roger Bracco was active as a mercenary
(pilot) in Katanga at least in 1967. The name ‘BRACCO R.J.’ also appears on a list of names
from June 1963 of mercenaries, declared persona non grata by the Congolese government
(26 l). Other information indicates that until the mid 1990’s, Bracco was still active in
mercenary circles, and was a known associate of the infamous French mercenary leader
‘Bob’ Denard (30 & 31).

The name ‘Delin / Deulin’ is mentioned once in a State Security document of January 1962,
containing a list of names of persons, believed to be active as mercenaries in Congo/Katanga
(26 j). It is stated that Major José Delin or Deulin is of Belgian origin, but has lived in South
Africa for a long time. In some open (Internet) sources, it is claimed that the name José Delin
was in fact an alias of a pilot whose real name was José Magain or Mangain. No records
were found regarding this latter name.

De Troyer*

The name De Troye or De Troyer is mentioned on pages 26-27 of Mr. Othman’s report of
2017, in connection with the possible involvement of mercenary pilots in the death of Mr.
Hammarskjöld, notably of a certain pilot named ‘Beukels’. A number of interviews between
this ‘Beukels’ and Mr. Claude de Kemoularia, a former personal assistant of Mr.
Hammarskjöld, would have been arranged in Paris by ‘De Troye’.
-25-
* There were two brohers de Troyer.
Our research has been able to show that a certain Jacques De Troyer (°19/03/1920) was a
former officer in the Belgian army and was active as military adviser for the gendarmerie of
Katanga in Elisabethville in 1961 (10 & 11). Subsequently, he would have returned to
Belgium in November 1961. Information about his later activities is not available.

‘Robert Gheysels’

In March 1988, an (unidentified) individual provided the military intelligence service GISS
with some elements of information surrounding the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld (27). One
of these elements concerns claims which would have been made by a certain Jacques
Duchemin, a French citizen, that the crash of Mr. Hammarskjöld plane would have been the
result of a failed hijacking, undertaken by a young officer with the initials R.G, who was
trained by a special ‘action service’ within the French secret services.

This version of events was published in the book ‘Notre guerre au Katanga’, of which
Duchemin is a co-author, and is cited in the magazine ‘Remarques congolaises’ of June 1963
(26 g), and on the internet page www.inchi-yetu.be/hamer01.html, where it is claimed that
Duchemin was Undersecretary of War in the government of Katanga at the time of Mr.
Hammarskjöld’s crash.

According to these open sources, the young officer’s name responsible for the failed
hijacking of Mr. Hammarskjöld’s plane and subsequent crash, would be one Robert
Gheysels.

From further open source information, it can be learned that Jacques Duchemin is a former
journalist and cabinet employee in the French government. On his personal website
jdcom.net, he claims that he performed ministerial functions in several African
governments, including that of Katanga. He also claims to have acted as a consultant to
other governments and multinational corporations.

On the basis of this information, a search was conducted to find information on ‘Robert
Gheysels’ in the concerned archives. However, this generated no results.

-26-
IV. CONCLUSIONS

The research carried out by the Standing Committee I and Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. Kris
Quanten of the Royal Military Academy (RMA) within the framework of this investigation,
did not reveal any information that sheds new light on the precise circumstances that led
to the death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld and his company in September 1961.

Our research has shown that the documentation available to the Belgian civil and military
intelligence services, and to the Ministry of Defense regarding the events in Katanga in 1961,
is rather limited.

As far as the State Security service is concerned, this can partly be explained by the fact that
this service had and has only domestic competence, and therefore does not collect any
information abroad. Moreover, the service stated that their intelligence work in the early
1960s, shortly after the independence of Congo, did not focus on the activities of
mercenaries in the region.

That searching the archives of the military intelligence service GISS and of the Ministry of
Defense has yielded less useful documentation than at the State Security service, can be
called somewhat astonishing. GISS did and does have the authority and the means to gather
information abroad. However, amazingly enough, at the beginning of the 1960s, the Belgian
Defense did not seem to have much interest in the activities and whereabouts of
mercenaries in Central Africa. This despite the fact that these mercenaries were often
Belgian (ex-)soldiers.

It should be noted that, at this stage, all GISS sub-archives have not yet been fully
investigated. The work will continue, and we will inform you of any results.

Nevertheless, certain information found can contribute to a more precise identification of

a number of quoted individuals, as well as to provide elements that make certain
hypotheses more or less likely.

Over the years several names of Belgians, soldiers and others, who may have been involved
in the September 1961 events in Katanga, were mentioned. Our research has allowed to
formally identify some of these persons, and has also brought some information to light
regarding their activities and whereabouts in the period that is of interest.

Firstly, information obtained from the State Security service, and from private family
archives, has shown that the ‘Van Risseghel/Van Risseghem’, which was cited as the person
who possibly piloted a Fouga Magister plane that possibly shot down Mr. Hammarskjöld’s
plane, could in fact be identified as Jan Van Risseghem de Sautiernon de Saint Clement, a
former pilot of the British Royal Air Force during WWII and of the Belgian Air Force after the
war. After his military career, he worked for several years in commercial aviation,
-27-
specifically at the airline Sabena. Records confirm his involvement with Katangese Aviation
(Avikat) as a mercenary pilot in 1961, but also show that he was most likely on his way from
Paris to Brazzaville on 17 and 18 September 1961. This information seems to indicate that
he could not possibly have been involved in the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld. *

Secondly, documents from archives of the Belgian civilian and military intelligence services
also allowed the further identification of other (former) military personnel who were active
in Katanga in 1961, such as Jacques De Troyer, Peter Wicksteed, Jean Cassart or Roger
Bracco. However, the available information teaches us little about the then activities of the
persons concerned, and even less about their possible involvement in the death of Mr.
Hammarskjöld.

The research also revealed a number of names of other individuals who at that time seem
to have been active as (co-)pilots on Fouga Magister flights for Avikat. In this way, we came
across the names of Delcourt, Pieret, and De L(o)uigi. Unfortunately, no further information
was available which could allow a more precise identification. One document from the
archives of the State Security service suggests that De L(o)uigi could possibly have been a
mercenary of Swiss nationality.

Furthermore, a number of other documents relate to Avikat’s air capacity. Thus it can be
established that the secessionist government of Katanga disposed of three aircraft of the
Fouga Magister type, and five or six aircraft of the Dornier-28 type in 1961. At the time of
the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld, however, only one aircraft from the three Fouga Magister
seems to have been operational and in the hands of Avikat. As for the Dornier-28 planes, it
is likely that most of these aircraft, possibly with the exception of one, was only delivered
to Katanga after the hostilities between the UN and Katangese troops in September 1961.

The technical characteristics of the Fouga Magister and Dornier-28 type aircraft – such as
absence of radar and suitable communication technology, absence of airfields with light
installations, relatively low airspeed, absence of air-to-air weapons system – seem to
indicate that it was unlikely that these types of aircraft could have been used for a nightly
attack against a plane of the type Douglas DC-6, in which Mr. Hammarskjöld and his
company flew to Ndola.

* This is a wrong statement, Jan Van Risseghem went 2 or 3 days earlier because of the
difference of the booking date of documents and the real time events... ( see added sheet)
-- --

-28-
 2019-06 Statement of Victor Rosez

There is more… On the sheets of the “mission Katangaise” released by the Belgian
Secret Services we can see that Jan Van Risseghem received an amount of 1500 New French
Francs. That means 15000 Belgian Francs or a reasonable high monthly salary. We also can see
that Bob Denard received his UAT ticket on September 19th, 1961.Several things are strange on
this document. The secret services are talking about the “Mission Katangaise” and that Jan Van
Risseghem got his full monthly salary of 1500 NFF or 15.000Bfrs … or was this in France? …
Because the Belgian mercenary offices Mistebel and (Colonel) Marissal were closed since August
1961 in Belgium. But it appears that, since Jan was gone on September 16 th, an authorized
representative cashed the salary. Further we see that the UAT tickets of Bob Denard were booked
on September 20 th, while I have seen Bob Denard on September 15 th, on the avenue Wangermée
where he took 24 Irishmen as POW in the house of main police officer Soete (the Belgian
policeman who dissolved the body of Lumumba in sulphuric acid from the Union Minière).
The amounts on the sheets are showing their booking dates. In reality the amounts were already
paid a few days earlier.
If it was clearly the case with Bob Denard, we may assume that it was also the case with Jan Van
Risseghem. Anyway, beside the forgery of his logbook again there are doubts about his alibi.
Added afterwartds: Furthermore, the role that Kipushi played is strongly underestimated as there was built at another
location of the town a brand-new asphalted 2km long runway which has been destroyed by the National Army of the Congo
in 1964, However, there are stil traces of it on Google. UAT organized once a week (or more) a special fly Paris/
Johannesburg whit a direct step-over to Ndola and not via Brazzaville, Leopoldville, Elisabethville as stated in
this document which was an impossible combination.
See upper corner on the left:
https://goo.gl/maps/iosi6XsnFCyQfV3i7